Aviation Runway and Ramp Safety
Sustained Efforts to Address Leadership, Technology, and Other Challenges Needed to Reduce Accidents and Incidents Gao ID: GAO-08-29 November 20, 2007While aviation accidents in the United States are relatively infrequent, recent incidents have heightened concerns about safety on airport runways and ramps. As the nation's aviation system becomes more crowded every day, increased congestion at airports may exacerbate ground safety concerns. To safely handle the anticipated larger volumes of air traffic, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is implementing the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) to better manage air traffic both in the air and on the ground. GAO was asked to evaluate (1) the progress being made in addressing runway safety and what additional measures, if any, could be taken and (2) the factors affecting progress in improving ramp safety and what is being done by FAA and others to address those factors. We reviewed runway and ramp safety data, interviewed agency officials and industry stakeholders, and surveyed experts.
FAA and aviation stakeholders have taken steps to address runway and ramp safety, including deploying and testing technology designed to prevent runway incursions, which occur when aircraft enter the runway without authorization, and overruns, which occur when aircraft run off the ends of runways; helping to change airport layout, markings, signage, and lighting; and providing training for pilots and air traffic controllers. In addition, FAA has made progress in addressing runway overruns and reports that 70 percent of the runways at U.S. commercial airports substantially comply with runway safety area standards, up from 55 percent in 2000. However, the rate of runway incursions has not decreased over the last 5 years. In addition, FAA has not prepared a national runway safety plan since 2002, despite agency policy that it be updated every 2 to 3 years, resulting in uncoordinated efforts within the agency. Runway safety technology currently being installed is experiencing some operational difficulties with its alerting function, while additional technology to prevent runway collisions is years away from deployment. FAA also lacks data on runway overruns that could be used to analyze the causes and circumstances of such incidents. Air traffic controller fatigue, which may result from regularly working overtime, continues to be a matter of concern for the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), which investigates transportation accidents, and other aviation stakeholders. Efforts to improve safety in airport ramp areas, where departing and arriving aircraft are serviced by baggage, catering, and fueling personnel, are hindered by a lack of complete accident data and standards for ground handling, but the aviation industry is taking steps to address these problems with the goal of reducing ramp accidents. Data from 2001 through 2006 from the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), which investigates occupational accidents, NTSB, and FAA indicated that these agencies had investigated 29 fatal ramp accidents during that time. The majority of the fatalities in these accidents were ramp workers. GAO found no comprehensive nonfatal injury data on ramp accidents and neither federal nor industrywide standards for ramp operations. The federal government has generally taken an indirect role overseeing ramp safety; airlines and airports typically control the ramp areas using their own policies and procedures. Meanwhile, some airlines and airports have initiated their own efforts to address ramp safety, and aviation organizations have begun collecting ramp accident data.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-08-29, Aviation Runway and Ramp Safety: Sustained Efforts to Address Leadership, Technology, and Other Challenges Needed to Reduce Accidents and Incidents
This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-08-29
entitled 'Aviation Runway and Ramp Safety: Sustained Efforts to Address
Leadership, Technology, and Other Challenges Needed to Reduce Accidents
and Incidents' which was released on December 5, 2007.
This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part
of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this
document to Webmaster@gao.gov.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this
material separately.
Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
November 2007:
Aviation Runway and Ramp Safety:
Sustained Efforts to Address Leadership, Technology, and Other
Challenges Needed to Reduce Accidents and Incidents:
GAO-08-29:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-29, a report to congressional requesters.
Why GAO Did This Study:
While aviation accidents in the United States are relatively
infrequent, recent incidents have heightened concerns about safety on
airport runways and ramps. As the nation‘s aviation system becomes more
crowded every day, increased congestion at airports may exacerbate
ground safety concerns. To safely handle the anticipated larger volumes
of air traffic, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is
implementing the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) to
better manage air traffic both in the air and on the ground. GAO was
asked to evaluate (1) the progress being made in addressing runway
safety and what additional measures, if any, could be taken and (2) the
factors affecting progress in improving ramp safety and what is being
done by FAA and others to address those factors. We reviewed runway and
ramp safety data, interviewed agency officials and industry
stakeholders, and surveyed experts.
What GAO Found:
FAA and aviation stakeholders have taken steps to address runway and
ramp safety, including deploying and testing technology designed to
prevent runway incursions, which occur when aircraft enter the runway
without authorization, and overruns, which occur when aircraft run off
the ends of runways; helping to change airport layout, markings,
signage, and lighting; and providing training for pilots and air
traffic controllers. In addition, FAA has made progress in addressing
runway overruns and reports that 70 percent of the runways at U.S.
commercial airports substantially comply with runway safety area
standards, up from 55 percent in 2000. However, the rate of runway
incursions has not decreased over the last 5 years. In addition, FAA
has not prepared a national runway safety plan since 2002, despite
agency policy that it be updated every 2 to 3 years, resulting in
uncoordinated efforts within the agency. Runway safety technology
currently being installed is experiencing some operational difficulties
with its alerting function, while additional technology to prevent
runway collisions is years away from deployment. FAA also lacks data on
runway overruns that could be used to analyze the causes and
circumstances of such incidents. Air traffic controller fatigue, which
may result from regularly working overtime, continues to be a matter of
concern for the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), which
investigates transportation accidents, and other aviation stakeholders.
Efforts to improve safety in airport ramp areas, where departing and
arriving aircraft are serviced by baggage, catering, and fueling
personnel, are hindered by a lack of complete accident data and
standards for ground handling, but the aviation industry is taking
steps to address these problems with the goal of reducing ramp
accidents. Data from 2001 through 2006 from the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA), which investigates occupational
accidents, NTSB, and FAA indicated that these agencies had investigated
29 fatal ramp accidents during that time. The majority of the
fatalities in these accidents were ramp workers. GAO found no
comprehensive nonfatal injury data on ramp accidents and neither
federal nor industrywide standards for ramp operations. The federal
government has generally taken an indirect role overseeing ramp safety;
airlines and airports typically control the ramp areas using their own
policies and procedures. Meanwhile, some airlines and airports have
initiated their own efforts to address ramp safety, and aviation
organizations have begun collecting ramp accident data.
Figure: Three Illustrations:
[See PDF for image]
This figure contains the following illustrations:
Runway Incursion;
Runway Overrun;
Terminal and Ramp Area.
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that FAA take several measures to enhance runway and
ramp safety, such as updating its national runway safety plan,
collecting data on runway overruns, and working with OSHA and industry
to collect and analyze better information on ramp accidents. DOT agreed
to consider the report‘s recommendations.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.GAO-08-29]. For more information, contact Gerald
L. Dillingham, Ph.D. at (202) 512-2834 or dillinghamg@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Challenges Remain Despite Numerous Efforts to Address Runway Safety:
Progress in Addressing Ramp Safety Is Affected by a Lack of Data and
Standards, but the Industry Is Taking Action to Address these Issues:
Conclusions:
Recommendations:
Agency Comments:
Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Survey Methodology:
Appendix III: Serious Incursions Involving Commercial Aircraft:
Appendix IV: Status of the National Runway Safety Plan Objectives:
Appendix V: Airports with Surface Surveillance Technology:
Appendix VI: Airports Where Ramp Accident Fatalities Occurred:
Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Experts' Ranking of the Most Effective FAA Actions to Address
Runway Incursions:
Table 2: Changes in ASDE-X Equipment Cost and Deployment Completion
Dates:
Table 3: ASDE-X Commissioned Airports as of August 2007:
Table 4: Experts' Ranking of the Actions that FAA Could Take with the
Most Potential to Address Runway Incursions:
Table 5: Experts' Ranking of the Most Effective Actions by FAA, OSHA,
Airports, and Airlines to Address Ramp Accidents:
Table 6: Experts' Ranking of the Actions that FAA, OSHA, Airports, or
Airlines Could Take with the Most Potential to Address Ramp Accidents:
Table 7: List of Organizations that GAO Visited or Contacted Regarding
Runway and Ramp Safety:
Table 8: Serious Incursions Involving At Least One Commercial Aircraft
during Fiscal Year 2006 and Fiscal Year 2007:
Table 9: Implementation Status of the Objectives Contained in Federal
Aviation Administration's (FAA) National Runway Safety Plan for 2002-
2004:
Table 10: Airports with Airport Surface Detection Equipment, Model 3
(ASDE-3)/Airport Movement Area Safety Systems (AMASS) or the Airport
Surface Detection Equipment, Model X (ASDE-X) or Scheduled to Receive
ASDE-X:
Table 11: U.S. Airports at which Ramp Fatalities Occurred from 2001
through 2006:
Figures:
Figure 1: Movement and Nonmovement Areas of the General Mitchell
International Airport in Milwaukee, WI:
Figure 2: Number and Rate of Runway Incursions from Fiscal Year 1998
through Fiscal Year 2007:
Figure 3: Total Number of Serious Incursions, Fiscal Year 2001 through
Fiscal Year 2007:
Figure 4: U.S. Commercial Airports that Experienced the Most Runway
Incursions from Fiscal Year 2001 through Fiscal Year 2006:
Figure 5: Photograph of the December 2005 Runway Overrun at Chicago
Midway Airport:
Figure 6: Example of an Accident in an Airport Ramp Area:
Figure 7: Airport Surface Detection Equipment, Model X (ASDE-X)
Deployment Sites:
Figure 8: Runway Status Lights System:
Figure 9: Aircraft Taxiing Routes at the Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta
International Airport Without Using the Perimeter Taxiway:
Figure 10: Aircraft Taxiing Route at the Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta
International Airport Using the Perimeter Taxiway:
Figure 11: Example of How EMAS Can Stop an Aircraft:
Figure 12: Annual Number of Ramp Fatalities at U.S. Airports from 2001
through 2006:
Figure 13: Questions Asked in First Survey:
Abbreviations:
ADS-B: Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast:
AMASS: Airport Movement Area Safety System:
ASDE-3: Airport Surface Detection Equipment, Model 3:
ASDE-X: Airport Surface Detection Equipment, Model X:
CAST: Commercial Aviation Safety Team:
EMAS: Engineered Materials Arresting System:
DOT: Department of Transportation:
FAA: Federal Aviation Administration:
ICAO: International Civil Aviation Organization:
JPDO: Joint Planning and Development Office:
NextGen: Next Generation Air Transportation System:
NTSB: National Transportation Safety Board:
OMB: Office of Management and Budget:
OSHA: Occupational Safety and Health Administration:
OSH Act: Occupational Safety and Health Act:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
November 20, 2007:
The Honorable Jerry F. Costello:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on Aviation:
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Frank R. Lautenberg:
United States Senate:
While aviation accidents in the United States are relatively
infrequent, recent incidents have heightened concerns about safety on
airport runways and ramps.[Footnote 1] On August 16, 2007, for example,
at Los Angeles International Airport--one of the nation's busiest
airports--two commercial aircraft carrying 296 people came within 37
feet of colliding, resulting in an incident called a runway incursion.
In another example, in 2005, an aircraft departing from Seattle-Tacoma
International Airport, carrying 142 people, experienced sudden cabin
depressurization caused by a ramp vehicle having punctured the aircraft
fuselage while on the ramp. As the nation's aviation system becomes
more crowded every day, increased congestion at airports may exacerbate
ground safety concerns. To safely handle the anticipated larger volumes
of air traffic, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is
implementing the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) to
better manage air traffic both in the air and on the ground. At
airports, FAA focuses its safety oversight on the movement areas--
runways and taxiways[Footnote 2]--where the chances of catastrophic
accidents are greater than other areas. By contrast, safety oversight
of operations in the ramp areas of airports is handled primarily by
airlines and airports.
To respond to your request, our objective was to determine how well FAA
and others are addressing runway and ramp safety issues. To accomplish
this, we focused on the following questions: (1) What progress is being
made in addressing runway safety, and what additional measures, if any,
could be taken? and (2) What factors affect progress in improving ramp
safety and what is being done by FAA and others to address those
factors?
To answer these questions, we reviewed data on runway and ramp safety
incidents and accidents from FAA, the National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB), and the Department of Labor's Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) and Bureau of Labor Statistics; relevant
laws, regulations, and agency policies; and federal government and
aviation industry efforts to address runway and ramp safety, including
the development of new technology. We also looked at how taxiways
affect runway safety. In addition, we interviewed FAA, NTSB, OSHA,
airport, and aviation trade organization officials reflecting various
segments of the industry, as well as pilots, air traffic controllers,
and ramp workers and their union representatives. We also surveyed
experts[Footnote 3] on the causes of runway and ramp incidents and
accidents, the effectiveness of measures that are being taken to
address them, and what additional measures could be taken. A majority
of the experts was selected with the assistance of the National Academy
of Sciences, and we identified additional experts during our review.
The individuals were selected on the basis of their expertise in areas
such as technology and procedures used to address runway incursions,
overruns, and ramp accidents; international aviation safety practices;
human factors issues; general aviation; airports; and ground
operations. We report the survey results in terms of actions that are
most effective or future actions that have the greatest potential.
Through our analyses, the actions that we report as being most
effective or having the greatest potential were ones that a majority of
respondents indicated were very or extremely effective for the
effectiveness questions or great or very great potential for the
questions asking about potential. Because we asked the experts to
answer questions only within their areas of expertise, a different
number of responses were received for various survey questions. Based
on interviews with officials knowledgeable about the data contained in
this report, we determined that runway and ramp safety data were
sufficiently reliable for the types of analyses that we performed for
this report such as trends in runway incursions, the incidence of
fatalities in airport ramp areas, and frequency of air traffic
controller overtime. We conducted our work in Atlanta, GA; Atlantic
City, NJ; Boston, MA; Burbank, Long Beach, Los Angeles, and San Diego,
CA; Newark, NJ; Seattle and Spokane, WA; and Washington, D.C. These
locations included airports that have experienced higher rates of
runway incursions or where new aviation safety technology was being
researched or tested. We conducted our work from October 2006 through
November 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Appendix I contains additional information about our
methods. Detailed information about our survey methodology and the
survey questions are contained in appendix II.
Results in Brief:
FAA and other aviation stakeholders have taken steps to address runway
and ramp safety, but the lack of coordination and leadership,
technology challenges, the lack of data, and human factors-related
issues impede further progress. Our analysis showed that FAA had
completed or was in the process of implementing 34 of the 39
initiatives contained in its 2002 national runway safety plan; 4
initiatives were canceled and 1 pertaining to deploying certain
technology was not met. The completed initiatives included deploying
and testing other technology designed to prevent runway collisions and
overruns; helping change airport layout, markings, signage, and
lighting; and providing training for pilots and air traffic
controllers. Of the measures that FAA is taking to address runway
incursions, the results of our survey of experts indicated that the
most effective actions were lower-cost ones, such as enhancing airport
markings, lighting, and signage. In addition, FAA has made progress in
addressing runway overruns and reported in May 2007 that 70 percent of
the runways at U.S. commercial airports substantially comply with
runway safety area standards, up from 55 percent in 2000. Runway safety
areas reduce the chance of aircraft being damaged from overruns. While
the number and rate of incursions declined after reaching a peak in
fiscal year 2001 and remained relatively constant for the next 5 years,
preliminary data for fiscal year 2007 indicate that the overall
incursion rate increased during fiscal year 2007 and is nearly as high
as the fiscal year 2001 peak. FAA's Office of Runway Safety has also
not carried out its leadership role in recent years. The office's role
is to lead the agency's runway safety efforts by coordinating and
monitoring runway safety activities to ensure that goals are met. Those
goals were established in 2002 in a national runway safety plan.
However, FAA has not updated the plan, despite agency policy that such
a plan be prepared every 2 to 3 years. The lack of an updated plan has
resulted in uncoordinated runway safety efforts by individual FAA
offices. Moreover, runway safety technology currently being installed,
the Airport Surface Detection Equipment, Model X (ASDE-X), which is
designed to provide air traffic controllers with the position and
identification of aircraft and alerts of potential collisions, has
faced cost increases and schedule delays from its original baselines
and is experiencing operational difficulties with its alerting
function. At the same time, additional technology to prevent runway
collisions is years away from deployment. FAA also lacks reliable
runway safety data and the mechanisms to ensure that the data are
complete. Furthermore, air traffic controller fatigue, which may result
from regularly working overtime, continues to be a matter of concern
for NTSB, which investigates transportation accidents, and other
aviation stakeholders. We found that, as of May 2007, at least 20
percent of the controllers at 25 air traffic control facilities,
including towers at several of the country's busiest airports, were
regularly working 6-day weeks. FAA could take additional measures to
improve runway safety. These measures include starting a nonpunitive,
confidential, voluntary program for air traffic controllers to report
safety risks in the national airspace system, which includes runways
and taxiways, similar to a program that FAA has already established for
pilots and others in the aviation community, and could help the agency
to understand the causes and circumstances regarding runway safety
incidents. The results of our survey of experts indicated that the
action FAA could take with the greatest potential for preventing runway
incursions was encouraging the use of lighting systems that guide
aircraft on their airport taxi routes. The results of our survey of
experts also indicated that the actions with the greatest potential
that FAA could take to prevent runway overruns included addressing the
causes and circumstances of overruns, such as improving communication
of runway conditions and weather information to flight crews, and
encouraging improvements in and use of runway condition and friction
measurements, which provide data regarding the slickness of a runway.
Efforts to improve airport ramp safety are hindered by a lack of
complete accident data and standards for ground handling. Such data
could help FAA and the aviation industry to understand the nature and
extent of the problem, as a first step to identifying what actions are
needed to reduce ramp accidents. We found no complete source of data on
ramp accidents, but reviewed ramp fatality data from 2001 through 2006
from FAA, OSHA, and NTSB, and found that these agencies had
investigated 29 fatal ramp accidents during that time. The majority of
the fatalities in these accidents were ramp workers. We found no
complete nonfatal injury data on ramp accidents. In addition, we found
no federal or industrywide standards for ramp operations. The federal
government has generally taken an indirect role in overseeing ramp
safety; airlines and airports typically control the ramp areas using
their own policies and procedures. Meanwhile, some airlines and
airports have initiated their own efforts to address ramp safety, and
aviation organizations have begun collecting ramp accident data. We
asked experts to provide their views on those industry efforts, and
they indicated that the most effective ones were being taken mainly by
airlines, for example, by setting safety targets and using ramp towers.
In addition, an international aviation association plans next year to
start a safety audit program of companies with employees who work in
airport ramp areas, which would be a step toward applying standardized
criteria to these companies. Officials from a union representing ramp
workers said that FAA should increase its safety oversight of ramp
areas, while other aviation industry officials said that FAA's
resources are more appropriately focused on the runways and taxiways,
where there are greater safety risks to passengers. The results of our
survey of experts indicated that the action FAA, OSHA, airport, or
airlines could take with the greatest potential for preventing ramp
accidents was promoting a safety culture in the ramp area.
We are recommending that FAA take several measures to enhance runway
and ramp safety, which include preparing a new national runway safety
plan, improving data collection on runway overruns and ramp accidents,
and addressing air traffic controller overtime and fatigue issues that
may affect runway safety. We provided the Department of Transportation
(DOT) and the Department of Labor with drafts of this report for their
review and comment. DOT agreed to consider the report's recommendations
and provided technical corrections and clarifications, which we
incorporated as appropriate. The Department of Labor had no comments
but provided a technical correction, which we incorporated.
Background:
Demand for air travel has increased in recent years, with over 740
million passengers flying in the United States in fiscal year 2006, and
is expected to climb to an estimated 1 billion passengers per year by
2015. To meet this demand, the Joint Planning and Development Office
(JPDO), housed within FAA and created to plan and coordinate the
transition to NextGen, has developed a strategy to establish the needed
national airspace system infrastructure, including airports. JPDO's
objectives include providing air traffic control and airport
authorities with greater flexibility to match capacity with demand,
reducing congestion, and establishing a comprehensive safety management
approach. Implementing the plan will include deploying Automatic
Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B), a satellite-based technology
that broadcasts aircraft identification, position and speed with once-
per-second updates, which will provide pilots with greater situational
awareness and help to keep aircraft at safe distances from each other
on the runways.
Safety at airports in the United States is a shared responsibility
among FAA, airlines, and airports. FAA air traffic controllers oversee
activity in the movement areas--runways and taxiways--but airlines and
airports provide primary safety oversight in the nonmovement areas--
ramps and gates.[Footnote 4] Figure 1 shows the movement and
nonmovement areas of the General Mitchell International Airport in
Milwaukee, WI.
Figure 1: Movement and Nonmovement Areas of the General Mitchell
International Airport in Milwaukee, WI:
[See PDF for image]
This illustration of the Movement and Nonmovement Areas of the General
Mitchell International Airport depicts the following data:
Non-movement areas (ramps and gates):
Northeast Hangar Area;
Wisconsin Air National Guard;
Private Aircraft Services;
US Air Force Reserve;
Aircraft Engine Testing Facility;
Cargo Ramp;
Corporate Hangars;
West Ramp;
C Concourse;
D Concourse;
E Concourse.
Movement area (runways):
Runway 19R-1L;
Runway 19L-1R;
Runway 13-31;
Runway 25R-7L;
Runway 25L-7R.
Movement area (taxiways):
Taxiway A;
Taxiway A1;
Taxiway A2;
Taxiway A3;
Taxiway A4;
Taxiway A5;
Taxiway A6;
Taxiway B;
Taxiway C;
Taxiway D;
Taxiway D1;
Taxiway E;
Taxiway F;
Taxiway F1;
Taxiway F2;
Taxiway G;
Taxiway H;
Taxiway M;
Taxiway N;
Taxiway P;
Taxiway R;
Taxiway R3;
Taxiway R4;
Taxiway S;
Taxiway T;
Taxiway U;
Taxiway V;
Taxiway W;
Taxiway Z.
Other areas depicted:
Terminal;
International Arrivals;
Parking Structure;
Control Tower;
Firehouse;
Maintenance;
Fuel Farm.
Source: General Mitchell International Airport and GAO.
[End of figure]
Runway safety is a major aviation safety concern that involves measures
to prevent runway incursions and overruns. Through September 2007, FAA
defined a runway incursion as "any occurrence in the runway environment
involving an aircraft, vehicle, person, or object on the ground that
creates a collision hazard or results in a loss of required separation
when an aircraft is taking off, intending to take off, landing, or
intending to land." On October 1, 2007, FAA began using a definition of
a runway incursion developed by the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO), a United Nations specialized agency.[Footnote 5]
ICAO's definition of an incursion is any occurrence at an airport
involving the incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle, or person on
the protected area of a surface designated for the landing or take-off
of aircraft. Runway incursion prevention has been on NTSB's list of
most wanted transportation improvements since 1990 because runway
collisions can have serious consequences. Six runway collisions have
occurred in the United States since 1990, resulting in 63 deaths. The
worst runway accident in the United States occurred at the Los Angeles
International Airport in 1991, when an aircraft that was landing
collided with another that was holding on the same runway, killing 34
people. The most recent fatal runway collision in the United States
occurred in 2000, when two general aviation aircraft collided on the
runway at the Sarasota Bradenton International Airport in Florida,
resulting in 4 fatalities.[Footnote 6] Other runway incidents, which
FAA did not classify as incursions, also can have serious consequences.
On August 27, 2006, for example, a Comair regional jet crashed in
Lexington, KY, after taking off from a wrong runway that was too short
for the aircraft, killing all but one of the 50 people onboard.
[Footnote 7]
The number and rate of runway incursions rose in the 1990s before
peaking in fiscal year 2001 (see fig. 2). In fiscal year 2001, there
were 407 incursions at a rate of 6.1 incursions per 1 million air
traffic control tower operations, compared to fiscal year 2006, when
there were 330 incursions at a rate of 5.4 incursions per 1 million
tower operations. As shown in fig. 2, the rate of incursions remained
relatively constant from fiscal year 2002 through fiscal year 2006, at
an average rate of 5.2 incursions per 1 million tower operations.
However, preliminary FAA data indicate 370 incursions occurred during
fiscal year 2007, representing a rate of 6.05 incursions per 1 million
air traffic control tower operations. The preliminary rate of
incursions for fiscal year 2007 is about 12 percent higher than during
fiscal year 2006 and is nearly as high as when the rate of incursions
reached a peak in fiscal year 2001.
Figure 2: Number and Rate of Runway Incursions from Fiscal Year 1998
through Fiscal Year 2007:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a combined vertical bar and line graph. The left
vertical axis of the graph represents number of runway incursions, from
0 to 500 (indicated by bars for each fiscal year). The right vertical
axis of the graph represents rate of runway incursions (indicated by a
line). The horizontal axis of the graph represents fiscal year from
1998 through 2007. The following data is depicted (number are
approximate):
Fiscal year: 1998;
Number of runway incursions: 300;
Rate of runway incursions (per 1 million tower operations): 4.7.
Fiscal year: 1999;
Number of runway incursions: 325;
Rate of runway incursions (per 1 million tower operations): 4.8.
Fiscal year: 2000;
Number of runway incursions: 400;
Rate of runway incursions (per 1 million tower operations): 6.o.
Fiscal year: 2001;
Number of runway incursions: 407;
Rate of runway incursions (per 1 million tower operations): 6.1.
Fiscal year: 2002;
Number of runway incursions: 325;
Rate of runway incursions (per 1 million tower operations): 5.4.
Fiscal year: 2003;
Number of runway incursions: 310;
Rate of runway incursions (per 1 million tower operations): 5.3.
Fiscal year: 2004;
Number of runway incursions: 315;
Rate of runway incursions (per 1 million tower operations): 5.3.
Fiscal year: 2005;
Number of runway incursions: 315;
Rate of runway incursions (per 1 million tower operations): 5.3;
Fiscal year: 2006;
Number of runway incursions: 330;
Rate of runway incursions (per 1 million tower operations): 5.4.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Number of runway incursions: 370;
Rate of runway incursions (per 1 million tower operations): 6.05.
Source: FAA.
Note: Fiscal year 2007 data are preliminary.
[End of figure]
Since 2001, FAA has classified the severity of runway incursions into
four categories--A through D.[Footnote 8] The number and rates of
serious incursions--categories A and B, where collisions were narrowly
or barely avoided--have continued to occur at about the same level from
fiscal year 2002 through fiscal year 2006 at an average of about 30
serious incursions per year and an average rate of 0.5 serious
incursions per 1 million air traffic control tower operations.
Preliminary data indicate that 24 serious incursions occurred during
fiscal year 2007, compared to 31 during fiscal year 2006. The
preliminary rate of serious incursions for fiscal year 2007 is 0.39 per
1 million air traffic control tower operations, which is about 24
percent less than during fiscal year 2006, when the rate of serious
incursions was 0.51 per 1 million tower operations.
Although most runway incursions involve general aviation aircraft,
[Footnote 9] about one-third of the most serious incursions from fiscal
year 2002 through fiscal year 2007 (categories A and B)-- about 9 per
year--involved at least one commercial aircraft that can carry many
passengers (see fig. 3). For example, on July 11, 2007, a collision
between two aircraft carrying 172 people was narrowly averted at the
Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood Airport in Florida, when a Boeing 757 that
had just touched down was able to become airborne again to avoid
hitting an Airbus A320 aircraft that was approaching the same runway.
An NTSB preliminary report indicated that the two aircraft missed each
other by less than 100 feet. According to NTSB, it has investigated
several near collisions in recent years that could have been
catastrophic if they had not been averted through pilot skill and luck.
Appendix III contains a list of serious incursions involving at least
one commercial aircraft during fiscal year 2006 and fiscal year 2007.
Figure 3: Total Number of Serious Incursions, Fiscal Year 2001 through
Fiscal Year 2007:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a stacked bar graph. Each bar depicts both serious
incursions not involving commercial aircraft and serious incursions
involving at least one commercial aircraft. The vertical axis of the
graph represents number of incursions from 0 to 60. The horizontal axis
of the graph represents fiscal years from 2001 through 2007. The
following data is depicted (numbers are approximations):
Fiscal year 2001:
Serious incursions not involving commercial aircraft: 27;
Serious incursions involving at least one commercial aircraft: 25;
Total number of incursions: 52.
Fiscal year 2002:
Serious incursions not involving commercial aircraft: 26;
Serious incursions involving at least one commercial aircraft: 10;
Total number of incursions: 36.
Fiscal year 2003:
Serious incursions not involving commercial aircraft: 24;
Serious incursions involving at least one commercial aircraft: 8;
Total number of incursions: 32.
Fiscal year 2004:
Serious incursions not involving commercial aircraft: 19;
Serious incursions involving at least one commercial aircraft: 8;
Total number of incursions: 27.
Fiscal year 2005:
Serious incursions not involving commercial aircraft: 20;
Serious incursions involving at least one commercial aircraft: 8;
Total number of incursions: 28.
Fiscal year 2006:
Serious incursions not involving commercial aircraft: 21;
Serious incursions involving at least one commercial aircraft: 9;
Total number of incursions: 30.
Fiscal year 2007:
Serious incursions not involving commercial aircraft: 17;
Serious incursions involving at least one commercial aircraft: 6;
Total number of incursions: 23.
Source: FAA.
Note: Fiscal year 2007 data are preliminary.
[End of figure]
FAA officials, experts we surveyed, and officials at some airports that
have experienced the most incursions said that runway incursions were
caused by many different factors, including airport complexity,
frequency of runway crossings, the amount of air traffic,
miscommunication between air traffic controllers and pilots, a lack of
situational awareness on the airfield by pilots, and performance and
judgment errors by air traffic controllers and pilots. According to
FAA, 54 percent of incursions from fiscal year 2003 through fiscal year
2006 were caused by pilot errors, 29 percent were caused by air traffic
controller errors, and 17 percent were caused by vehicle operator or
pedestrian errors.
In the United States, most runway incursions have occurred at major
commercial airports. Figure 4 shows the 10 U.S. commercial airports
that have experienced the most runway incursions from fiscal year 2001
through fiscal year 2006 and the overall number of incursions and the
number of serious incursions that occurred at those airports during
that time.
Figure 4: U.S. Commercial Airports that Experienced the Most Runway
Incursions from Fiscal Year 2001 through Fiscal Year 2006:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a stacked bar graph. Each bar depicts both serious
incursions (categories A and B) and All other incursions (categories C
and D). The vertical axis of the graph represents number of incursions
from 0 to 50. The horizontal axis of the graph represents airports. The
following data is depicted (numbers are approximations):
Airport: Los Angeles;
Serious incursions (categories A and B): 8;
All other incursions (categories C and D): 39;
Total incursions: 47.
Airport: Chicago O'Hare;
Serious incursions (categories A and B): 8;
All other incursions (categories C and D): 35;
Total incursions: 43.
Airport: Philadelphia;
Serious incursions (categories A and B): 1;
All other incursions (categories C and D): 35;
Total incursions: 36.
Airport: Boston Logan;
Serious incursions (categories A and B): 2;
All other incursions (categories C and D): 30;
Total incursions: 32.
Airport: Atlanta;
Serious incursions (categories A and B): 3;
All other incursions (categories C and D): 27;
Total incursions: 30.
Airport: Phoenix;
Serious incursions (categories A and B): 4;
All other incursions (categories C and D): 26;
Total incursions: 30.
Airport: Dallas/Fort Worth;
Serious incursions (categories A and B): 3;
All other incursions (categories C and D): 25;
Total incursions: 28.
Airport: St. Louis;
Serious incursions (categories A and B): 2;
All other incursions (categories C and D): 26;
Total incursions: 28.
Airport: Newark;
Serious incursions (categories A and B): 2;
All other incursions (categories C and D): 24;
Total incursions: 26.
Airport: Las Vegas;
Serious incursions (categories A and B): 1;
All other incursions (categories C and D): 24;
Total incursions: 25.
Source: GAO analysis of FAA data.
[End of figure]
In addition to incursions, overruns are a runway safety concern. When
an aircraft overruns the end of a runway during an aborted takeoff or
while landing, the results can be serious. In December 2005, for
example, a Southwest Boeing 737 overran the runway at the Chicago
Midway Airport during a snowstorm, ran through airport fencing, and
collided with a car on an adjacent roadway, resulting in one fatality
(see fig. 5).[Footnote 10] Since 2001, NTSB has investigated 12 runway
overruns that resulted in 18 fatalities, usually involving smaller
general aviation aircraft. NTSB attributed the overruns primarily to
pilot error, such as misjudgments of speed and distance.
Figure 5: Photograph of the December 2005 Runway Overrun at Chicago
Midway Airport:
[See PDF for image]
Source: Copywrite, Allan Goldstein, Aerial Images Photography
(Illinois). Reprint with permission. All rights reserved.
[End of figure]
FAA has established standards for runway safety areas, which are
unobstructed areas surrounding a runway, to enhance safety in the event
that an aircraft overruns, undershoots, or veers off a runway. FAA
airport design standards generally require commercial airports to
establish, to the extent practicable, 1,000-foot runway safety areas at
both ends of a runway.[Footnote 11] In 1999, FAA established its Runway
Safety Area Program, administered by the Office of Airport Safety and
Standards, to help commercial airports meet runway safety area
standards.[Footnote 12] In 2005, FAA set a goal of having commercial
service airports make all practicable improvements to runway safety
areas by 2015.[Footnote 13] Also in 2005, Congress enacted legislation
requiring the owner or operator of a commercial service
airport[Footnote 14] to meet FAA runway safety area standards by
December 31, 2015. The importance of establishing a runway safety area
was demonstrated during the crash of an American Airlines MD-82 in
Little Rock, AR, on June 1, 1999, when it overran the runway, went down
a rock embankment, and collided with a structure supporting a lighting
system, killing 11 passengers and crew. According to NTSB, the airport
had a runway safety area that was only 550 feet in length beyond the
end of the runway. Experts we surveyed said that runway overruns are
caused by factors such as pilot misjudgments about speed, altitude, or
distance; inadequate information on weather and runway conditions; and
aircraft equipment failure.
Although not considered part of the movement area of an airport, ramp
areas can be dangerous for ground workers and passengers. Airport ramps
are typically small, congested areas in which departing and arriving
aircraft are serviced by ramp workers, including baggage, catering, and
fueling personnel. Other personnel present on ramps include airport
police, FAA officials, and other airport, airline, and vendor staff.
The presence of a large number of people utilizing equipment in a
relatively small area, often under considerable time pressure, creates
an environment in which injuries and fatalities and aircraft and
equipment damage can occur. Figure 6 shows an example of a ramp
accident.
Figure 6: Example of an Accident in an Airport Ramp Area:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a photograph of a ramp accident.
Source: Copywrite, Rogerio Carvalho. Reprinted with permission. All
rights reserved.
[End of figure]
Activities in the ramp area can also affect the safety of air crew and
passengers once they leave the ramp area. Undetected aircraft damage
from ramp activities can cause in-flight emergencies. In December 2005,
for example, an Alaska Airlines MD-80 that had departed from Seattle to
Burbank, CA, experienced a sudden cabin depressurization. After the
aircraft safely returned to Seattle, it was discovered that a ramp
vehicle had punctured the aircraft fuselage, but the incident had not
been reported.
Aviation organizations have attempted to quantify the nature, extent,
and cost of ramp accidents. According to the experts we surveyed, these
errors occur as a result of multiple causes, such as carelessness,
distractions, confusion, and inadequate training of ramp workers; lack
of supervision; and time pressure. The Flight Safety Foundation, an
aviation safety research organization, has estimated that ground
accidents worldwide cost air carriers $10 billion annually, including
costs associated with injuries and fatalities and other indirect costs
such as canceled flights.[Footnote 15] However, these research efforts
have also been hindered by a lack of data. In a 2002 study of ramp
worker accidents, FAA noted the difficulty of obtaining nonfatality
data.[Footnote 16] The Flight Safety Foundation also noted the limited
amount of data available for its 2004 study of damage and injury on
airport ramps.[Footnote 17]
Federal Roles in Runway and Ramp Safety:
FAA has primary federal responsibility for runway safety. Several FAA
offices carry out these responsibilities, including:
* the Air Traffic Organization, which manages air traffic control--
including the hiring, training, and managing of more than 14,300 air
traffic controllers--and develops and maintains runway safety
technology;
* the Office of Runway Safety, created in 1999 as part of the Air
Traffic Organization to lead and coordinate the agency's runway safety
efforts--including developing a national runway safety plan and metrics
for runway safety--and evaluate the effectiveness of runway safety
activities;
* the William J. Hughes Technical Center in Atlantic City, NJ, which
conducts aviation safety research;[Footnote 18]
* the Office of Airports--which, as of July 2007, employed 45 safety
inspectors to check airports' compliance with regulations--develops
standards for airport signage, markings, and lighting, and manages the
agency's Runway Safety Area Program to address runway overruns;
* the Office of Aviation Safety, which conducts safety inspections of
airlines, audits air traffic safety issues, and administers a program
to obtain information from pilots about the circumstances of runway
incursions; and;
* the Civil Aerospace Medical Institute in Oklahoma City, which
conducts aerospace medical and human factors research.
FAA's oversight of ramp areas is provided indirectly through its
certification of airlines and airports.[Footnote 19] FAA has statutory
authority to investigate aviation accidents including those that occur
in ramp areas.[Footnote 20] Pursuant to an FAA order, it is responsible
for "ensuring that all facts, conditions, and circumstances leading to
the accident are recorded and evaluated and action is taken to prevent
similar accidents."[Footnote 21] According to NTSB officials, that
agency also investigates aviation accidents, including incursions and
overruns that result in accidents, and selected runway incursions--
those that are the most severe or those that the board believes
represent the most safety benefit. NTSB investigates ramp accidents
when someone is onboard the aircraft, when flight is intended or when a
death or serious injury or substantial damage to the aircraft occurs.
Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act), OSHA has
statutory authority to govern the occupational safety and health of
employees.[Footnote 22] According to OSHA officials, the agency
investigates ramp accidents when they involve fatalities or the
hospitalization of three or more employees and conducts workplace
inspections in response to complaints from workers.[Footnote 23]
According to a 2000 memorandum of understanding between OSHA and FAA
relating to coordination and enforcement of the OSH Act, OSHA does not
investigate accidents involving crew members on aircraft in operation.
Challenges Remain Despite Numerous Efforts to Address Runway Safety:
FAA has undertaken a number of efforts to address runway safety
problems involving incursions and overruns. The agency has taken a
layered approach to meet many of the runway safety strategic objectives
it set in 2002. However, the lack of coordination and leadership among
FAA's runway safety efforts, technology challenges, the lack of data,
and human factors issues impede further progress in addressing runway
safety. Because the number and rate of runway incursions did not
decrease from fiscal year 2002 through fiscal year 2006 and remains at
a level higher than any time during the 1990s, FAA could take
additional cost-effective measures to improve runway safety. These
measures include ensuring that FAA's Office of Runway Safety operates
as a coordinating entity for the agency's runway safety efforts, as
well as establishing a new voluntary safety incident reporting program
for air traffic controllers.
FAA Uses a Layered Approach to Reduce the Risks of Runway Incursions
and Overruns:
FAA's layered approach to addressing runway safety includes a range of
actions, such as deploying, researching, and testing new technology;
encouraging airport improvements, such as changes to layout, markings,
signage, and lighting; and providing human factors training for pilots
and air traffic controllers. Our analysis found that FAA completed or
was in the process of implementing 34 of the 39 runway safety
objectives it set in its most recent national runway safety plan,
issued in 2002, as a means of reducing the severity, number, and rate
of runway incursions[Footnote 24] (see app. IV). Most of the completed
objectives involved (1) developing and distributing runway safety
education and training materials to controllers, pilots, and other
airport users; (2) supporting and developing new technologies intended
to reduce the potential for runway collisions; and (3) assessing and
modifying procedures to enhance runway safety.[Footnote 25] The results
of our survey of experts indicated that the most effective actions that
FAA was taking were lower-cost measures, such as enhancing airport
markings, lighting, and signage (see table 1). Some experts noted that
markings, lighting, and signage help keep aircraft from becoming lost
on the airfield and accidentally entering an active runway. The testing
of runway status lights--technology that is more expensive to deploy
than improving airport markings, lighting, and signage--is another
action that a majority of the experts rated as being most effective.
Further, one expert noted that all of FAA's actions in addressing
runway incursions must be continued because one fix alone will not
improve safety.
Table 1: Experts' Ranking of the Most Effective FAA Actions to Address
Runway Incursions:
Ranking: 1;
Action: Enhancing airport markings and lighting.
Ranking: 2;
Action: Enhancing airport signage.
Ranking: 3;
Action: Approving perimeter taxiways, which provide aircraft with
access to gates without crossing active runways.
Ranking: 4;
Action: Establishing Runway Safety Action Teams, groups of airport
safety stakeholders to identify and implement safety improvements.
Ranking: 4;
Action: Testing runway status lights, which provide a visible warning
when runways are not clear to enter or cross.
Source: GAO analysis of responses from survey of experts.
Note: Rankings are based on responses from 22 experts and reflect the
actions that a majority of experts indicated were "very effective" or
"extremely effective."
[End of table]
FAA Is Using Technology as a Major Part of its Risk Reduction Strategy:
Surface surveillance technology is a major part of FAA's strategy to
improve runway safety. FAA has deployed the Airport Movement Area
Safety System (AMASS), which uses the Airport Surface Detection
Equipment, model 3 (ASDE-3) radar,[Footnote 26] and is deploying the
Airport Surface Detection Equipment, Model X (ASDE-X) to provide ground
surveillance, both of which give air traffic controllers better
visibility of activity on the airfield and could help prevent
collisions. FAA completed the deployment of ASDE-3/AMASS at 34 of the
nation's busiest airports (see app. V) in 2003, and is now deploying
ASDE-X at 35 major airports (see fig. 7). Although ASDE-3/AMASS and
ASDE-X are both radar-based, ASDE-X integrates data from a variety of
sources, including radars and aircraft and vehicle transponders, to
give controllers a more complete view of airport activities.[Footnote
27] ASDE-3/AMASS and ASDE-X are both designed to provide controllers
with alerts when the system detects a possible collision.
Figure 7: Airport Surface Detection Equipment, Model X (ASDE-X)
Deployment Sites:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a map of the United States depicting the location of
Airport Surface Detection Equipment, Model X (ASDE-X) deployment sites.
The following data is depicted:
Scheduled ASDE-X deployment sites:
Boston Logan International;
New York LaGuardia;
John F. Kennedy International (New York, NY);
Newark International;
Philadelphia International;
Baltimore Washington International;
Ronald Reagan Washington International;
Washington Dulles International;
Ft. Lauderdale/Hollywood;
Miami International;
Detroit Metro Wayne County;
Chicago Midway;
Minneapolis-St. Paul International;
Memphis International;
Dallas-Ft. Worth International;
George Bush Intercontinental (Houston, TX);
Denver International;
Salt Lake City International;
Phoenix Sky Harbor International;
Las Vegas McCarren International;
San Diego International;
John Wayne-Orange County (Santa Ana, CA);
Los Angeles International;
Honolulu International-Hickam AFB.
ASDE-X commissioned sites as of August 2007:
Bradley International (Hartford, CT);
Theodore Francis Green State (Providence, RI);
Charlotte Douglas International;
Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International;
Orlando International;
Louisville International-Standiford Field;
General Mitchell International (Milwaukee, WI);
Chicago O'Hare International;
Lambert-St. Louis International;
William P. Hobby (Houston TX);
Seattle-Tacoma International.
Source: FAA and GAO.
Note: ASDE-X-commissioned airports identified in bold.
[End of figure]
Runway status lights, which FAA is testing at the Dallas-Ft. Worth
International Airport and the San Diego International Airport, are a
series of lights embedded in the runways that give pilots a visible
warning when runways are not clear to enter, cross, or depart
on.[Footnote 28] They are a fully automatic, advisory safety system
requiring no input from controllers, and currently consist of takeoff
hold lights and runway entrance lights (see fig. 8).[Footnote 29] Ten
of 17 experts[Footnote 30] we surveyed indicated that FAA's testing of
runway status lights was very or extremely effective in addressing
runway incursions. Surface surveillance systems, such as ASDE-3/AMASS
and ASDE-X, provide the data needed to operate runway status lights,
and the systems' safety logic assesses any possible conflicts on the
airfield and provides alerts of potential collisions.
Figure 8: Runway Status Lights System:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is two illustrations of the runway status lights system.
The first illustration indicates that runway entrance lights illuminate
red when a runway is unsafe to enter or cross. The second illustration
indicates that takeoff hold lights illuminate red to indicate an unsafe
condition when an aircraft is in position for takeoff and another
aircraft or vehicle is on or about to be on the runway in front of it.
Source: Lincoln Laboratory, Massachusetts Institute of TEchnology, and
GAO.
[End of figure]
Another technology that FAA is testing, the Final Approach Runway
Occupancy Signal, is designed to provide a visible warning to aircraft
on approach. This system, which is being tested at the Long Beach
(Daugherty Field) airport in California, activates a flashing light
visible to aircraft on approach as a warning to pilots when a runway is
occupied and hazardous for landing. FAA is also testing low cost
surface surveillance systems for small to medium airports at the
Spokane International Airport.[Footnote 31] FAA would need to certify a
low cost surface surveillance system before it could be used at
airports in the United States. A low cost surface surveillance system
is being used at 44 airports outside of the United States.
Infrastructure Improvements and Research Efforts Are Being Made to
Prevent the Risk of Collisions:
Some airports are also making changes to their runways and taxiways to
reduce the risk of collisions. FAA has helped fund, for example, the
construction of perimeter taxiways (also called end-around taxiways)
that provide aircraft with access to gates without crossing active
runways. As discussed earlier in this report, the crossing of active
runways is one of the many causes of incursions. The Hartsfield-Jackson
Atlanta International Airport opened a perimeter taxiway in April 2007,
and the Dallas-Ft. Worth International Airport plans to open one in
October 2008.[Footnote 32] According to Atlanta airport officials, use
of the perimeter taxiway eliminates about 560 aircraft runway crossings
per day, or about one-third of the airport's total daily runway
crossings.[Footnote 33] Figure 9 shows the typical route that aircraft
landing on the northern runways at the Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta
International Airport would take to taxi to the gate without using the
perimeter taxiway. Figure 10 shows that, by using the perimeter
taxiway, aircraft landing on the northernmost runway no longer need to
cross a parallel runway to reach the gates. Eleven of 16 experts we
surveyed indicated that FAA's approval of perimeter taxiways was very
or extremely effective in addressing runway incursions.
Figure 9: Aircraft Taxiing Routes at the Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta
International Airport Without Using the Perimeter Taxiway:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of aircraft taxiing routes at the
Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport without using the
perimeter taxiway. The illustration depicts active runways 08L and 08R
and the taxiing routes used to reach the concourses.
Source: Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport and GAO.
[End of figure]
Figure 10: Aircraft Taxiing Route at the Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta
International Airport Using the Perimeter Taxiway:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of aircraft taxiing routes at the
Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport using the perimeter
taxiway. The illustration depicts active runways 08L and 08R and the
taxiing routes used to reach the concourses.
Source: Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport and GAO.
[End of figure]
FAA has also helped fund other runway and taxiway changes at various
airports. For example, the Los Angeles International Airport, the U.S.
commercial airport that has experienced the most runway incursions in
recent years, is modifying its runway and taxiway configuration in an
area where many of the incursions have occurred.[Footnote 34] FAA and
airports have made many runway safety improvements at airports that
were identified by local and regional Runway Safety Action Teams, which
are groups of FAA and airport officials, as well as other aviation
safety stakeholders, which were formed as part of the agency's runway
safety program in 2002. In addition, FAA has standardized airport
signage and markings, including issuing new standards for surface
markings that require the use of glass beads for better reflectivity,
requiring new taxiway markings that alert pilots that they are
approaching runway entrances, and doubling the size of markings
indicating where aircraft should hold before proceeding onto the
runway. A majority of the experts we surveyed confirmed the measures'
effectiveness, indicating that FAA's enhancement of airport markings,
lighting, and signage was very or extremely effective.[Footnote 35]
FAA has funded runway safety research that has led to the testing and
deployment of new technology and other measures. During fiscal year
2006, FAA spent about $3.5 million on runway incursion prevention
research at its William J. Hughes Technical Center on projects such as
visual guidance, including signs and lighting; and about $55,000 on
research at its Civil Aerospace Medical Institute regarding vehicle
incursions and operational errors. Also during fiscal year 2006, FAA
funded about $1 million for runway safety-related research that was
conducted at DOT's Volpe National Transportation Systems Center on
projects such as runway status lights, analyses of runway incursion
data, FAA's runway incursion severity calculator, and the electronic
flight bag.[Footnote 36]
FAA Training and Industry Outreach Includes Human Factors Issues:
Because most incursions are caused by human error, FAA is making
outreach and awareness efforts to address errors made by pilots, air
traffic controllers, and airport vehicle operators. The agency issued
booklets in 2004 and 2005 for pilots that highlight communication
procedures for safe surface operations at towered and nontowered
airports. In collaboration with the aviation industry, FAA helped to
create two online courses that educate pilots on runway safety and
conducts safety seminars for pilots across the country to encourage
safe practices on the airfield. To enhance air traffic supervisor and
controller education, FAA is developing for training purposes simulated
recreations of actual incursions. In addition, in recent years, FAA
developed and initiated controller training on human factors, including
skills enhancement regarding teamwork, communication, problem solving,
situational awareness, and managing workloads. FAA also provided
airline maintenance personnel operating "tug and tow" vehicles with
best practices while operating on the airport surface and requires
driver training programs for all airport workers who access the
airfield movement areas at commercial airports. Many of the items
implemented as a result of recommendations made by Runway Safety Action
Teams also involved human factors. FAA data indicated that Runway
Safety Action Teams recommended 4,441 action items for implementation
between April 2001 and mid-December 2006. Of these, 3,338 actions, or
about 75 percent, were completed, with the largest combined grouping
(945 actions) relating to pilots, air traffic controllers, and vehicle
drivers regarding actions such as training and improved procedures. Ten
of 19 experts we surveyed indicated that FAA's establishment of Runway
Safety Action Teams was very or extremely effective in addressing
runway incursions. Only 5 of 22 experts we surveyed indicated that
FAA's pilot educational initiatives were very or extremely effective
and 8 of 21 experts said that FAA's air traffic controller training was
very or extremely effective in addressing runway incursions.
FAA and Airports Have Improved Runway Safety Areas in Case of Overruns:
To address runway overruns, FAA and airports have made progress in
recent years to bring runway safety areas into compliance with FAA
standards. According to FAA, as of May 2007, 70 percent of the 1,014
runways at 573 commercial airports in the United States substantially
comply[Footnote 37] with runway safety area standards, up from 55
percent in 2000. Progress has also been made in bringing runways at the
nation's busiest airports into compliance with FAA runway safety area
standards pursuant to the congressional mandate to have all airports in
compliance by December 31, 2015. As of June 2007, 21 of 47 runways at
the 10 busiest U.S. commercial airports did not meet FAA runway safety
area standards,[Footnote 38] down from 30 runways at those airports
that did not meet standards in October 2006. Increased compliance with
runway safety area standards reduces the chance of aircraft being
damaged from overruns.
Recognizing the difficulties of meeting the runway safety area
standards at airports that do not have enough space to establish 1,000-
foot runway safety areas, FAA conducted research during the 1990s that
led to the development of the Engineered Materials Arresting System
(EMAS), a bed of crushable concrete designed to stop overrunning
aircraft. In 1999, FAA began accepting EMAS as an alternative to
constructing a runway safety area when its construction is not
practicable and, in 2004, began considering EMAS as generally
equivalent to a full-length runway safety area. As of June 2007, EMAS
was installed at 24 runway ends at 19 U.S. airports and 12 additional
EMAS systems were under contract at 8 airports. In addition, EMAS had
successfully stopped four aircraft that had overrun runways, including
a Boeing 747 that overran a runway at the John F. Kennedy International
Airport in January 2005 and was traveling at an exit speed of about 70
knots, or about 80 miles per hour. Figure 11 shows an example of how
EMAS can stop an aircraft. The effectiveness of this measure was
supported by a majority of experts we surveyed, who indicated that
FAA's acceptance of EMAS as an alternative to constructing a runway
safety area when its construction is not practical was very or
extremely effective in addressing runway overruns.[Footnote 39] One
expert, for example, said that because many airports no longer have the
ability to expand existing runway safety areas, EMAS may be the only
practical solution. Other experts noted that preventive measures, such
as training to improve pilot skills, are also needed.
Figure 11: Example of How EMAS Can Stop an Aircraft:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a photograph depicting how EMAS can stop an aircraft.
Source: Bob Hope Airport, Burbank, CA. Reprinted with permission.
[End of figure]
Since 2000, about $300 million per year from FAA's Airport Improvement
Program has been spent on runway safety area improvements, and $1.1
billion is expected to be needed to complete the remaining 207
projects. FAA officials told us that, if the current funding levels are
maintained for the Airport Improvement Program, sufficient resources
will be available to complete the planned runway safety area
improvements. An official from an airport association said that even if
sufficient airport improvement funds are available for runway safety
area improvements, all airports will not be able to acquire the land
needed to establish the safety areas. Eleven of 14 experts we surveyed
indicated that FAA's use of airport improvement funds to construct
runway safety areas was very or extremely effective in addressing
runway overruns.
Lack of Coordination and Leadership, Technology Challenges, Lack of
Data, and Human Factors Issues Impede Further Progress in Improving
Runway Safety:
Although FAA took many steps to address runway safety problems
involving incursions and overruns, especially since the number and rate
of incursions peaked in fiscal year 2001, its efforts have waned in
recent years, and the number and rate has remained steady. Additional
measures by FAA would enhance the coordination and leadership of runway
safety issues, technology, data collection and analysis, and human
factors issues.
FAA's Office of Runway Safety Is Not Carrying Out its Coordination and
Leadership Functions:
FAA is not following its order, issued in 2002, that directs the Office
of Runway Safety to coordinate and monitor activities throughout the
agency to ensure that runway safety goals are met.[Footnote 40] The
absence of coordination and national leadership impedes further
progress on runway safety because no single office is taking charge of
assessing the causes of runway safety problems and taking the steps
needed to address those problems. Under the FAA order, FAA's Office of
Runway Safety is to prepare a national runway safety plan every 2 to 3
years and to provide updates as needed. However, we found that the most
recent national runway safety plan, issued in 2002, is no longer being
used and the status of its objectives are not being tracked. FAA
officials told us the national runway safety plan has been replaced by
the FAA Flight Plan, which is a high-level planning document covering
all of FAA's programs. However, we agree with the conclusion in a May
2007 audit report by the DOT Office of Inspector General[Footnote 41]
that replacing the national runway safety plan by the higher-level FAA
Flight Plan, with the goal of having each FAA office separately include
its runway safety initiatives in its own business plan, does not have
the same national focus and emphasis on runway safety that a national
plan for runway safety provides. In addition, although the Airports
Office and the Air Traffic Organization included runway safety
objectives in their business plans, the Office of Aviation Safety's
business plan for fiscal year 2007 did not include plans to reduce
runway incursions.[Footnote 42] Moreover, the lack of a comprehensive,
targeted plan has resulted in uncoordinated efforts that may not be the
most effective.
In addition, although FAA hired a permanent director at the Senior
Executive Service (SES) level for the Office of Runway Safety in August
2007, the Office of Runway Safety did not have a permanent director for
the previous 2 years, resulting in a lack of national program
leadership, and its staff was reduced by about 45 percent over the last
4 years. Before 2004, the runway safety office had 66 full-time staff
led by an SES-level manager in headquarters, compared to about 37 full-
time runway safety staff led by a non-SES-level acting director as of
May 2007.[Footnote 43] Moreover, although contractors represented about
60 percent of the Office of Runway Safety staff in 2004,[Footnote 44]
funding for the office's contract employees was reduced from about $4
million in 2005 to about $2.5 million per year in 2007. An FAA official
told us that because the Office of Runway Safety relied heavily on
contractors for staff, it lacked a career path for potential managers
in the field and at headquarters and lost expertise that the
contractors had developed when their contracts expired. In addition, as
of May 2007, the Office of Runway Safety no longer had as many full-
time detailees from other FAA offices with runway safety
responsibilities, including FAA's Airports and Air Traffic
Organization's Terminal Service offices, as it had in the past.
Several FAA officials and others said that the lack of leadership in
the Office of Runway Safety had negatively affected the program. A
regional runway safety program manager said, for example, that having
had no permanent director for the office resulted in a lack of
direction from headquarters, leaving regions to carry out runway safety
efforts in different ways. This situation prevents FAA from identifying
systemwide causes of runway safety problems that may require
coordinated solutions. Furthermore, an official currently working on
the runway safety program said that no quarterly performance review
meetings were held between the Acting Director of Runway Safety and the
regional runway safety program managers for over a year during 2006 and
2007. These meetings had been held, for example, to discuss regional
initiatives. Such sharing of information between regions could help
address runway safety issues from a national perspective and implement
changes systematically. FAA research officials also told us that after
having completed a study for the Runway Safety Office, they could not
find anyone to give it to in FAA headquarters. The new permanent
director of the Office of Runway Safety indicated that the office plans
to restart some initiatives, including conducting quarterly runway
safety performance reviews, starting in December 2007. However, other
plans for the office are still being developed.
Technology Challenges Impede Progress in Improving Runway Safety:
FAA has faced significant challenges in deploying and developing
technology for runway safety. Technology currently being installed,
ASDE-X, has experienced cost increases and schedule delays from its
original baselines, and is encountering some operational
difficulties.[Footnote 45] At the same time, additional technology to
prevent runway collisions is years away from deployment. Because FAA
relies heavily on technology as part of its runway safety strategy to
supplement a controller's vision of the airfield, these challenges
impede progress in addressing runway safety.
FAA has revised its cost and schedule plans twice since 2001 to deploy
ASDE-X at 35 airports by 2011. The current program costs have increased
by about $125 million over the 2001 estimate, as FAA added nine
airports to its deployment schedule (see table 2). FAA currently
estimates that the total ASDE-X program cost will be about $806
million, including the cost to operate and maintain the system through
fiscal year 2030. This includes facilities and equipment costs of about
$550 million, which is approximately $40 million more than what we
reported in 2005, plus about $257 million in operations and maintenance
costs. As of August 2007, ASDE-X was commissioned[Footnote 46] at 11
airports. Regarding their plans to deploy ASDE-X to the remaining 24
airports by 2011, FAA officials said that they had focused their
efforts at the beginning of the program on software development, which
is nearly complete, and on system enhancements, which have been
completed, allowing them now to concentrate on system deployment. In
addition, FAA officials said in November 2007 that ASDE-X deployment is
ahead of the agency's revised 2005 schedule and that costs have
remained consistent with its revised 2005 cost estimate. Nonetheless,
as discussed below, our concerns about the schedule plans for ASDE-X
remain.
Table 2: Changes in ASDE-X Equipment Cost and Deployment Completion
Dates:
Cost targets;
2001 estimate: $424.3;
2002 estimate: $505.2;
2005 estimate: $549.8;
2007 estimate: $549.8.
Number of planned operational systems;
2001 estimate: 26;
2002 estimate: 33;
2005 estimate: 35;
2007 estimate: 35.
Deployment completion targets;
2001 estimate: 2007;
2002 estimate: 2007;
2005 estimate: 2011;
2007 estimate: 2011.
Source: GAO analysis of FAA data.
Note: Cost is millions of dollars.
[End of table]
Although it took about 4 years for ASDE-X to be commissioned at those
11 airports, FAA plans to deploy the system at the remaining 24
additional airports in less than 4 years (see app. V). Furthermore, not
all 11 ASDE-X commissioned airports have key safety features of the
system. For example, as of August 2007, three of the ASDE-X
commissioned airports did not have safety logic, which generates a
visible and audible alert to an air traffic controller regarding a
potential runway collision. Moreover, five airports, including the
three lacking safety logic, do not have a system enhancement that
allows ASDE-X to alert controllers of potential collisions on
intersecting runways or runways intersecting taxiways during inclement
weather (see table 3). Because of these issues, the DOT Inspector
General reported,[Footnote 47] and we agree, that the program is at
risk of not meeting its current cost and schedule plans to deliver ASDE-
X systems at 35 airports by 2011.
Table 3: ASDE-X Commissioned Airports as of August 2007:
Airport: General Mitchell International Airport (Milwaukee, WI);
Commissioned date: October 30, 2003;
Safety logic: Yes;
System enhancements[A]: Yes.
Airport: Orlando International Airport;
Commissioned date: September 30, 2004;
Safety logic: Yes;
System enhancements[A]: Yes.
Airport: Theodore Francis Green State Airport (Providence, RI);
Commissioned date: May 16, 2005;
Safety logic: No;
System enhancements[A]: No.
Airport: William P. Hobby Airport (Houston, TX);
Commissioned date: August 31, 2005;
Safety logic: No;
System enhancements[A]: No.
Airport: Seattle-Tacoma International Airport;
Commissioned date: February 24, 2006;
Safety logic: Yes;
System enhancements[A]: No.
Airport: Lambert-St. Louis International Airport;
Commissioned date: May 24, 2006;
Safety logic: Yes;
System enhancements[A]: No.
Airport: Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport;
Commissioned date: June 7, 2006;
Safety logic: Yes;
System enhancements[A]: Yes.
Airport: Bradley International Airport (Hartford, CT);
Commissioned date: June 21, 2006;
Safety logic: No;
System enhancements[A]: No.
Airport: Louisville International-Standiford Field;
Commissioned date: July 19, 2007;
Safety logic: Yes;
System enhancements[A]: Yes.
Airport: Chicago O'Hare International Airport;
Commissioned date: August 29, 2007;
Safety logic: Yes;
System enhancements[A]: Yes.
Airport: Charlotte Douglas International Airport (Charlotte, NC);
Commissioned date: August 30, 2007;
Safety logic: Yes;
System enhancements[A]: Yes.
Source: FAA.
[A] These enhancements include rain configuration, which maintains the
system functioning during inclement weather such as moderate or heavy
rain; converging taxiway logic, which generates an alert when an
aircraft or vehicle on a taxiway is predicted to enter a runway;
intersecting runway alerts, which generate alerts when aircraft are
predicted to collide at intersecting runways; and tower configuration,
which directs an alert regarding potential conflicts on particular
runways to certain controllers.
[End of table]
Recent serious runway incursions at airports with fully operational
runway safety technology reveal persistent problems with their alerting
functions. For example, air traffic controllers at eight airports with
ASDE-3/AMASS told us that the alerting function does not work well
during heavy precipitation and that they disable the alerting function
during inclement weather.[Footnote 48] As a result, air traffic
controllers at those airports with ASDE-3/AMASS do not have the benefit
of an incursion alerting system in poor weather conditions, when it may
be most needed. Furthermore, the ASDE-X commissioned airports are
experiencing problems with false alerts, which occur when the system
incorrectly predicts an impending collision, and false targets, which
occur when the system incorrectly identifies something on the airfield
as an aircraft or vehicle and could generate a false alert. (These
problems are discussed in more detail below.) Although FAA officials
acknowledged that ASDE-X is experiencing problems with false alerts,
they said the system is operating within specifications. An April 2007
FAA internal audit of the ASDE-3/AMASS and ASDE-X safety logic systems
concluded that the runway safety logic system was not providing
consistent information to controllers, creating a lack of confidence in
the system.[Footnote 49] Furthermore, NTSB, after several
investigations of incursions at airports equipped with ASDE-3/AMASS,
determined that the alerting process was ineffective because the delay
was too long before pilots would receive the alert relayed by
controllers. As a result, NTSB asked that FAA develop a system that
provides a direct warning to the cockpit.[Footnote 50]
Of the 11 ASDE-X commissioned airports, the control tower at the
Seattle-Tacoma International Airport reported the most problems with
false targets.[Footnote 51] In addition, of the eight ASDE-X
commissioned airports with the alerting function, the control tower at
the Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport reported the most
problems with false alerts.[Footnote 52] When an ASDE-3/AMASS or ASDE-
X alert sounds, air traffic controllers are required to instruct
landing aircraft to follow a go-around procedure, sending the aircraft
back into the airspace for another landing attempt, even if nothing is
visible on the runway that could cause a collision.[Footnote 53] The
controllers said the effect of this practice is to increase air traffic
and flight times. Officials from the ASDE-X manufacturer said an
elevated number of false targets, on average, at the Seattle-Tacoma
International Airport is caused primarily by the location of the
surface movement radar relative to the airport facility structures, the
movement area, and the airport's configuration. The location of these
structures is determined by FAA and the airports. Officials from the
manufacturer also said ASDE-X at the Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta
International Airport is experiencing an elevated number of nuisance
alerts, which are caused by real conditions that are not safety
threats, such as a vehicle on a runway, but landing aircraft are far
enough from the airport not to constitute a threat. They said the
nuisance alerts being experienced at the Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta
International Airport are caused by the site-specific configuration
parameters of the system, and that they are working with air traffic
controllers, FAA engineers, and the ASDE-X program office to adjust the
parameters of the system to minimize the nuisance alerts while
maintaining the required performance. The officials noted the
difference between nuisance alerts and false alerts, which are issued
after the system detects potential threats that are not real. The
officials said they examine false alerts very closely with FAA and
determine whether to make design modifications to the system to ensure
that they are minimized.
FAA ASDE-X program officials said that the problems with false alerts
and false targets are site-specific, rather than systemic issues,
relating to the location of sensors and radar towers. The officials
said they are working to address the problems by adjusting the
sensitivity of the systems, which they described as a time-consuming,
continuous process with no single fix. For example, they said that at
the Seattle-Tacoma International Airport, the system's level of
sensitivity was increased at the site's request because of its
experience with heavy fog, and that a certain number of false targets
cannot be eliminated without sacrificing the sensitivity. At the same
time, FAA officials acknowledged that the location of the ASDE-X
surface movement radar at the Seattle-Tacoma International Airport has
affected system performance much more than originally anticipated. FAA
also noted that all radar systems experience false targets as a
function of detection and that the majority of false targets at the
Seattle airport occurred on taxiways near the terminal. They also said
that new software being deployed at airports starting in September 2007
would help address the problems involving false alerts and that with
the addition of the new software, ASDE-X is operating under system
requirements not to generate more than two false alerts within 24
hours. This software enhancement was deployed at the Hartsfield-Jackson
Atlanta International Airport in September 2007, and FAA program
officials said they believe it has resulted in improved ASDE-X system
performance. We were not able to confirm this information.
Only 3 of 17 experts we surveyed indicated that FAA's deployment of
ASDE-3/AMASS was very effective,[Footnote 54] and 4 of 17 experts said
that ASDE-X was very or extremely effective in addressing runway
incursions.[Footnote 55] One expert, for example, said that ASDE-X
appears to be a great technology to aid controllers, but is not
trustworthy at this point because the rate of false alerts is somewhat
high. In addition, this expert said that because ASDE-X has been
deployed only to a few airports, it is not doing much to address runway
incursions within the national airspace system as a whole. Another
expert said that ASDE-X and runway status lights would greatly enhance
both pilot and air traffic controller awareness, particularly at
complex airports.
Most airports in the United States have no runway safety technology to
supplement a controller's vision of the airfield and will not have such
technology even after FAA completes its plan to deploy ASDE-X at 35
major airports. FAA's original plans called for 34 airports to receive
ASDE-3/AMASS and 35 airports to receive ASDE-X. In total, 59
airports[Footnote 56] were to receive either technology, but this
number was reduced to 44 in August 2006 after FAA canceled plans to
deploy ASDE-X at 15 of the originally scheduled airports.[Footnote 57]
The 35 major airports to receive ASDE-X handle 70 percent of the
enplanements at U.S. airports but represent only 6 percent of all U.S.
commercial airports,[Footnote 58] leaving most airports without this
type of technology. Six of 12 experts who indicated that they had
knowledge of or experience with the deployment of ASDE-X indicated
that, considering the benefits and problems with ASDE-X, including
false alerts and false targets, deployment of the system at the
remaining 27 airports[Footnote 59] by 2011 should be kept as planned, 4
said that deployment should be accelerated, and 2 said that deployment
should be slowed down. One expert, for example, who indicated that the
deployment of ASDE-X should be kept as planned, said that the problems
with the system will be worked out as the system is deployed.
FAA is testing additional runway safety technology, but these systems
are still years from being deployed in the United States. Runway status
lights, which warn pilots when runways are unsafe to enter or cross,
have had positive preliminary test evaluations, but need a surface
surveillance system such as ASDE-3/AMASS or ASDE-X to operate. FAA
officials expect to decide in 2007 whether to deploy runway status
lights at the 35 ASDE-X airports at an estimated cost of $300 million
but do not expect to make a final investment decision on another runway
safety lighting technology, the Final Approach Runway Occupancy Signal,
which provides a visible warning to aircraft on approach, for another 2
years. In addition, an FAA official said the agency is still exploring
the capabilities of the low cost surface surveillance system and does
not yet have a deployment schedule. Only 2 of the experts we surveyed
indicated that FAA's testing of the low cost surface surveillance
system was very effective in addressing runway incursions.[Footnote 60]
FAA announced in March 2007 that it was changing the certification
process to enable the use of electronic flight bags (electronic display
systems that give pilots a variety of aviation data such as aircraft
operating manuals and navigational charts) and airport moving
maps,[Footnote 61] which can show an aircraft's position on an
airfield, but a system that shows the location of other aircraft on the
airfield is still under development. In addition, although officials
from the Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport cited the
benefit of reducing aircraft runway crossings from using the airport's
new perimeter taxiway, FAA officials said that few U.S. airports have
the space to construct perimeter taxiways and noted that they are
expensive to construct.
Lack of Runway Incident Data Impedes Causal Analysis:
In addition to its technological challenges, FAA lacks reliable runway
safety data and the mechanisms to ensure that the data are complete.
FAA's tabulation of the number of incursions does not reflect the
actual number of incidents that occur. FAA only counts incursions that
occur at airports with air traffic control towers, so the actual number
of incursions, including those that occurred at airports without air
traffic control towers, is higher than FAA reports. In addition, FAA's
information on incursions that occurred at towered airports may not be
complete, according to some experts we surveyed. For example, one
expert said that the airline industry's reporting of runway incursions
is higher than FAA's data and that most or all air carriers are aware
of significant events that controllers failed to report. Although the
airline industry provides data to FAA on safety incidents that may
involve runway incursions, the information lacks sufficient specificity
for FAA to use in its tabulation of incursions.
Furthermore, although FAA requires errors[Footnote 62] that may result
in incursions to be reported, the information collected does not always
contain complete data on the causes and circumstances involved. Without
more complete data, FAA cannot conduct in-depth analyses to ensure that
the most effective corrective measures that address the causal factors
are being implemented. An FAA program to obtain detailed information
about the circumstances regarding runway incursions by administering
questionnaires to pilots involved in incursions--the Runway Incursion
Information and Evaluation Program--could help to identify root causes
of pilot deviations and provides a mechanism to obtain information that
may not otherwise be reported. However, only 19 percent of pilots
involved in runway incursions and surface incidents participated in the
program during 2004 through 2006, and FAA did not provide any evidence
that it analyzed the data that were collected.
Certain FAA efforts that are in the early stages have the potential to
improve runway safety data. For example, FAA plans to start a
nonpunitive, confidential, voluntary reporting program for air traffic
controllers, similar to the Aviation Safety Action Program[Footnote 63]
as part of the FAA safety management system.[Footnote 64] The program
will enable air traffic controllers to report anything that they
perceive could contribute to safety risks in the national airspace
system. The benefit of such program is that the information obtained
might not be reported otherwise, and could increase the amount of data
collected on the causes and circumstances of runway incursions. Many
industry stakeholders such as the National Air Traffic Controllers
Association, the Air Transport Association, the Air Line Pilots
Association, and the Air Safety Foundation, support establishing such a
program, which could also help reduce any underreporting of incidents.
FAA has been working on establishing such a program since 2004, and
indicated at a runway incursion meeting with the aviation community in
August 2007 that it would implement a short-term runway safety plan
that included implementing such a voluntary self-reporting program.
According to FAA, it signed a partnership agreement with the National
Air Traffic Controllers Association regarding the program in October
2007; however, the agency did not indicate when the plan would be
implemented.
We also found that FAA's categorization of the severity of runway
incursions involves a level of subjectivity, raising questions about
the accuracy of the data. An internal FAA audit of 2006 runway
incursion data found that the subjectivity of the severity
classifications has the potential to affect the accuracy of the
classifications. The audit found that incursion severity
classifications were subjective and partially incomplete. In addition,
18 percent of the incursion severity classifications for 2006 were
found not to be in compliance with FAA severity classification
requirements or could not be classified accurately.[Footnote 65] The
audit also found that since August 31, 2006, the Office of Runway
Safety has been using a computer program called Runway Incursion
Severity Classification to calculate initial assessments of
severity.[Footnote 66] FAA indicated that use of the computer program
ensures consistent ratings based on available data. However, most of
the information regarding incursions, which is entered into the
computer model, is based on observations of incidents, rather than
instrument readings, because many airports do not have the technology
needed to collect such information or the information is not available
to FAA, according to agency officials.[Footnote 67] Observations
regarding matters such as how close two aircraft came to colliding on a
runway may be less accurate than instrument readings and, therefore,
raise questions about the accuracy of the severity assessments. These
findings were supported by the experts we surveyed. The majority of the
experts who responded to a question about the accuracy of FAA's
incursion severity classifications indicated that, based on their
knowledge of specific incidents, FAA classified the incidents as being
less severe than they actually were.[Footnote 68]
Furthermore, FAA does not have complete information on ASDE-3/AMASS and
ASDE-X system abnormalities, which could be used to analyze the
performance of the systems' alerting functions. An internal FAA
audit[Footnote 69] concluded that 54 percent of all alerts--false and
real--from the ASDE-3/AMASS and ASDE-X systems and 40 percent of
instances when the systems' alerting functions were disabled were not
recorded.[Footnote 70] The audit also found no evidence of alerting
standards for the runway safety logic systems, which limits the
systems' capability of assessing risks and providing timely alerts to
air traffic controllers.
We also found that FAA does not systematically collect data on the
number of runway overruns that do not result in damage or injury that
could be used for analytical purposes to study trends and causes of
these incidents. FAA officials said it would be useful to collect such
data because it would help them tailor standards to what has actually
occurred, for example, how far an aircraft overran a runway before
stopping.
Controller Fatigue Continues to Be a Runway Safety Concern:
Air traffic controller fatigue continues to be a human factors issue
affecting runway safety. In April 2007, for example, NTSB recommended
that FAA mitigate concerns about air traffic controller fatigue by (1)
working with the National Air Traffic Controllers Association to revise
controller work-scheduling policies and practices so controllers would
have enough sleep and to modify shift rotations to minimize disrupted
sleep patterns for controllers, and (2) developing a fatigue awareness
and countermeasures training program for controllers and for the
personnel involved in scheduling their work. In supporting its
recommendation, NTSB cited four instances from 2001 through 2006 when
tired controllers made errors while performing their duties that
resulted in serious incursions. NTSB said that although FAA regulations
and policies place limits on controller work schedules, for example, by
requiring that controllers be provided at least one full 24-hour day
off per week, they do not adequately consider the potential effect of
work scheduling on fatigue and performance. FAA officials said they
were analyzing NTSB's recommendations on air traffic controller fatigue
but that implementing them would require renegotiating the agency's
contract with the union representing the controllers.
According to FAA data, as of May 2007, at least 20 percent of the
controllers at 25 air traffic control facilities, including towers at
several major airports, were working 6-day weeks,[Footnote 71] which
could cause fatigue. FAA officials said that it may take 2 to 3 years
before controller overtime can be reduced at some facilities, as the
agency acts to replace retiring controllers. In the meantime, the
agency officials indicated that they had no plan to mitigate the
effects of air traffic controller fatigue.
While FAA has taken some actions to address controller fatigue,
problems have been identified with some efforts. For example, an FAA
human factors initiative, the National Air Traffic Professional
Program, is aimed at identifying how controllers' performance can be
affected by factors such as fatigue and distraction. The program
consists of training designed to sharpen and maintain controllers'
mental skills most closely associated with visual attention and
scanning. However, the DOT Inspector General reported in May
2007[Footnote 72] that the program had not been implemented at towers
where visual attention and scanning are key factors in preventing
runway incursions. Although FAA has taken some steps to address human
factors issues through the educational initiatives that were discussed
earlier, progress on addressing runway safety will be impeded until the
human factors issues involving fatigue are addressed.
FAA Has Not Implemented NTSB's Runway Safety Recommendations:
FAA has not implemented any of NTSB's six runway incursion prevention
recommendations, made in 2000,[Footnote 73] that FAA:
* require all airports with scheduled passenger service to deploy a
ground movement safety system that will prevent runway incursions and
provide a direct warning capability to flight crews;
* require that all runway crossings be authorized by specific air
traffic control clearance;
* require that, when aircraft need to cross multiple runways, air
traffic controllers issue an explicit crossing instruction for each
runway;
* discontinue the practice of allowing departing aircraft to hold on
active runways at night or at any time when visibility conditions
preclude arriving aircraft from seeing traffic on the runway in time to
initiate a safe go-around maneuver;
* adopt an ICAO landing clearance procedure that forbids multiple
landing clearances for the same runway; and;
* require the use of ICAO phraseology for airport surface operations,
and periodically emphasize to controllers the need to use this
phraseology and to speak at reasonable rates when communicating with
flight crews.
Since NTSB made these recommendations 7 years ago, FAA has made some
efforts to address them, but NTSB has not accepted FAA's responses.
Regarding NTSB's recommendation that a direct incursion warning
capability be developed for flight crews, FAA indicated in 2006 that,
among other efforts, it had successfully completed promising initial
field tests of runway status lights at the Dallas-Ft. Worth
International Airport but that additional tests would be needed to
determine if the system could be deployed to airports throughout the
country. An NTSB official told us that the board would need to evaluate
the runway status lights system before it could determine whether the
system would satisfy this recommendation. Regarding NTSB's
recommendations that FAA change certain air traffic control procedures,
FAA said that implementing the recommendations could possibly transfer
the risk to another segment of the operation by increasing pilot and
controller workload and radio frequency congestion, and causing
unexpected and unnecessary go-around procedures. However, NTSB
disagreed, indicating that it remained concerned about situations where
pilots may be lost, or believed they have received permission to move
to different positions other than those that air traffic controllers
intended and that air traffic controllers should not clear aircraft to
land on runways that are occupied by other aircraft.
Regarding NTSB's recommendation that FAA adopt ICAO phraseology, FAA
indicated in 2004 that adopting certain ICAO phraseology would create
inconsistency and nonstandardization throughout the national airspace
system. However, NTSB noted that by not adopting the ICAO phraseology,
FAA has not harmonized its phraseology with the rest of the world. Two
of our survey respondents also suggested that FAA adopt ICAO
phraseology in communications between the air traffic controllers and
pilots. In August 2007, FAA announced that it plans to assess whether
it needs to change the phraseology of taxi clearances given by
controllers to better align with ICAO standards, among other planned
actions.
FAA Has Opportunities to Improve Runway Safety:
The results of our survey of experts indicated that the actions that
FAA could take with the greatest potential to prevent runway
incursions, considering costs, technological feasibility, and
operational changes, were measures to provide information or alerts
directly to pilots (see table 4). For example, the actions that FAA
could take with the most potential were lighting systems that guide
pilots as they taxi at the airport and technology that provides
enhanced situational awareness on the airfield and alerts of potential
incursions.
Table 4: Experts' Ranking of the Actions that FAA Could Take with the
Most Potential to Address Runway Incursions:
Ranking: 1;
Action: Encourage the use of a taxi guidance lighting system.
Ranking: 2;
Action: Encourage the development of runway incursion warnings in the
cockpit.
Ranking: 2;
Action: Encourage the development of cockpit moving maps that show the
location of other aircraft and vehicles on the airfield.
Ranking: 2;
Action: Encourage the use of yellow embedded lights for hold short
lines[A].
Ranking: 3;
Action: Encourage the use of Runway Awareness and Advisory System
technology, which provides aural situational advisories to pilots on
the airfield.
Ranking: 3;
Action: Improve airport markings.
Source: GAO analysis of responses from survey of experts.
[A] Hold short lines are markings indicating where aircraft should hold
before receiving permission from air traffic control to enter a runway.
Note: Rankings are based on responses from 22 experts and reflect
actions that a majority of experts indicated had "great potential" or
"very great potential." Although other actions also received a majority
of positive responses, this table reports those that received the
highest number of positive responses.
[End of table]
Our survey respondents and international aviation safety experts also
said that certain runway safety procedures in other countries have the
potential, if adopted, to improve runway safety in the United States.
International aviation organization officials said that there is some
benefit to having air traffic controllers clear aircraft to holding
points--a practice being followed at some airports outside of the
United States--rather than directly to runways but that it would
increase already-busy radio communications between pilots and the air
traffic control tower. In addition, some experts suggested that because
of the safety risks involved, FAA should stop using land and hold short
procedures, which are mainly used in the United States and involve
instructing landing aircraft to land and hold on their runway before
crossing an intersection or another runway. Officials from an
international aviation organization said that U.S. carriers are
generally comfortable with land and hold procedures and understand that
they are necessary to manage the large volume of traffic at certain
airports. However, they added that the procedures would be greatly
improved if they could be agreed upon and promulgated internationally.
An expert also suggested that FAA consider deploying progressive
taxiway lights that activate as aircraft taxi to or from the runway to
help keep aircraft from making wrong turns or entering the runway
environment. However, other experts said that progressive taxiway
lights are difficult to see in the daytime.
Recognizing the need for additional actions to improve runway safety,
on August 15, 2007, FAA met with the aviation community and agreed on a
short-term plan, which included some measures that our experts had also
recommended. The participants decided to take the following actions
during the subsequent 60 days: (1) conduct safety reviews at the
airports where runway incursions and wrong runway departures are the
greatest concern, (2) disseminate runway safety information and
training across the entire aviation industry, (3) accelerate the
deployment of improved airport signage and markings at the top 75
airports, and (4) review cockpit and air traffic control procedures,
which could include changing cockpit procedures to minimize pilot
activities and distractions while an aircraft is moving on the ground
and to make air traffic control procedures more precise. On October 22,
2007, FAA announced that among the actions taken, (1) safety reviews at
20 airports had been completed, (2) 104 of 112 air carriers provided
pilots with simulator and other training incorporating runway
scenarios, (3) runway markings had been upgraded at 52 of 75 medium-and
large-sized airports, and (4) 101 of 112 air carriers had reviewed
cockpit procedures to identify and develop a plan to address pilot
distractions when taxiing to runways. In addition, FAA indicated that
it had completed analyzing air traffic control procedures regarding
taxi clearances and found that more explicit taxi instructions were
needed.
The experts we surveyed also provided suggestions to prevent runway
overruns. They said the actions that FAA could take with the greatest
potential, considering costs, technological feasibility, and
operational changes, included improving communication of runway
conditions and weather to flight crews and encouraging improvements in
and use of runway condition and friction measurements (data regarding
the slickness of a runway). Regarding overseas practices to help
prevent overruns, some survey respondents said that more detailed
information about runway conditions is provided to pilots in some other
countries, which could be communicated to pilots in the United States
as they prepare to land. Furthermore, on October 4, 2007, NTSB
recommended that FAA require pilots to conduct landing distance
assessments before every landing on the basis of existing aircraft
performance data, actual conditions, and incorporating a minimum 15
percent safety margin. FAA has not yet responded to this recommendation.
Progress in Addressing Ramp Safety Is Affected by a Lack of Data and
Standards, but the Industry Is Taking Action to Address these Issues:
The aviation industry has made efforts in recent years to address the
incidence of ramp accidents. However, these efforts have been hindered
by a lack of data on the nature, extent, and cost of ramp accidents and
the absence of industrywide ground handling standards. In response, the
federal government and the aviation industry have undertaken additional
steps to collect data and develop standards as a means of understanding
the problem and reducing the number of accidents.
Lack of Complete Accident Data Hinders Efforts to Address Ramp Safety:
We found no source of comprehensive data on airport ramp accidents.
Various aviation entities collect ramp accident data, but they are not
complete enough to be useful for industrywide analyses, and, in many
cases, the entities were not willing for competitive reasons to
publicly disclose the data. Many industry stakeholders indicated to us
that they lack complete ramp accident data. Without such data, it will
be difficult for the aviation industry to understand the nature,
extent, and cost of ramp accidents and to allocate appropriate
resources and methods to improve ramp safety.
We found that data on ramp fatalities was more readily available than
data on nonfatal injuries and accidents without injuries. We reviewed
FAA, NTSB, and OSHA ramp fatality data[Footnote 74] from 2001 through
2006 and determined that these agencies investigated 29 fatal ramp
accidents during that time. (See fig. 12.) These accidents occurred at
airports of various sizes--from large hubs to small general aviation
airports.[Footnote 75] No airport experienced more than 2 fatalities
during this time period. (See app. VI.) Of the 29 fatalities, 17 were
ground workers, 8 were passengers, and 4 were pilots. The ramp
fatalities generally occurred when these employees were struck by
objects (such as vehicles), were crushed, or fell. Most aviation safety
officials told us that ramp accidents represent little or no danger to
passengers, although a potential danger exists if, for example, damage
to an aircraft is left unreported. Of the 8 passengers who were killed
in ramp accidents from 2001 through 2006, 5 were struck by propellers.
Although we obtained data on fatal accidents, it is difficult to
determine the true nature and extent of all ramp accidents, including
those that result in injuries, because OSHA, the primary source of ramp
fatality data, does not collect or report data on occupational injuries
other than fatalities that occur in ramp areas. Furthermore, because
FAA and NTSB only investigate certain ramp accidents, as discussed
earlier, they do not have complete ramp accident data.
Figure 12: Annual Number of Ramp Fatalities at U.S. Airports from 2001
through 2006:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a vertical bar graph. The vertical axis of the graph
represents number of ramp fatalities from 0 to 10. The horizontal axis
of the graph represents years from 2001 through 2006. The following
data is depicted:
Year: 2001;
Number of ramp fatalities: 9.
Year: 2002;
Number of ramp fatalities: 3.
Year: 2003;
Number of ramp fatalities: 5.
Year: 2004;
Number of ramp fatalities: 2.
Year: 2005;
Number of ramp fatalities: 4.
Year: 2006;
Number of ramp fatalities: 6.
Source: GAO analysis of FAA, NTSB, and OSHA data.
[End of figure]
Lack of Standards for Ramp Operations Could Hinder Safety:
We found no federal or industrywide standards for ramp operations. Each
airport authority has its own rules and regulations, which may be based
on local ordinances or state laws. In the United States, airlines
typically control the ramp areas, and each operates its ramps with its
own specific set of policies and procedures. In addition, in recent
years, more airlines have been contracting out some or all of these
services, and often one ground handling company services the aircraft
of several airlines at an airport. In this situation, ground handling
companies must carry out their duties in accordance with each airline's
policies and procedures, and, because there is no standard for ramp
operations, this could lead to confusion about operating procedures and
safety rules and increases the likelihood of accidents.
The Federal Government and the Aviation Industry Are Taking Some
Measures to Address Ramp Safety:
FAA, OSHA, airports, and airlines are taking various measures to
address ramp accidents. According to experts we surveyed, three of the
four most effective actions are being taken by airlines, for example,
by setting safety targets and using ramp towers (see table 5).
Table 5: Experts' Ranking of the Most Effective Actions by FAA, OSHA,
Airports, and Airlines to Address Ramp Accidents:
Ranking: 1;
Action: Airlines setting safety targets for reducing injuries in ramp
areas.
Ranking: 1;
Action: FAA's use of Runway Safety Action Teams.
Ranking: 2;
Action: Airlines' use of ramp towers.
Ranking: 2;
Action: Airlines entering into safety alliances with OSHA.
Source: GAO analysis of responses from survey of experts.
Note: Rankings are based on responses from 15 experts and reflect the
actions that received the highest number of responses indicating that
they were "very effective" or "extremely effective." However, none of
these actions received a majority of positive responses.
[End of table]
The federal government has generally taken an indirect role in
addressing ramp safety. Since August 2000, FAA and OSHA have operated
under a memorandum of understanding that gives FAA responsibility for
investigating occupational accidents involving flight attendants; in
the memorandum, OSHA agreed to continue its enforcement efforts on
behalf of other aviation employees, such as ramp workers. However,
neither agency has developed a plan or policy to reduce ramp accidents
and address ramp safety in a strategic, coordinated manner. FAA's
primary tool for enhancing ramp safety is the promotion of a safety
management system for aviation service and airport operators through
advisory circulars issued in 2006 and 2007.[Footnote 76] FAA defines a
safety management system as the application of a systematic, proactive
approach to identifying and mitigating safety risks. The use of safety
management systems increases the likelihood that safety problems would
be detected and corrected before they result in an accident. However,
advisory circulars are voluntary in nature. Although FAA expects to
issue a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in 2008, which would make this
guidance mandatory for airport operators, rulemakings often take years
to complete.
According to an official with the Air Transport Association, a trade
organization representing the airline industry, the safety management
system concept invites FAA's acceptance of the continuous improvement
process adopted by the carrier and its airport stakeholders. The
official added that measuring the effectiveness of mitigation efforts
is an essential part of safety management systems. However, only two of
the experts we surveyed indicated that FAA's issuance of advisory
circulars on safety management systems for airport operators and
aviation service providers was very effective in addressing ramp
accidents.[Footnote 77] One expert said that FAA's issuance of an
advisory circular does not prompt change, but is a way to reduce the
agency's inspection workload. However, another expert said that when
safety management systems are required, airports and air carriers will
assume a larger role in oversight, data collection, and safety
assurance.
OSHA uses industry participation in its voluntary programs to promote
ramp safety while also conducting workplace inspections and taking
enforcement actions when needed. Twelve[Footnote 78] airlines and the
National Safety Council, a nonprofit, nongovernmental, public service
organization dedicated to protecting life and promoting health,
maintained a national alliance addressing ergonomic issues associated
with customer checked baggage handling with OSHA from November 2002 to
November 2006. This alliance resulted in several tools for enhancing
ramp safety, including an OSHA e-Tool on baggage handling safety and an
OSHA Web page detailing the agency's assistance for the airline
industry. The Air Transport Association has initiated discussions with
OSHA about forming an alliance to address ramp vehicle safety. Three of
13 experts we surveyed indicated that airlines entering into safety
alliances with OSHA to address ramp accidents was very or extremely
effective.[Footnote 79] One expert, for example, said that OSHA safety
alliances are an extremely effective way for air carriers to develop
mitigation strategies in concert with OSHA. However, another expert
said that airlines entering into alliances with OSHA have no real
effect on ramp safety because OSHA's focus is on preventing personal
injury, not aircraft damage.
OSHA's workplace inspections--which are initiated in response to
fatalities or serious injuries, such as amputations, complaints, or
data indicating that an industry is experiencing a high rate of illness
or injury--may result in OSHA proposing that the employer be fined. For
example, on July 25, 2007, OSHA proposed fines totaling about $72,500
against an airline for alleged violations of workplace safety standards
in its ramp area at one airport.[Footnote 80] According to OSHA safety
enforcement officials, proposed fines are intended to serve as a
deterrent to unsafe practices in the workplace and are sometimes
reduced after the employers take corrective actions, show good faith,
or have a favorable safety history.[Footnote 81] However, as we
reported in 2005 on FAA's safety enforcement efforts, reductions in
proposed fines may weaken any deterrent effect that would be expected
from sanctions.[Footnote 82] Only 2 of 13 experts we surveyed indicated
that OSHA's safety enforcement actions were very effective in
addressing ramp accidents.[Footnote 83]
Several airport officials we interviewed had initiated efforts to
improve ramp safety at their airports, even though their ramp areas are
typically under the control of one or more airlines. For example, a
Massachusetts Port Authority official said that ramp accidents at the
Boston Logan International Airport were reduced by 50 percent during a
6-month period during 2004 and 2005 after they implemented a ramp
safety program. Other airport officials said they had used their local
Runway Safety Action Teams as forums or initiated their own efforts for
addressing ramp safety issues. In addition, the Seattle-Tacoma
International Airport uses a ramp tower and ASDE-X surface movement
radar to monitor ramp activities. Of 15 survey respondents, 4 experts
indicated that the use of Runway Safety Action Teams was very or
extremely effective in addressing ramp accidents, and 2 indicated that
surface surveillance technology was very effective.[Footnote 84] One
expert indicated that Runway Safety Action Teams are an extremely
important venue that can involve all airport stakeholders in a
collaborative process to identify hazards, perform a risk assessment,
and develop mitigation strategies and measure their effectiveness. Of
15 survey respondents, 2 experts indicated that airports' use of ramp
towers was very or extremely effective in addressing ramp
accidents,[Footnote 85] and 3 indicated that airlines' use of ramp
towers was very effective.[Footnote 86] One expert said that ramp
towers improve operational safety but that all operations are still not
completely visible.
We spoke with officials from two U.S. airlines about measures they were
taking to improve ramp safety. One of those airlines is using and the
other plans to use a Web-based surface surveillance system at certain
hubs to track the movements of ground vehicles and aircraft. Although
the airline's purpose for purchasing the system was for greater
efficiencies in its ground operations, an official from that airline
said he believed that increased safety was an additional benefit of the
system because it significantly improved situational awareness.
Although not specifically tracked, the airline believes it has had
fewer ground accidents and incidents since implementing the system.
Officials at another airline said they were addressing ramp safety
further by incorporating a safety management system into the ramp
procedures in the airline's operations manual, including specific
ground safety training as a component of recurrent training required
annually. In addition, the airline has established annual goals for
reducing employee injuries and ground damage. The airline reported the
setting of a goal appears effective and has resulted in a significant
decrease in employee injuries and ground damage over the prior year.
Officials from this airline also said that the airline had formed a
safety action team to share best practices with its ground handling
partners and to review their safety performance, resulting in an
incident rate for the airline's partners that has been greatly reduced
in the last two years and continues to improve. The experts we surveyed
had mixed views on the effectiveness of airlines setting safety targets
for reducing injuries in ramp areas in addressing ramp accidents. Four
of 15 experts indicated that it was very effective, 6 said it was
moderately effective, and 5 indicated it was slightly or not at all
effective. One expert said that airlines have set safety targets for
reducing injuries in ramp areas for years and failed to achieve
discernable results.
Aviation industry groups also have efforts under way to address the
lack of data for ramp accidents as well as the lack of standards for
ramp operations. In 2003, the Flight Safety Foundation, an
international nonprofit membership organization that researches and
promotes aviation safety, started the Ground Accident Prevention
Program to "analyze equipment damage and human injuries and develop
methods of preventing such accidents." The program is now in its third
phase, in which it will identify and encourage technical solutions to
ramp safety problems along with continued data collection and analysis.
Next year, the International Air Transport Association, an
international airline association, plans to start a safety audit
program of ground handling companies with the aim of improving
operational safety by establishing a "worldwide ground operational
safety benchmark and standard." The program will be available to all
ground service providers, who, after successfully completing the audit,
will be placed on a registry for an agreed-upon period. In addition,
the National Air Transportation Association, which represents companies
that own, operate, and service aircraft primarily for the general
aviation community, has launched an industry-wide effort to collect
ramp incident data and has goals of identifying best practices,
reducing insurance claims, and lowering insurance costs. The Airports
Council International, an organization that represents airports
worldwide, publishes the Airside Safety Handbook as one component of
its efforts to help airports operate more safely. Finally, the Air
Transport Association collects, aggregates, and shares ground incident
damage and injury data to its members. The data are reviewed at the
association's quarterly Ground Safety Committee meetings and form a
basis for assessing risk, developing mitigation strategies, and
measuring effectiveness. According to the association, airlines freely
share best practices concerning safety and many airlines perform ground
servicing of aircraft (fuel, potable water, baggage handling, etc.) for
one another.
Additional Measures May Improve Ramp Safety:
The results of our survey of experts indicated that the actions that
FAA, OSHA, airports, or airlines could take with greatest potential of
preventing ramp accidents, considering costs, technological
feasibility, and operational changes, included promoting a safety
culture, standardizing airport ramp markings, improving or increasing
training of ramp workers, increasing the supervision of ramp workers,
and developing safer equipment designs (see table 6).
Table 6: Experts' Ranking of the Actions that FAA, OSHA, Airports, or
Airlines Could Take with the Most Potential to Address Ramp Accidents:
Ranking: 1;
Action: Promote a safety culture in ramp areas.
Ranking: 2;
Action: Standardize airport ramp markings.
Ranking: 2;
Action: Improve or increasing training of ramp workers.
Ranking: 2;
Action: Increase supervision of ramp workers.
Ranking: 3;
Action: Develop safer designs of ramp equipment.
Source: GAO analysis of responses from survey of experts.
Note: Rankings are based on responses from 15 experts and reflect the
actions that a majority of respondents indicated had "great potential"
or "very great potential."
[End of table]
One expert said that as part of an improved safety culture--which
experts in our survey indicated was the most effective action to
address ramp accidents--management must recognize the connection
between the occurrence of ramp incidents and accidents and its demand
for quick aircraft turnaround times. Turnaround times are an important
cost factor for airlines. Another expert said that standardizing ramp
markings would be beneficial because the markings can be confusing for
pilots. One of the experts indicated, however, that while improving and
increasing the training of ramp workers would be beneficial, high job
turnover among ramp employees is also part of the problem. Furthermore,
a report prepared by an aviation industry group in 2004[Footnote 87]
cited inadequate training and high turnover of ramp workers,
particularly aircraft fuelers, as contributing factors in ramp
accidents. The report also indicated that low wages contributed to high
rates of employee turnover. One of the experts we surveyed indicated
that poor pay attracts a group of ramp workers that exhibit high
turnover rates, language issues, and work ethic challenges. Similarly,
in reports that we issued before the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks, we cited high turnover and low wages among airport security
screeners as factors affecting the effectiveness of performing their
security duties.[Footnote 88]
Some aviation industry officials and experts said that ramp safety in
the United States might be improved through the use of new technology.
One example is a ground pop-up system[Footnote 89] to handle aircraft
fueling and other ramp services, which is used at airports in Zhuhai,
China, and Stockholm, Sweden. An expert said that a ground pop-up
system reduces ramp congestion and the chance of vehicle collisions and
injuries. In addition, some aviation officials said that new baggage
loading technology could help make the ramp environment safer for ramp
workers. New baggage loading technologies include the sliding
carpet[Footnote 90] and RampSnakeŽ.[Footnote 91] However, an
international aviation safety official said that although these new
baggage loading devices could improve working conditions and effort
required by baggage loaders, it is not readily apparent how such
devices could help prevent ramp accidents. This official also noted the
high cost of a ground pop-up system and that it is inflexible to
accommodate changed aircraft parking arrangements and different
aircraft types. The potential effectiveness of safer designs of ramp
equipment was supported by the experts we surveyed, the majority of
whom said that developing safer designs of ramp equipment had great or
very great potential in addressing ramp accidents.[Footnote 92] An
International Air Transport Association official also indicated that
high-density airports outside of the United States typically have a
higher degree of control and coordination between the ramp and air
traffic controllers, which can contribute to safety.
Aviation industry stakeholders expressed diverse views about whether
the federal government should increase ramp safety oversight and if so,
which agency should carry out that increased oversight. Officials from
a union representing ramp workers favored increased FAA and OSHA
oversight of ramp operations because they felt this would lead to more
and better training for ramp workers, the implementation of
standardized procedures, and a focus on ramp safety equal to that
provided to runway safety. However, an airport association official
said that increasing FAA's oversight in the ramp area would not be the
best use of the agency's resources because the safety risks are greater
on the airfield, where an aircraft collision could result in many
fatalities. In addition, a Flight Safety Foundation official said that
additional FAA ramp safety oversight is not needed because FAA's focus
is on passenger safety and that the agency would have difficulty
identifying additional resources to oversee ramps. An author of reports
on ramp accidents issued by an aviation industry group said that OSHA
should do more to regulate safety on the ramp because, in his view, FAA
lacks knowledge of industrial safety issues. However, an airline
association official said that increased OSHA oversight of ramp
operations would have little potential until OSHA develops national
standards and appropriate regulations for airport ramp operations. This
airline association official also said that the lack of a voluntary
disclosure reporting program for OSHA-regulated incidents impedes
improving safety in the ramp area. OSHA officials, however, said that
very few industries have their own workplace safety standards, and that
the agency is devoting the appropriate amount of resources for
inspecting airport ramps because its safety inspections overall are
selected largely on the basis of injury and illness data and
complaints. However, they were not able to identify how many
inspections of ramp areas were prompted by data. FAA officials said
that they do not have responsibility for ramp safety and that their
jurisdiction is limited to the movement areas. They also noted that
ramp areas are normally under the jurisdiction of state and local
authorities but that ultimately the airport operator has responsibility
for ramp safety unless the area is leased to an air carrier or fixed-
base operator.
Conclusions:
FAA took a number of actions to address runway safety since the number
and rate of incursions reached a peak in fiscal year 2001. However, as
runway safety incidents declined, FAA's runway safety efforts
subsequently waned. During that period of decreased attention, the
number and rate of incursions remained relatively constant and at a
level higher than any time during the 1990s. Moreover, preliminary data
for fiscal year 2007 indicate the overall incursion rate increased to a
level nearly as high as the 2001 peak. In addition, serious incursions,
where collisions were narrowly or barely avoided, continue to occur--
about 30 per year since fiscal year 2002--suggesting a high risk of a
catastrophic runway collision occurring in the United States.
Furthermore, in recent years, FAA's Office of Runway Safety has not
been fulfilling its mission to coordinate and lead the agency's runway
safety efforts. The absence of national leadership and a current
national runway safety plan impede further progress on runway safety
because no single office is taking charge of assessing the causes of
runway safety problems. This situation has resulted in uncoordinated
runway safety efforts by individual FAA offices. FAA recently hired a
runway safety director, which is a good first step. However, other
plans for the program are still being developed, and it is too early to
know if the office will provide sustained attention to runway safety
problems.
FAA's runway safety program also lacks certain data on the causes and
circumstances of incursions and overruns. FAA has planned since 2004 to
develop a voluntary reporting system for air traffic controllers, which
would increase the amount of data available on runway incursions, but
it is not clear when such a program will be established. Without
additional data, FAA cannot conduct additional analysis of the causes
and circumstances of runway incidents to ensure that the most effective
corrective measures that address the causal factors are used. In
addition, the fact that air traffic controllers at some of the nation's
busiest airports are regularly working 6-day weeks due to staffing
shortages raises questions about the extent to which regularly working
overtime may cause fatigue, which NTSB has cited as a contributing
factor in air traffic control errors. Furthermore, the nature and scope
of ramp accidents are unknown. FAA is not working with the aviation
industry and OSHA to help collect and analyze ramp accident data, which
could identify the causes and circumstances of ramp accidents, and
identify corrective actions. Without such data, FAA and the aviation
industry will be hindered in understanding the nature and extent of
ramp accidents, which would help identify measures to improve ramp
safety.
Recommendations:
To advance efforts to improve runway safety, we recommend that the
Secretary of Transportation direct the FAA Administrator to take the
following five actions:
* Implement the FAA order establishing the Office of Runway Safety to
lead the agency's runway safety efforts, including preparing a new
national runway safety plan. The plan should include goals to improve
runway safety; near-and longer-term actions designed to reduce the
severity, number, and rate of runway incursions; timeframes and
resources needed for those actions; and a continuous evaluative process
to track performance towards those goals. The plan should also address
the increased runway safety risk associated with the expected increased
volume of air traffic.
* Develop an implementation schedule for establishing a nonpunitive
voluntary safety reporting program for air traffic controllers.
* Develop and implement a plan to collect data on runway overruns that
do not result in damage or injury for analyses of trends and causes
such as the locations, circumstances, and types of aircraft involved in
such incidents.
* Develop a mitigation plan for addressing controller overtime that
considers options such as shift changes and incentives to attract
controllers to facilities with high volumes of air traffic and high
rates of controller overtime.
* Work with the aviation industry and OSHA to develop a mechanism to
collect and analyze data on ramp accidents and, if the analysis shows
it is warranted, develop a strategic plan aimed at reducing accidents
involving workers, passengers, and aircraft in the ramp area. The plan
should include a discussion of roles and responsibilities, performance
measures, data collection and analysis, and milestones, and consider
ramp safety practices being followed in other countries.
Agency Comments:
We provided DOT and the Department of Labor with drafts of this report
for their review and comment. FAA agreed to consider the report's
recommendations and provided technical corrections and clarifications,
which we incorporated as appropriate. The Department of Labor had no
comments but provided a technical correction, which we incorporated.
As arranged with your offices, unless you publicly announce its
contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until
30 days after the date of this letter. At that time, we will send
copies of this report to interested congressional committees and to the
Secretary of Transportation and the Secretary of Labor. We will make
copies available to others upon request. In addition, this report will
be available at no charge on our Web site at [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me on (202) 512-2834 or at dillinghamg@gao.gov. Contact points
for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be
found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report
are listed in appendix VII.
Signed by:
Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D.
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology:
Our objective was to review how well the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) and others are addressing runway and ramp safety
issues. To accomplish this, we established the following questions: (1)
What progress is being made in addressing runway safety, and what
additional measures, if any, could be taken? and (2) What factors
affect progress in improving ramp safety and what is being done by FAA
and others to address those factors?
For background information on runway and ramp safety issues, we
reviewed reports prepared by FAA, the National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB), the Department of Transportation's (DOT) Inspector
General, and others; FAA orders, advisory circulars, and regulations;
and applicable laws. We also determined the roles and responsibilities
involving runway and ramp safety of FAA, NTSB, the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA), airports, and airlines. Regarding
runway incursions, we obtained data on the number and rates of
incursions from fiscal year 1998 through fiscal year 2007 and reviewed
NTSB accident reports on incursions that resulted in collisions during
that time. We also obtained runway incursion data from fiscal year 2001
through fiscal year 2006 broken down by severity, error types, and
frequency of incursions involving general aviation and commercial
aircraft. Regarding runway overruns, we collected data on overruns that
NTSB investigated from fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2006.
Regarding ramp accidents, we obtained information on ramp accident
fatalities that were investigated by FAA, NTSB, and OSHA from 2001
through 2006. Based on interviews with officials knowledgeable about
the data contained in this report, we determined that runway and ramp
safety data were sufficiently reliable for the types of analyses that
we performed for this report such as trends in runway incursions, the
incidence of fatalities in airport ramp areas, and frequency of air
traffic controller overtime.
To determine what progress is being made in addressing runway safety
and what additional measures could be taken, we reviewed the status of
FAA's implementation of objectives contained its 2002 national runway
safety plan and the status of the runway safety recommendations that
NTSB made to FAA. We also evaluated FAA's compliance with orders
establishing the agency's runway safety and runway safety area
programs; FAA's collection and analysis of runway safety data,
including the process that the agency follows to assess the severity of
runway incursions; and findings made by FAA's Air Traffic Safety
Oversight Service on the agency's runway incursion severity
classification process and runway safety technology. We also looked at
how taxiways affect runway safety. To help identify the causes of
runway incursions and measures being taken to prevent them, we
interviewed FAA and airport officials at five airports that have
experienced more runway incursions than other airports in recent
years.[Footnote 93] Because technology is a major part of FAA's
strategy to improve runway safety, we discussed the agency's efforts to
develop and deploy technology with program officials, visited five
airports where new technology was being tested and used to observe
their operation, reviewed data on the systems' performance, and
interviewed FAA air traffic controllers and managers and aviation
industry officials about their views on the effectiveness of the
technology. In addition, we reviewed the implementation status of
Public Law No. 109-115, which requires commercial service airports to
bring their runway safety areas into compliance with FAA standards by
2015. We also interviewed officials from FAA's William J. Hughes
Technical Center, DOT's Volpe National Transportation Systems Center,
and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's Ames Research
Center about their runway safety research projects. In addition, we
interviewed officials from international aviation organizations about
runway safety practices and technologies being used overseas that could
be used in the United States.
To determine the factors affecting progress in improving ramp safety
and what is being done by FAA and others to address those factors, we
interviewed officials from FAA, airports, and aviation industry
organizations; members of the Airport Operations Safety Panel, an
aviation industry group that issued reports on ramp accidents in 2004
and 2005; union officials representing ramp workers and pilots; and
other individuals knowledgeable about ramp safety. In addition, we
interviewed OSHA officials about the agency's industry alliance program
and enforcement efforts. We also interviewed officials from
international aviation organizations about ramp safety practices and
technologies being used overseas that could be used in the United
States.
Table 7 lists the organizations that we visited or contacted regarding
runway and ramp safety.
Table 7: List of Organizations that GAO Visited or Contacted Regarding
Runway and Ramp Safety:
Industry category: U.S. government agencies;
Organization interviewed: Department of Labor Bureau of Labor
Statistics.
Industry category: U.S. government agencies;
Organization interviewed: Department of Labor Occupational Safety and
Health Administration.
Industry category: U.S. government agencies;
Organization interviewed: Department of Transportation Volpe National
Transportation Systems Center.
Industry category: U.S. government agencies;
Organization interviewed: Federal Aviation Administration.
Industry category: U.S. government agencies;
Organization interviewed: Joint Planning and Development Office.
Industry category: U.S. government agencies;
Organization interviewed: National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
Industry category: U.S. government agencies;
Organization interviewed: National Transportation Safety Board.
Industry category: FAA regional runway safety program managers;
Organization interviewed: Eastern Region.
Industry category: FAA regional runway safety program managers;
Organization interviewed: New England Region.
Industry category: FAA regional runway safety program managers;
Organization interviewed: Southeast Region.
Industry category: FAA regional runway safety program managers;
Organization interviewed: Western Region.
Industry category: FAA air traffic control personnel;
Organization interviewed: Bob Hope Airport, Burbank, CA.
Industry category: FAA air traffic control personnel;
Organization interviewed: Bradley International Airport, Hartford, CT.
Industry category: FAA air traffic control personnel;
Organization interviewed: Dallas-Ft. Worth International Airport.
Industry category: FAA air traffic control personnel;
Organization interviewed: General Mitchell International Airport,
Milwaukee, WI.
Industry category: FAA air traffic control personnel;
Organization interviewed: Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International
Airport.
Industry category: FAA air traffic control personnel;
Organization interviewed: Lambert-St. Louis International Airport.
Industry category: FAA air traffic control personnel;
Organization interviewed: Long Beach Airport, Long Beach, CA.
Industry category: FAA air traffic control personnel;
Organization interviewed: Los Angeles International Airport.
Industry category: FAA air traffic control personnel;
Organization interviewed: Newark Liberty International Airport.
Industry category: FAA air traffic control personnel;
Organization interviewed: Orlando International Airport.
Industry category: FAA air traffic control personnel;
Organization interviewed: San Diego International Airport.
Industry category: FAA air traffic control personnel;
Organization interviewed: Seattle-Tacoma International Airport.
Industry category: FAA air traffic control personnel;
Organization interviewed: Spokane International Airport, Spokane, WA.
Industry category: FAA air traffic control personnel;
Organization interviewed: Theodore Francis Green State Airport,
Providence, RI.
Industry category: FAA air traffic control personnel;
Organization interviewed: William P. Hobby Airport, Houston, TX.
Industry category: Airports;
Organization interviewed: Bob Hope Airport, Burbank, CA.
Industry category: Airports;
Organization interviewed: Boston Logan International Airport.
Industry category: Airports;
Organization interviewed: Dallas-Ft. Worth International Airport.
Industry category: Airports;
Organization interviewed: Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International
Airport.
Industry category: Airports;
Organization interviewed: Long Beach Airport, Long Beach, CA.
Industry category: Airports;
Organization interviewed: Los Angeles International Airport.
Industry category: Airports;
Organization interviewed: Newark Liberty International Airport.
Industry category: Airports;
Organization interviewed: San Diego International Airport.
Industry category: Airports;
Organization interviewed: Spokane International Airport, Spokane, WA.
Industry category: Industry organizations;
Organization interviewed: Air Line Pilots Association.
Industry category: Industry organizations;
Organization interviewed: Air Safety Foundation.
Industry category: Industry organizations;
Organization interviewed: Air Transport Association.
Industry category: Industry organizations;
Organization interviewed: Airports Council International.
Industry category: Industry organizations;
Organization interviewed: International Air Transport Association.
Industry category: Industry organizations;
Organization interviewed: International Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers.
Industry category: Industry organizations;
Organization interviewed: National Air Traffic Controllers Association.
Industry category: Industry organizations;
Organization interviewed: National Air Transportation Association.
Industry category: Industry organizations;
Organization interviewed: Regional Airline Association.
Industry category: Others;
Organization interviewed: Airport Operations Safety Panel.
Industry category: Others;
Organization interviewed: Boeing.
Industry category: Others;
Organization interviewed: Commercial Aviation Safety Team.
Industry category: Others;
Organization interviewed: Continental Airlines.
Industry category: Others;
Organization interviewed: Flight Safety Foundation.
Industry category: Others;
Organization interviewed: International Civil Aviation Organization.
Industry category: Others;
Organization interviewed: Northwest Airlines.
Industry category: Others;
Organization interviewed: Robinson Aviation.
Industry category: Others;
Organization interviewed: Sensis Corporation.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
We conducted our work from October 2006 through November 2007 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Survey Methodology:
We administered a 2-phase Web-based survey to gather the professional
views of experts on runway incursions, runway overruns, and ramp
safety. The structured survey questions ensured that all individuals
had the opportunity to provide information in response to the same
questions and enabled us to quantify the results. Moreover, the
iterative nature of the 2-phase survey provided the experts with the
opportunity to identify future actions that could be taken to prevent
incursions, overruns, and ramp accidents and then to evaluate the
potential of the future actions that they and the other experts
identified.
We contracted with the National Academy of Sciences to identify experts
to participate in our survey. Using criteria to ensure adequate
representation across the criteria that we had specified, the National
Academy identified 19 experts and we identified ten. The criteria
ensured that we achieved:
* balance in terms of the type and depth of expertise (i.e., pilots,
airline officials, aircraft manufacturing officials, association
representatives, academics, foreign civil aviation authorities, unions
representing airlines, air traffic controllers, ramp workers, Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) maintenance and safety inspectors,
professors and researchers involved in aviation safety);
* balance of knowledge across relevant content areas (i.e.,
effectiveness of measures being used to address runway incursions,
overruns, and ramp accidents; technology research, testing, and use;
FAA air traffic control practices and procedures; international
aviation safety practices, human factors issues; general aviation;
airports; and ground operations); and:
* balance in representing relevant organizations (i.e., academia,
business, government, and professional organizations).
The survey responses represent the professional views of the experts.
Their expertise can be derived from formal education, professional
experience, or both. The experts were identified by the National
Academy and us as individuals who are recognized by others who work in
the same subject matter area as having knowledge that is greater in
scope or depth than that of most people working in the area.
We recognize that it is likely that no one individual possessed
complete knowledge in each of the content areas addressed in the
survey: runway incursions, runway overruns, and ramp accidents.
However, through our selection criteria, we attempted to identify a set
of individuals who, when their responses were considered in the
aggregate, could be viewed as representing the breadth of knowledge in
each of the areas addressed in the survey.
We identified the information to collect in our surveys based on our
congressional request, Internet and literature searches, professional
conferences we attended, and background interviews. A social science
survey specialist collaborated with staff with subject matter expertise
on the development of the surveys.
We developed a 2-phase Web-based survey. The first survey contained
open-ended questions asking respondents to identify the primary causes
of runway incursions, runway overruns, and ramp accidents; overseas
practices and technologies that could be used in the United States; and
future actions, including the development of new technology that FAA
could take in the future to prevent incursions, overruns, and ramp
accidents. The responses to the questions on future actions were
analyzed and coded into categories that were then used as the basis for
the questions on future actions in the second survey. A reviewer
checked the resulting categories and coded responses and, where
interpretations differed, agreement was reached between the initial
coder and the reviewer. As an extra step to check the completeness of
the list of future actions that was generated by the experts we
corroborated the list with other evidence we had collected as a part of
our study and found that many of the same actions the experts
identified were also identified through our other study efforts.
The same set of respondents was also sent the second survey. As
mentioned above, the second survey contained closed-ended questions
asking respondents to evaluate the potential of the future actions that
could be taken to prevent runway incursions, runway overruns, and ramp
accidents. Other closed-ended questions addressed the effectiveness of
specific actions that FAA and others are taking to address runway
incursions, runway overruns, and ramp accidents; the accuracy of FAA
reporting on runway incursions that have occurred since January 1,
2001; and whether the deployment schedule of the Airport Surface
Detection Equipment, Model-X (ASDE-X) at 27 additional airports by 2011
should be kept as planned or changed, considering some of the benefits
and problems associated with the system.
Both surveys were pretested to ensure that the questions appropriately
addressed the topics, were clearly stated, easy to comprehend,
unbiased, and did not place undue burden on respondents. We also
evaluated the usability of the Web-based surveys. Based on the pretest
results, we made necessary changes to the surveys prior to
implementation.
We administered the Web-based surveys between June and September 2007.
We used e-mail to inform the respondents of the survey administration,
and provided them with the Web link for the survey and their log-in
name and password. In the e-mail message, we informed respondents that
our report will not contain individual survey responses; instead, it
would present the aggregated results of all participants. To maximize
the response rate, we sent follow up e-mail reminders and followed up
by telephone as necessary to encourage survey participation.
The first survey was sent to 27 experts. Two experts did not respond
and were not included in the second survey. As a result, 25 of 27
experts responded to the first survey for a response rate of 93 percent.
The second survey was sent to the 25 experts who responded to the first
survey. Twenty-two of the 25 experts responded for a response rate of
88 percent.
The number of responses varied for each of the survey content areas--
runway incursions, runway overruns, and ramp accidents--because we
asked the experts to answer questions only within their areas of
expertise. In addition, the number of responses may vary by question
because we do not report the number of experts who responded "Don't
know" or "No basis to judge." We report the survey results in terms of
actions that are most effective or future actions that have the most
potential. For tables 1 and 6, the actions that we report as being the
most effective or having the most potential were the ones that a
majority of respondents indicated were very or extremely effective for
the effectiveness questions or great or very great potential for the
questions asking about potential. For table 4, the actions that we
report as having the most potential reflect the ones that a majority of
experts indicated as having great potential or very great potential.
Although other actions also received a majority of positive responses,
this table reports the ones that received the highest number of
positive responses. For table 5, the actions that we report received
the highest number of responses indicating that they were very
effective or extremely effective. However, none of these actions
received a majority of positive responses.
The first survey, which was administered via the Web, included 12
questions shown in figure 13.
Figure 13: Questions Asked in First Survey:
1. Do you have expertise in runway incursions to be able to answer the
following three questions on the causes of runway incursions, overseas
practices and technology, and future actions to prevent runway
incursions?
2. In your opinion, what are the primary causes of runway incursions?
3. What practices or technologies that are currently being used
overseas could be used in the United States to prevent runway
incursions?
4. What actions, including the development of new technologies, could
FAA take in the future to prevent runway incursions?
5. Do you have expertise in runway overruns to be able to answer the
following three questions on the causes of runway overruns, overseas
practices and technology, and future actions to prevent runway overruns?
6. In your opinion, what are the primary causes of runway overruns?
7. What practices or technologies that are currently being used
overseas could be used in the United States to prevent runway overruns?
8. What actions, including the development of new technologies, could
FAA take in the future to prevent runway overruns?
9. Do you have expertise in ramp accidents to be able to answer the
following three questions on the causes of ramp accidents, overseas
practices and technology, and future actions to prevent ramp accidents?
10. In your opinion, what are the primary causes of ramp accidents?
11. What practices or technologies that are currently being used
overseas could be used in the United States to prevent ramp accidents?
12. What actions, including the development of new technologies, could
FAA take in the future to prevent ramp accidents?
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
The second phase of the survey was also administered via the Web and is
reproduced as a graphic image on the following pages.
Survey on Runway and Ramp Safety - Second Phase:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
Click here to learn more about navigating, saving, and exiting the
survey, copying and pasting text responses, and printing all your
responses at one time.
Please be aware that you can print your responses to all the questions
at one time using the link at the end of the survey.
Runway Incursions:
1. Do you have expertise in runway incursions to be able to answer
questions on actions to address runway incursions? (Check one)
1. Yes;
2. No; (Click here to skip to question 7.)
Actions to address runway incursions:
2. In your opinion, how effective, if at all, are the following FAA
actions to address runway incursions? (Choose one answer for each row.)
2a. Deploying the Airport Movement Area Safety System (AMASS) and
Airport Surface Detection Equipment-3 (ASDE-3) (AMASS and ASDE-3 work
together):
Extremely effective:
Very effective:
Moderately effective:
Slightly effective:
Not at all effective:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
2b. Deploying the Airport Surface Detection Equipment, Model X (ASDE-
X):
Extremely effective:
Very effective:
Moderately effective:
Slightly effective:
Not at all effective:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
2c. Testing the Final Approach Runway Occupancy Signal (FAROS), which
provides a visual warning to aircraft that the runway is occupied:
Extremely effective:
Very effective:
Moderately effective:
Slightly effective:
Not at all effective:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
2d. Testing the Low Cost Surface Surveillance System (LCSS):
Extremely effective:
Very effective:
Moderately effective:
Slightly effective:
Not at all effective:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
2e. Enhancing airport markings:
Extremely effective:
Very effective:
Moderately effective:
Slightly effective:
Not at all effective:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
2f. Enhancing airport signage:
Extremely effective:
Very effective:
Moderately effective:
Slightly effective:
Not at all effective:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
2g. Enhancing airport lighting:
Extremely effective:
Very effective:
Moderately effective:
Slightly effective:
Not at all effective:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
2h. Establishing Runway Safety Action Teams:
Extremely effective:
Very effective:
Moderately effective:
Slightly effective:
Not at all effective:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
2i. Testing the Runway Status Lights System:
Extremely effective:
Very effective:
Moderately effective:
Slightly effective:
Not at all effective:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
2j. Approving perimeter taxiways:
Extremely effective:
Very effective:
Moderately effective:
Slightly effective:
Not at all effective:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
2k. Conducting pilot educational initiatives, such as seminars:
Extremely effective:
Very effective:
Moderately effective:
Slightly effective:
Not at all effective:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
21. Conducting air traffic controller training:
Extremely effective:
Very effective:
Moderately effective:
Slightly effective:
Not at all effective:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
If you would like to expand on any of your responses, please provide
your comments below. Be sure to indicate which FAA action you are
discussing.
Future actions to prevent runway incursions:
3. In your opinion, what is the potential--considering costs,
technological feasibility. and operational changes--of the following
actions that FAA could take to prevent runway incursions? (Choose one
answer for each row)
3a. Improve airport signage:
Very great potential:
Great potential:
Moderate potential:
Little potential:
No potential:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
3b. Improve airport markings:
Very great potential:
Great potential:
Moderate potential:
Little potential:
No potential:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
3c. Improve airport lighting:
Very great potential:
Great potential:
Moderate potential:
Little potential:
No potential:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
3d. Encourage use of taxi guidance lighting systems:
Very great potential:
Great potential:
Moderate potential:
Little potential:
No potential:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
3e. Encourage use of yellow embedded lights for hold short lines:
Very great potential:
Great potential:
Moderate potential:
Little potential:
No potential:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
3f. Deploy the Runway Status Lights System:
Very great potential:
Great potential:
Moderate potential:
Little potential:
No potential:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
3g. Deploy the Final Approach Runway Occupancy Signal (FAROS), which
provides a visual warning to arriving aircraft that the runway is
occupied:
Very great potential:
Great potential:
Moderate potential:
Little potential:
No potential:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
3h. Work toward common layouts of runways and taxiways:
Very great potential:
Great potential:
Moderate potential:
Little potential:
No potential:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
3i. Encourage construction of additional perimeter taxiways:
Very great potential:
Great potential:
Moderate potential:
Little potential:
No potential:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
3j. Encourage use of pop-up physical barriers at hold short lines:
Very great potential:
Great potential:
Moderate potential:
Little potential:
No potential:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
3k. Stop using land and hold short operations that require aircraft to
stop before intersecting runways:
Very great potential:
Great potential:
Moderate potential:
Little potential:
No potential:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
31. Require use of aircraft landing lights for takeoff:
Very great potential:
Great potential:
Moderate potential:
Little potential:
No potential:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
3m. Require aircraft to keep transponders on at all times on runway and
taxiways:
Very great potential:
Great potential:
Moderate potential:
Little potential:
No potential:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
3n. Require airport vehicles to use transponders at all times while on
runways and taxiways:
Very great potential:
Great potential:
Moderate potential:
Little potential:
No potential:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
3o. Encourage use of slower radio communication between air traffic
controllers and pilots:
Very great potential:
Great potential:
Moderate potential:
Little potential:
No potential:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
3p. Adopt International Civil Aviation Organization phraseology:
Very great potential:
Great potential:
Moderate potential:
Little potential:
No potential:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
3q. Use data-linked communication between air traffic controllers and
pilots:
Very great potential:
Great potential:
Moderate potential:
Little potential:
No potential:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
3r. Deploy ASDE-X at more airports than the 8 that currently have the
system and the 27 scheduled to receive it (Click link to see list of
airports)
Very great potential:
Great potential:
Moderate potential:
Little potential:
No potential:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
3s. Refine the ASDE-X safety logic (alerting system):
Very great potential:
Great potential:
Moderate potential:
Little potential:
No potential:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
3t. Deploy ground radar at all FAA-controlled airports:
Very great potential:
Great potential:
Moderate potential:
Little potential:
No potential:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
3u. Deploy the Low Cost Surface Surveillance System:
Very great potential:
Great potential:
Moderate potential:
Little potential:
No potential:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
3v. Encourage development of certified cockpit heads up display:
Very great potential:
Great potential:
Moderate potential:
Little potential:
No potential:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
3w. Encourage the development of cockpit moving map displays that show
the location of other aircraft and vehicles on the airfield:
Very great potential:
Great potential:
Moderate potential:
Little potential:
No potential:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
3x. Encourage the development of runway incursion warnings in the
cockpit:
Very great potential:
Great potential:
Moderate potential:
Little potential:
No potential:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
3y. Encourage the use of Runway Awareness and Advisory System
technology, which provides aural runway situational advisories to
flight crews:
Very great potential:
Great potential:
Moderate potential:
Little potential:
No potential:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
3z. Require greater emphasis on ground operations training for pilots:
Very great potential:
Great potential:
Moderate potential:
Little potential:
No potential:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
If you would like to expand on any of your responses, please provide
your comments below. Be sure to indicate which action you are
discussing.
FAA reporting on runway incursions:
4. Based on your knowledge of specific incidents, how accurate or
inaccurate are the severity classifications FAA has made regarding
runway incursions that have occurred since January 1, 2001? (Check one)
1. Incident(s) tend to be classified as more severe than they actually
were.
2. Incident(s) tend to be correctly classified.
3. Incident(s) tend to be classified as less severe than they actually
were.
4. Don't know/No basis to judge.
Please explain your answer:
ASDE-X deployment:
5. Do you have knowledge of and/or experience with the deployment of
ASDE-X? (Check one)
1. Yes.
2. No. (Click here to skip to question 7)
6. The preliminary information GAO his gathered indicates that, to
varying extents, at the 8 airports where ASDE-X has been deployed,
there have been operational problems with false targets and false
alerts. We have also learned that for airports that did not previously
have ground radar. ASDE-X now provides them with that capability.
Considering the benefits and problems of ASDE-X. what is your opinion
of FAA's plan to deploy ASDE-X at 27 additional airports by 2011?
1. Deployment should be accelerated.
2. Deployment should be kept as planned.
3. Deployment should be slowed down.
4. Deployment should be stopped.
5. Don't know/No basis to judge.
Please explain your answer:
Runway Overruns:
7. Do you have expertise in runway overruns to be able to answer
questions on actions to address runway overruns? (Check one)
1. Yes.
2. No. (Click here to skip to question 10)
Actions to address runway overruns:
8. In your opinion, how effective, if at all, are the following FAA
actions to address runway overruns? (Choose one answer for each row)
8a. Accepting Engineered Materials Arresting Systems (EMAS) as an
alternative to constructing a runway safety area when its construction
is not practicable:
Extremely effective:
Very effective:
Moderately effective:
Slightly effective:
Not at all effective:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
8b. Using Airport Improvement Funds to construct runway safety areas.
Extremely effective:
Very effective:
Moderately effective:
Slightly effective:
Not at all effective:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
If you would like to expand on any of your responses, please provide
your comments below. Be sure to indicate which FAA action you are
discussing.
Future actions to prevent runway overruns:
9. In your opinion, what is the potential--considering costs.
technological feasibility, and operational changes--of the following
actions that FAA could take to prevent runway overruns? (Choose one
answer for each row)
9a. Encourage improvements in and use of runway condition and friction
measurements:
Very great potential:
Great potential:
Moderate potential:
Little potential:
No potential:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
9b. Encourage development of improved airport lighting:
Very great potential:
Great potential:
Moderate potential:
Little potential:
No potential:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
9c. Encourage development of improved airport markings:
Very great potential:
Great potential:
Moderate potential:
Little potential:
No potential:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
9d. Encourage lengthening of runways:
Very great potential:
Great potential:
Moderate potential:
Little potential:
No potential:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
9e. Encourage deployment of EMAS:
Very great potential:
Great potential:
Moderate potential:
Little potential:
No potential:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
9f. Improve communication of runway conditions and weather to flight
crews:
Very great potential:
Great potential:
Moderate potential:
Little potential:
No potential:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
9g. Encourage improvements in pilot calculations of aircraft
performance:
Very great potential:
Great potential:
Moderate potential:
Little potential:
No potential:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
9h. Encourage buffer zones between airports and neighboring communities
to reduce obstacles that aircraft might hit:
If you would like to expand on any of your responses, please provide
your comments below. Be sure to indicate which action you are
discussing.
Ramp Accidents:
10. Do you have expertise in ramp accidents to be able to answer
questions on actions to address ramp accidents? (Check one)
1. Yes.
2. No. (Click here to skip to question 13)
Actions to address ramp accidents:
11. In your opinion. how effective, if at all, are the following
actions by FAA. the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA). airports. or airlines to address ramp accidents? (Choose one
answer for each row)
11a. FAA's use of Runway Safety Action Teams:
Extremely effective:
Very effective:
Moderately effective:
Slightly effective:
Not at all effective:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
11b. Airports' use of surface surveillance technology:
Extremely effective:
Very effective:
Moderately effective:
Slightly effective:
Not at all effective:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
11c. Airports' use of ramp towers:
Extremely effective:
Very effective:
Moderately effective:
Slightly effective:
Not at all effective:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
11d. Airlines' use of ramp towers:
Extremely effective:
Very effective:
Moderately effective:
Slightly effective:
Not at all effective:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
11e. FAA's issuance of advisory circulars on Safety Management Systems
for airport operators:
Extremely effective:
Very effective:
Moderately effective:
Slightly effective:
Not at all effective:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
11f. FAA's issuance of advisory circulars on Safety Management Systems
for aviation service providers:
Extremely effective:
Very effective:
Moderately effective:
Slightly effective:
Not at all effective:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
11g. Airlines setting safety targets for reducing injuries in ramp
areas:
Extremely effective:
Very effective:
Moderately effective:
Slightly effective:
Not at all effective:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
11h. Airlines entering into safety alliances with OSHA:
Extremely effective:
Very effective:
Moderately effective:
Slightly effective:
Not at all effective:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
11i. OSHA's safety enforcement actions, such as its Site-Specific
Targeting Program:
Extremely effective:
Very effective:
Moderately effective:
Slightly effective:
Not at all effective:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
If you would like to expand on any of your responses, please provide
your comments below. Be sure to indicate which FAA action you are
discussing.
Future actions to prevent ramp accidents:
12. In your opinion, what is the potential--considering costs.
technological feasibility. and operational changes--of the following
actions that FAA. OSHA, airports. or airlines could take to prevent
ramp accidents? (Choose one answer for each row)
12a. Standardize airport ramp markings:
Very great potential:
Great potential:
Moderate potential:
Little potential:
No potential:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
12b. Use moving maps on aircraft:
Very great potential:
Great potential:
Moderate potential:
Little potential:
No potential:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
12c. Use moving maps on airport vehicles:
Very great potential:
Great potential:
Moderate potential:
Little potential:
No potential:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
12d. Improve or increase training of ramp workers:
Very great potential:
Great potential:
Moderate potential:
Little potential:
No potential:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
12e. Increase supervision of ramp workers:
Very great potential:
Great potential:
Moderate potential:
Little potential:
No potential:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
12f. Require certification of ramp workers:
Very great potential:
Great potential:
Moderate potential:
Little potential:
No potential:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
12g. Promote safety culture in the ramp area:
Very great potential:
Great potential:
Moderate potential:
Little potential:
No potential:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
12h. Use transponders on airport vehicles:
Very great potential:
Great potential:
Moderate potential:
Little potential:
No potential:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
12i. Use collision warning systems for airport vehicles:
Very great potential:
Great potential:
Moderate potential:
Little potential:
No potential:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
12j. Increase FAA oversight of ramp operations:
Very great potential:
Great potential:
Moderate potential:
Little potential:
No potential:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
12k. Increase OSHA oversight of ramp operations:
Very great potential:
Great potential:
Moderate potential:
Little potential:
No potential:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
121. Develop safer designs of ramp equipment:
Very great potential:
Great potential:
Moderate potential:
Little potential:
No potential:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
If you would like to expand on any of your responses, please provide
your comments below. Be sure to indicate which action you are
discussing.
Submit Your Completed Questionnaire:
13. Are you ready to submit your final completed questionnaire to
GAO? (Clicking "Yes" tells GAO that your answers are final and are
being officially submitted. Follow-up email messages will not be sent
to those who answer "Yes" below) (Check one):
1. Yes, I have completed the questionnaire.
2. No, the questionnaire is not yet complete.
14. Would you like to print all of your answers? (Check one)
1. Yes (Click here to go to Get a Copy of Your Responses).
2. No (Click on the "Save responses and close" button below to send
your answers to GAO).
Get a Copy of Your Responses:
Click here to get a copy of your responses. Once you open the copy of
your responses, scroll to the end of the document and click on "Print".
Click on "Save responses and close" below to send your answers to GAO.
Thank you for your participation in GAO's Survey on Runway and Ramp
Safety.
Questionnaire Programming Language - Version 5.0:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
[End of section]
Appendix III: Serious Incursions Involving Commercial Aircraft:
Table 8: Serious Incursions Involving At Least One Commercial Aircraft
during Fiscal Year 2006 and Fiscal Year 2007:
Date: October 13, 2005;
Airport: Gulfport-Biloxi International, MS;
Airline(s) and aircraft involved: Northwest Airlines DC9 and Cessna
C172;
Number of air passengers: N/A.
Date: March 21, 2006;
Airport: Chicago O'Hare International;
Airline(s) and aircraft involved: Lufthansa Airbus A319 and Chautauqua
Embraer E145;
Number of air passengers: 78.
Date: April 29, 2006;
Airport: Phoenix Sky Harbor International;
Airline(s) and aircraft involved: US Airways Airbus A320 and
pedestrian;
Number of air passengers: N/A.
Date: May 25, 2006;
Airport: Miami International;
Airline(s) and aircraft involved: Boeing 747 and American Eagle
Aerospatiale AT43;
Number of air passengers: N/A.
Date: July 18, 2006;
Airport: Chicago O'Hare International;
Airline(s) and aircraft involved: American Eagle Canadair CRJ7 and US
Airways Boeing 737;
Number of air passengers: N/A.
Date: July 23, 2006;
Airport: Chicago O'Hare International;
Airline(s) and aircraft involved: ATLAS Boeing 747 and United Airlines
Boeing 737;
Number of air passengers: 131.
Date: July 26, 2006;
Airport: Los Angeles International;
Airline(s) and aircraft involved: Mesa Canadair CRJ2 and Skywest
Embraer E120;
Number of air passengers: N/A.
Date: August 8, 2006;
Airport: Southwest Florida International, Ft. Myers, FL;
Airline(s) and aircraft involved: Southwest Boeing 737 and vehicle;
Number of air passengers: N/A.
Date: September 30, 2006;
Airport: Los Angeles International;
Airline(s) and aircraft involved: Gulfstream GLF5 and Skywest Canadair
CRJ7;
Number of air passengers: N/A.
Date: January 5, 2007;
Airport: Denver International;
Airline(s) and aircraft involved: Key Lime Air Swearingen SW4 and
Frontier Airbus A319;
Number of air passengers: 50.
Date: February 2, 2007;
Airport: Denver International;
Airline(s) and aircraft involved: United Boeing 737 and snowplow;
Number of air passengers: 101.
Date: May 4, 2007;
Airport: Cyril E. King Airport, Charlotte Amalie, VI;
Airline(s) and aircraft involved: American Airlines Boeing 757 and
Cessna C208;
Number of air passengers: N/A.
Date: May 6, 2007;
Airport: Los Angeles International;
Airline(s) and aircraft involved: Skywest Embraer 120 and Virgin Air
A346;
Number of air passengers: N/A.
Date: May 26, 2007;
Airport: San Francisco International;
Airline(s) and aircraft involved: Republic Airlines Embraer 170,
Skywest Airlines Embraer 120;
Number of air passengers: 27.
Date: July 11, 2007;
Airport: Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International, FL;
Airline(s) and aircraft involved: Delta Air Lines Boeing 757 and United
Airlines Airbus A320;
Number of air passengers: 172.
Date: July 19, 2007;
Airport: Chicago O'Hare International;
Airline(s) and aircraft involved: United Airlines Boeing 737 and US
Airways Boeing 737;
Number of air passengers: N/A.
Date: August 16, 2007;
Airport: Lost Angeles International;
Airline(s) and aircraft involved: WestJet Boeing 737 and Northwest
Airlines Airbus A320;
Number of air passengers: 296.
Source: GAO analysis of Federal Aviation Administration and NTSB data.
Note: N/A indicates that the information was not contained in the
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) incident reports.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Status of the National Runway Safety Plan Objectives:
Table 9: Implementation Status of the Objectives Contained in Federal
Aviation Administration's (FAA) National Runway Safety Plan for 2002-
2004:
Runway Safety Objective:
1. Develop new training courses or informational briefings for
controllers to reduce operational errors;
Status: Complete.
Runway Safety Objective:
2. Facilitate use of surface operations training for air carriers and
general aviation;
Status: Complete.
Runway Safety Objective:
3. Distribute mechanic runway safety taxi training to major airlines;
Status: Complete.
Runway Safety Objective:
4. Complete over 1,000 safety seminars per year, including runway
safety topics;
Status: Ongoing.
Runway Safety Objective:
5. Publish airport vehicle surface operations advisory circular with
best practices and standard operating procedures;
Status: Complete.
Runway Safety Objective:
6. Conduct research on improving controller training related to memory
limitations. Review existing course materials;
Status: Complete.
Runway Safety Objective:
7. Require all tower controllers to complete training emphasizing team
effectiveness and situational awareness;
Status: Ongoing.
Runway Safety Objective:
8. Develop course material and conduct training for aviation safety
inspectors and enhance awareness of certified flight instructors and
pilot examiners on pilot surface operations;
Status: Complete.
Runway Safety Objective:
9. Develop and implement enhanced training for tower controllers;
Status: Complete.
Runway Safety Objective:
10. Implement a foreign air carrier pilot training program;
Status: Canceled.
Runway Safety Objective:
11. Expand role of flight service station specialists to provide runway
safety information for general aviation at towered and nontowered
airports;
Status: Complete.
Runway Safety Objective:
12. Publish series of letters to all pilots discussing runway safety;
Status: Canceled.
Runway Safety Objective:
13. Provide airport diagrams for towered airports to pilots via a link
or other means;
Status: Complete.
Runway Safety Objective:
14. Conduct at least one annual media emphasis project with trade or
association periodicals;
Status: Complete.
Runway Safety Objective:
15. Assess selected air traffic control procedures to enhance runway
safety;
Status: Ongoing.
Runway Safety Objective:
16. Implement national standardized requirements for tower positions;
Status: Complete.
Runway Safety Objective:
17. Implement standardization of national equipment and procedures for
runway incursion devices;
Status: Canceled.
Runway Safety Objective:
18. Publish and disseminate best practices and standard operating
procedures as appendixes to pilot surface movement advisory circulars;
Status: Complete.
Runway Safety Objective:
19. During inspectors, ensure that pilots have current surface
movements charts available and are being used;
Status: Complete.
Runway Safety Objective:
20. Develop advisory circulars addressing procedures, best practices,
and standard operating procedures for airline maintenance taxi
operators and tug and tow vehicles on airport surface;
Status: Complete.
Runway Safety Objective:
21. Disseminate and provide training to all safety inspectors for the
Runway Incursion Information Evaluation Program;
Status: Ongoing.
Runway Safety Objective:
22. Improve runway safety data collection, storage retrieval, and
distribution;
Status: Ongoing.
Runway Safety Objective:
23. Improve collection and analysis of operational error data with
human factors tool, using technique to identify root causes;
Status: Canceled.
Runway Safety Objective:
24. Complete and publish results from phraseology workgroup;
Status: Complete.
Runway Safety Objective:
25. Evaluate and, if appropriate, implement national procedures
requiring pilot read-backs to controllers for certain clearances or
instructions;
Status: Complete.
Runway Safety Objective:
26. Publish guidance on standard surface operations phraseology for
pilots and mechanics moving aircraft;
Status: Complete.
Runway Safety Objective:
27. Issue guidance on vehicle operations near active runways;
Status: Complete.
Runway Safety Objective:
28. Complete airport paint marking study and revise advisory circular
standards, if appropriate;
Status: Complete.
Runway Safety Objective:
29. Complete airport design and operations study. Enhance design
standards and improve procedures as appropriate;
Status: Complete.
Runway Safety Objective:
30. Ensure towered airports have current airport diagrams. Clarify
process, roles, and responsibilities for development and maintenance of
airport diagrams;
Status: Complete.
Runway Safety Objective:
31. Maintain the published ASDE-3/AMASS deployment waterfall schedule;
Status: Complete.
Runway Safety Objective:
32. Develop high-level requirements for runway status lights and
validate implementation methods through field demonstrations;
Status: Ongoing.
Runway Safety Objective:
33. Conduct evaluations of existing low-cost technologies;
Status: Complete.
Runway Safety Objective:
34. Meet published ASDE-X milestones; Status: Not met.
Runway Safety Objective:
35. Evaluate moving map technologies in an operational environment,
using either aircraft or surface vehicles;
Status: Complete.
Runway Safety Objective:
36. Develop and evaluate visual signal for direct warning to aircraft
on final approach when the runway is occupied;
Status: Ongoing.
Runway Safety Objective:
37. Develop a surface "road map" for low-cost technology architecture
and issue Broad Agency Announcements to solicit industry ideas;
Status: Complete.
Runway Safety Objective:
38. Create and accomplish periodic regional runway safety plans for
each FAA region, including Runway Safety Action Team site visits to
airports in each region;
Status: Ongoing.
Runway Safety Objective:
39. Implement an aggressive runway safety "special emphasis" program at
selected airports that results in reducing runway incursions;
Status: Ongoing.
Source: GAO analysis of FAA data.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix V: Airports with Surface Surveillance Technology:
Table 10: Airports with Airport Surface Detection Equipment, Model 3
(ASDE-3)/Airport Movement Area Safety Systems (AMASS) or the Airport
Surface Detection Equipment, Model X (ASDE-X) or Scheduled to Receive
ASDE-X:
Airport: Baltimore Washington International;
ASDE-3/AMASS: Check;
ASDE-X Commissioned: {Empty;
Scheduled ASDE-X Deployment[A]: June 2010.
Airport: Boston Logan International;
ASDE-3/AMASS: Check;
ASDE-X Commissioned: [Empty];
Scheduled ASDE-X Deployment[A]: July 2009.
Airport: Bradley International, Hartford, CT;
ASDE-3/AMASS: [Empty];
ASDE-X Commissioned: Check;
Scheduled ASDE-X Deployment[A]: [Empty].
Airport: Camp Springs Andrews Air Force Base;
ASDE-3/AMASS: Check;
ASDE-X Commissioned: [Empty];
Scheduled ASDE-X Deployment[A]: [Empty].
Airport: Charlotte Douglas International;
ASDE-3/AMASS: [Empty];
ASDE-X Commissioned: Check;
Scheduled ASDE-X Deployment[A]: [Empty].
Airport: Chicago Midway;
ASDE-3/AMASS: [Empty];
ASDE-X Commissioned: [Empty];
Scheduled ASDE-X Deployment[A]: July 2010.
Airport: Chicago O'Hare International;
ASDE-3/AMASS: [Empty];
ASDE-X Commissioned: Check;
Scheduled ASDE-X Deployment[A]: [Empty].
Airport: Cleveland Hopkins International;
ASDE-3/AMASS: Check;
ASDE-X Commissioned: [Empty];
Scheduled ASDE-X Deployment[A]: [Empty].
Airport: Covington/Cincinnati Northern Kentucky International;
ASDE-3/AMASS: Check;
ASDE-X Commissioned: [Empty];
Scheduled ASDE-X Deployment[A]: [Empty].
Airport: Dallas-Ft. Worth International;
ASDE-3/AMASS: Check;
ASDE-X Commissioned: [Empty];
Scheduled ASDE-X Deployment[A]: April 2010.
Airport: Denver International;
ASDE-3/AMASS: Check;
ASDE-X Commissioned: [Empty];
Scheduled ASDE-X Deployment[A]: November 2009.
Airport: Detroit Metro Wayne County;
ASDE-3/AMASS: Check;
ASDE-X Commissioned: [Empty];
Scheduled ASDE-X Deployment[A]: June 2008.
Airport: Ft. Lauderdale/Hollywood;
ASDE-3/AMASS: [Empty];
ASDE-X Commissioned: [Empty];
Scheduled ASDE-X Deployment[A]: April 2009.
Airport: General Mitchell International, Milwaukee, WI;
ASDE-3/AMASS: [Empty];
ASDE-X Commissioned: Check;
Scheduled ASDE-X Deployment[A]: [Empty].
Airport: George Bush Intercontinental;
ASDE-3/AMASS: Check;
ASDE-X Commissioned: [Empty];
Scheduled ASDE-X Deployment[A]: November 2009.
Airport: Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International;
ASDE-3/AMASS: [Empty];
ASDE-X Commissioned: Check;
Scheduled ASDE-X Deployment[A]: [Empty].
Airport: Honolulu International - Hickam Air Force Base;
ASDE-3/AMASS: [Empty];
ASDE-X Commissioned: [Empty];
Scheduled ASDE-X Deployment[A]: August 2010.
Airport: John F. Kennedy International, New York, NY;
ASDE-3/AMASS: Check;
ASDE-X Commissioned: [Empty];
Scheduled ASDE-X Deployment[A]: July 2009.
Airport: John Wayne-Orange County, Santa Ana, CA;
ASDE-3/AMASS: [Empty];
ASDE-X Commissioned: [Empty];
Scheduled ASDE-X Deployment[A]: February 2010.
Airport: Kansas City International;
ASDE-3/AMASS: Check;
ASDE-X Commissioned: [Empty];
Scheduled ASDE-X Deployment[A]: [Empty].
Airport: Lambert-St. Louis International;
ASDE-3/AMASS: [Empty];
ASDE-X Commissioned: Check;
Scheduled ASDE-X Deployment[A]: [Empty].
Airport: Las Vegas McCarran International;
ASDE-3/AMASS: Check;
ASDE-X Commissioned: [Empty];
Scheduled ASDE-X Deployment[A]: December 2009.
Airport: Los Angeles International;
ASDE-3/AMASS: Check;
ASDE-X Commissioned: [Empty];
Scheduled ASDE-X Deployment[A]: June 2009.
Airport: Louis Armstrong New Orleans International;
ASDE-3/AMASS: Check;
ASDE-X Commissioned: [Empty];
Scheduled ASDE-X Deployment[A]: [Empty].
Airport: Louisville International-Standiford Field;
ASDE-3/AMASS: [Empty];
ASDE-X Commissioned: Check;
Scheduled ASDE-X Deployment[A]: [Empty].
Airport: Memphis International;
ASDE-3/AMASS: Check;
ASDE-X Commissioned: [Empty];
Scheduled ASDE-X Deployment[A]: January 2011.
Airport: Miami International;
ASDE-3/AMASS: Check;
ASDE-X Commissioned: [Empty];
Scheduled ASDE-X Deployment[A]: August 2010.
Airport: Minneapolis-St. Paul International;
ASDE-3/AMASS: Check;
ASDE-X Commissioned: [Empty];
Scheduled ASDE-X Deployment[A]: February 2010.
Airport: New York LaGuardia;
ASDE-3/AMASS: Check;
ASDE-X Commissioned: [Empty];
Scheduled ASDE-X Deployment[A]: December 2010.
Airport: Newark International;
ASDE-3/AMASS: Check;
ASDE-X Commissioned: [Empty];
Scheduled ASDE-X Deployment[A]: July 2009.
Airport: Orlando International;
ASDE-3/AMASS: [Empty];
ASDE-X Commissioned: Check;
Scheduled ASDE-X Deployment[A]: [Empty].
Airport: Philadelphia International;
ASDE-3/AMASS: Check;
ASDE-X Commissioned: [Empty];
Scheduled ASDE-X Deployment[A]: December 2009.
Airport: Phoenix Sky Harbor International;
ASDE-3/AMASS: [Empty];
ASDE-X Commissioned: [Empty];
Scheduled ASDE-X Deployment[A]: December 2008.
Airport: Pittsburgh International;
ASDE-3/AMASS: Check;
ASDE-X Commissioned: [Empty];
Scheduled ASDE-X Deployment[A]: [Empty].
Airport: Portland International;
ASDE-3/AMASS: Check;
ASDE-X Commissioned: [Empty];
Scheduled ASDE-X Deployment[A]: [Empty].
Airport: Ronald Reagan Washington National;
ASDE-3/AMASS: Check;
ASDE-X Commissioned: [Empty];
Scheduled ASDE-X Deployment[A]: December 2010.
Airport: Salt Lake City International;
ASDE-3/AMASS: Check;
ASDE-X Commissioned: [Empty];
Scheduled ASDE-X Deployment[A]: May 2010.
Airport: San Diego International;
ASDE-3/AMASS: Check;
ASDE-X Commissioned: [Empty];
Scheduled ASDE-X Deployment[A]: January 2011.
Airport: San Francisco International;
ASDE-3/AMASS: Check;
ASDE-X Commissioned: [Empty];
Scheduled ASDE-X Deployment[A]: [Empty].
Airport: Seattle-Tacoma International;
ASDE-3/AMASS: [Empty];
ASDE-X Commissioned: Check;
Scheduled ASDE-X Deployment[A]: [Empty].
Airport: Ted Stevens Anchorage International;
ASDE-3/AMASS: Check;
ASDE-X Commissioned: [Empty];
Scheduled ASDE-X Deployment[A]: [Empty].
Airport: Theodore Francis Green State, Providence, RI;
ASDE-3/AMASS: [Empty];
ASDE-X Commissioned: Check;
Scheduled ASDE-X Deployment[A]: [Empty].
Airport: Washington Dulles International;
ASDE-3/AMASS: Check;
ASDE-X Commissioned: [Empty];
Scheduled ASDE-X Deployment[A]: July 2008.
Airport: William P. Hobby, Houston, TX;
ASDE-3/AMASS: [Empty];
ASDE-X Commissioned: Check;
Scheduled ASDE-X Deployment[A]: [Empty].
Source: FAA.
[A] Represents when the facility first declares the system ready for
conditional use. Once the system is formally accepted by the facility,
the system is commissioned.
Note: As indicated above, 28 airports currently have ASDE-3/AMASS. Six
additional airports (Seattle-Tacoma International, Lambert-St. Louis
International, Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International, Louisville
International-Standiford Field, Chicago O'Hare International, and
Charlotte Douglas International) originally had ASDE-3/AMASS, but the
equipment has since been upgraded to ASDE-X.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix VI: Airports Where Ramp Accident Fatalities Occurred:
Table 11: U.S. Airports at which Ramp Fatalities Occurred from 2001
through 2006:
Airport: Addison;
Location: Dallas, TX;
Type[A]: Reliever;
Number of fatalities: 1.
Airport: Burke Lakefront;
Location: Cleveland, OH;
Type[A]: Reliever;
Number of fatalities: 1.
Airport: Logan International;
Location: Boston, MA;
Type[A]: Large hub;
Number of fatalities: 1.
Airport: Baltimore/Washington International;
Location: Baltimore, MD;
Type[A]: Large hub;
Number of fatalities: 1.
Airport: Casa Grande Municipal;
Location: Casa Grande, AZ;
Type[A]: General aviation;
Number of fatalities: 1.
Airport: Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky International;
Location: Covington, KY;
Type[A]: Large hub;
Number of fatalities: 1.
Airport: Ronald Reagan Washington National;
Location: Arlington, VA;
Type[A]: Large hub;
Number of fatalities: 2.
Airport: Denver International;
Location: Denver, CO;
Type[A]: Large hub;
Number of fatalities: 1.
Airport: Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County;
Location: Detroit, MI;
Type[A]: Large hub;
Number of fatalities: 1.
Airport: El Paso International;
Location: El Paso, TX;
Type[A]: Small hub;
Number of fatalities: 1.
Airport: Newark Liberty International;
Location: Newark, NJ;
Type[A]: Large hub;
Number of fatalities: 2.
Airport: Forrest City Municipal;
Location: Forrest City, AR;
Type[A]: General aviation;
Number of fatalities: 1.
Airport: Hayward Executive;
Location: Hayward, CA;
Type[A]: Reliever;
Number of fatalities: 1.
Airport: Chicago O'Hare International;
Location: Chicago, IL;
Type[A]: Large hub;
Number of fatalities: 2.
Airport: Norfolk International;
Location: Norfolk, VA;
Type[A]: Medium hub;
Number of fatalities: 1.
Airport: Philadelphia International;
Location: Philadelphia, PA;
Type[A]: Large hub;
Number of fatalities: 2.
Airport: Richmond International;
Location: Richmond, VA;
Type[A]: Small hub;
Number of fatalities: 1.
Airport: Louisville International-Standiford Field;
Location: Louisville, KY;
Type[A]: Small hub;
Number of fatalities: 1.
Airport: Scappoose Industrial Airpark;
Location: Scappoose, OR;
Type[A]: General aviation;
Number of fatalities: 1.
Airport: Nut Tree;
Location: Vacaville, CA;
Type[A]: General aviation;
Number of fatalities: 1.
Airport: Total;
Number of fatalities: 24[B].
Source: GAO analysis of Federal Aviation Administration, National
Transportation Safety Board, and Occupational Safety and Health
Administration data.
[A] Primary commercial service airports are categorized based on the
percentage of total annual passenger boardings (enplanements) for all
operations of U.S. carriers within the United States. General aviation
airports are small airports that do not receive scheduled commercial
service.
[B] Five additional fatalities occurred from 2001 through 2006, but the
data sources did not specify the airports.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Gerald Dillingham, Ph.D., (202) 512-2834 or dillinghamg@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the individual named above, Teresa Spisak (Assistant
Director), Ashley Alley, Nancy Boardman, Colin Fallon, Evan Gilman, Bob
Homan, Dave Hooper, Richard Hung, Rosa Leung, Sara Ann Moessbauer, Josh
Ormond, and Pamela Vines made key contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] Ramps are areas of airports where aircraft are readied for arrival
and departure.
[2] Taxiways are routes that aircraft follow to and from runways.
[3] The survey consisted of two phases. Twenty-five experts responded
to the first phase survey and 22 responded to the second phase survey.
[4] Ramp towers, staffed by airline, airport, or contractor personnel,
are used to control the ramps at some airports.
[5] Among other things, ICAO develops standards and recommended
practices, procedures, and guidance material related to all aspects of
civil aviation, including safety and security.
[6] The worst accident in aviation history occurred in 1977 when a KLM
Boeing 747 collided with a Pan Am Boeing 747 on a runway in Tenerife,
the Canary Islands, killing 583 passengers and crew. The Spanish
government, which investigated the accident, determined that the
accident was caused by a miscommunication between the KLM pilot and the
control tower that take-off clearance had been provided, as well as
several other factors.
[7] FAA classified this accident as a surface incident, which it had
defined as any event where unauthorized or unapproved movement occurs
within a movement area associated with the operation of an aircraft
that affects or could affect the safety of flight. After adopting
ICAO's definition of a runway incursion, FAA began classifying some
incidents formerly classified as surface incidents as incursions.
[8] FAA defines category A as separation decreases and participants
take extreme action to narrowly avoid a collision, or the event results
in a collision; category B, separation decreases and there is a
significant potential for a collision; category C, separation decreases
but there is ample time and distance to avoid a potential collision;
and category D, there is little or no chance of collision.
[9] According to FAA, 72 percent of incursions from fiscal year 2003
through fiscal year 2006 involved at least one general aviation
aircraft.
[10] NTSB determined that the probable cause of that accident was the
pilots' failure to use available reverse thrust in a timely manner to
safely slow or stop the airplane after landing.
[11] The 1,000-foot runway safety area standard was based on the
results of an FAA study of overruns from 1975 to 1987, which indicated
that about 90 percent of overruns occurred within 1,000 feet of the
runway end. FAA runway safety area standards depend on the type of
aircraft using a runway and range from 120 feet wide by 240 feet beyond
the end of the runways used for smaller aircraft to 500 feet wide by
1,000 feet beyond the end of the runways for larger aircraft.
[12] In 2000, FAA started a program to accelerate the construction of
runway safety area improvements. Prior to 2000, FAA required that when
certificated airports undertook a major runways construction project,
the runway safety areas would be brought up to current standards to the
extent practicable.
[13] In a May 24, 2007, report to Congress, FAA indicated that it had
hoped that all runway safety area improvements would be complete by
2010 but that 42 projects would not be completed until after 2010
because they are often large and complex, requiring several years to
complete.
[14] The runway safety area requirement in Public Law 109-115, 119
Stat. 2401 (2005) is applicable to owners or operators of an airport
that have received an operating certificate under 49 U.S.C. § 44706.
[15] Flight Safety Foundation officials noted that this estimate
assumes 27 million departures annually, includes only International Air
Transport Association airlines, and is based mostly on foreign airline
data. They also noted that to determine injury costs, they extrapolated
U.S. injury costs across the world, perhaps resulting in injury cost
estimates higher than they actually would be.
[16] FAA, Report to Congress: Injuries and Fatalities of Workers Struck
by Vehicles on Airport Aprons, (Washington, D.C.: July 2002).
[17] Flight Safety Foundation, Equipment Damage and Human Injury on the
Apron: Is It a Cost of Doing Business? (Alexandria, VA: 2004).
[18] Other federal agencies such as DOT's Volpe National Transportation
Systems Center and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
also conduct runway safety research.
[19] Primarily through 14 C.F.R. parts 119, 121, 135, and 139.
[20] 49 U.S.C. § 46101(a)(2).
[21] FAA Order 8020.11B.
[22] 29 U.S.C. §§651 et seq.
[23] OSHA conducts its work pursuant to the 1970 Occupational Safety
and Health Act and the general industry safety and health standards
outlined in 29 C.F.R. part 1910; however, neither contains provisions
that pertain specifically to the aviation industry.
[24] FAA's 2002 national runway safety plan was developed in
cooperation with the Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST), a joint
government-aviation industry group formed to study aviation safety
issues, and encompassed 11 of the safety enhancements CAST identified
as having the greatest potential for improving runway safety from its
Runway Incursion Joint Safety Implementation Team.
[25] Of the remaining 5 objectives not implemented, 4 were canceled,
and 1 objective concerning the deployment of technology was not met.
[26] AMASS is essentially the safety logic, which is designed to detect
potential collisions, for ASDE-3. This combined technology is usually
referred to as ASDE-3/AMASS.
[27] Other sources of ASDE-X data include multilateration, which is a
group of antennas used to obtain position information on aircraft. Each
ASDE-X airport has between 10 and 20 antennas.
[28] FAA is testing both takeoff hold lights and runway entrance lights
with ASDE-X at the Dallas-Ft. Worth International Airport and is
testing runway entrance lights with AMASS at the San Diego
International Airport.
[29] According to FAA, future additions to the runway status lights
system could include runway intersection lights and lights to warn
pilots exiting at high speeds about traffic on closely-spaced parallel
runways.
[30] Twenty-two experts responded to our survey, but the number of
respondents for each question varies because we asked them to answer
questions only within their areas of expertise. In addition, some
respondents answered "don't know/no basis to judge" to certain
questions.
[31] According to an FAA official, by contrast to ASDE-X, which uses
multiple sensors, low cost surface surveillance systems collect data
using a single sensor.
[32] Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport officials said
the perimeter taxiway cost $48 million. An official from the Dallas-Ft.
Worth International Airport said its perimeter taxiway will cost about
$63.8 million. FAA indicated that it provided about $26 million in
Airport Improvement Program funds for the perimeter taxiway at the
Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport and about $47.3
million for the perimeter taxiway at the Dallas-Ft. Worth International
Airport.
[33] Certain large aircraft, such as the Boeing 747, Boeing 777, Airbus
A330, and Airbus A340 cannot use the perimeter taxiway because of their
large wingspans.
[34] This modification is being made by moving the southernmost runway
55 feet farther away from its parallel runway to accommodate the
construction of a centerfield taxiway between the two runways.
According to a Los Angeles World Airports official, the Los Angeles
International Airport is spending $333 million for the south airfield
improvements, of which FAA funded $98 million, including $29.6 million
for the new center taxiway.
[35] Fifteen of 22 respondents indicated that FAA's enhancement of
airport markings and lighting was very or extremely effective and 14
indicated that FAA's enhancement of airport signage was very or
extremely effective.
[36] An electronic flight bag is an electronic display system that
gives pilots a variety of aviation data such as aircraft operating
manuals and navigational charts. Electronic flight bags range from
laptop-like devices that are independent of the aircraft for use on
existing fleets to displays permanently installed in the cockpits of
newer aircraft.
[37] FAA considers runway safety areas that meet 90 percent of the
standards to be in substantial compliance.
[38] Those airports include Chicago O'Hare International Airport, with
six runways that did not meet runway safety area standards as of June
2007; Houston's George Bush Intercontinental Airport, with five runways
that did not meet standards; and Los Angeles International Airport,
with four runways that did not meet standards. Busiest airports were
identified from preliminary 2006 enplanement data.
[39] Twelve of 16 experts indicated that FAA's acceptance of EMAS as an
alternative to constructing a runway safety area when its construction
is not practical was very or extremely effective in addressing runway
overruns.
[40] FAA Order 7050.1.
[41] DOT Office of Inspector General, Progress Has Been Made in
Reducing Runway Incursions, but Recent Incidents Underscore the Need
for Further Proactive Efforts, Report No. AV-2007-050 (Washington,
D.C.: May 24, 2007).
[42] Under the 2002 national runway safety plan, 11 of the 39
objectives were assigned to the Office of Aviation Safety's Flight
Standards Service.
[43] In addition to his duties as acting director of the Office of
Runway Safety, this official was also a regional runway safety
director. Officials in the Air Traffic Organization's Office of Safety
Services assisted the acting director in carrying out his duties.
[44] Contractors represented 40 of the 66 Office of Runway Safety
employees before 2004 and 21 of the 37 employees in 2007.
[45] We are conducting ongoing work on how FAA factors cost increases
and schedule delays for systems such as ASDE-X into its acquisition
performance measurement.
[46] FAA refers to ASDE-X as being commissioned after the system has
been tested at an airport and demonstrated that the field site
personnel can fully operate and maintain it.
[47] DOT Office of Inspector General, Actions Needed To Reduce Risk
with the Next Generation Air Transportation System, CC-2007-047
(Washington, D.C.: May 9, 2007) and FAA Needs to Improve ASDE-X
Management Controls to Address Cost Growth, Schedule Delays, and Safety
Risks, AV-2008-004 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 31, 2007).
[48] FAA officials said that due to the nature of radar, heavy rain has
the potential to degrade system performance, but that all radar systems
have similar limitations. However, they also said that ASDE-X performs
much better in all levels of rain than the ASDE-3/AMASS system.
[49] Audit of Runway Safety Logic Systems, FAA Air Traffic Safety
Oversight Service, Audit Project Number: ADT-FY-07-001 (Washington,
D.C.: April 16, 2007).
[50] According to NTSB, simulations of ASDE-3/AMASS performance using
data from actual incursions showed that alerts may occur as little as 8
to 11 seconds before a potential collision.
[51] The air traffic control tower at the Seattle-Tacoma International
Airport reported 306 false targets from January 27, 2006, though May
17, 2007. According to FAA, 261 of these false targets have been
addressed by an adaptation or software change, and very few were
related to system malfunctions.
[52] We reviewed the daily records of air traffic control tower
operations at the Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport and
found that 41 false alerts were recorded from June 7, 2006, to May 16,
2007.
[53] FAA Order 7110.65R.
[54] Of the 17 respondents, 3 said ASDE-3/AMASS was very effective, 9
moderately effective, 4 slightly effective, and 1 not at all effective.
[55] Of the17 respondents, 1 said ASDE-X was extremely effective, 3
said it was very effective, 10 said it was moderately effective, and 3
said it was slightly effective.
[56] Ten airports that were scheduled to receive ASDE-X already had
ASDE-3/AMASS.
[57] FAA's rebaseline of the ASDE-X program, which was approved by the
agency's Joint Resources Council, was conducted on the basis of
analyzing the safety and efficiency benefits of deploying the system at
the 59 top-tier airports. The analysis assumed that maximum benefit was
derived from deploying ASDE-X at airports with larger traffic counts
and/or more complex operations. Sunk costs, such as site preparation
that was already underway, were also considered. However, we found that
FAA's ASDE-X business case did not include year-by-year estimates of
benefits and costs or a sensitivity analysis, as required for all
investment decisions by Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular
A-94. A sensitivity analysis is a quantitative assessment of the effect
that a change in an assumption--the numerical value of a single
parameter--will have on net present value. In commenting on a draft of
this report, FAA officials said that they had computed year-by-year
analyses and conducted a sensitivity analysis. However, this
information was not included in FAA's business case for ASDE-X for the
entire 30-year lifecycle investment, as required by OMB.
[58] There were approximately 570 airports used by commercial service
aircraft in 2006.
[59] At the time the survey was administered, ASDE-X had not yet been
commissioned at 27 of the 35 airports.
[60] Of 8 respondents, 2 said it was very effective, 3 moderately
effective, and 3 slightly effective.
[61] Most electronic flight bags contain moving maps, which help pilots
identify and anticipate an airplane's location on runways and taxiways.
[62] These errors include operational errors, which FAA defines as an
action by an air traffic controller that results in less than the
required minimum separation between two or more aircraft, or between an
aircraft and an obstacle (e.g., vehicles, equipment, personnel on
runways); operational deviations, which are defined as an occurrence
attributable to an element of the air traffic system in which
applicable separation minima were maintained, but an aircraft, vehicle,
equipment, or personnel encroached upon a landing area that was
delegated to another position of operation without prior coordination
or approval; pilot deviations, which are defined as actions by pilots
that violate any Federal Aviation Regulation; and vehicle/pedestrian
deviations, which are defined as vehicles, pedestrians, or other
objects interfering with aircraft operations by entering or moving on
the movement area without authorization from air traffic control.
[63] This program seeks to improve aviation safety through the
voluntary self-reporting of safety incidents. Participants include
employees of air carriers and repair stations that have entered into a
memorandum of understanding with FAA. FAA does not take enforcement
action against employees who voluntarily self-reported safety
violations for reports that are sole-source and will pursue
administrative action only for reports that are not sole-source.
Incidents that involve alcohol, drugs, criminal activity, or
intentional disregard for safety are not eligible for self-reporting
under the program. See GAO, Aviation Safety: FAA's Safety Oversight
System Is Effective but Could Benefit from Better Evaluation of Its
Programs' Performance, GAO-06-266T (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 17, 2005)
and Aviation Safety: Better Management Controls are Needed to Improve
FAA's Safety Enforcement and Compliance Efforts, GAO-04-646
(Washington, D.C.: July 6, 2004).
[64] Safety management is a systematic, explicit, and comprehensive
approach for managing safety risk at all levels and throughout the
entire scope of an operation and lifecycle of a system.
[65] Auditors found that 82 percent of the runway incursion assessments
complied with the severity classifications, 4 percent were not in
compliance, and that 13 percent of the incursions could not be
accurately classified due to insufficient guidance contained in FAA
Order 7050.1, which defines the severity classification categories.
[66] The current method of evaluation is for the program to assign a
severity rating and then have the Air Traffic Organization assessment
team members vote to reach a consensus. If the assessment team's rating
is different from the program, then the Air Traffic Organization's
Director of Operational Services will make the final determination of
severity. FAA plans to complete its validation of the computer program
in fiscal year 2008.
[67] An FAA official said, for example, that the agency usually does
not receive information from aircraft flight recorders for its runway
incursion assessments.
[68] Seven of 11 experts questioned the classifications and 4 said that
the incidents tended to be correctly classified.
[69] Audit of Runway Safety Logic Systems, FAA Air Traffic Oversight
Service, Audit Project Number: ADT-FY-07-001 (Washington, D.C.: April
16, 2007).
[70] FAA Order 7210.3 requires that when the safety logic system
generates any alert or is offline, it should be documented on the
facility's air traffic log.
[71] FAA identified 25 facilities with 20 percent or greater of the
employees working a 6-day week and 4 percent or greater of the hours
were covered by overtime. The 25 facilities included 21 control towers
and 4 terminal radar approach control facilities. Of 25 facilities, 12
had between 20 and 29 percent of their controllers working 6-day weeks,
7 had between 30 and 39 percent of their staff working 6-day weeks, and
6 facilities had between 40 to 52 percent of their controllers working
6-day weeks. The 25 facilities included 7 control towers at airports
that were ranked among the 50 busiest FAA air traffic control towers in
the country, including Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International
Airport, which is the busiest airport in the country and had 52 percent
of its controllers regularly working 6-day weeks.
[72] DOT Office of Inspector General, Progress Has Been Made in
Reducing Runway Incursions, but Recent Incidents Underscore the Need
for Further Proactive Efforts, Report No. AV-2007-050 (Washington,
D.C.: May 24, 2007).
[73] On August 28, 2007, NTSB made five additional runway safety
recommendations to FAA and others. These recommendations included (1)
requiring crewmembers on the flight deck to positively confirm and
cross-check the airplane's location at the assigned departure runway
before crossing the hold short line for takeoff, (2) requiring aircraft
operators install on their aircraft cockpits moving map displays or an
automatic system that alert pilots when a takeoff is attempted on a
taxiway or a runway other than the one intended, (3) requiring airports
implement enhanced taxiway centerline markings and surface painted
holding position signs at all runway entrances, (4) prohibiting the
issuance of a takeoff clearance during an airplane's taxi to its
departure runway until after the airplane has crossed all intersecting
runways, and (5) suggesting that controllers refrain from performing
administrative tasks, such as the traffic count, when moving aircraft
are in the controller's area of responsibility.
[74] FAA, NTSB, and OSHA have the authority to investigate accidents
that occur on the ramp.
[75] Primary commercial service airports are categorized based on the
percentage of total annual passenger boardings (enplanements) for all
operations of U.S. carriers within the United States. General aviation
airports are small airports that do not receive scheduled commercial
service.
[76] Advisory Circular 120-92 (June 22, 2006) and Advisory Circular
150/5200-37 (February 28, 2007).
[77] Of the 14 respondents to the question regarding the effectiveness
of FAA's issuance of advisory circulars on safety management systems
for airport operators, 2 said that it was very effective, 3 moderately
effective, 7 slightly effective, and 2 not at all effective. Of the 13
respondents to the question regarding the effectiveness of FAA's
issuance of advisory circulars on safety management systems for
aviation service providers, 2 said it was very effective, 3 moderately
effective, 7 slightly effective, and 1 not at all effective.
[78] Thirteen airlines originally entered into this alliance with OSHA.
When the alliance was renewed, 12 airlines participated in the
alliance.
[79] Of the 13 respondents, 1 said it was extremely effective, 2 very
effective, 3 moderately effective, 6 slightly effective, and 1 not at
all effective.
[80] OSHA's inspection of this airline's worksite was done as part of
the agency's Site-Specific Targeting Program. The worksites that OSHA
inspects under this program are identified from data on employee
illness and injuries that the agency collects each year from about
80,000 nonconstruction employers.
[81] OSHA does not routinely maintain data on the number of safety
inspections conducted in airport ramp areas or the amount of fines that
it proposed regarding violations in those areas. At our request, OSHA
officials broke out how much the fine indicated above pertained to
violations in the ramp area. According to the 2005 Bureau of Labor
Statistics' Survey of Occupational Injuries and Illnesses, scheduled
air transportation industry employees had the eighth highest rate
compared to other industries, but the data are not broken out to
identify the portion represented by ramp workers.
[82] GAO, FAA's Safety Oversight System is Effective but Could Benefit
from Better Evaluation of Its Programs' Performance, GAO-06-266T
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 17, 2005).
[83] Of the 13 respondents, 2 said it was very effective, 4 moderately
effective, 3 slightly effective, and 4 not at all effective.
[84] Of the 15 respondents, 1 said the use of Runway Safety Action
Teams was extremely effective, 3 very effective, 7 moderately
effective, and 4 slightly effective. In addition, of 15 respondents, 2
said that airports' use of surface surveillance was very effective, 8
moderately effective, and 5 slightly effective.
[85] Of the 15 respondents, 1 said it was extremely effective, 1 very
effective, 7 moderately effective, 4 slightly effective, and 2 not at
all effective.
[86] Of the 15 respondents, 3 said it was very effective, 7 moderately
effective, 3 slightly effective, and 2 not at all effective.
[87] Airport Operations Safety Panel, Reducing Accidents and Improving
Safety on the Ramp (Palm Beach Gardens, FL: June 15, 2004).
[88] GAO, Aviation Security: Long-Standing Problems Impair Airport
Screeners' Performance, GAO/RCED-00-75, (Washington, D.C.: June 28,
2000) and Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities Still Exist in the
Aviation Security System, GAO/T-RCED/AIMD-00-142 (Washington, D.C.:
April 6, 2000).
[89] Equipment to service aircraft pops up from beneath the ramp when
needed and returns below afterwards.
[90] The sliding carpet is an aircraft-based system for positioning
cargo once it is placed in the hold of a commercial aircraft.
[91] The RampSnakeŽ is a ramp-based system that delivers cargo into the
cargo hold and is capable of turning 90 degrees once inside the
aircraft.
[92] Of 15 respondents, 10 said that it had great or very great
potential, 3 moderate potential, and 2 little potential.
[93] They included Los Angeles International Airport, Boston Logan
International Airport, Dallas-Ft. Worth International Airport,
Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport, and Newark Liberty
International Airport. These five airports were among the 10 U.S.
airports that experienced the most runway incursions from fiscal year
2001 through fiscal year 2006.
[End of section]
GAO's Mission:
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation, and
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance
and accountability of the federal government for the American people.
GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and
policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance
to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding
decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is reflected in its core
values of accountability, integrity, and reliability.
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony:
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no
cost is through GAO's Web site [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov)]. Each
weekday, GAO posts newly released reports, testimony, and
correspondence on its Web site. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly
posted products every afternoon, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]
and select "E-mail Updates."
Order by Mail or Phone:
The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2
each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent
of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or
more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent.
Orders should be sent to:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room LM:
Washington, DC 20548:
To order by phone: Voice:
(202) 512-6000:
TDD: (202) 512-2537:
Fax: (202) 512-6061:
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs:
Contact:
Web site: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]:
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov:
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:
Congressional Relations:
Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, jarmonG@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4400:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7125:
Washington, DC 20548:
Public Affairs:
Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngcl@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4800:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7149:
Washington, DC 20548:
