Nuclear Nonproliferation and Safety

The United States and Russia have accumulated huge stockpiles of plutonium, a key ingredient in the production of nuclear weapons. Disposing of excess plutonium from both countries' stockpiles, thereby precluding its reuse in nuclear weapons, is a major policy initiative of the Clinton Administration. The Energy Department's (DOE) disposition program seeks to decrease the risk of nuclear proliferation by reducing U.S. plutonium stockpiles by half--to about 50 metric tons over the next 25 years--and by influencing Russia to take reciprocal actions. However, Russia has yet to formally commit, along with the United States, to a program to reduce its plutonium stockpile. Moreover, it is unclear whether Russia agrees with the U.S. objective of reducing both countries' stockpiles to equivalent levels or whether Russia is willing to make the financial commitment to such a disposition program--which could cost up to $2 billion over the next 25 years. Because it is uncertain when such an agreement will be signed, Congress may wish to link DOE's future requests for program funding to assurances that Russia will take binding reciprocal actions.

GAO noted that: (1) DOE's plutonium disposition program seeks to decrease the risk of nuclear proliferation by reducing U.S. plutonium stockpiles by about half over the next 25 years and by influencing Russia to take reciprocal actions, with the goal of reducing Russia's stockpiles to U.S. levels; (2) achieving these mutual reductions is a challenge because DOE's immobilization and mixed oxide fuel technologies have not yet been demonstrated on an industrial scale in the United States, and licensing, regulatory, and environmental issues will need to be addressed for both options; (3) the Russian plutonium stockpile is estimated to be about twice as large as the U.S. stockpile, and Russia may not have the financial resources to implement its program in a time frame comparable to that of the United States; (4) according to some U.S. executive branch officials, the success of the U.S. plutonium disposition program depends on Russia's implementing a similar program because a U.S.-only program could be seen as putting the United States at a strategic disadvantage and would not be supported by Congress or the international community; (5) executive branch officials told GAO that a plutonium disposition agreement between the United States and Russia should be negotiated before large-scale expenditures are made for U.S. plutonium disposition facilities; (6) no formal negotiations have begun to implement such an agreement; (7) DOE's preliminary estimates indicate that implementing the U.S. disposition program, which focuses on two technologies to convert plutonium to safer, more proliferant-resistant forms, could cost approximately $2.2 billion over the next 25 years; (8) the cost for a similar program in Russia could range between $1 billion and $2 billion, according to DOE's estimates; (9) U.S. assistance to Russia's program is expected to total between $40 million and $80 million over the next 5 to 7 years and includes plans to construct a pilot-scale plutonium conversion facility; (10) differing views exist about the potential nuclear nonproliferation impacts of DOE's plutonium disposition program and include: (a) a contention that DOE's consideration of burning plutonium in commercial nuclear reactors may pave the way for plutonium recycling and reverse a long-standing policy; and (b) a concern that an industry for mixed oxide fuel would be created in Russia that would increase opportunities for diversion and theft of nuclear materials; and (11) Department of State officials state that these and other issues will have to be addressed in a future binding agreement with Russia.

Recommendations

Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.

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