Embassy Construction
Process for Determining Staffing Requirements Needs Improvement Gao ID: GAO-03-411 April 7, 2003The 1998 terrorist attacks on two U.S. embassies in Africa highlighted security deficiencies in diplomatic facilities, leading the Department of State to embark on an estimated $16 billion embassy construction program. The program's key objective is to provide safe, secure, and cost-effective buildings for employees overseas. Given that the size and cost of new facilities are directly related to agencies' anticipated staffing needs, it is imperative that future requirements be projected as accurately as possible. GAO was asked to (1) assess whether State and other federal agencies have adopted a disciplined process for determining future staffing requirements and (2) review cost-sharing proposals for agencies with overseas staff.
U.S. agencies' staffing projections for new embassy compounds are developed without a systematic approach or comprehensive rightsizing analyses. State's headquarters gave embassies little guidance on factors to consider in developing projections, and thus U.S. agencies did not take a consistent or systematic approach to determining long-term staffing needs. Officials from each of the 14 posts GAO contacted reported that their headquarters bureaus had not provided specific, formal guidance on important factors to consider when developing staffing projections. The process was further complicated by the frequent turnover of embassy personnel who did not maintain documentation on projection exercises. Finally, staffing projections were not consistently vetted with all other agencies' headquarters. Because of these deficiencies, the government could construct wrong-sized buildings. In fact, officials at two embassies GAO visited said that due to poor projections, their sites may be inadequate almost immediately after staff move onto the new compound. State has proposed a cost-sharing plan that would require federal agencies to help fund new embassy construction. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is leading an interagency committee to develop a cost-sharing mechanism that would provide more discipline when determining overseas staffing needs and encourage agencies to think more carefully before posting personnel overseas. Numerous issues will need to be resolved for such a program to be successful, including how to structure the program and how payments will be made.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-03-411, Embassy Construction: Process for Determining Staffing Requirements Needs Improvement
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Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging
Threats, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform,
House of Representatives:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
April 2003:
Embassy Construction:
Process for Determining Staffing Requirements Needs Improvement:
Linking Staffing Needs to Embassy Construction:
GAO-03-411:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-03-411, a report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on
National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, House
Committee on Government Reform
Why GAO Did This Study:
The 1998 terrorist attacks on two U.S. embassies in Africa highlighted
security deficiencies in diplomatic facilities, leading the Department
of State to embark on an estimated $16 billion embassy construction
program. The program‘s key objective is to provide safe, secure, and
cost-effective buildings for employees overseas. Given that the size
and cost of new facilities are directly related to agencies‘
anticipated staffing needs, it is imperative that future requirements
be projected as accurately as possible.
GAO was asked to (1) assess whether State and other federal agencies
have adopted a disciplined process for determining future staffing
requirements and (2) review cost-sharing proposals for agencies with
overseas staff.
What GAO Found:
U.S. agencies‘ staffing projections for new embassy compounds are
developed without a systematic approach or comprehensive rightsizing
analyses. State‘s headquarters gave embassies little guidance on
factors to consider in developing projections, and thus U.S. agencies
did not take a consistent or systematic approach to determining
long-term staffing needs. Officials from each of the 14 posts GAO
contacted reported that their headquarters bureaus had not provided
specific, formal guidance on important factors to consider when
developing staffing projections. The process was further complicated by
the frequent turnover of embassy personnel who did not maintain
documentation on projection exercises. Finally, staffing projections
were not consistently vetted with all other agencies‘ headquarters.
Because of these deficiencies, the government could construct
wrong-sized buildings. In fact, officials at two embassies GAO visited
said that due to poor projections, their sites may be inadequate almost
immediately after staff move onto the new compound.
State has proposed a cost-sharing plan that would require federal
agencies to help fund new embassy construction. The Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) is leading an interagency committee to
develop a cost-sharing mechanism that would provide more discipline
when determining overseas staffing needs and encourage agencies to
think more carefully before posting personnel overseas. Numerous issues
will need to be resolved for such a program to be successful, including
how to structure the program and how payments will be made.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Department of State (1) develop standard and
comprehensive guidance for projecting staffing requirements, (2)
require the retention of documentation on how embassies determined
these requirements, and (3) ensure that all staffing projections have
been validated.
We received comments from State, OMB, and the U.S. Agency for
International Development, all of which generally agreed with our
conclusions and recommendations.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-411.
To view the full report, including the scope and methodology, click
on the link above. For more information, contact Jess T. Ford at
(202) 512-4128 or fordj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Systematic Effort to Project Staffing Needs for New Embassies Is
Lacking:
Government Aims to Distribute Costs of Overseas Facilities among Users:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Scope and Methodology:
Appendix I: Standard Embassy Compound Design:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of State:
Appendix III: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International
Development:
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Staff Acknowledgments:
Table:
Table 1: Notional Distribution of Costs under State‘s Capital Security
Cost-sharing Proposal Based on a May 2001 Overseas Personnel Survey:
Figures:
Figure 1: Map of New Embassy Compound Construction Projects, Fiscal
Years 1999 through 2004 Funding:
Figure 2: Major Milestones in Planning for a New Embassy Compound
Scheduled for Fiscal Year 2007 Funding:
Figure 3: Components of OBO‘s Staffing Projection Process:
Figure 4: Standard Design for New Embassy Compounds:
Abbreviations:
ICASS: International Cooperative Administrative Support Services
OBO: Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations
OMB: Office of Management and Budget
OPAP: Overseas Presence Advisory Panel
USAID: U.S. Agency for International Development:
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United States General Accounting Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
April 7, 2003:
The Honorable Christopher Shays
Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security,
Emerging Threats, and International Relations
Committee on Government Reform
House of Representatives:
Dear Mr. Chairman:
As a result of the 1998 terrorist attacks on two U.S. embassies in
Africa, which highlighted the security deficiencies in U.S. diplomatic
facilities, the Department of State has embarked on an estimated $16
billion embassy construction program, the largest program of its kind
in the department‘s history. The program‘s key objective is to provide
safe, secure, and cost-effective buildings for employees working
overseas. Given that the size and cost of new facilities are directly
related to anticipated staffing requirements for these posts, it is
imperative that future staffing needs be projected as accurately as
possible.
In August 2001, the President identified rightsizing[Footnote 1] of
embassies and consulates as one of his management priorities.[Footnote
2] One of the goals of this initiative is to develop accurate staffing
projections for new overseas construction. In July 2002, we developed a
framework for assessing embassy staff levels to help support
rightsizing initiatives for existing facilities.[Footnote 3] However,
developing staffing requirements for a new embassy is much more
difficult than for an existing facility because it requires managers to
project staffing needs 5 to 7 years in the future.
In response to your concerns, we assessed whether State and other
federal agencies have adopted a disciplined process for determining
staffing requirements for new embassies and consulates. We also
reviewed cost-sharing proposals for agencies with overseas staff. To
meet these objectives, we collected documentation from and conducted
interviews with executive branch agencies in Washington, D.C.,
including the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, and others,
regarding future staffing requirements, the projection process, and the
extent to which cost considerations were factored into the decision-
making process. To assess agencies‘ actions in developing staffing
requirements, we visited seven U.S. posts and contacted seven
additional embassies in a range of geographic regions, all of which are
slated for new compounds. These posts represent about 16 percent of the
new embassy compound projects in State‘s construction plan for fiscal
years 2002 through 2007, and 23 percent of these projects are expected
to be funded by fiscal year 2005.
Results in Brief:
U.S. agencies‘ staffing projections for new embassy compounds are
developed without a systematic approach or comprehensive rightsizing
analyses. Officials at the embassies we visited approached the process
in different ways. For example, some embassies solicited input from all
agencies and held several meetings to discuss future needs, while
others developed requirements without serious effort or review.
Although embassies play a key role in the projection process, State
Department headquarters officials provide chiefs of mission[Footnote 4]
with little formal guidance on factors to consider when setting
requirements, nor do they stress the importance of accurate
projections. Moreover, at each of the seven posts we visited, we found
little or no documentation to show that staff had completed a
comprehensive assessment of the number and types of people they would
need in the year that their embassy would be completed. In fact, a
failure to account for recent growth in current staffing levels at one
embassy we visited led to final projections that were too low and may
result in significant overcrowding in the new facility. In addition,
State‘s geographic bureaus[Footnote 5] are not consistently reviewing
and validating projections to ensure that they accurately reflect
future requirements. Finally, additional factors complicate the
projection process, including the frequent turnover of embassy
personnel and other breakdowns in communication among multiple agencies
with differing requirements on new embassy compounds. Building secure
and modern facilities for U.S. government employees working overseas is
extremely important and will require a significant investment. However,
without a systematic process, the U.S. government risks building wrong-
sized facilities, which could lead to security concerns, additional
costs, and other work inefficiencies.
The State Department has proposed the Capital Security Cost-sharing
Plan that would require federal agencies to help fund its embassy
construction program. Currently, other U.S. agencies are not required
to fund capital improvements to overseas facilities. The Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) is working with State and other agencies
through an interagency committee to develop a cost-sharing mechanism
that would provide more discipline when determining U.S. government
overseas staffing needs. The administration has committed to
implementing greater cost sharing among agencies that use overseas
facilities because it believes that if agencies are required to pay a
greater share of the costs associated with their overseas presence,
they will weigh cost considerations more carefully before posting
personnel overseas. The interagency committee will consider State‘s and
others‘ proposals when developing a new cost-sharing mechanism. There
are numerous issues that will need to be resolved for a cost-sharing
program to be successful, such as how best to structure the program,
how charges will be determined, and how payments will be made.
This report contains recommendations to the Secretary of State that the
department (1) develop standard and comprehensive guidance for
projecting staffing requirements for new embassy compounds, (2) require
the retention of documentation on how agencies and embassies determined
these requirements and the rationales for the decisions, and (3) ensure
chiefs of mission and State‘s geographic bureaus certify that the
projections have been reviewed and vetted before they are submitted to
State‘s Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO).
We received written comments from State and the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID), which we have reprinted in
appendixes II and III. We also received oral comments from OMB, which
we have summarized at the end of this report. All three agencies agreed
with our findings, conclusions, and recommendations.
Background:
The 1998 terrorist bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania
highlighted the compelling need for safe and secure overseas
facilities. Following the bombings, two high-level independent groups
cited problems at U.S. overseas facilities. In January 1999, the
chairman of the Accountability Review Boards,[Footnote 6] formed to
investigate the bombings, reported that unless security vulnerabilities
associated with U.S. overseas facilities were addressed, ’U.S.
Government employees and the public in many of our facilities abroad“
would be at continued risk from further terrorist bombings.[Footnote 7]
Later that year, the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel (OPAP)[Footnote
8] concluded that many U.S. overseas facilities are unsafe,
overcrowded, deteriorating, and ’shockingly shabby“ and recommended
major capital improvements and more accountability for security. In
addition, the panel recommended that the United States consider
rightsizing its overseas presence to reduce security vulnerabilities.
In January 2001, we recommended that State develop a long-term capital
construction plan to guide the multibillion dollar program to build new
secure facilities.[Footnote 9] We also reported in July 2002 on a
rightsizing framework we developed to facilitate the use of a common
set of criteria for making staff assessments and adjustments at
overseas posts, which included consideration of security, mission
priorities and requirements, and costs. We recommended that OMB use the
framework as a basis for assessing staffing levels at existing overseas
posts.[Footnote 10]
Figure 1 illustrates the locations worldwide for which State has
received funding for new embassy compound construction in fiscal years
1999 through 2003 and for which it has requested funding for projects
in fiscal year 2004.
Figure 1: Map of New Embassy Compound Construction Projects, Fiscal
Years 1999 through 2004 Funding:
[See PDF for image]
Note: The facilities in Cape Town, Istanbul, and Surabaya are U.S.
consulates. We did not include other projects, such as the construction
of new annex buildings on existing compounds, for which State has
received or requested funding during this period.
[A] Indicates projects for which State has requested funding in fiscal
year 2004.
[End of figure]:
In July 2001, State published its first Long-Range Overseas Building
Plan, a planning document that outlines the U.S. government‘s overseas
facilities requirements and guides implementation of State‘s expansive
and unprecedented overseas construction program. This program aims to
provide safe, secure, and cost-effective buildings for the thousands of
U.S. employees working overseas. State identified the projects with the
most compelling case for replacement and ranked them in the plan, which
OBO plans to update annually as compounds are completed and new
projects are added to the priority list.[Footnote 11] The current long-
range plan describes building new embassy compounds at more than 70
locations during fiscal years 2002 through 2007.[Footnote 12] State
estimates this will cost more than $6.2 billion.[Footnote 13]
Additional funding will be needed after this time to continue the
program.
State‘s construction program of the late 1980s encountered lengthy
delays and cost overruns in part because of a lack of coordinated
planning of post requirements prior to approval and budgeting for
construction projects. As we reported in 1991, meaningful planning
began only after project budgets had been authorized and funded. As
real needs were determined, changes in scope and increases in costs
followed.[Footnote 14] OBO now requires that all staffing projections
for new embassy compounds be finalized prior to submitting funding
requests, which are sent to the Congress as part of State‘s annual
budget request each February. To accomplish this task, OBO requires
that final staffing projections be submitted the previous spring.
Figure 2 outlines the major milestones and highlights key dates in the
planning and construction process for a new embassy compound scheduled
for 2007 funding. As Figure 2 depicts, OBO will receive final staffing
projections for fiscal year 2007 projects in spring 2005. Between
spring 2005 and February 2006, OBO will develop more firm cost
estimates for the project, vet the resulting funding requirements
through OMB, and submit the funding request to the Congress.
Appropriations for these fiscal year 2007 projects will not be secured
until at least October 2006--18 months after final projections are
submitted--and construction may not begin for another 6 months. In
total, OBO estimates that, in some cases, it could take 2 to 3 years
from the time projections are finalized to actually begin construction
of a new compound, which could take another 2 to 3 years to complete.
Figure 2: Major Milestones in Planning for a New Embassy Compound
Scheduled for Fiscal Year 2007 Funding:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
To ensure that projects in the long-range plan proceed on schedule and
at cost, OBO will not request additional funding to accommodate changes
made after funding requests are submitted to the Congress. Once OBO
receives appropriations for construction projects, it moves immediately
to complete the design of a new compound and secure a contracting firm
for the project. Changes to staffing projections after this point may
result in redesign and could lead to lengthy delays and additional
costs, according to an OBO official. For example, large changes
generally require that materials already purchased for the project be
replaced with new materials. According to OBO, there is little room for
flexibility after the budget is submitted given budgetary and
construction time frames. However, OBO does include a margin of error
in the designs for all new embassy compounds, which typically allows
for a 5-10 percent increase in building size to accommodate some
additional growth.
A key component of the planning process outlined in figure 2 is the
development of staffing projections for new embassy compounds. Staffing
projections present the number of staff likely to work in the facility
and the type of work they will perform. These are the two primary
drivers of the size and cost of new facilities. Individual embassies
and consulates, in consultation with headquarters bureaus and offices,
are responsible for developing the staffing projections, which OBO then
uses to design the new compounds and prepare funding requests. As the
government‘s overseas real property manager, OBO must rely on the other
bureaus in the State Department and other U.S. agencies for policy and
staffing decisions. OBO is not in a position to independently validate
the projections once the geographic bureaus have given their approval.
To help ensure that new compounds are designed as accurately as
possible, OBO designed a system for collecting future staffing
requirements, as shown in figure 3, that encourages the active
participation of embassy personnel, officials in State‘s geographic
bureaus, and officials from all other relevant federal
agencies.[Footnote 15] This process also calls upon embassy management
and geographic bureaus to review and validate all projections before
submitting them to OBO. OBO generally gives embassies and geographic
bureaus the opportunity to submit staffing projections several times
before they are finalized.
Figure 3: Components of OBO‘s Staffing Projection Process:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Finally, it should be noted that while OBO takes the lead in designing
and constructing all buildings on new embassy compounds, OBO is not
always responsible for securing funding for all compound buildings.
Pursuant to an informal agreement between OBO and USAID, USAID will
secure funding for a separate annex in a compound when it requires desk
space for 50 or more employees. However, if USAID projects it will need
fewer than 50 desks, its offices will be in the chancery building in
the compound, which State would fund, as it would for all U.S.
government agencies in the chancery. According to OBO and USAID
headquarters officials, there is some flexibility in the maximum number
of USAID desk spaces allowed in a chancery, and this issue is handled
on a case-by-case basis.
Systematic Effort to Project Staffing Needs for New Embassies Is
Lacking:
Although OBO has designed a reasonable approach to developing staffing
projections, we found that it was not adopted uniformly across all of
the embassies and geographic bureaus that we studied. While some of the
embassies we examined have conducted relatively thorough analyses of
their future needs, in other cases the process has been managed poorly,
both in the field and at headquarters offices, thus raising concerns
about the validity of the projected requirements. For example, with few
exceptions, officials at the posts we visited did not appreciate the
seriousness of the staffing projection process as it relates to the
size and cost of new diplomatic facilities. Moreover, none of the
embassies we contacted received formal, detailed guidance on how to
develop projections. In addition, they had no systematic approach, such
as the one presented in our framework, to conducting rightsizing
analyses that would ensure that projected needs are the minimum
necessary to support U.S. national security interests. In general, for
the embassies we contacted, rightsizing exercises were largely limited
to predictions of future workload, priorities, and funding levels, and
did not include analyses of other factors, such as operational costs.
Moreover, none of the embassies we contacted conducted a rightsizing
analysis of existing staffing levels prior to projecting future
requirements. We also found that posts did not maintain documentation
of the assessments they conducted when completing staffing projections,
and that State‘s geographic bureaus did not consistently vet posts‘
projections prior to submitting them to OBO. Finally, the process was
further complicated by other factors, such as frequent personnel
turnover and breakdowns in communication among multiple agencies.
Efforts to Develop Staffing Projections Vary Significantly across
Embassies and Geographic Bureaus:
We found that staffing projection exercises were not consistent across
all of the embassies we contacted, and, indeed, State officials
acknowledged that efforts to develop and validate projections were
informal and undisciplined. Some embassy management teams were more
engaged in the projection process than others. For instance, at several
of the U.S. embassies we contacted, chiefs of mission or deputy chiefs
of mission led interagency, or country team, meetings to discuss the
embassy‘s long-term priorities and the staffing implications. In
addition, management followed up with agency representatives in one-on-
one meetings to discuss each agency‘s projected requirements. However,
management teams at other embassies we contacted, such as the U.S.
embassies in Belgrade, Serbia and Montenegro, and Tbilisi, Georgia,
were less engaged and had relied mainly on administrative officers to
collect information from each agency informally. In Belgrade, officials
acknowledged that the projection exercise was not taken seriously and
that projections were not developed using a disciplined approach. In
Tbilisi, a failure to document recent growth in current staffing levels
led to final projections that were too low. OBO has had to meet
immediate additional requirements by using all of the growth space it
built into the original compound design and reducing the amount of
common space, such as conference rooms, to accommodate additional
offices. Therefore, the new facility may be overcrowded upon opening,
embassy officials said. If embassy or headquarters officials
communicated earlier to OBO the likelihood of large staffing increases
by the time construction was completed, OBO might have been able to
better accommodate these needs in its plans.
In addition to inconsistencies in the field, we found that officials in
the geographic bureaus in Washington, D.C., whose staff are responsible
for working most closely with embassies and consulates, also have
varied levels of involvement in the projection process. Officials with
whom we spoke in State‘s geographic bureaus acknowledged that there is
no mechanism to ensure the full participation of all relevant parties.
When these officials were more involved, we have more confidence in the
accuracy of the projections submitted to OBO. For example, officials
from the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, China, said that representatives from
their geographic bureau in Washington, D.C., have been very involved in
developing their projections. They reported that the geographic bureau
contacted all federal agencies that might be tenants at the new
embassy--even agencies that currently have no staff in the country--to
determine their projected staffing needs. Conversely, officials at
Embassy Belgrade said State‘s geographic bureau did not request any
justifications for or provide any input into the final projections
submitted to OBO. Officials in the geographic bureau acknowledged that
the bureau does not require formal justification for embassies‘
projected staffing requirements for new compounds. Given the weaknesses
in how staffing projections were developed in Embassy Belgrade, State
has little assurance that the planned compound will be the right size.
Embassies Do Not Receive Consistent, Formal Guidance on Staffing
Projection Process and Importance of Rightsizing:
Our analysis indicates that the State Department is not providing
embassies with sufficient formal guidance on important time lines in
the projection process or factors to consider when developing staffing
projections for new embassy compounds. Officials from each of the 14
posts we contacted reported that their headquarters bureaus had not
provided specific, formal guidance on important factors to consider
when developing staffing projections. One geographic bureau provided
its embassies with a brief primer on the process by which State
determines priorities for new embassy compounds that broadly described
the projection process and OBO‘s long-range plan. However, we found
that State generally did not advise embassies to consider factors such
as (1) anticipated changes in funding levels, (2) the likelihood that
policy changes could result in additional or fewer work requirements,
(3) linkages between agencies‘ annual operating costs and the
achievement of embassy goals, (4) costs associated with their presence
in a new facility, or (5) alternative ways to consolidate certain
positions among neighboring embassies, among others. Absent such
guidance from Washington, D.C., we found that factors that embassy
officials considered when developing projections varied on a case-by-
case basis. Officials at Embassy Sarajevo, for example, conducted a
relatively thorough analysis of their future needs, including
consulting World Bank indicators for Bosnia-Herzegovina to determine
the likelihood of increased U.S. investment in the region and link
future staffing needs accordingly. In addition, a consular affairs
officer analyzed the likelihood that new security requirements for
consular sections, which may allow only American consular officers to
screen visa applicants, would boost that section‘s staffing
requirements.
Other embassies we contacted conducted less thorough analyses of future
needs. For example, officials from several of the other embassies we
contacted reported that they largely relied on information from annual
Mission Performance Plans[Footnote 16] to justify future staffing needs
in a new compound. Although the performance plan links staffing to
budgets and performance, and may include goals related to improving
diplomatic facilities, it is a near-term tool. For example, performance
plans for fiscal year 2004 identify goals and strategies only for that
fiscal year. For a project scheduled for 2004 funding, an embassy may
go through two or three additional performance planning cycles before
embassy staff move onto a new compound. The performance plan, while a
reasonable starting point, is not directly linked to long-term staffing
requirements and by itself is not sufficient to justify staffing
decisions for new compounds.
Indeed, an official from one geographic bureau said that while the
bureau works with the embassies in developing staffing projections, it
generally does not send out additional or separate formal guidance to
all relevant embassies. Although OBO informed the geographic bureaus
that final projections for fiscal year 2004 funding would be due in
spring 2002, officials at some of the embassies we examined were
unaware of this deadline. For example, officials at the U.S. Embassy in
Harare, Zimbabwe, said they lacked information on the major time frames
in the funding process for their new compound. Officials at the Embassy
Belgrade said they were unaware that the projections they submitted to
OBO in spring 2002 would be their final chance to project future
staffing needs, and that the results would be used as the basis for the
new compound‘s design. In other words, they did not know that
additional requirements they might submit would not result in a larger-
sized building.
Use of Rightsizing Exercises:
According to OBO, individual embassies should have conducted
rightsizing exercises before submitting the staffing projections used
to develop the July 2001 version of the long-range plan. In addition,
in January 2002, OBO advised all geographic bureaus that staffing
projections should incorporate formalized rightsizing initiatives
early in the process so that building designs would accurately reflect
the embassies‘ needs. However, OBO is not in a position to know what
processes the geographic bureaus use when developing staffing
projections. Indeed, OBO officials stated that they cannot hold the
geographic bureaus accountable for policy-related decisions and can
only assume that rightsizing exercises have been incorporated into the
projection process.
The degree to which each geographic bureau stressed the importance of
rightsizing staffing projections differed across the embassies we
studied. We found that agencies at the posts we examined were not
consistently considering the three critical elements of diplomatic
operations outlined in our rightsizing frameworkæphysical security of
facilities, mission priorities and responsibilities, and operational
costs--when determining future staffing requirements. In general, for
these posts, rightsizing exercises were largely limited to predictions
of future funding levels and likely workloads. For example, officials
at each of the seven posts we visited reported that staffing
projections were, in large part, linked to anticipated funding levels.
In Skopje, for example, USAID officials estimated that funding levels
for some programs, such as the democracy and governance program, could
decline significantly over the next 5 years and could result in a
reduction in staff assigned to these areas.
Although these embassies had considered mission requirements as part of
the projection process, they did not consistently consider other
factors that are mentioned above, such as options for relocating
certain positions to regional centers or consolidating other positions
among neighboring embassies. Moreover, decision makers at these
embassies used current staffing levels as the basis for projecting
future requirements. None of the posts we contacted conducted a
rightsizing analysis of existing staffing levels prior to projecting
future requirements. In addition, we found that most agencies with
staff overseas are not consistently considering operational costs when
developing their staffing projections. The President‘s rightsizing
initiative has emphasized cost as a critical factor in determining
overseas staffing levels. However, during our fieldwork, only USAID
officials consistently reported that they considered the implications
of anticipated program funding on staffing levels and the resulting
operational costs. Furthermore, we found only one instance where an
agency, the U.S. Commercial Service, reported that as part of its
overseas staffing process, it compares operating costs of field offices
with the performance of those offices.
Little Documentation of Comprehensive Assessments of Long-term Staffing
Needs:
At each of the seven posts we visited, we found little or no
documentation to show that staff had completed a comprehensive
assessment of the number and types of people they would need in the
year that their new embassy would be completed. As part of our prior
work on rightsizing, we developed examples of key questions that may be
useful for embassy managers in making staffing decisions. These
include, but are not limited to the following questions:
* Is there adequate justification for the number of employees from each
agency compared to the agency‘s mission?
* What are the operating costs for each agency at the embassy?
* To what extent could agency program and/or routine administrative
functions (procurement, logistics, and financial management functions)
be handled from a regional center or other locations?
:
However, we did not find evidence of these types of analyses at the
posts we visited. Officials from several embassies told us they had
considered these factors; yet, they did not consistently document their
analyses or the rationales for their decisions. Although officials at
the embassies we visited said that these types of considerations are
included as part of their annual Mission Performance Plan process,
there was little evidence of analyses of long-term needs. Moreover, we
found little or no documentation explaining how previous projections
were developed or the justifications for these decisions. For example,
by the time the new embassy compound is completed in Yerevan, Armenia,
the embassy will be four administrative officers removed from the
person who developed the original staffing requirements, and current
embassy officials had no documentation on previous projection exercises
or the decision-making processes. Thus, there was generally no
institutional memory of and accountability for previous iterations of
staffing projections. As a result, future management teams will not
have accurate information on how or why previous decisions were made
when they embark on efforts to update and finalize staffing
projections.
Staffing Projections Are Not Vetted Consistently by Geographic Bureaus:
According to OBO, the relevant geographic bureaus are expected to
review and verify the staffing projections developed by individual
embassies and confirm these numbers with other agencies‘ headquarters
before they are submitted to OBO. However, we found that the degree to
which the staffing projections were reviewed varied. For example,
officials at Embassy Belgrade reported that their geographic bureau was
not an active participant in projection exercises. But officials at
Embassy Sarajevo reported that officials from the same geographic
bureau were involved in the projection process and often requested
justifications for some decisions. In addition, we found little
evidence to show that staffing projections were consistently vetted
with all other agencies‘ headquarters to ensure that the projections
were as accurate as possible. Indeed, State officials acknowledged that
(1) State and other agencies‘ headquarters offices are not held
accountable for conducting formal vetting exercises once projections
are received from the embassies; (2) there is no formal vetting
process; and, (3) the geographic bureaus expect that officials in the
field consult with all relevant agencies; therefore, the bureaus rarely
contact agency headquarters officials.
Additional Factors Complicate Staffing Projection Process:
We found additional factors that further complicate the staffing
projection process. First, frequent turnover of embassy personnel
responsible for developing staffing projections results in a lack of
continuity in the projection process. This turnover and the lack of
formal documentation may prevent subsequent embassy personnel from
building upon the work of their predecessors. Second, we found that
coordinating the projected needs of all agencies could be problematic.
For example, some agencies may decide not to be located in the new
compound, while others, such as USAID, may have different requirements
in the new compound. However, we found that these issues were not
always communicated to embassy management in a timely fashion, early in
the projection process.
Lack of Continuity in Projection Process:
Frequent turnover in embassy personnel can contribute to problems
obtaining accurate staffing projections. Embassy staff may be assigned
to a location for only 2 years, and at some locations, the assignment
may be shorter. For instance, the U.S. Office in Pristina, Kosovo, and
the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon, have only a 1-year assignment
requirement. Given that personnel responsible for developing the
projections could change from year to year, and that posts may go
through several updates before the numbers are finalized, the
continuity of the projection process is disrupted each year as
knowledgeable staff are transferred to new assignments. Officials in
Kosovo reported that the frequent turnover of administrative personnel
has forced incoming staff to rebuild institutional knowledge of the
projection process each year.
Breakdowns in Communication among Multiple Agencies:
Part of the complexity of the projection process is the difficulty in
coordinating staffing requirements for multiple agencies in a given
location. Agencies‘ space needs in the main office building may
differ--for instance, some may require classified space, which is more
expensive to construct and thus has different implications for the
design and cost of a new building than unclassified space. However,
agencies requesting office space may not currently be situated in the
country in question and, thus, communication between them and embassy
managers is difficult. For example, embassy management in Yerevan,
Armenia, stated that one agency without personnel currently in Armenia
did not notify the ambassador that it planned to request controlled
access space in the new embassy. Embassy officials stated they learned
of this only when floor plans for the new chancery were first
delivered. These kinds of issues should be communicated to embassy
managers in the early stages of the projection process so that the
final projections are based on the most accurate information available.
Embassy officials in Rangoon, Burma, for example, reported that close
interaction among agencies at post and OBO during the staff projection
process, under the leadership of the deputy chief of mission and the
administrative officer, kept OBO apprised of changes to requirements
early enough in the process that it was before the budget proposal was
submitted to the Congress and the projections were locked.
Failure to Provide Timely Requests for Co-location Waivers:
Following the 1998 embassy bombings, a law was passed requiring that
all U.S. agencies working at posts slated for new construction be
located on the new embassy compounds unless they are granted a special
co-location waiver.[Footnote 17] However, agencies are not required to
submit these waiver requests prior to submitting their final staffing
projections to OBO. To ensure that OBO has the most accurate
projections, it is imperative that waiver requests be incorporated
early in the staffing projection process so that OBO is not designing
and funding buildings that are too large or too small. In Yerevan, for
example, the Department of Agriculture office projected the need for 26
desks in the new chancery, yet officials in Yerevan plan to use only 13
of these desks and to house the remaining personnel in their current
office space. However, Agriculture has not yet requested a waiver. If
Agriculture receives a waiver and proceeds according to current plans,
OBO will have designed space and requested funding for 13 extra desks
for Agriculture staff. We found other instances where agencies had not
requested a waiver before submitting final projections. In Sarajevo,
for example, the Departments of the Defense, Treasury, and Justice have
staff in host country ministries they advise. However, officials at
Embassy Sarajevo, including the regional security officer, were
uncertain about which agencies would be requesting a waiver for the new
compound. Embassy officials acknowledged that these decisions must be
made before the staffing projections are finalized.
Separate Funding for USAID Annexes Could Complicate the Projection
Process:
In compounds where USAID is likely to require desk space for more than
50 employees, it is required to secure funding in its own
appropriations for an annex building on the compound. However,
officials from at least two of the embassies we examined had trouble
determining where USAID would be located, and this kind of problem
could delay planning and disrupt OBO‘s overall plan for concurrent
construction of the USAID annex with the rest of the compound. For
example, at Embassy Yerevan, confusion among USAID officials in
Washington and the field over whether USAID would fund a separate annex
has caused construction and funding on the annex to fall behind
schedule. Therefore, USAID staff will not move to the new site
concurrent with the rest of the embassy‘s staff. Rather, USAID may be
forced to remain at the current, insecure facilityæat an additional
costæuntil completion of its annex, unless alternative arrangements can
be made.
We also found a related problem in Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, where
USAID officials were concerned about having to build a separate annex.
Current staffing levels and projections exceed the 50-desk level, which
will require USAID to fund the construction of an annex on the
compound. However, the assistance program may be declining
significantly soon after the completion of the new compound and, as a
result, the office may need far fewer staff. Thus, USAID may be
constructing an annex that is oversized or unnecessary by the time
construction is completed or soon after. USAID officials in Sarajevo
acknowledged they would need to coordinate with embassy management and
their headquarters offices regarding the decision to build a separate
annex so that OBO has the most accurate projections possible.
The issue of USAID annex construction is further complicated by
difficulty coordinating funding schedules. One of the key assumptions
of the long-range plan is that where USAID requires a separate annex,
construction will coincide with the State-funded construction projects.
However, annual funding levels for USAID construction have been
insufficient to keep chancery and USAID annex construction on the same
track in some countries. In Tbilisi, Georgia, for example, funding for
the USAID annex has fallen behind State Department funding by 2 to 3
fiscal years. According to USAID officials in Washington, D.C., two-
track construction could lead to security concerns, work
inefficiencies, and additional costs. Because USAID is required to
secure funding for its annexes separate from State‘s funding for new
compounds, it is imperative that decisions regarding the future
location of USAID personnel be made early in the staffing projection
process to avoid additional security or financial risks.
Government Aims to Distribute Costs of Overseas Facilities among Users:
The State Department, which historically has been responsible for
funding the construction and maintenance of U.S. embassies and
consulates, recently proposed a capital security cost-sharing plan that
would require federal agencies to help fund its embassy construction
program. Traditionally, U.S. government agencies other than State have
not been required to help fund capital improvements of U.S. embassies
and consulates. OMB is examining State‘s and other cost-sharing
proposals designed to create more discipline in the process for
determining overseas staffing requirements. The administration
believes that if agencies were required to pay a greater portion of the
total costs associated with operating overseas facilities, they would
think more carefully before posting personnel overseas. In spring 2003,
OMB will lead an interagency committee to develop a cost-sharing
mechanism that would be implemented in fiscal year 2005. This new
mechanism could require agencies to help fund the construction of new
embassies and consulates. While it may be reasonable to expect that
agencies should pay full costs associated with their overseas presence,
many factors and questions must be addressed prior to implementing an
effective and equitable cost-sharing mechanism.
State‘s Proposed Capital Security Cost-sharing Plan:
The State Department has presented a capital security cost-sharing plan
to OMB that would require agencies to help fund State‘s capital
construction program. State‘s proposal calls for each agency to pay a
proportion of the total construction program costs based on its total
overseas staffing levels.[Footnote 18] Agencies would be charged
different costs based on whether their staff are located in classified
or nonclassified access areas.[Footnote 19] Agencies would be assessed
a fee each year, which would be updated annually, until the building
program is completed. An added benefit of such a program, State
believes, is it would provide incentive for agencies to place greater
consideration of the total costs associated with their presence abroad,
which in turn, would lead to greater efforts to rightsize overseas
presence. Table 1 shows an estimated distribution of costs for each
agency once the program is fully implemented, based on State‘s May 2001
survey data.
Table 1: Notional Distribution of Costs under State‘s Capital Security
Cost-sharing Proposal Based on a May 2001 Overseas Personnel Survey:
Agency: Department of State; Annual cost: $775,324,345; Percentage
of cost[A]: 55.38.
Agency: United States Agency for International Development; Annual
cost: 187,627,814; Percentage
of cost[A]: 13.40.
Agency: Department of Defense; Annual cost: 183,889,473; Percentage
of cost[A]: 13.13.
Agency: Department of Justice; Annual cost: 77,458,156; Percentage
of cost[A]: 5.53.
Agency: Department of Commerce; Annual cost: 48,000,356; Percentage
of cost[A]: 3.43.
Agency: Department of the Treasury; Annual cost: 26,956,128; Percentage
of cost[A]: 1.93.
Agency: Department of Agriculture; Annual cost: 24,016,819; Percentage
of cost[A]: 1.72.
Agency: International Broadcasting Bureau; Annual cost: 19,156,184;
Percentage
of cost[A]: 1.37.
Agency: Department of Health and Human Services; Annual cost:
13,383,305; Percentage
of cost[A]: 0.96.
Agency: Foreign Broadcast Information Service; Annual cost: 8,914,998;
Percentage
of cost[A]: 0.64.
Agency: Library of Congress; Annual cost: 8,008,619; Percentage
of cost[A]: 0.57.
Agency: North Atlantic Treaty Organization; Annual cost: 7,274,495;
Percentage
of cost[A]: 0.52.
Agency: Department of Veterans Affairs; Annual cost: 5,973,095;
Percentage
of cost[A]: 0.43.
Agency: Department of Transportation; Annual cost: 5,579,943;
Percentage
of cost[A]: 0.40.
Agency: American Battle Monuments Commission; Annual cost: 4,004,309;
Percentage
of cost[A]: 0.29.
Agency: National Aeronautics and Space Administration; Annual cost:
1,148,350; Percentage
of cost[A]: 0.08.
Agency: United States Trade Representative; Annual cost: 1,023,823;
Percentage
of cost[A]: 0.07.
Agency: Department of Energy; Annual cost: 795,083; Percentage
of cost[A]: 0.06.
Agency: Department of the Interior; Annual cost: 667,385; Percentage
of cost[A]: 0.05.
Agency: National Science Foundation; Annual cost: 241,601; Percentage
of cost[A]: 0.02.
Agency: Environmental Protection Agency; Annual cost: 166,846;
Percentage
of cost[A]: 0.01.
Agency: Federal Emergency Management Agency; Annual cost: 141,493;
Percentage
of cost[A]: 0.01.
Agency: General Services Administration; Annual cost: 100,108;
Percentage
of cost[A]: 0.01.
Agency: Department of Labor; Annual cost: 80,534; Percentage
of cost[A]: 0.01.
Agency: Department of Housing and Urban Development; Annual cost:
66,738; Percentage
of cost[A]: 0.00.
Agency: Total; Annual cost: $1,400,000,000; Percentage
of cost[A]: 100.00.
Source: Department of State.
[A] The percentage of cost reflects the proportion of all overseas
employees from a particular agency and the type of space occupied by
its staff. Space for State Department personnel associated with the
International Cooperative Administrative Support Services (ICASS)
system and for Marine Security Guards would not be charged to State or
to the Marine Corps. Rather, these costs would be distributed among all
agencies at post because all agencies benefit from the services
provided by ICASS and the Marines.
[End of table]
Efforts by OMB to Develop a Cost-sharing Mechanism:
As part of the President‘s Management Agenda, OMB is leading an effort
to develop a cost-sharing mechanism that would require users of U.S.
overseas facilities to share the costs associated with those facilities
to a greater extent than currently required.[Footnote 20] OMB and the
administration believe that such a requirement would provide agencies
with an incentive to scrutinize long-term staffing more thoroughly when
assessing their overseas presence. OMB officials also believe greater
cost sharing could provide a clear linkage between the costs of new
facilities that result directly from agencies‘ presence.
In its November 1999 report, the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel
(OPAP) noted a lack of cost sharing among agencies that use overseas
facilities, particularly as it related to capital improvements and
maintenance of sites. As a result, OPAP recommended that agencies be
required to pay rent in government-owned buildings in foreign countries
to cover current operating and maintenance costs. In effect, agencies
would pay for space in overseas facilities just as they would for
domestic office space operated by the General Services Administration.
In response to the OPAP recommendation, a working group consisting of
staff from the Departments of Commerce, Defense, Justice, State, and
Transportation; the Central Intelligence Agency; OMB; and USAID was
created to develop a mechanism by which agencies would be charged for
the use of overseas facilities. In summer 2000, the working group
recommended to the Interagency Subcommittee on Overseas Facilities that
agencies be assessed a surcharge based on the space they actually use
in overseas facilities.[Footnote 21] Like State‘s more recent proposal,
the working group‘s plan was designed to help fund construction of new
embassy compounds, but the plan was not implemented.
In January 2003, OMB notified each federal agency with overseas staff
how State‘s capital cost-sharing proposal would affect the agencies‘
respective budgets in fiscal year 2004. Because the State proposal and
OMB assessment were completed after the budget submission deadline, OMB
told agencies that they would not be charged in 2004; however, OMB did
say that a capital construction surcharge would be phased in over 5
years beginning in 2005. In addition, agencies were invited to
participate in an interagency working group charged with developing an
equitable cost-sharing program this year. Also during 2003, OMB is
requiring that agencies complete a census of all current overseas
positions and an assessment of agencies‘ future staffing plans as part
of their budget requests for 2005. The results of this census will
become the baseline for how future cost-sharing charges are determined.
Factors to Consider When Developing a Capital Cost-sharing Mechanism:
The impact of agencies‘ staffing levels on the costs associated with
maintaining and improving the physical infrastructure of overseas
facilities is an important factor agencies should consider when placing
staff overseas. However, agency personnel in Washington and in the
field, and embassy management teams with whom we spoke, expressed
concerns over many factors involved in implementing a new cost-sharing
arrangement. Therefore, as OMB and the interagency committee work to
develop a new cost-sharing mechanism, they also need to develop
consensus on many issues, including:
* how the cost-sharing mechanism would be structured--for example, as
capital reimbursement for new embassy compounds, or as a rent surcharge
applied to all embassy occupants worldwide or just those at new embassy
compounds;
* the basis for fees--such as full reimbursement of capital costs in a
year or amortized over time, or rent based on local market rates, an
average of market rates within a region, or one flat rate applied
worldwide;
* how charges would be assessed--based on the amount of space an agency
uses or on its per capita presence--and whether charges would be
applied on a worldwide level, at the post level, or just for posts
receiving new facilities;
* whether different rates would be applied to staff requiring
controlled access rather than noncontrolled access space;
* whether agencies would be charged for staff not located within
facilities operated by the State Department--for example, USAID staff
working in USAID-owned facilities outside an embassy compound or staff
who work in office space at host country ministries and departments;
* if and how costs associated with staff providing shared services
would be offset, and whether costs associated with Marine and other
security services would be covered;
* how fees would be paid and who would collect the payments--whether
through an interagency transfer of funds or through an existing
structure such as ICASS; and:
* whether potential legal barriers exist and, if so, what legislation
would be necessary to eliminate them.
In addition, the interagency committee must develop consensus on the
underlying purpose of capital cost sharing, demonstrate how such a
mechanism would benefit users of overseas facilities, and determine how
the mechanism can be implemented with the greatest fairness and equity.
Finally, the committee must figure out how to minimize the management
burden of whatever mechanism it develops.
Conclusions:
The State Department has embarked on an expansive capital construction
program designed to provide safe, secure, and cost-effective buildings
for employees working overseas. This program will require a substantial
investment of resources. Given that the size and cost of new facilities
are directly related to anticipated staffing requirements for these
posts, it is imperative that future staffing needs be projected as
accurately as possible. Developing staffing projections is a difficult
exercise that requires a serious effort by all U.S. agencies to
determine their requirements 5 to 7 years in the future. However, we
found that efforts to develop these projections at the embassies we
studied were undisciplined and did not follow a systematic approach.
Therefore, the U.S. government risks building new facilities that are
designed for the wrong number of staff. We believe that additional,
formal guidance and the consistent involvement of the geographic
bureaus would help mitigate the cost and security risks associated with
wrong-sized embassies. Although any staffing requirements could be
affected by changing world events and circumstances, we believe a
systematic process would help ensure that the construction of new
embassies is based on the best projections possible and most accurate
information.
Costs associated with the physical infrastructure of facilities are
important factors that agencies need to consider when deciding whether
to assign staff to overseas locations. Recent proposals to implement a
new cost-sharing mechanism may help add greater discipline to the
staffing projection and rightsizing processes. However, in deciding how
costs will be shared, decision makers will need to address issues such
as fairness and equity, while designing a system that is relatively
easy to administer.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To ensure that U.S. agencies are conducting systematic staffing
projection exercises, we recommend that the Secretary of State provide
embassies with formal, standard, and comprehensive guidance on
developing staffing projections for new embassy compounds. This
guidance should address factors to consider when developing
projections, encourage embassywide discussions, present potential
options for rightsizing, and identify important deadlines in the
projection process, including planning, funding, and construction time
lines. To ensure continuity in the process, we also recommend that the
Secretary of State require that chiefs of mission maintain
documentation on the decision-making process including justifications
for these staffing projections. Finally, we recommend that the
Secretary require all chiefs of mission and geographic bureaus to
certify that the projections have been reviewed and vetted before they
are submitted to OBO.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
State and USAID provided written comments on a draft of this report
(see apps. II and III). OMB provided oral comments. State agreed with
our conclusion that it is essential that staffing projections for new
embassy compounds be as accurate as possible. State also said it plans
to implement our recommendations fully by creating a standard and
comprehensive guide for developing staffing projections, which it
anticipates completing by late April 2003. State said this guide would
provide posts and geographic bureaus with a complete set of required
steps, the timelines involved, and the factors to consider when
developing staffing projections. Moreover, State agreed with our
recommendations that posts should retain documentation on the processes
they used to develop staffing projections, and that chiefs of mission
and geographic bureaus should certify staffing projections. State
provided technical comments related to our cost-sharing discussion,
which were incorporated into the text, where appropriate.
USAID also agreed that U.S. agencies do not take a consistent approach
to determining long-term staffing needs for new embassy compounds.
Specifically, USAID supported the recommendation calling for standard
and comprehensive guidance to assist posts when developing staffing
projections. USAID also expressed deep concerns about the security and
cost implications that result from delayed funding for their facilities
on new embassy compounds. Indeed, USAID acknowledged that its employees
will continue to work in facilities at two overseas locations that do
not meet minimal physical security standards even though other agencies
have been moved to new embassy compounds. USAID said that the lack of
funding has prevented USAID and State from coordinating the
construction of new facilities.
In oral comments, OMB said it agrees with our conclusions regarding
both the staffing projection process and cost sharing, and with our
three recommendations to the Secretary of State. In addition, OMB
suggested it would be useful to have an independent body review the
vetted staffing projections prior to their submission to OBO, to
augment the guidance developed by State, and ensure that agencies and
embassy management examine rightsizing options. OMB intends to address
this issue with the interagency cost-sharing committee. OMB also stated
it is concerned about the security and cost implications that can
result from funding delays for USAID annexes, and it is studying ways
to overcome this problem. OMB also provided technical comments, which
we addressed in the text, as appropriate.
Scope and Methodology:
To determine how U.S. agencies are developing staffing projections for
new embassy compounds, we analyzed the State Department‘s Long-Range
Overseas Buildings Plan and interviewed State Department officials from
OBO, the Office of Management Policy, and the six geographic bureaus.
We also interviewed headquarters officials from agencies with overseas
personnel, including officials from the Departments of Agriculture,
Commerce, Defense, Justice, and the Treasury, and officials from USAID
and the Peace Corps. In addition, we reviewed reports on embassy
security and overseas staffing issues, including those of the
Accountability Review Boards and OPAP, and we met with officials from
OMB to discuss how they are implementing the overseas presence
initiatives in the President‘s Management Agenda.
To further assess agencies‘ efforts to develop long-term staffing
projections and the extent to which agencies were conducting
rightsizing exercises as part of the projection process, we visited
seven posts in State‘s Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs--
Yerevan, Armenia; Baku, Azerbaijan; Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina;
Tbilisi, Georgia; Pristina, Kosovo; Skopje, Macedonia; and Belgrade,
Serbia and Montenegro--where State is planning to construct new
compounds from fiscal years 2002 through 2007. We selected these two
groups of neighboring posts--the Balkans and Caucasus posts--because
State is planning to complete a significant number of construction
projects in these subregions. By focusing on these subregions within
Europe and Eurasia, we were able to assess the extent to which these
posts considered combining services or positions when developing
staffing projections for their new compounds. At each post, we
interviewed management teams (ambassadors/chiefs of mission, deputy
chiefs of mission, and administrative officers), representatives of
U.S. agencies, and other personnel who participated in the staffing
projection process. To examine the staffing projection process at
embassies in other geographic bureaus, we also conducted structured
telephone interviews with administrative officers or deputy chiefs of
mission from seven other embassies slated for new compounds--Rangoon,
Burma; Beijing, China; Quito, Ecuador; Accra, Ghana; Beirut, Lebanon;
Panama City, Panama; and Harare, Zimbabwe. These embassies would have
just recently completed or were about to complete their staffing
projection process. In all, the posts we contacted represent about 16
percent of the new embassy compound construction projects in OBO‘s
Long-Range Overseas Buildings Plan for 2002 through 2007, and 23
percent of those construction projects in the plan expected to be
funded by fiscal year 2005.[Footnote 22] We also reviewed planning
documents, staffing patterns, staffing projections for the new
building, and other documentation provided by the posts.
To examine the issue of capital cost sharing for construction of new
diplomatic facilities, we solicited the views of agency headquarters
staff and the management teams of our case study posts to determine the
extent to which cost considerations were factored into the decision-
making process. We also solicited the views of agency headquarters
staff and the management teams of our case study posts to determine the
potential advantages and disadvantages of different capital cost-
sharing programs. In particular, we interviewed OBO officials and
reviewed documentation supporting its capital security cost-sharing
proposal. We also held discussions with OMB officials on their plans
for developing and implementing an equitable cost-sharing program and
on potential issues for the planned interagency working group. Finally,
we attended meetings of OBO‘s Industry Advisory Panel where cost
sharing was discussed by private sector and industry professionals. We
also interviewed staff from the International Facility Management
Association on how cost sharing is implemented within the private
sector.
We conducted our work between May 2002 and February 2003 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
We are sending copies of this report to other interested Members of
Congress. We are also providing copies of this report to the Secretary
of State and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. We
will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition,
this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me on (202) 512-4128. Another GAO contact and staff
acknowledgments are listed in appendix IV.
Sincerely yours,
Jess T. Ford
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
Signed by Jess T. Ford:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Standard Embassy Compound Design:
Figure 4 depicts the elements of a new embassy compound. State‘s Bureau
of Overseas Buildings Operations is purchasing parcels of land large
enough to accommodate these elements and the department‘s security
standards, which include the placement of all buildings at least 30
meters from a perimeter wall.
Figure 4: Standard Design for New Embassy Compounds:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of State:
United States Department of State:
Washington, D.C. 20520:
Dear Ms. Westin:
We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, ’EMBASSY
CONSTRUCTION: Process for Determining Staffing Requirements Needs
Improvement,“ GAO-03-411, GAO Job Code 320124.
The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.
If you have any questions -concerning this response, please contact Jay
Anania, Office of Management Policy, at (202) 647-1368:
Christopher B. Burnham
Assistant Secretary for Resource Management and
Chief Financial Officer:
Signed by Christopher B. Burnham:
Enclosure:
As stated.
cc: State/M - Mr. Grant Green State/H - Mr. Paul Kelly State/OIG - Mr.
Luther Atkins GAO/IAT - Mr. John Brummet:
Ms. Susan S. Westin, Managing Director, International Affairs and
Trade, U.S. General Accounting Office.
Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report EMBASSY CONSTRUCTION:
Process for Determining Staffing Requirements Needs Improvement (GAO
03-411, GAO Job Code 320124):
The Department of State welcomes GAO‘s work looking at how staffing
projections are developed for New Embassy Complex (NEC) construction
projects.
The Department agrees completely with the statement in the GAO report
that: ’Given that the size and cost of new facilities are directly
related to anticipated staffing requirements for these posts, it is
imperative that future staffing needs be projected as accurately as
possible.“ As GAO also points out, however, it is difficult to project
staffing needs five to seven years in the future. Even the most
thorough and well-documented staffing review can become obsolete in the
face of changing international circumstances and emerging foreign
policy priorities. A current example is the as yet unclear impact of
new Homeland Security staffing requirements on overseas staffing.
In order to ensure more consistency and completeness in staffing
projections for posts slated for new construction projects, the
Department of State is now preparing a ’Guide to Developing Staffing
Projections.“ We anticipate completing and clearing the guide within
State by the end of April 2003.
Specifically, we agree that such a guide needs to be standard and
comprehensive so that posts preparing NEC staffing projections and the
regional bureaus understand the importance of the task, the complete
set of required steps, the timelines involved, and the factors to
consider (such as those laid out in the GAO ’mission - security - cost“
rightsizing framework). We agree that posts need to retain
documentation of their staffing projection process so that new
personnel understand what has previously occurred. (The Bureau of
Overseas Buildings Operation (OBO) retains complete documentation of
all projects, but this does not negate the desirability of having posts
track their own projects.) We agree that, as part of the process,
Chiefs of Mission (COMs) and the regional bureaus should certify
staffing projections, which themselves have the explicit concurrence of
all USG agencies with a presence - current or planned - at a particular
post, before submitting them to OBO.
GAO‘s rightsizing framework is a useful contribution. It lays out a
common-sense approach that asks the kinds of questions COMs and other
decision-makers have always routinely addressed through formal and
informal processes when considering staffing issues. Among the three
elements of the framework, we strongly believe that the first priority
is without question Mission. The first question that must be answered
before all others is whether the United States has a compelling reason
to be in a particular location. If the answer is ’Yes,“ then it may be
necessary to place personnel there, even in the face of serious
security concerns or excessive costs (e.g., the opening of the U.S.
Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan). If the answer is ’No,“ the question of
whether personnel can be securely or economically located there is
irrelevant.
We endorse GAO‘s definition of rightsizing:
Rightsizing [is] aligning the number and location of staff assigned
overseas with foreign policy priorities and security and other
constraints. Rightsizing may result in the addition or reduction of
staff, or a change in the mix of staff at a given embassy or consulate.
(GAO-02-780 Overseas Presence: Framework for Assessing Embassy Staff
Levels Can Support Rightsizing Initiatives, p. l, July 2002):
We look forward to continuing to work with GAO and the Office of
Management and Budget on rightsizing.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International
Development:
USAID:
U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT:
MAR 11 2003
Mr. Jess T. Ford
Director
International Affairs and Trade U.S. General
Accounting office 441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Ford:
I am pleased to provide the U.S. Agency for International Development‘s
(USAID) formal response on the draft GAO report entitled ’EMBASSY
CONSTRUCTION, Process for Determining Staffing Requirements Needs
Improvement“ (March 31, 2003).
USAID agrees with the GAO finding that U.S. agencies overseas did not
take a consistent approach to determining long-term staffing needs.
USAID, for example, develops staffing projections as part of each 5-
year Country Strategic Plan. Strategic Plans are vetted through Chiefs
of Missions and project the number of staff and the professional skills
required in each of the technical, program, and administrative support
units to achieve the mission‘s development objectives in each
respective country. The projections are reviewed and updated as part of
each USAID mission‘s Annual Report to reflect the actual staff on board
as of a date specific and to include future ’out“ year projections.
To some extent, USAID and other agencies may have relied on current
projections without fully considering such projections in the context
of a New Embassy Compound. USAID supports the recommendation that
standard and comprehensive guidance be developed that will allow each
agency to project staffing requirements or revise existing projections
to ensure the construction of buildings and compounds that are
conducive to the achievement of the objectives of each agency in
support of broader foreign policy objectives.
The resources required to post an employee overseas are significant.
These costs are carefully considered by USAID in the formulation of
budgets and in the design of development programs with achievable
results. USAID‘s decision to post an employee overseas in support of a
strategic objective or the overall program is not made lightly. USAID
recognizes that additional costs imposed through a cost-sharing
program, as with any additional costs, would be likewise considered in
this programmatic context.
USAID remains committed, first and foremost, to the security of its
personnel. The approval of funding of facilities for USAID personnel
has lagged behind that of the State Department and USAID personnel
stationed overseas are increasingly vulnerable as a result. The Secure
Embassy and Counterterrorism Act of 1999 mandated the construction of
secure facilities and the collocation of employees on secure Embassy
compounds. USAID recognizes the critical nature of this requirement and
fully supports this objective.
The delayed, or in some cases failed, passage of appropriations has
complicated planning efforts and compromised the security of USAID
employees. The lack of funding has prevented the coordination of
construction efforts with the State Department Office of Overseas
Buildings Operations (OBO) at significant financial cost to both
agencies.
Yerevan is representative of this unfortunate situation. The request
for appropriated funds for the construction of the USAID annex remains
in pending status and the opportunity to economize through efficient
scheduling of the project has been lost. Although uncertainty
surrounding the status of the funding request did complicate planning
efforts and may have contributed to a sense of confusion, delays in
construction were simply due to the lack of funding itself. This
situation has been repeated at other locations. USAID requests for the
funding of building construction have remained in ’pending“ status for
months or even years following the approval of funding for State
Department facilities on the same compounds. At two locations, USAID
employees continue to work in facilities that do not meet minimal
standards for physical security even though counterparts from other
agencies have been moved to new Secure Embassy Compounds. Three
additional Secure Embassy Compounds are scheduled for construction this
year. To date, funds have not been appropriated to include USAID on
these secure compounds.
USAID has large programs and a corresponding presence in many countries
and OBO does not have the ability to fund separate annexes for USAID.
The security driven legal requirement, which USAID endorses, to co-
locate USAID facilities on Secure Embassy Compounds involves
considerable cost. An estimated $406 million will be needed to fund the
construction of USAID facilities between now and FY 2006. To be
successful, a practical approach to the administration of U.S. foreign
assistance programs must include an integrated discussion of how we
provide all employees with adequate facilities in which to work. The
Capital Cost Sharing Security Program considers the cost requirements
for most buildings overseas but does not include an integrated staffing
methodology or a solution to funding the construction of required USAID
annexes. This cannot be done in the current fiscal environment.
It is critical that any system used to project staffing levels reflects
a consideration of all foreign policy issues that require federal
agencies to have presence overseas. This holistic approach needs to
incorporate input from entities beyond the Department of State and the
Chiefs of Missions to ensure that projections of other Agency staff are
adequate to maintain their program management and oversight
responsibilities. Construction overseas is very expensive and space is
in short supply. The increase in terrorist activity worldwide has made
it painfully obvious that there is an urgent requirement for secure
facilities. All agencies should have adequate opportunity to provide
meaningful input and to address the issues. Above all, staff of all
agencies should be assured that the physical security of their
workplace will receive the attention it deserves in an increasingly
dangerous world. USAID welcomes the opportunity to contribute to the
development of improved systems for determining staffing requirements
and a funding solution that ensures secure facilities for all U.S.
Government employees overseas.
Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the GAO draft report and
for the courtesies extended by your staff in the conduct of this
review.
Sincerely,
John Marshall:
Assistant Administrator Bureau for Management:
Signed by John Marshall:
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
John Brummet (202) 512-5260:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the individual named above, David G. Bernet, Janey
Cohen, Martin de Alteriis, David Dornisch, Kathryn Hartsburg, Edward
Kennedy, and James Strus made key contributions to this report.
FOOTNOTES
[1] We define rightsizing as aligning the number and location of staff
at U.S. embassies and consulates with foreign policy goals. See U.S.
General Accounting Office, Overseas Presence: Framework for Assessing
Embassy Staff Levels Can Support Rightsizing Initiatives, GAO-02-780
(Washington, D.C.: July 26, 2002).
[2] Office of Management and Budget, The President‘s Management Agenda,
Fiscal Year 2002 (Washington, D.C.: August 2001).
[3] GAO-02-780.
[4] According to the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-465), as
amended, ’chiefs of mission“ are principal officers in charge of
diplomatic missions of the United States or of a U.S. office abroad,
such as U.S. ambassadors, who are responsible for the direction,
coordination, and supervision of all government executive branch
employees in a given foreign country (except employees under a military
commander).
[5] There are six geographically defined bureaus that report to the
Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs--bureaus for Africa, East
Asia and the Pacific, Europe and Eurasia, the Near East, South Asia,
and the Western Hemisphere. The Assistant Secretaries of the geographic
bureaus advise the Undersecretary and guide the operation of the U.S.
diplomatic missions within their regional jurisdiction. They are
assisted by Deputy Assistant Secretaries, office directors, post
management officers, and country desk officers. These officials work
closely with U.S. embassies and consulates and with foreign embassies
in Washington, D.C.
[6] Secretary of State Madeline Albright appointed the Accountability
Review Boards to investigate the facts and circumstances surrounding
the 1998 embassy bombings. Department of State, Report of the
Accountability Review Boards on the Embassy Bombings in Nairobi and Dar
Es Salaam (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 1999).
[7] Admiral William J. Crowe, Press Briefing on the Report of the
Accountability Review Boards on the Embassy Bombings in Nairobi and Dar
Es Salaam (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 8, 1999).
[8] Secretary of State Albright established the Overseas Presence
Advisory Panel following the 1998 embassy bombings in Africa to
consider the organization and condition of U.S. embassies. Department
of State, America‘s Overseas Presence in the 21st Century, The Report
of the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel (Washington, D.C.: November
1999).
[9] U.S. General Accounting Office, Embassy Construction: Long-Term
Planning Will Enhance Program Decision-making, GAO-01-11 (Washington,
D.C.: Jan. 22, 2001).
[10] GAO-02-780.
[11] Pursuant to the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism
Act of 1999 (P.L. 106-113), the State Department is required to
identify embassies for replacement or major security enhancements. The
first report was due to the Congress by February 1, 2000, as is each
subsequent update through 2004.
[12] According to State officials, OBO expects to issue an updated
building plan for fiscal years 2003 through 2008 in late April 2003.
[13] In total, there are about 260 diplomatic posts worldwide,
including embassies, consulates, and other special missions and
offices, such as the U.S. Mission to the European Union and the U.S.
Office of the High Commissioner in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
[14] U.S. General Accounting Office, State Department: Management
Weaknesses in the Security Construction Program, GAO/NSIAD-92-2
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 29, 1991).
[15] As the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel (OPAP) reported in 1999,
there are more than 30 federal departments or agencies operating
overseas, including the Departments of State and Defense, as well as
agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the U.S.
Commercial Service, and the Foreign Agricultural Service.
[16] Mission Performance Plans are annual embassy plans that link
performance goals and objectives to staffing and budgetary resources
needed to accomplish them in the given fiscal year.
[17] 22 U.S.C. § 4865 requires the Secretary of State, in selecting
sites for new U.S. diplomatic facilities abroad, to ensure that all
U.S. personnel under chief of mission authority be located on the site.
However, the Secretary of State may waive this requirement if the
Secretary, together with the heads of those agencies with personnel who
would be located off site, determines that security considerations
permit off site location and that it is in the U.S. national interests.
[18] Each agency‘s proportion was based on a May 2001 State Department
survey of U.S. government employees working overseas under the
authority of chiefs of mission.
[19] Based on data from State‘s May 2001 survey, the total construction
costs for controlled access, or classified, areas are about 40 percent
per desk more than the total costs for construction of noncontrolled
access, or unclassified, areas.
[20] Agencies contribute funding to support the ICASS system, which
funds common administrative support functions, such as travel, mail and
messenger, vouchering, and telephone services, that all agencies at a
post may use.
[21] This subcommittee was part of the Interagency Overseas Presence
Board, which was formed to implement OPAP‘s recommendations.
[22] Includes new embassy compounds in the security capital and regular
capital programs outlined in the long-range buildings plan and excludes
construction of annexes on existing compounds. The U.S. embassies in
Yerevan, Armenia, and Accra, Ghana, are also excluded. Embassy Yerevan
was funded in fiscal year 2001 and, thus, was not in the long-range
plan for 2002 through 2007. Embassy Accra was not initially in the
long-range plan, but was subsequently added.
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