Overseas Presence

More Data and Analysis Needed to Determine Whether Cost-Effective Alternatives Exist Gao ID: NSIAD-97-133 June 3, 1997

Since the end of the Cold War, U.S. military strategy has stressed the need to provide a credible overseas presence in peacetime to deter aggression and advance U.S. interests. On any given day, more than 200,000 military personnel are stationed worldwide. Overseas presence is an important aspect of the national military strategy, and the Defense Department spends billions of dollars to maintain that presence. This report discusses (1) changes in DOD's approaches to providing overseas presence since the end of the Cold War, (2) funding used to provide an overseas presence, (3) the importance that regional Commanders in Chief assign to national security objectives and presence approaches, and (4) DOD's process for determining requirements for overseas presence and assessing alternatives for meeting them.

GAO noted that: (1) in response to changes in the security environment since the end of the Cold War, U.S. presence has changed significantly in different regions of the world; (2) for example, as a result of force reductions since 1988, fewer military forces are located overseas to provide presence; (3) also, because of these overseas force reductions and the changing security environment, DOD has restructured land-based prepositioned equipment and is maintaining more prepositioned equipment afloat; (4) the funding for presence approaches can be significant and varies widely by approach, ranging from millions to billions of dollars; (5) DOD requires the largest amount of funds to maintain the forces that provide presence; (6) officials from regional commands view all national security objectives and presence approaches to be important, but differ on their relative importance; (7) U.S. Atlantic Command and U.S. Central Command officials view initial crises response and deterrence as the most important objectives, while U.S. European Command officials cite deterrence; (8) U.S. Pacific Command officials believe all four objectives are equally important; (9) U.S. Southern Command officials cite reassurance and influence as the most important objectives; (10) these officials also differ on the approaches they consider most important to meeting these objectives; (11) some prefer using various types of forces, while others preferred military interaction activities; (12) in prioritizing objectives and approaches, command officials considered a number of factors, including the threats and the availability of forward-based U.S. forces in their respective region; (13) DOD does not have a specific process for determining Commander in Chief (CINC) presence requirements; (14) most of the forces used to provide an overseas presence are also needed to meet warfighting needs, diplomatic commitments, and other purposes; (15) DOD generally allocates forces to the CINCs based on these requirements, rather than on presence; (16) currently, DOD does not compile comprehensive information on all CINC presence approaches nor does it completely analyze the effectiveness of these approaches or whether more cost-effective alternatives might exist; and (17) DOD and CINC efforts to develop planning processes related to presence, if expanded, would provide an opportunity for DOD to better assess presence requirements and approaches.

Recommendations

Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.

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