Export Controls
National Security Risks and Revisions to Controls on Computer Systems Gao ID: T-NSIAD-00-139 March 23, 2000U.S. policy on the export of sensitive technology, including computers, is to strike a balance between the desire to promote American exports and the need to protect U.S. national security interests. The United States has long controlled the export of high performance computers, which have both civilian and military uses, to sensitive destinations, such as Russia and China. This testimony draws on recent GAO work on export controls for high performance computers. (See GAO/NSIAD-98-196, Sept. 1998, and GAO/NSIAD-00-45, Nov. 1999.) GAO (1) assesses the national security risks associated with high performance computers being exported to countries of concern and (2) determines when the export of computers at existing performance levels can no longer be controlled.
GAO noted that: (1) the executive branch has not yet clearly articulated the specific national security interests to be protected in controlling the export of computers at various performance levels, nor has it stated how countries of military concern could benefit from using such computers; (2) without a clear statement of these interests, it is unclear how the executive branch determines what are militarily critical applications that may affect U.S. national security; (3) in addition, the executive branch has revised export controls on computers because it believes that these machines, at the previously approved levels, had become so widely available in the market that their export is uncontrollable; and (4) however, GAO could not assess the justification for the July 1999 export control levels because the terms "widely available" and "uncontrollable" used to explain the policy change are not clearly defined and are not found in law or regulation.