Mine Safety
Additional Guidance and Oversight of Mines' Emergency Response Plans Would Improve the Safety of Underground Coal Miners Gao ID: GAO-08-424 April 8, 2008In 2006, several mining tragedies led the Congress to pass the Mine Improvement and New Emergency Response Act of 2006 (MINER Act). The law required underground coal mine operators to develop emergency response plans that contain several components designed to improve accident preparedness and response, including providing a refuge of air to miners trapped underground after an accident and wireless communications systems. The Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) is responsible for approving the plans and ensuring their implementation. GAO examined (1) the effectiveness of the approval process, (2) the status of implementation of the plans, and (3) MSHA's efforts to enforce and oversee implementation. To address these questions, GAO reviewed a nonprobability sample of emergency response plans, analyzed MSHA data, and interviewed MSHA officials and members of the mining community.
The effectiveness of MSHA's process for approving underground coal mines' emergency response plans was hampered by several factors, including revisions and delays by MSHA in developing guidance for mine operators on the required components of the plans and the lack of specificity of its guidance, which delayed approval of the plans. MSHA revised its guidance several times and did not issue guidance on one key requirement--providing a refuge of air to miners trapped underground--until 6 months after the initial plans were due. In addition, while the content of the plans may differ because of the unique characteristics of the mines, GAO found that some plans did not specify the protections to be provided and information about these protections varied. For example, some of the plans did not specify whether refuges of air would be provided to miners working in certain areas of the mine to help them survive if they are trapped in the mine after an accident. As a result, it is uncertain whether all of the plans will help ensure that miners will be adequately protected in the event of an accident. Most of the components of the mines' emergency response plans have been implemented but, as of January 2008, two key components remain. First, many mines have not implemented methods of providing air to trapped miners because needed equipment is not available. Second, mines have not begun to implement wireless communications systems or comparable alternatives to meet the June 2009 requirement in the MINER Act because fully wireless technology is not available and MSHA has not determined what technology it will allow mines to use to meet the requirement. The act provides that, where wireless systems are not available, alternatives to wireless communications systems are acceptable. While alternatives are currently available, MSHA headquarters officials told us they had no immediate plans to issue guidance detailing what technology would be acceptable in meeting the June 2009 requirement because they wanted to wait and see how new technologies developed by then. Given the delay, it is uncertain whether mine operators will be able to plan for and order the appropriate technology to meet the deadline, thereby missing opportunities to improve the chances of miners trapped in an underground coal mine after an accident to survive until they are able to be rescued. MSHA's district offices have inspected many of the mines for compliance with their emergency response plans and have issued citations to enforce immediate implementation of the plans, but MSHA headquarters officials have not systematically evaluated the data on citations to identify potential problems with implementation or enforcement. For example, MSHA headquarters has not analyzed or compared citations issued under the statute or related regulations, which may lead to inconsistent enforcement and assessment of penalties. In addition, MSHA has provided insufficient oversight to ensure the quality of emergency response plans or to identify whether corrective actions are needed.
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Director: Team: Phone:GAO-08-424, Mine Safety: Additional Guidance and Oversight of Mines' Emergency Response Plans Would Improve the Safety of Underground Coal Miners
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Report to the Chairman, Committee on Education and Labor, House of
Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
April 2008:
Mine Safety:
Additional Guidance and Oversight of Mines' Emergency Response Plans
Would Improve the Safety of Underground Coal Miners:
GAO-08-424:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-424, a report to the Chairman, Committee on
Education and Labor, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
In 2006, several mining tragedies led the Congress to pass the Mine
Improvement and New Emergency Response Act of 2006 (MINER Act). The law
required underground coal mine operators to develop emergency response
plans that contain several components designed to improve accident
preparedness and response, including providing a refuge of air to
miners trapped underground after an accident and wireless
communications systems. The Mine Safety and Health Administration
(MSHA) is responsible for approving the plans and ensuring their
implementation. GAO examined (1) the effectiveness of the approval
process, (2) the status of implementation of the plans, and (3) MSHA‘s
efforts to enforce and oversee implementation. To address these
questions, GAO reviewed a nonprobability sample of emergency response
plans, analyzed MSHA data, and interviewed MSHA officials and members
of the mining community.
What GAO Found:
The effectiveness of MSHA‘s process for approving underground coal
mines‘ emergency response plans was hampered by several factors,
including revisions and delays by MSHA in developing guidance for mine
operators on the required components of the plans and the lack of
specificity of its guidance, which delayed approval of the plans. MSHA
revised its guidance several times and did not issue guidance on one
key requirement”providing a refuge of air to miners trapped
underground”until 6 months after the initial plans were due. In
addition, while the content of the plans may differ because of the
unique characteristics of the mines, GAO found that some plans did not
specify the protections to be provided and information about these
protections varied. For example, some of the plans did not specify
whether refuges of air would be provided to miners working in certain
areas of the mine to help them survive if they are trapped in the mine
after an accident. As a result, it is uncertain whether all of the
plans will help ensure that miners will be adequately protected in the
event of an accident.
Most of the components of the mines‘ emergency response plans have been
implemented but, as of January 2008, two key components remain. First,
many mines have not implemented methods of providing air to trapped
miners because needed equipment is not available. Second, mines have
not begun to implement wireless communications systems or comparable
alternatives to meet the June 2009 requirement in the MINER Act because
fully wireless technology is not available and MSHA has not determined
what technology it will allow mines to use to meet the requirement. The
act provides that, where wireless systems are not available,
alternatives to wireless communications systems are acceptable. While
alternatives are currently available, MSHA headquarters officials told
us they had no immediate plans to issue guidance detailing what
technology would be acceptable in meeting the June 2009 requirement
because they wanted to wait and see how new technologies developed by
then. Given the delay, it is uncertain whether mine operators will be
able to plan for and order the appropriate technology to meet the
deadline, thereby missing opportunities to improve the chances of
miners trapped in an underground coal mine after an accident to survive
until they are able to be rescued.
MSHA‘s district offices have inspected many of the mines for compliance
with their emergency response plans and have issued citations to
enforce immediate implementation of the plans, but MSHA headquarters
officials have not systematically evaluated the data on citations to
identify potential problems with implementation or enforcement. For
example, MSHA headquarters has not analyzed or compared citations
issued under the statute or related regulations, which may lead to
inconsistent enforcement and assessment of penalties. In addition, MSHA
has provided insufficient oversight to ensure the quality of emergency
response plans or to identify whether corrective actions are needed.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is recommending that MSHA clarify its guidance on the requirements
for key components of emergency response plans; develop guidance on how
mines can meet the June 2009 requirement for wireless communications
systems; and take steps to analyze information on plans and their
enforcement. MSHA agreed with the recommendations and noted several
actions it is taking or plans to take to implement them.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-424]. For more
information, contact Anne-Marie Lasowski at (202) 512-7215 or
lasowskia@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
The Effectiveness of MSHA's Approval Process Was Hampered by Several
Factors that Delayed Approval and Resulted in Variations in the Plans:
While Most Plan Components Have Been Implemented, Two Key Components
Have Not:
While MSHA's District Offices Have Enforced Mines' Implementation of
Emergency Response Plans, MSHA Headquarters Has Provided Limited
Oversight of Enforcement and Plan Quality:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Citations Issued by MSHA Related to the Requirements of
Mines' Emergency Response Plans:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Labor:
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Health and Human Services:
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Components of Emergency Response Plans Required by the MINER
Act of 2006:
Table 2: Examples of Partially Wireless Communications Systems for Use
in Underground Coal Mines:
Table 3: Examples of Conditions Cited by Inspectors for Noncompliance
with Mines' Emergency Response Plans:
Table 4: Correction Time Frames for Citations Issued under the MINER
Act to Mines for Failing to Submit or for Not Complying with Their
Emergency Response Plans:
Table 5: Number of Emergency Response Plans, by District:
Table 6: Number of Citations Issued under the MINER Act to Active Mines
for Violating Components of Emergency Response Plans, August 15, 2006,
to December 11, 2007:
Table 7: Citations Issued under the MINER Act for Violations of
Multiple Components of Mines' Emergency Response Plans as of December
11, 2007:
Table 8: Number and Percentage of Mines Cited per District under the
MINER Act as of December 11, 2007:
Figures:
Figure 1: MSHA's Coal Mine Safety and Health District Offices and
Number of Underground Coal Mines Located in Each District as of June
2007:
Figure 2: Number of Workers in U.S. Underground Coal Mines, 1996 to
2006:
Figure 3: Example of Self-Contained Self-Rescuer That Provides
Supplemental Air in Case of an Emergency:
Figure 4: Lifeline and Cache of Self-Contained Self-Rescuers in a Mine
Tunnel:
Figure 5: Timeline of Guidance and Key Events Related to Emergency
Response Plans:
Figure 6: Illustrations of Technologies Used to Meet the Current
Requirement for Redundant Communication Systems:
Figure 7: Methods for Providing Long-Term Postaccident Breathable Air
for Trapped Miners and Percentages of Mines Planning to Use Each
Method:
Figure 8: Citations MSHA Issued to Mines under the MINER Act for
Noncompliance with Each Emergency Response Plan Component, by
Component, August 15, 2006, to December 11, 2007:
Figure 9: Number of Citations Issued under the MINER Act Each Month,
August 15, 2006, to December 11, 2007:
Abbreviations:
MINER Act Mine Improvement and New Emergency Response Act of 2006:
MSHA: Mine Safety and Health Administration:
NIOSH: National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
April 8, 2008:
The Honorable George Miller:
Chairman:
Committee on Education and Labor :
House of Representatives:
Dear Mr. Chairman:
In January 2006, at the Sago mine in West Virginia, 12 men lost their
lives after an explosion prompted them to barricade themselves in the
mine to await rescue, an effort that took almost 2 days to complete.
They died hours after the explosion from the poisonous carbon monoxide
gases produced by the explosion. In the wake of this and other fatal
mine disasters in the United States, the Congress enacted the Mine
Improvement and New Emergency Response Act of 2006 (MINER Act) in an
effort to improve the safety of the nation's underground coal mines.
[Footnote 1] As part of this act, mine operators were required to
develop emergency response plans that detail how they will ensure the
safety of underground coal miners immediately following any future
disasters, such as how they plan to communicate with trapped miners
after an accident. The act required mine operators to submit their
plans to the Department of Labor's Mine Safety and Health
Administration (MSHA) for approval by August 14, 2006--2 months after
the law was enacted. MSHA issued guidance to mine operators on plan
development and assigned responsibility for reviewing and approving the
plans to its 11 district offices. After approving the emergency
response plans, MSHA inspectors in its district offices enforce mine
operators' compliance with the requirements described in their plans as
part of regular inspections of underground coal mines.
The plans must contain several components designed to help ensure the
safety of miners trapped in a mine after an accident, such as providing
breathable air--air that has not been contaminated by carbon monoxide
or other deadly gases released during an explosion or fire. Generally,
mine operators must implement each component of the plan as soon as the
component is approved by MSHA, rather than waiting for approval of the
entire plan. In addition, by June 2009, the plans must provide for
wireless communications and electronic tracking systems or alternatives
to these systems. The MINER Act also required the National Institute
for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), a research agency within
the Department of Health and Human Services' Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, to study options for providing refuge to miners
trapped underground after an accident.[Footnote 2]
To learn about MSHA's efforts to approve and enforce implementation of
the emergency response plans, you asked us to examine 1) the
effectiveness of MSHA's process for approving mines' emergency response
plans, 2) the status of implementation of underground coal mines'
emergency response plans, and 3) the efforts MSHA has made to enforce
implementation of the plans and oversee enforcement and plan quality.
To address these topics, we reviewed relevant federal laws,
regulations, and agency guidance. We reviewed data provided by MSHA on
the approval and implementation status of the emergency response plans
for all underground coal mines categorized by MSHA as active, producing
mines as of June 21, 2007. Using MSHA's data on the approval status of
the plans, we selected a nonprobability sample of plans from each of
MSHA's 11 district offices for review.[Footnote 3] Our sample included
both plans that had been fully approved and those that had only been
partially approved. Because there were so few, we selected many of the
partially approved plans to identify the factors delaying their
approval. We also reviewed data on citations issued by MSHA's district
offices to mine operators for noncompliance with their plans. To assess
the reliability of the data obtained from MSHA, we reviewed related
documentation to corroborate the data, including the sample of
emergency response plans and completed citation forms, evaluated the
data for obvious errors in accuracy and completeness, and interviewed
agency officials knowledgeable about the data. We determined that the
data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our review. In
addition, we interviewed officials at MSHA's headquarters and 11
district offices to learn about the plan approval process,
implementation of the plans, and MSHA's inspection efforts. We visited
two of MSHA's district offices, located in West Virginia and Kentucky-
-the two states with the largest number of underground coal mines in
the United States--and visited underground coal mines in those states
to learn about the equipment and technologies they used to implement
their emergency response plans. In addition, we consulted with
individuals knowledgeable about the field of mine safety, mine company
officials, and union and industry representatives. We conducted this
audit from April 2007 through April 2008 in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we
plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence
to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on
our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. See appendix I for further information on our scope and
methodology.
Results in Brief:
The effectiveness of MSHA's process for approving underground coal
mines' emergency response plans was hampered by several factors,
including revisions and delays in developing the guidance and the lack
of specificity of the guidance, which delayed approval of the plans.
While MSHA headquarters issued initial guidance to its district offices
and mine operators in July 2006, the agency continued to refine and
revise the guidance for several months and did not issue guidance on
one key component of the plans--providing postaccident breathable air
to miners--until 6 months after the plans were due. These revisions and
delays caused mine operators to revise and resubmit the plans and
district officials to review the changes, delaying their approval, and
ultimately, the preparedness of mine operators to respond in the event
of an accident. MSHA headquarters officials attributed the revisions to
not having enough time to interpret the law and obtain input from the
mining community given the 2-month period between the enactment of the
MINER Act and the deadline for submitting plans to MSHA. In addition,
the lack of specificity in MSHA's guidance compelled headquarters and
district staff to spend time resolving questions about the guidance
after it was issued. Further, while the content of the plans may differ
because of differences in the characteristics of each mine, we found
that some of the plans did not specify the protections to be provided,
and information about these protections varied. For example, some of
the plans did not specify whether postaccident breathable air would be
provided to miners working in certain areas of the mine, while other
plans did. As a result, it is uncertain whether all miners will be
adequately protected in the event of an accident.
As of January 2008, the operators of all active, producing underground
coal mines had implemented most components of their emergency response
plans, but many had not implemented two key components. Many mine
operators could not implement one of the components--providing
postaccident breathable air to trapped miners in the event of an
accident--because all of the needed equipment was not yet available.
For example, about one-fifth of the mines had not received breathing
devices on order from manufacturers, and nearly three-quarters of the
mines were waiting for refuge chambers--one of the methods operators
may use to provide breathable air to trapped miners. In addition, mine
operators have not yet begun to implement another key component of
their plans--upgrading mines' communication systems to wireless or
approved alternatives--because completely wireless systems are not
available for underground mine use and MSHA has not determined what
technologies it will allow mine operators to use to meet the June 2009
statutory requirement. The MINER Act provides that, where wireless
systems are not available, alternatives to wireless communication
systems are acceptable. Some companies have developed and begun
marketing partially wireless systems that, according to NIOSH, could
enhance communications and the safety of miners. However, MSHA
headquarters officials told us they had no immediate plans to issue
guidance detailing what technologies will be acceptable in meeting the
June 2009 requirement because they wanted to wait and see how new
technologies develop by then. Given the delay, it is uncertain whether
mine operators will be able to plan for and order the appropriate
technology to meet the deadline, thereby missing opportunities to
improve the chances of miners trapped in an underground coal mine after
an accident to survive until they are able to be rescued.
MSHA's district offices have conducted inspections and issued citations
to enforce implementation of mines' emergency response plans, but MSHA
headquarters has provided limited oversight of the districts'
enforcement efforts and the overall quality of the plans. MSHA's
districts have inspected many mines for compliance with their plans and
issued citations to ensure immediate implementation of all components
of the plans. Since late 2006, inspectors have issued over 350
citations to mine operators who had not properly implemented the
approved components of their plans. However, while its district offices
have taken steps to enforce implementation of the plans, MSHA
headquarters has not systematically evaluated the data on citations to
identify potential problems with implementation or enforcement. We
reviewed the citations issued by MSHA's 11 district offices for
violations of mines' emergency response plans from August 15, 2006,
through December 11, 2007, and found large differences in the number of
citations issued across districts. For example, one district had cited
one of its 18 mines for noncompliance, while three districts had each
issued citations to over two-thirds of their mines. While there may be
valid explanations for these differences, MSHA headquarters officials
have not reviewed the data to identify why they occurred and, when
asked about these differences, they said they were not aware of them.
Similarly, MSHA headquarters has not analyzed whether inspectors are
issuing citations under the statute or regulations when both apply,
which could prevent MSHA from adequately tracking compliance and lead
to inconsistent penalty assessments. In addition, MSHA has provided
insufficient oversight to ensure the content of underground coal mines'
emergency response plans meets a consistent agency-wide standard and
determine whether corrective actions are needed.
To help ensure that underground coal mines' emergency response plans
and their implementation improve the safety of underground coal miners
in the event of an accident, we are recommending that the Secretary of
Labor direct MSHA to develop additional guidance to clarify what is
required for key components of the emergency response plans, such as
providing postaccident breathable air for the maintenance of trapped
miners; work with NIOSH to develop guidance for mine operators on how
to meet the June 2009 requirement to provide postaccident wireless
communications systems; and take steps to ensure that district offices
are consistently applying MSHA's guidance on approving and enforcing
emergency response plans. In commenting on a draft of our report, the
Department of Labor agreed with the recommendations and noted several
actions that MSHA has begun or is planning to take to provide
additional guidance and oversight for emergency response plans. In its
comments, the Department of Health and Human Services concurred with
our recommendation that NIOSH and MSHA work together to develop
guidance on postaccident wireless communications systems.
Background:
Under the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 (the "Mine Act"),
Congress created MSHA and gave it primary responsibility for ensuring
the safety and health of mine workers. MSHA's Coal Mine Safety and
Health program office in headquarters is responsible for carrying out
enforcement activities related to surface and underground coal mines,
managing agency operations, and monitoring the activities of its 11
district offices. MSHA's district offices have day-to-day
responsibility for activities such as reviewing and approving mine
plans, including emergency response plans, and for conducting
inspections, issuing citations for violations of health and safety
standards, and investigating mine accidents. As of December 2007, MSHA
employed 460 underground coal mine inspectors in its 11 district
offices.[Footnote 4] MSHA's principal enforcement responsibility for
underground coal mines is fulfilled by conducting a minimum of four
comprehensive inspections of every underground coal mine in the United
States each year.[Footnote 5] When MSHA inspectors observe violations
of mandatory federal health and safety standards, they are required to
issue citations, or in some cases withdrawal orders,[Footnote 6] to
mine operators. The mine operators generally are required by law to
correct the hazardous situation on which the violation was based within
the time frame set by the inspector, even if the mine operator contests
the violation or penalty.
As of June 2007, there were approximately 470 U.S. underground coal
mines categorized by MSHA as active, producing mines. As shown in
figure 1, the number of active, producing mines varies among districts.
Figure 1: MSHA's Coal Mine Safety and Health District Offices and
Number of Underground Coal Mines Located in Each District as of June
2007[A]:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a map of the United States illustrating MSHA's Coal Mine
Safety and Health District Offices and Number of Underground Coal Mines
Located in Each District as of June 2007. The following data is
depicted:
District 1: Anthracite coal mining regions in Pennsylvania[B];
Number of underground coal mines: 12.
District 2: Bituminous coal mining regions in Pennsylvania;
Number of underground coal mines: 33.
District 3: Maryland, Ohio, and northern West Virginia;
Number of underground coal mines: 30.
District 4: Southern West Virginia;
Number of underground coal mines: 122.
District 5: Virginia;
Number of underground coal mines: 57.
District 6: Eastern Kentucky;
Number of underground coal mines: 89.
District 7: Central Kentucky, North Carolina, South Carolina, and
Tennessee;
Number of underground coal mines: 66.
District 8: Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, northern
Missouri, and Wisconsin;
Number of underground coal mines: 19.
District 9: All states west of the Mississippi River, except for
Minnesota, Iowa, and northern Missouri;
Number of underground coal mines: 22.
District 10: Western Kentucky;
Number of underground coal mines: 10.
District 11: Alabama, Georgia, Florida, Mississippi, Puerto Rico, and
the Virgin Islands;
Number of underground coal mines: 7.
Sources: MSHA (information); Art Explosion (map).
[A] We included all underground coal mines categorized by MSHA as
active, producing mines as of June 2007. MSHA defines active mines as
those that operate on a full-time basis to produce coal.
[B] While the map indicates that District 1 includes states north of
Pennsylvania, there currently is no coal mining in those states.
[End of figure]
The number of active, producing coal mines changes frequently as new
mines open, active mines are temporarily idled, or mines are
abandoned.[Footnote 7] Some underground mines do not actively produce
coal all year; some are only operated seasonally because of local
weather conditions; and operations at smaller, less cost-effective
mines are often suspended when the price of coal drops below a certain
level.
Underground coal mining is a dangerous industry for several reasons.
For example, the presence of methane gas, which is highly explosive and
is often produced in large quantities when coal is extracted,
contributes to the hazardous working conditions. Additional risks
include geological conditions in many areas of the country that make
the roofs of mines unstable, the danger posed by a fire in an
underground mine, and flooding from nearby abandoned mines. The danger
posed by these factors has increased in recent years as miners dig
deeper to reach remaining coal reserves. Further, while the number of
underground coal miners was on the decline in the last half of the
1990s, as shown in figure 2, this trend has reversed in recent years,
exposing more workers to the dangers of underground coal mining.
Figure 2: Number of Workers in U.S. Underground Coal Mines, 1996 to
2006:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a vertical bar graph depicting the following data:
Number of Workers in U.S. Underground Coal Mines, 1996 to 2006:
Year: 1996;
Underground mine employees: 56,905.
Year: 1997;
Underground mine employees: 55,869.
Year: 1998;
Underground mine employees: 53,284.
Year: 1999;
Underground mine employees: 49,061.
Year: 2000;
Underground mine employees: 46,133.
Year: 2001;
Underground mine employees: 48,394.
Year: 2002;
Underground mine employees: 46,615.
Year: 2003;
Underground mine employees: 43,629.
Year: 2004;
Underground mine employees: 45,282.
Year: 2005;
Underground mine employees: 49,395.
Year: 2006;
Underground mine employees: 52,197.
Source: GAO analysis of MSHA data.
[End of figure]
In March 2006, a few months after the Sago mine accident, MSHA issued
an Emergency Temporary Standard that required mine operators to
immediately implement certain health and safety improvements designed
to enhance protections for underground coal miners.[Footnote 8] MSHA
issued a final rule revising the standard in December 2006. In June
2006, the Congress passed the MINER Act, which required mine operators
and MSHA to undertake reforms, including developing and adopting
emergency response plans, enhancing mine rescue teams, and instituting
higher penalties for the most serious violations.
The MINER Act required that, within 60 days of enactment, underground
mine operators develop and adopt written emergency response plans.
[Footnote 9] The act also required MSHA to review and approve
emergency response plans. The agency implemented this requirement by
issuing guidance for mine operators to use in developing their plans
and by having its district offices review the plans submitted by mines
under their jurisdiction to ensure that they conformed with the
guidance.[Footnote 10] MSHA is also required to review approved plans
at least every 6 months to ensure that they are updated to reflect
changes in mine operations and advances in technology.[Footnote 11] The
MINER Act specified several components that mine operators must include
in their emergency response plans, including providing uncontaminated
or "breathable" air for miners after an accident.[Footnote 12] The
postaccident breathable air component includes two parts: (1) emergency
supplies of air sufficient to maintain trapped miners for extended
(long-term) periods and (2) caches of portable breathing devices--known
as self-contained self-rescuers (see fig. 3)--positioned along mine
tunnels leading to the mine entrance to aid in the miners'
escape.[Footnote 13] Another component required by the act is
postaccident lifelines--ropes that miners can use after an accident to
find their way out of the mine and to find the caches of portable
breathing devices stored in the mine[Footnote 14] (see fig. 4).
Figure 3: Example of Self-Contained Self-Rescuer That Provides
Supplemental Air in Case of an Emergency:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the Self-Contained Self-Rescuer.
Source: CSE Corporation.
[End of figure]
Figure 4: Lifeline and Cache of Self-Contained Self-Rescuers in a Mine
Tunnel:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a photograph of a Lifeline and Cache of Self-Contained
Self-Rescuers in a Mine Tunnel.
Source: MSHA.
[End of figure]
Table 1 describes all of the components of mines' emergency response
plans required by the MINER Act.
Table 1: Components of Emergency Response Plans Required by the MINER
Act of 2006:
Component: Postaccident communications;
Description of requirement: Redundant (backup) means of two-way
communication with the surface for persons underground; Plans must
require wireless two-way systems or alternatives by June 2009.
Component: Postaccident tracking;
Description of requirement: System to enable above ground personnel to
determine the current or immediately preaccident location of all
underground personnel; Plans must require an electronic tracking system
or alternative by June 2009.
Component: Postaccident breathable air;
Description of requirement: Emergency supplies of breathable air
sufficient to maintain trapped miners for a "sustained period of time."
Caches of self-contained self-rescuers providing, in total, not less
than 2 hours per miner to be kept in escapeways (tunnels that lead to
the mine entrance) from the deepest work area to the surface at
intervals no farther than a miner could walk in 30 minutes and a
schedule for checking the reliability of self-rescuers to ensure that
the units will function properly in an emergency.
Component: Training;
Description of requirement: Training for proper donning of self-
contained self-rescuers, switching from one self-contained self-rescuer
to another, and ensuring proper fit of self-contained self-rescuers;
Training program for emergency procedures described in the plan.
Component: Postaccident lifelines;
Description of requirement: Directional lifelines (ropes with cones or
other devices to indicate the direction of the mine entrance) used
during an evacuation that are installed along mine tunnels leading from
the areas where miners are extracting coal to the entrance of the mine
(escapeways); Plans must require lifelines that meet MSHA's flame
resistant standards by June 2009 or sooner, as existing lifelines are
replaced.
Component: Local coordination;
Description of requirement: Procedures for coordination and
communication between the mine operator, mine rescue teams, and local
emergency personnel; and provisions for familiarizing local rescue
personnel with surface functions that may be required in the course of
mine rescue work.
Source: GAO analysis of the MINER Act.
[End of table]
MSHA's headquarters allowed district offices to separately approve each
component of a mine's emergency response plan so that the mine could
begin implementing each component once it was approved, rather than
waiting for approval of the entire plan. Most of the required
components were to be implemented immediately upon approval or within
the time frames set in the approved plan. However, the act gave
operators additional time to implement certain components, including
wireless communications and electronic tracking systems, or their
alternatives, and flame-resistant lifelines, which generally are not
required to be implemented until June 15, 2009.
In addition, the MINER Act required NIOSH to study the utility,
practicality, survivability, and cost of providing various refuge
alternatives in underground coal mines and to report its findings,
which it did, by December 2007.[Footnote 15] Under its Mining Safety
and Health Research program, NIOSH conducts research on mine safety
technology, including research on advancements in self-contained self-
rescuers, communications equipment, and tracking devices. In 2006, the
Congress provided NIOSH with $10 million in emergency supplemental
appropriations for research to develop mine safety technology.
MSHA and NIOSH are both responsible for getting new safety technology
into the mines. For certain types of mining products, MSHA's technical
experts conduct evaluations and tests to ensure that they will not
cause a fire or an explosion in a mine before they approve the use of
such products. NIOSH is responsible for developing and adapting new
technologies for use in the mining industry. Based on research
findings, NIOSH may recommend that MSHA issue new safety and health
standards. However, NIOSH does not have the authority to compel MSHA to
take action on its recommendations. In our 2007 report on MSHA, we
stated that coordination between MSHA and NIOSH was primarily informal
and inconsistent and recommended that they develop a formal memorandum
of understanding to guide their agencywide coordination efforts.
[Footnote 16] However, at the time of our review, such a memorandum had
not been finalized.
The Effectiveness of MSHA's Approval Process Was Hampered by Several
Factors that Delayed Approval and Resulted in Variations in the Plans:
The effectiveness of MSHA's approval process for underground coal
mines' emergency response plans was hampered by several factors that
delayed approval of the plans. Specifically, MSHA issued its guidance
multiple times and did not issue guidance on one key requirement until
6 months after the initial plans were due. Once issued, MSHA's guidance
lacked specificity and, as a result, MSHA district staff we interviewed
said that they had to spend time resolving mine operators' questions
about the guidance after it was issued. In addition, actions taken by
some mine operators, such as their reluctance to submit adequate plans,
further delayed the approval process. We also found that the plans we
reviewed varied in content and did not always specify the protections
to be provided for miners.
MSHA's Revisions and Delays in Issuing Its Guidance Delayed Plan
Approvals:
Both MSHA district staff and mine operators we interviewed stated that
MSHA's revisions of its guidance and delays in issuing the guidance
caused mine operators to revise their mines' plans several times,
delaying plan approvals. The MINER Act required underground coal mine
operators to develop and adopt written emergency response plans by
August 14, 2006. (See fig. 5 for a timeline of MSHA's guidance and key
events related to the emergency response plans.) MSHA issued general
guidance on the requirements for the emergency response plan components
in July 2006 and revised it twice--in August and October of that year.
According to district officials, by the time MSHA headquarters issued
its revised guidance in October--2 months after mine operators were
required to submit their plans for approval--the districts were in the
process of reviewing and approving the plans. As a result, mine
operators had to revise and resubmit their plans to reflect the revised
guidance, and the districts had to review them to ensure that changes
were incorporated.
Figure 5: Timeline of Guidance and Key Events Related to Emergency
Response Plans:
[See PDF for image]
The following data is depicted on the timeline:
Date: January 2, 2006;
Event: Sago mine explosion.
Date: March 9, 2006;
Event: MSHA issues an Emergency Temporary Standard on Emergency Mine
Evacuation.
Date: June 15, 2006;
Event: Enactment of the MINER Act, including requirement for
underground coal mine operators to develop and adopt emergency response
plans within 60 days.
Date: June 27, 2006;
Event: MSHA solicits comments on implementation of the MINER Act‘s
requirement for underground coal mines to develop emergency response
plans.
Date: July 21, 2006;
Event: MSHA issues initial guidance on the emergency response plan
requirements.
Date: August 4, 2006;
Event: MSHA issues additional guidance revising its initial guidance on
the emergency response plan requirements.
Date: August 14, 2006;
Event: Underground coal mine operators required to submit emergency
response plans to MSHA.
Date: August 30, 2006;
Event: MSHA solicits information from the mining community on the
postaccident breathable air for the maintenance of trapped miners‘
requirement of the of the emergency response plans.
Date: October 16, 2006;
Event: Deadline for the mining community to submit information on
postaccident breathable air to MSHA.
Date: October 24, 2006;
Event: MSHA issues guidance on the emergency response plan requirements
that supersedes the previous guidance.
Date: December 8, 2006;
Event: MSHA issues final regulations on emergency mine evacuation.
Regulation modifies the Emergency Temporary Standard and incorporates
some requirements of the MINER Act.
Date: February 8, 2007;
Event: MSHA issues guidance on postaccident breathable air for the
maintenance of trapped miners requirement of the emergency response
plans.
Date: August 9, 2007;
Event: All but one of the underground coal mines‘ emergency response
plans fully approved by MSHA[A].
Date: October 26, 2007;
Event: All underground coal mines‘ emergency response plans fully
approved by MSHA[A].
Sources: MSHA and GAO analysis of applicable laws, regulations,
guidance, and Federal Register notices.
[A] This includes only mines categorized by MSHA as active, producing
as of June 2007.
[End of figure]
In addition, in February 2007, 6 months after mines were required to
submit their emergency response plans to MSHA for approval, the agency
issued new guidance on the MINER Act's requirement that the plans
provide long-term postaccident breathable air for miners trapped
underground. MSHA sought input from the mining community on this
requirement, requesting comments on methods for providing safe and
reliable supplies of postaccident breathable air in the summer of 2006.
However, while MSHA received 11 comments from mine operators or their
representatives during the comment period that closed on October 16,
2006, it did little to act on these comments for several months. One
senior level MSHA official told us that a working group established to
develop this guidance did not begin to do so until January 2007 and
that the agency did not finalize the guidance until February 2007, 4
months after the comment deadline and 6 months after the deadline for
mine operators to submit their plans to MSHA for approval.
In the absence of written guidance, some district officials we
interviewed said that they provided mine operators with verbal guidance
that was inconsistent with written guidance later issued by MSHA
headquarters. For example, officials in one district told us that they
had informed mine operators, based on discussions with headquarters
officials, that they would be required to provide 48 hours of long-term
postaccident breathable air. However, when headquarters later issued
written guidance requiring mine operators to provide 96 hours of
postaccident breathable air, the district officials had to meet with
mine operators to explain the new guidance and ask them to revise their
plans, which delayed approval.
According to MSHA officials, some of the revisions and delays in
developing guidance resulted from the tight time frames specified in
the MINER Act for developing and adopting the plans. MSHA headquarters
and district officials told us that, between the enactment of the MINER
Act in mid-June 2006 and the deadline for submitting emergency response
plans to MSHA for approval in mid-August, there was not enough time to
develop complete guidance outlining what mine operators should include
in their plans. At the same time, MSHA headquarters officials said that
they were also trying to meet the December 2006 deadline for finalizing
the Emergency Temporary Standard the agency issued in March. MSHA
headquarters officials said they needed additional time to interpret
the law, discuss it with key stakeholders from the mining community,
and incorporate the results of these discussions in the guidance.
Similarly, MSHA headquarters officials stated that they needed time to
review and evaluate acceptable methods for meeting the MINER Act's
requirement for postaccident breathable air before making decisions
about the type, amount, and location of breathable air mines would be
required to provide. However, because of the revisions and delays in
issuing the guidance, mine operators' ability to provide the equipment
and information needed to protect miners' safety in the event of an
accident, as intended by the MINER Act, was also delayed.
The Lack of Specificity of MSHA's Guidance Also Hampered Approval of
the Plans:
The effectiveness of the approval process was also hampered by the lack
of specificity of MSHA's guidance on the emergency response plans'
components, including its guidance on the postaccident tracking,
lifelines, and postaccident breathable air requirements of the MINER
Act. As a result, MSHA's district staff had to spend time resolving
mine operators' questions about the guidance after it was issued, which
further delayed approval of the plans and the preparedness of mine
operators to respond to an accident. To resolve some of the questions
posed by mine operators, some district officials told us that they
asked headquarters staff for additional guidance but did not always
receive a response, and sometimes the response was not timely. Staff in
a few districts said that, if they did not receive a response from
headquarters officials, they made their own decisions about how to
interpret the guidance. In some instances, they said that headquarters
officials later made decisions about the requirements of the plans that
differed from those made by the districts. As a result, the districts
had to ask mine operators to revise their plans to comply with
headquarters' revised interpretations of the requirements, further
delaying approval of the plans. The following examples illustrate the
impact of MSHA's guidance:
* Although MSHA's guidance indicated that operators could satisfy the
postaccident tracking requirement by using a dispatcher system, it did
not specify certain aspects of what should be included in the plans. A
few of the district officials we interviewed said that some mine
operators stated in their plans that they intended to divide their
mines into large zones to minimize the number of phones they had to
provide and make it easier for miners to move around the mine without
having to report their location to staff working above ground.[Footnote
17] However, because MSHA's guidance did not specify the allowable
sizes of the zones or provide criteria for determining their
appropriate sizes, the district officials said they had to spend time
negotiating with mine operators to establish smaller zone sizes, which
would improve the chances of identifying the location of trapped miners
after an accident.
* MSHA's guidance did not specify the materials mine operators needed
to use to meet the requirement for postaccident lifelines. One district
official told us some of the mine operators in his district wanted to
use existing water lines as lifelines, rather than providing new, flame
resistant lifelines. As a result, the official had to negotiate with
them to resolve this issue. MSHA headquarters later specified in
writing that some water lines were not a suitable option for meeting
this requirement of the MINER Act.
* Further, MSHA's guidance did not specify what methods mine operators
could use or what methods they were prohibited from using to provide
oxygen to and remove hazardous gas from refuge areas. A few of the
district officials we interviewed said that they had many discussions
with mine operators and headquarters officials about whether MSHA would
consider chemically-generated oxygen an acceptable method for supplying
long-term breathable air. Similarly, some officials were seeking
guidance from MSHA headquarters on acceptable methods of removing
hazardous gas from refuge areas several months after the initial
guidance was issued. MSHA's technical support division provided
additional guidance after researching the technical issues involved.
District officials then had to notify the mine operators who intended
to use these methods that their plans had to be revised, which delayed
their approval.
Approval of Plans Sometimes Delayed by Mine Operators' Actions:
In addition to the delays caused by issues related to MSHA's guidance,
actions taken by some mine operators delayed plan approval. While
district officials said that most mine operators were cooperative and
responsive during the approval process, some district officials said
some mine operators submitted initial plans that did not meet all of
the requirements, which contributed to delays in the review process.
For example, a few district officials said that some mine operators
used vague language in their plans. In addition, a few district
officials responsible for reviewing the plans told us that it was
difficult to reach some of the mine operators to discuss deficiencies
in their plans or ask them to resubmit their plans when revisions were
needed, further delaying the approval process. One official added that,
once MSHA gave mine operators deadlines for submitting revisions, the
process for reviewing the revisions moved more quickly.
Some mine operators proposed methods for meeting the requirements of
the MINER Act that took time for MSHA to evaluate because they were
unfamiliar with these methods. For example, a company that owned nine
mines in one district proposed an alternative method of meeting the
postaccident tracking requirement: using telephone answering machines
to track the locations of miners working underground. Since this method
differed from the typical dispatcher system used by other mines,
district staff sought input from headquarters on whether the proposed
system was an acceptable method of complying with the postaccident
tracking requirement for emergency response plans. MSHA's technical
support division observed the system before making a decision and
determined that it was not sufficient. The process of reviewing such
alternative methods prolonged the approval of some mines' plans.
By June 2007, MSHA had resolved most of the issues with the mine
operators and approved their plans, but the approval of a few plans was
delayed for several months. After discussion with the mine operators,
two districts reached an impasse with three mines on the postaccident
breathable air component of their plans.[Footnote 18] However, MSHA
subsequently reached agreement with these mines on their emergency
response plans. As of October 26, 2007, more than a year after the
initial deadline for submitting plans, MSHA had approved all
underground coal mines' emergency response plans that were part of our
analysis.[Footnote 19]
Mines' Approved Emergency Response Plans Vary in the Information
Provided on Certain Plan Components, Raising Uncertainties about the
Protections Provided to Miners:
The approved emergency response plans we reviewed varied in the
information provided and, therefore, it is uncertain whether certain
protections will be afforded to all miners. It is understandable that
the content of the plans may differ because there are differences in
the specific characteristics of mines. However, in our review of the
plans we sampled, we found that some plans did not specify the
protections to be provided and the amount of information about these
protections varied from plan to plan. The following examples illustrate
the variations in the plans we reviewed.
Postaccident breathable air. Some of the plans we reviewed specified
the materials that the mine needed to provide long-term postaccident
breathable air for trapped miners, but other plans did not. For
example, the plans we reviewed in three districts included worksheets
for mine operators to complete that specified the quantity of oxygen,
number of compressed air cylinders, and materials needed to remove
contaminants from the air. An official in one of the districts said the
district also required mines that chose refuge chambers as a method of
providing long-term postaccident breathable air to trapped miners to
indicate the size and type of refuge chambers they purchased. The
official said they asked for this information to help ensure that the
locations in the mines where the chambers would be placed were large
enough to accommodate the inflated chambers without puncturing them. In
contrast, some of the plans we reviewed in other districts only
indicated the possible options or combinations of methods of providing
breathable air that the mine might choose; the plans did not indicate
the specific methods that the mines chose for meeting the breathable
air requirement or specify the amount of oxygen, air, or materials
needed to remove contaminants from the air. As a result, it was unclear
how the districts determined that the methods identified in the plans
will be sufficient for those mines.
Postaccident breathable air in certain locations of the mine. The plans
we reviewed varied in whether they specified that the mine operator
would provide long-term postaccident breathable air in locations
between the working section of the mine where coal was being extracted
and the entrance of the mine, known as outby locations.[Footnote 20]
For 6 of the 10 districts with approved plans,[Footnote 21] all of the
approved plans we reviewed either specified that postaccident
breathable air would be provided in these locations and the method to
be used to provide air, or they indicated that air was not required in
these locations and explained why.[Footnote 22] However, for 4 of the
10 districts with approved plans, some plans did not specify whether
postaccident breathable air was required for miners working in outby
locations or the methods for providing it. As a result, in some mines,
miners working in these locations may not have access to postaccident
breathable air if they become trapped in the mine after an accident.
Postaccident tracking. We also found large differences in the
information contained in the plans we reviewed for the postaccident
tracking component. All of the plans we reviewed for one district
detailed the responsibilities of surface and underground personnel for
this component and described the underground areas or zones to be used
in identifying the location of miners. In contrast, in another
district, none of the plans we reviewed described the responsibilities
of the mine personnel or the zones to be used to identify the location
of miners. Without providing specific information about how to track
miners, it was not clear how the districts determined that the methods
identified in the plans will be sufficient for those mines and how mine
operators will identify where trapped miners are located in the event
of an accident.
While Most Plan Components Have Been Implemented, Two Key Components
Have Not:
Most of the components of mines' emergency response plans have been
implemented, but two key components remain. As of January 2008, all
underground coal mines had implemented all or most components of their
emergency response plans. However, few of the mines had implemented one
key component--postaccident breathable air--because needed equipment
was not available. In addition, mines had not begun to implement
another component--wireless communications systems or a comparable
alternative--because fully wireless technology is not available and
MSHA had not determined what alternative technologies mine operators
will be allowed to use to meet this requirement of the MINER Act, which
mines must implement by June 2009.
Mines Had Implemented All or Most Components of Their Emergency
Response Plans:
As of January 2008, all underground coal mines had implemented all or
most of the components of their emergency response plans[Footnote 23]
that were required to be implemented immediately after approval. Twenty
percent of all underground coal mines had fully implemented all
components of their emergency response plans. The remaining mines had
implemented all of the components, except the requirement for
postaccident breathable air. Specifically, according to MSHA district
officials, all mines had implemented the redundant communication and
tracking systems required by their plans, had provided training on
emergency procedures and the use of self-contained self-rescuers, and
had developed procedures for coordinating and communicating with local
emergency responders, as required. In addition, many mines had
installed flame-resistant lifelines, although the MINER Act generally
does not require their installation until June 2009.
Generally, as with most plan components, mines are using widely
accepted methods to implement the current postaccident communications
and tracking requirements of their emergency response plans and are
moving toward using electronic tracking systems to meet the June 2009
requirement of the MINER Act. To meet the redundant communications
requirement, according to NIOSH, most mines are using hardwired mine
phones and leaky feeder cable systems with handheld radios[Footnote 24]
(see fig. 6). To meet the postaccident tracking requirement, nearly 90
percent of the plans we reviewed specified that a dispatcher or
equivalent system would be used to track miners.[Footnote 25] At the
time of our review, according to the manufacturers we interviewed,
approximately 13 mines were installing electronic tracking systems.
[Footnote 26]
Figure 6: Illustrations of Technologies Used to Meet the Current
Requirement for Redundant Communication Systems:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a series of three photographs of technologies used to
meet the current requirement for redundant communication systems.
Pictured are:
* Mine pager phone;
* Leaky feeder cable, which receives signals from and transmits it to
handheld radios;
* Handheld radios.
Sources: GAO presentation of miner‘s equipment used to summon help;
images partially from Art Explosion.
[End of figure]
One Key Component Had Not Been Fully Implemented Because Equipment Was
Not Available:
As of January 2008, because needed equipment was not available, more
than three-quarters of the mines had not been able to fully implement
the requirement to provide long-term postaccident breathable air for
trapped miners, and one-fifth of the mines had not been able to provide
all of the required self-contained self-rescuers to aid in miners'
escape.[Footnote 27] According to MSHA's guidance, mines can use
several alternative methods to provide long-term postaccident
breathable air for trapped miners. These methods include providing a
premanufactured refuge chamber, either hard-sided or inflatable, that
can be easily moved around the mine; building a protected room in the
mine--called a prebuilt safe haven--where breathable air and survival
supplies will be available; and providing a skid that contains
materials for constructing an airtight barricade after an accident,
equipment to provide breathable air, as well as water, food, and other
supplies. As shown in figure 7, most mines planned to use at least one
refuge chamber to provide long-term postaccident breathable air to
trapped miners.
Figure 7: Methods for Providing Long-Term Postaccident Breathable Air
for Trapped Miners and Percentages of Mines Planning to Use Each
Method[A]:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a series of illustrations of methods for providing long-
term postaccident breathable air for trapped miners and percentages of
mines planning to use each method. The following data is illustrated:
Method: Prebuilt safe haven (contains airlock area and skid, which
contains oxygen equipment for cleaning contaminants from the air, food,
water, and other survival supplies);
Percentage of mines using this system: 14%.
Method: Miners using barricading materials from a skid to erect a safe
haven after an accident (materials include food, water, oxygen, tools,
wood beams and brattice cloth);
Percentage of mines using this system: 27%.
Method: Inflatable and hard-sided refuge chambers;
Percentage of mines using this system: 69%.
Source: GAO‘s illustration of miner‘s refuge in an emergency.
[A] Mines may use more than one method to provide breathable air to
trapped miners. For example, a mine may choose to use a refuge chamber
at the working section of the mine (i.e., where the coal is being
removed) and a prebuilt safe haven at locations nearer the mine
entrance along an exit route.
Note: District officials reported that 7 percent of mines were using
something other than the above alternatives to provide postaccident
breathable air, such as forcing air into the mine through preinstalled
pipes or through a borehole or shaft drilled from the surface into the
mine.
[End of figure]
Refuge chambers. Although, according to MSHA, 69 percent of all
underground coal mines had ordered either inflatable or hard-sided
refuge chambers, only 4 percent of these mines had received the
chambers as of January 2008. Manufacturers had difficulty increasing
production to meet the demand from mine operators prompted by enactment
of the MINER Act, and they encountered shortages of needed materials
and equipment. According to the MSHA officials and manufacturers we
interviewed, manufacturing limitations may delay delivery of some
refuge chambers until 2009. In light of these delays, senior MSHA
headquarters officials told us that they were considering requiring
mine operators who had not yet received refuge chambers to make interim
arrangements, such as providing prebuilt safe havens or barricading
materials to allow miners to construct safe havens. In addition, mine
operators we interviewed said they were concerned that, based on
NIOSH's evaluation of the chambers, MSHA might develop guidance that
requires modification or replacement of the chambers they have ordered,
which might further delay their delivery or increase the costs.
[Footnote 28]
Prebuilt safe havens and skids with barricading materials. Fourteen
percent of the mines opted to build their own safe havens, and 27
percent opted to provide skids with supplies needed for breathable air,
barricades, and other survival necessities. However, as of January
2008, only 12 percent of the mines using safe havens and 50 percent of
the mines using skids had fully implemented these methods. Unavailable
equipment prevented full implementation for many mines, often because
manufacturers were not able to meet the increased demand for items such
as oxygen tanks, airlock doors, and equipment needed to eliminate
carbon dioxide from refuge areas.
Self-contained self-rescuers. At the time of our review, manufacturers
of self-contained self-rescuers were beginning to catch up with the
sudden increased demand created by the requirements of the MINER Act.
However, as of January 2008, 20 percent of the mines were waiting for
delivery of some of the self-contained self-rescuers required by their
plans. The manufacturers we interviewed told us that they did not
expect this large increase in demand to continue into the foreseeable
future and, therefore, did not greatly increase their production
capacity, which limited the number of units they could produce in the
short term.
MSHA Has Not Determined What Technologies Will Be Acceptable in Meeting
the MINER Act Requirement for Wireless Communications Systems:
Although the MINER Act requires mines to provide postaccident wireless
two-way communications systems or approved alternatives by June 2009,
MSHA has not determined what technology mine operators will be allowed
to use to meet this requirement. The MINER Act does not define wireless
communications systems, except to state that mines' emergency response
plans must include provisions for postaccident communications between
underground and surface personnel via a "wireless two-way medium."
However, the act also states that, if such components cannot be adopted
by mine operators, their plans may instead include alternative methods
that "approximate, as closely as possible, the degree of functional
utility and safety protection" that would be provided by a wireless
system.[Footnote 29] The Senate committee report on the act stated that
the intent of this requirement is for mine operators to use the most
advanced technology available that works best in their particular mine.
The report also noted that the intent is to avoid interpreting the law
so narrowly as to stifle innovation and delay implementation of methods
or equipment that would have significant safety benefits.[Footnote 30]
According to NIOSH, the term "wireless," as used by the global
telecommunications industry, has come to mean that the end user device,
such as a cell phone, is not connected locally by a wire. However,
these systems require a hardwired infrastructure to support
communications. In its research, NIOSH has found that infrastructure-
free systems that can provide wireless two-way communications--which we
refer to in this report as fully wireless systems--do not exist for
most underground coal mines due to operational constraints. According
to NIOSH officials, their research has demonstrated that, for wearable
and portable two-way communications devices to work in most underground
coal mines, infrastructure will be required to support any postaccident
communications systems that will be available in the foreseeable
future.
Although researchers and manufacturers have developed fully wireless
communications systems, there are concerns about the viability and
practicality of these systems, and there are significant limitations
for their use in underground coal mines. For example, according to
NIOSH, systems that use antennae placed underground and on the surface
above the mine (referred to as through-the-earth systems) have a very
limited range and most provide only one-way text communication from
individuals on the surface to miners underground. Individuals we
interviewed who were knowledgeable about the mine industry--including
representatives of NIOSH, MSHA's technical support division, and
companies that develop new technology for use in underground coal
mines--and the research we reviewed indicated that fully wireless two-
way communications systems may not be available for many years because
the conditions in the mines make it extremely difficult for
communication signals to cover significant distances.
According to NIOSH, MSHA's technical support division staff, and
manufacturers, some partially wireless systems in which the coal miner
is not tethered to the infrastructure are available now, and other
alternatives that could enhance communications and the safety of miners
in underground coal mines are nearly ready for use. The use of these
partially wireless communications systems--such as leaky feeder or
fiber optic cable systems--is becoming more widespread in mines. In
addition, NIOSH and manufacturers are developing other options for
providing partially wireless communications in mines, including
ethernet networks and wireless mesh networks. Examples of some of these
systems are shown in table 2.
Table 2: Examples of Partially Wireless Communications Systems for Use
in Underground Coal Mines:
Type of system: Leaky feeder;
Description: Signal "leaks" to and from a feeder cable, radiating a
signal that allows communication throughout much of the mine.
Type of system: Ethernet;
Description: Ethernet local area network that uses a special data
communications protocol transmitted over coaxial cable or twisted-pair
wires to permit voice communications in mines.
Type of system: Wireless mesh;
Description: Wireless mesh networks use wireless modems (called nodes)
placed throughout a mine. The signal "hops" from node to node,
permitting two-way voice, data and video to be sent and received. If
some nodes fail in a mine accident, the network can reconfigure itself
and create a new path for communication signals using nodes that are
still functional.
Type of system: Parasitic signal propagation;
Description: A signal is transmitted along existing mine
infrastructure, such as wires, rails, and cabling, and can "jump" from
one medium to another, such as traveling from a wire to a rail. In some
instances, the signal can bypass a damaged section of cable by
traveling along an alternate medium until it is past the damaged
section.
Source: NIOSH.
[End of table]
Although some of these systems are currently available, others are
still being developed, and some components have not yet been approved
by MSHA as being safe for use in underground coal mines.[Footnote 31]
In early 2008, MSHA approved the first wireless mesh network for
tracking miners and is reviewing the manufacturer's application for
approval of a modification that would enable two-way text messaging
using this network. An MSHA official responsible for approving
equipment for use in underground coal mines told us that the agency is
working with a number of other manufacturers seeking MSHA's approval of
wireless mesh systems that would allow two-way voice communications.
NIOSH has developed plans for ensuring that advanced and survivable
communications systems are provided in the mines. Given the progress
that has been made in developing alternatives to fully wireless
technology, NIOSH has developed a phased approach in which underground
coal mines would install systems using partially wireless technology.
Mines could install these improved communications systems alongside
traditional systems, such as mine pager phones, or combine systems that
use one type of technology, such as leaky feeder cable, with those that
use other technologies, such as wireless mesh, to create communications
systems more likely to survive a mine accident. NIOSH officials told us
that their approach is focused on ensuring that mine operators can make
use of existing technologies as they upgrade to more survivable
communications systems.
Similar to NIOSH's approach, West Virginia requires mines to use
wireless communications systems but defines them as systems that allow
individual communications by a miner through a mine communication and
tracking system without a physical connection. West Virginia allows
mines to use leaky feeder cable and WiFi communications systems to meet
this requirement, both of which are partially, rather than fully,
wireless systems. West Virginia's state mining office has approved
communications and tracking technologies developed by several
manufacturers, but not all of them have been approved by MSHA for use
in underground coal mines. West Virginia officials said that they
expect their mines to have operational systems to meet this requirement
by late 2008.
Despite these advances in partially wireless technology, MSHA had not
yet determined what types of technology will be acceptable for mines to
use to meet the June 2009 requirement for wireless communications. In
its guidance on emergency response plans issued in October 2006, MSHA
defined the term wireless to mean systems with no underground wires
that might be damaged by fire or explosion. As previously noted,
according to NIOSH, such infrastructure-free systems will not be
possible for most mines. MSHA's guidance noted that specific conditions
in each mine would be taken into account in determining whether the
system was likely to withstand an accident intact. At the time of our
review, MSHA officials told us they had no immediate plans to issue
guidance detailing what technology will be acceptable in meeting the
June 2009 requirement for wireless communications because they wanted
to wait and see what technology is available closer to the deadline. As
a result, it is uncertain whether mine operators will be able to plan
for and order enhanced communications systems to meet the deadline. In
justifying the delay, one official expressed concern that manufacturers
would stop trying to develop fully wireless technology if MSHA
announced that partially wireless technology is acceptable. However,
some manufacturers told us that, because MSHA has not determined what
technology will be acceptable, they are concerned that they are
investing time and money in developing technology that may not
ultimately be acceptable to MSHA.
While MSHA's District Offices Have Enforced Mines' Implementation of
Emergency Response Plans, MSHA Headquarters Has Provided Limited
Oversight of Enforcement and Plan Quality:
MSHA's district offices have conducted inspections and issued citations
to enforce implementation of mines' emergency response plans, but MSHA
headquarters has provided limited oversight of the districts'
enforcement efforts and the overall quality of the plans. MSHA's
districts have inspected many mines for compliance and issued citations
to enforce implementation of their emergency response plans, but MSHA
headquarters officials have not systematically evaluated the data on
citations related to emergency response plans to identify potential
problems with implementation or enforcement. In addition, MSHA
headquarters has provided insufficient oversight to ensure the quality
of underground coal mines' emergency response plans or to identify
whether corrective actions might be needed.
District Offices Have Used Inspections and Citations to Enforce
Implementation of Plans:
In October 2006, MSHA headquarters provided the districts with guidance
stating that inspectors should begin checking for compliance with
approved emergency response plan components during the regular
inspection process. If an inspector finds a mine operator has not
implemented a component of its approved plan, MSHA can cite the mine
for noncompliance with its plan. According to district officials, all
of MSHA's districts began incorporating individual components of mines'
plans into their regular inspections as soon as the components were
approved. Inspectors were notified of the approval of individual
components of the mines' plans through updates of the mines' uniform
mine files, which contain all of the mines' plans and must be reviewed
by inspectors prior to each inspection.[Footnote 32]
As of December 2007, inspectors had issued over 350 citations to mine
operators who had not properly implemented the approved components of
their emergency response plans. MSHA inspectors began issuing citations
for noncompliance in November 2006, shortly after MSHA headquarters
issued its guidance.[Footnote 33] Prior to November 2006, MSHA district
offices only issued citations to mines that had failed to submit or
revise their emergency response plans for approval. From November 2006
through mid-December 2007, the most frequently issued citations were
related to postaccident communications, postaccident tracking,
postaccident breathable air, and additional plan content.[Footnote 34]
The citations for noncompliance with the postaccident breathable air
component of mines' plans included violations for not having the
required self-contained self-rescuers and supplies for providing oxygen
to miners trapped underground for a long period of time. Figure 8
indicates the percentage and number of citations issued for
noncompliance with each component of the mines' emergency response
plans.
Figure 8: Citations MSHA Issued to Mines under the MINER Act for
Noncompliance with Each Emergency Response Plan Component, by
Component, August 15, 2006, to December 11, 2007:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a pie-chart depicting the following data:
Citation MSHA Issued: Additional plan content provisions;
Number: 101;
Percentage: 30%.
Citation MSHA Issued: Postaccidnet communications;
Number: 98;
Percentage: 29%.
Citation MSHA Issued: Postaccident tracking;
Number: 53;
Percentage: 16%.
Citation MSHA Issued: Postaccident breathable air;
Number: 50[A];
Percentage: 15%.
Citation MSHA Issued: Other;
Number: 12;
Percentage: 4%.
Citation MSHA Issued: Postaccident illness;
Number: 9;
Percentage: 3%.
Citation MSHA Issued: Multiple;
Number: 11;
Percentage: 3%.
Citation MSHA Issued: Training;
Number: 5;
Percentage: 1%.
Source: GAO analysis of MSHA data.
[A] The 50 citations for noncompliance with the postaccident breathable
air component include 42 violations of plans' provisions for the long-
term maintenance of miners trapped underground, 7 violations of plans'
provisions for self-contained self-rescuers, and 1 violation of both
provisions for both.
[End of figure]
The reasons for the citations varied; instances of noncompliance cited
included, among other things, mines not installing required equipment
or equipment not functioning properly. Table 3 includes examples of the
conditions cited by inspectors.
Table 3: Examples of Conditions Cited by Inspectors for Noncompliance
with Mines' Emergency Response Plans:
Emergency response plan component:
Postaccident communications; Summary of violation: The plan stated that
a second and separate communications system would be installed in the
primary escapeway. The plan also stated that the second system would be
a telephone line that would extend with the lifeline as mining
progressed. This second line was to be installed within 30 days of the
approval of the plan. No secondary communications system had been
installed.
Emergency response plan component: Postaccident tracking;
Summary of violation: The mine operator failed to comply with the
tracking plan in the mine's emergency response plan. The tracking plan
was not effective in that one miner was recorded as being in two
different working sections of the mine at the same time and two miners
were recorded as being underground when they were actually both on the
surface.
Emergency response plan component: Postaccident breathable air: long-
term maintenance of miners trapped underground;
Summary of violation: The operator's emergency response plan required
that arrangements be made to provide breathable air for the active
section of the mine within 60 days after the plan was approved. The
plan had been approved and 60 days had elapsed, but the operator had
not made arrangements to provide breathable air.
Emergency response plan component: Postaccident breathable air: self-
contained self-rescuers;
Summary of violation: A self-contained self-rescuer storage container
was not being maintained. The container had been damaged; the lids were
badly bent and hanging; and the self-contained self-rescuers were
exposed to dirt, dust, and water.
Emergency response plan component: Training;
Summary of violation: Discussions with seven miners indicated that they
were not adequately trained in transferring from one self-contained
self-rescuer to another, as required by the approved emergency response
plan.
Emergency response plan component: Postaccident lifelines;
Summary of violation: The lifeline installed in the alternate escapeway
along the conveyor belt was broken in several locations. A section of
the lifeline was wrapped around other equipment.
Emergency response plan component: Additional plan content;
Summary of violation: The following items were not available on the
working section: claw hammer, protective gloves, eight roof jacks, four
brattice boards, nails, and food and water in sufficient amounts.
Emergency response plan component: Multiple;
Summary of violation: The operator had not installed a lifeline in the
primary escapeway from the surface to the working section. Also, the
mine operator had not installed an additional means of communication
from the surface to the working section of the mine.
Emergency response plan component: Multiple;
Summary of violation: The mine operator was not keeping a written
record of the location of miners underground, as required by the mine's
emergency response plan. In addition, the items listed in the plan's
section for additional plan contents were not provided on the working
section for the maintenance of miners trapped underground.
Source: GAO summary of MSHA data.
[End of table]
MSHA issued more citations to mines beginning in May 2007 when more
plans had been fully approved. Citations issued for failure to submit
or revise a plan were generally issued earlier in light of the August
2006 deadline, and citations issued for long-term postaccident
breathable air for miners trapped underground tended to be issued
later, since MSHA did not provide guidance on this issue until February
2007. Excluding these two categories, the number of monthly citations
increased from 9 in April 2007 to 30 in May 2007 and had increased to
nearly 60 by October 2007 (see fig. 9). According to MSHA's
Administrator for Coal Mine Safety and Health, the number of citations
increased as more approved plans became eligible for inspection, and
will likely decrease as more mines successfully implement their plans
and properly maintain their equipment.
Figure 9: Number of Citations Issued under the MINER Act Each Month,
August 15, 2006, to December 11, 2007:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a vertical bar graph depicting the following data:
Date: August 2006;
Citations issued, postaccident breathable air[A]: 0;
Citations issued, other citations[B]: 0;
Citations issued, plan submission[C]: 25.
Date: September 2006;
Citations issued, postaccident breathable air[A]: 0;
Citations issued, other citations[B]: 0;
Citations issued, plan submission[C]: 1.
Date: October 2006;
Citations issued, postaccident breathable air[A]: 0;
Citations issued, other citations[B]: 0;
Citations issued, plan submission[C]: 0.
Date: November 2006;
Citations issued, postaccident breathable air[A]: 0;
Citations issued, other citations[B]: 3;
Citations issued, plan submission[C]: 0.
Date: December 2006;
Citations issued, postaccident breathable air[A]: 0;
Citations issued, other citations[B]: 4;
Citations issued, plan submission[C]: 0.
Date: January 2007;
Citations issued, postaccident breathable air[A]: 0;
Citations issued, other citations[B]: 5;
Citations issued, plan submission[C]: 0.
Date: February 2007;
Citations issued, postaccident breathable air[A]: 0;
Citations issued, other citations[B]: 5;
Citations issued, plan submission[C]: 0.
Date: March 2007;
Citations issued, postaccident breathable air[A]: 0;
Citations issued, other citations[B]: 9;
Citations issued, plan submission[C]: 1.
Date: April 2007;
Citations issued, postaccident breathable air[A]: 0;
Citations issued, other citations[B]: 9;
Citations issued, plan submission[C]: 3.
Date: May 2007;
Citations issued, postaccident breathable air[A]: 2;
Citations issued, other citations[B]: 30;
Citations issued, plan submission[C]: 0.
Date: June 2007;
Citations issued, postaccident breathable air[A]: 0;
Citations issued, other citations[B]: 25;
Citations issued, plan submission[C]: 0.
Date: July 2007;
Citations issued, postaccident breathable air[A]: 4;
Citations issued, other citations[B]: 31;
Citations issued, plan submission[C]: 0.
Date: August 2007;
Citations issued, postaccident breathable air[A]: 19;
Citations issued, other citations[B]: 27;
Citations issued, plan submission[C]: 0.
Date: September 2007;
Citations issued, postaccident breathable air[A]: 14;
Citations issued, other citations[B]: 46;
Citations issued, plan submission[C]: 1.
Date: October 2007;
Citations issued, postaccident breathable air[A]: 2;
Citations issued, other citations[B]: 58;
Citations issued, plan submission[C]: 0.
Date: November 2007;
Citations issued, postaccident breathable air[A]: 1;
Citations issued, other citations[B]: 32;
Citations issued, plan submission[C]: 1.
Date: December 2007;
Citations issued, postaccident breathable air[A]: 1;
Citations issued, other citations[B]: 12;
Citations issued, plan submission[C]: 0.
Source: GAO analysis of MSHA data.
[A] "Postaccident breathable air" includes citations issued for not
providing supplies for the long-term maintenance of miners trapped
underground. These citations were related to MSHA's February 2007
guidance on providing postaccident breathable air for the maintenance
of miners trapped underground. Citations issued for failure to comply
with the requirement for providing caches of self-contained self-
rescuers, which MSHA addressed in its general guidance in the summer
and fall of 2006, are included in "other citations." We categorized the
citations this way to demonstrate the increase in citations related to
postaccident breathable air that occurred after MSHA issued the
guidance on this component. One citation that was issued for both the
maintenance of trapped miners and for self-contained self-rescuers is
included in this category.
[B] "Other citations" includes citations issued for multiple
components, including one from August 2007 that cited a mine for, among
other things, not providing postaccident breathable air for the long-
term maintenance of miners trapped underground. The category also
includes citations issued regarding self-contained self-rescuers,
which were addressed in MSHA's general guidance on emergency response
plans issued in the summer and fall of 2006.
[C] "Plan submission" includes failure to submit a plan or revise a
plan. For example, after MSHA released its February 2007 guidance on
postaccident breathable air for the long-term maintenance of trapped
miners, MSHA required mine operators to resubmit their plans to show
how the mine would address this component.
[End of figure]
Most citations MSHA issued for violations of mines' emergency response
plans were promptly addressed by the mine operators. Upon issuing a
citation, the MSHA inspector is required to establish a deadline for
correction of the safety or health hazard identified in the citation.
More than half of the hazards identified in citations issued to
underground coal mines through December 11, 2007, were corrected within
a week of being issued, and one-quarter were corrected on the same day
that the citations were issued (see table 4). About 7 percent of the
citations reviewed were still outstanding at the end of 2007 and
pertained to mines' failure to comply with their plans' requirement to
provide long-term postaccident breathable air to trapped miners. Half
of these outstanding citations have not been terminated because the
equipment the mine operators planned to use to meet the requirement was
unavailable.
Table 4: Correction Time Frames for Citations Issued under the MINER
Act to Mines for Failing to Submit or for Not Complying with Their
Emergency Response Plans:
Correction time frame: Same day;
Number of violations: 94;
Percent of total violations: 25.3%.
Correction time frame: Within 1 week;
Number of violations: 134;
Percent of total violations: 36.1.
Correction time frame: Within 2 weeks;
Number of violations: 39;
Percent of total violations: 10.5.
Correction time frame: Within 3 weeks;
Number of violations: 39;
Percent of total violations: 10.5.
Correction time frame: Within 4 weeks;
Number of violations: 18;
Percent of total violations: 4.9.
Correction time frame: Greater than 4 weeks;
Number of violations: 20;
Percent of total violations: 5.4.
Correction time frame: Not corrected[A];
Number of violations: 27;
Percent of total violations: 7.3.
Total:
Number of violations: 371;
Percent of total violations: 100%.
Source: GAO analysis of MSHA data.
[A] These citations were still outstanding, as of January 1, 2008.
[End of table]
In a November 2007 report, the Department of Labor's Office of
Inspector General indicated that decreasing inspection resources has
made it difficult for MSHA to complete all required inspections of
underground coal mines.[Footnote 35] Management officials we
interviewed in 4 of the 11 district offices indicated that they did not
have an adequate number of inspectors to complete the required
emergency response plan inspections. However, several managers also
said that this situation will be remedied when newly hired inspectors
become fully qualified to conduct inspections. One former district
manager said that inspectors were able to complete the required
inspections of mines' emergency response plans but may not have had
time to proactively recommend improved safety practices to mine
operators during these inspections.
MSHA Has Not Systematically Evaluated Citation Data to Identify
Potential Problems with Implementation or Enforcement:
MSHA headquarters has not examined the available data on citations to
assess the extent to which each emergency response plan component has
been violated or whether enforcement of the plans may differ across
districts. Senior officials at MSHA headquarters told us that they had
not analyzed the citations related to emergency response plans, apart
from totaling the number of citations issued under the MINER Act. The
MSHA specialist responsible for reviewing the citation data said that
MSHA headquarters analyzes the citation data more to oversee the
compliance of individual mine operators and mines, rather than to
oversee districts' enforcement efforts. As a result, MSHA headquarters
officials were not aware that the number of citations related to
emergency response plans varies across districts. We reviewed the
citations issued by MSHA's 11 district offices for violations of mines'
emergency response plans from August 15, 2006, through December 11,
2007, and found large differences in the number of citations issued
across districts. For example, as of December 11, 2007, one district
had cited one of its 18 mines for failing to comply with its emergency
response plan; in contrast, three districts had cited over two-thirds
of their mines for noncompliance with their plans. (See app. II for
details on the number of citations issued and the number of mines cited
per district.) When we informed a senior MSHA official of these
differences, he said he was not aware of them or the reasons for these
differences. While some differences can be expected, MSHA has not
identified the causes of these differences or whether they are the
result of inconsistent enforcement, which may warrant corrective
actions.
MSHA headquarters also has not analyzed and compared citations issued
under the MINER Act with citations issued under related agency
regulations.[Footnote 36] Some of the emergency response plan
requirements of the MINER Act are also contained in MSHA's regulations.
For example, both the MINER Act and MSHA regulations require mines to
have lifelines or equivalent devices.[Footnote 37] MSHA has not
established a clear policy for when inspectors should cite the
emergency response plan requirement of the MINER Act or the regulations
when both apply. We found that both types of citations have been issued
for the same requirement, indicating that it would not be possible to
assess mines' compliance with a requirement by evaluating either type
of citation in isolation. Specifically, based on our analysis of MSHA's
citation data, we found that, while inspectors issued only 14 citations
for noncompliance with the lifeline requirements of the MINER Act, they
issued over 150 citations for noncompliance with regulations regarding
lifelines over the same period.[Footnote 38] One assistant district
manager said that inspectors use the regulations as the basis for
citations because they are more specific than the language of the MINER
Act; therefore, the regulations allow the inspector to better specify
the nature of the violation and defend the citation if it is
contested.[Footnote 39] While data on citations for noncompliance with
the MINER Act and the regulations are available, MSHA headquarters does
not review both data sources and, as a result, may not have accurate
information to reflect the full extent of operator compliance with
emergency response plan requirements.
The option to cite either the emergency response plan requirement of
the MINER Act or regulations for certain kinds of violations could also
prevent MSHA from appropriately considering one of the statutory
factors that is used to calculate penalty assessments. Specifically,
MSHA is required to consider the mine operator's history of previous
violations in assessing penalties. The formula it uses to assess
penalties results in a higher penalty if the mine has been cited
previously five or more times for violating the same statutory
provision or regulation in the preceding 15 months. However, if
citations for repeat violations by the same mine are not issued
consistently under the same provision--either the applicable statute or
the regulations--MSHA's penalty assessment system will not identify
them as repeat violations, even though the nature of the violation is
the same. Therefore, if an inspector issued five citations to a mine
operator for failing to maintain the mine's lifelines under the
emergency response plan requirement of the MINER Act and subsequently
issued a sixth citation under the regulations, rather than the MINER
Act, MSHA's penalty assessment system would not flag the violation as a
repeat violation, and the higher penalty assessment would not apply.
For example, MSHA issued two citations to one mine under the MINER Act
and assessed the minimum penalty amount. Between the dates that these
two citations were issued, however, the mine received at least four
citations for violations of regulations that overlapped with the
requirements of the MINER Act. Had these four citations been issued
under the MINER Act per MSHA headquarters' guidance to its districts,
rather than under MSHA's regulations, the penalties assessed would have
been higher to reflect the mine's repeated violations of the emergency
response plan requirements of the MINER Act.
MSHA Has Not Provided Sufficient Oversight to Ensure Plan Quality:
Although MSHA headquarters has reviewed some of the mines' emergency
response plans, it has not provided sufficient oversight of the
district offices to ensure that the levels of safety protection
required by the plans are adequate across all of its district offices.
Internal control standards for the federal government advise that
internal controls should be designed so that monitoring is ongoing and
ingrained in agency operations.[Footnote 40] During mine inspections,
inspectors must ensure that the mines are adhering to the requirements
described in the content of their emergency response plans. However, as
discussed earlier in this report, the plans we reviewed varied in the
information provided for certain plan components, such as postaccident
breathable air and postaccident tracking, raising uncertainties about
the protections provided to miners. One senior MSHA headquarters
official said that the district offices have submitted samples of
mines' approved plans to headquarters but the review of such plans has
not been systematic or comprehensive. He further indicated that such a
review would be time-consuming and resource intensive. MSHA
headquarters officials said they plan to review the emergency response
plans as part of the agency's peer review process, but each district
office only undergoes a peer review once every 2 years. Without
monitoring the quality of the plans across all districts, it is unclear
how MSHA headquarters can ensure that its guidance and the requirements
of the MINER Act are applied consistently and that mines are held to
the same standards.
Conclusions:
At the Sago mine, 12 miners died hours after an explosion in the mine
after being exposed to the carbon monoxide that accumulated in the
mine. The MINER Act now requires underground coal mines to develop
emergency response plans to ensure that miners have the tools and
technology needed to protect them in the event of future mine
accidents. However, because of differences in the mines' emergency
response plans, it is not clear that all mines are being held to the
same standards for providing these tools to trapped miners and,
ultimately, for providing the protections needed to ensure the safety
of miners. We understand that not all of the mines' emergency response
plans will be exactly the same because they must take into account the
specific characteristics of each mine. However, the differences in the
plans we reviewed seemed to reflect a lack of specific guidance, rather
than the unique characteristics of each mine. MSHA's current guidance
will continue to be a problem as districts approve emergency response
plans for new mines and review compliance with emergency response plans
as part of their inspections of all mines. In addition, despite
advances in technology, MSHA has not developed guidance indicating what
technologies it will allow mine operators to use to meet the June 2009
wireless communications requirement of the MINER Act because they want
to wait and see what will be available. However, if MSHA does not act
soon to determine what will be acceptable, it is not clear that
manufacturers and mine operators will be able to plan and prepare for
the implementation of new technologies before the deadline, thereby
missing opportunities to improve trapped miners' chances of survival
after an accident. Finally, by not monitoring district offices to
determine the quality of the emergency response plans and district
enforcement efforts, MSHA headquarters officials will not be aware that
the district offices may be holding mines to different standards. As a
result, all mines may not be prepared to adequately protect their
miners in the event of an accident.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To ensure that new and existing mines are held to the same agencywide
standards in preparing for future accidents, we recommend that the
Secretary of Labor direct the Assistant Secretary for Mine Safety and
Health to develop and issue additional guidance to district offices to
clarify what is required for key components of the emergency response
plans, such as providing postaccident breathable air for the
maintenance of trapped miners.
To improve trapped miners' chances of survival after future accidents
through the use of advanced technology, we recommend that the Secretary
of Labor direct the Assistant Secretary for Mine Safety and Health to
work with NIOSH to develop guidance for mine operators on how to meet
the June 2009 requirement to provide postaccident wireless
communications systems.
To improve oversight of the enforcement and approval of emergency
response plans, we recommend that the Secretary of Labor direct the
Assistant Secretary for Mine Safety and Health to take steps to ensure
that district offices are consistently applying MSHA's guidance on
approving and enforcing emergency response plans, such as:
* analyzing its citation data by district offices and using the
information to clarify policies across districts if these analyses
reveal discrepancies in policies;
* analyzing violations of the MINER Act and related regulations to
identify trends and ensure that the appropriate penalties are being
assessed, particularly for repeat violations; and:
* reviewing a sample of plans across districts to ensure that the
content of the plans meets a consistent agencywide standard and, if
not, take corrective action by clarifying the guidance.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We obtained written comments on a draft of this report from the
Departments of Labor and Health and Human Services, which are
reproduced in their entirety in appendixes III and IV. Both agencies
concurred with our recommendations and the Department of Health and
Human Services provided technical comments and clarification, which we
incorporated in the report as appropriate.
In response to our recommendation that MSHA issue additional guidance
to its district offices clarifying the requirements for key components
of emergency response plans, the Department of Labor agreed and stated
that MSHA will issue more detailed guidance to district managers,
including checklists that clarify what must be included in reviewing
new emergency response plans and 6-month reviews of the plans. The
agency also noted that, in developing guidance on the breathable air
component of the plans, MSHA needed time to evaluate all available
technology to ensure that breathable air was provided safely in an
underground mine environment. We understand that the safety issues
involved warranted careful consideration and that MSHA needed to obtain
input from the mining community as it developed the guidance. However,
as stated in our report, MSHA, for several months, did little to act on
the comments it received on the draft guidance which made it difficult
for its district offices and mine operators to move forward in
providing miners with the protections intended by the MINER Act.
In response to our recommendation that MSHA work with NIOSH to develop
guidance for mine operators on meeting the June 2009 requirement to
provide postaccident wireless communications systems, both the
Departments of Labor and Health and Human Services agreed with the
recommendation. The Department of Labor stated that it expects MSHA to
develop guidelines at least 6 months prior to the June 2009 deadline.
In its comments, the Department of Health and Human Services emphasized
the need for MSHA to issue its guidance in time for mine operators to
respond quickly, indicating that at least 10 months would be needed for
them to develop plans, order equipment, and install the new systems.
Given the upcoming June 2009 deadline and steps mine operators and
manufacturers must take, the Departments of Labor and Health and Human
Services should work quickly to develop the needed guidance. The
Department of Labor also indicated that our report omitted the fact
that MSHA maintains up-to-date lists of approved equipment on its
website. However, while these lists indicate which equipment has been
approved as safe for use in underground coal mines, they do not address
what equipment will be sufficient to meet the postaccident wireless
communications requirement in the MINER Act.
In response to our recommendation that MSHA provide additional
oversight to ensure that district offices are consistently applying the
agency's guidance on approving and enforcing emergency response plans,
the Department of Labor agreed. It stated that MSHA plans to review
citations issued by its district offices; provide inspectors with
guidance to help ensure that consistent methods are used in citing
statutory provisions of the MINER Act or regulations violated by mine
operators; and formalize headquarters' reviews of emergency response
plans to ensure consistency in their content, implementation, and
enforcement.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days
after its issue date. At that time, we will send copies of this report
to the Secretaries of Labor and Health and Human Services, interested
congressional committees, and other interested parties. We will also
make copies available to others on request. In addition, the report
will be available at no charge on GAO's Web site at [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-7215 or lasowskia@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions
to this report are listed in appendix V.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Anne-Marie Lasowski:
Acting Director:
Education, Workforce, and Income Security Issues:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To conduct this work, we interviewed officials at the Mine Safety and
Health Administration's (MSHA) Coal Mine Safety and Health headquarters
and its 11 district offices to learn about MSHA's guidance for
approving the emergency response plans, the status of implementation of
the plans, and MSHA's inspection efforts. In each district, we
interviewed the district manager or assistant district manager,
[Footnote 41] the specialist responsible for reviewing and
approving emergency response plans, and an underground coal mine
inspector. We visited two of MSHA's district offices located in West
Virginia and Kentucky--the two states with the largest number of
underground coal mines in the United States. We selected District 3 in
West Virginia because of the state's stringent mine safety laws. During
this visit, we accompanied MSHA officials to observe conditions in an
underground coal mine. We selected District 7 in Kentucky because of
the unique and hazardous conditions in some of its mines, such as mines
that release high amounts of methane. During this site visit, we
accompanied an MSHA inspector to observe a system used by one mine that
incorporated relatively new technology to meet the requirement for a
postaccident tracking system. We also interviewed officials from the
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH); MSHA's
Approval and Certification Center; and manufacturers of refuge
chambers, breathing devices, and communications and tracking
technologies to learn about the status of mine safety technology
research and development. In addition, we interviewed the director of
MSHA's penalty assessment office to determine how citations for
violations related to mines' emergency response plans are processed.
We examined relevant federal laws and regulations that govern MSHA, the
Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission, and NIOSH, as they
applied to our research. Further, we reviewed the decisions that
resolved the cases in which MSHA reached an impasse with mine operators
on the requirements of their emergency response plans mentioned in our
report. Finally, we consulted with outside individuals knowledgeable
about the field of mine safety; mine company officials; and other
representatives of the mining community, including the United Mine
Workers of America, the National Mining Association, and the Bituminous
Coal Operators' Association to obtain their views on mine safety
efforts and the new requirements of the Mine Improvement and New
Emergency Response Act of 2006 (MINER Act) for emergency response
plans.
We also obtained and analyzed data provided by MSHA on the approval,
implementation, and enforcement of the emergency response plans that
all underground coal mines were required to submit to MSHA as part of
the MINER Act. Our review included all mines that MSHA categorized as
active, producing mines, which MSHA defines as those mines that operate
on a full-time basis to produce coal.
Data on the Approval Status of Mines' Emergency Response Plans:
To determine the approval status of mines' emergency response plans, we
obtained copies of the tracking reports from each district office used
by MSHA headquarters officials to track the approval status of each
component of the mines' plans. The reports indicate which components of
each mine's plan had been approved, as of June 21, 2007. MSHA's
district offices updated these tracking reports weekly and provided
them to MSHA headquarters. To assess the accuracy and reliability of
the data recorded on the tracking reports, we (1) reviewed a
nonprobability sample of emergency response plans and the supporting
approval and deficiency letters sent by MSHA's district offices to mine
operators that corroborated the reports provided to us by MSHA's
district offices; (2) ensured that the data included all mines that
became active, producing mines prior to June 21, 2007; and (3)
interviewed agency officials knowledgeable about the data. We worked
with district officials to correct any discrepancies we found before
conducting our analyses. MSHA's tracking reports contained data for 462
of 467 mines; for the 5 mines that were omitted, we obtained the mines'
emergency response plans and supplemented MSHA's tracking reports with
information for these mines. We verified our assessment of the approval
status of these plans with MSHA. After completing these steps, we
determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of
our review.
We selected the nonprobability sample of mines' emergency response
plans from mines that were included in the data provided by MSHA. Our
sample included 77 of the plans submitted to MSHA by the 462 mines for
which MSHA was tracking the approval status of their plans as of June
21, 2007. As of June 21, 2007, with the exception of District 1, all of
MSHA's district offices had fully approved most of their mines'
emergency response plans.[Footnote 42] Districts 2 through 11 had fewer
than five plans that had only been partially approved. Therefore, we
included all of the partially approved plans from these districts in
our sample to determine why they had not been fully approved and what
factors were delaying their approval. We also randomly selected a
minimum of five fully approved plans for the mines in these districts
and 10 percent of the plans in the four districts with over 50 mines.
Because none of the emergency response plans for the 12 mines in
District 1 had been fully approved as of that date, we randomly
selected a sample of 5 of these 12 partially approved plans for review.
As shown in Table 5, our sample included 63 of the 441 plans that had
been fully approved and 14 of the 21 plans that had been partially
approved as of June 21, 2007.
Table 5: Number of Emergency Response Plans, by District:
Underground coal mines' emergency response plans tracked for approval,
as of June 21, 2007:
District office: 1: 12;
District office: 2: 33;
District office: 3: 29;
District office: 4: 120;
District office: 5: 57;
District office: 6: 89;
District office: 7: 64;
District office: 8: 19;
District office: 9: 22;
District office: 10: 10;
District office: 11: 7;
Total: 462.
Partially approved plans, as of June 21, 2007;
District office: 1: 12;
District office: 2: 2;
District office: 3: 0;
District office: 4: 0;
District office: 5: 2;
District office: 6: 0;
District office: 7: 0;
District office: 8: 4;
District office: 9: 1;
District office: 10: 0;
District office: 11: 0;
Total: 21.
Partially approved plans selected for review;
District office: 1: 5;
District office: 2: 2;
District office: 3: 0;
District office: 4: 0;
District office: 5: 2;
District office: 6: 0;
District office: 7: 0;
District office: 8: 4;
District office: 9: 1;
District office: 10: 0;
District office: 11: 0;
District office: Total: 14.
Fully approved plans, as of June 21, 2007;
District office: 1: 0;
District office: 2: 31;
District office: 3: 29;
District office: 4: 120;
District office: 5: 55;
District office: 6: 89;
District office: 7: 64;
District office: 8: 15;
District office: 9: 21;
District office: 10: 10;
District office: 11: 7;
Total: 441.
Fully approved plans selected for review;
District office: 1: 0;
District office: 2: 5;
District office: 3: 5;
District office: 4: 12;
District office: 5: 6;
District office: 6: 9;
District office: 7: 6;
District office: 8: 5;
District office: 9: 5;
District office: 10: 5;
District office: 11: 5;
Total: 63.
Total number of plans selected for review;
District office: 1: 5;
District office: 2: 7;
District office: 3: 5;
District office: 4: 12;
District office: 5: 8;
District office: 6: 9;
District office: 7: 6;
District office: 8: 9;
District office: 9: 6;
District office: 10: 5;
District office: 11: 5;
Total: 77.
Source: GAO analysis of MSHA data.
[End of table]
We also used the 77 plans that we sampled to review the content of the
plans and analyze the differences in the plans. We developed a data
collection instrument to record information on each component contained
in the plans. We used this data collection instrument to analyze and
compare differences across the plans we reviewed.
Because, at the time of our review, MSHA had only recently approved
most of the mines' emergency response plans, we did not include in the
scope or our work the 6-month reviews of approved plans that the MINER
Act requires MSHA to conduct.
Data on the Implementation Status of Mines' Emergency Response Plans:
To determine the status of mines' implementation of the components of
their emergency response plans, we obtained data as of September 2007
from MSHA headquarters detailing whether the mines' plans had been
partially or fully implemented and what supplies mines had on order. We
obtained these data for 439 of the 449 mines categorized by MSHA as
active, producing mines as of October 30, 2007. We used this more
recent date, rather than the June 2007 date, because it better
reflected the implementation status of the emergency response plans of
mines categorized as active, producing mines.[Footnote 43] We could not
obtain information on the implementation status of 10 mines' emergency
response plans because MSHA did not track the status of their plans.
The September 2007 data on the implementation status of the mines'
emergency response plans were compiled by MSHA's district offices as
part of a one-time request from MSHA headquarters for this information.
In January 2008, we asked the district offices to provide updated
information on the implementation status of the emergency response
plans for each of the 449 mines that were still active, producing
mines. We used the January 2008 data to assess the extent to which
mines had implemented their emergency response plans and the extent to
which they were using certain methods to implement the requirements of
their plans, such as whether they were using refuge chambers to meet
the requirement to provide postaccident breathable air to trapped
miners.
We did not independently verify the information provided by MSHA on the
implementation status of each mine's emergency response plan, but we
assessed its reliability. To assess the reliability of the data
provided by MSHA on the implementation status of each mine's emergency
response plan, we (1) reviewed MSHA's citation data to corroborate the
data on implementation of the mines' emergency response plans and (2)
interviewed agency officials knowledgeable about the data. We
determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of
our review.
Data on MSHA's Citations:
To analyze MSHA's enforcement efforts, we obtained data from MSHA's
headquarters office on citations issued by its inspectors for
violations of the emergency response plan section of the MINER Act. The
data represent citations issued from August 15, 2006, through December
11, 2007. We analyzed citations issued to underground coal mines that
were among the 449 categorized by MSHA as active, producing mines as of
October 30, 2007. Many mines may have changed status during that time
frame; therefore, we used the data on the status of each mine as of
October 30, 2007 that we obtained in conjunction with the data on the
status of the implementation of the mines' plans because obtaining data
on the status of each mine on the date that it received a citation
would have been too cumbersome. We also obtained data on citations
issued for violations of 30 C.F.R. Part 75 during this same general
period because some of the provisions it contains overlap with
requirements of the MINER Act. We reviewed these citations, as well as
those issued for violations of the of the emergency response plan
section of the MINER Act, to obtain a complete picture of MSHA's
enforcement efforts. We also analyzed whether some of these overlapping
requirements posed a problem for inspectors in deciding how to issue
the citations and for MSHA in assessing accurate penalties. We did not,
however, review the extent to which mine operators contested citations
issued by MSHA.
To assess the reliability of MSHA's citation data, we (1) reviewed a
sample of completed citation forms to corroborate the data provided by
MSHA, (2) performed electronic testing for obvious errors in accuracy
and completeness, and (3) interviewed agency officials knowledgeable
about the data. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable
for the purposes of our review.
We conducted this audit from April 2007 through April 2008 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Citations Issued by MSHA Related to the Requirements of
Mines' Emergency Response Plans:
The following tables summarize MSHA's citations of the MINER Act, by
district, from August 15, 2006, through December 11, 2007. Table 6
shows the number of citations issued by each district for each
component of mines' emergency response plans. Table 7 provides
additional detail on citations issued for violations of multiple
components of the mines' plans. Table 8 indicates the number of mines
per district that have been issued citations under the MINER Act.
Table 6: Number of Citations Issued under the MINER Act to Active Mines
for Violating Components of Emergency Response Plans, August 15, 2006,
to December 11, 2007:
(Continued From Previous Page)
Violation: Failure to submit;
District 1: 2;
District 2: 2;
District 3: 5;
District 4: 3;
District 5: 0;
District 6: 0;
District 7: 17;
District 8: 0;
District 9: 0;
District 10: 0;
District 11: 3;
Totals: 32.
Violation: Failure to comply: Postaccident communications;
District 1: 3;
District 2: 7;
District 3: 10;
District 4: 24;
District 5: 23;
District 6: 3;
District 7: 14;
District 8: 1;
District 9: 3;
District 10: 1;
District 11: 9;
Totals: 98.
Violation: Failure to comply: Postaccident tracking;
District 1: 0;
District 2: 9;
District 3: 8;
District 4: 8;
District 5: 20;
District 6: 0;
District 7: 4;
District 8: 0;
District 9: 1;
District 10: 3;
District 11: 0;
Totals: 53.
Violation: Failure to comply: Postaccident breathable air: Maintenance
of miners trapped underground;
District 1: 0;
District 2: 2;
District 3: 0;
District 4: 0;
District 5: 26;
District 6: 8;
District 7: 4;
District 8: 0;
District 9: 2;
District 10: 0;
District 11: 0;
Totals: 42.
Violation: Failure to comply: Postaccident breathable air: Self-
contained self-rescuers;
District 1: 0;
District 2: 0;
District 3: 5;
District 4: 0;
District 5: 0;
District 6: 2;
District 7: 0;
District 8: 0;
District 9: 0;
District 10: 0;
District 11: 0;
Totals: 7.
Violation: Failure to comply: Postaccident breathable air: Maintenance
of miners trapped underground and self-contained self-rescuers;
District 1: 0;
District 2: 0;
District 3: 0;
District 4: 0;
District 5: 1;
District 6: 0;
District 7: 0;
District 8: 0;
District 9: 0;
District 10: 0;
District 11: 0;
Totals: 1.
Violation: Failure to comply: Training;
District 1: 0;
District 2: 0;
District 3: 1;
District 4: 2;
District 5: 0;
District 6: 0;
District 7: 0;
District 8: 0;
District 9: 0;
District 10: 0;
District 11: 5;
Totals: 5.
Violation: Failure to comply: Postaccident lifelines;
District 1: 0;
District 2: 0;
District 3: 0;
District 4: 1;
District 5: 1;
District 6: 0;
District 7: 6;
District 8: 0;
District 9: 1;
District 10: 0;
District 11: 0;
Totals: 9.
Violation: Failure to comply: Local coordination;
District 1: 0;
District 2: 0;
District 3: 0;
District 4: 0;
District 5: 0;
District 6: 0;
District 7: 0;
District 8: 0;
District 9: 0;
District 10: 0;
District 11: 0;
Totals: 0.
Violation: Failure to comply: Additional plan content provisions;
District 1: 3;
District 2: 4;
District 3: 3;
District 4: 44;
District 5: 15;
District 6: 3;
District 7: 25;
District 8: 0;
District 9: 0;
District 10: 0;
District 11: 4;
Totals: 101.
Violation: Failure to comply: Additional plan content provisions:
Multiple[A];
District 1: 0;
District 2: 0;
District 3: 3;
District 4: 3;
District 5: 1;
District 6: 0;
District 7: 4;
District 8: 0;
District 9: 0;
District 10: 0;
District 11: 0;
Totals: 11.
Violation: Failure to comply: Additional plan content provisions:
Other;
District 1: 0;
District 2: 0;
District 3: 2;
District 4: 7;
District 5: 1;
District 6: 0;
District 7: 1;
District 8: 0;
District 9: 0;
District 10: 0;
District 11: 1;
Totals: 12.
Total number of citations issued:
District 1: 8;
District 2: 24;
District 3: 37;
District 4: 92;
District 5: 88;
District 6: 16;
District 7: 75;
District 8: 1;
District 9: 7;
District 10: 4;
District 11: 19;
Totals: 371.
Number of active, producing mines, as of October 30, 2007:
District 1: 11;
District 2: 33;
District 3: 30;
District 4: 119;
District 5: 54;
District 6: 85;
District 7: 61;
District 8: 18;
District 9: 21;
District 10: 10;
District 11: 7;
Totals: 449.
Source: GAO analysis of MSHA data.
[A] See table 7 for a breakdown of citations issued for multiple
violations.
[End of table]
Table 7: Citations Issued under the MINER Act for Violations of
Multiple Components of Mines' Emergency Response Plans as of December
11, 2007:
Emergency response plan components violated:
District 3:
Additional plan content provisions, postaccident communications,
postaccident lifelines, postaccident tracking, training;
Number of instances in which a mine in a district was issued one
citation for violating multiple components: 1.
District 3:
Postaccident communications, postaccident lifelines;
Number of instances in which a mine in a district was issued one
citation for violating multiple components: 1.
District 3:
Postaccident communications, postaccident tracking;
Number of instances in which a mine in a district was issued one
citation for violating multiple components: 1.
District 4:
Additional plan content provisions, postaccident communications;
Number of instances in which a mine in a district was issued one
citation for violating multiple components: 2.
District 4:
Additional plan content provisions, postaccident lifelines;
Number of instances in which a mine in a district was issued one
citation for violating multiple components: 1.
District 5:
Additional plan content provisions, postaccident tracking;
Number of instances in which a mine in a district was issued one
citation for violating multiple components: 1.
District 7:
Additional plan content provisions, postaccident tracking;
Number of instances in which a mine in a district was issued one
citation for violating multiple components: 1.
District 7:
Postaccident communications, postaccident lifelines;
Number of instances in which a mine in a district was issued one
citation for violating multiple components: 2.
District 7:
Additional plan content provisions, postaccident breathable air:
maintenance of miners trapped underground;
Number of instances in which a mine in a district was issued one
citation for violating multiple components: 1.
Source: GAO analysis of MSHA data.
[End of table]
Table 8: Number and Percentage of Mines Cited per District under the
MINER Act as of December 11, 2007:
District: District 1;
Number of mines in district: 11;
Number of mines cited: 5;
Percentage of mines cited by district: 36%.
District: District 2;
Number of mines in district: 33;
Number of mines cited: 15;
Percentage of mines cited by district: 45.
District: District 3;
Number of mines in district: 30;
Number of mines cited: 17;
Percentage of mines cited by district: 57.
District: District 4;
Number of mines in district: 119;
Number of mines cited: 50;
Percentage of mines cited by district: 42.
District: District 5;
Number of mines in district: 54;
Number of mines cited: 39;
Percentage of mines cited by district: 72.
District: District 6;
Number of mines in district: 85;
Number of mines cited: 11;
Percentage of mines cited by district: 13.
District: District 7;
umber of mines in district: 61;
Number of mines cited: 41;
Percentage of mines cited by district: 67.
District: District 8;
Number of mines in district: 18;
Number of mines cited: 1;
Percentage of mines cited by district: 6.
District: District 9;
Number of mines in district: 21;
Number of mines cited: 5;
Percentage of mines cited by district: 24.
District: District 10;
Number of mines in district: 10;
Number of mines cited: 3;
Percentage of mines cited by district: 30.
District: District 11;
Number of mines in district: 7;
Number of mines cited: 6.
Percentage of mines cited by district: 86.
Source: GAO analysis of MSHA data.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Labor:
U.S. Department of Labor:
Mine Safety and Health Administration:
1100 Wilson Boulevard:
Arlington, Virginia 22209-3939:
March 31, 2008:
Ms. Anne-Marie Lasowski
Acting Director:
Education, Workforce, and Income Security Issues:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. Lasowski:
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on your draft report titled
"Additional Guidance and Oversight of Mines' Emergency Response Plans
Would Improve the Safety of Underground Coal Miners" (GAO-08-424). As
you note in your report, MSHA has been diligent in taking actions to
enhance mine safety since passage of the MINER Act in June 2006. As of
March 17, 2008, 552 Emergency Response Plans (ERPs) for all active
producing underground coal mines have been fully approved and
implemented except where technology or products are not yet available.
MSHA continues to improve mine safety and values GAO's input in its
efforts. A more detailed response to each of your agency's
recommendation is enclosed. Also included is a summary of the MSHA
actions taken to date to improve coal miner health and safety following
enactment of the MINER Act.
We look forward to continued dialogue with your staff regarding any
additional improvements that will benefit our nation's miners.
If you have any questions, please contact Ken Bullock at (202) 693-
9778.
Signed by:
Richard E. Sickler:
Acting Assistant Secretary for Mine Safety and Health:
Enclosures:
You can now file your MSHA forms online at [hyperlink,
http://www.MSHA.gov]. It's easy, it's fast, and it saves you money!
Enclosure:
Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) Responses to GAO Report:
GAO Recommendation:
To ensure that new and existing mines are held to the same agency-wide
standards in preparing for future accidents, we recommend that the
Secretary of Labor direct the Assistant Secretary for Mine Safety and
Health to develop and issue additional guidance to district offices to
clarify what is required for key components of the emergency response
plans, such as providing post-accident breathable air for the
maintenance of trapped miners.
MSHA Response:
MSHA continually reviews Emergency Response Plans (ERPs) every six
months to ensure consistency and constant improvement. MSHA is pleased
that GAO determined that MSHA has successfully implemented all
technologically feasible Emergency Response Plan (ERP) requirements of
the MINER Act in all active, producing underground coal mines. We also
appreciate that GAO acknowledged that the two exceptions to full
implementation are outside the control of MSHA and the coal mining
industry due to supply constraints and technological feasibility.
To address the specific GAO recommendation, MSHA will issue updated
guidance from the Administrator for Coal Mine Safety and Health (CMS&H)
to the District Managers with more detailed information on the content
and reviews of ERPs. This will include a national checklist and
guidance on what must be included in a new emergency response plan
review and a 6-month review. Each ERP will be different because of the
unique conditions of the mine; however, as mine specific ERP
implementation experience is gained and additional knowledge is
learned, providing further guidance on the specific protections
required will help to ensure that operators "(i) provide for the
evacuation of all individuals endangered by an emergency; and (ii)
provide for the maintenance of individuals trapped underground in the
event that miners are not able to evacuate the mine."
One concern we have with the report, however, is GAO's criticism of
MSHA's implementation schedule for the breathable air component of
ERPs. The MINER Act required that ERPs must:
a. Afford miners a level of safety protection at least consistent with
the existing standards, including standards mandated by law and
regulation;
b. Reflect the most recent credible scientific research;
c. Be technologically feasible, make use of current commercially
available technology, and account for the specific physical
characteristics of the mine; and
d. Reflect the improvements in mine safety gained from experience under
the [MINER] Act and other worker safety and health laws.
Stockpiling large amounts of oxygen for breathable air underground
could create a significant safety issue. Thus, in requiring breathable
air underground, MSHA had to evaluate all available technology to
determine how breathable air could be most safely provided. Without
careful consideration, premature implementation could have actually
increased the danger to miners in the event of a mine
accident, rather than improving their chances of survival, which is the
overarching goal of MSHA.
GAO Recommendation:
To improve trapped miners' chance of survival after future accidents
through the use of advanced technology, we recommend that the Secretary
of Labor direct the Assistant Secretary for Mine Safety and Health to
work with NIOSH to develop guidance for mine operators on how to meet
the June 2009 requirement to provide post accident wireless
communications systems.
MSHA Response:
MSHA concurs with the recommendation and has been working diligently
with the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH)
to evaluate all communication and tracking technologies since the MINER
Act was signed in June 2006. For example, NIOSH has a number of
research and development contracts that have completion dates later
this year that may develop new technology to meet the goals of the
MINER Act. MSHA has also been working with NIOSH on guidance for mine
operators on how to meet the June 2009 requirement to provide post
accident wireless communications systems, and expects to implement
guidelines well in advance of the required deadline -- at least six
months prior to June 2009.
As GAO's report notes, currently available communication systems are
not truly wireless. In the event of a significant accident underground,
the infrastructure that these systems rely upon is almost certainly
going to be damaged or destroyed - exactly when communications are
needed most. Moreover, MSHA believes that mandating technologies that
do not ensure communications in the event of an accident, could
actually hinder the development of truly wireless technologies and
thereby preclude an important safety improvement.
Should technology take longer to develop, the MINER Act allows for
alternative means of compliance if the necessary, completely wireless
technologies are not fully developed by June 2009. As noted, MSHA
currently plans to provide guidance on a performance-based criteria for
acceptable technological alternatives by January 2009, and later
provide performance-based criteria for completely wireless solutions
when such systems become commercially available.
Also, while we share GAO's concern that operators be given formal
guidance as soon as possible, we believe GAO's report omits the
important fact that MSHA maintains an up-to-date listing of MSHA-
approved technologies and evaluation results of such technologies on
its website at [hyperlink,
http://www.msha.gov/techsupp/commoandtracking.asp], which can be easily
referenced by operators in evaluating systems for their mines.
GAO Recommendation:
To improve oversight of the enforcement and approval of emergency
response plans, we recommend that the Secretary of Labor direct the
Assistant Secretary for Mine Safety and Health to take steps to ensure
that district offices are consistently applying MSHA's guidance on
approving and enforcing emergency response plans, such as:
* analyzing its citation data by district offices and using the
information to clarify policies across districts if these analyses
reveal discrepancies in policies;
MSHA Response:
MSHA is pleased that GAO found that MSHA's diligent enforcement of ERP
requirements has resulted in mine operators promptly improving safety -
the majority "within a week" when cited -- and that any ongoing
problems with ERP implementation are due to manufacturing back orders
of breathable air components and technological limitations, which are
outside the control of mine operators and MSHA. As noted above, MSHA is
constantly seeking to improve the ERP review process for the benefit of
miners in the course of it twice annual reviews of each ERP. To
specifically address GAO's recommendation, the Administrator for CMS&H
will issue a memo to District Managers requesting that all citations
issued for ERP violations be scanned and transmitted to Headquarters
for review and analysis. Internal guidance will be issued to
underground coal mine inspectors to cite the statutory provision of the
MINER Act applicable to emergency response plans when inspectors find a
violation of the plan, unless there is a more specific regulation that
applies to the violation. Headquarters staff will evaluate the issued
violations and determine if any policy clarifications are necessary to
improve consistency in issuances, and as MSHA does in all other areas,
it will hold regular discussions with District Managers to receive
input and develop best practices and improvements for ERPs.
* analyzing violations of the MINER Act and related regulations to
identify trends and ensure that the appropriate penalties are being
assessed, particularly for repeat violations;
MSHA Response:
Penalties are an essential part of the Mine Act's enforcement scheme
and deter mine operators from committing violations. When operators
ignore their responsibilities, repeat violations rightfully incur a
much higher penalty. Currently, there are only some specific safety
regulations, such as those for lifelines, that apply to the components
of the required ERPs; other requirements are covered by the statute and
are more general. As GAO notes in its report, to ensure the fullest
protection of miners, MSHA prefers to issue citations under the more
protective regulations it has developed in cooperation with miners,
operators and scientific experts through the rulemaking process, as
opposed to more general statutory provisions. As a legal matter, we
note that a violation of the regulations may not also violate the MINER
Act and vice versa.
MSHA, however, appreciates the importance of requiring that repeat
violations under either the statute or the regulation are deterred.
Accordingly, MSHA will issue guidance to its inspectors to cite the
statutory provision of the MINER Act where it is applicable unless
there is a more protective regulation that applies to the violation.
This policy will ensure that repeat violations are accurately
captured in a mine's violation history and that the resulting
assessment amount will reflect that history and ensure that the most
protective standard for miners is met by operators.
* reviewing a sample of plans across districts to ensure that the
content of the plans meets a consistent agency-wide standard and, if
not, take corrective action by clarifying the guidance.
MSHA Response:
As noted in GAO's report, MSHA headquarters personnel have been
reviewing ERPs from mines throughout the country and working to ensure
consistency of ERPs. In order to formalize that effort, MSHA will issue
a memo to the Director, Office of Accountability (OA) and the
Administrator, CMS&H, requiring the review of ERPs during any national
OA review and CMS&H headquarters accountability review and district
peer reviews to ensure consistency in plan provisions, operator
implementation of the ERPs, and enforcement efforts.
CMS&H headquarters has already developed a list of mines, encompassing
an appropriate cross-section of coal mine types and operators, for ERP
review. The national ERP checklist and guidance, described previously,
will be used to ensure that the content and approval of the ERPs meet
the applicable agency-wide guidance. Based on a recurring review of
sample ERPs from the districts, corrective action will be taken to
update and clarify headquarters' guidance to address discrepancies and
inconsistencies from established policy on the approval of these
emergency response plans.
Conclusion:
MSHA concurs with all of the GAO's recommendations for additional
guidance and oversight of the approval and enforcement of mine
operators' emergency response plans, and had already been working on
improvements that address a number of GAO's recommendations. We will
continue our efforts in that regard and expect these actions will
further improve the consistency in ERPs approved and enforced
nationwide for the benefit of our nation's miners.
[End of enclosure]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Health and Human Services:
Department Of Health & Human Services:
Office of the Assistant Secretary for Legislation:
Washington, D.C. 20201:
April 2, 2008:
Anne-Marie Lasowski:
Acting Director:
Education, Workforce, and Income Security Issues:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. Lasowski:
Enclosed are the Department's comments on the U.S. Government
Accountability Office's (GAO) draft report entitled: Mine Safety:
Additional Guidance and Oversight of Mines' Emergency Response Plans
Would Improve the Safety of Underground Coal Miners (GAO 08-424).
The attached comments serve as the final comments for publication.
The Department appreciates the opportunity to review and comment on
this report.
Sincerely,
Signed by: [Illegible] for:
Vince Ventimiglia:
Assistant Secretary for Legislation:
General Comments Of The Department Of Health And Human Services (HHS)
On The Government Accountability Office's (GAO) Draft Report Entitled:
Mine Safety: Additional Guidance And Oversight Of Mines' Emergency
Response Plans (GAO 08-424):
We have reviewed the report with particular attention to the issues,
findings, and recommendations that relate to NIOSH's research
activities. Overall we concur with those aspects of the report.
Below is an explanation/clarification of the timeline and excel
spreadsheet sent with our earlier comments, which makes reference to
the 10 month timeframe.
* We especially want to emphasize the importance of GAO's finding on
page 28 that fully wireless systems may not be available for many
years.
* As GAO correctly observed on page 27, the MINER Act itself does not
define "wireless" communication, but as noted in the Senate HELP
Committee Report on the Act, the intent is for mine operators to use
the most advanced technology available for a particular mine, and to
avoid interpretation of the law so narrowly as to stifle innovation and
delay implementation of methods or equipment that would have
significant safety benefits.
* These are critical points. NIOSH has informed MSHA that its policy
statement on wireless communication is too narrowly defined.
* Moreover, we have estimated that it will take many operators at least
10 months after MSHA issues policy guidance to develop a post-accident
communication plan, place equipment orders, and begin in-mine
installation.
* Therefore, this guidance should be issued as soon as practicable, if
the goal is to meet the June 2009 target established by the MINER Act.
* For this reason, we fully support GAO's recommendation that MSHA work
with NIOSH to develop this guidance.
* It should be noted that MSHA has made a commitment to work with us on
this issue.
[End of section]
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Anne-Marie Lasowski, (202) 512-7215 or lasowskia@gao.gov.
Staff Acknowledgments:
Revae Moran, Assistant Director, and Cady Panetta, Analyst-in-Charge,
managed this report. Other staff who made key contributions to the
report include Alana Finley and Jill Yost. Sheila McCoy provided legal
assistance. Cindy Gilbert and Shana Wallace assisted with the
methodology and statistical analysis. Susanna Compton and Mimi Nguyen
helped prepare the final report and the graphics.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] Pub. L. No. 109-236.
[2] NIOSH is responsible for developing or adapting new technologies
for use in the mining industry and may make recommendations to MSHA
based on its research findings.
[3] A nonprobability sample cannot be generalized to the population
from which it was drawn.
[4] These offices also employed approximately 76 inspectors who are
authorized to inspect surface coal mines but not underground mines.
[5] Mines that are recognized as being especially dangerous, such as
those containing high levels of methane gas, are required to be
inspected more frequently.
[6] Withdrawal orders compel mine operators to remove miners from the
affected work areas until the hazardous situation cited is corrected,
which could halt production in those areas of the mine.
[7] MSHA categorizes mines that have ceased production but anticipate
reopening in the future as temporarily idled; mines that are closed for
the foreseeable future as being abandoned; and mines that have been
abandoned with their underground openings sealed as being abandoned and
sealed.
[8] MSHA has the authority to issue an Emergency Temporary Standard
when it determines that miners are exposed to grave danger from
exposure to substances or agents determined to be toxic or physically
harmful, or to other hazards, and that an emergency standard is needed
to protect miners from such danger. The standard becomes effective upon
publication in the Federal Register and remains in effect until
replaced by final regulations subject to the rulemaking process, but
for no longer than 9 months.
[9] 30 U.S.C. § 876(b)(2)(A).
[10] 30 U.S.C. § 876(b)(2)(C).
[11] 30 U.S.C. § 876(b)(2)(D).
[12] 30 U.S.C. § 876(b)(2)(E)(iii).
[13] According to MSHA's guidance, self-contained self-rescuers are not
an acceptable method of providing emergency supplies of air for the
long-term maintenance of trapped miners.
[14] 30 U.S.C. § 876(b)(2)(E)(iv).
[15] NIOSH, Research Report on Refuge Alternatives for Underground Coal
Mines (Washington, D.C., Dec. 2007).
[16] GAO, Mine Safety: Better Oversight and Coordination by MSHA and
Other Federal Agencies Could Improve Safety for Underground Coal
Miners, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-622]
(Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2007).
[17] Generally, underground areas of the mine are divided into zones.
Miners are required to contact mine staff working above ground when
they move from one zone to another to let them know in which zone they
are located in case of an accident.
[18] Under the MINER Act, if MSHA and a mine operator reach an impasse
on the approval of the mine's emergency response plan, MSHA must issue
the mine a citation. Such a citation is immediately referred to the
Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission, where an
administrative law judge must render an expedited decision to resolve
the dispute. That decision is reviewable by the Commission.
[19] This included all underground coal mines that were categorized by
MSHA as active, producing mines as of June 2007.
[20] MSHA's guidance on long-term postaccident breathable air issued in
February 2007 did not clearly specify whether the plans must require
postaccident breathable air in these locations. It was later, in April
2007, in a questions and answers document, that MSHA headquarters
clarified that the plans should require breathable air in outby
locations.
[21] One of MSHA's districts did not have any fully approved plans when
we collected the sample of plans to be reviewed and, therefore, was not
included in this analysis.
[22] According to MSHA's guidance, some mines are not required to
provide postaccident breathable air if the working section of the mine
(the area where the coal is being removed) is less than 2,000 feet from
the mine entrance.
[23] This includes 449 mines characterized by MSHA as active, producing
mines as of October 30, 2007.
[24] These are systems that use feeder cables that allow radio signals
to "leak" into and out of the cable, radiating a signal throughout most
areas of a mine and allowing miners working underground and personnel
above ground to communicate using these signals.
[25] Miners report their changes in location to a dispatcher on the
surface, who notes their new location on a map of the mine.
[26] Identifying tags attached to miners' helmets or belts are read by
electronic readers when the miners pass by the readers. The tags
transmit each miner's location to electronic equipment on the surface.
The system provides each miner's location on an electronic map of the
mine.
[27] The postaccident breathable air component includes two parts: (1)
emergency supplies of air sufficient for the long-term maintenance of
trapped miners and (2) caches of self-contained self-rescuers
positioned along mine tunnels leading to the mine entrance to aid in
the miners' escape. According to MSHA guidance, self-contained self-
rescuers are not an acceptable method for providing emergency supplies
of air sufficient for the long-term maintenance of trapped miners.
[28] In April 2007, MSHA specified in a questions and answers document
that state-approved refuge chambers were an acceptable alternative for
providing postaccident breathable air for trapped miners. NIOSH
released its research report on refuge alternatives in December 2007,
which identified shortcomings in selected refuge chambers that must be
corrected before they are installed in mines. As of February 2008, MSHA
had not responded to the NIOSH report with specific guidance on the use
of refuge alternatives. Its response is required by June 2008.
[29] 30 U.S.C. § 876(b)(2)(F).
[30] S. Rep. No. 109-365 (2006).
[31] Equipment installed in an underground coal mine must have prior
approval from MSHA as being either intrinsically safe for use in an
underground coal mine or explosion-proof.
[32] Each district office maintains all of the plans that each mine is
required to have approved by MSHA, including its emergency response
plan, in a uniform mine file for that mine. In addition to the
emergency response plans, mines are required to have many other plans
approved by MSHA, including ventilation plans and roof control plans.
[33] Unless otherwise specified, the citations referred to in this
report are citations written under the MINER Act, in which the
inspector cites either § 316(b) or § 316 as the section of the act that
was violated. We analyzed the citations MSHA issued from August 15,
2006, through December 11, 2007, to mines that were categorized by MSHA
as active, producing mines, as of October 30, 2007.
[34] The MINER Act does not specify the requirements for additional
plan content; however, the requirements for this component of the plans
are detailed in MSHA's guidance to underground coal mine operators on
the content of emergency response plans. The guidance specifies
provisions that the plan should include for the maintenance of miners
trapped underground, including barricading materials, food and water,
and emergency supplies.
[35] U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Inspector General, Underground
Coal Mine Inspection Mandate Not Fulfilled Due to Resource Limitations
and Lack of Management Emphasis, 05-08-001-06-001 (Washington, D.C.,
Nov. 2007).
[36] 30 C.F.R. Part 75 contains regulations relating to mandatory
safety standards for underground coal mines.
[37] See 30 U.S.C. § 876(b)(2)(E)(iv) and 30 C.F.R. § 75.380(d)(7) and
§ 75.381(c)(5).
[38] Lifeline citations included in this analysis were those issued
under 30 C.F.R. §75.380(d)(7)(i)-(ii) and 30 C.F.R. §75.381(c)(5)(i).
[39] For example, MSHA's regulations contain more specific requirements
regarding the spacing between directional indicators and the use of
reflective material to mark the location of lifelines.
[40] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 1999).
[41] Due to changes in MSHA's staffing that occurred during our review,
we interviewed the former managers of some of the district offices who
oversaw the approval process, rather than the current managers who were
not knowledgeable about the process because they were not in the
district at the time that the approval process was being developed.
[42] None of the emergency response plans for the 12 underground coal
mines in District 1 had been fully approved because, at the time, the
mine operators were contesting the MINER Act's requirements for some
components of their plans.
[43] MSHA was in the process of collecting the implementation data
throughout the month of September 2007 and provided it to us in late
October 2007. In order to examine only active, producing mines, we
requested mine status information, and MSHA was able to accommodate
this request on October 30, 2007.
[End of section]
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