Nuclear Nonproliferation

Iraq's use of so-called dual-use equipment--items with civilian uses that can also be used to build nuclear explosives or produce weapons grade uranium and plutonium--has raised concerns about the effectiveness of export controls over this material. The United States approved more than 1,500 licenses for dual-use items, mainly high-speed computers, to eight countries with suspected nuclear weapons programs, significantly increasing the risk that U.S. exports are fueling nuclear proliferation. Weaknesses in the interagency licensing review process have resulted in the approval of a number of sensitive license applications without review by the Energy Department or other members of the Subgroup on Nuclear Export Coordination, an interagency group. U.S. government approval of sensitive exports dictates the need for effective ways to prevent or detect export diversions, but GAO discovered several weaknesses in current procedures. These include (1) inadequate criteria for selecting prelicense checks and postshipment verifications, (2) ineffective methods used to do these inspections, and (3) a lack of verification of government-to-government assurances against nuclear end uses. GAO summarized this report in testimony before Congress; see: Nuclear Nonproliferation: Licensing Procedures for Dual-Use Export Need Strengthening, by Joseph E. Kelley, Director of International Affairs Issues, before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs. GAO/T-NSIAD-94-163, May 17, 1994 (20 pages).

GAO found that: (1) between 1985 and 1992, the Department of Commerce approved a significant number of nuclear-related dual-use export licenses to countries of nuclear proliferation concern; (2) although the majority of the approved licenses involve nuclear referral list (NRL) items, items with critical nuclear explosive or nonnuclear applications are rarely approved; (3) although license requests for NRL items are expected to continue to decline, license requests from countries on the Special Country List are not declining as rapidly; (4) U.S. licensing decisions are based on minimizing proliferation risk without impeding legitimate exports; (5) the United States approved 87 percent of the license requests from eight countries on the Special Country List; (6) although most licensing decisions for the eight countries were consistent with U.S. export policy, 1,500 licenses were approved to end users suspected of being involved in nuclear proliferation activities; (7) the interagency licensing review process includes weaknesses that prevent some nuclear-related licenses from receiving adequate review; (8) Commerce does not always refer dual-use license applications to the Subgroup on Nuclear Export Coordination (SNEC) as required and the Department of Energy has approved many licenses without subjecting them to adequate interagency review; and (9) the United States needs to improve its criteria for selecting pre-license checks (PLC) and post-shipment verifications (PSV), methods used to perform dual-use inspections, and verification of government-to-government assurances against nuclear end uses.

Recommendations

Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.

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