Weapons of Mass Destruction
Observations on U.S. Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation Programs in Russia Gao ID: GAO-03-526T March 4, 2003After the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia inherited the world's largest arsenal of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. The Soviets' extensive military resources and autocratic rule allowed it to maintain and secure this vast arsenal. As Russia adopted economic reforms and moved toward an open society, its economy and central controls deteriorated, making it difficult to maintain security at these weapons sites. Recognizing these difficulties, the Congress authorized funds for programs to help destroy Russian weapons and improve WMD security. The events of September 11th have increased U.S. concerns that terrorists might obtain nuclear materials or weapons at poorly secured sites. GAO has reviewed U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation efforts in Russia since 1993.
Over the past decade, the United States has responded to increased proliferation risks in Russia by providing $6.4 billion for Departments of Defense, Energy, and State programs in the former Soviet Union. The United States has made important progress in three areas. First, the Department of Defense helped destroy 463 Russian nuclear submarines, long-range bombers, and strategic missiles to support Russia's efforts to meet treaty requirements. Second, the Department of Energy installed security systems that helped protect 32 percent of Russia's weapons-usable nuclear material. Third, the United States supplemented the income of thousands of Russian weapons scientists so they would be less inclined to sell their skills to countries of concern. However, U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation programs have consistently faced two critical challenges: (1) the Russian government has not always paid its agreed-upon share of program costs and (2) Russian ministries have often denied U.S. officials access to key nuclear and biological sites. Regarding program costs, Russia did not pay, for example, its previously agreed-upon share of $275 million to design and build a nuclear storage site at Mayak. As of January 2003, the United States plans to spend $385 million for a scaled-down version of this site. Russia has also failed to pay operation and maintenance costs for security equipment the United States installed at sites with weapons-usable nuclear material. As a result, DOE plans to spend an additional $171 million to ensure that this equipment is properly maintained. Regarding access, Russia will not allow DOD and DOE the level of access they require to design security improvements, verify their installation, and ensure their proper operation. As a result, the agencies have been unable to help protect substantial portions of Russia's nuclear warheads and weapons-usable nuclear material. In addition, many Russian biological sites that store dangerous biological pathogens remain off-limits to the United States. Russia justifies these access restrictions on the grounds that it is protecting its national security interests.
GAO-03-526T, Weapons of Mass Destruction: Observations on U.S. Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation Programs in Russia
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Testimony:
Before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 2:00 p.m., EST
Wednesay, March 5, 2003:
Weapons of Mass Destruction:
Observations on U.S. Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation Programs in
Russia:
Statement of Joseph A. Christoff, Director,
International Affairs and Trade:
Weapons of Mass Destruction:
GAO-03-526T:
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss efforts by the Departments of
Defense, Energy, and State to help Russia secure, destroy, and
dismantle weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and prevent their
proliferation.
After the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia inherited the
world‘s largest arsenal of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.
The Soviets‘ extensive military resources and autocratic rule allowed
it to maintain and secure this vast arsenal. As Russia adopted economic
reforms and moved toward an open society, its economy and central
controls deteriorated, making it difficult to maintain security at
these weapons sites. Recognizing these difficulties, the Congress
authorized funds for programs to help destroy Russian weapons and
improve WMD security. The events of September 11th have increased U.S.
concerns that terrorists might obtain nuclear materials or weapons at
poorly secured sites.
GAO has reviewed U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation efforts in
Russia since 1993. Today, I will present our overall observations on
the progress and key challenges of these programs based on published
GAO reports since 1993.[Footnote 1]
Summary:
Over the past decade, the United States has responded to increased
proliferation risks in Russia by providing $6.4 billion for Departments
of Defense, Energy, and State programs in the former Soviet Union. The
United States has made important progress in three areas. First, the
Department of Defense helped destroy 463 Russian nuclear submarines,
long-range bombers, and strategic missiles to support Russia‘s efforts
to meet treaty requirements. Second, the Department of Energy installed
security systems that helped protect 32 percent of Russia‘s weapons-
usable nuclear material. Third, the United States supplemented the
income of thousands of Russian weapons scientists so they would be less
inclined to sell their skills to countries of concern.
However, U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation programs have
consistently faced two critical challenges: (1) the Russian government
has not always paid its agreed-upon share of program costs and (2)
Russian ministries have often denied U.S. officials access to key
nuclear and biological sites. Regarding program costs, Russia did not
pay, for example, its previously agreed-upon share of $275 million to
design and build a nuclear storage site at Mayak. As of January 2003,
the United States plans to spend $385 million for a scaled-down version
of this site. Russia has also failed to pay operation and maintenance
costs for security equipment the United States installed at sites with
weapons-usable nuclear material. As a result, DOE plans to spend an
additional $171 million to ensure that this equipment is properly
maintained. Regarding access, Russia will not allow DOD and DOE the
level of access they require to design security improvements, verify
their installation, and ensure their proper operation. As a result, the
agencies have been unable to help protect substantial portions of
Russia‘s nuclear warheads and weapons-usable nuclear material. In
addition, many Russian biological sites that store dangerous biological
pathogens remain off-limits to the United States. Russia justifies
these access restrictions on the grounds that it is protecting its
national security interests.
Background:
Russia inherited the world‘s largest arsenal of weapons of mass
destruction after the collapse of the Soviet Union. This arsenal
includes approximately:
* 30,000 nuclear weapons,
* 600 metric tons of weapons-usable nuclear materials,
* 40,000 metric tons of declared chemical weapons,
* 2,100 systems (missiles and bombers) for delivering weapons of mass
destruction, and:
* About 40 research institutes devoted to the development and
production of biological weapons.
In addition, the Soviet collapse also left 30,000 to 75,000 senior
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons scientists and thousands of
less experienced junior scientists without full-time employment.
To date, Congress has authorized more than $6.4 billion for several
programs to help Russia and other countries in the former Soviet Union
reduce the proliferation threats posed by their weapons of mass
destruction.
In 1992, Congress authorized DOD to establish the Cooperative Threat
Reduction Program. The program remains the largest and most diverse
U.S. program addressing former Soviet weapons of mass destruction
threats. Most Cooperative Threat Reduction projects (1) destroy
vehicles and launchers that deliver nuclear weapons and their related
facilities and (2) secure Russia‘s nuclear weapons and materials to
prevent their proliferation.
The Department of State helped establish and, with DOD, funded the
International Science and Technology Center in Moscow to help fund
peaceful research carried out by underpaid weapons scientists in 1994.
The Center supplements the income of scientists, purchases equipment
for scientific research, and supports programs to help scientists
identify and develop commercially viable research projects. The
Center‘s sponsors include the United States, the European Union, and
Japan.
In 1995, DOE launched the Material Protection, Control, and Accounting
Program to help secure former Soviet weapons-usable nuclear materials.
It later created the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention Program
and the Nuclear Cities Initiative to engage unemployed weapons
scientists in various peaceful commercial projects. The Department also
has two other initiatives to reduce former Soviet stockpiles of weapons
useable material. These programs are designed to convert highly
enriched uranium and weapons-usable plutonium to fuels that can be used
in civilian nuclear power plants.
In 1998, DOD initiated efforts to help secure Russian sites with
dangerous biological pathogens in response to intensified efforts by
Iran and other countries of proliferation concern to acquire biological
weapons expertise and materials.[Footnote 2] In 1999, Congress approved
funds to begin enhancing security at Russia‘s chemical weapons storage
sites.
U.S. Programs Have Made Progress in Three Areas:
The United States has made progress in helping reduce threats from the
weapons, materials, and personnel working in weapons development.
First, the most important progress the United States has made to date
has been in support of Russia‘s efforts to eliminate strategic nuclear
delivery systems as required by the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
(START). START I required Russia to reduce the number of delivery
vehicles from 2100 to 1600.[Footnote 3] Further cuts are required under
START II. Through the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, the
Department of Defense has helped de-fuel, transport, and destroy excess
missiles and bombers, and destroy excess launchers.[Footnote 4]
According to the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, 24 nuclear ballistic
missile submarines, 44 long-range heavy bombers, and 395
intercontinental missiles that previously contained nuclear warheads
have been destroyed as of 2002. These efforts have been successful
because the United States and Russia had mutually agreed-upon goals
rooted in START and the Russians provided relatively open
access.[Footnote 5]
The Department of Energy has made progress in securing Russia‘s
plutonium and highly enriched uranium. As we reported in February
2001,[Footnote 6] DOE had installed systems that helped improve
security over 32 percent of Russia‘s weapons-usable nuclear material.
Much of DOE‘s progress was at Russian civilian and navel fuel storage
sites. At those sites, DOE completed the installation of security
systems at nearly 60 percent (73 of 125) of the buildings and had work
under way at 26 percent (33 of 125) of the remaining
buildings.[Footnote 7] In addition, within 2 years of beginning a
program to help the Russian Navy secure its nuclear warheads, DOE had
begun installing security systems at 41 of 42 sites. The installation
of security equipment such as fences, sensors, video cameras, and
access control systems at these sites has reduced the risk of theft of
nuclear material and nuclear warheads.
The United States also seeks to reduce proliferation risks associated
with under-employed, highly trained scientists who could be tempted to
sell their expertise to terrorists or countries of concern. As we
reported in May 2001,[Footnote 8] the Departments of Defense, Energy,
and State have supplemented the incomes of thousands of former Soviet
weapons scientists. For example, in 2000, about 6,800 senior weapons
scientists were engaged in research projects such as developing
vaccines and devising techniques to enhance environmental cleanup.
However, the U.S.-sponsored research generally provides only part-time
employment for Russian scientists. Consequently, the departments know
little about the scientists‘ activities outside these programs.
U.S. Threat Reduction Programs in Russia Face Key Challenges:
Since 1991, U.S. threat reduction programs in Russia have faced two key
challenges. First, Russia has not always adhered to agreements to pay
its share of program costs, and second, Russia has not always provided
the access DOD and DOE require to design security improvements, verify
their installation, and ensure their proper operation.
Russia Has Not Always Provided Its Share of Funding for Programs:
Three programs illustrate the difficulty of relying on Russia to
provide agreed-upon funds for threat reduction programs. In 1992,
Russia requested assistance from the United States to build a site to
store nuclear material from dismantled warheads. DOD agreed to help
Russia build a Pentagon-sized facility at Mayak to store the plutonium
and limited its contribution to no more than one half ($275 million) of
the total estimated cost. However, as we reported in 1999,[Footnote 9]
Russia did not fund its $275 million share of the project. As a result,
the United States, as of January 2003, plans to spend $385 million to
design and build a scaled-back version of the facility. In addition, as
we testified in March 2000,[Footnote 10] the United States does not
know if Russia will be able to pay the annual operating costs of more
than $10 million after the facility is completed in 2004.
Since 1994, DOD has been negotiating with Russia to design and build a
destruction facility for chemical weapons. Under the terms of the
Chemical Weapons Convention, Russia is required to destroy its entire
chemical weapons stockpile by 2012. Russia estimates that it will cost
$3.5 to $5 billion for multiple facilities to destroy this stockpile.
In November 2001, we testified that DOD estimated that it will cost the
United States $890 million to design and build a single
facility.[Footnote 11] However, the successful completion of the
project was based on the assumption that Russia will pay an additional
$750 million in operational costs and related infrastructure such as
gas and water lines, storm sewers, and a rail line to link the
destruction facility with a nearby chemical weapons storage site.
However, through 2001, Russia had only provided $25 million toward this
effort.
Russia also apparently faces significant limitations on its ability to
pay for the operation and maintenance of U.S.-provided security
equipment such as cameras, electronic locks, and motion detectors. As
we reported in February 2001,[Footnote 12] when DOE began to help
secure Russia‘s weapons-usable nuclear material in 1995, the agency
assumed that Russia would be able to pay for the long-term operation
and maintenance of the security systems DOE planned to install.
However, DOE soon learned that Russian officials said they lacked the
resources to pay for these costs. As a result, as of February 2001, DOE
planned to spend $171 million to cover the cost of equipment
warranties, operating procedure development, and training. Without U.S.
funding, the operation and maintenance of security systems at these
sites would be reduced, leaving nuclear materials more vulnerable to
theft.
Russia Has Denied DOD and DOE Access to Significant Nuclear and
Biological Sites:
Russia has not provided DOD and DOE the access to sites that they
require to design security improvements, verify their installation, and
ensure their proper operation. Russia justifies these access
restrictions on the grounds that it is protecting its national security
interests. As a result, DOD and DOE have been unable to help protect
substantial portions of Russia‘s nuclear warhead stockpile and weapons-
usable nuclear material. In addition, several Russian biological sites
of potential proliferation concern have been off-limits to the United
States. The following three examples illustrate the lack of access the
agencies have encountered.
The United States has long-standing concerns about the security
conditions at Russia‘s nuclear warhead sites. In 1997, DOD began
efforts to help secure these sites. As we reported in June
2001,[Footnote 13] the Russian Ministry of Defense does not provide
U.S. personnel with access to nuclear weapons storage sites. This has
blocked DOD from installing security improvements such as fences,
sensors, and access control systems to prevent outsiders from breaking
in and employees from stealing on the inside.
As we reported in February 2001,[Footnote 14] DOE‘s lack of access to
buildings in Russia‘s nuclear weapons complex is a significant
challenge to improving security over weapons-usable nuclear material in
Russia. DOE requires access to these buildings to design security
systems and confirm their installation. The Russian Ministry of Atomic
Energy had denied DOE access to 73 percent of the buildings with
weapons-usable material in the nuclear weapons complex. As a result,
DOE was unable to improve security over hundreds of metric tons of
weapons-usable nuclear material.
The Russian government has refused to grant the United States access to
biological facilities managed by the Ministry of Defense. As we
reported in April 2000,[Footnote 15] the United States is concerned
that offensive research may continue to take place at these facilities.
It is believed that these sites maintain a national collection of
dangerous pathogens, including Ebola and Marburg viruses. U.S.
officials stated that they are concerned that dangerous pathogen stocks
could be stolen and used for illicit purposes.
The Departments of Defense and Energy have worked with the Russian
government over the years to gain access to these sites but with
limited success. As a result, the United States employs alternatives to
onsite access through the use of photographs and videotapes before and
after the installation of security systems, visual inspections by a
single member of a U.S. project team, and written certification by
Russian site directors.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, this concludes my prepared
statement. I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.
Contacts and Acknowledgments:
For future contacts regarding this testimony, please call Joseph
Christoff at (202) 512-8979. Gene Aloise, R. Stockton Butler, Joseph
Cook, Lynn Cothern, Muriel Forster, Beth Hoffman Leon, Hynek Kalkus,
David Maurer, Maria Oliver, Jeffrey Phillips, Daniele Schiffman, F.
James Shafer, and Pierre Toureille made key contributions to the
reports on which this testimony is based.
[End of section]
GAO Related Products:
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program Annual Report. GAO-03-341R.
Washington, D.C.: December 2, 2002.
Arms Control: Efforts to Strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention.
GAO-02-1038NI. Washington, D.C.: September 30, 2002.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat
Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and Planning. GAO-02-
426. Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2002.
Cooperative Threat Reduction: DOD Has Adequate Oversight of Assistance,
but Procedural Limitations Remain. GAO-01-694. Washington, D.C.: June
19, 2001.
Weapons of Mass Destruction: State Department Oversight of Science
Centers Program. GAO-01-582. Washington, D.C.: May 10, 2001.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE‘s Efforts to Assist Weapons Scientists in
Russia‘s Nuclear Cities Face Challenges. GAO-01-429. Washington, D.C.:
May 3, 2001.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: Security of Russia‘s Nuclear Material
Improving; Further Enhancements Needed. GAO-01-312. Washington, D.C.:
February 28, 2001.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: Implications of the U.S. Purchase of Russian
Highly Enriched Uranium. GAO-01-148. Washington, D.C.: December 15,
2000.
Biological Weapons: Effort to Reduce Former Soviet Threat Offers
Benefits, Poses New Risks. NSIAD-00-138. Washington, D.C.: April 28,
2000.
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Some U.S. Assistance to Redirect Russian
Scientists Taxed by Russia. NSIAD-00-154R. Washington, D.C.: April 28,
2000.
Cooperative Threat Reduction: DOD‘s 1997-98 Reports on Accounting for
Assistance Were Late and Incomplete. NSIAD-00-40. Washington, D.C.:
March 15, 2000.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: Limited Progress in Improving Nuclear
Material Security in Russia and the Newly Independent States. RCED/
NSIAD-00-82. Washington, D.C.: March 6, 2000.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: Status of Transparency Measures for U.S.
Purchase of Russian Highly Enriched Uranium. RCED-99-194. Washington,
D.C.: September 22, 1999.
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Effort to Reduce Russian Arsenals May Cost
More, Achieve Less Than Planned. NSIAD-99-76. Washington, D.C.: April
13, 1999.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: Concerns With DOE‘s Efforts to Reduce the
Risks Posed by Russia‘s Unemployed Weapons Scientists. RCED-99-54.
Washington, D.C.: February 19, 1999.
Nuclear Nonproliferation and Safety: Uncertainties About the
Implementation of U.S.-Russian Plutonium Disposition Efforts. RCED-98-
46. Washington, D.C.: January 14, 1998.
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Review of DOD‘s June 1997 Report on
Assistance Provided. NSIAD-97-218. Washington, D.C.: September 5, 1997.
Cooperative Threat Reduction: Status of Defense Conversion Efforts in
the Former Soviet Union. NSIAD-97-101. Washington, D.C.: April 11,
1997.
Weapons of Mass Destruction: DOD Reporting on Cooperative Threat
Reduction Assistance Has Improved. NSIAD-97-84. Washington, D.C.:
February 27, 1997.
Nuclear Safety: Status of U.S. Assistance to Improve the Safety of
Soviet-Designed Reactors. RCED-97-5. Washington, D.C.: October 29,
1996.
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Status of the Cooperative Threat Reduction
Program. NSIAD-96-222. Washington, D.C.: September 27, 1996.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: Status of U.S. Efforts to Improve Nuclear
Materials Controls in Newly Independent States. NSIAD/RCED-96-89.
Washington, D.C.: March 8, 1996.
Nuclear Safety: Concerns With Nuclear Facilities and Other Sources of
Radiation in the Former Soviet Union. RCED-96-4. Washington, D.C.:
November 7, 1995.
Weapons of Mass Destruction: DOD Reporting on Cooperative Threat
Reduction Assistance Can Be Improved. NSIAD-95-191. Washington, D.C.:
September 29, 1995.
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Reducing the Threat From the Former Soviet
Union--An Update. NSIAD-95-165. Washington, D.C.: June 17, 1995.
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Reducing the Threat From the Former Soviet
Union. NSIAD-95-7. Washington, D.C.: October 6, 1994.
Nuclear Safety: International Assistance Efforts to Make Soviet-
Designed Reactors Safer. RCED-94-234. Washington, D.C.: September 29,
1994.
Soviet Nuclear Weapons: Priorities and Costs Associated with U.S.
Dismantlement Assistance. NSIAD-93-154. Washington, D.C.: March 8,
1993.
FOOTNOTES
[1] Appendix I contains a list of reports GAO has published since 1993
on U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation efforts in the former
Soviet Union.
[2] Biological Weapons: Effort to Reduce Former Soviet Threat Offers
Benefits, Poses New Risks (GAO/NSIAD-00-138, Apr. 28, 2000).
[3] Under the terms of START I, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine were
required to eliminate their entire stockpile of about 400 strategic
nuclear delivery vehicles.
[4] Weapons of Mass Destruction: Status of the Cooperative Threat
Reduction Program (GAO/NSIAD-96-222, Sep. 27, 1996).
[5] Weapons of Mass Destruction: U.S. Efforts to Reduce Threats from
the Former Soviet Union. GAO/T-NSIAD/RCED-00-119, Mar. 6, 2000.
[6] Nuclear Nonproliferation: Security of Russia‘s Nuclear Material
Improving; Further Enhancements Needed (GAO-01-312, Feb. 28, 2001).
[7] Russia stores weapons-usable nuclear material at three types of
sites. Civilian sites produce nuclear fuels and materials for civilian
application; naval fuel sites store stockpiles of highly enriched
uranium used in submarines and icebreakers; and the nuclear weapons
complex fabricates, refurbishes, and dismantles nuclear weapons and
components.
[8] Weapons of Mass Destruction: State Department Oversight of Science
Centers Program (GAO-01-582, May 10, 2001) and Nuclear
Nonproliferation: DOE‘s Efforts to Assist Weapons Scientists in
Russia‘s Nuclear Cities Face Challenges (GAO-01-429, May 3, 2001).
[9] Weapons of Mass Destruction: Effort to Reduce Russian Arsenals May
Cost More, Achieve Less Than Planned (GAO/NSIAD-99-76, Apr. 1999).
[10] Weapons of Mass Destruction: U.S. Efforts to Reduce Threats from
the Former Soviet Union (GAO/T-NSIAD/RCED-00-119, Mar. 6, 2000).
[11] Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing U.S. Policy Tools for
Combating Proliferation (GAO-02-226T, Nov. 7, 2001).
[12] GAO-01-312.
[13] Cooperative Threat Reduction: DOD Has Adequate Oversight of
Assistance, but Procedural Limitations Remain (GAO-01-694, Jun. 19,
2001).
[14] GAO-01-312.
[15] GAO/NSIAD-00-138.
