Border Security
Implications of Eliminating the Visa Waiver Program Gao ID: GAO-03-38 November 22, 2002Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. Congress, the administration, law enforcement officials, and the public have questioned the effectiveness of U.S. visa programs in protecting national security. Some have voiced concern that terrorists or other criminals may exploit one of these programs--the Visa Waiver Program--to enter the United States. The program enables citizens of 28 participating countries to travel to the United States for tourism or business for 90 days or less without first obtaining a visa. It was created, in part, to promote the effective use of government resources and to facilitate international travel without threatening U.S. security. GAO was asked to review the Visa Waiver Program, including the process for assessing countries' eligibility to participate in the program. GAO was also asked to determine the implications--specifically those affecting national security, foreign relations, tourism, and State Department resources--of eliminating the program. GAO analysts traveled to several visa waiver countries, including Belgium, Italy, Slovenia, Spain, and Uruguay, as well as to Argentina, whose participation in the program was recently revoked.
To ensure that countries participating in the Visa Waiver Program pose a low risk to U.S. national interests, the Departments of Justice and State verify each country's political and economic stability and the security of its passport issuance process. However, laws passed since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, affect the processes for determining eligibility for the program. The new laws expand passport requirements for visa waiver countries and call for a system to monitor visitors' movement into and out of the United States. Whether these requirements will be implemented by the specified deadlines remains uncertain. The implications for U.S. national security of eliminating the Visa Waiver Program are difficult to determine. It is clear, however, that eliminating the program could affect U.S. relations with other countries, U.S. tourism, and State Department resources abroad. Although the Departments of Justice and State generally agreed with our report, Justice was concerned that GAO did not fully take into account its progress in meeting certain requirements. State questioned whether GAO considered the border inspection process when discussing the national security implications of eliminating the Visa Waiver Program.
GAO-03-38, Border Security: Implications of Eliminating the Visa Waiver Program
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Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans
Affairs, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform,
House of Representatives:
November 2002:
BORDER SECURITY:
GAO HIGHLIGHTS:
Highlights of GAO-03-38, a report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on
National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations,
Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives.
BORDER SECURITY
Implications of Eliminating the Visa Waiver Program:
Why GAO did this Study:
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. Congress,
the administration, law enforcement officials, and the public have
questioned the effectiveness of U.S. visa programs in protecting
national security. Some have voiced concern that terrorists or other
criminals may exploit one of these programs”the Visa Waiver Program”to
enter the United States. The program enables citizens of 28
participating
countries to travel to the United States for tourism or business for
90 days or less without first obtaining a visa. It was created, in
part,
to promote the effective use of government resources and to facilitate
international travel without threatening U.S. security. GAO was asked
to
review the Visa Waiver Program, including the process for assessing
countries‘
eligibility to participate in the program. GAO was also asked to
determine
the implications”specifically those affecting national security,
foreign
relations, tourism, and State Department resources”of eliminating the
program.
GAO analysts traveled to several visa waiver countries, including
Belgium,
Italy, Slovenia, Spain, and Uruguay, as well as to Argentina, whose
participation
in the program was recently revoked.
What GAO Found:
To ensure that countries participating in the Visa Waiver Program pose
a low risk
to U.S. national interests, the Departments of Justice and State verify
each
country‘s political and economic stability and the security of its
passport
issuance process. However, laws passed since the terrorist attacks of
September
11, 2001, affect the processes for determining eligibility for the
program.
The new laws expand passport requirements for visa waiver countries
and call
for a system to monitor visitors‘ movement into and out of the United
States.
Whether these requirements will be implemented by the specified
deadlines
remains uncertain. The implications for U.S. national security of
eliminating
the Visa Waiver Program are difficult to determine. It is clear,
however, that
eliminating the program could affect U.S. relations with other
countries, U.S.
tourism, and State Department resources abroad. Although the
Departments of Justice
and State generally agreed with our report, Justice was concerned that
GAO did not
fully take into account its progress in meeting certain requirements.
State
questioned whether GAO considered the border inspection process when
discussing
the national security implications of eliminating the Visa Waiver
Program.
[See PDF for Image]
[End of Figure]
To view the full report, including the scopeand methodology, click on
the
link above. For more information, contact Jess Ford (202) 512-4128 or
fordj@gao.gov
Implications of Eliminating the Visa Waiver Program:
GAO-03-38:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Recent Legislative Requirements Could Affect Countries‘ Participation
in the Visa Waiver Program:
Implications of Eliminating the Visa Waiver Program Are Uncertain:
Eliminating the Program Would Increase the Need for State Department
Resources:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Justice:
GAO Comments:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State:
GAO Comments:
Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements:
GAO Contacts:
Acknowledgments:
Table:
Table 1: Visa Waiver Countries, by Year of Admission and Number of
Arrivals in 2000:
Figures:
Figure 1: Visa Waiver Program Nomination Process:
Figure 2: U.S. Arrivals from Visa Waiver Countries as Share of Total
International Arrivals, 1992-2000:
Figure 3: Estimates of State Department‘s Initial Costs if the Visa
Waiver Program Were Eliminated:
Figure 4: Estimates of State Department‘s Annual Recurring Costs if the
Visa Waiver Program Were Eliminated:
Abbreviations:
DEA: Drug Enforcement Administration:
EU: European Union :
FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation :
INS: Immigration and Naturalization Service :
Letter November 22, 2002:
The Honorable Christopher Shays
Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security,
Veterans Affairs, and International Relations
Committee on Government Reform
House of Representatives:
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. Congress,
the administration, law enforcement officials, and the public have
questioned the effectiveness of U.S. visa programs in protecting
national security. Some have voiced concern that terrorists or other
criminals may exploit one of these programs--the Visa Waiver Program--
to enter the United States.
The Visa Waiver Program, established in 1986, enables citizens of 28
participating countries to travel to the United States for tourism or
business for 90 days or less without first obtaining a visa from U.S.
embassies and consulates abroad.[Footnote 1] Persons traveling to the
United States under the program must have a valid passport issued by
the participating country and be a citizen of that country. According
to the program‘s legislative history, Congress created the program, in
part, to promote the effective use of government resources and to
facilitate international travel without threatening U.S. security.
Immigration and Naturalization Service data show more than 16 million
admissions into the United States under the Visa Waiver Program for
each of the past 3 years.
To assist in the subcommittee‘s oversight of U.S. visa policies and
practices, you asked us to review the Visa Waiver Program. In this
report we describe (1) the process that the Departments of Justice and
State established to assess countries‘ eligibility to participate in
the program, including the implications of changes in the law since
September 11, 2001, that affect the process and (2) the major
implications of eliminating the program, specifically implications
affecting national security, foreign relations, tourism, and State
Department resources. You also asked us to assess how the visa process
operated prior to September 11, 2001, and what changes have occurred
since then to strengthen the process as a screen against terrorists.
That assessment is contained in our report Border Security: Visa
Process Should Be Strengthened as an Antiterrorism Tool.[Footnote 2]
To describe the process for assessing countries‘ eligibility to
participate in the Visa Waiver Program, we examined laws establishing
the program, relevant congressional reports, regulations and agency
protocols governing the program, Department of Justice Office of
Inspector General reports, and other relevant documents. To assess the
implications of eliminating the program as regards U.S. national
security and U.S. foreign relations, we visited U.S. embassies in
Argentina, Belgium, Italy, Slovenia, Spain, and Uruguay, and we met
with officials of the Departments of State and Justice, including the
Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI). We selected five of these countries because they
were the first countries whose participation in the program was being
evaluated by the Departments of Justice and State. We selected the
sixth country, Spain, to provide a perspective on countries that had
not been evaluated. To assess the economic importance and implications
of international tourism, we reviewed official travel data for 1991-
2001 and a 2002 report commissioned by the Department of Commerce. To
estimate the costs that the Department of State would incur if the Visa
Waiver Program were eliminated, we developed a model using Department
of State workload and staffing data and information on
biometrics.[Footnote 3] (See app. I for a more detailed description of
our scope and methodology.):
The President has proposed and the Congress has passed legislation to
establish a Department of Homeland Security and has called for visa
policy-making authority to be transferred to this new department, while
the administration of visas is retained by the Department of State.
Some of the issues addressed in this report may become the
responsibility of the new department.
Results in Brief:
The Departments of Justice and State have established processes for
determining, on the basis of the Visa Waiver Program‘s statutory
criteria, whether a country is eligible to participate in the program.
These processes are intended to ensure that countries meet certain
criteria for nomination for, and continued participation in, the
program. These criteria include a low refusal rate for a country‘s
citizens who apply for U.S. nonimmigrant visitor visas. In assessing a
country, the Departments of Justice and State also look at its
political and economic stability and the security of its process for
issuing passports. The Immigration and Naturalization Service recently
assessed five countries and submitted its reports to the Attorney
General, who will decide whether the countries will continue to
participate in the program. The Attorney General can immediately
terminate a country‘s participation in the program if an emergency
occurs that threatens U.S. interests. The Attorney General removed
Argentina from the program in February 2002 because of concerns that
the economic crisis in that country could lead to increased illegal
immigration into the United States. Laws passed since the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001, affect a country‘s qualifications for
participating in the Visa Waiver Program; for example, one of the new
laws requires participating countries to issue passports that contain
biometric identifiers, such as fingerprints. However, it is unclear
whether these requirements will be fully implemented by the deadlines
called for in the law.
The implications for U.S. national security of eliminating the Visa
Waiver Program are difficult to determine, but eliminating the program
could affect U.S. relations with other countries, U.S. tourism, and
State Department resources abroad. The U.S. government has not
systematically collected data on how frequently potential terrorists
and other criminals have entered the United States under the program.
Anecdotal information indicates that such persons have entered the
United States under the Visa Waiver Program as well as with valid U.S.
visas. As a result, U.S. government officials expressed different
opinions about the effect of the program on U.S. national security.
They agreed that the visa screening process could serve as an
additional tool to screen out terrorists but only to the extent that
State had the necessary overseas resources, including relevant timely
information on potential terrorists and sufficient staff and facilities
to interview all or most visa applicants. They said that if current
visa waiver travelers were required to apply for visas and State‘s
current resource levels were not increased, consular officers would be
inundated with paperwork for routine and low-risk cases and would
become less effective and alert in dealing with cases needing
additional scrutiny. The decision to eliminate the program could
negatively affect U.S. relations with participating countries, could
discourage some business and tourism in the United States, and would
increase the need for State Department resources. For example, if the
program were eliminated, we estimated that the department‘s initial
costs to process the additional workload would likely range between
$739 million and $1.28 billion and that annual recurring costs would
likely range between $522 million and $810 million. It could take 2 to
4 years or longer to put the necessary people and facilities in place
to handle the increased workload, according to State officials.
The Justice and State Departments provided written comments on a draft
of this report. The Justice Department expressed concern that we had
underestimated its ability to meet certain requirements of recent
border security laws. For example, it does not anticipate significant
delays in the incorporation of standardized, machine-verifiable
biometrics in the national passports of Visa Waiver Program countries.
However, information from the State Department as of October 2002 shows
that only three Visa Waiver Program countries stated that they would
have a biometrics passport program by October 2004. Therefore, we
remain concerned that the requirements will not be implemented in the
time frame that the law defines. The State Department wrote that in
general it agreed with our findings. However, it raised some concerns
about whether we had considered the U.S. border inspection process when
discussing the implications of eliminating the Visa Waiver Program on
U.S. national security. We acknowledge the importance of the inspection
process for aliens seeking to enter the United States under the Visa
Waiver Program as well as with visas. We have added a discussion of the
inspection process to the report. In addition, both we and the Justice
Department Inspector General have work under way that will provide a
more thorough assessment of the border inspection process.
Background:
According to the program‘s legislative history,[Footnote 4] the Visa
Waiver Pilot Program was created, in part, to improve U.S. foreign
relations and to promote effective use of State Department‘s resources.
It was also intended to facilitate international travel, without posing
a threat to the welfare or security of the United States, and thereby
to increase the number of foreign travelers to the United States. In
addition, according to a statement by President Clinton,[Footnote 5]
the program allowed the State Department to reallocate scarce
department resources from the issuing of visas in low-risk countries to
higher priority needs such as visa screening in high-fraud areas. The
law that created the Visa Waiver Pilot Program required that before
implementing the program, the Attorney General establish an automated
arrival and departure tracking system (see page 15 for a discussion of
this system). The law also required that the Attorney General produce a
special arrival and departure form for travelers seeking to enter the
United States under the program, which was made permanent in 2000.
Persons traveling to the United States under the Visa Waiver Program
must:
* have a valid passport issued by the participating country and be a
national of that country;
* be seeking entry for 90 days or less as a temporary visitor;
* have their identity checked at the U.S. port of entry against an
automated electronic database containing information about the
inadmissibility of aliens, to uncover any grounds on which the alien
may be inadmissible to the United States, with no such ground found;
* have been determined by the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) at the U.S. port of entry to represent no threat to the welfare,
health, safety, or security of the United States;
* have complied with conditions of any previous admission under the
program (e.g., stayed in the United States for 90 days or less);
* if entering by air or sea, possess a round-trip transportation ticket
issued by a carrier that has signed an agreement with the U.S.
government to participate in the program and must have arrived in the
United States aboard such a carrier; and:
* if entering by land, have proof of financial solvency and a domicile
abroad to which he or she intends to return.
In addition, the applicant must present a completed and signed visa
waiver arrival and departure form on which he or she waives the right
to a hearing, other than on the basis of an application for asylum, if
INS denies the applicant entry into the United States. All foreign
visitors, whether they have visas[Footnote 6] or are seeking to enter
the United States under the Visa Waiver Program, undergo inspections
conducted by INS inspectors at U.S. airports and seaports. These
inspections are intended to ensure that only admissible persons enter
the United States. The INS inspectors observe the applicant, examine
his or her passport, and check his or her name against an automated
database that contains information regarding the admissibility of
aliens.
Table 1 lists the visa waiver countries, the year each country entered
the program, and the numbers of arrivals to the United States under the
program in 2000.
Table 1: Visa Waiver Countries, by Year of Admission and Number of
Arrivals in 2000:
Country: Japan; Year of admission: 1988; [Empty]; Number of arrivals:
5,061,377.
Country: United Kingdom; Year of admission: 1988; [Empty]; Number of
arrivals: 4,703,008.
Country: France; Year of admission: 1989; [Empty]; Number of arrivals:
1,087,087.
Country: Germany; Year of admission: 1989; [Empty]; Number of arrivals:
1,786,045.
Country: Italy; Year of admission: 1989; [Empty]; Number of arrivals:
612,357.
Country: Netherlands; Year of admission: 1989; [Empty]; Number of
arrivals: 553,297.
Country: Sweden; Year of admission: 1989; [Empty]; Number of arrivals:
321,881.
Country: Switzerland; Year of admission: 1989; [Empty]; Number of
arrivals: 395,031.
Country: Andorra; Year of admission: 1991; [Empty]; Number of arrivals:
1,235.
Country: Austria; Year of admission: 1991; [Empty]; Number of arrivals:
175,533.
Country: Belgium; Year of admission: 1991; [Empty]; Number of arrivals:
249,957.
Country: Denmark; Year of admission: 1991; [Empty]; Number of arrivals:
149,211.
Country: Finland; Year of admission: 1991; [Empty]; Number of arrivals:
93,649.
Country: Iceland; Year of admission: 1991; [Empty]; Number of arrivals:
27,682.
Country: Liechtenstein; Year of admission: 1991; [Empty]; Number of
arrivals: 2,011.
Country: Luxembourg; Year of admission: 1991; [Empty]; Number of
arrivals: 16,385.
Country: Monaco; Year of admission: 1991; [Empty]; Number of arrivals:
5,622.
Country: New Zealand; Year of admission: 1991; [Empty]; Number of
arrivals: 172,012.
Country: Norway; Year of admission: 1991; [Empty]; Number of arrivals:
147,540.
Country: San Marino; Year of admission: 1991; [Empty]; Number of
arrivals: 0.
Country: Spain; Year of admission: 1991; [Empty]; Number of arrivals:
361,177.
Country: Brunei; Year of admission: 1993; [Empty]; Number of arrivals:
1,230.
Country: Ireland; Year of admission: 1995; [Empty]; Number of arrivals:
285,697.
Country: Argentina[A]; Year of admission: 1996; [Empty]; Number of
arrivals: 533,936.
Country: Australia; Year of admission: 1996; [Empty]; Number of
arrivals: 539,559.
Country: Slovenia; Year of admission: 1997; [Empty]; Number of
arrivals: 14,886.
Country: Portugal; Year of admission: 1999; [Empty]; Number of
arrivals: 86,333.
Country: Singapore; Year of admission: 1999; [Empty]; Number of
arrivals: 136,439.
Country: Uruguay; Year of admission: 1999; [Empty]; Number of arrivals:
69,607.
Country: Total; Year of admission: [Empty]; [Empty]; Number of
arrivals: 17,589,784.
[A] The U.S. Attorney General removed Argentina from the program in
February 2002.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce.
[End of table]
Recent Legislative Requirements Could Affect Countries‘ Participation
in the Visa Waiver Program:
The Visa Waiver Program Act includes criteria that a country must
fulfill to be eligible for nomination for, and continued participation
in, the program. Justice and State have established a draft protocol
based on these criteria that spells out the procedures that the
agencies must follow in nominating a country and for assessing
participating countries to ensure that they continue to pose a low risk
to U.S. security. The Attorney General, in consultation with the
Secretary of State, may also immediately terminate a country‘s
participation in the Visa Waiver Program in the event of an emergency
that threatens U.S. law enforcement or security interests. Legislation
enacted after September 11, 2001, added more requirements for countries
to remain eligible to participate in the program, but full, timely
implementation of these requirements is uncertain.
Nomination Process Assesses Countries‘ Eligibility to Join the Program:
To comply with laws intended to ensure that countries‘ participation in
the Visa Waiver Program does not threaten U.S. security and interests,
the Departments of State and Justice have established a draft protocol
that spells out procedures to assess countries‘ eligibility to be
admitted to the program. The procedures are comprehensive and cover a
variety of security concerns, including patterns of passport and visa
fraud, assessments of terrorism within the country, and assessments of
law enforcement practices. An Interagency Working Group comprising
representatives from Justice, including the INS, and from State,
including the Bureau of Consular Affairs, developed the protocol.
Although the protocol is in draft, the agencies have used it to assess
some countries‘ eligibility. (See fig. 1.):
Figure 1: Visa Waiver Program Nomination Process:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
As shown in figure 1, State initiates the process of adding countries
to the program by advising Justice of its intent to nominate a country
for inclusion in the program. State may nominate a country only after
it has determined that the country:
* has a low nonimmigrant visa refusal rate for its citizens who apply
for U.S. nonimmigrant visitor visas (ranging from less than 2 percent
to less than 3 percent depending on the years assessed),
* has the ability to supply machine-readable passports to its citizens
or is in the process of developing such passports,[Footnote 7] and:
* offers visa-free travel for U.S. citizens and nationals.[Footnote 8]
The protocol requires State to provide Justice with information on the
nominated country, including:
* patterns of passport fraud, visa fraud, and visa abuse over the past
5 years;
* assessments of terrorism within or outside the country by the
country‘s nationals; and:
* evaluations of the impact of the country‘s participation on U.S.
national security and law enforcement.
Various Justice components--including the law enforcement agencies (for
example, INS and the FBI), Criminal Division, and Office of
Intelligence Policy and Review--review the nomination, focusing on the
effect that the country‘s inclusion would have on U.S. law enforcement
and national security. If no clearly disqualifying objections are
raised during this review, the Secretary of State submits a formal
written nomination to the Attorney General. After a country‘s formal
nomination, INS leads a team of representatives from interested
agencies to visit the nominated country. The team reviews the
country‘s:
* political, social, and economic conditions;
* security over its passport and national identity documents;
* border controls; and:
* immigration and nationality laws, law enforcement policies and
practices, and other matters relevant to law enforcement, immigration,
and national security.
On the basis of the review and site visit, the Interagency Working
Group submits a recommendation to the Attorney General, who, in
consultation with the Secretary of State, then decides whether to admit
the country to the program.
Evaluation Process Assesses Country‘s Continued Participation:
The protocol includes an evaluation process, similar to the nomination
process, for periodically assessing the effect on U.S. law enforcement
and security interests of each country‘s continued participation in the
Visa Waiver Program.[Footnote 9] INS is primarily responsible for these
evaluations. It obtains information from a number of other agencies,
including State and intelligence agencies, and other components of
Justice. These evaluations assess the status of factors reviewed during
the nomination process, including:
* whether the rate at which visa waiver applicants are refused entry at
U.S. ports of entry exceeds specific numerical targets;
* demographic, economic, political, and social trends in the program
countries;
* the security of the country‘s procedures for issuing passports; and:
* legal issues, including how foreign nationals acquire citizenship,
law enforcement considerations, national security (including
information on terrorism), and other matters.
The areas evaluated involve more qualitative than quantitative
assessments. For example, INS examines the security of processes for
issuing passports but uses no quantitative criteria in assessing the
process. However, the protocol does allow the Attorney General, in
determining a country‘s risk level, to consider quantifiable data. Such
data may include comparisons between the denial rates of persons
presenting passports purported to have been lawfully issued by a
particular visa waiver country and the denial rates of individuals
traveling from the same country with nonimmigrant visas.
INS has completed the assessments of five countries: Argentina,
Belgium, Italy, Portugal, and Slovenia. The assessment of Uruguay is
still pending. INS selected the countries for assessment on the basis
of specific security concerns. For example, INS selected Argentina
because of the economic crisis and political instability in the
country; the Attorney General subsequently removed Argentina from the
program because of those problems. INS selected Belgium because of
repeated thefts of blank Belgian passports. INS accelerated the
scheduling of the evaluations after the terrorist attacks on September
11, 2001. However, although INS completed the field visits to the
countries in December 2001, it did not send the finalized reports with
recommendations to Justice until September 2002. The next step in the
evaluation process is for the Attorney General, in consultation with
the Secretary of State, to decide whether each country should remain in
the program or its participation should be terminated.
Attorney General May Immediately Terminate a Country‘s Participation:
The Attorney General, in consultation with the Secretary of State, may
also immediately terminate a country‘s participation in the Visa Waiver
Program in the event of an emergency that threatens U.S. law
enforcement or security interests. The law defines emergencies as:
* the overthrow of a democratically elected government;
* war (including undeclared war, civil war, or other military activity)
in the program country;
* a severe breakdown in law and order affecting a significant portion
of the program country‘s territory;
* a severe economic collapse in the program country; or:
* any other extraordinary event in the program country that threatens
the law enforcement or security interests of the United States.
On February 20, 2002, the Attorney General used this emergency
provision to remove Argentina from the Visa Waiver Program because of
the country‘s economic crisis, which had raised concerns that the
number of Argentines illegally immigrating to the United States would
increase. INS had reported an increase in the number of Argentine
nationals attempting to remain illegally in the United States after
their 90-day period of admission had expired.
Recent Laws Affect Process for Assessing Eligibility, but Full, Timely
Implementation Uncertain:
Laws passed since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, affect
the process for determining countries‘ eligibility to participate in
the Visa Waiver Program. These laws cover passport requirements for
visa waiver countries and reemphasize the requirement for the Attorney
General to establish a system to monitor peoples‘ entry into and exit
from the United States. However, it is unclear whether Justice and
State will fully implement these requirements by the deadlines called
for under U.S. law.
First, regarding passports, the October 2001 USA PATRIOT Act advanced
to October 1, 2003,[Footnote 10] the deadline for the requirement that
travelers from participating countries wishing to enter the United
States under the Visa Waiver Program must submit a machine-readable
passport.[Footnote 11] Subsequently, the May 2002 Enhanced Border
Security Act stated that to remain in the program, a visa waiver
country must certify, by October 26, 2004, that it has a program to
issue tamper-resistant, machine-readable passports that contain
biometric and document authentication identifiers. With the exception
of Switzerland and San Marino,[Footnote 12] all participating countries
are issuing machine-readable passports, but none issue passports that
have biometric identifiers, according to State. Some State and law
enforcement officials in Europe and the United States questioned
whether countries participating in the Visa Waiver Program would be
able to certify by October 2004 that they can issue passports with
acceptable biometric identifiers--particularly since there is not yet
an international standard for biometric identifiers. The Act required
that the biometric identifiers comply with standards established by the
International Civil Aviation Organization. Representatives of several
countries, including the United States, Visa Waiver Program
participating countries, and members of the European Union (EU), have
met to work toward developing recommendations on minimum standards for
the application of biometrics in procedures and documents by the spring
of 2003. However, responding to a State inquiry to visa waiver
countries about their plans to issue passports with biometric
identifiers, only 3 of 17 countries had said as of October 2002 that
they would meet the deadline. State plans to incorporate this
information into a report to the Congress on the status of countries‘
efforts to include biometric identifiers in their passports. State
officials also told us that in response to the U.S. requirement,
European countries might require U.S. passports to have biometric
identifiers. For the system to be effective in increasing U.S. national
security, INS will need to install machines capable of reading the
biometric identifiers at each U.S. port of entry, of which there are
about 390. However, until countries decide which biometrics they will
include in their passport, INS may have a difficult time ensuring that
all ports will have machines that can read the various biometric
identifiers by October 2004.
Additionally, the Enhanced Border Security Act conditioned
participation in the Visa Waiver Program on a country‘s timely
reporting of its stolen blank passports to the United States. INS has
described problems with countries‘ timely reporting of stolen blank
passports, and the Justice Inspector General concluded that INS does
not have a mechanism to provide systematic, consistent, and timely
information about missing passports to its inspectors.[Footnote 13] A
State official testified that although this requirement probably will
not apply to countries until they are certified for:
continued participation in the program, State is discussing this
requirement with all countries.[Footnote 14]
Finally, INS has not yet developed an automated nonimmigrant entry-exit
control system to screen and monitor the arrival and departure of
foreign visitors entering the United States as temporary visitors.
Congress has passed several laws requiring the Attorney General to
implement such a system and has extended the implementation deadline
several times. For example, the 1986 law creating the Visa Waiver Pilot
Program required, as a condition of implementing the program, that an
automated nonimmigrant entry-exit control system to monitor aliens
using the program be established.[Footnote 15] The Visa Waiver
Permanent Program Act reiterated the requirement, directing that the
system be implemented no later than 2001.[Footnote 16] INS decided to
use an existing automated border inspections system in conjunction with
its arrival-departure system to meet this requirement. The arrival-
departure system includes passenger information electronically
transmitted by air and sea carriers that have an agreement with INS to
transport aliens to the United States. INS began using this system on
October 1, 2002. An INS official recently testified that this new
initiative implements the requirements that had been set forth in the
Visa Waiver Permanent Program Act of 2000.[Footnote 17]
Also, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
of 1996 required an entry-exit system that covered all nonimmigrant
visitors, not solely those traveling under the Visa Waiver
Program.[Footnote 18] This act required the Attorney General to develop
an automated entry-exit system within 2 years of the law‘s enactment to
collect a record of departure for every alien departing the United
States and match the record of departure with the record of the alien‘s
arrival in the United States. Subsequently, Congress extended the
deadline to implement the system at all U.S. ports of entry to December
31, 2005. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the
effectiveness of monitoring nonimmigrant visitors came under additional
scrutiny, as authorities considered how to identify and locate
terrorists who might be in the United States. As a result, new laws
have again directed the Attorney General to establish an integrated
entry-exit system.[Footnote 19] INS and other agencies, including the
U.S. Customs Service, State, and the Transportation Security Agency,
are working together to develop the system. According to Justice, INS
has established a multiagency task force to coordinate all activity
associated with the establishment of the entry-exit system. The systems
established as part of the Visa Waiver Program, as well as a system
launched on September 11, 2002, to collect fingerprints and a
photograph from a specific population, are the first step in the
development of the entry-exit system.
Implications of Eliminating the Visa Waiver Program Are Uncertain:
The implications for U.S. national security of eliminating the program
are uncertain; however, eliminating the program could negatively affect
U.S. relations with participating country governments, impede tourism
to the United States, and increase the need for State personnel and
facilities overseas. According to the program‘s legislative history,
Congress established the program, in part, to facilitate travel by
citizens from countries that the Attorney General and Secretary of
State determined to pose low risk to U.S. national security. Data
showing the extent to which the program has been exploited are limited,
and U.S. government officials expressed differing opinions about the
effect of the program on U.S. national security.
Implications for National Security Are Unclear:
The implications for U.S. national security of eliminating the Visa
Waiver Program are not clear. While Justice has not systematically
collected data on how frequently potential terrorists and other
criminals have entered the United States, anecdotal information
indicates that such individuals have entered the United States under
the Visa Waiver Program as well as with valid U.S. visas. State
Department and U.S. law enforcement officials‘ opinions varied on the
effect of the Visa Waiver Program on U.S. national security. Some law
enforcement agency officials said that the Visa Waiver Program
negatively affects U.S. national security and that eliminating the
program and requiring visas from current visa waiver travelers would
increase national security. Other officials from Justice and State
asserted that unless the current visa-screening process is improved,
for example, by increased information sharing among U.S. agencies, the
effect of the program on U.S. national security is not certain.
Limited Data Available to Show Extent to Which the Program Is
Exploited:
Justice has not systematically collected data on the extent to which
terrorists and other criminals have entered the United States under the
Visa Waiver Program or committed crimes while in the country. The FBI
operates a nationwide information system dedicated to serving and
supporting local, state, and federal criminal justice agencies. This
system contains 17 databases with information on, among other things,
stolen articles, foreign fugitives, gangs and terrorist members, and
wanted persons. However, crime statistics collected by the FBI do not
capture the criminals‘ immigration status. Also, the data that INS
collects on aliens it has removed from the United States for committing
crimes include some information on aliens‘ immigration status.
According to INS data, 204 (about 0.3 percent) of the 69,580 criminals
removed from the United States during fiscal year 2002 entered under
the Visa Waiver Program. The Drug Enforcement Agency maintains
information on domestic drug arrests by country that shows the
arrestees‘ country of nationality but not their immigration status.
While Justice has not systematically collected data on how frequently
potential terrorists and other criminals have entered the United
States, anecdotal information indicates that such persons have entered
the United States under the Visa Waiver Program as well as with a valid
U.S. visa. For example, Zacarias Moussaoui, a French national whom the
United States indicted as a co-conspirator in the attacks of September
11, 2001, entered the United States under the Visa Waiver Program, and
the 19 individuals who carried out the attacks entered with valid U.S.
visas.
U.S. law enforcement and State officials in Washington, D.C., and at
posts overseas expressed different opinions about the effect of the
Visa Waiver Program on U.S. national security. Some INS and other law
enforcement agency officials said that the Visa Waiver Program can
facilitate illegal entry into the United States by inadmissible aliens,
including terrorists and other criminals, because under the program
such individuals avoid the screening that consular officers usually
perform on visa applicants abroad. The lack of consular screening makes
the program attractive to inadmissible aliens, according to INS
officials. Aliens traveling to the United States under the Visa Waiver
Program are first screened when INS inspectors interview them for
admission at the U.S. port of entry. These inspectors have little time
to screen each person entering the United States, according to a report
by the Justice Department‘s Office of Inspector General. INS inspectors
reported that terrorists and criminals who were intercepted had
attempted to enter the United States under the Visa Waiver Program--
rather than applying for a U.S. visa abroad--because they believed it
would give them a greater chance of entering the country.[Footnote 20]
Some officials in Washington, D.C., and at the U.S. embassies in
Argentina and Uruguay said that eliminating the Visa Waiver Program
would increase national security, because the visa-screening process is
an additional tool to deter terrorists from entering the United States.
One Justice official stated that the Visa Waiver Program is clearly a
vulnerability and that eliminating the program would increase national
security, but at a high cost in terms of the effect on State resources
and U.S. tourism.
Other law enforcement and State officials in Washington, D.C., and at
the U.S. embassies in Belgium, Italy, and Spain questioned whether
eliminating the Visa Waiver Program and requiring visas would increase
national security. They agreed that the visa-screening process could
serve as an additional tool to screen out terrorists but only to the
extent that State had the necessary overseas resources, including
relevant information on potential terrorists and sufficient staff and
facilities to interview all or most visa applicants. They said that if
current visa waiver travelers were required to apply for visas and
State‘s current resource levels were not increased, consular officers
would be inundated with paperwork for routine and low-risk cases and
would become less effective and alert in dealing with cases needing
additional scrutiny. The officials emphasized that better, timely
information and improved data sharing on inadmissible aliens among U.S.
law enforcement, border control, and intelligence agencies are
essential to improving U.S. national security.
Eliminating the Program Could Affect U.S. Relations with Participating
Country Governments:
U.S. officials, including those from State as well as from some law
enforcement agencies, said that eliminating the Visa Waiver Program
could have negative implications for U.S. relations with governments of
participating countries and could impair their cooperation in efforts
to combat terrorism.
Some allies are cooperating significantly in matters ranging from
providing military personnel and access to air bases to support
Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan to freezing terrorists‘
financial assets. Examples are as follows:
* Visa waiver countries have provided political and military support to
Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and to the International
Security Assistance Force, which is to help the new Afghan Interim
Authority provide security and stability in Kabul. The United Kingdom,
France, Italy, Germany, Australia, Japan, and other visa waiver
countries partnered with the United States in military operations to
expel the Taliban and al Qaeda from Afghanistan, according to
government reports.[Footnote 21]
* EU member states vigorously supported U.S. efforts in the United
Nations to adopt strong resolutions against terrorism and U.S. efforts
to persuade third countries to resist terrorism.[Footnote 22]
* Visa waiver countries have also increased their law enforcement
efforts. The EU strengthened member states‘ ability to take action
against terrorists and their supporters--including freezing their
assets.[Footnote 23] The EU reported that between September 11, 2001,
and June 3, 2002, about $100 million of assets belonging to persons and
entities sponsoring terrorist
actions was frozen throughout the EU.[Footnote 24] Since September 11,
2001, authorities in Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the
United Kingdom have arrested supporters of al Qaeda and other extremist
groups. Also, according to State, Italian authorities arrested the
leader of the group suspected of plotting to bomb the U.S. embassy in
Rome. The government of Singapore detained 13 members of a terrorist
group in December 2001, thereby disrupting a plot to bomb the U.S.
embassy there.
Some U.S. embassy and law enforcement agency officials expressed
concern that eliminating the Visa Waiver Program could lessen
countries‘ cooperation in military and law enforcement operations
related to the global coalition against terrorism. Participating
countries may see their loss of visa waiver status as a sign that the
United States views them as untrustworthy--more as security risks than
as allies.
If the United States decides to eliminate visa waiver status for
participating countries, those countries‘ governments could begin
requiring Americans to obtain visas before visiting their countries.
For example, if the United States requires a national from an EU member
country to obtain a visa before entering the United States for 90 days
or less, the EU may institute a provisional requirement that U.S.
citizens obtain a visa before entering any of the EU member
countries.[Footnote 25] Thereafter, if the U.S. visa policy continues,
the EU Council may amend regulations to make the visa requirement
permanent.
Eliminating the Program Could Affect U.S. Tourism:
As previously mentioned, Congress created the Visa Waiver Program, in
part, to facilitate international travel and thereby increase the
number of foreign travelers to the United States. A large proportion of
international tourists to the United States comes from Visa Waiver
Program countries. From 1991 to 2000, in terms of both the number of
travelers and dollars spent, tourism from visa waiver
countries[Footnote 26] accounted for more than half of the overseas
visitor market. Visa waiver travelers generally spend more than other
international travelers, and their spending helps to balance the U.S.
trade accounts. Because of direct and indirect economic contributions
from visa waiver travel, elimination of the Visa Waiver Program is a
concern for the travel and tourism industry. One study commissioned by
the Department of Commerce in 2002 estimated that discontinuation of
the Visa Waiver Program will cost the U.S. economy more than $28
billion in tourism exports from 2003 to 2007.
Travelers from visa waiver countries to the United States totaled
approximately 17.6 million in 2000 and 14.7 million in 2001, according
to the Commerce Department.[Footnote 27] As a share of total
international arrivals,[Footnote 28] travelers from visa waiver
countries grew from 25 percent in 1992 to 35 percent in 2000 (see fig.
2).[Footnote 29] Excluding arrivals from Canada and Mexico, the share
of overseas arrivals from visa waiver countries has averaged 68 percent
in the last 5 years.
Figure 2: U.S. Arrivals from Visa Waiver Countries as Share of Total
International Arrivals, 1992-2000:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Using data from Commerce and the Travel Industry Association of
America, we calculated that in 2000, travelers from visa waiver
countries spent an estimated $39.6 billion in the United States,
accounting for 57 percent of overseas tourist spending. Average
spending per traveler from visa waiver countries in 2000 was $2,253,
compared with $1,274 per traveler for other international tourists to
the United States. A range of estimates from Commerce, the Travel
Industry Association of America, and the World Travel and Tourism
Council indicate that visa waiver travelers‘ direct and indirect
spending within the United States added between $75 billion and $102
billion to the U.S. gross domestic product in 2000.[Footnote 30]
According to the Travel Industry Association of America, international
tourism provides more than one million U.S. jobs, of which more than 60
percent are located in Florida, California, New York, and Hawaii. The
association also estimates that in 2001, U.S. spending generated from
international tourism contributed $16 billion in tax revenues.
The Department of Commerce commissioned a study in 2002 on the economic
effect of the Visa Waiver Program and estimated that, over a
5-year period, eliminating the program could result in a loss of 3
million visitors, $28 billion in tourism exports, and 475,000
jobs.[Footnote 31] The estimates of this study, together with anecdotal
information, support the likelihood of a negative effect on tourism.
According to the Travel Industry Association of America, the Visa
Waiver Program enhances the competitiveness of the U.S. market as an
international destination and elimination of the program could divert
tourists to other destinations that do not require a visa for entry.
Foreign Commercial Service Officers in Belgium and Spain reported visas
to be a significant impediment to travel demand. State officials agreed
that visas are an impediment to both tourist and business travel and
added that any additional requirements, such as the collection of
biometric indicators, could further discourage travel to the United
States. The World Travel and Tourism Council and the World Tourism
Organization also view visa requirements as an important factor in
determining levels of tourism.
Eliminating the Program Would Increase the Need for State Department
Resources:
Should the Congress decide to require visas from current visa waiver
travelers, State would require more resources, such as personnel and
facilities overseas, to handle the resulting increased visa processing
and biometric collection workload. State estimates that if the
individuals now traveling under the Visa Waiver Program were required
to obtain visas, the number of applications would rise by 14 million.
We estimated that State‘s initial costs to process the additional
workload would likely range between $739 million and $1.28 billion, and
annual recurring costs would likely range between $522 million and $810
million.[Footnote 32] The ranges of our cost estimates are large
because they reflect the uncertainty of key variables in our cost
estimating model, such as costs for consular personnel, space, and:
supplies;[Footnote 33] the percentage of visa applicants that State
interviews; and the method by which State collects biometrics. Given
this uncertainty, actual costs could vary significantly.
To estimate the costs of eliminating the Visa Waiver Program, we
created a cost model that included information on a number of variables
such as workload and staffing data (e.g., personnel and facility costs)
from State‘s Bureau of Consular Affairs and the time and costs involved
in collecting biometrics. We used our model to forecast a range for
both additional initial and recurring costs. Consistent with State
assumptions, we assumed a ’low“ interview rate of 10 percent (about 1.4
million applicants) and a ’high“ interview rate of 95 percent (about
13.3 million applicants). (See app. I for more details of our
methodology and assumptions.):
Figure 3 shows estimated initial costs to State if the Visa Waiver
Program were eliminated. These costs include elements such as hiring,
training, and moving new consular personnel; installing additional
equipment to collect and store biometrics; and building or renovating
facilities in all visa waiver posts.
Figure 3: Estimates of State Department‘s Initial Costs if the Visa
Waiver Program Were Eliminated:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
We estimated that if State were to interview 10 percent of all visa
applicants, initial costs would likely range from $739 million to $821
million. If State were to interview 95 percent of all visa applicants,
initial costs would likely range from $1.12 billion to $1.28 billion.
Figure 4 shows annual recurring costs, which include elements such as
consular personnel salaries, biometric hardware and software
maintenance, facility leasing and maintenance, and supplies.
Figure 4: Estimates of State Department‘s Annual Recurring Costs if the
Visa Waiver Program Were Eliminated:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
If State were to interview 10 percent of all visa applicants, recurring
costs would likely range from $522 million to $587 million. If State
were to interview 95 percent of all visa applicants, recurring costs
would likely range from $723 million to $810 million. For fiscal year
2003, State requested $3.36 billion for ongoing operations related to
diplomatic and consular programs, including the operation of all
overseas facilities.
It could take at least 2 to 4 years to put the necessary people and
facilities in place to handle the increased workload, according to
State officials. Using State‘s staffing and workload assumptions, we
estimated that the department would need, in addition to the
approximately 840 Foreign Service officers who are currently overseas,
more than 350 additional Foreign Service officers to handle the extra
nonimmigrant visa workload if required to interview 10 percent of all
applicants and more than 800 additional officers if required to
interview 95 percent of all applicants. According to consular
officials, hiring Foreign Service officers and training them for
general Foreign Service and languages could take a year or more. It
could take several months to hire Foreign Service nationals, depending
on the availability of qualified candidates and their ability to pass
the security background check. In cases where a significant number of
new consular staff were added and new facilities were acquired, posts
might also need to employ administrative staff such as human resource
managers, post security guards, and additional facilities management
and maintenance staff.[Footnote 34]
A portion of the initial and recurring costs shown in figures 3 and 4
would be used for new or renovated facilities that the post would need
in order to process an increased number of nonimmigrant visa
applications. In some countries, including but not limited to Belgium,
France, Italy, Slovenia, Spain, and the United Kingdom, State would
need additional work and waiting room space to process applications;
this could involve acquiring new facilities or reopening and renovating
additional posts for the nonimmigrant visa workload.[Footnote 35] For
example, in Italy, State officials said that they would need to
renovate or reopen facilities in Naples, Sicily, Rome, Milan, and
Florence. In some U.S. embassies, such as those in Slovenia and
Uruguay, available space would have to be adapted for processing the
additional workload. Identifying, procuring, and fitting out lease
space can take 24 to 48 months, on average, according to State
officials.
State officials in most countries we visited and analysts in Washington
said that until they acquired additional space for handling
nonimmigrant visas, there would be long lines of visa applicants
waiting outside the current posts, posing a potential security threat
for both the applicants and U.S. embassy officials. Also, if additional
space was acquired in unsecured buildings separate from the embassy,
personnel working in such buildings would be put at risk until the
space was upgraded for security. A U.S. ambassador pointed out that
acquiring additional space for visas would conflict with the
department‘s efforts to consolidate Americans into joint space to
improve their security and protect them.
Although revenues from the surcharge for machine-readable visas would
not cover the additional initial costs related to the elimination of
the Visa Waiver Program, State could cover additional recurring costs
over time.[Footnote 36] To pay for the costs associated with the
processing and issuing of machine-readable visas and with State‘s
Border Security Program, State currently charges applicants a $65 fee
each time they apply for a machine-readable visa.[Footnote 37] On
November 1, 2002, State increased the fee to $100 to compensate for
increases in the actual cost of providing visa service. State officials
have not determined how they will fund the costs of collecting
biometrics. The options they have discussed include requesting an
appropriation from the Congress, passing the cost to the visa
applicant, or a combination of the two.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
The Justice Department and the State Department provided written
comments on a draft of our report. These comments, along with our
responses to specific points, are reprinted in appendixes II and III.
Justice expressed optimism that the requirements of recent border
security laws will be met. Specifically, Justice stated that it does
not anticipate significant delays in the incorporation of standardized,
machine-verifiable biometrics in the national passports of most Visa
Waiver Program countries. We continue to believe, however, that some
countries may be unable to add biometrics to their passports by the
2004 deadline. Our assessment is based on the statements of U.S. State
Department and law enforcement officials as well as the responses from
several Visa Waiver Program countries concerning their ability to issue
passports with biometrics.
Justice also stated that our discussion of the entry-exit system leaves
the impression that implementation of the system is not moving forward.
We acknowledge that INS is taking steps to implement the system, and we
have added information on INS‘s progress to the report. However, the
report points also out that an entry-exit system covering all
nonimmigrant travelers to the United States has been required since
1996.
State generally concurred with the report and stated that our comments
on the Visa Waiver Program are in keeping with its assessment of the
implications and costs resulting from a blanket suspension of the
program. However, State expressed concern that the report did not
discuss the border inspection process at the U.S. port of entry as an
alternative solution to the visa application process to address
perceived weaknesses in the program. We acknowledge the importance of
the inspection process for aliens seeking to enter the United States
under the Visa Waiver Program as well as with visas. We have added a
discussion of the inspection process to the report. The Justice
Department Inspector General and GAO have work under way that will
provide a more thorough assessment of the border inspection process.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees, the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the
Commissioner of the INS, and the Assistant to the President for
Homeland Security. We will make copies available to others on request.
In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web
site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-4128. Additional GAO contacts and staff
acknowledgments are listed in appendix IV.
Sincerely yours,
Jess Ford
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
Signed by Jess Ford:
[End of section]
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To describe the process for assessing countries‘ eligibility to
participate in the Visa Waiver Program, we examined laws establishing
the program, relevant congressional reports, regulations and agency
protocols governing the program, Department of Justice Office of
Inspector General reports, and other relevant documents. To assess
steps being taken to increase the requirements for the program and
enhance U.S. border security, we reviewed recent laws such as the USA
PATRIOT Act and the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act
of 2002, Departments of State and Justice reports, and recent GAO
reports.
To describe U.S. national security issues related to the Visa Waiver
Program, we reviewed Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) data
on terrorists who entered the United States under the Visa Waiver
Program as well as with valid visas. We reviewed State, INS, Federal
Bureau of Investigations (FBI), and Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) data
and databases on inadmissible aliens, the immigration status of
criminals, the number of aliens refused entry to the United States, and
the reasons aliens were refused entry. We also examined Justice
officials‘ testimony before Congress, the President‘s National Strategy
for Homeland Security, and GAO‘s report Border Security: Visa Process
Should Be Strengthened as an Antiterrorism Tool. Given the limited
amount of data addressing this issue, we interviewed officials from
State, including the Bureaus of Consular Affairs and Diplomatic
Security, and Justice, including the INS, FBI, and DEA in the United
States and in Argentina, Belgium, Italy, Slovenia, Spain, and Uruguay.
We selected five of these countries because they were the first
countries whose participation in the program was being evaluated by the
Departments of Justice and State. We selected the sixth country, Spain,
to provide a perspective on countries that had not been evaluated. We
discussed with U.S. officials their views about whether eliminating the
Visa Waiver Program would increase U.S. national security.
To describe the importance of the Visa Waiver Program to U.S. relations
with other countries, we reviewed government reports, including the
U.S. Department of Defense‘s Fact Sheet: International Contributions to
the War Against Terrorism, the State Department‘s Patterns of Global
Terrorism--2001, and the U.K. Coalition Information Centre‘s Campaign
Against Terrorism: A Coalition Update. We reviewed European Union
documents, including European Council positions and regulations. We
also interviewed officials from the Departments of State, including the
Bureaus of Consular Affairs and Diplomatic Security, and Justice,
including the INS, FBI, and DEA in the United States and in Argentina,
Belgium, Italy, Slovenia, Spain, and Uruguay. We discussed with them
whether eliminating countries‘ participation in the Visa Waiver Program
could affect U.S. relations with those countries and, if so, what the
effects might be. Because of the sensitivity of the issues, in four of
the six countries, the State Department requested that we not meet with
representatives from other countries‘ governments or chambers of
commerce. We met with the governments of Argentina and Uruguay and with
the American Chamber of Commerce in Argentina.
To determine whether requiring citizens of visa waiver countries to
obtain visas would affect their decision to travel to the United
States, we examined the existing economic literature on tourism and
interviewed industry experts. We interviewed officials from State,
Foreign Commercial Service Officers in overseas posts, the Department
of Commerce‘s Office of Travel and Tourism Industries, the Travel
Industry Association of America, the World Travel and Tourism Council,
and the World Tourism Organization. To determine the contribution of
travel from visa waiver countries to the U.S. economy, we reviewed
official travel data for 1991-2001 from Commerce, a 2002 study from
Commerce, and data from the Travel Industry Association of America and
the World Travel and Tourism Council.
To determine the potential effects that requiring visas and biometrics
from current visa waiver travelers would have on State‘s resources, we
created a cost estimating model using workload and staffing data from
State‘s Bureau of Consular Affairs and information on the time and
costs involved in collecting biometrics. Such information included
analogies to the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification
System, averages of biometric vendor costs, expert opinions from the
field of biometrics, and cost estimates developed by the International
Biometrics Group. We conducted a simulation that varied the cost
estimating model approximately 1,000 times with information on
variables such as personnel and facility costs to forecast a range for
both initial and recurring costs. During our simulation, costs fell
below the top of the shaded areas in Figures 3 and 4 in the report 90
percent of the time, while costs fell below the bottom of the shaded
areas only 10 percent of the time. In other words, 80 percent of the
times we varied our simulation, costs fell within our reported ranges.
We chose to report large ranges of cost estimates to reflect the
uncertainty of key variables in our cost estimating model, such as
costs for consular personnel, space, and supplies; the percentage of
visa applicants that State interviews; and the method by which State
collects:
biometrics.[Footnote 38]We based our estimates on the following
assumptions:
* All costs were expressed in constant fiscal 2002 dollars.
* The amount of additional visa applications for current visa waiver
travelers would remain about 14 million per year.[Footnote 39]
* Cost estimates provided to us by State, such as Foreign Service
national salaries and leasing and maintenance fees, could vary by about
10 percent, barring unforeseen circumstances.
* The ratio of Foreign Service nationals needed to assist each Foreign
Service officer with nonimmigrant visa processing is 2.5 to 1 but can
vary between 2 and 4 to 1.
* Under a ’low interview“ scenario, State would interview 10 percent of
all visa applicants and, under a ’high interview“ scenario, State would
interview 95 percent of all visa applicants. Estimates are based on a
4-minute interview.[Footnote 40]
* Consular officers would capture four flat fingerprints from each visa
applicant at the embassy or consulate and would store the biometric
data in a separate memory storage card from the visa.[Footnote 41]
* Resources would be in place at all visa-issuing posts to collect
biometrics for the current 10.3 million visa applications.
* Some Foreign Service nationals would spend time both processing visa
applications and collecting biometrics.
* Visa applicants whom State must interview would visit the embassy to
be interviewed and have their biometrics collected on the same day.
We also met with consular officials at the U.S. consulate in Buenos
Aires, Argentina, to determine the effect that the elimination of the
Visa Waiver Program had on their staff and facility levels. Similarly,
we met with consular officials in U.S. consulates in Brussels, Belgium;
Rome, Italy; Ljubljana, Slovenia; Madrid, Spain; and Montevideo,
Uruguay, to determine how the elimination of the Visa Waiver Program
would affect their resources.
We performed our work from February 2002 through August 2002, in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Justice:
U.S. Department of Justice:
Washington, D.C 20530:
November 4, 2002:
Cheryl Goodman Assistant Director International Affairs and Trade Team
U.S. General Accounting Office:
441 G Street, NW Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. Goodman:
On October 10, 2002, the General Accounting Office (GAO) provided the
Department of Justice (DOJ) copies of its draft report entitled.
’BORDER SECURITY: Implications of Eliminating the Visa Waiver Program,“
with a request for comment. The DOJ has reviewed the report and would
like to respond to the concerns that the GAO has raised in this report
regarding its ability to meet certain requirements of the law. We
believe there are factors that suggest greater optimism for achieving
these requirements.
The GAO reports that recent legislation has resulted in stricter
requirements for country participation in the Visa Waiver Program (V
WP) including requirements to. 1) improve the tamper resistance of
foreign passports:, and 2) hold partnering governments responsible for
reporting thefts of stolen blank passports to the United States. The
GAO expresses concern regarding the ability of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS), the Department of State, and the
governments of VWP participating countries to implement these
requirements by the specific deadlines called for under U.S. law. The
GAO suggests that the current lack of a single international standard
for biometric identifiers may preclude participating countries from
certifying by October 26, 2004, that they are issuing machine-readable
passports with internationally acceptable biometric identifiers.
However, we note that the current standards for machine-readable
passports endorsed by the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO) already include the use of some form of biometrics. Moreover,
the ICAO technical advisory group on machine-readable travel documents
is substantially involved in ensuring the global interoperability of
different biometric technologies in the issuance and inspection of
machine-readable passports. Further we note that over half the
countries currently participating in the VWP are or will soon be
members of the European Union. These countries have been issuing a
uniform passport meeting ICAO specifications since 1985. Thus, we do not
believe there will be significant delays in the incorporation of
standardized, machine-verifiable biometrics in the national passports
of most VWP participating countries.
Moreover, the Administration has been studying the biometrics issue for
some time. In fact, the United States government is working through the
G-8 to coordinate biometric standards. On:
October 22, 2002, experts from the G-8 countries (Canada, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States)
and the European Union met in Montreal to discuss various issues
related to migration, including biometrics. The U. S. delegation was
tasked with providing a draft report on biometric requirements by
December for review at the next G-8 Migration meeting. The group agreed
to work towards developing recommendations on minimum standards for the
application of biometrics in procedures and documents by the spring of
2003, with a view to forwarding them to standards organizations. In
addition, the Administration is currently drafting a report to Congress
required by Section 303 of the Enhanced Border Security Act of 2002,
Pub. L. 107-173:
(May 14, 2002). This report will address issues related to ’machine-
readable, tamper-resistant visas and other travel and entry documents
that use biometric identifiers.“ Section 303(b)(1) of the Enhanced
Border Security Act of 2002. We would suggest that you include the
above information on the report at page 17.
The GAO report also expresses concern over the INS‘s ability to
implement the automated entry-exit system mandated under section 110 of
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
and subsequently amended. The GAO reports that the Visa Waiver
Permanent Program Act (VWPPA) directs that an automated system to
monitor the entry-exit of aliens under the visa waiver program be
implemented by October 2001 and that this system, has not been
implemented as of October 1, 2002. It should be noted that after the
amendment creating the VWPPA passed on October 30, 2000, the INS began
to use the Interagency Border Inspections System in conjunction with
the Arrival Departure Information System. The paired use of these two
systems allows the Attorney General to fulfill his reporting
requirements under the Act. This automated control system was to be
based, to the maximum extent practicable, on passenger data collected
and electronically transmitted by each carrier that has an agreement
with the INS to transport aliens to the United States. As of October 1,
2002, the system became operational and began receiving arrival and
departure data on all passengers entering and leaving through air and
sea ports of entry, and on October 11, 2002, the INS promulgated an
interim rule to this effect. See 67 FR 63246-63250. Currently, over 140
carriers submit electronic arrival passenger information. Moreover, the
VWPPA also specifies that, as of October 1, 2002, no alien may be
admitted under the VWP if the carrier is not electronically
transmitting passenger manifest data as required by the Attorney
General. On October 1, 2002, the INS began collecting the arrival and
departure data for VWP countries at air and seaports and on October 11,
2002, the INS promulgated an interim rule to this effect-See 67 FR
63246-63250. Currently, inspectors at only 3 ports of entry are able to
annotate the passengers‘ records differentiating the Visa Waiver
passengers from all others. However, the INS expects to make this
necessary feature available nation-wide before the end of November
2002.
Further, the discussion in the report on entry-exit leaves the
impression that this is not moving forward, but for the statement that
’INS and other agencies are working together to develop the system.“
The INS has established a multi-agency Project Management Office to
coordinate all activity associated with the establishment of an Entry-
Exit
program, to include a fully integrated automated system of systems to
be
deployed at over 300 ports of entry, and infrastructure enhancements.
In addition to several components within the INS, the Project Office
has
membership from other Department of Justice components, the United
States
Customs Service, the Department of State‘s Visa and Passport Offices
and
the Department of Transportation. In addition, the INS is working with
the
Department of State and the National Institute of Standards and
Technology to
develop a technology standard that would allow for the use of
biometrics in the Entry-Exit system. The first phase of the program was
launched on September 11, 2002, with the National Security Entry Exit
Registration System (NSEERS). The NSEERS focuses on a specific
population and requires additional information including two live-scan
fingerprints and a photograph. The NSEERS is deployed to all major
airports and land border ports of entry. Both NSEERS and the systems
established as part of the Visa Waiver Permanent Program will be
integrated into the larger Entry-Exit System.
I hope you will consider our concerns in preparing the final GAO report
on this subject. If you have any questions regarding the Department‘s
comments, you may contact Vickie L. Sloan, Director, Audit Liaison
Office, on (202) 514-0469.
Sincerely,
Robert F. Diegelman Acting Assistant Attorney General for
Administration:
Signed by Robert F. Diegelman:
The following are GAO‘s comments on the Department of Justice‘s letter
dated November 4, 2002.
GAO Comments:
1. Justice stated that it does not anticipate significant delays in the
incorporation of standardized, machine-verifiable biometrics in the
national passports of most Visa Waiver Program countries. We believe
that some countries may not be able to establish programs to issue the
passports by the 2004 deadline. Our assessment is based on the
statements of U.S. State Department and law enforcement officials in
Europe and the United States. Moreover, our concern is supported by
additional information that we subsequently obtained from the State
Department. As of October 2002, State found that only 3 of the 17
countries discussing their plans for issuing biometric passports would
meet the deadline. Most of the respondents stated that they did not
know if they would meet the deadline. Some of these respondents cited
the lack of an international standard as a reason for the uncertainty.
2. Justice also commented that our discussion of the entry-exit system
leaves the impression that implementation of the system is not moving
forward. We acknowledge that INS has implemented systems, as of October
1, 2002, to fulfill the requirement for an automated system to monitor
the entry and exit of aliens under the Visa Waiver Program. We have
added this information to the report. However, we note that there have
been delays in implementing the entry-exit system for Visa Waiver
Program travelers. Implementation of such a system has been required
since 1986. However, the report also points out that an entry-exit
system covering all nonimmigrant travelers to the United States has
been required since 1996. Moreover, the Justice Inspector General has
reported that completion of the entire entry-exit system will take
several years.[Footnote 42]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State:
United States Department of State Washington, D. C. 20520:
NOV 7 2002:
Dear Ms. Westin:
We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, ’BORDER
SECURITY: Implications of Eliminating the Visa Waiver Program,“ GAO-03-
38, GAO Job Code 320101.
The Department‘s comments are enclosed for incorporation, along with
this letter, as an appendix to the GAO final report. Please find
technical comments also attached.
If you have any questions regarding this response, please contact
Colombia Barrosse, Office of Executive Director, Bureau of Consular
Affairs on (202) 663-2504.
Sincerely,
Christopher B. Burnham Assistant Secretary of Resource Management and
Chief Financial Officer:
Signed by Christopher B. Burnham:
Enclosure:
As stated.
cc:
GAO/IAT - Mr. Brummet State/OIG - Mr. Berman State/CA - Mr. Moss:
Ms. Susan S. Westin, Managing Director, International Affairs and
Trade,
U.S. General Accounting Office.
Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report:
BORDER SECURITY: Implications of Eliminating the Visa Waiver Program
(GAO-03-38, GAO Code 320101):
The Department appreciates the balanced approach taken by GAO in its
evaluation of how the Visa Waiver Program (VWP) functions, and its
contributions to our economy and to our relations with participating
countries. In general, we find the comments about the VWP to be in
keeping with our own views as well as with our assessment of the
implications and costs resulting from a blanket suspension of the
Program. As the GAO report makes clear, the VWP has been effective in
achieving its original goals - promoting the effective use of scarce
government resources by focusing them away from lower risk countries,
and facilitating international travel between the United States and
countries that grant reciprocal privileges to U.S. travelers. The VWP
has also contributed significantly to the U.S. economy, particularly
the tourism industry. The Department is pleased that the GAO report
also highlights the effectiveness of the VWP‘s formal review mechanisms
in ensuring that individual member countries adhere to membership
criteria in order to remain in the program. The removal of Argentina
from the program in early 2002 is a demonstration of the VWP‘s self-
regulating capacity.
What is still in question, therefore, is whether the VWP can continue
to function ’without unduly threatening national security“,
particularly in the post-9/11 world. It is the exploration of this
issue in the GAO report that raises some concerns for the Department.
The GAO points out, for example, that it is not clear how many
individuals with terrorist or criminal backgrounds have entered the
United States under the Visa Waiver Program. It names Zacarias
Moussaoui as one of those individuals, but does not describe the
circumstances surrounding his port of entry processing prior to
admission into the United States. The report does not explain whether
there was a flaw in the processing of that particular case or a
systemic flaw in the screening of VWP travelers. Thus, the report does
not address whether the INS inspector conducted an interview or,
indeed, whether Moussaoui‘s name was run through the name-check system.
It does not inform the reader that INS:
computers at port of entry contained no derogatory information about
Moussaoui that would have lead the INS inspector to deny him entry. It
does not mention that Moussaoui had been in federal (FBI) custody
undergoing professional interrogation prior to 9/11 and that only after
the attacks did any information linking him to terrorist activities
become available to border security agencies, or, indeed, to the
Department of State.
The report then refers to the visa process but does not provide the
type of detailed information that would permit the reader to adequately
compare the two processes, that is, a process of port-of-entry
inspections each time a person seeks to enter the United States, with
no prior visa issuance (visa waiver), and a process of port-of-entry
inspections each time a person seeks to enter the United States, with a
visa having been issued to the alien some time in the past. (In the case
of a visa waiver country national, the relevant visa would generally be
a multiple entry visa valid for up to ten years.) Given the time lag
between visa issuance and actual travel, it should be clear that the
visa cannot substitute for INS inspection at port of entry, including a
check against the INS lookout system for information about the alien
available at that time. In this regard, it is important for the report
to also make clear that the visa application process does not guarantee
admission into the U.S. The visa application process can only result in
permission to ’apply“ to enter the United States. As with VWP
travelers, the ultimate authority to admit or deny entry rests with the
INS inspector. Visa issuance cannot eliminate the need for a
comprehensive and thorough screening at port of entry, and INS is free
to deny entry to persons who hold valid visas. INS screening (which
also
relies on the law enforcement database for national security
information) of both visa holders and visa waiver program participants
can, and does, result in denial of admission into the U.S. In fact,
since the inception of the VWP, approximately 150 individuals have been
turned away at port of entry on terrorism-related grounds - information
contained in the law-enforcement database. If the report discussed
these separate processes more clearly, the reader would better
understand that whether an individual with terrorist links enters the
United States or not has less to do with the method of entry (with or
without a visa) than with the information contained in the name-check
database at the time of entry.
Thus, while the GAO report is not intended (and does not) provide
formal recommendations regarding the future of the VWP, it cuts off a
line of reasoning for decision-makers by focusing on the visa
application process as the single alternative solution to the Program‘s
perceived weaknesses. It overlooks the possibility that these
weaknesses could be resolved through changes in border inspection
procedures (or by other means, such as pre-inspection programs). It
does not address the possibility that if additional resources are
needed to ensure the VWP meets our national security needs, while
maintaining its economic and political benefits, these resources might
be more appropriately dedicated to port of entry processing of VWP
travelers and/or to other immigration-related homeland security
programs. These alternatives need to be discussed.
The Department stresses the importance it affixes to the protection of
the United States‘ national security. Its comments regarding the future
of the VWP are intended to ensure that a final decision on the Program
is made with all relevant information and all possible alternatives
available
to decision; makers. The Department is most appreciative of GAO‘s
efforts to
bring this information and alternatives to light through this report.
The following are GAO‘s comments on the Department of State‘s letter
dated November 7, 2002.
GAO Comments:
1. State commented that the discussion of Zacarias Moussaoui should
include more details. We do not believe additional details are
necessary. We discussed Moussaoui and the 19 individuals who carried
out the attacks of September 11, 2001, merely as examples of anecdotal
evidence about terrorists entering the United States under the Visa
Waiver Program and with visas.
2. State commented that the draft report did not provide detailed
information on the border inspection process. State also commented that
the draft report overemphasizes the visa application as a solution to
perceived weaknesses of the Visa Waver Program and overlooks the
possibility that these weaknesses could be resolved through changes in
border inspection procedures or other means. We acknowledge the
importance of the inspection process for aliens seeking to enter the
United States under the Visa Waiver Program as well as with visas. We
have added a discussion of the inspection process to the report. The
Justice Department Inspector General and GAO are conducting more
thorough assessments of the border inspection process.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
Cheryl Goodman (202) 512-6571
La Verne Tharpes (202) 512-5961:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the persons named above, Lyric Clark, Kendall Schafer,
Bruce Kutnick, Mary Moutsos, and Reid Lowe made key contributions to
this report.
FOOTNOTES
[1] The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-603)
created the Visa Waiver Program as a pilot in 1986. It became a
permanent program in 2000 under the Visa Waiver Permanent Program Act
(P.L. 106-396, Oct. 30, 2000). The program applies only to temporary
visitors traveling to the United States for business or pleasure for 90
days or less. Persons traveling to the United States for other
purposes, for example, to study or to work, are required to have a
visa.
[2] U.S. General Accounting Office, Border Security: Visa Process
Should Be Strengthened as an Antiterrorism Tool, GAO-03-132NI
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2002).
[3] Biometrics can be used to verify identity by measuring and
analyzing physical characteristics such as fingerprints, irises and
retinas, and facial geometry.
[4] Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Report of the Committee
on the Judiciary, Senate Report No. 99-132 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 28,
1985); Report of House Judiciary Committee, Report No. 99-682(I)
(Washington, D.C.: August 1986).
[5] Statement by the President: Signing of the Visa Waiver Permanent
Program Act (The White House, Oct. 30, 2000).
[6] The visa application process does not guarantee admission into the
United States. Rather, it can result in permission to apply to enter
the United States. The ultimate authority to admit or deny a person
permission to enter the United States rests with the INS inspector.
[7] A machine-readable travel document is one that contains mandatory
visual data and a separate mandatory data summary in a format that can
be read by a machine.
[8] The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 as amended, (P.L.
99-603).
[9] The Visa Waiver Permanent Program Act (P.L. 106-396) required the
evaluations every 5 years. The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry
Reform Act (P.L 107-173, May 14, 2002) increased the frequency of the
evaluations to every 2 years.
[10] See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of
2001 (P.L. 107-56). The Visa Waiver Permanent Program Act originally
stated that on or after October 1, 2007, an alien applying for
admission under the Visa Waiver Program must have a valid machine-
readable passport that satisfies the internationally accepted standard
for machine-readability.
[11] The Secretary of State may waive this requirement if the country
is making a good-faith effort to issue machine-readable passports to
its citizens and has taken appropriate measures to protect against
misuse of its passports that are not machine-readable.
[12] Switzerland and San Marino plan to begin issuing machine-readable
passports in 2003.
[13] U.S. Department of Justice, Follow-up Report on the Visa Waiver
Program (Washington, D.C.: December 2001).
[14] See Statement of Steven Edson, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State for Visas, Oct. 9, 2002.
[15] P.L. 99-603.
[16] P.L. 106-396.
[17] The next step involving electronic manifests will occur on January
1, 2003, when air and sea carriers will be required to transmit
electronic arrival and departure data for all arriving and departing
passengers, including new data elements, which will aid in the
identification of mala fide travelers. See Statement of Michael Cronin,
Assistant Commissioner for Inspections, INS, Oct. 9, 2002.
[18] P.L. 104-208.
[19] The USA PATRIOT Act directed the Attorney General, in consultation
with the Secretary of State, to fully implement such a system as
expeditiously as possible. More recently, the Enhanced Border Security
Act set forth technology standards to be used in the development and
implementation of the system.
[20] U.S. Department of Justice, The Potential for Fraud and INS‘s
Efforts to Reduce the Risks of the Visa Waiver Pilot Program
(Washington, D.C.: March 1999).
[21] See U.S. Department of Defense, Fact Sheet: Coalition
Contributions to the War on Terrorism (Arlington, Virginia: 2002); U.S.
Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism-2001 (Washington,
D.C.: 2002); and U.K. Coalition Information Centre, Campaign Against
Terrorism: A Coalition Update (London, England: 2002).
[22] The 15 member states of the European Union are Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
[23] See European Union Common Positions 2001/930/CFSP (Dec. 27, 2001)
on combating terrorism, 2001/931/CFSP (Dec. 27, 2001) on the
application of specific measures to combat terrorism, and 2002/462/CFSP
(June 17, 2002) updating Common Position 2001/931/CFSP.
[24] See European Union, EU Response to 11 September: European
Commission Action (Brussels, Belgium: June 2002). Also, on May 3, 2002,
the EU and the United States took coordinated actions against the
assets of several terrorist groups and individuals, according to a U.S.
Treasury official. See statement of Jimmy Gurulé, Under Secretary for
Enforcement, U.S. Department of the Treasury, before the Commission on
Security and Cooperation in Europe, May 8, 2002.
[25] Council Regulation (EC) No. 539/2001, Council of the European
Union, Mar. 15, 2001. The United States requires Greek nationals to
obtain visas when visiting the United States for 90 days or less.
However, the EU has not required U.S. citizens to have visas to visit
EU countries, because Greece has not contested or notified the EU of
the requirement, according to a U.S. government official.
[26] Excluding Canada and Mexico.
[27] Not all arrivals from visa waiver countries enter the United
States under the program. According to the Department of Commerce,
however, 97 percent of all international arrivals are for stays of 90
days or less for vacation or business purposes, both of which qualify
under the Visa Waiver Program.
[28] The INS estimated that there were more than 500 million border
crossings into the United States in fiscal year 2001, the majority
originating from Mexico or Canada. Data on international arrivals in
this report exclude entries of same-day travelers as defined by the
Department of Transportation, such as those from Mexico or Canada.
[29] However, the number of arrivals in 2001 was lower than in 2000
owing to the events of September 11.
[30] These agencies estimate that every dollar spent directly by a
traveler in the United States translates into $1.89 to $2.33 for the
U.S. economy.
[31] These results are based on a limited econometric estimation and a
comparison of simulated effects from elimination of the Visa Waiver
Program with their baseline tourism forecast, which we have not
verified.
[32] Any initial and recurring costs estimated for an increased
workload of 14 million applications are in addition to State‘s costs
for the estimated visa and biometric processing workload for the
current 10.3 million applications, including student visa applications.
We estimated that additional initial and recurring costs for consular
operating personnel and space to collect a single type of biometric,
such as fingerprints, would be approximately $412 million and $201
million, respectively, for the current 10.3 million applications. See
U.S. General Accounting Office, Technology Assessment: Using Biometrics
for Border Security, GAO-03-174. (Washington, D.C.:Nov. 15, 2002).
[33] For example, additional security procedures, such as restrictions
on the role of Foreign Service national employees, and further
increases in management oversight could increase the number of Foreign
Service officers needed to adjudicate visas.
[34] Costs to employ additional administrative staff were not included
in our cost estimates.
[35] State consolidated some of its posts in visa waiver countries in
the 1990s in response to budget constraints and shifting objectives in
the post-Cold War era. For example, in Italy, State closed consulates
in Palermo in January 1994 and Genoa in June 1993.
[36] The additional machine-readable visa fees collected for 14 million
applicants at the current rate of $65 would be $910 million. According
to State, the fee will increase to $100 beginning November 1, 2002,
resulting in total estimated collections of $1.4 billion.
[37] The machine-readable visa and border crossing card application
fees pay for all costs associated with processing and issuing the visas
and the cards. See Federal Register, Vol. 67, No. 60, March 28, 2002.
[38] See GAO-03-174 for a detailed description on different scenarios
in which biometrics could be collected and the costs that each scenario
would entail; also see that report for the assumptions used in
estimating the initial and annual recurring costs of each scenario. We
chose to use the scenario for fingerprint recognition. Finally, see the
report for more specific details of the assumptions used to estimate
costs involved with collecting fingerprints.
[39] The number of visa waiver travelers who would apply for visas is
highly variable and is based on many factors, including the economy and
personal preferences. We did not vary this number in our analysis.
[40] Interview length could vary with new security screening parameters
in place, which could require interviews of 15 minutes or longer. We
did not vary interview length in our analysis.
[41] This assumption is not the recommendation of the State Department
for implementation of biometrics in the visa process.
[42] U.S. Department of Justice, Follow-up Report on INS Efforts to
Improve the Control of Nonimmigrant Overstays (Washington, D.C.: April
2002).
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