The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 Should Be Selectively Modified

Gao ID: OCG-81-2 May 21, 1981

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA) represents an important step by the United States to establish a framework of controls and incentives that, if adopted internationally, could reduce the threat of weapons proliferation and promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Title I states that, as a matter of national policy, the United States should take such actions and measures as are necessary to assure the availability of an adequate supply of nuclear fuel to those nations which adhere to effective nonproliferation policies. Title II calls for U.S. contributions of financial, technical, informational, and other resources to assist the International Atomic Energy Agency in effectively implementing safeguards. It also calls on the United States to seek to negotiate international principles and procedures to be followed in the event of the diversion, theft, loss, or sabotage of nuclear materials, equipment, or technology. Title III establishes new regulatory controls over U.S. nuclear exports and mandates new complex procedures in the way commercial nuclear export decisions are reviewed and approved by federal agencies, with provisions for oversight by the President and Congress. Title IV expands U.S. criteria for future agreements for peaceful nuclear cooperation and directs the President to attempt to change existing agreements to comply with the new criteria. Title V calls on the United States to assist developing nations, especially Nonproliferation Treaty parties, in identifying and developing nonnuclear energy alternatives with emphasis on solar and other renewable energy sources. Since the act's enactment in 1978: (1) no additional nations have acknowledged exploding a nuclear device; (2) 12 nations have ratified the Nonproliferation Treaty; (3) Spain has moved toward placing all of its nuclear activities under international safeguards; and (4) the predicted foreign drive to acquire enrichment and reprocessing capabilities has somewhat abated.

International cooperation is the key to the nonproliferation effort but, with few exceptions, major nations have criticized the U.S. nonproliferation strategy. The factors influencing foreign reactions to the strategy vary widely and include energy, security, political, technical, and economic issues. Despite the act's limited impact to date, GAO does not believe that major revisions are warranted because: (1) the Act has only been in existence for 3 years and, since many international cooperative initiatives are required, it may be too soon to make a meaningful and objective assessment of its potential long-term impact; and (2) although it is questionable whether one nation can single-handedly solve nonproliferation issues, through the act the United States has heightened worldwide awareness to the dangers of proliferation. However, GAO believes that the act should be selectively modified to: (1) conform with political, technical, and economic realities; (2) obtain wider international acceptance; (3) preserve the framework for curbing the inherent risks of weapons proliferation associated with peaceful nuclear cooperation; and (4) improve executive branch implementation.

Recommendations

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