Export Controls

Because of inadequate export controls over shipments of U.S. missile technology to China--ostensibly for use in satellite projects--and weaknesses in monitoring such shipments after export to China, the United States has no guarantee that such sensitive equipment will not be used for military purposes. This report discusses (1) the nature and the extent of U.S. dual-use and missile technology exports to the Peoples Republic of China and the extent to which the items are exported to sensitive end users, (2) the ability of the United States to monitor Chinese compliance with conditions attached to U.S. missile technology exports and with the terms of U.S.-China understanding on Missile Technology Control Regime, (3) the terms of the U.S.-China understanding on the Regime and the degree to which the understanding requires China to adhere to the full range of commitments, and (4) the effectiveness of U.S. sanctions imposed on China.

GAO found that: (1) for fiscal years 1990 through 1993, the U.S. government approved 67 export licenses worth about $530 million for missile-related technology items exported to China; (2) such export licenses accounted for less than one percent of all special licenses for exports to China; (3) the Department of Defense (DOD) is concerned that the Department of Commerce might not be identifying or seeking interagency concurrence on all potential missile-technology export license applications; (4) DOD does not have an interagency agreement with Commerce regarding which export applications should be referred for comments; (5) existing licensing procedures and monitoring controls cannot ensure that most missile-technology and dual-use exports are kept from sensitive end users, but controls on satellite-related exports appear to be adequate; (6) U.S. government agencies do not share all the information they have on sensitive end users in China; (7) the lack of Chinese cooperation has made end-use monitoring of export licenses only marginally effective; (8) Commerce does not require monitoring cooperation before it grants an export license; (9) although China has recently accepted more stringent MTCR requirements, it does not accept the revised MTCR guidelines and annex; and (10) there are no criteria for measuring the effectiveness of proliferation sanctions imposed on China.

Recommendations

Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.

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