Export Controls

Issues In Removing Militarily Sensitive Items From the Munitions List Gao ID: NSIAD-93-67 March 31, 1993

With the opening up of the former Soviet Bloc, U.S. exporters are pressing to liberalize U.S. export controls to boost their export competitiveness. In November 1990, the President ordered the removal of dual-use items from the U.S. Munitions List and its licensing controls unless significant national security interests would be jeopardized. In response to congressional concerns that national security interests may not be adequately considered when weighed against the commercial and economic benefits of liberalized export controls, this report examines (1) items being considered for removal from the List and (2) the extent to which national security interests were being considered and protected in the decision process.

GAO found that: (1) State and DOD agreed to transfer over two dozen commodities, including vessels and explosives, to the Department of Commerce; (2) State and DOD identified several items that should be retained on the U.S. munitions list (USML) for national security reasons; (3) Commerce argues that dual-use items belonged on the Commerce control list (CCL) and DOD and State had to prove why the transfer of the items to CCL would jeopardize national security; (4) State agreed to transfer nonmilitary inertial navigation system (INS) technical data and nonmilitary technical data to Commerce if it would impose a new foreign policy control to relieve DOD concerns; (5) in March 1992, State, DOD, and Commerce signed a memorandum of understanding detailing conditions for the transfers; (6) jurisdiction over certain technologies for commercial jet engines has been a constant problem, since State and Commerce claim jurisdiction; (7) while State has generally denied licenses for exports related to jet engine technologies, Commerce has approved such licenses; (8) DOD argued that jet engine technologies should remain on USML to maintain an air combat advantage for U.S. forces over potential adversaries; and (9) State controls all technologies associated with the design, manufacture, production, development, repair, and overhaul of jet engines.

Recommendations

Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.

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