Nuclear Nonproliferation and Safety

The discovery of Iraq's nuclear weapons program, North Korea's refusal to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to conduct nuclear inspections, and the Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident have focused attention on nuclear proliferation and the safety of nuclear power plants. These issues are of particular concern to IAEA, whose main duties are verifying the peaceful use of nuclear material and promoting nuclear energy. This report examines the (1) effectiveness of IAEA's safeguards program and the adequacy of program funding, (2) management of U.S. technical assistance to IAEA's safeguards program, (3) effectiveness of IAEA's program for advising member states about the safety of nuclear power plants, and (4) adequacy of program funding.

GAO found that: (1) although IAEA safeguards are a central element of international efforts to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation, IAEA cannot ensure that its member states are complying with the safeguards because it has limited inspection authority; (2) six of IAEA member states have not joined the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty that mandates full-scope inspections; (3) the discovery of Iraq's nuclear weapons program showed weaknesses in IAEA safeguards and IAEA lack of necessary access, mindset, member support, and information needed to adequately investigate nuclear activities; (4) IAEA initiatives to better detect undeclared nuclear activities and facilities include using shared information from member states regarding suspected proliferators, extending its inspections, and developing new sampling and monitoring techniques; (5) although IAEA safeguard responsibilities are expanding, IAEA has not been able to maintain or upgrade its equipment inventory or meet its inspection goals because of budgetary constraints; (6) solutions to IAEA funding problems include reducing expenses, changing the timing of U.S. support payments, enabling IAEA to use year-end surpluses, and increasing prioritization; (7) although the U.S. program of technical assistance (POTAS) has significantly enhanced IAEA ability to apply safeguards, its internal management and contract administration could be improved; (8) the Department of Energy (DOE) and IAEA need to develop procedures to improve coordination to prevent duplication of work before DOE provides direct assistance to IAEA; and (9) although IAEA is meeting its overall safety advisory responsibilities, it has been unable to fully implement additional safety activities and review the operational safety of nuclear power plants.

Recommendations

Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.

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