Bureau of Prisons
Improved Evaluations and Increased Coordination Could Improve Cell Phone Detection Gao ID: GAO-11-893 September 6, 2011The rates Bureau of Prisons (BOP) inmates pay to make phone calls generate revenue that funds inmate wages and other amenities; however, inmates' contraband cell phone use is growing. The Cell Phone Contraband Act of 2010 criminalized cell phone possession in federal prisons and mandated that GAO study related issues. In response to the mandate, this report addresses (1) how telephone rates for BOP inmates compare with other correctional systems and the implications of lowering rates; (2) the number of cell phones confiscated in BOP and selected states, and any reported impact; and (3) the extent to which BOP and selected states have taken actions to minimize cell phone smuggling, these actions' effectiveness, and how BOP has coordinated internal and state information sharing. GAO reviewed BOP's policies, procedures, and cell phone confiscation data (2008-2010). GAO also interviewed BOP officials within BOP's 6 regions and 4 of its 116 institutions--as well as officials from 8 state correctional departments--selected for their cell phone detection efforts or challenges faced. The results are not generalizable, but provide insights.
BOP's rates for inmate telephone calls typically are lower than selected state and military branch systems that also use telephone revenues to support inmate activities; lowering rates would have several implications. Inmates would benefit from the ability to make cheaper phone calls, but lower rates could result in less revenue and lower profits, and therefore fewer funds available for inmate wages and recreational activities. According to BOP officials, when inmates have fewer opportunities for physical activity, idleness increases, and the risk of violence, escapes, and other disruptions also rises. BOP and selected states confiscated thousands of cell phones in 2010, and these entities believe that rising inmate cell phone use threatens institutional safety and expands criminal activity. All of the BOP officials, as well as officials from all eight of the state departments of correction with whom GAO spoke, cited cell phones as a major security concern, given the potential the phones provide for inmates to have unmonitored conversations that could further criminal activity, such as selling drugs or harassing other individuals. BOP and selected states have taken actions to address contraband cell phone use in their correctional institutions, but BOP could better evaluate existing technologies to maximize its investment decisions. BOP screens visitors and staff to detect contraband and has also tested multiple cell-phone detection technologies. However, BOP has not developed evaluation plans for institutional use to measure the effectiveness of these tests, which could help ensure that such tests generate information needed to make effective policy decisions. Moreover, while BOP has shared detection strategies with state agencies to some extent, BOP's regional offices have only had limited interaction with states, and could increase coordination and knowledge sharing to better identify and benefit from other strategies being used. This is a public version of a sensitive but unclassified - law enforcement sensitive report that GAO issued in July 2011. Information that the Department of Justice deemed sensitive has been omitted. GAO recommends that BOP's Director formulate evaluation plans for cell phone detection technology to aid decision making, require use of these plans, and enhance regional collaboration with states. The Department of Justice concurred with GAO's recommendations.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: David C. Maurer Team: Government Accountability Office: Homeland Security and Justice Phone: (202) 512-9627GAO-11-893, Bureau of Prisons: Improved Evaluations and Increased Coordination Could Improve Cell Phone Detection
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United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Report to Congressional Committees:
September 2011:
Bureau of Prisons:
Improved Evaluations and Increased Coordination Could Improve Cell
Phone Detection:
GAO-11-893:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-11-893, a report to congressional committees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The rates Bureau of Prisons (BOP) inmates pay to make phone calls
generate revenue that funds inmate wages and other amenities; however,
inmates‘ contraband cell phone use is growing. The Cell Phone
Contraband Act of 2010 criminalized cell phone possession in federal
prisons and mandated that GAO study related issues. In response to the
mandate, this report addresses (1) how telephone rates for BOP inmates
compare with other correctional systems and the implications of
lowering rates; (2) the number of cell phones confiscated in BOP and
selected states, and any reported impact; and (3) the extent to which
BOP and selected states have taken actions to minimize cell phone
smuggling, these actions‘ effectiveness, and how BOP has coordinated
internal and state information sharing. GAO reviewed BOP‘s policies,
procedures, and cell phone confiscation data (2008–2010). GAO also
interviewed BOP officials within BOP‘s 6 regions and 4 of its 116
institutions-”as well as officials from 8 state correctional
departments-”selected for their cell phone detection efforts or
challenges faced. The results are not generalizable, but provide
insights.
What GAO Found:
BOP‘s rates for inmate telephone calls typically are lower than
selected state and military branch systems that also use telephone
revenues to support inmate activities; lowering rates would have
several implications. Inmates would benefit from the ability to make
cheaper phone calls, but lower rates could result in less revenue and
lower profits, and therefore fewer funds available for inmate wages
and recreational activities. According to BOP officials, when inmates
have fewer opportunities for physical activity, idleness increases,
and the risk of violence, escapes, and other disruptions also rises.
BOP and selected states confiscated thousands of cell phones in 2010,
and these entities believe that rising inmate cell phone use threatens
institutional safety and expands criminal activity. All of the BOP
officials, as well as officials from all eight of the state
departments of correction with whom GAO spoke, cited cell phones as a
major security concern, given the potential the phones provide for
inmates to have unmonitored conversations that could further criminal
activity, such as selling drugs or harassing other individuals.
BOP and selected states have taken actions to address contraband cell
phone use in their correctional institutions, but BOP could better
evaluate existing technologies to maximize its investment decisions.
BOP screens visitors and staff to detect contraband and has also
tested multiple cell-phone detection technologies. However, BOP has
not developed evaluation plans for institutional use to measure the
effectiveness of these tests, which could help ensure that such tests
generate information needed to make effective policy decisions.
Moreover, while BOP has shared detection strategies with state
agencies to some extent, BOP‘s regional offices have only had limited
interaction with states, and could increase coordination and knowledge
sharing to better identify and benefit from other strategies being
used.
This is a public version of a sensitive but unclassified – law
enforcement sensitive report that GAO issued in July 2011. Information
that the Department of Justice deemed sensitive has been omitted.
Figure: Cell Phones That BOP Has Confiscated at a Federal Prison and
Adjacent Camp:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that BOP‘s Director formulate evaluation plans for cell
phone detection technology to aid decision making, require use of
these plans, and enhance regional collaboration with states. The
Department of Justice concurred with GAO‘s recommendations.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-893]. For more
information, contact David Maurer at (202) 512-8777 or maurerd@gao.gov
or Mark Goldstein at (202) 512-2834 or goldsteinm@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
BOP Telephone Rates Typically Are Less Than Other Correctional
Systems' Rates and Fund Inmate Wages and Recreation; Lowering Rates
Would Decrease Costs for Inmate Calls but Could Reduce Revenue:
BOP and Selected States Confiscated Thousands of Cell Phones in 2010
and Believe That Rising Inmate Cell Phone Usage Threatens
Institutional Safety and Expands Criminal Activity:
BOP and Selected States Have Implemented Cell Phone Search and
Detection Technologies, but BOP Could Evaluate Technologies Better and
Increase Coordination:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments:
Appendix I: National Telecommunications and Information Administration
(NTIA) Observations on Technologies to Combat Contraband Cell Phones:
Appendix II: BOP's Policy Memorandums and Program Statements Governing
Entrance-Screening Protocols at Prison Institutions:
Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Comparing the Cost of a 15-Minute Call, by Call Type, across
BOP and Selected Correctional Systems That Use Revenues to Provide
Inmate Amenities:
Table 2: Inmate Amenities Funded by Profits from BOP's Trust Fund for
Fiscal Year 2010:
Table 3: Number of Cell Phones That BOP Has Confiscated in
Institutions and Camps, 2008-2010:
Table 4: Number of Cell Phones That Selected State Correctional
Departments Have Confiscated:
Table 5: NTIA Observations on Technologies Designed to Reduce or
Eliminate Contraband Cell Phone Use:
Table 6: BOP Guidance on Entrance-Screening Procedures and Their
Relation to Cell Phone Detection:
Figures:
Figure 1: Comparison of Local and Long Distance Minutes Used and
Telephone System Revenue, from First Quarter 2009 through First
Quarter 2011:
Figure 2: Sources of Trust Fund Profits in Fiscal Year 2010:
Figure 3: Cell Phones That BOP Has Confiscated at a Federal Prison and
Adjacent Camp:
Figure 4: BOP Screening Equipment:
Abbreviations:
ASCA: Association of State Correctional Administrators:
BOP: Bureau of Prisons:
BOSS: Body Orifice Security Scanner:
DOC: department of correction:
DOJ: Department of Justice:
FCC: Federal Communications Commission:
GORT: Ground Observation Reconnaissance Transmitter:
ITS: Inmate Telephone System:
NIJ: National Institute of Justice:
NLECTC: National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center:
NTIA: National Telecommunications and Information Administration:
OST: Office of Security Technology:
RF: radio frequency:
TRULINCS: Trust Fund Limited Inmate Computer System:
TWG: technology working group:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
September 6, 2011:
The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy:
Chairman:
The Honorable Charles Grassley:
Ranking Member:
Committee on the Judiciary:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Lamar Smith:
Chairman:
The Honorable John Conyers, Jr.
Ranking Member:
Committee on the Judiciary:
House of Representatives:
The Department of Justice's (DOJ) Bureau of Prisons (BOP) provides
telephone service to federal inmates to facilitate their contact with
family and friends and to help maintain inmates' ties to the
community. Research has shown that such contact reduces the likelihood
of inmates' return to prison once they complete their sentences. BOP
records inmates' calls and charges inmates rates for telephone use. In
recent years, there have been rising incidents of federal and state
inmates using contraband cell phones to circumvent correctional
institutions' telephone systems.[Footnote 1] Some prisoner advocates
believe that inmates are increasingly using contraband cell phones
because of the rates correctional institutions charge for telephone
service. However, by circumventing the correctional institutions'
telephone systems, inmates also avoid the monitoring of their calls,
and a number of reports have demonstrated that inmates are smuggling
in cell phones to coordinate criminal activity, such as drug sales,
assault, and murder. Various federal entities and state departments of
corrections (DOC) have voiced concerns over the increasing number of
contraband cell phones in correctional institutions, stressing the
potential for these devices to facilitate further criminal misconduct.
To help address this issue, the Cell Phone Contraband Act of 2010
criminalized possession of cell phones in federal prisons by defining
them as a "prohibited object" punishable by a fine or imprisonment for
not more than 1 year or both.[Footnote 2]
The Cell Phone Contraband Act of 2010 also mandated that we study both
telephone rates and contraband cell phones in prisons.[Footnote 3]
Thus, this report addresses the following questions:
1. How do BOP's inmate telephone rates compare to those charged by
other correctional systems; how does BOP use the revenues generated by
its telephone charges; and what are the implications of lowering its
rates?
2. How many cell phones have been confiscated within BOP and selected
state institutions, and what is the reported impact, if any, of cell
phone use on overall prison security and criminal activity?
3. To what extent have BOP and selected state prisons taken actions to
prevent or minimize cell phone smuggling and use; what is known about
the actions' effectiveness; and how has BOP coordinated information
sharing internally and with states?
This report is a public version of the prior sensitive report that we
provided to you. DOJ deemed some of the information in the prior
report as sensitive but unclassified - law enforcement sensitive,
which must be protected from public disclosure. Therefore, this report
omits sensitive information about methods by which cell phones are
smuggled into prisons. In addition, at DOJ's request, we have omitted
information regarding BOP conclusions on strategies tested and
implemented by BOP to address cell phone smuggling and use. Although
the information provided in this report is more limited in scope, it
addresses the same questions as the sensitive report. Also, the
overall methodology used for both reports is the same.
To determine how BOP's prison telephone rates compare to those charged
by other correctional systems, BOP's use of telephone revenues, and
the implications of lowering rates, we reviewed BOP's policies and
procedures related to its inmate telephone system, the costs and
revenues of this system, the rates BOP charges inmates, inmate
amenities funded through the system, and data on phone services from
2008 through 2010. We also interviewed and gathered data from BOP
management--including officials with the BOP Trust Fund, which manages
the finances of the inmate telephone system--as well as officials with
the Department of Defense, which also provides phone services to
inmates, in order to determine how their rates compare with those
charged by BOP. In addition, from March through June 2011, we gathered
and analyzed data on inmate telephone rates from eight selected state
DOCs.[Footnote 4]
To learn more about the level of prison cell phone confiscations, and
inmates' cell phone use and implications, we collected data on cell
phone confiscations for all BOP institutions and the same eight
selected state correctional systems for 2008 through 2010. We obtained
information from relevant officials about the steps taken to ensure
the accuracy of all of the above data and found the data to be
sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We also interviewed BOP
officials in the Correctional Programs Division, which is responsible
for ensuring a safe institutional environment; BOP's Office of
Security Technology (OST), which identifies and evaluates security
technology equipment within BOP, among other things; and each of BOP's
six regions and four of its institutions.[Footnote 5] We selected
these institutions based on specific technologies adopted to defeat
cell phones, as well as other challenges posed by inmate
communications. In addition, we interviewed officials from eight state
DOCs. The views of the officials from these BOP institutions and state
departments are not generalizable to other BOP institutions or states,
but do provide valuable insights into issues surrounding cell phones
in prisons.[Footnote 6] We also researched state laws to gain an
understanding of the types of state statutory provisions that have
been adopted to penalize possession or smuggling of contraband cell
phones.
To determine actions being taken to prevent or minimize cell phone
smuggling, the effectiveness of these actions, and BOP's coordination
of information sharing, we interviewed and gathered documents from
officials in BOP's OST, regional offices, and our selected
institutions to learn about agency efforts in testing and evaluating
cell phone detection equipment and how it shares such information
internally.[Footnote 7] We then compared these efforts with BOP's
program statements governing technology evaluations, as well as GAO's
internal control standards and GAO criteria on evaluation plans for
new technology tests and collaboration with other agencies.[Footnote
8] We also interviewed state correctional department officials and met
with a nonprobability sample of officials from DOJ's National
Institute of Justice (NIJ); NIJ's National Law Enforcement and
Corrections Technology Center (NLECTC) system; the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC); the Department of Commerce's National
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA); the
Association of State Correctional Administrators (ASCA); CTIA-the
Wireless Association; and two companies that make cell phone detection
and defeat equipment.[Footnote 9] We identified these agencies and
organizations based on their involvement in combating contraband cell
phones, such as taking part in public forums to discuss the issue. The
views of those representing these agencies are not generalizable, but
they provide valuable insights.
We conducted this work from August 2010 to September 2011 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Background:
As a component of DOJ, BOP's mission, in part, is to protect society
by confining federal offenders in the controlled environments of
prisons and community-based institutions that are safe, humane, cost-
effective, and appropriately secure. In fiscal year 2010, BOP oversaw
more than 209,000 inmates, housing more than 170,000 of these inmates
in its 116 institutions and relying on privately managed secure
institutions; residential reentry centers, also known as halfway
houses; bed space secured through agreements with state and local
entities; and home confinement to secure the rest.[Footnote 10] In
fiscal year 2011, approximately $6.4 billion was appropriated for BOP
to carry out its mission.[Footnote 11]
Features of BOP's Inmate Telephone System:
While there is no specific statutory provision requiring BOP to
provide inmates with telephone services or privileges,[Footnote 12]
BOP extends telephone privileges to inmates and asserts that telephone
privileges help inmates maintain family and community ties and
facilitate the reintegration of inmates into society upon release from
prison.[Footnote 13] However, limitations and conditions may be
imposed upon an inmate's telephone privileges to ensure that these are
consistent with other aspects of BOP's correctional management
responsibilities. For example, the length of telephone calls is
generally limited to 15 minutes, and the warden may restrict or
suspend temporarily an inmate's regular telephone privilege when there
is reasonable suspicion that the inmate has acted in a way that
threatens the safety, security, or good order of the institution, or
the protection of the public. For many years, BOP provided inmates
with collect-call service only--whereby the receiving party, and not
the inmate, bore the cost of the call. In 1988, BOP began to shift to
its current Inmate Telephone System (ITS), which provides both a
collect call and a direct-dial option, emphasizing inmates' financial
responsibility and reducing the burden on others of inmates' calls.
[Footnote 14]
BOP personnel within the individual prisons maintain the ITS.
Specifically, BOP staff are responsible for installing, maintaining,
and repairing the telephone system. Vendors provide the hardware and
software that enable ITS, also known as TRUFONE, to perform the
following:
* use voice recognition to identify inmates placing calls;
* provide each inmate with a "personal access code," which allows
inmates' TRUFONE accounts to be debited for the cost of their calls;
[Footnote 15]
* check the inmate's TRUFONE account to make sure the inmate has
sufficient funds for a one-minute phone call;
* record all calls automatically;
* restrict inmates' calls to numbers on the inmates' contact lists;
* require placement of calls only from specific telephones;
* deny particular inmates access to telephones as warranted; and:
* terminate all prison telephone service if security needs dictate.
In addition to direct-dial telephone service, BOP has recently made e-
mail available to inmates in all of its institutions through an
electronic-messaging system. Through this electronic-messaging system,
inmates can communicate with a list of contacts, but they cannot
access the Internet. Both inmates and persons in the community with
whom they correspond must consent to having all incoming and outgoing
electronic messages monitored and retained by staff.[Footnote 16]
BOP's Trust Fund and the Inmate Amenities It Supports:
BOP established commissaries to allow inmates to purchase items not
issued by prisons. Inmates purchase commissary items with funds
available in individual inmate accounts managed by BOP. Funds are
placed into these accounts by friends and family members (through
BOP), or may be earned as wages through work performed in Federal
Prison Industries or other on-site work at an institution (e.g., food
service, laundry).[Footnote 17] In 1998, the Omnibus Consolidated and
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999 provided BOP with
the authority to accept revenues and make expenditures from the
Commissary Fund of the Federal Prison System in order to pay for ITS
as well as other prisoner amenities.[Footnote 18] This authorized
trust fund is a self-sustaining revolving fund account in which BOP
deposits revenues generated by inmate telephone charges through ITS
and pays the expenses of ITS operations--rather than through
appropriations. BOP uses the profits (the amount of revenue that
exceeds expenses) from operating the inmate telephone service, as well
as those from the commissary and other services, to provide inmate
amenities, such as employment opportunities and educational and
recreational activities, that are not currently supported through
appropriations. By providing amenities like these through telephone
system profits, BOP is similar to other federal correctional
institutions like those within the Department of Defense. In
particular, the Army, the Navy, and the Marine Corps all charge
inmates rates above cost for telephone service. The Navy uses the
profits to provide items or activities, such as movies and sports
contests, for the benefit of the inmates exclusively, while the Army
and the Marine Corps use the funds to provide amenities to all persons
on the base.
The Cell Phone Contraband Act of 2010 and BOP's Process for Addressing
Cell Phone Possession:
In August 2010, the Cell Phone Contraband Act of 2010 was passed and
amended 18 U.S.C. § 1791 to prohibit an inmate of a prison from
possessing, obtaining, or attempting to obtain a cell phone.[Footnote
19] The Cell Phone Contraband Act also provided for punishing such
possession with a fine or imprisonment for not more than 1 year, or
both. BOP stated that cell phones are considered hazardous tools, as
defined by BOP policy as tools most likely to be used in an escape
attempt or to serve as weapons capable of doing serious bodily harm to
others; or those hazardous to institutional security or personal
safety. According to officials in BOP's Correctional Programs
Division, when an inmate is caught with a cell phone, an incident
report is filed and the inmate is subject to BOP's disciplinary
process, which involves an administrative hearing[Footnote 20]. The
inmate ultimately could face a range of sanctions from transfer to a
higher-security institution to loss of "good time" or other
privileges.[Footnote 21] BOP may refer the case to a law enforcement
agency with criminal investigative authority for investigation, and/or
to the local U.S. Attorney's Office, which maintains discretion for
prosecution.
Other Federal Agencies' Roles in Exploring and Addressing Contraband
Cell Phone Issue:
In addition to BOP, various federal agencies serve as key stakeholders
in exploring and addressing the illicit use of cell phones in federal
and state prisons. For example, DOJ's National Institute of Justice
(NIJ) coordinates subject matter experts into three technical working
groups to address, among other topics, illicit cell phone use.
[Footnote 22] Further, at its 2010 National Conference, NIJ convened a
plenary panel to discuss the detection and defeat of cell phone use in
prisons. NIJ also funds the National Law Enforcement and Corrections
Technology Center (NLECTC) system, which assists state, local, tribal,
and federal correctional agencies, as well as law enforcement and
criminal justice agencies, in addressing technology needs and
challenges, such as contraband cell phones.
NIJ also hopes to soon establish an interagency working group with
representatives from BOP, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC),
and the National Telecommunications and Information Administration
(NTIA), to continue working on solutions to overcome illicit cell
phone use in prisons, subject to the availability of funds.[Footnote
23] In particular, the FCC maintains an important role in combating
illicit cell phone use in prisons because the FCC, in general,
executes and enforces the provisions of the Communications Act of
1934, which prohibits nonfederal entities--such as state correctional
institutions--from intentionally interfering with or blocking radio
communications signals, which include cell phone transmissions. In
addition, NTIA is a critical partner for the research capacity it
possesses. Specifically, in December 2009, Congress directed NTIA, in
coordination with BOP, FCC, and NIJ, to develop a plan to investigate
and evaluate how wireless jamming, detection, and other technologies
might be used for corrections applications in federal and state prison
institutions.[Footnote 24] In response to this congressional
direction, in May 2010, NTIA issued a Notice of Inquiry seeking public
comment on "technologies that would significantly reduce or eliminate
contraband cell phone use without negatively affecting commercial
wireless and public safety services ... in areas surrounding
prisons."[Footnote 25] These technologies include the following:
* Jammers: Devices that transmit on the same radio frequencies as cell
phones, disrupting the communication link between the phone and the
cell phone tower, essentially rendering the cell phone unusable until
the jamming stops.
* Managed access systems: Those that intercept, or re-route, certain
cell phone calls (i.e., unauthorized calls that inmates attempt) away
from carrier networks, preventing them from reaching towers and
completing the call.
* Detection systems/devices: Those that locate, track, or identify
unauthorized cell phones by, for example, scanning frequencies within
correctional institutions to detect the location of a caller.
After analyzing the comments it received, NTIA issued observations on
advantages and disadvantages of each of these strategies, as detailed
in appendix I.[Footnote 26] NTIA also reported that prison officials
should be able to use technology for combating prison cell phone use
while not disrupting public safety and federal government entities'
use of spectrum or citizens' use of airwaves for cell phone
communications.
States and Nonfederal Entities' Roles:
A number of states have expressed concerns over threats posed by
contraband cell phones in their correctional institutions and sought
out both independent solutions and federal assistance. In particular,
during 2009, officials from 31 state and 2 regional (i.e., city-based)
prison systems requested that the FCC initiate rulemaking to permit
jamming of commercial mobile radio services (which would include cell
phone signals) within correctional institutions.[Footnote 27] Also,
officials from Texas and Maryland correctional departments have
testified before Congress about the dangers posed by cell phones in
prisons and to support passage of a bill known as the Safe Prisons
Communications Act of 2009.[Footnote 28]
States have implemented different means to define the legality of cell
phone possession in prisons. Some states have specific statutory
provisions making it illegal for inmates to possess cell phones while
incarcerated in a state prison institution,[Footnote 29] while other
states have statutorily defined cell phones to be contraband that is
prohibited within a state prison institution.[Footnote 30] In
addition, there are other states that have general statutory
provisions banning contraband and allow the department of corrections
to define what items are contraband administratively.[Footnote 31]
In addition, the Association of State Correctional Administrators
(ASCA)--an organization comprised of both BOP and state correctional
officials that seeks to improve correctional services and practices--
has been active in studying the issue of cell phones in prisons. For
example, in July 2010, ASCA hosted a symposium to discuss the problem
of cell phone smuggling and potential solutions to address the issue.
BOP Telephone Rates Typically Are Less Than Other Correctional
Systems' Rates and Fund Inmate Wages and Recreation; Lowering Rates
Would Decrease Costs for Inmate Calls but Could Reduce Revenue:
BOP's rates for inmate telephone calls typically are lower than
selected states' and military branch systems that also use inmate
telephone revenue to support inmate amenities, and lowering rates
would have several implications. BOP charges inmates $0.06 per minute
for local calls and $0.23 per minute for long distance calls, with no
connection charge. BOP sets its rates to cover the cost of operating
the telephone system and to generate profits, which BOP uses to
provide the majority of funding for inmate amenities--the most
significant of which are wages for inmate employment and expenses
associated with inmate recreational activities. If BOP reduced inmate
telephone rates, inmates would benefit from the ability to make less
expensive phone calls. However, lower rates also could result in less
revenue, lower profits, and therefore fewer funds available for inmate
wages and other amenities, unless BOP recovers these funds through
other sources. According to BOP officials, when inmates have fewer
opportunities for physical activity, idleness increases and the risk
of violence, escapes, and other disruptions also rises.
BOP's Inmate Telephone Rates Typically Are Less Than Those Charged by
Other Correctional Systems That Also Fund Inmate Amenities:
Currently, for direct dial calls, BOP charges inmates per minute rates
of $0.06 for local calls and $0.23 for long distance calls with no
connection charge. For collect calls, both local and long distance,
BOP charges a connection fee and per minute charge.[Footnote 32] The
rates that BOP charges inmates for a 15-minute direct-dial local call
typically are lower than rates charged by most other correctional
systems, such as state systems and Department of Defense military
prisons that also use telephone system revenue to help finance
prisoner amenities.[Footnote 33] As illustrated by table 1, a direct
dial long distance call lasting 15 minutes would cost a BOP inmate
significantly less than if he or she made that call in most other
selected comparable correctional systems.
Table 1: Comparing the Cost of a 15-Minute Call, by Call Type, across
BOP and Selected Correctional Systems That Use Revenues to Provide
Inmate Amenities:
Correctional system: Bureau of Prisons;
Local - direct dial/debit card: $0.90;
Local - collect: $0.95 - $5.70[A];
Long distance - direct dial/debit card: $3.45;
Long distance/collect: $8.45.
Correctional system: Department of Defense - Army;
Local - direct dial/debit card: $3.75;
Local - collect: $6.00;
Long distance - direct dial/debit card: $3.75;
Long distance/collect: $6.00.
Correctional system: Department of Defense - Navy;
Local - direct dial/debit card: $6.00;
Local - collect: $16.08;
Long distance - direct dial/debit card: $6.00;
Long distance/collect: $16.08.
Correctional system: Department of Defense - Marines;
Local - direct dial/debit card: $6.00;
Local - collect: $16.08;
Long distance - direct dial/debit card: $6.00;
Long distance/collect: $16.08.
Correctional system: Maryland Division of Correction;
Local - direct dial/debit card: $0.50;
Local - collect: $0.85;
Long distance - direct dial/debit card: $4.50;
Long distance/collect: $7.20.
Correctional system: Mississippi Department of Corrections;
Local - direct dial/debit card: State does not offer direct dial;
Local - collect: $2.85;
Long distance - direct dial/debit card: State does not offer direct
dial;
Long distance/collect: $14.55.
Correctional system: New Jersey Department of Corrections;
Local - direct dial/debit card: $4.95;
Local - collect: $4.95;
Long distance - direct dial/debit card: $4.95;
Long distance/collect: $4.95.
Correctional system: Texas Department of Criminal Justice[B];
Local - direct dial/debit card: $3.90;
Local - collect: $3.90;
Long distance - direct dial/debit card: $6.45;
Long distance/collect: $6.45.
Source: GAO analysis of BOP, Department of Defense, and state data.
[A] State utility commissions have jurisdiction over local collect
call rates so they vary depending on the state in which the prison is
located.
[B] Although Texas does not use telephone revenues to provide prisoner
amenities, it does require the telephone service provider to pay the
state 40 percent of gross revenues; the first $10 million goes to the
Victims Services Crime Fund.
[End of table]
Revenues, Costs, and Profits of BOP's Telephone System:
In fiscal year 2010, BOP's inmate telephone system generated
approximately $74 million in revenue, cost approximately $39 million
to operate, and showed a profit of approximately $34 million. Records
provided by BOP for the first quarters of 2009, 2010 and 2011
indicated that inmates' long distance calls generated more than 90
percent of BOP's telephone revenues.[Footnote 34] According to BOP
officials, over the past 12-18 months, the inmate telephone service
has generated significantly less revenue as inmates purchased more
local minutes and fewer long distance minutes. Figure 1--which shows
the local and long distance phone minutes used and phone-system
revenues for the first quarters of 2009, 2010, and 2011--illustrates
this trend.
Figure 1: Comparison of Local and Long Distance Minutes Used and
Telephone System Revenue, from First Quarter 2009 through First
Quarter 2011:
[Refer to PDF for image: multiple line graph]
Quarter: FY 09 1st Quarter;
Local minutes: 11.1 million;
Long distance minutes: 76.3 million;
Quarterly revenue: $20.4 million.
Quarter: FY 10 1st Quarter;
Local minutes: 15.0 million;
Long distance minutes: 76.4 million;
Quarterly revenue: $20.3 million.
Quarter: FY 11 1st Quarter;
Local minutes: 18.1 million;
Long distance minutes: 71.8 million;
Quarterly revenue: $18.9 million.
Source: BOP.
[End of figure]
BOP officials attribute this shift from long distance to local minute
calls to the emergence of technology that allows inmates' friends and
family who do not live within the inmates' local calling area to
acquire telephone numbers local to the inmates' prison locations. As a
result, long distance calls that previously cost inmates $0.23 per
minute can now be made for the local rate of $0.06 per minute--a
savings of more than 70 percent on a 15-minute call. BOP officials
told us that this trend has prompted them to consider eliminating the
distinction between local and long distance call rates and instead set
a uniform price for calls of either type that would fall somewhere
between the current local and long distance rates. According to
officials, this would lower rates for approximately 84 percent of the
calls made by inmates that are long distance. BOP officials told us
that while they anticipate losing some of the revenue generated by
long distance minutes, they believe the sale of access minutes for
their electronic messaging system, which has recently become available
in all federal prisons, will compensate for some lost revenue.
[Footnote 35] BOP officials told us that the number of electronic
message minutes sold in 2010, at $0.05 per minute, was more than twice
the number sold in 2009, and they expect even more minutes to be sold
in 2011.
With respect to telephone system costs, in fiscal year 2010, BOP spent
approximately $39 million to operate the telephone system. About $9.7
million of this amount covered the costs of the telephone system's
physical resources, including hardware and software, which were
purchased through competitively bid, governmentwide contracts. Just
over $22 million covered labor costs, including technical,
operational, and administrative costs of the inmate telephone system
at each of the institutions. Another $7.5 million covered personnel
salaries and benefits of headquarters staff, who provide
administration and program management, including policy and procedures
development, and training.
BOP's telephone system generated more than $34 million in profits in
fiscal year 2010.[Footnote 36] Since BOP both receives and disburses
money to pay for telephone service operations through its Trust Fund,
profits from telephone service are also retained therein. In fiscal
year 2010, BOP's Trust Fund had total revenues, which included
collections from BOP's commissary services, of $331 million. After
paying all related costs for phones and commissary provisions, there
were Trust Fund revenues in excess of expenses of over $46 million and
BOP's phone service was responsible for $34 million, or 74 percent of
this amount, while Trust Fund profits from all other sources amounted
to almost $12 million, as shown in figure 2.
Figure 2: Sources of Trust Fund Profits in Fiscal Year 2010:
[Refer to PDF for image: pie-chart]
Profits from inmate telephone systems: $34,235,528 (74%);
Trust fund profits from all other sources: $11,995,839 (26%).
Source: GAO analysis of BOP data.
[End of figure]
BOP officials told us that BOP uses revenue from its Trust Fund to pay
for various inmate amenities, such as wages to inmates and
recreational materials--as illustrated by table 2. However, by law,
there are some specific inmate amenities, among other items, that
cannot be purchased with Trust Fund revenues.[Footnote 37] BOP
officials told us that all aspects of BOP's work are audited annually
by an independent auditing and accounting firm, including BOP's
financial records; officials told us that BOP has been certified as in
compliance since 1999.[Footnote 38]
Table 2: Inmate Amenities Funded by Profits from BOP's Trust Fund for
Fiscal Year 2010:
Amenity type: Inmate wages;
Description: Funds income inmates earn from work within the
institution, working in areas such as food service, commissaries,
facilities (electrical, plumbing, welding, painting, landscaping)
laundry, and as barbers, tutors, law library clerks, and warehouse
workers;
Amount: $34,978,786.
Amenity type: Recreational activities;
Description: Board games, movies, educational books, and cable
television. There is no funding of administrative costs such as
salaries for staff;
Amount: $8,555,291.
Amenity type: Distribution of profits to institutions;
Description: Items purchased with these funds include holiday packages
for the inmates, microwave ovens, washers and dryers, seasonal
programs, holiday decorations, children's items, and programs for
children of inmates;
Amount: $1,249,896.
Amenity type: Completion awards;
Description: Small monetary awards for inmates' completion of
psychological treatment programs;
Amount: $1,099,332.
Amenity type: Psychology program;
Description: Drug abuse programs, group and individual psychotherapy,
social skill building, mental health counseling, etc., for inmates;
Amount: $223,381.
Amenity type: "Artist in Residence" program;
Description: An interagency agreement with the National Endowment for
the Arts provides and funds this program for the inmate population;
currently, there is a creative writing program provided at five
locations;
Amount: $80,000.
Amenity type: "Reading Is Fundamental;"
Description: Provides for inmates to participate in a national reading
program;
Amount: $44,681.
Source: BOP.
[End of table]
Lowering Phone Rates Would Reduce the Cost of Inmate Calls but Could
Leave Fewer Funds Available for Inmate Activities:
Lowering the rates it charges inmates for phone calls would have
several implications for BOP and inmates. The primary advantage would
be that inmates would incur lower costs for making calls. This could
possibly encourage greater communication between inmates and their
families, which BOP has stated facilitates the reintegration of
inmates into society upon release from prison.[Footnote 39] In
contrast, reducing inmate telephone rates could also have some
disadvantages. BOP officials told us that lowered rates would likely
result in lower revenues for the Trust Fund and therefore less profit,
unless some provision was made to replace the lost revenue. With fewer
profits, BOP would have less Trust Fund money to spend on inmate
amenities. As a result, unless BOP recouped these revenues from other
sources, BOP would have to reduce the wages it pays inmates for their
labor and/or scale back the number and type of other educational and
recreational activities it currently offers using revenue from the
Trust Fund. According to BOP officials, such reductions could make
prisons more dangerous to manage and more expensive to operate. For
example, BOP officials said that inmates perform electrical work,
which keeps prisons well lighted, as well as janitorial services,
which preserve order and cleanliness--both of which contribute to
institutional safety and reduce inmate idleness. According to BOP
officials, inmate idleness increases the risk of violence, escapes,
and other disruptions. BOP officials also reported that inmate work
programs--which teach inmates, many of whom have never held a
traditional job before, work skills and a work ethic (e.g., coming to
work on time, taking directions from a supervisor, working effectively
with co-workers)--can help inmates assimilate back into society upon
completion of their prison sentence. This helps to reduce recidivism
and thus contributes to public safety.
If BOP wanted to lower inmate telephone rates while maintaining the
current level of inmate services, BOP could explore one of two
approaches: (1) recoup lost revenue resulting from lowered telephone
rates by increasing prices inmates pay for other services, such as
commissary items or electronic messaging system access, or (2) seek
authorization allowing BOP's general appropriation to be available for
inmate amenities in addition to the funds from the Trust Fund.
Regarding the first approach, BOP officials told us that they already
receive inmate complaints related to current commissary prices, and as
a result, the officials indicated reluctance to choose this option. In
addition, raising commissary prices could result in inmates purchasing
fewer items, and coupled with decreased telephone rates, overall Trust
Fund revenues could decline, resulting in less funding available for
inmate amenities, including wages. With respect to the second
approach, if BOP reduced rates for telephone service and was given
authority to replace the lost revenue with its appropriations, BOP
could maintain both the inmate wage rate and the type and variation of
inmate activity, and keep the prices inmates pay for other services
from increasing. However, to accomplish this, BOP would have to seek
authorization allowing BOP's general appropriation to be available for
inmate amenities, in addition to the funds from the Trust Fund.
[Footnote 40] BOP officials told us they did not think this option was
a realistic possibility, as they do not believe Congress would
appropriate money for prisoner amenities.
BOP and Selected States Confiscated Thousands of Cell Phones in 2010
and Believe That Rising Inmate Cell Phone Usage Threatens
Institutional Safety and Expands Criminal Activity:
BOP and officials from most of the selected states we contacted
reported increases in the numbers of cell phones confiscated at
prisons over the last 3 to 4 years and cite cell phone use as a
security concern. All of the BOP officials, as well as officials from
all eight of the states' DOCs with whom we spoke, cited cell phones as
a major security concern, given the potential the phones provide for
inmates to have unmonitored conversations that could further criminal
activity, such as selling drugs or harassing other individuals.
BOP's and Selected States' Cell Phone Confiscations Have Increased in
the Last 2 Years:
BOP has tracked the number of cell phones confiscated at its
institutions, by prison camp and secure institutions, since 2008.
Table 3 shows that the number of cell phones confiscated has increased
each of the last 2 years. As the data also illustrate, over three-
fourths (77 percent) of all cell phones confiscated at BOP
institutions are found at prison camps, or "minimum security"
institutions--this despite the fact that prison camps have accounted
for only about 13 percent of BOP's inmate population from fiscal years
2008-2010. Prison camps typically are located adjacent to larger,
higher-security institutions but are usually not surrounded by
perimeter fencing. In some instances, camps are located very near
local roads or wooded areas.
Table 3: Number of Cell Phones That BOP Has Confiscated in
Institutions and Camps, 2008-2010:
Type of BOP institution: High, medium, low security institutions;
2008: 255 (14%);
2009: 591 (18%);
2010: 1,161 (32%);
Total: 2,007 (23%).
Type of BOP institution: Minimum security institutions (prison camps);
2008: 1,519 (86%);
2009: 2,607 (82%);
2010: 2,523 (68%);
Total: 6,649 (77%).
Type of BOP institution: Total;
2008: 1,774 (100%);
2009: 3,198 (100%);
2010: 3,684 (100%);
Total: 8,656 (100%).
Source: GAO analysis of BOP data.
[End of table]
To illustrate the extent of the problem at one federal correctional
complex, figure 3 shows cell phones confiscated by BOP from a federal
prison and its adjacent work camp over a 1-year period.
Figure 3: Cell Phones That BOP Has Confiscated at a Federal Prison and
Adjacent Camp:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Officials from BOP's Correctional Programs Division and three of the
six regions that we spoke with attribute the rise in confiscated cell
phones to the ease of availability of small, low cost cell phones that
allow inmates to carry on unmonitored conversations with the desired
contacts. In addition, officials we interviewed from two of the six
regions also cited increasingly stringent search procedures by staff
at some prisons resulting in a greater number of cell phone
confiscations. Correctional Programs Division officials added that a
combination of easier access to cheaper cell phones, better awareness
by staff conducting contraband searches, and better collection of
intelligence have all contributed to these increases, but it is
difficult to determine how much each factor has resulted in increased
cell phone confiscations.
We selected and obtained information from eight states during the
course of our review, and these selected states in general are also
dealing with increasing numbers of contraband cell phones, as shown in
table 4. Some of these selected states maintain cell phone
confiscations in the aggregate and have not broken it out by camps as
compared to secure institutions.
Table 4: Number of Cell Phones That Selected State Correctional
Departments Have Confiscated:
State: California[A];
2007: 900;
2008: 2,800;
2009: 6,900;
2010: 10,700.
State: Florida[B];
2007: n/a;
2008: 242;
2009: 1,026;
2010: 1,509.
State: Maryland[C];
2007: 741;
2008: 1,236;
2009: 1,658;
2010: 1,128.
State: Mississippi;
2007: n/a;
2008: 2,200;
2009: 3,600;
2010: 4,300.
State: New Jersey[D];
2007: n/a;
2008: n/a;
2009: n/a;
2010: 249.
State: New York;
2007: 55;
2008: 75;
2009: 93;
2010: 85.
State: South Carolina[E];
2007: n/a;
2008: 2,015;
2009: 2,594;
2010: 3,241.
State: Texas[F];
2007: n/a;
2008: 1,226;
2009: 1,480;
2010: 1,193.
Source: Correctional departments from the states listed.
[A] In 2009, California began to include cell phone confiscation data
from its community correctional facilities (private or publicly run
contracted facilities for low level offenders) and California out-of-
state correctional facilities (private facilities in several states
that California has contracted with to house inmates). California
officials stated that these types of facilities house approximately
five to six percent of all state inmates.
[B] Florida did not begin keeping counts of contraband cell phones
until October 2008.
[C] Maryland data was provided by fiscal year, not calendar year.
[D] New Jersey began capturing data on contraband cell phones in mid-
2010; the data shown covers the time period July 2010 through February
2011.
[E] South Carolina includes cell phone parts and accessories, such as
batteries and chargers, in its count of cell phone confiscations. One
official estimated that the cell phones themselves account for about
70 percent of these totals.
[F] Texas' 2008 data represents the number of "incidents" of cell
phone confiscations; there could have been multiple cell phones found
in one incident. In 2009 and 2010, Texas also separated the data
gathered by cell phones confiscated before and after introduction to
the inmate population. For 2009, 370 of the 1,480 cell phones were
confiscated before entering the inmate population (e.g., inside of
mailrooms, outside prison perimeter). For 2010, 402 of the 1,193 cell
phones were confiscated before entering the inmate population.
[End of table]
The types of institutions in which most cell phones are found varied
among the states we contacted. For example, officials we interviewed
from two of the eight states indicated that based on their experience,
most phones were found in prison camps, while officials from five
other states said that their states have confiscated greater numbers
of cell phones in more secure institutions. Officials from the eighth
state said the number of cell phones found in camps and secure
institutions was about equal. Three states also attribute the increase
in cell phone confiscations to the availability of smaller, cheaper
cell phones and additional search and detection efforts they have
employed to identify cell phones.
BOP and Officials from Selected States Reported That Contraband Cell
Phones Can Threaten the Safety within Institutions and Expand Criminal
Activity:
Officials we contacted from BOP's Correctional Programs Division, six
regional offices, and four institutions--as well as from each of the
eight states we selected for our review--all cited contraband cell
phones as an issue of serious concern. According to BOP officials in
particular, inmates with cell phones are able to circumvent the
approved prison telephone system and thus are able to hold unmonitored
conversations. This, the BOP officials reported, could lead to several
actions that threaten the security of prisons and expand criminal
activity both inside and outside of a prison institution. For example,
inmates could use cell phones to arrange the delivery of contraband
drugs or other goods, transmit information on prison staff to or from
noninmates, harass witnesses or other individuals, or potentially
coordinate an escape.
BOP management does not currently compile any specific data or prepare
comprehensive reports of situations where contraband cell phones were
used to conduct criminal activity in federal prisons--nor do DOJ or
the Cell Phone Contraband Act require that these things be done.
However, BOP officials we interviewed from two of the regions provided
examples of criminal activity linked to cell phones. In one case, in
January 2011, an inmate at a federal institution was sentenced to an
additional 14 years in prison for running an identity-theft ring using
a contraband cell phone. This inmate and his accomplices obtained
personal information on credit card holders at various retailers and
impersonated these account holders to fraudulently purchase over
$254,000 worth of merchandise.
In addition, officials from seven of our selected eight states
provided examples of specific criminal actions that occurred as a
result of inmate cell phone use. For example, in October 2008, a death
row inmate in a Texas state prison used a smuggled cell phone to
threaten a state Senator and his family. This same phone was also used
by a number of other inmates within the prison. In addition, in 2007,
an inmate in a Maryland detention center ordered the murder of a state
witness via a cell phone. In 2005, an inmate in a New Jersey state
prison--serving time for previously shooting at two police officers--
used a contraband cell phone to order the murder of his girlfriend,
who had previously testified against him during a trial.
BOP and officials in selected states acknowledged that definitively
linking the possession of a contraband cell phone to an individual can
be challenging. For example, officials we interviewed from BOP's
Correctional Programs Division, and two of the four BOP institutions
that we interviewed say that cell phones are often found on the
grounds of an institution or in "common areas" such as bathrooms or
television rooms rather than in the possession of an inmate directly.
Cell phones are also frequently passed around and used by several
different inmates, making it difficult to link the ownership of a cell
phone to a particular inmate.
In order to gain useful information--such as phone numbers or text
messages--that could link a cell phone to an individual inmate or
related criminal activity, BOP conducts forensic investigations of the
cell phones it confiscates.
BOP and Selected States Have Implemented Cell Phone Search and
Detection Technologies, but BOP Could Evaluate Technologies Better and
Increase Coordination:
BOP and the eight selected states we contacted have taken steps to
address growing contraband cell phone smuggling and use in their
correctional institutions, but BOP could evaluate existing
technologies better to maximize its investment decisions. BOP has
tested multiple cell phone detection technologies; however, it has not
developed evaluation plans to measure the effectiveness of these
tests. Moreover, BOP has shared information with state agencies to
some extent on strategies for combating contraband cell phones, but
BOP's regional offices could pursue more direct connections with
states in accordance with relevant BOP policy that encourages them to
do so. By enhancing information sharing, BOP could gain knowledge from
states' practices and lessons learned and likewise, states' practices
could be better informed by learning more about BOP's efforts related
to cell phone detection.
BOP and Selected States Have Implemented a Variety of Strategies to
Prevent and Minimize Cell Phone Smuggling and Use:
BOP and officials from all eight selected state correctional
departments we contacted have developed multiple methods for
preventing cell phones from entering prison institutions and being
used by inmates. These include search procedures for visitors and
correctional staff as well as cell phone detection technologies, which
identify the use of cell phones once they have reached the inmate
population.
Through policy memorandums and program statements that govern its
protocols, BOP has implemented agencywide screening procedures for all
visitors, contractors, and staff for detecting contraband items. These
procedures include the use of x-ray screening machines, walk-through
metal detectors, and hand-held metal detectors. Though these
procedures are not cell phone specific, BOP officials told us they
represent a concerted effort in keeping contraband out of prisons in
general. See appendix II for more information on the direction that
BOP provides for screening of visitors, staff, and inmates.
In addition to its search procedures, BOP has employed technology to
stem the rise in cell phone smuggling. In particular, BOP has
implemented two large-scale sensor-based cell phone detection systems
at two of its prison institutions, a technology BOP officials
described as being the only effective solution at this time. The Radio
Frequency (RF) sensor based system detects the presence of cell phones
and displays their approximate location using a monitored computer
screen.
In April 2007, BOP installed the original prototype sensor system in
three housing units within one building, which included the purchase
of a server, computer work station, and switches. According to BOP
officials, the manufacturer provided the actual sensors and software
at minimal costs in order to assist in research and development for
the project, while other fiber and wiring were obtained from surplus
supplies at no cost to BOP. Additionally, BOP officials told us that
BOP staff installed the sensor system, helping cut costs that an
outside party might have otherwise charged for installation.[Footnote
41] Because of these factors, BOP officials said a similar system
installed by a contractor at other prison institutions would be more
expensive. For example, BOP officials told us that it cost them
approximately seven times more than the original system to install
equipment for a newer-generation version of BOP's prototype RF sensor
system at a second prison institution in December 2010, even though
BOP officials were able to install it themselves as they had in the
first location. According to BOP officials, the second system covers
11 housing units in both an institution and prison camp, and is also
configured so that officials throughout the prison can view areas of
cell phone detection, which BOP officials said accounted for a higher
installation cost.[Footnote 42]
We found that all eight of the selected state officials we interviewed
cited using entrance screening practices such as use of walk-through
metal detectors or x-ray machines at their secure institutions; and,
six of these states are using different cell phone detection
techniques that BOP has not yet employed, such as canines[Footnote 43]
and managed access.[Footnote 44]
Additional information on cell phone detection strategies tested or
deployed by BOP and selected state DOCs--as well as these officials'
perspectives on their utility--is deemed law enforcement sensitive and
not included in this report.
BOP Has Steps in Place to Identify Promising Cell Phone Detection
Technologies, but Lacks Sound Evaluation Plans:
BOP takes several steps to determine which cell phone detection
technologies to test. BOP's OST is tasked with identifying promising
technology in the area of cell phone detection, and all five OST staff
share responsibility for testing and evaluating technology security
initiatives throughout BOP. To make determinations about which
technology BOP should test, OST officials told us that they
familiarize themselves through working groups with other federal and
state organizations and discussions with all interested product
vendors with equipment that other federal or state correctional
entities use. OST officials also explained that they have developed
criteria over several years that they believe should be met before
they will test any given approach.[Footnote 45] These four criteria
are:
1. The equipment must work without affecting or collecting information
from the general public located outside the correctional facilities'
secure perimeter.
2. The solution should have no legal restrictions.[Footnote 46]
3. The equipment must work with all cellular phone protocols.[Footnote
47]
4. The overall cost of equipment and installation must be fair and
reasonable.[Footnote 48]
Once OST is satisfied that the technology meets most of these
criteria, OST tests the equipment at BOP headquarters and then sends
it out to one or more prison institutions for testing by staff in a
prison environment. Once tested, institutional staff then provide OST
with a brief written response or phone call regarding their views of
the equipment's effectiveness. Once OST receives feedback from the
prison institution, OST may then send the equipment to another
institution for further testing by prison staff.
[Side bar: Photograph: Example of hand-held RF cell phone detector
tested by BOP. Source: BOP. End of sidebar]
While BOP has put the above criteria in place, it does not have a
sound evaluation plan that includes, among other dimensions, criteria
or standards for determining how well the technology works. OST
officials told us that they rely on the process discussed above to
make decisions regarding the effectiveness of cell phone detection
equipment, but they acknowledged that the tests each institution
conducts may vary in scope and rigor and that they have no evaluation
plan to govern this process. OST officials told us they previously
attempted to distribute consistent evaluation questions to
institutional staff testing each technology, using an "Initial
Technology Assessment" form, but that OST abandoned this practice
because it rarely received the form back from prison institutions.
Further, officials told us that when institutions do respond with
technology test results, OST receives very little feedback. OST
officials told us that institutional staff have limited time and
resources for assisting them with cell phone detection technology
evaluations because such testing is in addition to their normal
duties. Also, OST has stated that some institutions are more eager
than others for the opportunity to test new technology; thus, some
institutions may not have the interest or expertise to contribute
information to a technology assessment. In addition, according to OST,
the role of the individual conducting the test can vary by
institution. Specifically, equipment could be tested by a correctional
officer, a lieutenant, or a computer specialist, a situation that OST
officials said results in inconsistent testing methods because these
individuals have different skills and knowledge levels. In addition,
the OST official tasked with addressing contraband cell phone
detection issues told us that BOP regions and local prison
institutions regularly test cell phone detection devices and
approaches, as well as other types of equipment, without OST's
knowledge and most often do not inform OST of their findings. For
example, the official explained that in some instances, vendors notify
OST of technology tests conducted at local prison institutions that
OST was unaware of at the time. GAO's internal control standards
require that an agency's organizational structure clearly define key
areas of authority and responsibility, and establish appropriate lines
of reporting.[Footnote 49] Thus, while OST applies its criteria to
screen new technologies before sending them to prison institutions for
testing, it lacks clearly defined responsibilities for the individuals
conducting tests and sound evaluation methods to fully evaluate such
technologies once institutional testing has been completed. As a
result, BOP has implemented--and discarded--some technologies without
fully evaluating them and documenting results as discussed below.
We have previously reported that for tests of new technology, a sound,
well-developed and documented evaluation plan should include:
1. well-defined, clear, and measurable objectives;
2. criteria or standards for determining program performance;
3. clearly articulated methodology, including sound sampling methods,
determination of appropriate sample size for the evaluation design,
and a strategy for comparing the pilot results with other efforts;
4. a clear plan that details the type and source of data necessary to
evaluate the pilot, methods for data collection, and the timing and
frequency of data collection; and:
5. a detailed data analysis plan to track the program's performance
and evaluate the final results of the project.[Footnote 50]
Certain details on the tests OST has conducted and the conclusions it
has drawn have not been included here due to law enforcement
sensitivities.
OST officials explained that BOP has a policy, called Pilot
Initiatives, Approval and Evaluation, that identifies numerous
criteria that should be followed when implementing and evaluating
pilot programs[Footnote 51]. The policy includes practices such as
defining goals and objectives, developing an evaluation plan,
describing costs for the program, and identifying advantages and
disadvantages related to a broader implementation of the technology,
all of which align with established best practices. According to OST
officials, however, they have not designated the testing phase of any
cell phone technologies as "a pilot" by the definition included in
their policy, and OST does not apply the policy to any of their
testing.[Footnote 52] In our view, BOP could benefit by using its
pilot initiative-evaluation criteria as a best practice when
evaluating cell phone detection tests to better inform decisions about
whether investments on a larger scale are warranted.
[Side bar: Photograph: Ground Observation Reconnaissance Transmitter
(GORT) in use at one BOP facility to detect movement of contraband
over security fence. Source: GAO. End of sidebar]
When we requested reports and documentation--including evaluation
plans and reports--resulting from tests of the technologies that OST
explained to us, officials sometimes provided us with brief overviews
of testing methods that did not meet best practices. For example, OST
told us it has not subjected its RF sensor system--currently deployed
in two institutions--to any final assessment or evaluation outlining
when and how BOP would determine whether adopting this system on a
wider scale would be feasible and effective. On the other hand, in one
instance, OST officials told us BOP did adhere to more rigorous
evaluation procedures. Specifically, with assistance from OST, one
prison institution has deployed the Ground Observation Reconnaissance
Transmitter (GORT) in one of its institutions. When testing the GORT
system, officials identified system goals and objectives; identified
criteria for determining program performance; completed a final
product evaluation that documented advantages and disadvantages of the
system; and concluded that GORT successfully reduced smuggling of
contraband including cell phones at the test location. OST officials
told us the assessment of the GORT differed from assessments of its
other technologies because the level of evaluation performed was at
the discretion of the local prison institution implementing the
system. OST officials agree that developing a sound evaluation
approach that could be used by prison institution staff for testing
cell phone detection technologies would strengthen BOP's approach for
combating the issue of contraband cell phones in prisons. Having an
evaluation plan for selected cell phone detection technology that
follows BOP pilot evaluation criteria or other best practices could
help BOP more effectively measure how well each piece of equipment
functions. Moreover, these steps could better allow OST to better
inform BOP leadership's decisions regarding the adoption of such
technology and the associated resource allocations.
BOP Could Take Steps to Enhance Information Sharing with States:
BOP reports that OST collaborates with various state-level agencies,
but has opportunities to improve coordination between its regional
offices and states in identifying effective strategies and
technologies for combating contraband cell phones in prisons.[Footnote
53] BOP recognizes the importance of outreach with state and local
entities and has developed a policy statement governing such
interaction.[Footnote 54] This policy notes that "communication and
understanding among [BOP] institutions and regional offices and their
local communities will be enhanced by formal and informal contacts
between [BOP] staff and local agencies and organizations." It further
states that "Regional Directors and Wardens shall include in their
lists of annual accomplishments a summary of all organizations with
which their institutions or regional offices are formally associated,
including a general statement about any significant contribution to
[BOP] operations or criminal justice relationships that have resulted
from those associations." Further, we have previously reported on the
importance of interagency coordination and information sharing across
federal, regional, state, and local government entities.[Footnote 55]
We also previously reported that making efficient use of security
technology to supplement and reinforce other security measures is a
key practice for protecting federal institutions, but that the type of
technology to use should be carefully analyzed.[Footnote 56]
OST, located at BOP headquarters in Washington, D.C., reported
coordination with state-level agencies through direct information
sharing, professional organizations, and established working groups.
In particular, ASCA officials told us BOP coordinates with their group
through panels, demonstrations, and briefings. For example, OST also
participates in multiple NIJ/NLECTC technology working groups (TWG)
involving cell phone detection.[Footnote 57] OST also coordinates with
representatives from multiple state DOCs on an individual basis after
establishing relationships as members of professional organizations,
committees, and working groups. For example, OST provided the New York
correctional department with 30-day access to a cell phone detection
device after the state demonstrated interest in the technology.
According to OST, BOP has also shared information on its practices for
detecting contraband cell phones with states such as Pennsylvania,
Texas, and Florida.
We corroborated BOP headquarters' level of coordination with these
groups and multiple state DOCs. At the regional level, we found that
BOP's regional offices had limited coordination with states regarding
contraband cell phone issues. For example, one BOP regional director
stated that his region coordinated with officials from ASCA, but said
he has not coordinated with state entities because such coordination
occurs through BOP officials in headquarters. Another regional
director concurred, reporting that nobody in his region participates
in any task forces, working groups, or other collaborative efforts
with federal or state entities concerning cell phone detection issues
because this should be occurring through headquarters' outreach. As
discussed earlier, some states have taken efforts that BOP does not
currently use to combat contraband cell phones, such as canine
detection units. Thus, enhanced coordination could allow BOP to better
leverage information on potentially employing these state efforts to
combat contraband cell phones. Likewise, while BOP has shared
practices with states in the past, OST officials agreed that BOP could
improve coordination efforts by its regional offices as well.
In addition, while BOP policy states that "over the years, formal and
informal employee relationships with organizations, such as advisory
committees, law enforcement coordinating councils, criminal justice
councils, and state and local planning organizations, have enhanced
[BOP] operations," we found limited BOP regional-office interaction
with state and local government agencies concerning contraband cell-
phone smuggling and use.[Footnote 58] For example, according to BOP
officials, Regional Directors and Wardens annually prepare a
Performance Work Plan that lists, among other things, efforts made in
establishing relations and collaborating with other state and local
correctional and law enforcement entities in their communities.
However, BOP officials have informed us that these plans do not
provide a level of detail--such as including lessons learned on cell-
phone-smuggling approaches and the technologies to address them--to
inform BOP's central office of the nature of issues discussed. Our
review of the three work plans with which BOP provided us confirmed
the limitations in the information they contained. As we have
previously reported, by having a process in place to obtain and share
information on potential threats, agencies can better understand the
risk they face and more effectively determine what preventive measures
should be implemented.[Footnote 59] Regularly reaching out to
coordinate with key stakeholders, particularly at the state level, to
learn about their cell phone-combating efforts could help improve
BOP's ability to address cell phone smuggling and use in prisons.
Conversely, BOP's outreach and coordination with states at the
regional level--to highlight practices BOP believes are useful--could
help inform state practices as well. Further, keeping records of these
exchanges, through Performance Work Plans for example, could help the
regional offices provide BOP with greater problem-solving information
by leveraging states' experience in addressing contraband cell phones.
Conclusions:
BOP provides a variety of options to its inmates for making phone
calls to friends and families--at rates that compare favorably to
correctional institutions operated by states and other federal
agencies. Nevertheless, the number of contraband cell phones in
prisons is rising. As documented in our discussions with federal and
state officials, the illicit use of cell phones can pose a danger to
staff and inmates, as well as to the public at large. BOP has reviewed
a number of technologies and adopted large-scale sensor detection
systems at two of its institutions in an attempt to combat this
problem. BOP does have opportunities, however, to enhance assessments
of how well these technologies can work. For example, if BOP
formulated well-developed and well-documented plans for testing and
evaluating cell phone detection and defeat technologies--including the
establishment of goals, objectives, and criteria--and defined
evaluation-related responsibilities for individuals performing the
tests, it would be better positioned to make decisions before adopting
these technologies. BOP also has opportunities to better leverage what
states are learning in their attempts to better detect and prevent
cell phone smuggling. In particular, if BOP encouraged its regional
offices to improve coordination with its local counterparts, BOP could
be better positioned to track and monitor what states were
experimenting with and what their evaluation results have been. By
taking these steps, BOP could make more well-informed decisions as it
moves forward in addressing the growing safety and security threats
posed by contraband cell phones in its prisons.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To help BOP respond more effectively to contraband cell phone
challenges, we recommend that the Attorney General direct the BOP
Director to take the following three actions:
* Direct OST to formulate evaluation plans that both support a
consistent approach to testing cell phone detection technologies and
strengthen decisions about deploying cell phone detection projects.
Such plans should include key characteristics of successful evaluation
methods, such as defining measurable objectives and including a
detailed data analysis plan. The plans should also clearly define
evaluation-related responsibilities for the individuals conducting the
test at each institution.
* Develop a policy to require that regions and institutions apply
OST's evaluation plans when testing the technology that OST believes
may be viable for detecting or combating contraband cell phones. This
policy should also require OST to provide the results of these
evaluations to BOP leadership to better inform BOP-wide decisions
regarding the adoption of such technology.
* Enhance regional office collaboration with other federal, state, and
local organizations; document what is learned; and share it throughout
BOP to enhance agencywide knowledge of key efforts to prevent or
minimize cell phone smuggling in prisons.
Agency Comments:
We provided a draft of the sensitive version of this report to DOJ,
and also requested comments from the Department of Commerce, FCC, and
Department of Defense on nonsensitive draft excerpts related to these
agencies. The agencies did not provide written comments. However, in
an e-mail received July 12, 2011, the DOJ liaison stated that DOJ
concurred with our recommendations. DOJ, FCC, and Department of
Defense provided written technical comments, which we incorporated
into the report, as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the Attorney General,
Secretaries of Commerce and Defense and the Chairman of the Federal
Communications Commission. In addition, this report will also be
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact David Maurer at (202) 512-8777 or maurerd@gao.gov or Mark
Goldstein at (202) 512-2834 or goldsteinm@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major
contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.
Signed by:
David C. Maurer:
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
Signed by:
Mark L. Goldstein:
Director, Physical Infrastructure:
[End of section]
Appendix I: National Telecommunications and Information Administration
(NTIA) Observations on Technologies to Combat Contraband Cell Phones:
In 2010, NTIA sought out and received public comments on "technologies
that would significantly reduce or eliminate contraband cell phone use
without negatively affecting commercial wireless and public safety
services ... in areas surrounding prisons."[Footnote 60] NTIA analyzed
the comments received and reported its observations on advantages and
disadvantages of each of these technologies, as illustrated in table 5.
Table 5: NTIA Observations on Technologies Designed to Reduce or
Eliminate Contraband Cell Phone Use:
Technology: Jamming;
NTIA observations:
* Jamming could potentially cause interference to cell phone signals
outside of a prison institution, unless properly designed;
* Jamming interferes with 911 and authorized calls and violates the
Communications Act of 1934 when performed by nonfederal entities[A];
* Implementation costs vary with the complexity of the prison site.
Technology: Managed access;
NTIA observations:
* Managed access systems have the potential to cause interference
outside of the prison or to adjacent bands unless properly designed;
* These systems permit 911 and known authorized calls, but require FCC
approval and carrier consent;
* Costs can vary based on the complexity of the prison site.
Technology: Detection;
NTIA observations:
* Detection systems are "passive" in that they do not transmit
signals, and thus do not cause interference to phone calls;
* Such systems protect 911 and authorized calls and, unless used for
data gathering for law enforcement intelligence, raise no regulatory
or legal issues;
* Costs can vary based on the complexity of the prison site and
sophistication of the technology used (e.g., simple hand-held devices
would involve a lower cost than a prison-wide sensor-based detection
system).
Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Department of Commerce information.
Note: Information was taken from U.S. Department of Commerce report,
Contraband Cell Phones in Prisons: Possible Wireless Technology
Solutions (December 2010).
[A] Specifically, the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, provides
that "no person shall willfully or maliciously interfere with or cause
interference to any radio communications of any station licensed or
authorized by or under this Act or operated by the United States
Government." 47 U.S.C. § 333. This particular prohibition related to
interference does not apply directly to U.S. Government agencies.
Nonfederal spectrum use is managed by the Federal Communications
Commission while spectrum use by U.S. Government agencies is managed
by the National Telecommunications and Information Administration
(NTIA). As a general matter, NTIA's policy reflects the limitation
with respect to the prevention of intentional harmful interference to
licensed or authorized users of radio communications. See Manual of
Regulations and Procedures for Federal Radio Frequency Management, §
2.3.6. In light of this, NTIA has authorized spectrum use by U.S.
Government agencies that results in intentional harmful interference
only in limited national security instances, such as by DOJ for an
electronic countermeasure in response to threats of radio-controlled
improvised explosive devices.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix II: BOP's Policy Memorandums and Program Statements Governing
Entrance-Screening Protocols at Prison Institutions:
Table 6 describes BOP memorandums or program statements related to
entrance-screening procedures for staff and visitors at BOP
institutions.
Table 6: BOP Guidance on Entrance-Screening Procedures and Their
Relation to Cell Phone Detection:
BOP memorandum or program statement: Program Statement P5510.12:
Searching, Detaining, or Arresting Visitors to Bureau Ground and
Facilities (January 2008);
Purpose: Provides BOP staff procedures and guidance for searching
visitors at federal prison institutions;
Relation to cell phone detection: This policy identifies telephones as
a prohibited item and outlines how to conduct screening for
identifying metallic contraband items such as cell phones. BOP
officials said federal prisons generally experience fewer cell phone
confiscations than state prisons in part because of BOP's standardized
screening procedures.
BOP memorandum or program statement: Memorandum: Electronic Searches
of Bureau of Prisons Staff (November 2007);
BOP memorandum or program statement: Memorandum: Staff Entrance
Procedures Additional Guidance (January 2008);
Purpose: Describes the entrance-screening requirements for all BOP
staff entering a prison. BOP told us prior to this, BOP staff members
were not screened for contraband;
Relation to cell phone detection: BOP's policy change for screening
staff was first agreed to and signed on November 8, 2007. Additional
screening guidance was then provided on January 28, 2008, as part of
this memorandum. BOP staff must be screened using electronic equipment
such as walk-through metal detectors, which are used for detecting
metallic contraband items like cell phones. The policy also details
the secure storage procedures for employees who commute via public
transportation and carry a cell phone.
BOP memorandum or program statement: Memorandum: Screening with Walk-
Through Metal Detectors - Staff, Visitors, and Inmates (January 9,
2008);
Purpose: Provides BOP standardization on the use of walk-through metal
detectors for screening;
Relation to cell phone detection: BOP's Office of Security Technology
provided standardized screening equipment guidance to all BOP
institutions with this memorandum.
Source: GAO analysis of BOP data.
[End of table]
Figure 4 provides examples of the types of equipment BOP uses to
screen staff and visitors entering BOP institutions, as well as
inmates on institution grounds.
Figure 4: BOP Screening Equipment:
[Refer to PDF for image: 4 photographs]
X-ray screening machine;
Walk-thru metal detector;
Hand-held metal detector;
BOSS Chair[A].
Sources: BOP (X-ray machine, walk-thru metal detector, and hand-held
metal detector); and GAO (BOSS chair).
[A] A BOSS Chair is a Body Orifice Security Scanner that detects metal
objects inside inmates' body cavities.
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
David Maurer, (202) 512-8777 or maurerd@gao.gov Mark Goldstein, (202)
512-2834 or goldsteinm@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contacts named above, Mike Clements and Joy Booth,
Assistant Directors, and Adam Couvillion, Analyst-in-Charge, managed
this assignment. Raymond Griffith and Nancy Zearfoss made significant
contributions to the work. David Alexander, Madhav Panwar, and Ramon
Rodriguez assisted with design and methodology. Willie Commons III
provided legal support and Katherine Davis provided assistance in
report preparation.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] For the purposes of this report, we will use the term "cell phone"
to represent not only cell phones but also any other wireless
communications devices.
[2] Cell Phone Contraband Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-225, 124 Stat.
2387. Under 18 U.S.C. § 1791, the term "prohibited object" includes,
but is not limited to, a firearm, ammunition, a phone or other device
used by a user of commercial mobile service, controlled substance,
narcotic drug, any United States or foreign currency, or any other
object that threatens the order, discipline, or security of a prison,
or the life, health, or safety of an individual.
[3] Pub. L. No. 111-225, § 3, 124 Stat. 2387, 2387-88.
[4] Specifically, we interviewed and gathered data from officials in
California, Florida, Maryland, Mississippi, New Jersey, New York,
South Carolina, and Texas. We selected these state correctional
departments based on the level of their efforts to combat contraband
cell phones, as identified by BOP officials and records of
congressional testimony. In conducting our analysis we did not,
ultimately, include rate information from four of these states--
California, Florida, New York or South Carolina--because these states
do not fund prisoner amenities from telephone revenues in a manner
consistent with BOP. This was due to either (a) these states not
receiving monies from the companies providing inmate telephone service
or (b) laws requiring them to send any monies they do receive to the
state's general fund. The views of officials from the states whose
rates we did include are not generalizable to other states, but do
provide valuable insights into issues surrounding cell phones in
prisons.
[5] OST officials told us they do not consider their office a testing
lab or research and development facility. Instead, OST's task is to
evaluate the effectiveness of new technology in the federal prison
environment.
[6] In addition, we observed specific cell phone detection efforts at
a state prison in Virginia while conducting work on another review of
correctional officer safety (see GAO, Bureau of Prisons: Evaluating
the Impact of Protective Equipment Could Help Enhance Officer Safety,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-410] (Washington, D.C.:
Apr. 8, 2011)), even though Virginia was not one of the states
selected for our review.
[7] In the context of this report, we define testing as BOP's effort
to determine if cell phone detection technology will be effective in
the federal prison environment.
[8] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999); Tax Administration: IRS Needs to
Strengthen Its Approach for Evaluation the SFFMI Data-Sharing Pilot
Program, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-45]
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 7, 2008); GAO, Aviation Security: A National
Strategy and Other Actions Would Strengthen TSA's Efforts to Secure
Commercial Airport Perimeters and Access Controls, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-399] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30,
2009); and GAO, Homeland Security: Further Actions Needed to
Coordinate Federal Agencies' Facility Protection Efforts and Promote
Key Practices, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-49]
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 30, 2004).
[9] ASCA is an organization consisting of state and BOP officials
focusing on improving correctional practices. CTIA-the Wireless
Association is a nonprofit organization that represents the wireless-
communications industry and advocates at all levels of government on
behalf of its members.
[10] BOP's 116 institutions generally have one of four security level
designations: minimum, low, medium, and high. The designations depend
on the level of security and staff supervision the institution is able
to provide, such as the presence of security towers; perimeter
barriers; the type of inmate housing, including dormitory, cubicle, or
cell-type housing; and the staff-to-inmate ratio.
[11] We previously reported on BOP's Budget Process. See GAO, Bureau
of Prisons: Methods for Cost Estimation Largely Reflect Best
Practices, but Quantifying Risks Would Enhance Decision Making,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-94] (Washington, D.C.:
Nov. 10, 2009).
[12] Certain federal courts have held that inmates have a First
Amendment right to some level of telephone access, but this right is
subject to reasonable restrictions related to prison administration
and security. Johnson v. Galli, 596 F. Supp. 135, 138 (D. Nev. 1984);
Washington v. Reno, 35 F.3d 1093, 1100 (6th Cir. 1994).
[13] U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Prisons, Program
Statement, No. P5264.08, Inmate Telephone Regulations, provides
national policy and procedure regarding inmate telephone privileges
within BOP institutions and contract facilities.
[14] Generally, BOP allows each inmate to designate up to 30 phone
numbers on his or her "contact" list.
[15] BOP provides every inmate with a bank-type account into which
money can be deposited and withdrawn for purchases such as snacks,
telephone calls, or laundry.
[16] The pilot of the electronic messaging program began April 14,
2005, and was completely implemented on January 30, 2011. BOP issued
Program Statement P5265.13, Trust Fund Limited Inmate Computer System
(TRULINCS).
[17] Federal Prison Industries is a federal government corporation
established by Congress in 1934 to, among other things, employ and
provide job skills training to a number of federal inmates, and
produce goods and services for sale to the federal government.
[18] Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 108, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-67 (Oct. 21,
1998) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 4043 note).
[19] Cell phones are low-powered radio transceivers (a combination
radio transmitter and receiver) that use radio waves (spectrum) to
communicate with base stations. Electromagnetic spectrum is the medium
that enables wireless communications of all kinds, including cell
phone and paging services, radio and television broadcasting, radar,
and satellite-based services.
[20] The Correctional Programs Division oversees BOP's efforts to
ensure safe, secure institutions for inmates and staff.
[21] Good conduct time is a credit (measured in days) that an inmate
may earn based on adherence to prison rules and lack of punishment
received that is deducted from the inmate's sentence.
[22] NIJ funds research, development, and evaluation related to crime
and criminal justice issues and programs, including research,
development, and evaluation related to criminal justice tools and
technologies.
[23] FCC is an independent federal agency that regulates interstate
and international communications by radio, television, wire,
satellite, and cable--as such, FCC has oversight over the use of
spectrum for states, localities, and the private sector. NTIA, an
agency within the U.S. Department of Commerce, has principal
responsibility for advising the President on telecommunications and
information policies and has oversight of the use of spectrum by
federal agencies, such as BOP.
[24] H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 111-366, at 619 (2009).
[25] Preventing Contraband Cell Phone Use in Prisons, 75 Fed. Reg.
26733-01 (May 12, 2010).
[26] U.S. Department of Commerce, Contraband Cell Phones in Prisons:
Possible Wireless Technology Solutions (December 2010).
[27] See Petition for Rulemaking of South Carolina Department of
Corrections before the Federal Communications Commission, WT Docket
No. 09-30 (Aug. 6, 2009).
[28] The Safe Prisons Communications Act of 2009, S. 251, 111TH Cong.
(2009), passed the U.S. Senate in October of that year but was not
enacted. The bill would have amended the Communications Act of 1934 to
allow the FCC to authorize non-federal entities, such as state
correctional facilities, to operate systems that would prevent, jam,
or otherwise interfere with wireless communications from inmates held
in those facilities. This act was referred to the House of
Representatives that same month, and no further action was taken.
[29] For example, Maryland has a specific statutory provision with
regard to cell phones in prison. A person detained or confined in a
place of confinement may not knowingly possess or receive a
telecommunications device. A person who violates this provision is
guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction is subject to imprisonment
not exceeding 3 years or a fine not exceeding $1,000 or both. Md. Code
Ann., Crim. Law § 9-417.
[30] For example, Arizona has a statutory provision that specifically
includes a "wireless communication device" within the meaning of
"contraband" in the correctional facility context. Generally, a
person, not otherwise authorized by law, commits the felony of
promoting prison contraband by knowingly taking contraband into a
correctional facility or the grounds of a correctional facility; or
conveying contraband to any person confined in a correctional
facility; or making, obtaining or possessing contraband while being
confined in a correctional facility or while being lawfully
transported or moved incident to correctional facility confinement.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-2501, 13-2505.
[31] For example, Alabama has a general contraband statute. The
statute defines contraband as any article or thing which a person
confined in a detention facility is legally prohibited from obtaining
or possessing by statute, rule, regulation, or order. A person
confined in a detention facility that intentionally and unlawfully
makes, obtains or possesses any deadly weapon, instrument, tool or
other thing which may be useful for escape is guilty of promoting
prison contraband in the first degree which is a Class C felony.
Further, a person confined in a detention facility that intentionally
and unlawfully makes, obtains, or possesses any contraband is guilty
of promoting contraband in the third degree which is a Class B
misdemeanor. Cell phones could be covered by statute, rule,
regulation, or order. Ala. Code §§ 13A-10-30, 13A-10-36, 13A-10-38.
[32] Direct dial calls allow the inmate to dial the call and pay for
it using their TRUFONE account; collect calls are calls that require
the recipient to pay.
[33] According to BOP officials, inmate telephone rates are set in
order to generate sufficient revenue to pay the costs of the inmate
telephone system and support specific inmate amenities.
[34] BOP officials told us this is an estimate. According to BOP
officials, they generate a consolidated audited financial statement
for the entire Inmate Trust Fund Program rather than a separate
audited profit and loss statement for the Inmate Telephone System.
[35] BOP began a pilot electronic messaging program in April 2005 and
concluded Bureau-wide implementation in January 2011. Inmates are only
permitted to exchange electronic messages with persons who have
accepted the inmate's request to communicate. BOP issued Program
Statement P5265.13 on February 19, 2009, describing the operation of
the Trust Fund Limited Inmate Computer System (TRULINCS)--Electronic
Messaging.
[36] BOP officials told us this is only an estimate. According to BOP
officials, they generate a consolidated audited financial statement
for the entire Inmate Trust Fund Program rather than a separate
audited Profit and Loss statement for the Inmate Telephone System.
[37] None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available to
BOP, including Trust Fund revenues, may be used to provide the
following amenities or personal comforts in the federal prison system:
(a) televisions in cells except for prisoners who are segregated from
the general prison population for their own safety; (b) the viewing of
R, X, and NC-17 rated movies, through whatever medium presented; (c)
any instruction (live or through broadcasts) or training equipment for
boxing, wrestling, judo, karate, or other martial art, or any
bodybuilding or weightlifting equipment of any sort; (d) possession of
in-cell coffee pots, hot plates, or heating elements; or (e) the use
or possession of any electric or electronic musical instrument. See
Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and
Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-77, § 611,
115 Stat. 748, 800 (Nov. 28, 2001) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 4042 note).
[38] In 2001-2002, there was some criticism by the auditing agency
regarding insufficient security for information system controls. That
issue has since been remedied. In addition, GAO reviewed the audited
financial statements of BOP for fiscal years 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009,
and 2010 and agreed with the auditors that the audits for these fiscal
years were presented fairly and were in conformity with generally
accepted accounting principles.
[39] Approximately 25 percent of inmates use all of their allotment of
300 minutes per month, so these inmates would not be able to make
additional calls, even if rates were lower.
[40] Because the Director of BOP may make expenditures out of the
Commissary Fund of the Federal System for programs, goods, and
services for the benefit of inmates (to the extent the provision of
those programs, goods, or services to inmates is not otherwise
prohibited by law), general appropriations may not be used for those
purposes. The specific authority to operate the fund for the purposes
described acts as a specific appropriation for that purpose. If an
agency has a specific appropriation for a particular purpose, and also
has a general appropriation broad enough to cover the same purpose, it
does not have an option as to which to use. It must use the specific
appropriation.
[41] BOP officials told us this installation was done without using
conduit for wiring, secure boxes for sensors, and without connecting
the system to BOP's network.
[42] Due to BOP concerns over revealing the locations where this
detection system is in use, we have omitted the specific BOP locations
examining the RF sensor-based system.
[43] Six of the state DOCs we interviewed reported using cell phone
detection canines.
[44] Two of the state DOCs we interviewed reported using a managed
access system.
[45] According to OST officials, these criteria have been modified
over time and were most recently collapsed into four dimensions in
preparation of NTIA's report. Analysis for NTIA's report began soon
after December 2009, when Congress directed the NTIA, in coordination
with BOP, the FCC, and NIJ, to develop a plan to investigate and
evaluate how wireless jamming, detection, and other technologies might
be utilized for law enforcement and corrections applications in
federal and state prison facilities. See U.S. Department of Commerce,
Contraband Cell Phones in Prisons: Possible Wireless Technology
Solutions (December 2010).
[46] For example, some cell phone detection equipment captures
dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information, and BOP would
have to obtain a court order to use this equipment.
[47] In other words, equipment must work with the phones of all cell
phone operators, including AT&T, Verizon, Sprint, and other smaller
operators.
[48] BOP considers "reasonable" cost to be a subjective determination
based on common sense value of the equipment, weighing such factors as
effectiveness of the equipment, relative cost compared to similar
equipment, coverage area, perceived threat, risks and consequences,
and alternative solutions.
[49] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1].
[50] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-45] and
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-399].
[51] BOP Program Statement P1066.04: Pilot Initiatives, Approval and
Evaluation (Nov. 14, 2007).
[52] OST officials told us that pilot projects require extensive
oversight and that such a designation is only given to new technology
with a broad, high-level scope. Although BOP's RF sensor-based system
may have qualified as a pilot project if tested by OST, implementation
of the system at the regional and institutional level required no such
assessment.
[53] BOP's six regional offices oversee the operations of the
institutions in their respective regions. Among other things, regional
office staff provide management and technical assistance to
institutional personnel.
[54] BOP Program Statement 1400.04: Contacts with Other Agencies and
Organizations (Sept. 9, 1996).
[55] GAO, Homeland Security: Effective Regional Coordination Can
Enhance Emergency Preparedness, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-1009] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 15,
2004).
[56] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-49].
[57] A TWG is a practitioner-based committee of 10 to 30 experienced
practitioners from local, state, tribal, and federal agencies and
laboratories associated with a particular NIJ technology investment
portfolio. Three of NIJ's TWGs are concerned with, among other things,
the issue of cell phones in correctional institutions. OST
participates in the Institutional Corrections TWG and the Sensors and
Surveillance TWG, but not the Communications TWG. The Institutional
Corrections TWG is particularly interested in contraband detection and
interdiction of wireless devices. NIJ officials report that, with
respect to cell phones, this TWG is currently focused on exploring
smaller-scale cell phone detection technology, such as hand-held
devices, due in part to limited funds available to many state and
local correctional departments. The Sensors and Surveillance TWG is
exploring various cell phone detection technologies. The
Communications TWG is interested in controlled (or managed) access,
which would still allow the lawful use of cell phones in prison.
[58] BOP Program Statement 1400.04.
[59] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-49].
[60] Preventing Contraband Cell Phone Use in Prisons, 75 Fed. Reg.
26733-01 (May 12, 2010).
[End of section]
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