Foreign Assistance
U.S. Democracy Programs in Six Latin American Countries Have Yielded Modest Results Gao ID: GAO-03-358 March 18, 2003Supporting democracy abroad is a major U.S. foreign policy objective. To better understand how this assistance has been implemented in Latin America, GAO was asked to review programs in six countries--Bolivia, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Peru--that have been of particular importance to U.S. interests in Central and South America. Between fiscal years 1992 and 2002, U.S. agencies have funded more than $580 million in democracy-related programs in these countries. This report discusses the impact of and factors affecting this assistance and the overarching management issues that have affected program planning and implementation.
U.S. programs to strengthen democratic institutions in six Latin American countries have had a modest impact to date. These programs have primarily focused on promoting (1) the rule of law, (2) governance, (3) human rights, and (4) elections. U.S. assistance has helped bring about important reforms in criminal justice in five of the six countries, improved transparency and accountability of some government functions, increased attention to human rights, and supported elections that observation groups have considered free and fair. However, host governments have not always sustained these reforms by providing the needed political, financial, and human capital. For example, host countries often did not support training programs, computer systems, or equipment after U.S. funding ended. In other cases, U.S.-supported programs were limited and targeted, and countries have not adopted these programs on a national scale. Since host country resources for sustaining democracy programs are difficult to mobilize, it is crucial that the U.S. government and other donors manage available international resources as efficiently as possible for maximum impact and sustainability. Several management issues have affected democracy assistance programs. Poor coordination among the key U.S. agencies has been a long-standing management problem, and cooperation with other foreign donors has been limited. U.S. agencies' strategic plans do not outline how these agencies will overcome coordination problems and cooperate with other foreign donors on program planning and implementation to maximize scarce resources. Also, U.S. agencies have not consistently evaluated program results or shared lessons learned from completed projects, thus missing opportunities to enhance the outcomes of their programs.
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
March 2003:
Foreign Assistance:
U.S. Democracy Programs in Six Latin American Countries Have Yielded
Modest Results:
GAO-03-358:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-03-358, a report to the Chairmen and Ranking Minority
Members of the House Committee on International Relations and the
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere
Why GAO Did This Study:
Supporting democracy abroad is a major U.S. foreign policy objective.
To better understand how this assistance has been implemented in Latin
America, GAO was asked to review programs in six countries”Bolivia,
Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Peru”that have been of
particular importance to U.S. interests in Central and South America.
Between fiscal years 1992 and 2002, U.S. agencies have funded more than
$580 million in democracy-related programs in these countries. This
report discusses the impact of and factors affecting this assistance
and the overarching management issues that have affected program
planning and implementation.
What GAO Found:
U.S. programs to strengthen democratic institutions in six Latin
American countries have had a modest impact to date. These programs
have primarily focused on promoting (1) the rule of law, (2)
governance, (3) human rights, and (4) elections. U.S. assistance has
helped bring about important reforms in criminal justice in five of
the six countries, improved transparency and accountability of some
government functions, increased attention to human rights, and
supported elections that observation groups have considered free and
fair. However, host governments have not always sustained these
reforms by providing the needed political, financial, and human
capital. For example, host countries often did not support training
programs, computer systems, or equipment after U.S. funding ended. In
other cases, U.S.-supported programs were limited and targeted, and
countries have not adopted these programs on a national scale.
Since host country resources for sustaining democracy programs are
difficult to mobilize, it is crucial that the U.S. government and other
donors manage available international resources as efficiently as
possible for maximum impact and sustainability. Several management
issues have affected democracy assistance programs. Poor coordination
among the key U.S. agencies has been a long-standing management
problem, and cooperation with other foreign donors has been limited.
U.S. agencies‘ strategic plans do not outline how these agencies will
overcome coordination problems and cooperate with other foreign donors
on program planning and implementation to maximize scarce resources.
Also, U.S. agencies have not consistently evaluated program results or
shared lessons learned from completed projects, thus missing
opportunities to enhance the outcomes of their programs.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Departments of State and Justice and the U.S.
Agency for International Development
* develop more comprehensive strategic plans at the regional and
country level to address cooperation among agencies and other major
donors,
* establish a strategy for periodically evaluating projects, and
* establish a systematic mechanism to share information among U.S.
agencies and project implementers.
In responding to a draft of this report, these agencies generally
agreed with our recommendations.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-358
To view the full report, including the scope
and methodology, click on the link above.
For more information, contact Jess Ford at (202) 512-4128 or
fordj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Letter:
Purpose:
Results in Brief:
Background:
GAO's Analysis:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments:
Chapter 1:
Background:
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Chapter 2:
Criminal Justice Reforms Were Established but Not Fully Implemented;
Sustainability Will Require Stronger Host Government Commitment:
USAID Has Helped Increase Citizen Access to Justice, but Sustainability
and Expansion of Services Will Require Greater Host Country Support:
U.S. Police Assistance Supporting Criminal Investigations and
Management of Police Operations Has Had Mixed Results:
Conclusions:
Chapter 3:
Legislatures Initially Increased Their Planning, Infrastructure,
Analytical, and Outreach Capacities, but Gains Have Eroded over Time:
Local Governance and Citizen Participation Were Enhanced in Target
Municipalities, but Broader Impacts Are More Difficult to Achieve:
Anticorruption Policies and Procedures Have Been Implemented in Some
Countries, but the Long-term Impact Is Not Yet Evident:
Conclusions:
Chapter 4:
U.S. Human Rights Assistance Has Increased Awareness and Government
Accountability:
Conclusions:
Chapter 5:
The United States Has Primarily Targeted Three Countries with
Assistance in Election Administration, Voter Access, and Electoral
Observation:
U.S. Assistance Has Helped Ensure Free and Fair Elections, but
Nicaragua May Still Need Additional Assistance:
Conclusions:
Chapter 6:
Poorly Coordinated Program Management Limits Effectiveness of U.S.
Democracy Assistance:
Limited Evaluation and Sharing of Lessons Learned among Program
Implementers:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: U.S. Democracy Assistance to Six Latin American Countries
Bolivia:
Colombia:
El Salvador:
Guatemala:
Nicaragua:
Peru:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of State:
GAO Comment:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Justice:
Appendix IV: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International Development
GAO Comments:
Appendix V: Quality of Life and Economic Indicators for Selected
Countries:
Appendix VI: Freedom House Scores for Individual Countries, Fiscal
Years 1992 through 2002:
Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables :
Table 1: Freedom House Ratings for the Six Countries Studied, Fiscal
Years 1992 and 2002:
Table 2: U.S. Rule of Law Assistance in the Six Countries Studied:
Table 3: USAID Legislative Strengthening Assistance:
Table 4: USAID Local Governance Assistance:
Table 5: USAID Anticorruption Assistance:
Table 6: U.S. Human Rights Assistance in Three Countries:
Table 7: USAID Election Assistance in the Six Countries:
Table 8: Quality of Life and Economic Indicators for Selected Countries:
Figures :
Figure 1: Average Freedom House Democracy Scores for the Six Countries
Studied, Fiscal Years 1992 through 2002:
Figure 2: Distribution of U.S. Democracy Assistance among Six Countries,
Fiscal Years 1992 through 2002:
Figure 3: Distribution of U.S. Democracy Assistance to Six Countries by
Key Agencies, Fiscal Years 1992 through 2002:
Figure 4: Four Elements of the U.S. Democracy Assistance Program:
Figure 5: Distribution of U.S. Democracy Assistance to the Six Countries
Studied, for Fiscal Years 2000 through 2002, by Element:
Figure 6: Public Hearing Room Constructed with U.S. Government Funding
in Manizales, Colombia:
Figure 7: Justice House in Manizales, Colombia, Constructed with U.S.
Government Funds:
Figure 8: Free Legal Consultation Provided by Colombian Official at a
Justice House Constructed with U.S. Government Funds:
Figure 9: Forensics Equipment Donated by the U.S. Government to Improve
Criminal Investigative Capacity of Bolivian National Police in La Paz,
Bolivia:
Figure 10: U.S.-Funded Crime-Scene Management Training for Law
Enforcement Officials in San Salvador, El Salvador:
Figure 11: The Nicaraguan Legislature's Office of Citizen
Participation, Established with USAID Assistance:
Figure 12: Acting Mayor of Leon, Nicaragua, One of the Municipalities
That Received USAID Assistance to Strengthen Local Governance:
Figure 13: A Meeting Organized by USAID's Office of Transition
Initiatives to Educate Citizens from Rural Peru about the Country's New
Decentralization Program:
Figure 14: Nicaragua's Integrated Financial Management System Was
Developed with Assistance from USAID Funds:
Figure 15: USAID-supported Victims Assistance Center Managed by the
Attorney General's Office, Guatemala City, Guatemala:
Figure 16: Coffins used by USAID-supported Foundation for
Anthropological Forensics to Reinter Remains Exhumed from Mass Graves
in Guatemala:
Figure 17: Human Rights Units Using Forensics Equipment Provided by the
Justice Department to Investigate a Crime Scene in San Jose de
Apartado, Colombia:
Figure 18: Poll Workers Organizing Voting Materials before Opening a
Polling Station in Lima, Peru, during the April 2001 National Elections:
Figure 19: Voters Waiting to Enter Polling Station in Lima, Peru, during
the April 2001 National Elections:
Figure 20: Freedom House Democracy Scores for Bolivia, Fiscal Years 1992
through 2002:
Figure 21: Freedom House Democracy Scores for Colombia, Fiscal Years
1992 through 2002:
Figure 22: Freedom House Democracy Scores for El Salvador, Fiscal Years
1992 through 2002:
Figure 23: Freedom House Democracy Scores for Guatemala, Fiscal Years
1992 through 2002:
Figure 24: Freedom House Democracy Scores for Nicaragua, Fiscal Years
1992 through 2002:
Figure 25: Freedom House Democracy Scores for Peru, Fiscal Years 1992
through 2002:
Abbreviations :
ARI: Andean Regional Initiative:
GDP: Gross Domestic Product:
ICITAP: International Criminal Investigations Training and Assistance
Program (Department of Justice):
IDB: Inter-American Development Bank:
INL: Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
(Department of State):
OAS: Organization of American States:
USAID: U.S. Agency for International Development:
This is a work of the U.S. Government and is not subject to copyright
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Letter March 18, 2003:
The Honorable Henry Hyde
Chairman
The Honorable Tom Lantos
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on International Relations
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Cass Ballenger
Chairman
The Honorable Robert Menendez
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere
Committee on International Relations
House of Representatives:
In response to your request, this report discusses the nature, impact,
and factors that affect U.S. democracy assistance to Bolivia, Colombia,
El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Peru as well as the overarching
management issues that have affected program planning and
implementation. We include recommendations to the Departments of State
and Justice and the U.S. Agency for International Development. We
recommend that these agencies develop more comprehensive strategic
plans at the regional and country level to address cooperation among
agencies and other major donors; develop a strategy to periodically
evaluate democracy assistance projects; and develop a mechanism to
share information on development approaches, methods, materials, and
results among U.S. agencies and implementers.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly release its contents
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days
after its date. At that time, we will provide copies to interested
congressional committees, the Secretary of State, the Attorney General,
the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development, and
the President of the Inter-American Foundation. We will also provide
copies to others upon request. In addition, this report will be
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff has any questions on this report, please call me
on (202) 512-4128. Other major contributors to this report are listed
in appendix VII.
Jess T. Ford
Director
International Affairs and Trade:
Signed by Jess T. Ford:
[End of section]
Executive Summary:
Purpose:
Nearly all countries in Latin America have seen their systems of
government shift from dictatorships, military regimes, and other forms
of authoritarian rule to democratically elected governments. Supporting
this transition has been a formal part of the U.S. foreign aid program
since at least 1985. During fiscal years 1992 through 2002, the U.S.
government has provided more than $1 billion to help Latin American and
Caribbean nations develop sustainable democratic institutions. This
assistance has focused on promoting the rule of law,[Footnote 1]
transparent and accountable government institutions, respect for human
rights, and free and fair elections. Assistance activities have been
largely implemented by the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID) and the Departments of State and Justice and have been funded
primarily by appropriations authorized under the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961.
Since the early 1990s, GAO has assessed the implementation and
effectiveness of democracy-related programs worldwide, particularly in
Latin America and the Caribbean and the Former Soviet Union (see
Related GAO Products). In these reviews, GAO has found that helping to
strengthen democracy can be a difficult and long-term challenge that
requires sustained political support from key host country leaders.
When this political support wavers, hard-won gains can be quickly lost.
The Chairmen and Ranking Minority Members of the House Committee on
International Relations and the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere
requested that GAO assess the effectiveness of U.S. democracy
assistance programs in six Latin American countries--Bolivia, Colombia,
El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Peru. These countries, which are
located in both Central and South America, have been particularly
important to U.S. interests and face persistent social, economic, and
political challenges. In response to this request, GAO (1) assessed the
impact of the four main elements of U.S. democracy assistance--rule of
law, governance, human rights, and elections--and the factors that
affected the outcome of these programs and (2) analyzed the overarching
management issues that have affected program planning and
implementation.
To address these objectives, GAO reviewed documentation on democracy-
related assistance projects that were implemented from fiscal years
1992 through 2002 and interviewed knowledgeable officials from USAID
and the State and Justice Departments and other agencies that implement
this assistance. GAO conducted fieldwork in the six countries
previously identified, where it interviewed U.S. and senior host
country officials, representatives of many nongovernmental
organizations, and project implementers and beneficiaries. Appendix I
provides an overview of the U.S. democracy assistance programs by
country.
Results in Brief:
Overall, U.S. programs and efforts to strengthen democracy in the six
Latin American countries GAO reviewed have had a modest impact to date.
U.S. assistance programs have supported a variety of reforms and have
introduced innovative practices in justice, governance, human rights,
and elections. For example, GAO found that these programs have helped
five of the six countries reviewed (Bolivia, Colombia, El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Nicaragua) adopt and begin implementing new criminal
procedures codes that allow justice to be dispensed with more
efficiency and openness. In all six countries, U.S. programs have
supported improving the capacity of some municipalities to budget and
plan public expenditures more effectively and with greater citizen
participation, according to USAID data and reports. Host country and
U.S. officials stated that U.S. programs also have contributed to some
increased government attention to protecting human rights in countries
where this assistance has been provided. U.S. assistance has been
instrumental in supporting elections that electoral observation groups
have considered to be free and fair.
Despite these successes, considerable work remains and U.S. democracy
programs often have had a limited impact due to various factors, and in
the countries GAO visited, questions remain regarding the
sustainability of the gains made with U.S. assistance. In particular,
these countries still have work remaining to fully put into practice
the roles and responsibilities contained in their new criminal
procedures codes. In many cases, the size and scope of U.S.-supported
programs have been relatively limited, and countries have not adopted
them on a national scale. The inability or unwillingness of host
governments to provide the necessary financial, human, and political
capital has often negatively affected democracy program outcomes in
these countries. GAO found cases in which U.S.-funded training
programs, computer systems, and police equipment had languished for
lack of resources after U.S. support ended. Political changes in host
governments have also undermined U.S.-supported programs. Of the
legislative strengthening programs begun in the 1990s in four of the
countries GAO visited (Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua),
only the program in El Salvador appears to have received sufficient
host government political support to operate as intended with a
positive impact on governance. Consolidating many of the gains that
these countries have achieved in building democratic institutions is
likely to require increased host country commitment and continued
assistance from the United States or other donors.
Since host country resources for sustaining democracy programs are
difficult to mobilize, it is crucial that the U.S. government and other
donors manage available international resources as efficiently as
possible for maximum impact and sustainability. Although promoting
democracy abroad is a strategic goal of the U.S. government, USAID and
the State and Justice Departments do not take a strategic, coordinated
approach to providing democracy assistance, disrupting the long-term
planning, implementation, and continuity of U.S. law enforcement
programs in some countries. The agencies' strategic plans also do not
identify how U.S. agencies and other foreign donors will coordinate
program planning and implementation, as required by the Government
Performance and Results Act of 1993. USAID and the State and Justice
Departments have conducted few formal evaluations on the results of
these activities to inform the ongoing debate about how to best provide
and manage democracy assistance. Information sharing among U.S.-funded
program implementers also has been limited, both within and among
countries where these programs exist. These agencies do not always take
advantage of the lessons learned from their democracy-related programs
to ensure that funds are spent in a cost-effective manner.
The six chapters of this report address background information on U.S.
democracy assistance programs; the four elements of democracy
assistance, rule of law, governance, human rights, and elections; and
the overarching management issues affecting program planning and
implementation.
In this report, GAO makes recommendations to the Secretary of State,
the Attorney General, and the Administrator of USAID, who together
administer nearly all U.S. democracy assistance, to improve program
management. Specifically, GAO recommends that these officials (1)
develop more comprehensive strategic plans at the regional and country
level to address cooperation among agencies and other major donors, (2)
establish a strategy for periodically evaluating projects, and (3)
establish a systematic mechanism to share information among U.S.
agencies and project implementers.
Background:
Under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, since 1992, the United States
has provided about $580 million to support democracy programs in the
six countries GAO reviewed for this report. Colombia received the
largest amount of democracy assistance ($149 million), followed by El
Salvador ($146 million), Nicaragua ($88 million), Guatemala ($70
million), Peru ($65 million), and Bolivia ($63 million).
Democracy assistance has four major components: rule of law,
governance, human rights, and elections. USAID generally implements
governance, human rights, and elections projects and develops rule of
law institutions and processes, while the State and Justice Departments
focus on the law enforcement component of rule of law efforts. In
fiscal years 2000 through 2002 in the six countries GAO reviewed, rule
of law and governance programs received 39 and 29 percent,
respectively, of the $221 million total allocated for democracy
assistance by the U.S. government. In addition to the United States,
other countries and institutions provide this type of foreign aid. The
World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the Organization
of American States all provide democracy-related assistance to these
six countries, as do several bilateral donors.
GAO's Analysis:
U.S. Rule of Law Assistance Has Supported Some Promising Reforms but
Many Have Not Yet Been Institutionalized:
U.S. rule of law assistance encompasses support for criminal justice
reform, greater access to the justice system for poor and marginalized
populations, and strengthened capacity of law enforcement agencies to
investigate crimes. Although U.S. programs have helped almost all of
these countries begin implementing critical justice sector reforms, it
remains unclear whether the countries can and will provide the
necessary political and financial support to fully implement these
reforms.
In supporting criminal justice reforms, the United States has helped
introduce fundamental changes and new roles and responsibilities for
judicial and law enforcement institutions. U.S. assistance has included
training for judges, prosecutors, and others who implement new criminal
codes and has supported computerized case management systems to
increase justice system efficiency and transparency. The countries GAO
reviewed are in different stages of carrying out reforms. El Salvador
has made the most progress in reforming its justice sector, while
Nicaragua and Bolivia have only recently enacted and begun implementing
new criminal procedures codes. Colombia and Guatemala, which enacted
reforms in the early 1990s, have made limited progress in implementing
them, according to U.S. officials GAO interviewed. For example,
Colombia, which established oral trials in 1991, has only 26
operational courtrooms to serve that nation's 2,000 municipal, circuit,
and special jurisdiction judges.
USAID's access-to-justice programs have helped several countries
establish public defense services to assist poor criminal defendants.
USAID also has supported decentralized justice centers and alternative
dispute resolution mechanisms. In Colombia, for example, USAID has
helped establish 18 justice houses (casas de justicia) that provide
dispute resolution and other legal services and help reinforce the
presence of the Colombian government in poor, marginalized areas. USAID
plans to construct 40 justice houses in Colombia by 2005, but the
sustainability of many of the justice houses already built is uncertain
due to precarious municipal government finances. Colombian officials
also said that, due to severe funding constraints, the government does
not currently plan to build additional justice houses.
U.S.-supported police assistance, which the Justice Department
primarily provides, has focused on developing criminal investigations
capabilities and strengthening police management, accountability, and
operations. The results and impact of this assistance have varied
across the countries GAO reviewed. Of the six countries GAO reviewed,
U.S. police assistance appears to have had the greatest impact in El
Salvador, where the Justice Department has helped implement a new
policing model characterized by active, visible police patrols in high-
crime areas. In other countries, U.S. assistance has provided extensive
training and supported the development of training centers for criminal
investigators, but impact has been more limited. In Bolivia, Justice
Department officials said they have frequently had to repeat training
courses due to high turnover in the criminal investigations unit.
Bolivian police officials also told GAO that they lack the resources to
maintain and use U.S.-donated materials, including forensics equipment
and a computerized case-tracking and management system. USAID, State,
and Justice officials also stated that section 660 of
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961[Footnote 2] hampers the
effectiveness of justice sector assistance because it prohibits some
types of police assistance.[Footnote 3] Officials GAO interviewed in
Washington, D.C., and overseas said that the section 660 prohibition
makes it difficult to plan and implement comprehensive justice sector
programs because it often precludes involving the police fully in
reform efforts. For example, in Nicaragua, USAID could not invite
police force representatives to conferences at which criminal justice
reform approaches were being discussed and debated. Police officers
were similarly excluded from human rights training that USAID was
providing to other host government agencies.
U.S. Governance Assistance Has Had a Modest Impact:
U.S. governance assistance seeks to improve the administrative,
analytical, and outreach capacity of legislatures; strengthen the
administrative capacity and accountability of municipal governments and
increase citizen participation; foster greater awareness about
corruption; and help governments become more transparent and
accountable. In most of the six countries GAO visited, U.S. governance
assistance has had an initial impact on making government institutions
more effective, responsive, and accountable, according to USAID staff,
contractors, and host country officials. However, some programs have
not been sustained or replicated and have been hindered by a lack of
political support from host country governments. Elsewhere,
institutional weaknesses and lack of human and financial resources have
made it difficult for government counterparts to implement or expand
U.S. programs.
In its legislative-strengthening programs, USAID-supported programs
initially increased the outreach capacities of legislatures, according
to U.S. and host country officials. For example, in Bolivia, USAID
helped create a congressional research center and budget office to
assist legislators. With the exception of El Salvador, however, host
governments have not generally sustained these programs. Because
legislative programs have been perceived to be associated with
particular parties, these programs have lost credibility when competing
parties took control. In Guatemala, for example, newly elected
legislators attempted to use USAID-supported legislative institutions
for partisan ends, according to U.S. officials working there. Despite
the difficulty in sustaining these programs, USAID funding has helped
leverage financial support from other donors for legislative-
strengthening programs in several countries, according to bilateral and
multilateral representatives.
GAO found that USAID's programs to support local governance have had an
impact in target municipalities, but the programs have been less
successful in influencing and reforming policies and practices at the
national level. In target municipalities where USAID has worked,
municipal governments have become more effective and responsive, and
citizen participation has increased in municipal affairs, according to
USAID contract staff, host country officials, and local citizens. For
example, according to data that a USAID project implementer provided,
more than 4,400 citizens in rural Colombia have participated in the
development, implementation, and oversight of 67 municipal-level social
infrastructure projects, such as building schools, bridges, and sewers.
In Bolivia and El Salvador, where these programs have been operating
since 1993 and 1996, respectively, municipalities have begun to adopt
USAID-supported practices; however, there has been less success in
Guatemala and Nicaragua disseminating these programs outside of target
municipalities. Host government and USAID officials attributed
difficulties in disseminating innovative practices to limited municipal
resources and skills. For example, local government officials in
Guatemala said it was difficult to use USAID's participatory planning
methods, since limited funds were available to implement projects.
Representatives of national municipal associations, such as the
National Association of Municipalities in Nicaragua, said that USAID's
policy assistance has helped develop national laws and regulations to
decentralize government functions, but in some cases, limited
government support has hindered these efforts.
USAID has helped to develop and implement anticorruption policies and
procedures in five countries GAO reviewed, focusing on developing
anticorruption legislation and regulations, helping government
institutions become more transparent and accountable, and informing
citizens of the need to become more aware of the cost and consequences
of corruption. In Colombia, for example, USAID provided support for a
presidential decree to establish standards for a national system of
internal controls in ministries and other national agencies. Citizen
awareness of corruption has increased in several countries, as has
citizen oversight at the national and municipal levels, according to
USAID officials, contract staff, and representatives of local
governments and nongovernmental organizations. For example, according
to a study by a USAID contractor,[Footnote 4] Nicaraguans have become
better informed about corruption issues as a result of a national
campaign supported by USAID. However, the lack of consistent political
support in host governments has impeded anticorruption projects. In
Nicaragua, according to a former high-ranking government official, in
2001 the Ministry of Finance fired experienced staff who had been
working on the USAID-assisted Integrated Financial Management System,
resulting in lost institutional memory and expertise. These efforts
face long-term challenges because these countries are in the early
stages of addressing a widespread and deeply rooted problem, and the
public is skeptical about anticorruption efforts.
U.S. Human Rights Assistance in Three Countries Has Helped Increase
Public Awareness and Government Accountability:
Three of the countries that GAO studied have human rights assistance
programs. Host government officials and project implementers stated
that this assistance has had a positive but limited impact in the
countries GAO visited. In Colombia, Guatemala, and Peru, current U.S.
human rights projects have (1) increased citizens' awareness of their
rights and have helped governments take on greater responsibility for
protecting those rights, (2) protected threatened individuals and
prevented future abuses, and (3) helped governments address past
abuses. In some instances, political and logistical problems have
hindered these projects, and serious problems remain. Furthermore, host
government officials said some long-term projects might be difficult to
sustain due to budgetary constraints.
USAID's human rights projects have attempted to increase citizen
awareness of human rights through education and community participation
in information networks. One such network is Colombia's "Early Warning
System." This system relies on citizen and nongovernmental
organizations to alert authorities to human rights threats (such as
massacres and other violent acts against civilians) from the armed
groups involved in that country's ongoing conflict. U.S. and Colombian
officials told GAO that coordination and communication problems hinder
the smooth flow of information in this project and compromise the
ability of Colombian security forces to prevent violence by insurgent
groups.
GAO found that these human rights projects also have enabled host
governments to become more responsible and accountable to some degree.
In each of the six countries GAO visited, USAID has been instrumental
in supporting the creation of a Human Rights Ombudsman Office, which
provides a legal channel for complaints and allegations of human rights
violations. In some countries, this office ranks high in public opinion
polls, while in others, according to the State Department, allegations
of corruption and funding problems have eroded the office's
credibility.
In addition, USAID assistance has fostered greater justice for victims
and their families. USAID support for national reconciliation efforts,
including exhumations of clandestine cemeteries in Guatemala and Peru,
has helped resolve questions about the fate of victims and bring guilty
parties to justice, according to project officials and published
reports. Justice Department data indicate that special human rights
investigative units created in Colombia have enabled the government to
prosecute 167 human rights cases. There are currently not enough of
these units to investigate cases throughout the entire country, and the
Justice Department plans to help the Colombian government expand the
number and the size of these units in fiscal years 2003 and 2004.
Despite the positive impact of U.S. human rights projects in these
countries, serious problems remain with some governments' respect for
human rights, particularly in Guatemala and Colombia. For example,
police and military forces in these countries continue to be implicated
in human rights abuses but are rarely prosecuted, according to State
Department human rights reports.
U.S. Electoral Assistance Has Been Instrumental in Helping to Ensure
Free and Fair Elections:
The United States has strived to help governments in Latin America
establish a tradition of free and fair elections. U.S. electoral
support efforts have been designed to help improve election
administration, enhance voter access, and legitimize election results.
Since 1990, this assistance has supported host country efforts that
have resulted in elections considered generally free and fair by the
Organization of American States and other electoral observation groups
in the six countries GAO reviewed. USAID has provided about $66 million
in elections assistance. Most of this assistance, about $60 million,
went to three countries: $27 million to Nicaragua, more than $20
million to Peru, and about $13 million to El Salvador. Assistance
projects have strengthened the capacity of electoral authorities,
improved voter access through voter registration and education and
electoral reforms, and supported electoral observation by domestic and
international groups. According to U.S. officials, Nicaragua is the
only country GAO visited that is expected to require significant
international support before it holds its next major election because
it continues to experience problems in election administration and
voter registration.
Program Planning and Coordination Are Lacking:
The effectiveness of U.S. democracy assistance programs in the six
countries GAO reviewed has been limited by the lack of a strategic
interagency management approach.
Without a strategic plan that coordinates and leverages U.S. government
resources and those of multilateral donors that receive U.S. funds,
opportunities to sustain or expand democracy assistance gains may be
missed. Furthermore, organizations implementing U.S. assistance
projects have not routinely evaluated the results of their efforts or
widely shared reports, materials, and other important information.
The State Department and USAID identify the promotion of democracy
abroad as a strategic goal for their agencies. The Government
Performance and Results Act of 1993 requires U.S. government agencies
to develop annual plans for achieving their goals. As GAO has
previously reported in its work relating to this act, such plans should
identify how similar programs that different U.S. government agencies
conduct will be coordinated to achieve their common
objectives.[Footnote 5] However, neither USAID's or State's plans nor
the subordinate regional or country-level planning documents GAO
reviewed specifically address the role of other U.S. agencies and
donors in ensuring that U.S.-funded democracy programs leverage and
coordinate domestic and international resources.
Not addressing the role of other organizations in their strategic plans
is a significant oversight, since it represents the risk that the U.S.
government is not maximizing the use of available resources.
Interagency coordination on rule of law assistance has been a long-
standing problem, as GAO noted in a:
1999 report.[Footnote 6] According to U.S. officials, the relationship
among implementing agencies has often been characterized more by
competition than by cooperation, which has led to fragmented programs
that are not always mutually supportive in achieving common goals. For
example, in Bolivia, poor communication and disagreement among USAID,
State, and Justice on their respective roles disrupted efforts to
assist the development of that country's national police. Furthermore,
by not addressing and building on potentially complementary programs of
other international donors--some of which receive considerable funding
from the United States--agencies risk overlooking critical resources
that can be used to meet the strategic goal of democracy promotion.
U.S. agencies implementing democracy assistance projects have also not
consistently evaluated project results, thus missing opportunities to
highlight lessons learned and to share best practices and information.
Although USAID has conducted evaluations on an ad hoc basis, the State
and Justice Departments have sponsored few formal reviews of their
projects. Consequently, GAO found few project reviews that were useful
for transferring knowledge about the impact and sustainability of
projects in different countries.
USAID also has not taken steps to compile and disseminate detailed
information on the results of its various projects. Although U.S.
democracy assistance activities across the six countries GAO visited
were often very similar, USAID has no centralized documentation on
these activities to determine whether some approaches and materials
were more effective than others. For example, although USAID missions
fund projects to educate local municipal officials in the six
countries, the comprehensive set of handbooks and manuals developed in
Bolivia are not part of any central repository at USAID or at the USAID
intranet site. Lessons learned are a potentially powerful method of
sharing ideas for improving work processes, program design and
implementation, and cost-effectiveness.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To ensure that key U.S. agencies that implement programs to support and
strengthen democracies in Latin America make better use of available
resources, GAO recommends that the Secretary of State, the Attorney
General, and the Administrator of USAID:
* develop comprehensive strategic plans for democracy assistance at the
regional and country level that address how U.S. agencies will
cooperate with each other and other major donors to achieve greater
impact and sustainability in these programs;
* establish a strategy for periodically evaluating democracy assistance
projects that is consistent across agencies, countries, and types of
programs; and:
* establish a systematic mechanism to share information on development
approaches, methods, materials, and results from democracy assistance
projects among U.S. agencies and implementers.
Agency Comments:
GAO received comments on a draft of this report from the State and
Justice Departments and USAID, which are reprinted in appendixes II to
IV. These appendixes also contain GAO responses to the agencies'
comments. Overall, the agencies generally agreed with the thrust of our
recommendations for how the management of program assistance could be
improved. They also noted that in some cases activities are either
planned or under way that would address our recommendations.
[End of section]
Chapter 1: Introduction:
Background:
The countries of Latin America have a long history of political change,
including dictatorships, autocratic rule, military juntas, and various
forms of democracy.
According to Freedom House, a U.S. research organization that tracks
political developments around the world, these countries have, since
the 1980s, gradually progressed toward stronger democracies, as
measured by the extent to which the citizens of these countries enjoy
political rights and civil liberties (see fig. 1). Of the six countries
in our study (Bolivia, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and
Peru), all but Colombia and Nicaragua experienced a strengthening of
democracy by these standards between 1992 and 2002 (see table 1 and
app. VI for more information). Appendix V provides further information
on the quality of life and selected indicators for the selected
countries.
Figure 1: Average Freedom House Democracy Scores for the Six Countries
Studied, Fiscal Years 1992 through 2002:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Table 1: Freedom House Ratings for the Six Countries Studied, Fiscal
Years 1992 and 2002:
Country: Bolivia; 1992 Freedom House score: 2.5; 2002 Freedom House
score: 2; Change: Better.
Country: Colombia; 1992 Freedom House score: 3; 2002 Freedom House
score: 4; Change: Worse.
Country: El Salvador; 1992 Freedom House score: 3.5; 2002 Freedom
House score: 2.5; Change: Better.
Country: Guatemala; 1992 Freedom House score: 4; 2002 Freedom House
score: 3.5; Change: Better.
Country: Nicaragua; 1992 Freedom House score: 3; 2002 Freedom House
score: 3; Change: Same.
Country: Peru; 1992 Freedom House score: 4; 2002 Freedom House score:
2; Change: Better.
Country: Average for all six countries; 1992 Freedom House score:
3.3; 2002 Freedom House score: 2.8; Change: Better.
Source: Freedom House.
Note: Freedom House scores are ranked from 1 (more free) to 7 (less
free).
[End of table]
In September 2001, the 34 democratic members of the Organization of
American States (OAS)[Footnote 7] unanimously adopted the Inter-
American Democratic Charter, declaring that "the peoples of the
Americas have a right to democracy and their governments have an
obligation to promote and defend it." This commitment goes beyond
preserving elections to ensuring the defense of human rights and
fundamental freedoms, popular participation in government, the rule of
law,[Footnote 8] the separation of powers, and transparent and
accountable government institutions. Despite this commitment, many
Latin American nations have yet to fully achieve these conditions.
According to the OAS charter, the hallmarks of democracy include:
* respect for the rule of law on the part of all institutions and
sectors of society;
* constitutional subordination of all state institutions to the legally
constituted civilian authority;
* access to and the exercise of power in accordance with the rule of
law;
* transparency in government activities and probity, responsible public
administration on the part of governments;
* participation of citizens in decisions relating to their own
development;
* separation of powers and independence of the branches of government;
* a pluralistic system of political parties and organizations;
* freedom of expression and of the press;
* respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; and:
* periodic, free, and fair elections based on secret balloting and
universal suffrage.
Although the national governments of all six countries we visited have
been democratically elected since the 1990s, they face serious social,
economic, and political challenges that have made strengthening key
democratic institutions a difficult and long-term endeavor.[Footnote 9]
In South America, Colombia continues to struggle with the escalation of
a nearly 40-year campaign to overthrow the government, with attendant
economic and social disruptions that affect thousands of its citizens
each year, while Peru is emerging from the shadow of authoritarian rule
and the violent actions of insurgent guerillas. Bolivia, which has had
a relatively more stable political environment, must now deal with a
host of economic challenges and an increasingly disillusioned and vocal
indigenous class. In Central America, El Salvador's and Guatemala's
Peace Accords were signed in 1992 and 1996, respectively, providing a
framework for rebuilding those societies after decades of civil war.
Nicaragua, one of the poorest nations in the hemisphere, still
confronts political polarization and corruption, according to U.S.
officials.
The United States has provided assistance to many of the countries of
Latin America and the Caribbean to aid in strengthening democracies.
From fiscal years 1992 to 2002, the six countries in our study,
Bolivia, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Peru,
received about $580 million in assistance (see fig. 2 for distribution
of funding among these six countries). Almost all U.S. funding for
democracy assistance, authorized under the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961, is appropriated to the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID) and the Department of State. A significant amount of assistance
has been allocated to the Department of Justice through interagency
fund transfers from USAID and State. From fiscal years 1992 through
2002, USAID has administered $479.3 million of program funding for
democracy activities in this region, while the Justice Department has
administered $101.3 million. The State Department also administered
democracy-related programs during this time period. However, the
department could not readily provide disaggregated data on the bulk of
its democracy-related programs, such as funding provided by the Bureau
for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL). Figure 3
shows the distribution among the major implementing agencies of
democracy assistance funding to the six countries we reviewed. Other
organizations with democracy-related assistance activities funded by
the U.S. government include the National Endowment for Democracy, the
Inter-American Foundation, and the Department of the Treasury.
Figure 2: Distribution of U.S. Democracy Assistance among Six
Countries, Fiscal Years 1992 through 2002:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Figure 3: Distribution of U.S. Democracy Assistance to Six Countries by
Key Agencies, Fiscal Years 1992 through 2002:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
These agencies provide assistance through a variety of means, primarily
in the form of goods and services to governmental and nongovernmental
organizations and individuals. For some projects, such as law
enforcement training, U.S. government agencies provide the assistance
directly, or with contract assistance, as needed. For other projects,
such as institutional development projects, the agencies distribute aid
to beneficiaries primarily through grants, cooperative agreements, and
contracts with nongovernmental organizations, private voluntary
organizations, and firms located in the United States or overseas. Cash
disbursements are generally not provided directly to foreign
governments.
Democracy assistance efforts, if successful, can influence political
stability and economic growth. Economists have long demonstrated that
countries with stronger democratic institutions are more likely to
experience sustained economic growth. For example, the positive
relationship between the respect for property and contractual rights
and the rate of economic growth has been found to be especially strong.
Law-respecting, accountable governments tend to provide conditions that
encourage long-term investments and innovation. As the standard of
living improves, the probability of further democratization of
political institutions over time increases substantially.
Many other foreign donors have also provided democracy assistance to
the countries covered in our review. Multilateral donors, including the
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the World Bank, the United
Nations, and OAS have been active in funding democracy-related
activities. In addition, many Western European countries, the European
Union, and private international donors have also financed projects
similar to those funded by the United States. We did not attempt to
determine the total amounts of funding and the outcomes associated with
this assistance, given the difficulty in identifying many different
efforts, their costs, and the paucity of studies documenting program
outcomes.
The United States has taken a broad approach to providing democracy
assistance. The assistance approach generally incorporates four
elements: (1) rule of law, (2) governance (3) human rights, and (4)
elections. (See fig. 4 for an illustration of these elements.):
Figure 4: Four Elements of the U.S. Democracy Assistance Program:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
:
Rule of Law: These projects support constitutional and criminal code
reforms to make criminal justice more swift, transparent, and
participatory; establish new institutions and enhance existing ones to
improve management of the justice sector and to help safeguard the
legal rights of citizens; provide technical assistance, training, and
management information systems for judges, prosecutors, public
defenders, and law enforcement agencies to improve their capabilities
and increase their efficiency, effectiveness, and fairness; increase
access to justice through mediation, alternative dispute resolution,
and other mechanisms; and reform law school curricula to reflect modern
methods and necessary skills for practicing law.
Governance: These projects seek to improve the administrative,
analytical, and outreach capacity of legislatures; strengthen the
administrative capacity and accountability of municipalities and
increase citizen participation in local government; and foster a
greater public awareness about corruption and implement strategies to
enable government institutions to become more transparent and
accountable.
Human Rights: These projects are intended to prevent human rights
abuses through greater public awareness, protect citizens against
abuses, and respond to past violations through legal action and public
reconciliation processes.
Elections: These projects are designed to improve election
administration, enhance voter access, and legitimize election results
by supporting domestic and international observers.
USAID and the State and Justice Departments have not traditionally
accounted for funding data according to the four elements previously
described but have provided this information for fiscal years 2000
through 2002, as shown in figure 5. While assistance to civil society
appears to be relatively small in figure 5, important civil society
support is also included through the four programmatic areas we focus
on in this report.[Footnote 10]
Figure 5: Distribution of U.S. Democracy Assistance to the Six
Countries Studied, for Fiscal Years 2000 through 2002, by Element:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
While USAID funds and implements assistance projects in all areas
covered by this report, the State Department provides funding to the
Justice Department for law enforcement assistance. The State
Department's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor also provided
a relatively small amount of democracy-related assistance to some of
the six countries covered in our review, as did the department's
Western Hemisphere public diplomacy program.
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
To assess the nature, impact, and sustainability of U.S. assistance
programs to strengthen democratic institutions in Bolivia, Colombia, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Peru, we first interviewed
headquarters officials in Washington, D.C., at the departments and
agencies providing rule of law, governance, human rights, and election
assistance, including USAID, the State and Justice Departments, the
National Endowment for Democracy, and the Inter-American Foundation. We
also interviewed experts at nongovernmental organizations, including
the National Democratic Institute, the International Republican
Institute, the Washington Office on Latin America, and Human Rights
Watch. For all six countries, we reviewed Mission Performance Plans,
USAID country and regional strategic plans and other planning
documents, funding agreements, contracts, and project evaluations. We
obtained funding information for fiscal years 1992 through 2002 from
USAID headquarters and country staff and the Justice Department (the
Justice Department administers funding provided by the State
Department). The State Department could not readily differentiate most
of its democracy-related assistance funding during this period from
counternarcotics-related funding, which we did not include in the scope
of our review. We also reviewed our prior reports on democracy
assistance to Latin America.[Footnote 11]
We conducted fieldwork in each of the previously identified six
countries between March and September 2002. In each of these countries,
we met with the U.S. Ambassador; the USAID Chief of Mission; political
and economic officers; senior U.S. officials representing agencies with
rule of law, governance, human rights, or elections programs; and
numerous program staff, including contractors responsible for
implementing the projects. We interviewed host country officials at
supreme courts; law enforcement organizations; legislatures; national
ombudsmen; and ministries covering justice, police, local governments,
government oversight, and elections. We visited training schools for
judges, prosecutors, and police; local justice centers; local
government pilot projects; and legislative outreach offices, as
appropriate. We also met with numerous representatives from
nongovernmental organizations and other groups representing a broad
spectrum of civil society, including local citizen groups involved with
rule of law, governance, human rights, and elections programs.
To analyze the overarching management issues that have affected program
outcomes, we analyzed project documentation, interviewed knowledgeable
officials, and reviewed assistance activities on field visits to the
six countries. We then analyzed and synthesized information across the
six countries. To look for broader themes, we also interviewed experts
in the field, including those from nongovernmental organizations and
academia, and attended USAID's annual democracy officers' conference in
2001.
We performed our work from August 2001 through December 2002 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Chapter 2: Rule of Law Assistance:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Reforming the criminal justice sector has been a critical area of
concern in Latin America. Nontransparent legal processes, corruption,
and incarceration of prisoners for months or years before trials can
undermine confidence that justice is being dispensed fairly. Surveys
done in the region have shown that high levels of crime and citizens'
lack of trust in justice institutions are positively correlated with
reduced public support of democracy. In the six countries we reviewed,
USAID and the State and Justice Departments have sought to (1) reform
criminal justice systems by helping establish new legal frameworks to
make criminal procedures more efficient and transparent and by
strengthening the capabilities of justice sector institutions, (2)
increase the public's access to the justice system by establishing
public defense services for poor defendants and by supporting
construction of justice centers in poor communities, and (3) help law
enforcement institutions conduct criminal investigations and manage
their operations more efficiently and effectively. We found that
although the U.S. assistance had contributed to noteworthy progress in
these areas in most of the countries we reviewed, concerns remain about
whether gains will be sustained. Due to resource constraints and other
implementation difficulties, judicial and law enforcement institutions
in these countries continue to rely to a large degree on U.S. and other
international assistance for implementing justice sector reforms. U.S.
officials also stated that legislative restrictions on law enforcement
assistance restrict their ability to plan and carry out comprehensive
justice sector reform programs because they prohibit many types of
police assistance.
As seen in table 2, U.S. rule of law assistance has been provided to
five of the six countries we visited since the mid-1980s, beginning
first with El Salvador in 1984.
Table 2: U.S. Rule of Law Assistance in the Six Countries Studied:
Country: Bolivia; Assistance dates: 1986 - present.
Country: Colombia; Assistance dates: 1986 - present.
Country: El Salvador; Assistance dates: 1984 - present.
Country: Guatemala; Assistance dates: 1986 - present.
Country: Nicaragua; Assistance dates: 1993 - present.
Country: Peru; Assistance dates: 1986 - present.
Sources: USAID and Justice Department.
[End of table]
Criminal Justice Reforms Were Established but Not Fully Implemented;
Sustainability Will Require Stronger Host Government Commitment:
A key component of U.S. rule of law assistance in five of the six
countries we reviewed has been support for criminal justice sector
reforms establishing new roles and responsibilities for judicial and
law enforcement institutions and introducing oral procedures and public
trials.[Footnote 12] Support for criminal justice reforms has been
provided primarily by USAID and the Justice Department and has focused
on:
* facilitating constitutional and criminal code reforms,
* helping to create and strengthen justice sector institutions, and:
* improving legal training for justice sector professionals and
reforming law school curricula.
Constitutional and Criminal Code Reforms Have Been Enacted but Not
Fully Implemented:
The United States has helped five of the countries we reviewed
establish new legal frameworks for their criminal justice systems,
supporting the drafting of new criminal codes and developing political
consensus for criminal justice reform, both within the government and
among civil society. Although the reforms each country has enacted have
varied, U.S. assistance has supported the necessary legal frameworks
for oral, adversarial criminal procedures and training for justice
sector actors to implement these procedures. The United States has
assisted Latin American countries' transitions from inquisitorial to
adversarial systems to help increase the transparency and efficiency of
the judicial process. Benefits of the adversarial system include
shortened pretrial detentions, the presumption of innocence, and the
right to a defense.
Host country officials commented that U.S. support has been critical to
building consensus for the development and enactment of these reforms.
USAID has supported constitutional and criminal procedures code reforms
that went into effect in Colombia (1991), Guatemala (1994), El Salvador
(1998), Bolivia (2001), and Nicaragua (2002).[Footnote 13] In Bolivia,
for example, USAID's rule of law assistance since 1997 has focused
primarily on support for the passage and implementation of a new
criminal procedures code. USAID's assistance, provided in close
coordination with the German government, has supported reforms that
provide the basis for oral, accusatory procedures and public trials,
which significantly changed the roles and responsibilities of judges,
prosecutors, defense attorneys, and the police. In addition, U.S. and
German assistance has supported disseminating information on the code
to the public, mainly through nongovernmental organizations.[Footnote
14]
Despite achievements in passing criminal justice reforms, these
countries have had varying degrees of success in implementing the
reforms in practice, and each has work remaining to fully put into
practice the new roles and responsibilities contained in the reforms.
For example, Nicaragua and Bolivia have only recently begun
implementing newly enacted criminal procedures codes, while reforms for
criminal sentencing codes have not yet been enacted. The Nicaraguan
legislature also passed an administrative litigation code in 2000,
which created a mechanism for citizens to bring legal cases against the
government.[Footnote 15] This code has not been implemented because,
according to a USAID official, the Supreme Court has raised
constitutional objections to them.
Colombia and Guatemala enacted criminal justice reforms in the early
1990s but have made limited progress in implementing them. Colombia,
for example, has made little progress in establishing an adversarial
criminal justice system, including oral trials, despite enacting its
constitutional reform in 1991. Colombia's reforms established a legal
structure for oral trials and modernized criminal investigation and
prosecutorial functions, and the reforms were developed through a
coordinated approach that involved key justice sector
institutions.[Footnote 16] Following this promising start, however,
political support for these reforms waned during the 1990s, and oral,
adversarial procedures are still rare in Colombia, according to USAID
officials.
Although Guatemala's reforms provided the basis for transitioning to an
adversarial criminal justice system in 1994, and Guatemala reorganized
and created the necessary justice institutions for implementing the
reforms, the Guatemalan justice system is still plagued by problems,
particularly the courts, prosecutor's office, and the police. During
our visit to Guatemala, the prosecutor's office and the police were
still trying to resolve profound differences in the roles that their
respective institutions would have in carrying out criminal
investigations. U.S. assistance provided by the State and Justice
Departments and USAID has helped justice institutions introduce
important enhancements to their organizations and operations. Despite
these improvements, the Guatemalan criminal justice system still faces
serious challenges in its efforts to fully implement these reforms.
El Salvador appears to have made the most progress in reforming its
justice sector; for example, the Attorney General has instituted
sweeping personnel changes in the prosecutor's office to improve the
quality and integrity of its workforce. However, the judiciary in El
Salvador has yet to institute similar reforms, according to U.S.
officials.
According to the State Department's most recent human reports, the
judiciaries in each of the six countries we reviewed are continuing to
face problems, including inefficiency, corruption, and a climate of
impunity. In Bolivia, for example, State reported that judicial
corruption and inadequate case-tracking mechanisms are contributing to
the incarcerations of persons for months or years before their trials.
In Colombia, State reported that Colombia's large backlog of over 3
million cases has overburdened the judicial system, and that
prosecutors and judges are struggling to transition from traditional,
written procedures, to an oral, adversarial system.
Justice Sector Institutions Were Established and Strengthened, but
Pilot Programs Have Not Been Widely Replicated:
U.S. assistance also has supported the creation and strengthening of
new institutions to implement the new codes and other reforms, such as
judicial councils that participate in selecting, training, and
disciplining judges and independent prosecutor's offices to manage
investigations and bring criminal cases to trial. For example:
* In Bolivia, USAID assistance supported creating a judicial council in
1998 that reviews the qualifications of judicial candidates, evaluates
the performance of sitting judges, and manages a training center for
judges.
* In Nicaragua, USAID has supported establishing a prosecutor's office
that is independent of the executive branch that will implement the new
criminal procedures code.
The United States also has provided assistance to strengthen and
modernize justice sector institutions' operational capabilities. For
example, USAID support helped establish a clerk of courts office in
Guatemala City that centralized case intake and management in one
location for the city's 11 criminal courts. A USAID study showed that
after this office was established in 1999, the annual number of cases
that were unaccounted for decreased from more than 1,000 to 2. USAID
and the Justice Department also have assisted in the publication of
operations manuals for judges, prosecutors, and other legal operators
to help clarify roles and responsibilities and ensure uniform
implementation of legal codes.
Judicial and law enforcement institutions that the United States has
assisted face resource constraints that make it difficult to sustain or
expand U.S-supported pilot projects. For example, in Bolivia, the
government lacked the resources to maintain or replicate a U.S.-funded
model prosecutor's office, and the project ended with little impact.
Also in Bolivia, USAID supported a pilot case intake and management
system for judges. This system was designed to provide information on
case assignments and their progress through the judicial system.
Originally implemented in 1996, use of this system continues to be
uneven due to resource constraints, and the system has not been
implemented on a national level.
In Colombia, USAID had funded 13 oral trial courtrooms, in addition to
13 such courtrooms opened by Colombia's judicial council. However,
these are the only oral trial courtrooms currently operating in the
country, and a major challenge will be to build similar courtrooms for
the country's more than 2,000 municipal, circuit, and special
jurisdiction judges. In one regional court we visited in Colombia,
USAID had built an oral hearing room and equipped it with new recording
equipment to facilitate this transition. Although judges were holding
regular oral hearings in this room, this equipment was not used because
the court could not afford audiotapes (see fig. 6).
Figure 6: Public Hearing Room Constructed with U.S. Government Funding
in Manizales, Colombia:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
New Legal Training Was Introduced but Has Not Been Institutionalized:
In five of the six countries we visited, USAID and the Justice
Department have provided extensive legal training to judges,
prosecutors, investigators, and public defenders on new criminal
procedures codes, either directly or through support to training
centers in host government institutions. For example:
* In Bolivia, these agencies trained more than 5,000 justice operators
on the country's new code through a variety of courses, seminars, and
"train-the-trainer" activities.
* In Colombia, USAID has assisted a training academy for judges by
supporting restructuring the school and its curriculum. The school has
trained 600 judges to be trainers, allowing the training to be
replicated throughout the country. The Justice Department also has
provided extensive training to prosecutors and law enforcement
personnel.
However, training centers for judges, prosecutors, and public defenders
have faced severe budgetary constraints, and in most cases do not
operate independent of U.S. assistance. For example, in Colombia, the
director of the judges training academy told us that its budget has
been eliminated, and the future operation of this center is uncertain.
Similarly, a USAID-supported training center within Colombia's Public
Defender's Office lacks a training budget. In Bolivia, the Attorney
General told us that, without international assistance, he could not
afford to staff and adequately equip his academy to train prosecutors
to implement the country's new criminal procedures code.
USAID also has worked with some law schools in Bolivia, Colombia, El
Salvador, and Guatemala to revise their curricula to reflect new
reforms and provide more practical training in oral, public trials. For
example, USAID helped Guatemala's National University implement a
revised curriculum for new law students with greater emphasis on ethics
and including courses on constitutional law and human rights.
Nonetheless, U.S. and host country officials in the countries we
visited also stated that legal education remains a major concern.
Although law schools in these countries have proliferated, officials
stated that many schools do not provide adequate legal training. In El
Salvador, the validity of the degrees and academic credentials of
judges and attorneys has come into question, as the Supreme Court has
initiated an extensive review of justice officials' academic
backgrounds. Host country officials in El Salvador commented that poor
quality legal education requires that lawyers and judges be retrained
once they enter the justice sector.
USAID Has Helped Increase Citizen Access to Justice, but Sustainability
and Expansion of Services Will Require Greater Host Country Support:
USAID has supported efforts to increase citizens' access to justice
through programs to provide legal services to poor citizens and
communities (see figs. 7 and 8). USAID's access-to-justice assistance
has focused on:
* establishing and strengthening public defender's offices and:
* supporting decentralized justice centers and alternative dispute
resolution mechanisms.
Figure 7: Justice House in Manizales, Colombia, Constructed with U.S.
Government Funds:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Figure 8: Free Legal Consultation Provided by Colombian Official at a
Justice House Constructed with U.S. Government Funds:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Public Defenders Established for Poor, but Availability and Quality of
Legal Defense Are Still Limited:
USAID has assisted in establishing or strengthening professional Public
Defender's Offices in five of the six countries we reviewed by helping
build political consensus for the creation of these offices and by
providing operational support. USAID also has provided training and
operation manuals and has supported computerized information systems
for Public Defender's Offices. The number of public defenders and the
services they provided has also increased, due in part to USAID
contributions. For example:
* In El Salvador, the number of public defenders increased from 25 in
1991 to over 300 in 2002, and USAID contributed to this increase by
initially paying public defender salaries. El Salvador's Public
Defender's Office now also has local and national coordinators,
investigators, and legal aids. This office handles an average of 35,000
cases per year, which is approximately 95 percent of El Salvador's
criminal cases.
* In Guatemala, USAID supported creating an independent public
defender's institute, as called for in the 1996 Peace Accords. In 2001,
the institute provided services to approximately 20,000 Guatemalans.
These newly created Public Defender's Offices have faced severe
budgetary constraints and in some cases are not able to provide
adequate services to poor defendants nationwide. For example:
* In Nicaragua, the Public Defender's Office, created in 1999, had only
13 attorneys when we visited, all of whom were located in the capital,
Managua. Since then, according to USAID 23 additional offices have been
established throughout Nicaragua, and the total number of public
defenders has increased to 47.
* Colombia's public defenders work on a part-time contractual basis.
According to USAID's justice contractor, these defenders have large
caseloads and are paid a low, fixed salary. Furthermore, Colombia's
approximately 1,200 public defenders handle less than 10 percent of the
cases involving poor defendants. Private attorneys appointed by the
court to work on a pro bono basis handle the rest of the cases.
* In Bolivia, host country officials told us that the USAID-supported
Office of Public Defense, established in 1995, has not been adequately
funded. The office depends on external financing to fund the relatively
low public defender salaries. Bolivian officials stated that they have
not been able to adequately replace staff who left for higher salaries,
and that in criminal trials, public defenders are at a substantial
disadvantage to prosecutors because they lack resources and support
services.
The State Department's most recent reports on human rights cited the
Public Defender's Offices in four of the six countries as being
overburdened by large caseloads and not always able to provide
qualified attorneys for indigent defendants. In Nicaragua, State also
cited public defenders' complaints that judges were continuing to
sentence poor defendants without the presence of a public defender,
despite these defendants' right to legal counsel.
Justice Houses and Centers Bring Legal Services to Poor Communities,
but It Is Not Clear How the Centers Will Be Sustained or Expanded:
In four of the six countries we reviewed, USAID has provided funds to
support the creation of decentralized, community-based houses and
centers to provide greater access to the justice system and mediation
to resolve domestic disputes.
* In Colombia, "justice houses" (casas de justicia) have been built in
poor, marginalized areas to provide dispute resolution and other legal
services and help reinforce the presence of the Colombian government.
Since 1995, 18 justice houses have been built, and USAID plans to
expand this number to 40 by 2005. National institutions provide the
staff, including prosecutors, public defenders, police inspectors,
social workers, and mediators, while municipalities are expected to
maintain the facilities.
* In Guatemala, 11 justice centers were built outside the capital along
with 16 complementary mediation centers to serve indigenous communities
near these centers. U.S. and Guatemalan officials stated that the
centers have facilitated coordination of services and have improved
local citizens' experiences with the justice system.
* In Peru, the Ministry of Justice has established 32 conciliation
centers and 31 legal aid clinics in poor communities.
* In El Salvador, a pilot project plans to open 6 justice houses by the
end of 2003. These justice houses will focus on providing mediation
services.
Despite the positive impact that the justice houses and centers appear
to have had, it is not clear how these projects will be supported by
host
governments or whether they will be able to operate without U.S.
assistance. Greater host country commitment of resources will be
required to make them more sustainable and to have a wider impact. For
example:
* While Colombia's Ministry of Justice and Interior has supported the
justice houses, it has not made a commitment to build more or take over
existing ones from USAID. Further, many Colombian municipalities face
severe resource constraints and may not be able to maintain and support
existing justice houses.
* Guatemala has had some success in expanding an aspect of the justice
center model from secondary cities to its capitol, Guatemala City,
improving officials' ability to track criminal cases. However,
Guatemala's justice centers are not currently sustainable without U.S.
or other donor support, according to USAID and contractor officials,
and the Guatemalan government has no plans to fully expand this justice
center model to the national level.
* In Peru, USAID funded pilot conciliation and legal aid centers by
nongovernmental organizations and municipalities as well as government-
operated centers in several major cities. USAID also has helped the
Peruvian government build its capacity to train, license, and regulate
a growing number of private conciliators. However, most pilot centers
that USAID helped create are now closed for lack of funds, according to
project officials. The Minister of Justice also told us that the
government lacks the resources to expand the number of government-
operated conciliation centers or provide meaningful oversight to
privately run centers.
U.S. Police Assistance Supporting Criminal Investigations and
Management of Police Operations Has Had Mixed Results:
U.S. assistance to develop and strengthen the capacities of the police
in the six countries we reviewed was provided primarily by the Justice
Department's International Criminal Investigations Training and
Assistance
Program (ICITAP).[Footnote 17] ICITAP's assistance in these countries
has focused primarily on:
* developing criminal investigations capabilities by providing training
and equipment and:
* supporting police management, accountability, and operations (see
figs. 9 and 10).
Figure 9: Forensics Equipment Donated by the U.S. Government to Improve
Criminal Investigative Capacity of Bolivian National Police in La Paz,
Bolivia:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Figure 10: U.S.-Funded Crime-Scene Management Training for Law
Enforcement Officials in San Salvador, El Salvador:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Criminal Investigations Capacities Are Supported through Training and
Equipment, but Sustainability Is a Concern:
Five of the countries we reviewed have ICITAP police assistance
programs.[Footnote 18] A key focus of this assistance has been to
strengthen police criminal investigations capabilities by providing
direct training to investigators in crime-scene management and
coordinating with prosecutors, among other areas, and helping
investigator schools prepare to take over these functions. ICITAP also
has provided equipment for analyzing forensic evidence and has assisted
in developing computerized case management systems. In Guatemala, for
example, ICITAP has
provided assistance to strengthen the criminal investigations unit
within the National Civilian Police, including training in
investigative, administrative, and case management skills, and
supported an automated case-tracking system.
In Colombia, ICITAP also has focused on providing training in criminal
investigations, developing internal training capabilities, and
strengthening forensics capabilities. Currently, ICITAP is providing
assistance under Plan Colombia and the Andean Regional Initiative,
which is a more than $2 billion effort to assist the Colombian
government in fighting illicit crop production and improve its judicial
and law enforcement capabilities. ICITAP, with the Justice Department's
Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and Training,
has helped establish and strengthen specialized investigative units
that focus on money laundering, human rights, anticorruption, and
antinarcotics. In an effort to improve interinstitutional coordination,
these units include prosecutors, judicial police, and other
investigative personnel. In addition, ICITAP is strengthening
Colombia's forensics capabilities in the country's four laboratory
systems through standardized procedures, protocols, and new equipment.
In El Salvador, USAID also is working in the criminal investigations
area by providing courses on joint crime-scene management as requested
by El Salvador's Attorney General and Chief of Police. Prosecutors,
police investigators, and forensic specialists have attended this
course to improve police-prosecutor coordination in protecting and
managing evidence.
U.S. assistance to strengthen criminal investigations capabilities has
provided extensive training and supported the development of internal
training centers. However, the impact of this assistance has been
limited, in some cases, due to the lack of political will for change
and resource constraints. In Guatemala, for example, U.S. officials
stated that corruption, funding problems, and the lack of political
will for reform have limited the impact of U.S. assistance to
strengthen criminal investigations. According to U.S. officials, key
barriers to improving the police's investigative capabilities have been
the lack of continuity of police leadership and coordination problems
between prosecutors and police, including an inability of these
institutions to agree on their roles. U.S. officials in Guatemala
further stated that the police-prosecutor dispute has impeded effective
crime-scene management and evidence handling, and:
the two institutions developed criminal laboratories with overlapping
functions.[Footnote 19]
In Bolivia, ICITAP has supported training and provided equipment for
the criminal investigation unit, but the ICITAP program manager stated
that courses had to be repeated multiple times because of a high
turnover of officers within the unit. In addition, U.S. and Bolivian
officials stated that the Bolivian police are facing significant
resource constraints that have impeded their ability to operate and
expand an ICITAP-supported case management system that would link
police units and records in different cities. Originally designed as a
nationwide system when it began in 1997, ICITAP is now supporting
implementation in five cities, and even in these locations use of the
system has varied. According to ICITAP officials, in some cases, police
have not paid telephone bills, causing service to be cut off, which has
been a major obstacle. Bolivian police officials told us that resource
constraints also have prevented them from purchasing fingerprint powder
and toner for printers, thus precluding full use of ICITAP-donated
equipment. ICITAP officials stated that Bolivia's centralized
administration and management of the police have not been responsive to
the resource needs of departmental police units. In August 2002, the
State Department's Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs defunded
ICITAP's police assistance program in Bolivia. A State Department
official said that the decision was made on the basis of
dissatisfaction with ICITAP headquarters' management of the program.
This official also stated that future U.S. police assistance in Bolivia
would be taken over by the State Department's INL and USAID. A Justice
Department official said that State's decision was a reflection of a
continuing disagreement between the State and Justice Departments over
the role of each agency in implementing and managing criminal justice
programs. The official noted that ICITAP headquarters had provided the
same management assistance throughout the region, including to the
successful program in El Salvador.
According to the State Department's most recent human rights reports,
the police in each of the six countries continue to be involved in
illegal activities and were not always investigated for these
activities. In Guatemala, for example, State reported that there were
credible allegations of the involvement of police officers in
kidnappings, and that impunity for police who commit criminal offenses
remained a problem. In Bolivia, State cited credible allegations that
police were involved in abuses, including excessive force, extortion,
and improper arrests. State also reported that investigations of these
abuses were slow.
Police Management, Accountability, and Operations Were Supported, with
the Most Positive Results in El Salvador:
In addition to supporting criminal investigations, ICITAP also has
provided assistance in police management, accountability, and
operations. This assistance has included training in police
administration and management and training to strengthen internal
oversight. In Bolivia, ICTAP has supported a new disciplinary code and
Office of Professional Responsibility. ICITAP also has supported
curriculum improvements for Bolivia's 4-year, university-level police
academy. In addition, ICITAP has provided technical assistance to draft
a new police organizational law that would decentralize operational and
administrative decision-making authority and assign resources to
operational units, rather than through a centrally controlled budget.
To date, this legislation has not been passed into law.
Among the countries we visited, ICITAP's assistance appears to have had
the greatest impact in El Salvador. ICITAP has helped El Salvador's
National Civilian Police by developing a strategic plan, supporting
standardizing and centralizing record keeping and reporting, and
providing a management course to command-level officers. ICITAP also
has supported development of the Police Academy since its inception in
1993 and has been able to scale back its assistance to the academy
because Salvadorans are now managing its operations and teaching most
of its courses. In addition, in an effort to address the country's
serious crime problem, ICITAP has helped develop a new policing model,
characterized by increased use of crime statistics and the deployment
of police patrols with greater community visibility. Modeled on U.S.
programs, this project seeks to establish a permanent and highly
visible police presence in urban areas facing crime and involves
greater community outreach. The national police have implemented such
patrols in 174 of El Salvador's 262 municipalities, covering
approximately 80 percent of the country's population. Police statistics
show that certain crimes have been significantly reduced in areas where
these patrols have been deployed. For example, these statistics show a
30 percent drop in overall crime, a 32 percent decrease in homicides,
and a 25 percent drop in armed robberies. The program also is being
coordinated with an ICITAP-supported "9-1-1" system that covers
approximately 65 percent of the country's population.
Legislative Restrictions on Law Enforcement Assistance May Inhibit Rule
of Law Programs:
An additional factor related to implementation of police assistance is
section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which restricts the
use of foreign assistance funds for training and financial support for
police or other law enforcement forces of foreign governments.
Specifically, the provision states that that these funds may not be
used "to provide training or advice, or provide any financial support,
for police, prisons, or other law enforcement forces for any foreign
government or any program of internal intelligence or surveillance on
behalf of any foreign government." This prohibition was put in place in
1975[Footnote 20] in response to human rights violations committed by
nondemocratic regimes receiving USAID public safety assistance. USAID
and the State Department have funded police assistance programs in
Latin America, implemented by the Justice Department, under a series of
exemptions that have subsequently been added to this provision. For
example, an exemption allows for U.S. assistance to support police in
the areas of investigative and forensic functions, the development of
academic instruction, and programs to improve the administrative and
management capabilities.[Footnote 21] The Justice Department's program
supporting community-oriented police patrols in El Salvador has been
permitted under an additional exemption allowing assistance to
strengthen civilian police authority and capability in postconflict
countries.
U.S. officials from the State and Justice Departments and USAID have
told us that section 660 is a barrier to developing, or planning
effectively, for a comprehensive, coordinated, and integrated justice
sector assistance program that includes the police. Under the
prohibition on law enforcement assistance, U.S. agencies may not be
able to fully incorporate law enforcement organizations into their
programs supporting justice sector reform. For example, a USAID
official in Nicaragua stated that due to this restriction, the agency
could not include the police in its human rights promotion programs or
invite police officials to seminars and other forums where their
participation was considered to be critical to a productive dialog on
implementing justice sector reforms. These officials stated that U.S.
assistance providers should be able to plan their rule of law
assistance strategies on the basis of local country situations and not
on whether an exemption from the law can be justified. For example, the
USAID-funded assistance for community-oriented police patrols,
implemented by the Justice Department, was scheduled to terminate in
2003 because USAID's General Council determined that the postconflict
exemption permitting this program no longer applies in El Salvador.
Conclusions:
U.S. rule of law assistance to Latin America supports criminal justice
reforms, increased access to justice, and police investigative and
management capabilities, and U.S. assistance has had an impact in each
area. Due to budgetary constraints and other implementation
difficulties, judicial and law enforcement institutions in the six
countries we visited continue to rely to a large degree on U.S. and
other international assistance to implement judicial reforms and other
projects. U.S. and Latin American officials we interviewed stated that
criminal justice reform in these countries is likely to be a long-term
process, and it will likely take a number of years before these reforms
are fully institutionalized. It is thus unclear at this time whether
the initial results of U.S. assistance will be sustained or expanded to
have greater impact. However, if U.S.-supported reforms are to become
sustainable and have a larger impact, it appears that a long-term U.S.
commitment and presence in providing rule of law assistance in these
countries will be necessary.
The State Department indicated that the Executive Branch should develop
and propose to the Congress new legislation on law enforcement
assistance that could be used to modify section 660 of the Foreign
Assistance Act, to provide a clear statement of authority for providing
law enforcement assistance abroad. The Justice Department stated that
it would work with the State Department and USAID to consider whether
changes to section 660 would be appropriate. This could be an important
step in providing the Congress with options when considering how to
better provide police assistance abroad.
[End of section]
Chapter 3: Governance Assistance: Legislatures, Local Government, and
Anticorruption:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Latin American governments have historically been highly centralized,
and local governments have lacked authority and resources. In addition,
the legislative branch of government has usually been weaker than the
executive branch, and public sector corruption remains a serious
problem. To address these conditions, U.S. assistance activities,
implemented primarily by USAID, have focused on (1) strengthening
legislatures by improving their planning, analytical, and citizen
outreach capabilities; (2) improving democratic local governance by
building the administrative capabilities of municipalities and
promoting effective decentralization of government functions; and (3)
combating corruption by raising citizen awareness of this problem and
establishing laws, regulations, and internal control structures to
enhance government accountability. Overall, we found that U.S.
governance assistance has enabled all six countries to develop and
adopt reforms to make government institutions more effective,
accountable, and responsive to the needs of the people. Despite the
initially positive results, the sustainability and scope of many of
these programs is uncertain because of inconsistent political support
and lack of resources.
Legislatures Initially Increased Their Planning, Infrastructure,
Analytical, and Outreach Capacities, but Gains Have Eroded over Time:
USAID's legislative strengthening programs have aimed to:
* improve legislative planning and infrastructure,
* enhance legislative analytical and technical capabilities, and:
* increase citizen knowledge of and input into congressional
activities.
As shown in table 3, U.S. legislative strengthening assistance has been
provided to five of the six countries we visited, starting in the early
1990s and continuing off and on to the present.
Table 3: USAID Legislative Strengthening Assistance:
Country: Bolivia; Assistance dates: 1992 - 1996, 2001 - present.
Country: Colombia; Assistance dates: Under discussion.
Country: El Salvador; Assistance dates: 1990 - present.
Country: Guatemala; Assistance dates: 1997 - 2000.
Country: Nicaragua; Assistance dates: 1991 - 2001.
Country: Peru; Assistance dates: 2001 - present.
Source: USAID.
[End of table]
Legislative Planning and Infrastructure Strengthened, but Not All
Improvements Have Lasted:
USAID has provided support to help legislatures function more
effectively and professionally by improving their planning and
infrastructure in all five countries where there are or have been
legislative strengthening programs. USAID has generally done this by
supporting the formation of modernization committees, which have
developed plans to improve legislative infrastructure and processes, to
encourage reform.
* In Nicaragua, modernization committee projects included upgrading the
voting system, strengthening the legislature's budget oversight
capabilities, and creating a Web site to publicize legislative
information. The Web site received 35,000 hits within the first 6
months that it was in operation.
* In El Salvador, the legislature developed a master plan for
modernization that has helped to facilitate a consensus across
political lines regarding public participation in the legislative
process.
In addition, USAID's efforts to upgrade legislative infrastructure
helped create more professional and transparent working conditions.
* In El Salvador, semiprivate offices were constructed for all
legislators, thereby enabling some members to work more professionally
and some to increase the number of constituents they met with.
* In Nicaragua, according to USAID officials, a conference room for the
National Assembly was equipped, and an electronic voting board was also
provided to display and record individual members' votes.
However, not all of these modernization committees are functioning
today, and the infrastructure improvements have not always been well
maintained. According to USAID and host government officials, there
have been problems in three of the five countries where USAID has had
legislative strengthening programs.
* In Nicaragua, former members of the modernization committee reported
a decrease in the committee's influence since the 2000 elections and
noted that the committee no longer has the administrative or political
support of the legislature. Also, the Nicaraguan legislature invested
its own funds to upgrade the electronic voting board, the technician
responsible for operating it told us that he no longer had adequate
funds to maintain or improve the voting board. Lastly, the conference
room that USAID had helped to equip in Nicaragua is now being used
solely by one party.
* In Bolivia, the modernization committee no longer functions.
* In Guatemala, after the 1999 elections the new majority party cut
back staffing of the modernization program, thereby causing the
program's offices to decrease their operations.
Legislative Analytical Capabilities Bolstered Initially, but Most Gains
Were Not Maintained:
USAID has supported efforts to establish and strengthen analytical
capabilities in three of the five countries that have legislative
strengthening programs, thereby enabling them to develop laws and
regulations in a more informed fashion and to improve their oversight
of the executive branch.
* In Bolivia, USAID helped establish a congressional research center
and a budget office to analyze the executive branch's proposed budget.
This office identified approximately $43 million in errors in 1995.
* In Guatemala, assistance was provided to the Unit for Technical
Support, which produced about 150 studies. According to the former
manager of this unit, legislators now consider such reports necessary
before presenting a proposal to the legislature.
* In El Salvador, a unit was created to provide analytical studies to
legislators, staff, and committees.
In two of these countries, USAID's efforts to provide analytical
support to legislatures have faced challenges due to changes in
political support.
* In Bolivia, despite several years of positive impact, after the 1997
elections legislative branch institutions that USAID had supported,
including the congressional research center, lost credibility as
neutral entities and became ineffective, according to a 2001 USAID-
sponsored evaluation.
* In Guatemala, after the 1999 elections, the new majority party cut 18
of 24 legislative technician positions, drastically curtailing the
legislature's analytical capacity.
Citizen Input into Congress Increased, but Outreach Efforts Were
Hindered by a Lack of Legislative Support:
USAID also has assisted legislatures in increasing their constituent
outreach in all five countries with legislative strengthening programs
and has worked to provide more opportunities for citizens to have input
into congressional activities.
* In Peru, USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives provided assistance
for four congressional committees to hold public hearings. To inform
people about the congress, USAID supported seminars and a play that was
performed in 45 public high schools in Lima, Peru.
* In El Salvador, three legislative outreach offices were built outside
the capital. At one center we visited, representatives from three
different political parties shared these offices. They stated that the
presence of these offices has helped decrease partisanship. According
to a USAID official, the legislature has been actively involved in
setting program priorities and has paid for the outreach offices'
recurring costs.
* In Guatemala, three constituent outreach offices were established
that implemented civic education initiatives, organized public
hearings, and handled constituent casework.
In two countries, these outreach activities have not been sustained,
owing to a lack of consistent political support and in some cases
politicization of the project.
* The head of the Nicaraguan Office of Citizen Participation, which
USAID helped to create, noted that her office has received little
financial or political support from the legislature. In visiting the
office, we observed that its location on the 10th floor of an office
building in central Managua makes it less accessible and visible to
citizens outside the capital (see fig. 11).
* USAID ended its legislative strengthening program in Guatemala after
the 1999 elections when the constituent outreach office staff came
under undue political pressure. Today the majority party runs the
offices, and opposition legislators are not permitted to work there,
according to USAID officials.
Figure 11: The Nicaraguan Legislature's Office of Citizen
Participation, Established with USAID Assistance:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Some USAID Legislative Programs Have Leveraged Funding from Other
Donors:
Some of USAID's programs have helped leverage funding from other major
donors for legislative strengthening programs.
* The Salvadoran congressional modernization plan helped the
legislature secure a loan from the IDB to support new information
systems and infrastructure.
* The current USAID program in Bolivia encouraged investment from the
World Bank, the IDB, and two private German foundations.
* In Peru, USAID expects that its project will complement a planned $10
million IDB technical assistance project.
Local Governance and Citizen Participation Were Enhanced in Target
Municipalities, but Broader Impacts Are More Difficult to Achieve:
U.S. programs to strengthen local governance, primarily implemented by
USAID and to a lesser extent by the Inter-American Foundation, aim to
increase the effectiveness, responsiveness, and accountability of
municipal governments and to enhance citizen participation in local
government.
USAID's local governance assistance has focused on:
* strengthening municipal administrative, budgetary, and outreach
capabilities and increasing citizen participation in local government
and:
* supporting national-level policy reform and institutions for
strengthening local governments.
As shown in table 4, local governance assistance has been provided in
all of the six countries we visited, with starting dates ranging from
1993 in El Salvador to 2001 in Peru and Colombia.
Table 4: USAID Local Governance Assistance:
Country: Bolivia; Assistance dates: 1996 - present.
Country: Colombia; Assistance dates: 2001 - present.
Country: El Salvador; Assistance dates: 1993 - present.
Country: Guatemala; Assistance dates: 1998 - present.
Country: Nicaragua; Assistance dates: 1994 - 2001.
Country: Peru; Assistance dates: 2001 - present.
Source: USAID.
[End of table]
In the late 1980s, Latin American governments began to make efforts to
decentralize their countries both fiscally and politically. Countries
are undertaking various decentralization activities, including
developing a nationwide decentralization program, addressing issues of
financial transfers and taxation, and focusing on municipal
accountability and citizen oversight.
With limited funding for local government, USAID has focused on a small
number of municipalities in each country, with the general aim that the
host country government, other donors, and other municipalities would
replicate the programs' concepts. For example, in El Salvador, USAID is
currently assisting 28 of 262 municipalities. In Colombia, USAID's
democratic local governance program, run by several contractors, is
working intensively in 62 of 1,080 municipalities and is also providing
training to members of 226 city councils.
Administrative, Budgetary, and Outreach Capabilities of Target
Municipalities Strengthened:
USAID's local governance programs have helped many target
municipalities operate more effectively and responsively (see fig. 12).
* In El Salvador, target municipalities increased financial resources
by 72 percent between 1996 and 1999 by improving tax records and tax
collection.
* Colombia's program aims to help increase local tax resources by
improving local land records and also partially funds small-scale
social infrastructure projects, such as the installation of water
meters designed to generate revenue to make local water systems
sustainable. Mayors we met with noted that these projects helped
enhance local government planning, budgeting, project design,
implementation, and evaluation.
* In Bolivia, according to yearly surveys done by a USAID contractor
between 1998 and 2000, citizens in USAID-assisted municipalities rated
their local governments more highly on responsiveness than citizens in
other municipalities.
Figure 12: Acting Mayor of Leon, Nicaragua, One of the Municipalities
That Received USAID Assistance to Strengthen Local Governance:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
In addition, USAID programs have helped to increase citizen
participation in, and oversight of, municipal activities in target
municipalities. Some of the municipal oversight activities are closely
tied in with USAID's anticorruption programs.
* In Guatemala, support was provided for municipalities' efforts to
disseminate information and organize public meetings to develop
municipal plans and budgets.
* In Colombia, according to USAID data, more than 4,400 citizens have
participated in the development, implementation, and oversight of 67
municipal-level social infrastructure projects.
On a smaller scale, the work of the Inter-American Foundation also
supports local governance through small-scale, grassroots-driven
projects that often increase and strengthen participation by citizens
and civil society organizations (see fig. 13). For example, in Peru,
one Inter-American Foundation grantee organization described how they
helped raise women's awareness of their rights, resulting in increased
women's participation in municipal affairs. The Inter-American
Foundation also funded a Bolivian foundation that helped increase the
involvement of small-scale rural enterprises, cooperatives, and mayors
in defining a national poverty-reduction strategy. From 1997 to 2001,
the Inter-American Foundation estimates it funded $34.3 million of
projects that had some effect on local governance in the six countries
we visited.
Figure 13: A Meeting Organized by USAID's Office of Transition
Initiatives to Educate Citizens from Rural Peru about the Country's New
Decentralization Program:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Replication Outside Target Municipalities Was Mainly Limited to Bolivia
and El Salvador:
According to our observations and discussions with USAID and contractor
staff, the impact of USAID local governance programs projects has
mainly extended outside target municipalities in Bolivia and El
Salvador.
* In Bolivia, where the government has accepted USAID's approach to
working with local governments to replicate programs, impact has been
broad. According to USAID, 175 of 314 municipalities in Bolivia now
employ some of these participatory methods. Subnational associations of
municipalities and departmental municipal associations have also been
trained to replicate aspects of USAID's programs. An Internet portal
has also been funded that would enable municipalities to share best
practices, have more transparent procurement, expand their financial
base, and pursue advocacy and networking.
* The Salvadoran government has made participatory municipal planning a
prerequisite for some government disbursements. The Salvadoran National
Municipal Association estimated that in 2001, 160 of 262 municipalities
used some form of citizen participation.
In Bolivia and El Salvador, USAID has helped create materials that
provide guidelines for municipalities and implementers on strengthening
local governance and increasing citizen participation.
* In El Salvador, a manual on the basic criteria for participatory
municipal planning was developed, in consultation with other donors.
The Salvadoran government has begun to use this manual to measure
progress in participation and transparency in all municipalities.
* In Bolivia, the IDB has funded the publication of manuals, originally
developed with USAID support, that were made available to all 314
municipalities.
While these manuals have helped increase the scope and sustainability
of USAID's programs in individual countries, they have not been widely
or systematically shared among USAID missions where there are local
governance programs. According to USAID officials in Washington, D.C.,
there is no central repository for these materials, which are usually
produced by contractors. USAID mission staff we spoke with agreed that
materials developed by USAID and its contractors are often not shared
across missions.
Other donors have also helped replicate USAID's projects and expand
their impact beyond target municipalities.
* A municipal-level integrated financial management system implemented
in 4 municipalities in El Salvador will be extended a $2 million IDB
project in at least 20 additional municipalities. In addition, the IDB
and the Salvadoran government are planning a joint $2 million project
to replicate USAID's methodology of linking participatory development
plans to municipal budget support.
* In Bolivia, USAID, a German foundation, and the Dutch Embassy have
adopted a common methodology for municipal strengthening.
USAID's Municipal-Level Efforts Were Constrained by Limited Municipal
Resources and Skills and by Staff Turnover:
USAID's efforts to assist target municipalities have been constrained
by limited municipal resources and skills and by staff turnover.
Although these conditions exist in other countries, they were most
evident in our visits to Nicaragua and Guatemala.
* According to USAID officials, Nicaraguan municipalities do not have
the authority to set local taxes, which have been lowered in some cases
by the national government to attract foreign investment.
* Representatives from a Nicaraguan institute that works with
municipalities expressed concern that local officials may not possess
the appropriate skills to handle increased governance responsibilities.
USAID officials in Nicaragua and contractor staff in Guatemala said
municipal staff turnover has exacerbated this problem, as newly elected
mayors have fired existing staff and brought in less experienced
personnel.
* Municipal staff in Guatemala also stated that they were frustrated
about their lack of resources, noting that it was difficult to put into
practice USAID's method of participatory planning since there were few
funds to implement projects.
Policy Reforms Adopted and Institutions Strengthened at the National
Level, but Results Affected by Level of Political Support for
Decentralization:
At the national level in all six countries, USAID has helped develop
policies and institutions that support municipalities, often by working
with national municipal associations.
* In Peru, policy advice has been given to the government for a
nationwide decentralization program scheduled to begin in 2003. As part
of this support, the Prime Minister's office reviewed local experiences
with decentralization and a congressional committee held public
hearings to obtain input into its draft decentralization law.
* In Guatemala, USAID supported national-level working groups on
municipal indebtedness and tax codes.
* In Colombia, USAID is helping the Colombian Federation of
Municipalities organize meetings among mayors and local leaders at the
regional level to discuss areas for policy reform.
* In Nicaragua, the National Association of Municipalities, which
advises and advocates for municipalities, was established and
strengthened.
However, USAID's work in this area has been affected by the level of
political support for decentralization, which varies by country.
* In Nicaragua, municipal officials and representatives of the national
municipal association noted that the past government had provided
little political or financial support to municipalities. Subsequent to
our visit, the current government passed three decentralization laws in
May 2002, according to a USAID official. The lack of a municipal civil
service law, for example, has posed obstacles to efforts to train local
officials.
* Although the Bolivian government's support for decentralization
decreased after the 1997 elections, USAID continued to work and have an
impact at the municipal level because the key decentralization law was
already in place.
* In El Salvador, USAID's program has been assisted by the government's
commitment to implement a supportive policy agenda.
Anticorruption Policies and Procedures Have Been Implemented in Some
Countries, but the Long-term Impact Is Not Yet Evident:
USAID anticorruption assistance has focused on:
* supporting reforms in anticorruption legislation and regulations,
* introducing programs to make national and municipal government
institutions more transparent and accountable, and:
* fostering citizen awareness and oversight.
As shown in table 5, U.S. anticorruption assistance has been provided
in five of the six countries we visited, beginning with Peru in 1995.
Table 5: USAID Anticorruption Assistance:
Country: Bolivia; Assistance dates: N/A.
Country: Colombia; Assistance dates: 2001 - present.
Country: El Salvador; Assistance dates: 2000 - present.
Country: Guatemala; Assistance dates: 2001 - present.
Country: Nicaragua; Assistance dates: 1994 - 2001.
Country: Peru; Assistance dates: 1995 - 2000; 2001 - present[A].
Source: USAID.
[A] Small-scale program through USAID's Office of Transition
Initiatives.
[End of table]
Anticorruption Legislation Was Developed; Some Institutions Are More
Transparent and Accountable; and Citizen Awareness Has Increased:
USAID's anticorruption activities have helped countries develop
anticorruption legislation and regulations. In Nicaragua, for example,
USAID provided recommendations for the 2001 National Budget Law and
worked with the National Assembly's Anticorruption Commission to
promote civil service reform. In both Colombia and El Salvador, USAID
has supported measures to increase the accountability of public
servants, including the development of a code of ethics.
USAID also has helped government institutions take steps to become more
transparent and accountable.
* In Nicaragua, USAID collaborated with other donors to help develop an
integrated financial management system. This system, when fully
operational, will enable the Ministry of Finance to track the spending
of 13 government ministries, the National Assembly, and the courts (see
fig. 14).[Footnote 22]
* In Colombia, the government adopted regulations that will require
3,000 national and subnational entities to follow standardized internal
control processes that were recommended by USAID.
Figure 14: Nicaragua's Integrated Financial Management System Was
Developed with Assistance from USAID Funds:
[See PDF for image]
Note: When Nicaragua's Integrated Financial Management System is fully
implemented, it will enable the Ministry of Finance to track the
spending of other ministries.
[End of figure]
USAID-supported anticorruption programs have also helped citizens
become more aware and active regarding corruption issues.
* In Colombia, an anticorruption campaign reached 23 million people
through radio and television spots.
* According to a study by a USAID contractor,[Footnote 23] Nicaraguans
have become better informed about corruption issues as a result of a
USAID-supported national anticorruption awareness campaign.
* Municipal-level public oversight in El Salvador and Colombia has
increased as a result of local citizen watchdog groups that have been
supported by USAID.
USAID's Programs Are Challenged by a Lack of Consistent Political
Support and by the Broad Scope of Corruption:
Despite some initial success, the broader impact and sustainability of
USAID's anticorruption programs are still unclear. Transparency
International, which is an international nongovernmental organization
that focuses on combating corruption, concurs that although there have
been some positive developments in the region, the results of
anticorruption programs have been modest so far. According to our
observations and discussions with USAID and host country officials,
USAID's projects have been hindered by politicization and a lack of
consistent political support.
* In Nicaragua, for example, the Comptroller General's Office, which
USAID had been supporting with technical assistance and training, was
reorganized. Now, a committee of political appointees runs it,
impairing its objectivity. In addition, according to a high-ranking
Nicaraguan official, in 2001 the Ministry of Finance fired experienced
staff that had been trained as part of the USAID-and World Bank-
supported integrated financial management system, resulting in lost
institutional memory and expertise.
* In Peru, the Comptroller General's Office has been unable to fully
implement its oversight plans owing to a lack of political or financial
support from the government, according to USAID and Peruvian officials.
Finally, the systemic nature of corruption in Latin America, combined
with public skepticism about anticorruption efforts, poses a major
challenge for USAID's programs. Although the political leaders of
countries such as Colombia and Nicaragua have stated that combating
corruption is a high priority, both USAID and the host countries are in
the relatively early stages of addressing a broad and deeply rooted
problem in the region. Transparency International notes that despite
some progress, corruption remains widespread in the region, and the
credibility of institutions is low. According to a 2002 study focusing
on four Latin American countries, higher levels of corruption are
significantly associated with lower levels of support for the political
system.[Footnote 24] This is the case in El Salvador, according to a
1999 study, where Salvadorans who were victims of corruption
demonstrated less support for the political system than those who were
not.[Footnote 25] In Nicaragua, public sector corruption is endemic,
according to USAID, and the public has little confidence in many
government institutions, in part because of this corruption. According
to a 2001 survey by a USAID anticorruption contractor, more than 70
percent of the Colombians surveyed considered corruption to be common
in government institutions. A work plan prepared by the same USAID
contractor cited a recent World Bank survey indicating that the same
percentage of respondents considered the Colombian Congress to be
corrupt or very corrupt. According to this USAID contractor, widespread
public skepticism exists regarding the national government's effort to
combat corruption. USAID has noted that this lack of confidence poses
challenges to its work in Colombia.
Conclusions:
U.S. governance-related assistance programs have enabled the six
countries we visited to take limited steps toward more effective,
responsive, and accountable government institutions. In some cases,
other donors have taken steps to replicate or expand USAID's programs.
At the same time, however, USAID's governance programs have been
challenged by inconsistent political will and resource constraints. In
light of this modest progress and the continued obstacles to reform, it
is unlikely that U.S. governance-related assistance will be able to
produce sustainable results without ongoing, long-term involvement.
[End of section]
Chapter 4: Human Rights:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Many Latin American countries have suffered from decades of
authoritarian rule and internal conflict. Guatemala, Peru, and Colombia
in particular have endured terrorism, massacres, and forced
disappearances. While the human rights situation in Peru and
Guatemala[Footnote 26] has slowly improved over the last few years, the
situation in Colombia[Footnote 27] has deteriorated even further. U.S.
human rights assistance to Latin America has supported efforts to
foster greater awareness of, and respect for, human rights.
From 1992 to 2002, Guatemala, Peru, and Colombia were among the largest
recipients of USAID human rights funding in Latin America. U.S.
assistance efforts to improve the human rights situation in these
countries have included technical assistance for the creation of
government agencies that address human rights problems, training
programs, education programs, and the provision of protection for
threatened individuals. For the most part, the impact of these projects
has been positive, but they are limited in scope and hindered by a lack
of resources. Often, political and logistical problems must be resolved
for these programs to work better. Despite some improvements in
governments' respect for human rights in these countries, serious
problems persist. In some cases, longer term project results may be
difficult for host governments to sustain owing to high recurring
costs.
As shown in table 6, the U.S. government has provided human rights
assistance over the past decade to Colombia, Guatemala, and Peru.
Table 6: U.S. Human Rights Assistance in Three Countries:
Country: Colombia; Assistance dates: 1996 - present.
Country: Guatemala; Assistance dates: 1993 - 1994, 2000 - present.
Country: Peru; Assistance dates: 1994 - present.
Source: USAID.
[End of table]
U.S. Human Rights Assistance Has Increased Awareness and Government
Accountability:
U.S. human rights assistance has had a positive impact in the three
countries we reviewed that have a current human rights program. In
Guatemala, Peru, and Colombia, human rights assistance has addressed
past abuses, protected threatened individuals, and prevented future
abuses. These efforts have fostered an increased awareness among the
citizenry as to what rights the efforts have, and they have increased
government accountability. Provided primarily by USAID, human rights
assistance in these countries has focused on:
* preventing future human rights abuses by promoting greater public
awareness and mechanisms to address potential incidents;
* protecting human rights by providing physical, economic, and legal
assistance to threatened individuals and communities; and:
* responding to past abuses by supporting reconciliation commissions as
well as the investigation and prosecution of human rights violations.
Mechanisms Were Put in Place to Prevent Human Rights Abuses:
USAID assistance programs have served to foster greater citizen
awareness of human rights and have provided mechanisms for government
action in support of human rights. For example, in Colombia, USAID has
supported the creation of a national information network, called the
"Early Warning System," for citizens, nongovernmental organizations,
and local authorities to report signs of impending massacres or other
human rights violations in their communities by any of the irregular
armed groups involved in that country's ongoing conflict.[Footnote 28]
If a threat is deemed real, the military, police, a national social
service organization, or all three, will be alerted to take appropriate
action. As of August 2002, USAID had provided $600,000 of a total
planned investment of $3.1 million to support direct technical
assistance and training for the network as well as to establish its
central office. USAID also has helped establish 13 regional offices out
of a planned 15, although the Early Warning System director said even
more offices would be needed. According to its Coordinator, the Early
Warning System has been publicized on the Internet and advertised on
both television and radio to inform citizens about its existence. This
project appears to have facilitated citizens' ability to recognize and
report potential human rights threats as well as allowed them to hold
the government directly responsible for taking action. From June 2001
through August 2002, 150 alerts were emitted, of which the military,
the police, or both, responded to 107. The Early Warning System
director estimates that this response has saved 90,000 people from
being victimized, although no actual results indicators have been
developed. :
Although the Early Warning System is a unique tool for preventing
large-scale human rights violations and has great potential for
replication, coordination problems could hinder its proper
implementation and ultimate impact. The director admitted that smooth
communication between the regional and central offices can be
problematic on the weekends, particularly Sundays, when the central
office is not staffed. The system does not appear to have adequate
backup communications methods and at times relies on one cell phone to
ensure that alerts are transmitted to the appropriate authorities.
Furthermore, government authorities have not:
always responded consistently to alerts and have failed to avert major
human rights violations.[Footnote 29]
Increased Protection Provided for Some Threatened Citizens:
The U.S. government also has supported the creation of protection
programs for threatened citizens in Colombia. The Justice Department
supports both a witness and a judicial protection program. Both of
these programs place special emphasis on operational security[Footnote
30] and seek to ensure safe participation in judicial proceedings for
witnesses, judges, investigators, and prosecutors. USAID supports a
separate protection program for human rights defenders. As of August
2002, USAID has helped protect 2,776 individuals from irregular armed
groups.[Footnote 31] In response to lobbying from the human rights
community, the Colombian government has expanded the target protected
population to include criminal witnesses, union leaders, journalists,
leftist party members, mayors (all 1,098 of Colombia's mayors were
threatened with kidnapping or death by the Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Colombia if they did not resign in 2002), council members, and
municipal human rights workers. In the 5-year period between 1997 and
2002, the Colombian government spent approximately $25 million on the
project. Resources, however, are too limited to help all vulnerable
groups of people or even to keep pace with the increasing demand for
individual protection. Nevertheless, the program demonstrates that the
Colombian government is taking some action to protect threatened
citizens.
Official Response Provided for Some Past Abuses:
USAID human rights programs also have fostered greater government
responsiveness to allegations of past or ongoing human rights abuses.
For example, the Human Rights Promoters Network operated by the
Colombian government educates citizen leaders about their rights
protected by law. These leaders are expected to promote greater human
rights awareness by replicating the training in their own communities,
particularly for those groups most vulnerable to human rights
violations.
USAID also has been instrumental in supporting the creation of Human
Rights Ombudsman Offices in five of the six countries by providing
technical assistance, office equipment, and salaried professionals.
These offices address citizen complaints, investigate officials accused
of human rights violations, and propose human rights legislation. The
State Department has reported that despite providing a legal channel
for citizen complaints, funding problems have undermined sustainability
and credibility of the ombudsman offices in Colombia and Nicaragua.
Furthermore, the ombudsman has at times temporarily cast the entire
office in a negative light, as in the case of Guatemala, where an
ombudsmamn was accused of corruption. Various government officials,
however, stated that, according to public opinion polls in Peru and
Bolivia, the ombudsman's office is one of the most highly respected
public organizations.
In Guatemala, USAID helped the Attorney General's Office design the
first Victims Assistance Office in Latin America in 1997, staffed with
full-time doctors, nurses, social workers and lawyers to provide aid to
victims of crime and gather evidence for potential prosecution (see
fig. 15). Since then, each of Guatemala's 23 departments has
established at least one such office.
Figure 15: USAID-supported Victims Assistance Center Managed by the
Attorney General's Office, Guatemala City, Guatemala:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
USAID human rights programs have also fostered greater justice and
resolution for victims and their families. For example, the Foundation
for Anthropological Forensics of Guatemala, with funding from USAID,
has been carrying out exhumations of clandestine cemeteries created
during Guatemala's 34-year civil war (see fig. 16). These efforts have
helped to prove that massacres occurred, put questions about loved ones
to rest, and aided in national reconciliation efforts. Peru's Truth and
Reconciliation Commission is carrying out exhumation efforts with
similar goals and also is investigating culpability for atrocities. One
of the commissioners with whom we met stated that U.S. assistance has
been critical for the functioning of the commission, keeping it in
operation when the Peruvian government was delayed in providing
promised funding. The commission's work is expected to culminate in a
July 2003 report that will make recommendations for government
reparations.
Figure 16: Coffins used by USAID-supported Foundation for
Anthropological Forensics to Reinter Remains Exhumed from Mass Graves
in Guatemala:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Finally, the Justice Department has also worked to achieve justice and
resolution for victims of human rights violations in Colombia. The
department has trained special units of prosecutors and investigators
to pursue major human rights cases and high-impact crimes, such as
massacres, bombings, and kidnappings, in the criminal justice system.
From August 2001 to August 2002, special units operating out of eight
cities prosecuted 167 cases against irregular armed groups, including
high-profile cases such as the assassination attempt on then-
presidential candidate Alvaro Uribe in 2002 and various massacres
across the country (see fig. 17). According to the Justice Department,
it has plans to help the Colombian government expand the number and
size of these units in fiscal years 2003 and 2004.
Figure 17: Human Rights Units Using Forensics Equipment Provided by the
Justice Department to Investigate a Crime Scene in San Jose de
Apartado, Colombia:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Despite Improvements, Serious Human Rights Problems Persist:
According to the State Department's most recent human rights reports,
although government respect for human rights has improved in some
cases, serious problems still remain. In Peru, State reports that in
recent years the government has demonstrated greater respect for human
rights advocates and had generally improved its relationship with civil
society. In Guatemala, State reports that the government generally
respects the human rights of its citizens, but its willingness and
ability to prosecute and convict human rights violators is seriously
limited, and that the police and military may be involved in illegal
executions. In Colombia, the government's human rights record remained
poor, according to State; there were continued efforts to improve the
legal framework and institutional mechanisms for protecting human
rights, but implementation lagged, and serious problems remained in
many areas. For example, members of the police and armed forces have
committed serious human rights abuses and have collaborated with
paramilitary insurgents in doing so, but they have rarely been brought
to justice. Government security forces also often failed to take action
to prevent paramilitary attacks, according to the State Department
report.
Outlook for Human Rights Assistance:
The long-term outlook for many U.S. human rights assistance projects
differs from most of the other programs we reviewed. Some human rights
efforts that the United States is supporting, such as Peru's Truth
Commission, are short term and are projected to end on a specific date.
Other projects, such as assistance to Colombia's internally displaced
persons, are fundamentally humanitarian in nature and may require
outside support for as long as there is internal conflict. Funding for
some longer term projects, however, is questionable owing to
potentially high recurring costs. For example, the Colombian human
rights units trained by the Justice Department still have a very
limited national presence and depend on U.S. support to update and
expand their training and equipment. It is not clear whether the
Colombian government will expand these units on a national basis.
Conclusions:
The United States has provided Colombia, Guatemala, and Peru with some
important tools to help address the human rights problems. Nonetheless,
human rights remain a major concern in Colombia and Guatemala. Given
the magnitude and political complexity of these problems and the
limited scope of U.S. assistance, the tools that the United States has
provided are likely to have only a marginal impact on these problems.
[End of section]
Chapter 5: Elections:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Over the last two decades, many Latin American countries have
transitioned to democracy and most countries in the region have held
elections regularly. Although U.S. election-related assistance has
supported efforts that have contributed to free and fair elections in
the six countries we reviewed, most of this assistance has gone to
three of these countries--Nicaragua, Peru, and El Salvador--to help
them improve electoral institutions and enhance voter access. U.S.
officials noted that of these three countries, only Nicaragua is likely
to require significant international support before its next major
election.
The United States Has Primarily Targeted Three Countries with
Assistance in Election Administration, Voter Access, and Electoral
Observation:
The United States has been the largest donor of election-related
assistance in many of the six countries we visited, and USAID has
provided the bulk of this aid, almost $66 million, during fiscal years
1990 through 2002.[Footnote 32] Most of this assistance went to
Nicaragua ($27 million), Peru ($20 million), and El Salvador ($13
million). The State Department, the National Endowment for Democracy,
the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, and the
International Republican Institute provided smaller amounts of
additional election assistance to some of these countries. The last two
organizations have also used USAID election funds in some of these
countries, according to representatives from these institutions.
As shown in table 7, USAID provided electoral assistance to all six of
the countries visited, starting in 1990 and continuing off and on to
the present.
Table 7: USAID Election Assistance in the Six Countries:
Country: Bolivia; Assistance dates: 1991 - 1999.
Country: Colombia; Assistance dates: 2002.
Country: El Salvador; Assistance dates: 1991, 1994, 1997, 1999, 2000.
Country: Guatemala; Assistance dates: 1990 - 1992, 1994 - 1997, 1999,
2002.
Country: Nicaragua; Assistance dates: 1990, 1995, 1996, 1998, 2001,
2002.
Country: Peru; Assistance dates: 1993 - 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002.
Sources: GAO (analysis) and USAID (data).
[End of table]
Overall, U.S. election assistance activities have focused on:
* improving election administration by building the institutional
capacity of electoral authorities,
* enhancing voter access by improving voter registration and education
and supporting electoral reform, and:
* legitimizing election results by supporting electoral observation by
domestic and international groups.
USAID also has recently helped improve election administration in Peru
and Nicaragua by strengthening the capabilities of electoral
authorities. In Peru, USAID supported staff training, technical
assistance, election planning, logistics, information systems, and
transmission of results by providing almost $3.3 million in assistance
before the 2001 national elections. The agency also provided support at
a lower level to help run Peru's 2002 regional and local elections. In
Nicaragua, USAID has provided similar types of election administration
support since 1990, including more than $1.8 million to the electoral
authority for administrative enhancements in planning, logistics,
information technology, and transmission of results before the 2001
national elections.
U.S. assistance also has helped enhance voter access to the electoral
system by improving voter registration and education in El Salvador,
Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Peru. In El Salvador, according to USAID
officials, the agency supported the establishment of civil and voter
registries and helped issue 937,000 single identity documents, out of
an expected total of 3.2 million documents, which will be used as
official voter identification in future elections. On the basis of an
electoral reform enacted with USAID support, the Salvadorian electoral
authority plans to use the new voter registry to assign voters to
polling stations closer to their residence for the 2004 presidential
elections, thereby further improving voter access. In Nicaragua, USAID
also provided support for registration efforts before the 2001
elections. This assistance helped about 150,000 citizens obtain voting
credentials, according to USAID. To support Guatemala's 2003 elections,
USAID, through OAS, is providing $750,000 in assistance to fund voter
registration activities to increase the access of the population to the
electoral system. In Peru, USAID funded voter-training activities
conducted by nongovernmental groups before the 2001 national elections
and the 2002 regional elections.
In Peru, El Salvador, and Guatemala, U.S. election-related assistance
also has supported electoral reform efforts to improve voter access,
with limited success. This assistance has focused on enhancing the
rules and procedures governing the electoral system in order to improve
political participation of the population. In Peru, USAID provided
support for electoral reforms that were proposed following the 2001
national elections, but these reforms have not yet been enacted. In El
Salvador and Guatemala, following the signing of those countries' Peace
Accords in 1992 and 1996, respectively, the agency supported efforts to
improve electoral rules and procedures and increase political
participation of the population, including participation of women,
indigenous groups, and rural populations. In El Salvador, USAID
supported the drafting of four proposals to reform political parties,
the electoral authority, electoral procedures, and proportional
representation. In Guatemala, the agency supported efforts to develop
an electoral and political parties law and to facilitate public
discussion of various other proposals under consideration. These
reforms are still being considered in the El Salvadoran and Guatemalan
legislatures.
U.S. assistance has recently helped legitimize election results by
supporting election observation in Peru, Nicaragua, and Colombia by
domestic and international groups. In Peru's 2001 elections, for
instance, USAID provided more than $2.1 million to field election
observers from the Peruvian Ombudsman's Office; the Organization of
American States; the National Democratic Institute; the Carter Center;
and Transparencia, which is a local nongovernmental group (see fig.
18). USAID also provided a similar amount to fund international and
domestic observers of Nicaragua's 2001 elections and $325,000 to
support OAS observers of Colombia's 2002 elections.
Figure 18: Poll Workers Organizing Voting Materials before Opening a
Polling Station in Lima, Peru, during the April 2001 National
Elections:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
U.S. Assistance Has Helped Ensure Free and Fair Elections, but
Nicaragua May Still Need Additional Assistance:
The State Department has noted in its human rights reports, on the
basis of reports by domestic and international observation groups, that
elections in the six countries have been generally free and fair, with
the exception of the seriously flawed and controversial 2000 Peruvian
national elections. This pattern of free and fair elections is
consistent with the elections held in other countries in the region
since many of these countries started their transition to democracy
almost two decades ago.
Looking toward the future, USAID officials stated that Peru and El
Salvador might require significantly less international assistance to
run upcoming elections. USAID officials highlighted that these
countries have enhanced their institutional capabilities to run
elections, as demonstrated by the widely recognized legitimacy of their
recent elections and the decreasing international support required by
their electoral authorities for conducting elections. These officials
noted that USAID does not plan to fund any electoral activities in Peru
and after the 2003 elections in El Salvador (see fig. 19).
Figure 19: Voters Waiting to Enter Polling Station in Lima, Peru,
during the April 2001 National Elections:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
On the other hand, Nicaragua, which has received the largest amount of
U.S. election assistance, will likely require significant international
aid to run its next major election, according to USAID officials. These
officials noted that the Nicaraguan electoral authority, despite
efforts to improve it, still faces major financial, planning, and
organizational problems. For example, this electoral authority is still
highly politicized and exhibits serious institutional and managerial
weaknesses that compromise its ability to run elections. Also,
Nicaragua's civil and voter registries are outdated, and many voter
documents used in the 2001 national election were temporary or will
expire soon, leaving the challenge of registering a large number of
voters before the next election. In their final 2001 election
observation reports, the Carter Center and the International Republican
Institute noted that, despite having held a free and fair election,
Nicaragua still has important shortcomings in its electoral system,
particularly in election administration and voter access.[Footnote 33]
Conclusions:
U.S. elections assistance has helped all six countries we visited
realize a fundamental component of democracy--free and fair elections.
While continued improvements will be needed to achieve wider
participation and greater efficiency in elections administration,
particularly in Nicaragua, basic capabilities are in place in these
countries to enable them to continue to hold free and fair elections
into the future.
[End of section]
Chapter 6: Management Issues Hinder Impact and Sustainability of U.S.
Democracy Assistance:
Many organizations and entities are involved in providing democracy
assistance in the six countries we reviewed, including U.S. government
agencies, other multilateral and bilateral donors, and nongovernmental
organizations. Effective coordination and cooperation among these
players is critical for achieving meaningful, long-term results from
assistance efforts. U.S. agencies have not always managed their
programs in a way that would leverage the contributions from all of
these organizations, particularly other major donors, and maximize the
impact and sustainability of U.S. funded programs. Assistance efforts
are not always well-coordinated among the agencies, and strategic plans
have not defined overarching goals and the roles that key U.S. agencies
will play in these efforts or ways to link these efforts with those of
other donors to help ensure that results are sustainable. Furthermore,
evaluation of program results and sharing lessons learned has been
limited among U.S. agencies and implementers across countries where
this assistance is provided.
Poorly Coordinated Program Management Limits Effectiveness of U.S.
Democracy Assistance:
Although a wide variety of U.S. government agencies and international
donors provide democracy assistance, coordination of this assistance
was inconsistent in the six countries we visited. We found that those
organizations supporting democratic institutions did not always
cooperate in a way that would maximize the impact and sustainability of
their efforts. As a result, the programs they implemented were often
fragmented and not mutually supportive and failed to overcome common
financial and political obstacles. U.S. government agencies have not
outlined a long-term, strategic approach to this assistance that
considers all of the major parties and available resources and
information.
Poor Coordination and Strategic Planning among U.S. Government
Agencies:
The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (the Results Act)
requires U.S. government agencies to identify their strategic goals and
develop annual plans for achieving them.[Footnote 34] Further, as we
have previously reported in our work relating to this act, such plans
should identify how similar programs conducted by other agencies will
be coordinated to ensure that goals are consistent, and, as
appropriate, program efforts are mutually reinforcing.[Footnote 35]
The annual performance plans prepared by the State Department and USAID
in accordance with the Results Act both identify promoting democracy
and human rights abroad as agency strategic goals. However, neither
USAID's or State's plans nor the subordinate regional or country-level
planning documents we reviewed specifically address the role of other
U.S. agencies and donors in ensuring that U.S.-funded democracy
projects are well coordinated and leverage domestic and international
resources. With few exceptions, these planning documents did not take
into account the unique resources that each of the various U.S.
agencies has to offer and the role each could play over what will be a
long-term effort to help countries achieve and institutionalize
democratic reforms. Although some documents mentioned that other
agencies would be involved in the assistance effort, the nature or
duration of that involvement was not discussed in detail.
The relationship among USAID and the State and Justice Departments has
frequently been difficult when it comes to rule of law programs, which
has hindered long-term joint planning in that area. As we noted in a
1999 report, interagency coordination on rule of law assistance has
been a long-standing problem.[Footnote 36] At that time, the Chairman
of the House Committee on International Relations had expressed the
concern that, because funds were provided through so many channels,
rule of law programs had become inefficient and uncoordinated. Little
progress has been made to resolve this problem. According to U.S.
officials with whom we spoke, the relationship among implementing
agencies is often still characterized more by competition than
cooperation and has led to fragmented programs that are not always
mutually supportive in achieving common goals. For example, in Bolivia,
poor communication and disagreement among these agencies on their
respective roles has disrupted efforts to assist the development of
that country's national police by casting the program's staffing and
funding in uncertainty. Unresolved coordination issues among these
agencies have precluded efforts to establish a joint strategy on law
enforcement development on either the regional, or country-specific
level. As a result, in the countries we visited, the agencies are often
operating on parallel tracks and not developing programs that are
closely coordinated and mutually supportive.
Better coordination among these agencies could leverage the critical
resources and comparative advantage that each offers to overcome
obstacles. For example, while USAID has significant institutional
experience designing and implementing development programs, the Justice
Department has significant technical expertise in law enforcement and
criminal investigations, and the State Department has diplomatic
relationships and influence that can be helpful in resolving political
impediments to reform.
Limited Cooperation among International Donors:
Other international donors have major efforts to promote democracy in
the countries we visited, and two of the largest, the World Bank and
the IDB, are funded in part by contributions from the U.S. government.
However, the strategic plans and other related planning documents
prepared by the State and Justice Departments and USAID included very
little information on plans to cooperate with other major international
donors in the six countries we reviewed. Some plans mentioned a few
successful cooperative efforts in the past, but donor cooperation was
not consistently discussed as an integral component of the U.S.
government's approach in any of the areas of democracy assistance we
reviewed.
We observed that donors working in closer coordination, with a common
strategy and work plan, can make significant progress. In Bolivia, the
U.S. and German governments embarked on a joint program to implement
the new criminal code, each providing mutually supporting activities
and financing. As a result of this effort, a large number of legal
operators were trained on the code's provisions, and the Bolivian
government began implementing the code on schedule. Other examples of
close coordination include the following:
* In Bolivia, USAID, a German foundation, and the government of the
Netherlands have adopted a common methodology for municipal
strengthening, expanding the impact of USAID's initial contributions to
additional municipalities.
* In El Salvador, the IDB is funding projects to extend a USAID-
supported, municipal-level financial management system to additional
localities.
* Donors and Latin American countries have been collaborating
regionally on anticorruption activities since the early 1990s. For
example, the Donors Consultative Group of the USAID-supported Americas'
Accountability/Anticorruption Project has helped to increase the number
of anticorruption projects in the region, according to USAID. Other
multilateral initiatives, such as the Inter-American Convention Against
Corruption and ongoing United Nations negotiations for a global
anticorruption convention, are also mobilizing states to focus on
corruption.
Such donor cooperation was not always the norm in the countries we
visited, however, and donors often pursued parallel but not necessarily
mutually supporting activities. Donor coordination was generally
characterized by organizations keeping one another informed of the
nature, progress, and location of their activities. Across the six
countries, the U.S. government and other donors generally worked on
different agendas in the area of judicial reform. In Bolivia, for
example, USAID and the World Bank divided their justice sector reform
efforts between host government agencies using different approaches.
The two organizations have helped the government develop two
information systems--one to track criminal cases and one for civil
cases. At the time of our visit in June 2002, neither system was being
fully implemented on a national scale, and USAID officials were
concerned about the future compatibility of these two systems.
Pooling financial resources and political influence could enable donor
organizations to overcome some political and financial obstacles that
limit the impact and sustainability of assistance programs. The United
States, with its on-the-ground presence and long-standing diplomatic
relationships, can offer significant technical expertise and influence
to help achieve political support. At the same time, the multilateral
development banks, in particular, can offer significant, low-cost,
long-term financing for host governments. Better coordinated, these
resources could be combined to (1) leverage political support from host
governments for mutually agreed-upon reform programs, (2) devise
appropriate program designs, and (3) provide long-term financing that
could help ensure that the programs are sustainable.
Donor cooperation can be difficult for a number of political and
cultural reasons. Donors may have different development priorities or
policies that may not allow them to work on the same types of programs
in some cases. U.S. government officials have also cited bureaucratic
incompatibilities between the agencies that effectively limited the
ability of the agencies to work closely together on certain projects.
In one country we visited, the working relationship between USAID and a
multilateral development bank has been difficult, according to a USAID
mission official with whom we spoke. Overcoming some of these obstacles
to closer cooperation may require a high-level commitment and impetus
from the senior management of these organizations.
Limited Evaluation and Sharing of Lessons Learned among Program
Implementers:
U.S. agencies and their implementing contractors and grantees have not
extensively compiled and shared information on program results. Many
U.S. assistance programs have not been evaluated, and important
democracy project information, such as materials, final reports, and
evaluations, are not systematically made available to the large body of
project implementers.
Inconsistent Program Evaluation by U.S. Agencies:
The U.S. agencies implementing democracy assistance programs have not
consistently evaluated the results of their activities. Our review of
project documentation and our discussions with senior U.S. government
officials at the State and Justice Departments and USAID indicate that
limited efforts have been made to review project results over time to
ensure that impact and sustainability have been achieved. In
particular, officials from the State and Justice Departments stated
that those agencies have conducted very little formal evaluation of law
enforcement assistance. Although USAID has a more extensive process for
assessing its activities, its efforts to evaluate democracy assistance
have not been consistent. Although governance programs in Latin
America, in particular legislative strengthening, have undergone
considerable evaluation, we found relatively little formal evaluation
of rule of law, human rights, and elections assistance. The level of
evaluation has varied geographically as well: While USAID sponsored a
comprehensive democracy evaluation for Bolivia, it has not conducted
similar studies for the other countries we visited. In 2002, USAID
commissioned a private contractor to complete a broad study of the
agency's achievements in its rule of law programs around the world,
including in many of the countries we visited. This recently completed
study provides information on the nature and history of USAID rule of
law programs in individual countries but was not meant to be an
evaluation of these programs, according to a USAID official.
Furthermore, the agencies have not consistently used available survey
data to help evaluate the impact of their activities. In several of the
countries we visited, a USAID contractor had been conducting regular
"democratic values surveys" to gauge public opinion about recent and
ongoing political and government reforms, many of which the United
States has assisted. The mission in Bolivia has used the results of
this survey as a source of data for monitoring, among other things, the
impact of Bolivia's decentralization activities; however, the other
missions or embassies we visited did not consistently use these data as
a tool for evaluating or monitoring the impact of U.S. assistance.
Without systematic evaluations identifying lessons learned and best
practices, agencies will have difficulty making informed decisions
about a strategy to maximize impact and sustainability and planning for
future efforts. For example, USAID and the State and Justice
Departments are currently debating the U.S. government's strategy for
police assistance. Each agency has participated in police development
programs, and officials from each agency stated that they are uniquely
qualified to manage such programs in the future. Yet, none of these
agencies has conducted a comprehensive evaluation of police assistance
program results to inform the debate about how best to provide this
assistance. Evaluations or other efforts to systematically compile
lessons learned across countries could enable a more objective
comparison of agency performance to identify the advantages of one
approach over another and to inform a long-term interagency strategy
for achieving various democracy assistance goals.
Project Materials and Information on Results Are Not Widely Available:
USAID has not taken steps to pool the resources produced by U.S.-funded
democracy program implementers, including international development
firms, private voluntary organizations, and other nongovernmental
organizations to help them achieve common and related goals more
effectively and efficiently. USAID-funded contractors often used
similar approaches to achieve democratic strengthening and reform in
many of the countries we visited. For example, support for local
governments often aimed to influence the broad policy framework in a
country while directly assisting a relatively small number of target
municipalities. However, we found little evidence that the project
implementers in these countries had shared with each other the
materials they had developed. For example, in several countries, USAID
financed the printing of operational guidance for municipal officials,
ranging from handbooks on countrywide criteria for governance to
detailed, step-by-step manuals on ways to improve local public
administration. The contractors and USAID officials stated that to
their knowledge, these handbooks had not been systematically shared
among USAID missions or contractors.
Although mission officials and implementers told us they frequently
shared information on an informal basis, the agency's attempts to
systematically compile information about democracy program
implementation and results to establish an agency wide "institutional
knowledge base" are incomplete. USAID has a very decentralized
organizational structure, and, according to USAID officials, the agency
has no central repository of implementation reports and other program
documents that can be accessed by the various democracy program
implementers to determine, among other things, which activities have
been more successful than others. Although USAID maintains some
documentation from its democracy programs, such as scopes of work for
projects, at its intranet site, the agency does not compile
contractors' technical manuals and final reports with information on
implementation and results. Such information could be very instrumental
in identifying approaches that are most appropriate for replication,
while avoiding developing similar materials in different countries at
additional expense. As we have previously reported, use of lessons
learned is a principal component of an organizational culture committed
to continuous improvement. Lessons learned mechanisms serve to
communicate acquired knowledge more effectively and to ensure that
beneficial information is factored into planning, work processes, and
activities. Lessons learned provide a powerful method of sharing good
ideas for improving work processes, program design and implementation,
and cost-effectiveness.[Footnote 37] USAID mission directors and other
agency officials stated that future assistance efforts would be more
effective if they were designed on the basis of concrete information
and lessons learned from similar programs in other countries.
Conclusions:
Local resources for sustaining democracy programs are difficult to
mobilize given the serious economic problems in the countries we
visited, and funding shortages were often cited by program implementers
and beneficiaries as major obstacles to long-term program success.
Therefore, it is crucial that the U.S. government and other
international donors manage available international resources as
efficiently as possible. Achieving greater impact and responsibility in
democracy assistance projects may be more likely with a more strategic
approach, including closer coordination, and greater information
sharing among U.S. agencies, international donors, and other program
implementers.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To ensure that U.S. assistance activities designed to support and
strengthen democracies in Latin America have the maximum impact and
sustainability, we recommend that the Secretary of State, the Attorney
General, and the Administrator of USAID:
* develop more comprehensive interagency strategic plans at the
regional and country level for democracy assistance addressing how U.S.
agencies will cooperate with each other and other major donors to
achieve greater impact and sustainability in democracy programs;
* establish a strategy for periodically evaluating democracy assistance
projects that is consistent across agencies, countries, and types of
programs; and:
* establish a systematic mechanism to share information on development
approaches, methods, materials, and results from all democracy
assistance projects among U.S. agencies and implementers.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of State and
Justice, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the
Inter-American Foundation for their comment. The Inter-American
Foundation did not comment on this report. The comments of the State
and Justice Departments and USAID, along with our responses to specific
points, are reprinted in appendixes II, III, and IV, respectively.
In general, the State and Justice Departments and USAID acknowledged
that democracy assistance is a long-term challenge that requires host
country commitment and support for reforms, and that U.S.-supported
institutions and programs must ultimately be sustainable, as we discuss
in this report. Overall, the agencies basically agreed with the thrust
of our recommendations regarding how the management of program
assistance could be improved. They also noted that in some cases,
activities are either planned or under way that would address our
recommendations.
The State Department concurred with our recommendation that it work
with other agencies to develop comprehensive strategic plans for
democracy assistance at the regional and country levels. State agreed
with our recommendation that democracy assistance programs should be
evaluated but said that our recommendation was a "broad brush" approach
that is not appropriate for the diversity of activities covered in the
report. State said that it is taking steps with USAID and the Justice
Department to improve evaluation, including recently agreeing to
undertake joint evaluations of justice programs. Such actions appear to
meet the intent of our recommendation. However, our recommendation is
intended to establish a basis for periodic overall assessments of
democracy programs as well as regular evaluations of specific
components of democracy assistance, such as rule of law, governance,
and elections.
While the State Department agreed that it would be desirable to have
better access to project information across the board, they noted that
the recommendation goes too far in suggesting the need for a
centralized record system containing all project materials. State also
said that much useful information is currently shared among programs on
an informal basis. Our recommendation is designed to address an
important problem we identified in this report, namely that much
information is currently not being shared among agencies or programs
with similar goals, approaches, and methods. The thinking behind this
recommendation is the State Department and other agencies that fund and
implement democracy assistance programs should maintain key program
documents and evaluations along with examples of materials used for
core activities (e.g., training manuals so that groups implementing
similar programs can benefit from lessons learned). Given the advances
in Web-based technology as a way of sharing information, we believe
this recommendation is not unreasonable. The State Department also
provided technical comments, which we have incorporated in this report,
where appropriate.
The Justice Department endorsed our recommendation for better
coordination and planning among State, USAID, and Justice; agreed that
objective, regularized evaluation of assistance programs is needed to
consistently obtain useful information on program outcomes; and
supported the recommendation that agencies involved in democracy
assistance should establish effective information-sharing mechanisms.
The Justice Department also provided technical comments, which we have
incorporated in this report, where appropriate.
USAID also agreed with our recommendations. Regarding our
recommendation on strategic planning, USAID said that it participates
in a number of planning activities but that such planning systems can
always be upgraded. It also agreed that periodic evaluations of program
outcomes and results are important, noting that evaluating democracy
programs is a challenge made difficult by the complexities and
subtleties of local political situations that influence democracy
program implementation and outcomes. USAID also agreed with our
recommendation that agencies need to do a better job of sharing
information on development methods, approaches, and materials, noting
that a new bureau within the agency should respond to these concerns.
USAID also provided technical comments, which we have incorporated
throughout this report, where appropriate.
The State and Justice Departments both commented on our discussion of a
provision of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 that restricts the use
of foreign assistance funds for training and financial support for
police and other law enforcement forces of foreign governments (section
660). In its comments, State said that the Executive Branch should
develop and propose to the Congress new legislation on law enforcement
assistance, stating that the Executive Branch needs a clear statement
of its authority to provide law enforcement assistance abroad, coupled
with whatever specific prohibitions the Congress may wish to consider.
The Justice Department stated that it is concerned that section 660 may
in some instances adversely impact long-range planning and the
development of broad-based, practical police assistance programs. The
Justice Department also indicated that it will work with the State
Department and USAID to consider whether changes to section 660 would
be appropriate. We believe the approach suggested by the State and
Justice Departments could be an important and useful step in providing
options for the Congress to consider regarding potential amendments to
section 660.
[End of section]
Appendixes:
Appendix I: U.S. Democracy Assistance to Six Latin American Countries:
During fiscal years 1992 through 2002, the United States has provided
democracy assistance to Bolivia, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Nicaragua, and Peru. The U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID) and the Departments of State and Justice have provided the bulk
of this assistance in the areas of rule of law, governance, human
rights, and elections. Rule of law assistance has supported the
modernization of the criminal justice system and increased the access
of the local population to justice. Governance assistance has funded
efforts to strengthen legislatures and national and local governments
and to enact and implement anticorruption measures. Human rights
assistance has supported activities to improve public awareness of and
government accountability for human rights abuses. Election assistance
has helped enhance electoral institutions, increase voter registration
and education, and support electoral observation.
Bolivia:
USAID rule of law assistance to Bolivia began in earnest in 1991 when
USAID sponsored a United Nations diagnostic study of Bolivia's judicial
system to determine priorities and build consensus for reform. Since
then USAID has been closely involved in a fundamental revamping of
Bolivia's criminal justice system. USAID supported a number of justice
sector reforms, including drafting and promoting laws establishing new
justice sector institutions. These institutions included the
Constitutional Tribunal, the Judicial Council, the Ombudsman, and the
Office of Public Defense. In 1993, USAID initiated the Bolivian
Administration of Justice Program, focusing primarily on the drafting
and passage of a new Criminal Procedures Code. This code, which
introduced an oral, accusatory trial system to increase the efficiency,
transparency, and fairness of the criminal justice system, was enacted
in 1999 and went into effect in 2001. Since its enactment, USAID rule
of law assistance has primarily focused on providing training and
technical assistance to institutions concerning implementation of the
code and also on disseminating public education about the new code.
During the late 1990s, USAID and the Justice Department also assisted
the Bolivian National Police and the Attorney General's Office
(Fiscalia) to enhance investigative capabilities. The departments did
this primarily through supplementing training and forensics equipment
and technology to manage and track criminal cases electronically. From
1992 to 2002, USAID provided $18.5 million and the Justice Department
administered $9.9 million in rule of law assistance to Bolivia.
U.S. governance assistance to Bolivia started in 1992, when USAID
provided funds to establish and strengthen the congressional research
center and budget office. After the 1997 elections, the institutions
that USAID had supported in the legislature lost credibility as neutral
entities and became less effective, according to a USAID-sponsored
evaluation. In 2001, USAID began a new program aimed at strengthening
the representative function of the Bolivian Congress by helping
deputies from single-member districts, who are elected directly by
citizens in a given district, increase their outreach to their
constituencies. USAID's local governance program in Bolivia began in
1996, soon after the passage of the Popular Participation Law. This law
divided Bolivia into self-governing municipalities with popularly
elected local leaders for the first time in the country's history. The
program has aimed to make local governments more responsive to citizen
needs and demands and to strengthen municipalities' administrative and
financial capacities. The program's methods are now being implemented
in about 175 municipalities. USAID also is using Web-based technology
to expand its local governance program. USAID provided at least $14.6
million on governance assistance to Bolivia between 1992 and 2002.
USAID began providing electoral support to Bolivia in 1988, primarily
to institutionalize a politically neutral National Electoral Court.
Between 1991 and 1999, USAID provided Bolivia with $2.4 million in
election assistance to increase voter registration and education and
ensure that the elections held during this period were free and fair.
Colombia:
USAID's rule of law assistance to Colombia began in 1986, primarily
focusing on restructuring and improving Colombia's justice sector and
providing protection for judicial figures and institutions. This
program culminated in the enactment of a new constitution in 1991,
which created new justice sector institutions (e.g., the Judicial
Council, Constitutional Court, and Prosecutor's Office) and procedures,
including oral trials. USAID assistance from 1991 to 1995 focused on
implementing the reforms, including support for the development of
these new institutions. In 1995, the program expanded to support
improved access to justice, including the creation of justice houses to
provide legal services in poor and marginalized communities. USAID has
continued to support the transition to a more transparent accusatorial
system, primarily through training judges, prosecutors, and public
defenders. The Justice Department has provided an array of training for
prosecutors and law enforcement officials, focusing mainly on
specialized criminal investigations units, human rights,
counternarcotics, money laundering, and other specific types of crimes.
Between 1992 and 2002, USAID provided $48.3 million and the Justice
Department administered $37.9 million in rule of law assistance to
Colombia.
The U.S. governance assistance program in Colombia, which began in
2001, has aimed to strengthen municipal governments, increase citizen
participation, and combat corruption. Local officials and citizens have
played a central role in planning and overseeing social infrastructure
projects cofinanced by USAID, such as the construction of schools and
sewage systems. USAID's anticorruption program in Colombia, also
initiated in 2001, has focused on improving internal control systems,
strengthening citizen participation, and training local officials on
oversight and transparency. USAID reports that it has provided at least
$54.6 million for these programs.
USAID human rights assistance in Colombia began with technical and
financial support for the Human Rights Ombudsman Office, which was
created by the new constitution in 1991. The Justice Department began
training special human rights units within the Attorney General's
Office in 1996. Assistance for both of these projects is ongoing. USAID
funded the majority of its human rights assistance projects after 2000,
including the development of an Early Warning System to alert
authorities of potential human rights violations, a protection program
for threatened individuals, training for community human rights
promoters, and post emergency assistance to people who have been
internally displaced by the nearly 40-year-old internal conflict. In
addition, USAID has supported efforts to foster reconciliation and
provide assistance to victims and excluded groups.
USAID provided $325,000 in election assistance to Colombia in 2002.
This assistance focused on supporting a mission of the Organization of
American States to observe the 2002 national elections, which were
declared to be generally free and fair.
El Salvador:
USAID's rule of law assistance to El Salvador started in 1984 with a
focus on enhancing criminal investigative capabilities and modernizing
the justice system. Following the 1992 Peace Accords, USAID supported
efforts to restructure the justice sector, reduce criminal case
backlogs, and draft new criminal codes. El Salvador began implementing
the new codes in 1998, and USAID and the Justice Department have
supported these implementation efforts. USAID has focused on training
judges, prosecutors, and public defenders to help them transition to an
oral, adversarial system. The Justice Department has focused on
building and strengthening a new police force--particularly, its
criminal investigations capabilities. Most recently, the department has
supported a new policing model characterized by active community-
oriented patrols. From 1992 to 2002, USAID provided $27.8 million and
the Justice Department administered $38.2 million to support these
efforts.
USAID's governance assistance to El Salvador began in 1990, when it set
up a legislative assistance program to help develop a master plan for
legislative modernization, establish a mentoring program for which
students complete studies of interest to legislators, and open three
legislative outreach offices outside the capital. These projects are
still ongoing. In 1993, USAID initiated its local governance program in
El Salvador, which helped to strengthen municipal management and
increase citizen participation in 28 target municipalities and assisted
national-level organizations that support municipalities. Together
with other donors, USAID helped create a manual on basic criteria for
participatory municipal development that is now available to
municipalities across the country. USAID anticorruption assistance in
El Salvador, which began in 2000, has focused on institutional
strengthening, anticorruption reforms, public awareness, and
municipal-level anticorruption activities. USAID has provided at least
$23 million for these programs.
Since 1991, USAID has provided about $13 million to support four
national elections in El Salvador. After the Peace Accords were signed
in 1992, the agency supported reintegrating former guerrilla groups
into the political system. Elections assistance in the 1990s also
helped create a new, impartial electoral authority and supported the
establishment of a new civil/voter registry. Because El Salvador has
significantly improved election administration and voter access and had
run free and fair elections during the 1990s, USAID does not intend to
provide additional election support to this country after the 2003
elections.
Guatemala:
USAID rule of law assistance to Guatemala started in 1986, with an
early focus on training judges, prosecutors, and public defenders and
promoting legal reforms. USAID supported the enactment and
implementation of criminal code reforms in the mid-1990s to improve the
functioning of the criminal justice system. Following the enactment of
a new criminal procedures code in 1994, USAID's assistance focused on
preparing justice sector officials to carry out new roles and
responsibilities under the code for conducting investigations and
holding oral trials. Following the signing of the Peace Accords in
1996, this assistance expanded to building the capabilities of justice
institutions in the capital and supporting justice centers in other
cities to improve the delivery of justice services. These justice
centers integrate various justice institutions, modernize case tracking
and administration, and increase access to justice. The State and
Justice Departments have also provided assistance to law enforcement
institutions, focused mainly on improving criminal investigations under
the new codes. From 1992 to 2002, USAID has provided $23.8 million and
the Justice Department has administered $13.6 million in rule of law
assistance to Guatemala.
USAID's governance-related assistance to Guatemala began with a
legislative strengthening program in 1997. The program focused on
improving the legislature's research and analytical capabilities and
strengthening constituent outreach. Although USAID's legislative
assistance had some initial positive results, the agency ended its
support after the 1999 elections when it became clear that the new
congressional leadership was not willing to support the program.
USAID's local governance program in Guatemala, which began in 1998, has
helped increase participatory planning and community outreach in about
40 municipalities. USAID has also provided support and advice to the
government of Guatemala on national-level policy affecting municipal
indebtedness, reforms to the municipal law, and the municipal tax code.
USAID has provided more than $9.4 million for these programs.
In the early 1990s, USAID provided training and program development
support to the Human Rights Ombudsman Office. Recent USAID human rights
projects in Guatemala have focused on supporting national
reconciliation efforts. Since 2000, USAID has supported the exhumation
of clandestine cemeteries to identify victims of human rights
atrocities during the 1962 to 1996 civil war and to help family members
achieve a measure of closure. USAID began the Human Rights and
Reconciliation Program in 2001 to coordinate human rights groups;
mobilize citizens to defend their rights; and disseminate information
about the civil war for remembrance purposes, among other activities.
USAID has provided $3.2 million in election assistance to Guatemala
since 1990. This assistance has focused on improving voter registration
and education and promoting electoral reforms. In 1995, USAID focused
on broadening electoral participation throughout the country,
especially in rural and indigenous areas. In 1999, USAID supported
increased participation in two electoral events--the constitutional
reform referendum and the general elections. USAID is currently
providing a small amount of assistance to support electoral reform
efforts, with limited success.
Nicaragua:
USAID and the State and Justice Departments have provided most of the
rule of law assistance to Nicaragua since the 1990s. This assistance
has focused on supporting the modernization of the criminal justice
system. It has supported the enactment of criminal codes and helped
prepare Nicaragua for the implementation of these codes starting in
December 2002 by supporting the creation and strengthening of justice
institutions, including the courts, Public Prosecutor's Office, and
Public Defender's Office, and by building the capabilities and various
law enforcement organizations for conducting criminal investigations.
From 1992 to 2002, USAID has provided $11.3 million and the Justice
Department has administered $1.7 million to support these efforts.
USAID has provided the bulk of U.S. governance assistance to Nicaragua
since 1991. This assistance has focused on strengthening the
legislature and local governments and supporting anticorruption
efforts. USAID's legislative strengthening program, which lasted from
1991 to 2001, focused on strengthening infrastructure, improving
planning and administration, and increasing outreach to constituents.
Although there was initial progress, USAID ended its support in 2001 in
part because of a lack of political will in the legislature to
cofinance USAID programs. The local governance program organized by
USAID worked in 25 municipalities to strengthen municipal
administration and increase citizen participation in municipal affairs.
USAID also helped establish and strengthen the national association of
municipalities, which is now self-sustaining. This program ended in
2001, and USAID has indicated that it will consider once again focus on
strengthening local governance as part of its new 5-year strategy.
USAID's anticorruption program in Nicaragua, which ran from 1998 to
2001, aimed to make institutions more accountable and transparent and
to increase public awareness of corruption. USAID provided about $6
million for these programs.
USAID has provided about $27 million in election assistance to
Nicaragua since 1990. This assistance has focused on improving the
institutional capacity of Nicaragua's electoral authority, improving
voter registration and education, and legitimizing election results by
supporting domestic and international electoral observation groups.
Although this assistance has helped Nicaragua run three national
elections that were determined to be free and fair since 1990, that
country still faces major election administration and voter access
problems. Nicaragua is likely to require additional international
support before holding its next national election.
Peru:
USAID rule of law assistance to Peru began in 1986 working with key
public sector institutions on justice sector reform. Due to the actions
of President Alberto Fujimori to weaken the independence and
accountability of the justice sector, USAID discontinued direct
assistance to most public institutions in the sector in 1994. Funding
was diverted from rule of law to human rights and civil society
activities, with the exception of a small amount of funding for free
legal and conciliation services. In 2002, USAID initiated a new rule of
law program centered on building support and consensus for justice
sector reforms through civil society coalitions. The Justice Department
has sponsored some small-scale training efforts in the 1990s but has no
ongoing assistance effort. From 1992 through 2002, USAID provided $13.2
million and the Justice Department administered $27,000 to support
these efforts.
USAID has provided the bulk of U.S. governance assistance to Peru. From
2001 to 2003, USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives focused on
providing small-scale, governance-related grants in the areas of
legislative strengthening, decentralization, anticorruption, and
civil-military relations. The office estimates that it will spend $11
million by the time the program ends. In mid-2002, USAID began
providing legislative strengthening assistance to enable a civil
society coalition to conduct citizen outreach on legislative issues,
and in fall 2002, USAID began a 4-year project to increase
congressional transparency, outreach, and oversight. In the area of
local governance, USAID has been providing policy advice to the
government for a nationwide decentralization program scheduled to begin
in 2003. USAID also has begun to provide support to a civil society
coalition to share decentralization-related information with civil
society, promote citizen participation in governance, communicate
citizens' opinions to the government, and promote oversight of regional
and local authorities. In 2003, USAID plans to fund an $18 million, 5-
year "Pro-Decentralization" project to strengthen municipal government
and increase citizen participation.
From 1992 to 1996, USAID helped the Peruvian Attorney General's Office
establish 12 detainee registry centers to document the location and
legal status of all people detained by the authorities on charges of
terrorism. Using the registry, people have been able to find
information on their missing loved ones. Also, since 1997, USAID has
supported the activities of a Peruvian nongovernmental organization in
its investigations and attempts to release prisoners being held on
illegitimate terrorism charges. USAID also has supported the operation
of the Truth Commission, which the President of Peru created in 2000
with a mandate to investigate allegations of human rights violations
during 1980 to 2000. Finally, USAID has provided continuous technical
and financial support to the Human Rights Ombudsman since its inception
in 1994.
USAID has provided over $20 million in election assistance to Peru for
supporting national and local elections in 1995, 1998, 2000, 2001, and
2002. This assistance included technical assistance to the electoral
institutions and support for voter education and international
observations of the elections. Because this assistance, following the
departure of President Fujimori, helped the electoral authorities run
free and fair elections in 2001 and 2002, USAID does not plan to
provide additional election support to Peru.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of State:
United States Department of State Washington, D. C. 20520:
MAR 05 2003:
Dear Ms. Westin:
We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "FOREIGN
ASSISTANCE: U.S. Democracy Programs in Six Latin American Countries
Have Yielded Modest Results," GAO-03-358, GAO Job Code 320081.
The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.
If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact Fay
Armstrong, Office of Policy, Planning and Coordination, Bureau of
Western Hemispheres at (202-) 647-5333.
Christopher B. Burnham
Assistant Secretary and Chief Financial Officer:
Signed by Christopher B. Burnham
Enclosure:
As stated.
cc: GAO/IAT - John Brummet State/OIG - Luther Atkins State/WHA/PPC -
Linda Jewell:
Ms. Susan S. Westin, Managing Director, International Affairs and
Trade, U.S. General Accounting Office.
GAO Draft Report: Foreign Assistance: U.S. Democracy Programs in Six
Latin American Countries Have Yielded Modest Results (GAO-03-358, GAO
Code 320127):
The Department of State is pleased to have the opportunity to comment
on the GAO's latest report on democracy assistance to Latin America. It
was not until the 1980s, when the pendulum swung definitively away from
military dictatorships in the region, that the United States could
embark on a program of assistance of this kind. The GAO has issued
numerous reports on USAID and DOJ programs since that time, generally
finding that such assistance is needed and justified while noting both
bureaucratic and political obstacles in administering programs and
achieving lasting results. The current report is the broadest review to
date, covering ten years of experience with justice, human rights,
governance, and elections assistance in six countries with large
programs. While the Department agrees with the report's overall
conclusion - that notwithstanding the large investments to date,
sustainable results are not evident in all cases but that such
assistance should continue --it does not agree with many of the
specific characterizations of activities or inter-agency
relationships. For the sake of brevity, the Department will respond to
the recommendations and clarify some related points in the text.
The first recommendation calls for the three agencies - State, USAID
and Justice - to "develop more comprehensive strategic plans at the
regional and country levels to address cooperation among agencies and
other major donors." While the Department agrees that, for reasons
discussed below, a more strategic approach among the three agencies is
desirable in the justice area, and between USAID and State in the
governance and human rights areas, it is hard to imagine developing a
more strategic approach to elections assistance. Moreover, the
diversity of mandates among agencies and subject matter for different
kinds of democracy assistance requires that the detailed assistance
plans be worked out on the ground, among the recipients and donors
involved, subject always to the possibility of substantial changes in
plans should there be a fundamental change in circumstances on the
ground. The Department and USAID have well-established systems for
planning and implementing all foreign assistance programs, which
require multi-year projections yet can still react to unexpected
events. Nevertheless, the Department acknowledges the need for greater
coordination of democracy programs among the different funding sources
within State and USAID and is working to achieve this goal.
In the justice area, more specifically the criminal justice area, there
is a need to integrate better current planning mechanisms for law
enforcement assistance and justice sector development assistance at
both the regional and country levels. The GAO's decision to exclude
counternarcotics assistance from this review obscures the importance of
this issue to its recommendations for how to make U.S. support
democracy assistance in Latin America more effective. The Department -
both the Bureaus of Western Hemisphere (WHA) and International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) - is actively working on
this issue with colleagues at USAID and the Department of Justice.
The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL) has recently been
invited to join these conversations. There is agreement among the three
agencies that a more strategic approach is needed at the regional level
- to set priorities among countries receiving justice assistance
(defined here as including counternarcotics and other assistance
through INL). There is also agreement that the views of the Department
of Justice will be sought in setting assistance priorities at the
country level. Whether this will be achieved through the country team
or in Washington remains to be determined on a country-by-country
basis. However, as crime is now recognized as a significant threat to
the institutionalization of democracy in Latin America, it is clear
that U.S. law enforcement and development programs - and INL and USAID,
as their primary funders - need to work more closely together, bringing
in the Department of Justice and other agencies to implement activities
as appropriate. The Department is confident that this will occur as we
continue the inter-agency discussions now underway.
In addition, WHA, DRL and USAID have agreed to initiate regular
meetings to discuss ongoing democracy and human rights programs, as
well as new needs as they arise. While WHA and its regional counterpart
at USAID have a very close working relationship on all budget and
program issues, the reorganization at USAID and the recent expansion of
DRL programming in the region indicate the need to include the global
democracy bureaus at both agencies in regular discussions of such
issues. The immediate objective will be to share information, avoid
duplication and ensure optimal use of available funds from all sources.
However, the discussions could well develop a more strategic and/or
evaluative focus over time and be further expanded to include other
actors, as appropriate.
The second recommendation calls for development of "a strategy for
periodically evaluating democracy assistance projects that is
consistent across agencies, countries, and types of programs." The
Department feels that such a broad brush approach is not appropriate
for the diversity of activities discussed in the report. In the justice
area, WHA, INL, USAID and DOJ have recently discussed how evaluations
should be handled for ICITAP and USAID justice projects, and there is
no reason that these points of agreement may not be readily extended
more generally to law enforcement assistance funded by INL. In brief,
the agreement is to undertake regular joint evaluations of justice
programs, in which an inter-agency team from Washington would travel to
review program objectives, progress in achieving benchmarks, and other
implementation issues in the field with those responsible for program
implementation. Such an approach would greatly enhance information
sharing about specific programs and build inter-agency consensus, where
it is now lacking. In addition, formal independent evaluations would be
undertaken where the size of the program or other factors so indicated.
Contrary to what is implied in the GAO report, independent evaluations
have been undertaken of the ICITAP program in the past as part of
USAID-sponsored AOJ country-wide evaluations. The idea is to expand on
that experience and include related INL-funded activities at the same
time.
The third recommendation calls for systematic sharing of information on
development approaches for all democracy projects and seems to be
addressed primarily:
to USAID, the repository of most such information. While the Department
agrees that it would be desirable to have better access to project
information across the board, the recommendation goes too far in
suggesting the need for a centralized record system containing all
project materials. The sheer volume of information would make it hard
for a user to identify appropriate approaches for replication in a new
program context. The Department agrees with USAID that much useful
information is currently transmitted among programs on an informal
basis, including lessons learned that should be and are being applied
elsewhere.
Although not framed as a separate recommendation, the Department would
note that the GAO report leads to the clear conclusion that the
Executive Branch should develop and propose to the Congress
comprehensive new legislation on law enforcement assistance that would
entail a repeal of section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,
as amended. In the Department's view, section 660 has long since
outlived its usefulness as a statement of U.S. policy.
In place of a blanket
prohibition on assistance to law enforcement followed by a confusing
array of exceptions to override the prohibition, the Executive Branch
needs a clear statement of its authority to provide law enforcement
assistance abroad, coupled with whatever specific prohibitions the
Congress may consider appropriate at this time. The Department is
prepared to work on an expedited basis with other interested agencies
to develop an Administration proposal to amend the Foreign Assistance
Act toward this end. The Department agrees with the GAO that such a
change would enhance the effectiveness of both law enforcement and
democracy programs by facilitating planning of comprehensive programs
and enabling the most appropriate agency to work any specific issue
with the police, pursuant to a clear articulation of objectives for law
enforcement assistance.
Finally, given the report's repeated descriptions of funding data
received from the Department as having been incomplete for democracy
programs it administered, the Department wishes to clarify that INL had
no ready way of separating out democracy and rule of law assistance
from other law enforcement assistance in the categories GAO had
requested. Similarly, while USIA and later Public Diplomacy programs
within WHA have been a consistent part of democracy programming over
the ten-year period covered by the report, comprehensive data for such
programs was not readily available. In the case of DRL, its support for
programs in the Western Hemisphere has become more important since
1998, when the Human Rights and Democracy Fund (HRDF) was established.
HRDF funds have been used to support elections in Nicaragua and Peru,
as well as a judicial sector relocation program in Colombia, intended
to complement judicial protection activities funded under Plan
Colombia. The Department stands ready to answer any questions about
these other areas of assistance should that be desired.
The following is GAO's comment on the Department of State's letter
dated March 5, 2003.
GAO Comment:
1. We disagree with the statement that we implied that independent
evaluations have not been done on ICITAP programs. On page 83 of our
report, we stated that the Departments of State and Justice have done
very little formal evaluation of law enforcement assistance. We
modified the text on page 84 to indicate that none of the agencies
involved in the debate about how to best provide police assistance have
done a comprehensive evaluation of police assistance program results.
Such an evaluation could inform this debate.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Justice:
U.S. Department of Justice:
Washington, D.C. 20530:
MAR 0 5 2003:
Mr. Jess T. Ford
Director International Affairs and Trade
General Accounting Office Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Ford:
Thank you for the opportunity to review the final draft of the General
Accounting Office (GAO) report entitled "Foreign Assistance: U.S.
Democracy Programs in Six Latin American Countries Have Yielded Modest
Results, GAO-03-358." The draft report was reviewed by representatives
of the Department's Criminal Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
and the Drug Enforcement Administration. This letter constitutes the
formal comments of the Department of Justice (DOJ), and I request that
it be included in the final report.
The DOJ believes democracy assistance programs in the areas of criminal
justice, human rights and anti-corruption are essential to its efforts
to combat transnational crime and to develop strong international
partners in those efforts. The continuing involvement of the
International Criminal Investigation Training Assistance Program
(ICITAP) in providing assistance and training for police and
investigators, and the Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development
Assistance and Training (OPDAT) in providing assistance and training
for prosecutors and judges, as well as support in drafting needed
legislation, is critical to the development of democratic institutions
and processes in Latin American countries.
The DOJ agrees with the GAO finding that these democratic institutions
and processes must ultimately be sustainable without U.S. assistance.
Through OPDAT and ICITAP, DOJ, in coordination with the Department of
State (DOS) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID),
provides assistance and training designed to build and strengthen the
criminal justice institutions and processes necessary for countries in
Latin America to make the fundamental transition from written,
inquisitory systems of justice to oral, accusatory methods, and toward
civilian, democratic style policing. While earlier assistance programs
may have focused on criminal investigative and prosecutorial
capacities, more recent programs have emphasized practical institution
building. The development in El Salvador of community-based police
patrols, and the establishment in Colombia of specialized joint
prosecution/police task force units are just two examples of successful
ICITAP/OPDAT programs.
The DOJ recognizes the crucial role that political will plays in
sustaining any reforms or development efforts. DOJ strongly supports
the continuing effort of the DOS Bureau of International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement to enter into Letters of Agreement with recipient
nations with the purpose of having those countries agree to tangible,
long-term commitments of resources for training, equipment maintenance
and other indicators of political will. Similarly, host nation agencies
must agree to the sustained assignment of personnel, particularly those
trained in specialized areas, as another demonstration of their
commitment. U.S. Chiefs of Mission play a pivotal role in the
articulation to host governments of concerns about the continuing
political will needed to support development and reform. OPDAT and
ICITAP personnel assigned overseas can play a role by helping to keep
the Chiefs of Mission updated on the level of indigenous support.
GAO has correctly identified inadequate legal education to be a major
concern in development assistance to the Latin American countries. The
experienced attorneys, prosecutors and criminal investigators of the
DOJ are uniquely qualified to fashion programs and strategies to
address this area. We welcome opportunities to assist in the
development of Embassy Mission Performance Plans and USAID Rule of Law
Strategies by adding our criminal law expertise to achieve an
integrated approach in the planning and implementation of assistance
programs in foreign justice sectors as GAO suggests.
The GAO's recommendations for greater interagency strategic planning
and cooperation are consistent with the DOJ's endeavors to formulate
comprehensive criminal sector development plans that incorporate US
interagency objectives and policies. The DOJ endorses GAO's
recommendation for better coordination and planning among the DOS,
USAID and DOJ, and we are exploring means to achieve this goal. As we
explore options, however, we remain concerned about host-country
working groups, supported by U.S. agencies, which are developing
important legislation pertaining to justice sector reform. Many times,
these working groups do not include practitioners or anyone recently
experienced in the particular criminal topic area at issue or
knowledgeable of international best practices and norms, e.g., the FATF
40 recommendations for an effective anti-money laundering regime. These
efforts then often produce inadequate and unworkable results - an
embarrassment to the host nation and the U.S. alike. The DOJ has
considerable expertise in transnational crimes as well as in drafting
statutes and codes. Moreover, there are strong U.S. interests in those
aspects of such codes that affect the operation of mutual legal
assistance and extradition treaties. DOJ experts (both prosecutors and
agents) should participate in and guide such working groups, as
appropriate, to produce modern codes and rules.
Comprehensive technical assistance plans are critical to the overall
success and sustainability of democracy programs. For example, new
codes of criminal procedure cannot be effectively implemented unless
all assistance programs to all branches of the criminal justice system
are consistent and complementary. At one time, DOS used one
implementing agency for the police, another for prosecutors, another
for judges, etc., without first undertaking interagency assistance
planning and coordination.
Now, in certain countries, there is a more collaborative process among
OPDAT, ICITAP, DOS, USAID and the US Missions in the development and
implementation of criminal justice sector technical assistance. This is
a first step that is important now and in the future.
Broader country and region-wide strategic plans for host nation
criminal justice sectors must be developed through an inter-agency
process in which DOJ is an equal partner. DOJ, DOS and USAID have
initiated an inter-agency forum for Latin American and the Caribbean
that is intended to develop such a process. We are encouraged by DOS
and USAID's support and participation in these discussions, and we seek
to replicate this inter-agency process for other regions. For such a
forum to be effective, initiatives from US Missions must become part of
such a process. This is particularly true for initiatives coming from
USAID representatives at missions, which typically are developed at
post and often are launched with little or no USAID HQ review.
GAO further recommends that the involved agencies establish a strategy
of periodic evaluation of their respective projects. The DOJ agrees
that objective, regularized evaluation of assistance programs is the
only method to obtain consistently useful information that can be used
not only to modify and improve particular programs but also to develop
broader lessons learned and best practices. Such regular evaluations
are also the most efficacious way to develop and maintain a centralized
repository of such information for easy access by all parties,
including Congress. Such evaluations must be based primarily upon
relevant and appropriate performance indicators that are set forth in
the strategy and implementation plans established by all parties for
each program at the outset.
The DOJ has adopted the strategy of periodic on-site evaluation in its
Latin American programs. Personnel from OPDAT and ICITAP headquarters
often travel to Colombia and other countries for the specific purpose
of assessing the impact and effectiveness of DOJ programs. Although the
DOJ does not prepare formal evaluation reports, it does provide direct
feedback to DOS on programmatic assistance in the form of written
after-action reports, quarterly reports and oral briefings, which have
fostered coordination of shared lessons and strategic planning, as
suggested by the GAO.
The DOJ supports GAO's recommendation that the involved agencies
establish effective information-sharing mechanisms. We are studying how
to achieve regional coordination similar to the Latin America/Caribbean
effort described above, as well as how to develop regularized, inter-
agency program evaluations. In the interim, we are committed to sharing
information from DOJ-administered programs with our funding partners.
The DOJ is concerned that Section 660 may in some instances adversely
impact long-range planning and the development of broad-based,
practical police assistance programs. For example, criminal gangs are a
major law enforcement and society problem throughout Latin American and
the Caribbean. There are many approaches to curbing such gangs beyond
traditional:
law enforcement techniques, such as anti-recruitment measures, but some
of them are
prohibited by Section 660. The DOJ will work with DOS and USAID to
consider whether changes to Section 660 would be appropriate in light
of these concerns.
The Department looks forward to working with our colleagues at State
and USAID to implement the GAO recommendations.
Sincerely,
Paul R. Corts:
Assistant Attorney General for Administration:
Signed by Paul R. Corts:
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International
Development:
U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT:
March 5, 2003:
Mr. Jess Ford Director International Affairs and Trade U.S. General
Accounting Office 441 G Street NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Ford:
I am pleased to provide the U.S. Agency for International Development's
(USAID's) formal response on the draft GAO report entitled "Foreign
Assistance: U.S. Democracy Programs in Six Latin American Countries
Have Yielded Modest Results" (February 2003).
Enclosed are our detailed comments on the broad issues that are
discussed in the draft report.
Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the draft report and for
the courtesies extended by your staff in the conduct of this review.
Sincerely,
John Marshall
Assistant Administrator
Bureau for Management.
Signedy for John Marshall:
Enclosure: a/s;
USAID Comments on the GAO Draft Report "Foreign Assistance: U.S.
Democracy Programs in Six Latin American Countries Have Yielded Modest
Results" (GAO-03-358):
The U.S. Agency for International Development appreciates the
opportunity to review the GAO draft report, "Foreign Assistance: U.S.
Democracy Programs in Six Latin American Countries Have Yielded Modest
Results" (GAO-03-358).
The Development Challenge:
The GAO auditors recognized the long-term nature of democratic
development. In that vein, we believe our impacts have been very
important and significant. Realizing that this is an area in which
reasonable people can differ in their assessment of the quality or
measure of results, we have taken seriously the charge to select
appropriate indicators and measures of success. Unfortunately, the
democracy sector does not easily lend itself to clear "before and
after" measures, and consequently, we accept that it was the GAO's view
that impacts were just "modest." Still, we would like to put these
programs in context.
When USAID began to support democracy promotion and justice reform,
this new arena had not yet captured the attention or support of the
international community. No other donor was involved and no consensus
existed about the importance of democracy as a condition for social and
economic development. The USG began its work in response to human
rights abuses in Central America, as documented in prior GAO reports.
All knew it was a Herculean task. USAID's support to address, end and
correct human rights abuses through support for justice reform began to
loosen authoritarian practices, previously masked as part of armed
internal conflict or justified by post-colonial systems and tradition.
In the 1980s, prior to USAID involvement in the democracy sector, many
of the countries in the region were not democracies, including all of
the countries included in this audit, with the exception of Colombia.
Militaries often ruled with a repressive hand. Three countries in
Central America endured long, bloody civil wars. Grave human rights
abuses by the state, such as disappearances and confessions forced by
torture, were common and citizens had no recourse. Countries had
inquisitorial legal systems with no effective right to an attorney
where trials were secret with no right to confront the accuser. The
detained were presumed guilty, and prosecutors and judges did not
operate independently. Space for political participation and dissent
was restricted. Under authoritarian governments, elections were
extraordinary, infrequent, often illegitimate, and almost fully reliant
on donor financing. Civil society and non-governmental organizations
were few, weak and often ineffectual; or they were the targets of human
rights violations and
disappearances. Few, if any, channels existed for citizens to express
their needs to elected officials, as many local level functionaries
were appointed extensions of elite, entrenched political regimes.
Success to date:
Despite the tremendous challenges, USAID has had tangible success in
its programs. After sustained, committed USAID involvement, and with
USAID-supported civil society involvement, militaries today are largely
confined to their barracks. New adversarial systems, promoted by USAID,
are giving the accused fundamental human rights such as the presumption
of innocence, the right to counsel, the right to confront witnesses,
and the right to an interpreter or justice in one's own language. The
passage and implementation of criminal procedure codes, however
imperfect, represents a sea-change. This includes the adoption of a
more transparent, accountable and efficient system of justice after
hundreds of years under another system. Years of intense USAID policy
work with Latin American governments and civil society have borne
fruit. As a percent of national budget, funding to support the justice
sector for most of Latin America is much higher than in the United
States. As a result, this has provided improved salaries for judges,
prosecutors, public defenders and police that are all multiples, in
real terms, of what they were before.
With USAID help, Latin America has made great progress to advance
democracy, human rights and the rule of law. A comprehensive, region-
wide, independent evaluation of USAID democracy and justice programs in
Latin America (Achievements in Building and Maintaining the Rule of
Law, November 2002, Management Systems International, Amb. Jim Michel
et al.) found:
"A comparison of today's justice systems in Latin America with those
described in the early justice sector assessments of 10 to 15 years ago
shows that much has changed. Judges and prosecutors are demonstrating
greater independence and are more willing to challenge wrongdoing by
the powerful. Disadvantaged groups have gained greater access to legal
remedies and legal assistance. Within judicial systems, numbers of
personnel have increased. Both judges and staff are better qualified,
and more are selected pursuant to merit systems and receive specialized
training. Procedures are more fair, transparent and efficient. Budgets
are larger, productivity is higher, and backlogs are smaller.
Corruption and impunity are no longer considered acceptable or
inevitable, civil society is increasingly concerned with justice reform
efforts and demands, and public awareness overall has increased. USAID
has played an important role in focusing attention on these issues, in
supporting successful reforms, and in promoting respect for the rule of
law.":
Sustainability:
The GAO correctly identifies sustainability as essential in
development. Sustainability and political will for reform come, in
large part, from societal demand. In this sense, although not
highlighted in the report, USAID commitment to working with civil
society over the long term is essential for the sustainability of USG
foreign policy in the region. Citizens and citizen groups must advocate
for reform, monitor government performance, and work with the
international community to maintain pressure for modernization and
government accountability. This in turn is a critical element in USAID
efforts to encourage broad-based and sustainable democracies. In
excluding civil society as a separate sector in the draft GAO report,
it is easy to miss how important the impact has been. Approximately 20%
of USAID funding in these countries went toward civil society
development, including labor programs.
USAID support for civil society has had tangible results. A
proliferation of media outlets and newspapers today assert real
editorial independence from national governments. Twenty years ago,
only four countries allowed their citizens to directly elect their
mayors and local officials. Today, every democratic country in the
region provides this right. This is a new "quiet revolution" of
democracy that allows citizens to have a direct relationship to the
people they elect, and a greater voice in local decision-making. At the
same time, national governments are directly passing on new budget
resources and responsibilities to local governments. New financial
management systems promoted by USAID have now been adopted in all
countries in Latin America and the Caribbean (with the exception of
Cuba). USAID support for civil society has been key to generate the
demands for these types of reform. And civil society pressure is also
fundamental to making sure that these measures are sustained and not
reversed.
The GAO recommendations:
(a) Strategic Planning:
We agree with the GAO that the USG and USAID can always upgrade its
strategic planning systems. Having said that, we note that USAID takes
an average of 18 months of intense effort to prepare five year
strategies for each country (copies of these strategic plans were
provided to the GAO for all countries reviewed). For their part, U.S.
Embassies also draft annual Mission Performance Plans (MPPs) which
direct not only USAID activities in country, but those of all other USG
entities as well. Further, USAID, through its donor coordination
efforts, is well-connected with the strategy design processes of the
other donors and banks, and thus designs activities to complement what
others are doing.
(b) Evaluations:
We agree with GAO that improved evaluations would be useful. Having
said that, leading experts in the field believe that measuring results
may be more art than science. Thomas Carothers (Aiding Democracy
Abroad: The Learning Curve, Carnegie Institute for Peace: 1999, p. 297)
noted that:
"Aid providers must start by accepting that definitive evaluations-
objective assessments that establish with certainty the democratic
value of particular aid programs-are not possible. Subjectivity in
evaluations is inevitable. Interpretation is essential. Nuance is
necessary...":
Carothers adds (p. 301):
"[Aid] providers and those who stand outside the aid community looking
in must accept the limitations of evaluation. Assessing democracy aid,
like democratization itself, cannot be turned into a science. And in
most cases, pseudoscientific efforts are worse than none at all. There
is no easy solution to the challenges of determining the effects and
values of particular aid projects. There is no substitute for in-depth
qualitative analysis that deals head on with the complexities and
subtleties of a recipient country's political situation.":
Nevertheless, we concur with the GAO that evaluations are important.
Just because they are difficult does not mean they should not be done.
(c) Communication, Coordination and Information Sharing:
We recognize that there is room for improvement. We hope the
reorganization of USAID with a new Bureau of Democracy, Conflict
Prevention and Humanitarian Assistance will respond to many of the
concerns raised.
The New Challenges:
While the GAO report was retrospective in nature, we are anxious to
take the lessons learned and apply them to the future. Unfortunately,
while the urgency of democracy promotion has never been higher, we do
not see USAID's task as getting easier. New challenges include money
laundering, alien smuggling, bribing of public officials, organized
crime, and gang-related violence. While the countries are only coming
to grips with their internal issues, there is the tremendous weight of
increased international organized crime. In terms of trade integration,
international syndicates are quite savvy on the way they do business
with gangs like the Salvatruchas having offices and
representatives in Los Angeles, Chicago, Bogota, Medellin and every
major Central American capital. This escalation of narcotics
trafficking, organized crime and related problems is affecting
democratic consolidation and, in some cases, threatening the legitimacy
of democracy itself. The power and sheer size of these illegal forces
overwhelms the capacity of nascent democratic institutions.
Bottom Line:
One evaluation (Southwestern Journal of Law and Trade in the Americas,
previously provided to the GAO) comments on donor support for democracy
and the rule of law: "(T)he present malaise was not created in a day,
and it will take a generational shift... to mature into a more nuanced
system of justice. In the meantime, both the (host governments) and
donors must keep pushing to ensure... real reform, the prospects for
which have never been higher." (Fall issue, 1998, page 418). The top
recommendation should be for USAID to stay the course on democracy for
the long term, improving strategy, evaluations and coordination where
possible, while keeping its eye on long-term, sustainable institutional
change.
Factual Clarifications to the Text:
In reading the report, we came across a number of issues that require
clarification or correction. These are listed below:
* Pages 4 and 23 note that Guatemala has made "little progress in
implementing" the new criminal procedure code. To the contrary, GAO
auditors witnessed trials in Guatemala under the new Code. GAO also
interviewed Supreme Court justices who confirmed progress, and visited
the Clerk of Court for Guatemala City to observe the judicial process.
As noted in the Encyclopedia "Legal Systems of the World" entry under
"Guatemala" (copy previously provided to GAO), "Most striking (about
the new Code) is the advancement of community understanding of and
participation in the criminal justice system because of the new oral
process. Under the old inquisitorial system, judges supervised
prosecution, criminal investigation, and public defense, in addition to
performing their functions as judge. The new system separates roles:
public defenders defend, prosecutors prosecute, and judges judge, each
being independent of the other, as in the U.S. system." (page 617).
This accomplishment would never have been achieved but for USAID
assistance.
* On page 6, it states that: "...municipalities have begun to adopt
USAID-supported practices but there has been less success in Guatemala
and Nicaragua." It is not clear what practices are being referred to or
what "less success" means. The
Government of Nicaragua adopted the municipal budget model developed
under USAID's municipal strengthening program as the official budgeting
system to be used nationwide. Guatemala has also adopted a new
Municipal Code, based on USAID technical assistance.
* On page 9, "For example, in Peru instead of combining resources, USAID
and the Inter-American Development Bank pursued different and
independent programs for strengthening access to justice for the poor
in the mid-1990s. Neither
approach could be sustained for lack of resources and political
support." To set the record straight, USAID/Peru decided not to support
any judicial reform programs under then President Fujimori because the
executive branch was clearly manipulating the appointment and retention
of judges to control the outcome of cases of importance to the regime.
USAID did not believe Fuji was committed to genuine reform. As it turns
out (and as the video tapes of Montesinos bribing demonstrated), USAID
was right. The system was corrupt and it would have been an enormous
waste of US taxpayer resources to support an obviously corrupt
government. After Fujimori fell, USAID received compliments from civil
society and human rights groups for not having provided judicial reform
assistance to the GOP during the Fujimori years. In other words, had
USAID/Peru worked with the Bank to invest in Fujimori Justice, USAID
would have lost respect and prestige within the community of Peruvians
committed to the return of democracy.
* On page 23, the last paragraph states that Guatemala has made limited
progress in implementing criminal justice reforms. Yet an evaluation in
the Southwestern Journal of Law and Trade in the Americas (Fall 1998,
page 365 - copy provided previously to GAO) notes that Guatemala's code
is "a first of its kind in Latin America." The Code has been fully
implemented on a national level, and the GAO witnessed trials in action
in Quetzaltenango, Guatemala. Guatemala's Code has been used as a model
for Honduras, Nicaragua, Venezuela and elsewhere. Also, as noted in the
referenced evaluation, Guatemala's Code is more expansive than many of
its neighbors by including plea bargaining and alternative dispute
settlement mechanisms.
* Public Defenders Established (p. 28). Regarding the discussion of the
public defender's office in Nicaragua, it is true that at the time of
the GAO visit, the office had only 13 public defenders, based in
Managua. However, since then, and with USAID support, 23 additional
offices have been established throughout Nicaragua and the total number
of public defenders has been increased to 47. During the GAO visit, GAO
was advised that this activity was in progress, the new offices were
about to be established, and new public defenders trained.
* Pages 38 and 40 cite cancellation of the USAID Congressional support
program in Guatemala as a failed experience. For its part, in final
briefings when presenting its draft report, the GAO justified use of
the term "modest" noting that some programs were successful, while
others were not (and so the overall value judgment of "modest').
Evaluators cited the case of the cancellation of support to the
Guatemalan Congress as one example where programs did not work out. In
fairness, however, it should be noted that this was an example USAID
provided up front to GAO, not something uncovered by the GAO. And when
the GAO team was briefed on this in Guatemala, GAO was profuse in its
praise to USAID/Guatemala for first, taking a risk, second, for
recognizing when the effort was off track, and third, cutting off
funding. Too seldom, GAO noted in its Guatemala country debrief, do
U.S. government agencies or donors take that courageous action. This is
illustrative of sound management and strategic decision-making in the
face of a major change in the political climate.
* On page 65 (and earlier on page 9), the report discusses the IDB and
USAID programs for promoting access to justice for the poor in Peru.
The report suggests that if USAID combined resources and coordinated
better, the Government of
Peru would have come through with the needed budgetary resources to
keep these activities going. This hypothesis is not backed up with
analysis. The IDB program in Peru was focused on building "modulos
basicos de justicia". It was a construction project more than a true
access to justice program, as most would define it. The problem with
the IDB program is that while the buildings have now been constructed,
the judiciary does not have the operating resources to provide these
"modulos" (or any other part of the justice system for that matter)
with enough paper, spare computer parts, etc. to make them truly
efficient and functional. The problem is not unique to the "modulos de
justicia," and would not have been overcome if we added USAID/Peru
resources to those of
the IDB. USAID and other donors still would not have paid the required
operating costs. The activities USAID supported were with another part
of the justice system (the Ministry of Justice) and were focused on
providing legal aid/conciliation services to the poor. USAID did not
construct any buildings, but instead focused on technical assistance,
training and the provision of some limited equipment. In some cases,
Ministry of Justice legal aid and conciliation staff actually were
housed in the "modulos" constructed by the IDB.
At the top of page 67, the report states, "while USAID sponsored a
comprehensive democracy evaluation for Bolivia, it has not conducted
similar studies for the other countries we visited." However, USAID/El
Salvador has sponsored several such studies, the last being in 1996
right before our current
strategy began (copy was provided to the GAO). Similar impact studies
have been carried out in Guatemala. USAID also carries out assessments
of the democracy sector prior to each five year strategy period. USAID/
Peru carried out an evaluation of our democracy program in April 2000
as well as a full democracy assessment. Copies of all these analyses
were made available to the GAO review team.
The following are GAO's comments on the U.S. Agency for International
Development's letter dated March 5, 2003.
GAO Comments:
1. We disagree and believe that despite some success, much work still
remains at the national and local levels to implement Guatemala's
criminal procedures code. We modified the text on pages 29 and 30 to
add additional information on the challenges faced by Guatemala in
fully implementing criminal justice reforms.
2. We revised the text on page 9 to indicate that programs in Guatemala
and Nicaragua have had less success in disseminating programs outside
of target municipalities.
3. On the basis of additional information provided, we removed this
reference from the text. However, it should be noted that the draft
referred to USAID's support for conciliation and legal aid centers and
did not in any way suggest or infer that USAID should have supported
Fujimori-era justice institutions. As stated in the draft report on
page 64 and on page 95 in this report, we noted that USAID discontinued
direct assistance to Peru's public sector institutions in 1994.
4. The 1998 article in the Southwestern Journal of Law and Trade in the
Americas was written by a USAID employee who was the justice program
manager in Guatemala. In our view, this does not constitute an
independent program evaluation. Also, see comment 1.
5. We modified the text on page 36.
6. On the basis of additional information provided, we removed this
reference from the text.
7. As noted in this report, limited efforts have been made to review
project results over time to ensure that impact and sustainability of
results has been achieved. We stated that although USAID has a more
extensive process for assessing its activities, its efforts to evaluate
democracy assistance have not been consistent, and we found relatively
little formal evaluation of rule of law, human rights, and elections
assistance. As discussed in the Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
Section of this report, our recommendation regarding evaluation is
intended to establish the basis for periodic overall assessments of
democracy programs as well as regular evaluations of specific
components of democracy assistance. Systematic evaluations that
identify lessons learned and best practices are crucial in facilitating
congressional oversight of democracy programs and providing the basis
for informed decisions about how to maximize program impact and plan
future efforts.
[End of section]
Appendix V: Quality of Life and Economic Indicators for Selected
Countries:
U.S. democracy programs are designed to help address serious social,
political, and economic problems many of these countries face. Over the
years, the World Bank, United Nations, and other organizations have
devised indicators to attempt to measure the general quality of life
within a country. This appendix provides a statistical overview of
selected social and economic indicators for the six countries we
visited and comparative data for Latin America and the United States
(see table 8).
A few of the social indicators illustrate the challenges some of these
countries face. In Bolivia, for example, the infant mortality rate in
2000 was still over 57 deaths per 1,000 births. Even in Colombia, which
has the lowest rate among the six countries we reviewed, the infant
mortality rate was 275 percent of that in the United States. In
addition, life expectancy at birth in 2000 was 14.5 years less in
Bolivia than it was in the United States. Furthermore, although adult
illiteracy decreased in all six countries between 1990 and 2000, about
one-third of Guatemala and Nicaragua's adult population still cannot
read.
In terms of economic and political impediments to democracy, the gross
national income average for the six countries we reviewed fell from 61
percent of the Latin American average in 1990 to 55 percent in 2000.
While the gross national income for five of the six countries increased
slightly over the decade, Colombia's decreased. In terms of general
government expenditures as a percentage of gross domestic product
(GDP), all six countries spend less than 20 percent of their GDP, with
the Guatemalan government spending the least, just under 7 percent.
Finally, foreign domestic investment as a percentage of gross capital
formation varies considerably among the six countries. In the 1990
through 2000 period, it has increased as high as 44.2 percentage points
in Bolivia and as little as 2.6 in Guatemala.
Table 8: Quality of Life and Economic Indicators for Selected
Countries:
Indicator: Gross national income per capita (purchasing power parity in
current international dollars); Year: 1990; Bolivia: $1,740; Colombia:
$6,820; El Salvador: $2,920; Guatemala: $2,770; Nicaragua: $1,680;
Peru: $3,150; Six-country average: $3,180; Latin American average:
$5,190; United States: $23,440.
Year: 1995; Bolivia: $2,140; Colombia: $6,050; El Salvador: $4,040;
Guatemala: $3,400; Nicaragua: $1,780; Peru: $4,290; Six-country
average: $3,617; Latin American average: $6,240; United States:
$28,260.
Year: 2000; Bolivia: $2,360; Colombia: $6,060; El Salvador: $4,410;
Guatemala: $3,770; Nicaragua: $2,080; Peru: $4,660; Six-country
average: $3,890; Latin American average: $7,080; United States:
$34,100.
Indicator: Human Development Index[B]; Year: 1990; 1995; 2000;
Bolivia: 0.597; 0.630; 0.653; Colombia: 0.724; 0.750; 0.772; El
Salvador: 0.644; 0.682; 0.706; Guatemala: 0.579; 0.609; 0.631;
Nicaragua: 0.592; 0.615; 0.635; Peru: 0.704; 0.730; 0.747; Six-
country average: 0.640; 0.669; 0.691; Latin American average:
0.823[A]; ; 0.767; United States: 0.914; 0.925; 0.939.
Indicator: Infant mortality (per 1,000 births); Year: 1990; 1995;
2000; Bolivia: 80.0; 67.0; 57.2; Colombia: 30.4; 24.4; 19.5; El
Salvador: 45.6; 35.0; 29.1; Guatemala: 56.2; 45.6; 38.8;
Nicaragua: 51.0; 39.5; 33.0; Peru: 54.0; 43.0; 31.8; Six-
country average: 52.9; 42.4; 34.9; Latin American average: 41.3;
34.1; 29.0; United States: 9.4; 7.5; 7.1.
Indicator: Adult illiteracy (percentage of people age 15 and above);
Year: 1990; 1995; 2000; Bolivia: 21.8%; 17.8%; 14.5%; Colombia:
11.5%; 9.8%; 8.3%; El Salvador: 27.5%; 24.0%; 21.3%; Guatemala:
38.9%; 34.9%; 31.4%; Nicaragua: 37.2%; 35.3%; 33.5%; Peru:
14.5%; 12.1%; 10.1%; Six-country average: 25.2%; 22.3%; 19.9%;
Latin American average: 15.2%; 13.3%; 11.6%; United States:
[Empty].
Indicator: Life expectancy at birth (years); Year: 1990; 1995;
2000; Bolivia: 58.3; 60.6; 62.6; Colombia: 68.3; 69.8; 71.6; El
Salvador: 65.6; 68.5; 70.1; Guatemala: 61.4; 63.6; 65.2;
Nicaragua: 64.5; 67.3; 68.9; Peru: 65.8; 67.8; 69.3; Six-
country average: 64.0; 66.3; 68.0; Latin American average: 67.9;
69.2; 70.4; United States: 75.2; 75.6; 77.1.
Indicator: Percentage of population under age 15; Year: 1990; 1995;
2000; Bolivia: 41.2%; 40.6%; 39.6%; Colombia: 36.0%; 34.4%;
32.8%; El Salvador: 40.8%; 37.4%; 35.6%; Guatemala: 46.0%; 45.1%;
; 43. 6%; Nicaragua: 46.4%; 45.0%; 42.7%; Peru: 38.3%; 35.9%;
33.4%; Six-country average: 41.5%; 39.7%; 38.0%; Latin American
average: 36.0%; 33.8%; 31.5%; United States: 21.9%; 22.2%;
21.7%.
Indicator: General government expenditures as a percentage of Gross
Domestic Product; Year: 1990; 1995; 2000; Bolivia: 11.8%; 13.6%;
; 15.7%; Colombia: 9.4%; 14.9%; 19.0%; El Salvador: 9.9%; 8.6%;
10. 2%; Guatemala: 6.6%; 5.4%; 6.6%; Nicaragua: 43.5%; 15.7%;
18.9%; Peru: 7.9%; 9.8%; 11.2%; Six-country average: 14.9%;
11.3%; 13.6%; Latin American average: 13.3%; 15.5%; 15.3%; United
States: 17.0%; 15.3%.
Indicator: Net Foreign Direct Investment as a percentage of Gross
Capital Formation; Year: 1990; 1995; 2000; Bolivia: 4.4%; 38.5%;
; 48.6%; Colombia: 6.7%; 4.0%; 23.9%; El Salvador: 0.3%; 2.0%;
8.2%; Guatemala: 4.6%; 3.4%; 7.2%; Nicaragua: 0%; 16.4%; 30.8%;
Peru: 0.9%; 15.4%; 6.3%; Six-country average: 2.8%; 13.3%;
20.8%; Latin American average: 3.8%; 8.5%; 19.1%; United States:
4.8%; 4.3%.
Indicator: Top three exports[C]; Year: 2002; Bolivia: soybeans, natural
gas, zinc; Colombia: petroleum, coffee, coal; El Salvador: offshore
assembly exports, coffee, sugar; Guatemala: coffee,
sugar, bananas; Nicaragua: coffee, shrimp and lobster, cotton; Peru:
fish and fish products, gold, copper; Six-country average: n/a; Latin
American average: n/a; United States: n/a.
Indicator: Economic Freedom Index[D]; Year: 1998; 2003; Bolivia:
2.60; 2.65; Colombia: 3.00; 3.00; El Salvador: 2.40; 2.25;
Guatemala: 2.70; 2.80; Nicaragua: 3.50; 3.00; Peru: 2.85; 2.80;
Six-country average: 2.80; 2.80; Latin American average: 2.98;
2.94; United States: 1.80; 1.85.
Sources: World Bank, United Nations, CIA World Factbook, and The
Heritage Foundation.
Note: Economic and social data are from the World Bank, World
Development Indicators 2002 CDROM.
[A] 1992 figure.
[B] The Human Development Index is produced by the United Nations and is
compiled from several demographic and economic statistics; it ranges in
value from Norway (.939) to Sierra Leone (.258). A higher Human
Development Index score means a country with more advanced degree of
human development.
[C] The listing of the top three exports for each country comes from the
CIA World Factbook. The listing provides a rank ordering of exported
products starting with the most important; it sometimes includes the
percentage of total dollar value.
[D] These figures come from The Heritage Foundation, which works in
conjunction with The Wall Street Journal to produce the Index of
Economic Freedom. To measure economic freedom and rate each country,
the authors of the index study 50 independent economic variables. These
variables (1) fall into 10 broad categories, or factors, of economic
freedom and (2) include, trade policy, fiscal burden of government,
government intervention in the economy, monetary policy, capital flows
and foreign investment, banking and finance, wages and prices, property
rights, regulation, and black market activity. Each country receives
its overall economic freedom score on the basis of the average of the
10 individual factor scores. Each factor is scored according to a
grading scale that is unique for that factor. The scales run from 1 to
5: A score of 1 signifies an institutional or consistent set of
policies that are most conducive to economic freedom, while a score of
5 signifies a set of policies that are least conducive.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix VI: Freedom House Scores for Individual Countries, Fiscal Years
1992 through 2002:
Figures 20 to 25 show the change in the political rights and civil
liberties in the six countries examined in this report (Bolivia,
Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Peru), according to
Freedom House, a U.S. research organization that tracks political
developments around the world. Note that the trend in these two
categories is in a generally positive direction for all of the
countries except Colombia.
Figure 20: Freedom House Democracy Scores for Bolivia, Fiscal Years
1992 through 2002:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Figure 21: Freedom House Democracy Scores for Colombia, Fiscal Years
1992 through 2002:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Figure 22: Freedom House Democracy Scores for El Salvador, Fiscal Years
1992 through 2002:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Figure 23: Freedom House Democracy Scores for Guatemala, Fiscal Years
1992 through 2002:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Figure 24: Freedom House Democracy Scores for Nicaragua, Fiscal Years
1992 through 2002:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Figure 25: Freedom House Democracy Scores for Peru, Fiscal Years 1992
through 2002:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Phillip Herr (202) 512-8509:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the persons listed above, Jeremy Latimer, James Michels,
Juan Tapia-Videla, Rhonda Horried, Eve Weisberg, Judith Williams, and
Lynn Cothern made key contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Latin America and the Caribbean:
Foreign Assistance: Peru on Track for Free and Fair Elections but Faces
Major Challenges. GAO-01-496T. Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2001.
Foreign Assistance: Any Further Aid to Haitian Justice System Should be
Linked to Performance-Related Conditions. GAO-01-24. Washington, D.C.:
October 17, 2000.
Foreign Assistance: U.S. Rule of Law Assistance to Five Latin American
Countries. GAO/NSIAD-99-195. Washington, D.C.: August 4, 1999.
Aid to El Salvador: Slow Progress in Developing a National Civilian
Police. GAO/NSIAD-92-338. Washington, D.C.: September 22, 1992.
Foreign Assistance: Promising Approach to Judicial Reform in Colombia.
GAO/NSIAD-92-269. Washington, D.C.: September 24, 1992.
Central America: Assistance to Promote Democracy and National
Reconciliation in Nicaragua. NSIAD-90-245. Washington, D.C.: September
24, 1990.
Foreign Aid: Efforts to Improve the Judicial System in El Salvador.
NSIAD-90-81. Washington, D.C.: May 29, 1990.
Former Soviet Union:
Former Soviet Union: U.S. Rule of Law Assistance Has Had Limited Impact
and Sustainability. GAO-01-740T. Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2001.
Former Soviet Union: U.S. Rule of Law Assistance Has Had Limited
Impact. GAO-01-354. Washington, D.C.: April 17, 2001.
Foreign Assistance: International Efforts to Aid Russia's Transition
Have Had Mixed Results. GAO-01-08. Washington, D.C.: November 1, 2000.
Foreign Assistance: Harvard Institute for International Development's
Work in Russia and Ukraine. GAO/NSIAD-97-27. Washington, D.C.: November
27, 1996.
Promoting Democracy: Progress Report on U.S. Democratic Development
Assistance to Russia. GAO/NSIAD-96-40. Washington, D.C.: February 29,
1996.
Other Rule of Law:
Foreign Assistance: Status of Rule of Law Program Coordination. GAO/
NSIAD-00-8R. Washington, D.C.: October 13, 1999.
Foreign Assistance: Rule of Law Funding Worldwide for Fiscal Years
1993-1998. GAO/NSIAD-99-158. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 1999.
Other Governance:
Cambodia: Governance Reform Progressing, But Key Efforts Are Lagging.
GAO-02-569. Washington, D.C.: June 13, 2002.
Other Elections/Human Rights:
Cambodia: Limited Progress on Free Elections, Human Rights, and Mine
Clearing. NSIAD-96-15BR. Washington, D.C.: February 29, 1996.
U.S. Government Planning and Coordination:
Results Act: An Evaluator's Guide to Assessing Annual Performance
Plans. GAO/GGD-10.1.20. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 1998.
NASA: Better Mechanisms Needed for Sharing Lessons Learned. GAO-02-195.
Washington, D.C.: January 30, 2002.
Other:
Foreign Affairs: Internally Displaced Persons Lack Effective
Protection. GAO-01-803. Washington, D.C.: August 17, 2001.
(320127):
FOOTNOTES
[1] According to the U.S. Agency for International Development, the
rule of law embodies the basic principles of equal treatment of all
people before the law and is founded on a predictable and transparent
legal system with fair and effective judicial and law enforcement
institutions to protect citizens against the arbitrary use of state
authority and lawless acts.
[2] 22 U.S.C. 2420.
[3] This provision restricts the use of foreign assistance funds for
training and financial support for police or other law enforcement
forces of foreign governments. Specifically, the provision states that,
with a variety of exceptions, these funds may not be used "to provide
training or advice, or provide any financial support, for police,
prisons, or other law enforcement forces for any foreign government or
any program of internal intelligence or surveillance on behalf of any
foreign government."
[4] Mitchell A. Seligson, Nicaraguans Talk about Corruption: A Follow-
Up Study of Public Opinion (Arlington, Va.: Casals and Associates for
USAID, 1999).
[5] U.S. General Accounting Office, The Results Act: An Evaluator's
Guide to Assessing Annual Agency Performance Plans, GGD-10.1.20
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 1, 1998).
[6] U.S. General Accounting Office, Foreign Assistance: Status of Rule
of Law Program Coordination, NSIAD-00-8R (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 13,
1999).
[7] Active member countries are Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, The
Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico,
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis Saint Lucia,
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, the
United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Cuba is not active and is the
only nondemocratic member.
[8] The U.S. Agency for International Development defines the rule of
law as embodying the basic principles of equal treatment of all people
before the law; it is founded on a predictable and transparent legal
system with fair and effective judicial and law enforcement
institutions to protect citizens against the arbitrary use of state
authority and lawless acts.
[9] Appendix VI provides a statistical overview of selected social and
economic indicators for the six countries we visited and comparative
data for Latin America and the United States.
[10] Civil society includes the general population and nongovernmental
organizations, such as associations, trade unions, and interest groups.
[11] See Related GAO Products at the end of this report.
[12] While Peru adopted a new criminal procedures code in 1991, it has
still not entered into force. Peru has yet to initiate similar reforms
of its criminal justice system. Following then President Fujimori's
1992 unconstitutional takeover of political power from the legislature
and judiciary, USAID devoted most rule of law assistance to civil
society and access-to-justice programs in the mid-1990s.
[13] In Nicaragua, the new criminal procedures code went into effect
for felonies in December 2002 and will go into effect for misdemeanors
in December 2003.
[14] For cases carrying a sentence of more than 4 years, Bolivian
citizens are required to participate in criminal trials, as "citizen
judges," in a role similar to that of jurors in the United States.
Sentencing courts include a panel of three citizen judges and two
professional judges.
[15] Before the passage of this law, the only option for citizens to
bring a case against the government was to submit a case directly to
the Supreme Court.
[16] In a 1992 report, Foreign Assistance: Promising Approach to
Judicial Reform in Colombia, GAO/NSIAD-92-269 (Washington, D.C.: Sept.
24, 1992), we commented positively on the commitment of Colombian
justice sector officials for reform. An interagency working group, led
by the Minister of Justice, agreed to and designed a constitutional
revision that included provisions to increase the judiciary's
independence and established an independent prosecutor's office to
investigate and prosecute criminal cases. In a 1999 report, Foreign
Assistance: U.S. Rule of Law Assistance to Five Latin American
Countries, GAO/NSIAD-99-195 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 4, 1999), we found
that Colombia had not fully implemented many of its criminal justice
reforms and, despite the training and assistance provided to justice
officials, few of these officials were implementing new procedures for
conducting investigations or holding trials.
[17] The State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs has also provided assistance to these six
countries, primarily to specialized police units focusing on
counternarcotics crimes. We did not focus on counternarcotics
assistance in this report.
[18] ICITAP is not currently operating in Peru.
[19] The U.S. embassy withheld $500,000 of assistance until the
Attorney General and Director of the Police signed an agreement that
the two institutions would develop a single, unified forensics lab.
After a year's delay, ICITAP has begun to disperse this assistance
following the signing of this agreement in 2002. However, the two
institutions have yet to agree on which institution will house and
manage this laboratory.
[20] P.L. 93-559, sec. 30 (a).
[21] U.S. counternarcotics assistance is also exempted from the section
660 prohibition.
[22] The general model for this type of integrated financial management
system in Latin America was developed by the USAID-funded Americas'
Accountability/Anticorruption Project. Similar systems are being
developed in other Latin American countries.
[23] Mitchell A. Seligson, Nicaraguans Talk about Corruption: A Follow-
Up Study of Public Opinion (Arlington, Va.: Casals and Associates for
USAID, 1999).
[24] Mitchell A. Seligson, "The Impact of Corruption on Regime
Legitimacy: A Comparative Study of Four Latin American Countries,"
Journal of Politics 64 (May 2002), 418, 423, 424.
[25] Mitchell A. Seligson, Ricardo Cordova Macias, and Jose Miguel
Cruz, Democracy Audit: El Salvador 1999 (USAID, 1999), 96.
[26] Guatemala suffered from more than 34 years of a civil war that
ended in 1996; during the war, state forces and related paramilitary
groups engaged in a brutal campaign of repression against insurgent
groups and civilians. In Peru, the period between 1980 and 2000 was one
of terrorism and armed conflict, when the Shining Path and Tupac Amaru
terrorist groups and the Peruvian military killed an estimated 30,000
civilians and tortured or forcibly "disappeared" thousands more. Under
the administration of President Fujimori, civil liberties were severely
curbed and thousands of innocent people were wrongfully detained
without trial.
[27] In Colombia, the current conflict between the paramilitaries;
guerillas; and, to a lesser extent, the military has continued for
almost four decades, and the longevity and the recent escalation of the
violence have adversely affected the lives of millions of civilians.
More than 1.1 million people have been internally displaced from their
homes, and tens of thousands more have been murdered. Colombia also has
the highest rate of kidnappings in the world, with the guerilla and
paramilitary groups committing 3,706 kidnappings in 2000 alone.
[28] These groups include the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(also know as the "FARC"), the National Liberation Army (also known as
the "ELN"), and the right-wing paramilitary forces (known by their
umbrella organization, the United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia, or
"AUC").
[29] For example, in May 2002, a massacre occurred in the municipality
of Bojaya. In this instance, the Early Warning System had issued an
alert ahead of time, but the military did not respond. During the
ensuing clash with paramilitaries, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia launched a gas cylinder bomb and hit the roof of a church
where citizens had taken refuge--killing 119 people, 40 of them
children, and injuring over 100 additional people.
[30] Operational security focuses on the provision of armored vehicles;
the architectural design of a "safe site" for witnesses; the purchase
of computers, radios, audio-visual equipment, etc.; and the training of
protective force personnel.
[31] This assistance includes both "soft" and "hard" protection. Soft
protection refers to relocation and economic assistance, and hard
protection includes armored vehicles and offices as well as
communication devices, such as radios and cellular phones. USAID also
has provided office equipment and information systems software to the
government of Colombia to manage the protection program.
[32] In this chapter, we report USAID assistance from fiscal years 1990
through 2002 because of the substantive amount of assistance provided
to support the 1990 Nicaraguan elections.
[33] The Carter Center, Observing the 2001 Nicaraguan Elections: Final
Report (Atlanta: 2002); International Republican Institute, Nicaragua,
Election Observation Report, November 4, 2001 (Washington, D.C.: 2002).
[34] The Results Act seeks to improve the management of federal
programs by shifting the focus of decision-making from staffing and
activity levels to the results of federal programs. Under the Results
Act, executive agencies are to prepare 5-year strategic plans that set
the general direction for their efforts. Agencies then are to prepare
annual performance plans that establish the connections between the
long-term strategic goals outlined in the strategic plans and the day-
to-day activities of program managers and staff. Finally, the act
requires that each agency report annually on the extent to which it is
meeting its annual performance goals and the actions needed to achieve
or modify those goals that have not been met.
[35] U.S. General Accounting Office, Results Act: An Evaluator's Guide
to Assessing Annual Performance Plans, GAO/GGD-10.1.20 (Washington,
D.C.: Apr. 1, 1998).
[36] U.S. General Accounting Office, Foreign Assistance: Status of Rule
of Law Program Coordination, NSIAD-00-8R (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 13,
1999).
[37] U.S. General Accounting Office, NASA: Better Mechanisms Needed for
Sharing Lessons Learned, GAO-02-195 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 30, 2002).
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