Foreign Assistance

In April 1999, after North Korea agreed on U.S. inspection rights for a suspected underground nuclear facility, the United States, North Korea, and a consortium of U.S. private voluntary groups agreed to the first U.S. government-supported bilateral assistance project in North Korea. The project consisted of two parts under Consortium implementation and monitoring: The Consortium would provide seed potatoes to North Korean farmers for two plantings to increase potato production; and the United States would provide 100,000 metric tons of emergency food aid to laborers participating in food-for-work projects. However, the project had mixed results. The Consortium estimates that about 3,000 metric tons of mainly poor potatoes were produced during the first harvest instead of a possible 8,400 tons to 12,600 tons. The poor condition resulted from various problems including less-than-ideal planting locations directed by the North Korean government. The Consortium did not collaborate on the second planting because the North Korean government wanted potato propagation technology instead of seed potatoes. Because of the Consortium's incomplete monitoring, it could not verify North Korean claims that one-third of American potatoes were damaged on arrival and were then destroyed or fed to animals. Conversely, Consortium personnel and U.S. officials believe that the food-for-work part improved North Korean perceptions of the United States. The Consortium estimates that the food supported work on 176 projects and was distributed to nearly 2.4 million North Koreans, with at least half going to the most needy provinces. However, key problems, such as disagreement over how the food should be used, undermined affected food aid distribution and the Consortium's monitoring efforts.

GAO noted that: (1) the potato component of the bilateral aid project sought to increase North Korean potato production by using 1,000 metric tons of imported Chinese and American seed potatoes to generate as much as several hundred thousand tons of potatoes over two growing seasons (1999 and 2000); (2) the Consortium estimates that only 3,000 metric tons of potatoes were produced during the first harvest and that most of these were in poor condition; (3) the project produced substantially fewer potatoes than expected primarily because the seed potatoes were planted late in the first growing season, unusually bad weather struck close to the harvest time, and the North Korean government directed that the potatoes be planted in areas that were less than ideal; (4) in addition, the Consortium and the Flood Damage Rehabilitation Committee did not collaborate on a second planting because the North Korean government no longer wanted assistance in the form of seed potatoes, but instead sought commercial potato propagation technology from the Consortium; (5) the food-for-work program sought to provide 100,000 metric tons of U.S. government-donated food to North Koreans in return for their work on agricultural and other infrastructure projects to benefit their communities, including the seed potato assistance project; (6) the Consortium estimates that the food was distributed to nearly 2.7 million persons in 107 of 211 North Korean counties and met a goal of providing at least 50 percent of the food to northeast provinces, which were considered the most in need of food; (7) key problems that negatively affected the distribution of the food aid were shipping and visa delays and disagreement between the Consortium and the Food Damage Rehabilitation Committee over how the food should be used; (8) as a result of these problems, and in an effort to ensure accountability, the Consortium found it necessary to redirect shipments of commodities to the United Nations World Food Program in North Korea; (9) the Agency for International Development (AID) later arranged to temporarily store subsequent commodities in South Korea, where they were stored until the Consortium and Flood Damage Rehabilitation Committee agreed on food distribution plans; (10) U.S. officials said they have no plans for providing additional bilateral emergency assistance to North Korea; and (11) according to Department of State officials, if North Korea were to take actions that resulted in its being removed from its terrorist list, the provision of bilateral development assistance would nevertheless remain certain.

Recommendations

Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.

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