Export Controls

Concerns Over Stealth-Related Exports Gao ID: NSIAD-95-140 May 10, 1995

Lax export controls and unclear jurisdiction at federal agencies may put sensitive stealth technology into the hands of foreign governments, enabling them to build weapons capable of evading detection by U.S. radar systems. Also, under current interagency referral practices, the Defense Department does not review most license applications for stealth technology processed by the Commerce Department. This report (1) determines how control over stealth technology is split between the State Department's U.S. Munitions List and the Commerce Department's Control List, (2) identifies the impact of shared jurisdiction over stealth-related items, and (3) assesses whether current referral procedures enable the Defense Department to review all stealth-related exports. GAO summarized this report in testimony before Congress; see: Export Controls: Issues Concerning Sensitive Stealth-Related Items and Technologies, by David E. Cooper, Director of Acquisition Policy, Technology, and Competitiveness Issues, before the Senate Committee on Armed Services. GAO/T-NSIAD-95-158, May 11, 1995 (13 pages).

GAO found that: (1) stealth technology materials fall under the jurisdiction of both USML and CCL; (2) Commerce believes that stealth-related commodities should be placed on USML to avoid confusion and possible seizure by the Customs Service; (3) the unclear jurisdiction over stealth technology may lead to the inappropriate export of militarily-sensitive stealth materials and technology; (4) the less restrictive export controls governing CCL commodities give exporters an incentive to apply for CCL export licenses for USML-covered material; (5) Commerce can deny CCL export licenses only under limited circumstances or for certain destinations, while State has broader authority to deny applications that are against national interests; and (6) the United States cannot ensure that export licenses for stealth-related technology are properly reviewed and controlled because Commerce does not refer all stealth technology export applications to DOD or State for review.

Recommendations

Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.

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