Soviet Nuclear Weapons

The Defense Department has earmarked more than $300 million to help improve the safety and security of former Soviet nuclear weapons and materials and to prevent its proliferation. Although the Russians have ruled out direct U.S. involvement in the dismantling of Soviet bombs and warheads, the United States is seeking to help the former Soviet republics destroy missile delivery vehicles, and, in a related effort, the United States and Russia have agreed to cooperate in converting highly enriched uranium in former Soviet weapons into reactor fuel for possible sale to the United States. Despite these positive steps, significant gaps remain in the U.S. understanding of how to best deal with the legacy of the Soviet nuclear arsenal. Russia's request for U.S. help in building a fissile material storage facility has raised questions about cost and other issues, and the United States has deferred selecting an approach for the long-term disposition of Russian plutonium until more can be learned about various technologies. Moreover, it is still too early to determine precisely how the United States would integrate converted Russian highly enriched uranium into U.S. reactor fuel enrichment operations. GAO summarized this report in testimony before Congress; see: Soviet Nuclear Weapons: U.S. Efforts to Help Former Soviet Republics Secure and Destroy Weapons, by Joseph E. Kelley, Director of International Affairs Issues, before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs. GAO/T-NSIAD-93-5, Mar. 9, 1993 (15 pages).

GAO found that: (1) the United States has not prepared prioritized lists of items that affect the destruction of former Soviet nuclear weapons; (2) the ability to prioritize items is limited by Russia's rejection of direct U.S. assistance and a lack of technically trained personnel; (3) the United States planned to provide $90 million for four projects aimed at improving the safety and security of Russia's existing nuclear weapons; (4) the United States has shifted priorities toward dismantling nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and supporting Russian efforts for a proposed fissile material storage facility; (5) the United States did not involve private industry experts in its efforts to develop priorities for dismantling nuclear weapons primarily to avoid unfair competitive advantages and the general feeling that the U.S. government should define its overall priorities for the program; (6) only a few former Soviet nuclear weapons have been dismantled and only limited amounts of U.S. nuclear safety equipment has been delivered; (7) between December 1991 and December 1992, 185 officials from various agencies made 343 trips to Russia and the other independent republics in support of nuclear weapons dismantling efforts at a cost of $1.68 million; and (8) the Department of Defense financed about 21 percent of the travel costs and executive branch general appropriations paid the balance of the costs.