Overseas Presence
Rightsizing Framework Can Be Applied at U.S. Diplomatic Posts in Developing Countries Gao ID: GAO-03-396 April 7, 2003Since the mid-1990s, GAO has highlighted the need for the Department of State and other agencies to establish a systematic process for determining their overseas staffing levels. To support this long-standing need and in support of the President's Management Agenda, GAO developed a framework for assessing overseas workforce size and identified options for rightsizing. Because the framework was largely based on work at the U.S. embassy in Paris, GAO was asked to determine whether the rightsizing framework is applicable at U.S. embassies in developing countries. To accomplish this objective, we visited three U.S. embassies in West Africa--a medium-sized post in Dakar, Senegal; and two small embassies in Banjul, The Gambia; and Nouakchott, Mauritania--and applied the framework and its corresponding questions there.
GAO's rightsizing framework can be applied at U.S. embassies in developing countries. Officials from the Bureau of African Affairs, and U.S. embassy officials in Dakar, Senegal; Banjul, The Gambia; and Nouakchott, Mauritania, said that the framework's questions highlighted specific issues at each post that should be considered in determining staffing levels. Officials in other State bureaus also believed that the security, mission, cost, and option components of the framework provided a logical basis for planning and making rightsizing decisions. At each of the posts GAO visited, application of the framework and corresponding questions generally highlighted (1) physical and technical security deficiencies that needed to be weighed against proposed staff increases; (2) mission priorities and requirements that are not fully documented or justified in the posts' Mission Performance Plans; (3) cost of operations data that were unavailable, incomplete, or fragmented across funding sources; and (4) rightsizing actions and other options that post managers should consider for adjusting the number of personnel.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-03-396, Overseas Presence: Rightsizing Framework Can Be Applied at U.S. Diplomatic Posts in Developing Countries
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Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging
Threats, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform,
House of Representatives:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
April 2003:
Overseas Presence:
Rightsizing Framework Can Be Applied at U.S. Diplomatic Posts in
Developing Countries:
GAO-03-396:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-03-396, a report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on
National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, House
Committee on Government Reform
Why GAO Did This Study:
Since the mid-1990s, GAO has highlighted the need for the Department of
State and other agencies to establish a systematic process for
determining their overseas staffing levels. To support this long-
standing need and in support of the President‘s Management Agenda, GAO
developed a framework for assessing overseas workforce size and
identified options for rightsizing. Because the framework was largely
based on work at the U.S. embassy in Paris, GAO was asked to determine
whether the rightsizing framework is applicable at U.S. embassies in
developing countries. To accomplish this objective, we visited three
U.S. embassies in West Africa”a medium-sized post in Dakar, Senegal;
and two small embassies in Banjul, The Gambia; and Nouakchott,
Mauritania”and applied the framework and its corresponding questions
there.
What GAO Found:
GAO‘s rightsizing framework can be applied at U.S. embassies in
developing countries. Officials from the Bureau of African Affairs, and
U.S. embassy officials in Dakar, Senegal; Banjul, The Gambia; and
Nouakchott, Mauritania, said that the framework‘s questions highlighted
specific issues at each post that should be considered in determining
staffing levels. Officials in other State bureaus also believed that
the security, mission, cost, and option components of the framework
provided a logical basis for planning and making rightsizing decisions.
At each of the posts GAO visited, application of the framework and
corresponding questions generally highlighted
* physical and technical security deficiencies that needed to be
weighed against proposed staff increases;
* mission priorities and requirements that are not fully documented or
justified in the posts‘ Mission Performance Plans;
* cost of operations data that were unavailable, incomplete, or
fragmented across funding sources; and
* rightsizing actions and other options that post managers should
consider for adjusting the number of personnel.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Director of OMB, in coordination with the
Secretary of State, ensure that application of our framework be
expanded as a basis for assessing staffing levels at embassies and
consulates worldwide; and the Secretary of State adopt the framework as
part of the Mission Performance Planning process.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-396.
To view the full report, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Jess T. Ford at (202)
512-4128 or fordj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Rightsizing Framework Can Be Applied and Used to Highlight Specific
Issues at Each Embassy:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Scope and Methodology:
Appendix I: Rightsizing Issues at West African Posts:
Dakar: Physical and Technical Security:
Dakar: Mission Priorities and Requirements:
Dakar: Cost of Operations:
Dakar: Consideration of Rightsizing Actions and Options:
Banjul: Physical and Technical Security:
Banjul: Mission Priorities and Requirements:
Banjul: Cost of Operations:
Nouakchott: Physical and Technical Security:
Nouakchott: Mission Priorities and Requirements:
Nouakchott: Cost of Operations:
Appendix II: Rightsizing Framework and Corresponding
Questions:
Appendix III: Comments from the Office of Management and
Budget:
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of State:
GAO‘s Comments:
Figures:
Figure 1: Applying the Rightsizing Framework in Dakar, Senegal:
Figure 2: Applying the Rightsizing Framework in Banjul, The Gambia:
Figure 3: Applying the Rightsizing Framework in Nouakchott, Mauritania:
Abbreviations:
ICASS: International Cooperative Administrative Support Services:
MPP: Mission Performance Plan:
NSDD-38: National Security Decision Directive-38:
OMB: Office of Management and Budget:
OPA: POverseas Presence Advisory Panel:
USAID: United States Agency for International Development:
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United States General Accounting Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
April 7, 2003:
The Honorable Christopher Shays
Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security,
Emerging Threats, and International Relations,
Committee on Government Reform
House of Representatives:
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Since the mid-1990s, GAO has highlighted the need for the Department of
State and other agencies to establish a systematic process for
determining their overseas staffing levels.[Footnote 1] Shortly after
the 1998 bombings of two U.S. embassies in East Africa, two high level
independent groups called for the reassessment of staffing levels at
U.S. embassies and consulates. In August 2001, the President‘s
Management Agenda directed all agencies to ’rightsize“ their overseas
presence to the minimum necessary to meet U.S. foreign policy goals. To
support the long-standing need for a successful rightsizing initiative,
in 2002 we developed a framework that identifies critical elements of
embassy operations--physical security, mission priorities and
requirements, and cost--and also includes rightsizing options for
consideration.[Footnote 2] Each element contains a set of corresponding
questions for rightsizing the overseas workforce.[Footnote 3] The
questions provide a basis for decision makers to systematically link
the elements of security, mission, and cost to embassy staffing levels
and requirements. The framework also includes questions on rightsizing
options, including relocating staff to the United States or to regional
centers, and competitively sourcing[Footnote 4] certain functions.
[Footnote 5] (See app. II for the rightsizing framework and
corresponding questions.) After responding to the questions, decision
makers should then be in a position to determine whether rightsizing
actions are needed to add, reduce, or change the staff mix at an
embassy, and to consider rightsizing options.
Our July 2002 report recommended that the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) use our framework to support the administration‘s
rightsizing initiatives, starting with its assessments of staffing
levels and rightsizing options at posts in Europe and Eurasia.[Footnote
6] OMB said the framework would serve as a valuable starting point for
rightsizing embassies. However, because the questions were developed
primarily based on our work at the U.S. embassy in Paris, OMB was not
confident that the questions could be uniformly applied at all posts
worldwide. In response to OMB‘s concerns, you requested that we
determine whether the questions could be applied at U.S. embassies in
developing countries.
This report presents the results of our work at three U.S. embassies we
visited in West Africa--the medium-sized post in Dakar, Senegal; and
two small embassies in Banjul, The Gambia; and Nouakchott, Mauritania.
The objective of our work at these embassies was to determine whether
our rightsizing framework is applicable at U.S. embassies in developing
countries. To accomplish this objective, we applied the questions to
each post in West Africa by reviewing embassy planning and requirements
documents and by interviewing embassy managers and officials in the
Department of State‘s Bureau of African Affairs regarding each
embassy‘s security, mission, cost, and rightsizing options. We also
discussed security issues at those posts with officials in State‘s
Bureau of Diplomatic Security. In addition, we met with officials in
State‘s Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs and the Bureau of Near
Eastern Affairs to discuss the potential applicability of the framework
at posts in other developing countries.
Results in Brief:
Our analysis of the three embassies we visited indicates that the
rightsizing framework can be applied at U.S. embassies in developing
countries. Officials at each embassy agreed that answering these
questions could systematically help identify the trade-offs and options
that should be considered in determining staffing levels. For example,
responses to the questions highlighted deficiencies in physical
security that need to be weighed against proposed staff increases;
identified deficiencies in cost data needed to make sound staffing
decisions; and identified potential rightsizing options, such as better
defining regional responsibilities and related staffing requirements,
streamlining support functions, and assessing the feasibility of
competitively sourcing goods and services. Officials in State‘s Bureau
of African Affairs and other regional bureaus agreed that a broad
application of the framework and its corresponding questions would
provide a logical and commonsense approach to systematically
considering rightsizing issues in developed and developing countries
and that it can be adjusted as necessary to address emerging
rightsizing conditions. Currently, most agencies operating overseas do
not systematically address rightsizing as a policy or management issue.
The rightsizing issues related to security, mission, and cost, and
options such as competitively sourcing or relocating staff, are
addressed only in a fragmented manner, not specifically as part of the
embassies‘ planning process.
As a result of our work, we are recommending that the Director of OMB,
in coordination with the Secretary of State, expand the use of our
framework in assessing staffing levels at all U.S. embassies and
consulates. We are also recommending that the Secretary of State
include the framework as part of the Department of State‘s mission
performance planning process. OMB agreed with our findings and
recommendations and stated that our framework may serve as a valuable
base for the development of a broader methodology that can be applied
worldwide. The Department of State generally agreed with our
recommendations and said that they welcome our work on developing a
rightsizing framework. The Department of State also said that the
framework‘s questions provide a good foundation for it to proceed in
working with OMB and other agencies to improve the process for
determining overseas staffing levels. In addition, the Department of
State said that it plans to incorporate elements of our rightsizing
framework into future mission performance planning.
Background:
In our reviews of embassy staffing issues during the 1990s, we found
that the Department of State and some other agencies operating overseas
lacked clear criteria for staffing overseas embassies.[Footnote 7]
Other reviews reached similar conclusions. In early 1999, the
Accountability Review Boards that investigated the bombings of two U.S.
embassies in East Africa concluded that the United States should
consider adjusting the size of its embassies and consulates to reduce
security vulnerabilities.[Footnote 8] Later that year, the Overseas
Presence Advisory Panel (OPAP) recommended that rightsizing be a key
strategy to improve security and reduce operating costs.[Footnote 9] In
August 2001, President Bush announced that achieving a rightsized
overseas presence was one of his 14 management priorities. The
September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States added impetus for
this initiative. In May 2002, we testified before the Subcommittee on
National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, House
Committee on Government Reform, on a proposed framework for determining
the appropriate number of staff to be assigned to a U.S. embassy.
To further assess the applicability of GAO‘s rightsizing framework, we
selected the embassies in Dakar, Senegal; Banjul, The Gambia; and
Nouakchott, Mauritania. We selected these embassies based on OMB‘s
questions about whether our framework can be uniformly applied at all
posts, and because experts suggest that rightsizing in Africa is a
significant challenge. The embassy in Dakar is a medium-sized post that
provides regional support to several embassies including Cape Verde,
Guinea, The Gambia, Mali, Mauritania, and Sierra Leone. Embassy Dakar
has about 90 direct-hire Americans and 350 local hires working in seven
U.S. agencies. Embassy Banjul is a special embassy program[Footnote 10]
post with 7 American direct hires and about 65 local hires. Embassy
Nouakchott is also a special embassy program post with 14 American
direct hires and about 42 local hires.
Rightsizing Framework Can Be Applied and Used to Highlight Specific
Issues at Each Embassy:
Our work at the three posts in West Africa further demonstrated that
our framework and corresponding questions can provide a systematic
approach for assessing overseas workforce size and identifying options
for rightsizing in developing countries. We identified examples of the
specific security, mission, and cost issues at each post, which, when
considered collectively, highlighted staffing issues and rightsizing
options to consider. (See app. I for more details on our findings at
each of the embassies.):
Physical and Technical Security of Facilities and Employees:
The ability to protect personnel should be a critical factor in
determining embassy staffing levels. Recurring security threats to
embassies and consulates further highlight the importance of
rightsizing as a tool to minimize the number of embassy employees at
risk. Our security questions address a broad range of issues, including
the security of embassy buildings, the use of existing secure space,
and the vulnerabilities of staff to terrorist attack. Officials at the
embassies in Dakar, Banjul, and Nouakchott agreed that security
vulnerability should be a key concern in determining the size and
composition of staffing levels at the posts and should be addressed in
conjunction with the other rightsizing elements of mission and cost.
Each post has undergone security upgrades since the 1998 embassy
bombings to address deficiencies and ensure better security.[Footnote
11] However, until facilities are replaced as part of the long-term
construction plan, most will not meet security standards. For example,
many buildings at overseas posts do not meet the security setback
requirement.[Footnote 12] At the Dakar post, responses to the
framework‘s security questions identified significant limitations in
facility security and office space that likely limit the number of
additional staff that could be adequately protected in the embassy
compound. This is a significant issue for the embassy in Dakar given
its expanding regional role and projected increases in staffing to
accommodate visa workload and increasing personnel at non-State
agencies, as well as because planned construction of a new secure
embassy compound will not be completed until at least 2007. In
contrast, Embassy Banjul has unused office space that could accommodate
additional staff within the embassy compound. Although U.S. interests
are limited in The Gambia, a staff increase could be accommodated if
decision makers determine that additional staff are needed as a result
of answering the framework‘s questions. In Nouakchott, existing space
is limited but adequate. However, officials raised concerns about the
security risks associated with the expected increase in personnel on
the compound.
Mission Priorities and Staff Requirements:
The placement and composition of staff overseas must reflect the
highest priority goals of U.S. foreign policy. Questions in this
section of our framework include assessing the overall justification of
agency staffing levels in relation to embassy priorities and the extent
to which it is necessary for each agency to maintain or change its
presence in a country, given the scope of its responsibilities and its
mission. Related questions include asking if each agency‘s mission
reinforces embassy priorities and if an agency‘s mission could be
pursued in other ways. Responses to the questions showed that there are
key management systems for controlling and planning staffing levels
currently in use at overseas posts, but they are not designed or used
to systematically address these staffing, priority, and mission issues.
One such management system is the National Security Decision Directive-
38 (NSDD-38). NSDD-38 is a long-standing directive that requires non-
State agencies to seek approval by chiefs of missions on any proposed
changes in staff.[Footnote 13] NSDD-38 does not, however, direct the
Chief of Mission to initiate an assessment of an agency‘s overall
presence. The Overseas Presence Advisory Panel reported that the
directive is not designed to enable ambassadors to make decisions on
each new agency position in a coordinated, interagency plan for U.S.
operations at a post.[Footnote 14] Post officials agreed that the NSDD-
38 system has only limited usefulness for controlling staffing levels
and achieving rightsizing objectives.
Another management system is the Department of State‘s Mission
Performance Plan (MPP). The MPP is the primary planning document for
each overseas post.[Footnote 15] State‘s MPP process has been
strengthened significantly to require each embassy to set its top
priorities and link staffing and workload requirements to those
priorities. However, the MPP does not address rightsizing as a
management issue or provide full guidance to posts for assessing
overall staffing levels, by agency, in relation to a post‘s mission. At
the three posts we visited, staffing requests were addressed in the
MPPs in the context of each post‘s mission performance goals; however,
these documents did not address the security and cost trade-offs
associated with making such staffing changes. In addition, Embassy
Dakar has an increasing regional role, which is not sufficiently
addressed in the MPP.
Finally, the Department of State‘s Overseas Staffing Model provides
guidance for State in assigning its full-time American direct hire
staff to posts, but it does not include comprehensive guidance on
linking staffing levels to security, workload requirements, cost, and
other elements of rightsizing. It also does not provide guidance on
staffing levels for foreign service nationals or for other agencies at
a post.
Using various methods for addressing staffing and other key resource
requirements is not effective in planning for or controlling growth.
The Deputy Chief of Mission at Embassy Dakar agreed, as this has
resulted in growth beyond the post‘s capacity. Specifically, The
Department of State has added at least seven American direct-hire
positions to the post, and non-State agencies operating in Dakar have
added another six positions over the last year. In addition, post
officials project more increases in personnel by fiscal year 2004 to
accommodate other agencies interested in working out of Dakar. Post
officials agreed that a more systematic and comprehensive approach
might improve the post‘s ability to plan for and control growth.
Responses to the framework‘s questions by Banjul and Dakar consular
officers also indicated that they could further explore processing all
nonimmigrant visas from the Dakar post, particularly since Dakar has
done so in the past on a temporary basis. Neither post‘s MPP discussed
the possibility of covering these functions on a regional basis from
Dakar, yet doing so would relieve Banjul‘s consular officer from
processing nonimmigrant visas, thereby allowing more time for political
and economic reporting. Thus, the post might not need to request a
junior officer to handle such reporting. However, Banjul post officials
said this arrangement would not be feasible for a variety of reasons.
Nevertheless, their assessment illustrates the importance of weighing
the benefits and trade-offs of exercising rightsizing options.
Officials at both posts also agreed that applying the rightsizing
questions, as part of the post‘s annual MPP process, would result in an
improved and more systematic approach for addressing rightsizing
issues.
Cost of Operations:
The cost section of our framework includes questions that involve
developing and consolidating cost information from all agencies at a
particular embassy to permit cost-based decision-making. Without
comprehensive cost data, decision makers cannot determine the
correlation between costs and the work being performed, nor can they
assess the short-and long-term costs associated with feasible business
alternatives.
At all of the posts, we found there was no mechanism to provide the
ambassador or other decision makers with comprehensive data on State‘s
and other agencies‘ cost of operations. For example, complete budget
data that reflect the cost of employee salaries and benefits and
certain information management expenses for each agency at post were
not available. Further, we found that embassy profile reports
maintained by State‘s Bureau of Administration contained incomplete and
inaccurate information for each embassy‘s funding levels and
sources.[Footnote 16] Officials at each post agreed that it is
difficult to discern overall costs because data are incomplete and
fragmented across funding sources, thereby making it difficult for
decision makers to justify staffing levels in relation to overall post
costs.[Footnote 17]
In view of Embassy Dakar‘s plans to expand its regional
responsibilities, embassy officials said it would be beneficial to
document and justify the cost effectiveness of providing support to
posts in the region. The type of support can be substantial and can
have significant implications for planning future staffing and other
resource requirements. For example, Embassy Nouakchott relies heavily
on Embassy Dakar for budget and fiscal support, security engineering,
public affairs, medical/medevac services, and procurement/purchasing,
in addition to temporary warehousing for certain goods.
OMB and the Department of State recognize that lack of cost-based
decision-making is a long-standing problem. As part of the President‘s
Management Agenda, they are working to better identify the full
operating costs at individual posts and improve cost accounting
mechanisms for overseas presence.
Consideration of Rightsizing Actions and Other Options:
Our work demonstrates that responses to our questions could be used to
identify and exercise rightsizing actions and options, such as
adjusting staffing requirements, competitively sourcing certain
commercial goods and services, and streamlining warehousing operations.
Examples of identifying and exercising rightsizing options include the
following:
* Embassy space and security limitations in Dakar suggest that planned
increases in staff levels may not be feasible. If Embassy Dakar used
our framework to complete a full and comprehensive analysis of its
regional capabilities, in conjunction with analyses of mission
priorities and requirements of other embassies in West Africa, then
staffing levels could be adjusted at some of the posts in the region.
One rightsizing option includes having Embassy Banjul‘s visa services
handled from Dakar.
:
* The general services officers at the Dakar and Banjul posts agreed
that our framework could be used to identify competitive sourcing
opportunities in their locations. One rightsizing option includes
assessing the feasibility of competitively sourcing the work of
currently employed painters, upholsterers, electricians, and others to
yield cost savings and reduce staff requirements. This could have a
particularly significant impact at the Dakar post, which employs more
than 70 staff who are working in these types of positions.[Footnote 18]
:
* The Dakar and Banjul embassies operate substantial warehousing and
maintenance complexes. Post officials said that operations and staffing
requirements at these government-owned facilities could be potentially
streamlined in a number of areas. The Department of State and other
agencies maintain separate nonexpendable properties, such as furniture
and appliances in Dakar, while the Department of State and Peace Corps
maintain their own warehouses in the same compound in Banjul.
Department of State logistics managers and post general services
personnel agree that pooling such items could potentially reduce
overall inventories, costs, and staffing requirements.[Footnote 19]
:
Relocating staff, competitively sourcing goods and services, and other
rightsizing options should be based on a full feasibility and cost
analysis, and thus we are not recommending them in this report.
However, such rightsizing options deserve consideration, particularly
in view of Embassy Dakar‘s concerns about how to manage anticipated
increasing regionalization, the general security threats to embassies
around the world, and the President‘s Management Agenda‘s emphasis on
reducing costs of overseas operations.
Framework‘s Questions Provide a Systematic Approach to Rightsizing:
The need for a systematic approach to rightsizing the U.S. overseas
presence has been a recurring theme in developing our framework. We
have noted that the criteria for assigning staff to individual overseas
posts vary significantly by agency and that agencies do not fully and
collectively consider embassy security, mission priorities, and
workload requirements. At the three embassies we visited in West
Africa, we found that rightsizing issues have not been systematically
assessed as part of the embassy management and planning process.
However, The Department of State has taken several steps that help lay
the groundwork for such a process by refining its overseas post MPP
guidance. That guidance, applicable to posts in all countries, was
recently strengthened and now directs each embassy to set five top
priorities and link staffing and workload requirements to fulfilling
those priorities. Chiefs of Mission also certify that the performance
goals in their MPPs accurately reflect the highest priorities of their
embassies. This is consistent with questions in our framework
addressing program priorities. The guidance does not, however, identify
rightsizing as a management goal or explicitly discuss how rightsizing
issues of security, mission, cost, and options should be addressed. For
example, it does not ask embassies to formally consider the extent to
which it is necessary for each agency to maintain its current presence
in country, or to consider relocation to the United States or regional
centers, given the scope of each embassies‘ responsibilities and
missions.
Officials at the posts in West Africa generally agreed that applying
the framework and corresponding questions could result in an improved
and more systematic approach to rightsizing. They agreed that the
framework can be adjusted to consider emerging rightsizing issues and
staffing conditions. For example, at Embassy Dakar, the regional
security officer suggested including a question addressing the capacity
of the host country police, military, and intelligence services as part
of the physical and technical security section. Other officials
suggested including a question regarding the extent to which health
conditions in the host country might limit the number of employees that
should be assigned to a post.
Officials in the Department of State‘s Bureau of African Affairs
generally agreed that applying our questions provides a logical basis
for systematically addressing rightsizing issues. They agreed it is
important that the Department of State and other agencies consider
staffing issues based on a common set of criteria, for both existing
embassies and future facilities. Officials in the Department of State‘s
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs and the Bureau of Near Eastern
Affairs also agreed that the security, mission, cost, and option
elements of the framework provide a logical basis for planning and
making rightsizing decisions. They also believed that rightsizing
analyses would be most effective if the framework were adopted as a
part of the Department of State‘s MPP process.
Conclusions:
Our rightsizing framework and its corresponding questions can be
applied to embassies in developing countries and help decision makers
collectively focus on security, mission, and cost trade-offs associated
with staffing levels and rightsizing options. The rightsizing questions
systematically provide embassy and agency decision makers a common set
of criteria and a logical approach for coordinating and determining
staffing levels at U.S. diplomatic posts. We recognize that the
framework and its questions are a starting point and that modification
of the questions may be considered in future planning, as appropriate.
The Department of State‘s MPP process has been strengthened and
addresses some of the rightsizing questions in our framework. In
particular, it better addresses embassy priorities, a key factor in our
rightsizing framework. However, the mission planning process neither
specifically addresses embassy rightsizing as a policy or critical
management issue nor calls for assessments of related security and cost
issues affecting all agencies operating at overseas posts.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
In keeping with the administration‘s rightsizing initiative, we are
recommending that:
* the Director of OMB, in coordination with the Secretary of State,
ensure that application of our framework be expanded as a basis for
assessing staffing levels at embassies and consulates worldwide; and
:
* the Secretary of State adopt the framework as part of the embassy
Mission Performance Planning process to ensure participation of all
agencies at posts and the use of comparable criteria to address
security, mission, cost issues, and rightsizing options.
:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
OMB and The Department of State provided written comments on a draft of
this report (see apps. III and IV). OMB said that it agrees with our
findings and recommendations and stated that our framework may serve as
a valuable base for the development of a broader methodology that can
be applied worldwide. OMB agreed that security, mission, and cost are
key elements to consider in making rightsizing decisions. In addition,
OMB noted that workload requirements, options for information
technology, regionalization possibilities, and competitive sourcing
opportunities should be considered in order to adapt the methodology to
fit each post.
The Department of State generally agreed with our recommendations and
said that it welcomed GAO‘s work on developing a rightsizing framework.
The Department of State said that the rightsizing questions provide a
good foundation for it to proceed in working with OMB and other
agencies to improve the process for determining overseas staffing
levels. The Department of State noted that some elements of the
framework are already being undertaken and that it plans to incorporate
additional elements of our rightsizing questions into its future
planning processes, including the MPP. Department of State comments are
reprinted in appendix IV. The Department of State also provided
technical comments, which we have incorporated into the report where
appropriate.
Scope and Methodology:
To determine the extent to which our framework‘s questions are
applicable in developing regions, we visited three West African
embassies--Dakar, Senegal; Banjul, The Gambia; and Nouakchott,
Mauritania. At all posts, we spoke with regional security officers, in
addition to ambassadors and other post officials, regarding the
security status of their embassies and related security concerns. At
all locations, we reviewed the applicability of the mission priorities
and requirements section of the framework by asking the ambassadors,
deputy chiefs of mission, administrative officers, consular officers,
and general services officers to answer key questions in that section.
To assess the usefulness of the cost section, we spoke with the same
officers, in addition to Embassy Dakar‘s financial management officer
who provides regional support to both Banjul and Nouakchott. We also
discussed with key officials whether opportunities exist to exercise
certain rightsizing options such as competitively sourcing post goods
and services or streamlining embassy functions that are commercial in
nature. In addition, we interviewed Bureau of African Affairs executive
officers, officials in the Bureau of Diplomatic Security in Washington,
D.C., and the heads of key agencies operating in each country.
Specifically, in Dakar we interviewed the Director and Deputy Director
of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the U.S.
Treasury representative. In Banjul and Nouakchott, we interviewed the
Directors of Peace Corps. We also met with officials in the executive
offices of the Department of State‘s Bureau of East Asian and Pacific
Affairs and the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs to determine the
applicability of the framework in those regions.
We conducted our work from October 2002 through January 2003 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
We are sending copies of this report to other interested members of
Congress. We are also sending copies of this report to the Director of
OMB and the Secretary of State. We also will make copies available to
others upon request. In addition, the report will also be available at
no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me on (202) 512-4128 or John Brummet on (202) 512-5260. In
addition to the persons named above, Janey Cohen, Lynn Moore, Ann M.
Ulrich, and Joseph Zamoyta made key contributions to this report.
Sincerely yours,
Jess T. Ford
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
Signed by Jess T. Ford:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Rightsizing Issues at West African Posts:
This appendix provides detailed information on the responses to the
rightsizing questions in our framework at the embassies in Dakar,
Senegal; Banjul, The Gambia; and Nouakchott, Mauritania. Specific
rightsizing issues, actions, and options for consideration are
highlighted.
Dakar: Physical and Technical Security:
Prior to the 1998 embassy bombings in East Africa, U.S. diplomatic
facilities in Dakar[Footnote 20] had serious physical security
vulnerabilities, including insufficient setbacks at most office
buildings, including the chancery. Since 1998, many steps have been
taken to ensure better security throughout the post. Important steps
included (1) the relocation of the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) to a more secure location, (2) host-country
cooperation for embassy-only traffic on the four streets surrounding
the embassy‘s main building, (3) the renovation and expansion of a more
secure ’waiting facility“ for the consular affairs section, and (4) an
increase in surveillance and detection units for the entire compound
and employee residences.
Although security at the Dakar post is now characterized as ’good“ for
the current number of personnel, embassy officials cautioned that
actions by Senegalese authorities to close off streets adjacent to the
embassy are temporary measures that could be reversed at any time. In
addition, the office space in the chancery can only accommodate a
slight increase in personnel. Officials said that adding personnel to
the post would aggravate certain security concerns.
Dakar: Mission Priorities and Requirements:
Embassy Dakar increasingly has more regional responsibilities and there
are significant pressures to assign more personnel to Dakar--a
situation that has been exacerbated as a result of the recently ordered
departure status at the U.S. embassy in Abidjan, Cote
d‘Ivoire.[Footnote 21] The Dakar post now has about 90 American direct-
hire personnel and 350 local hires. Staff projections over the next two
fiscal years indicate an increase in staffing at the embassy for
additional agencies, such as the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention and the Departments of Agriculture and Homeland Security,
and the possible transfer of Foreign Commercial Service employees from
the embassy in Abidjan. In addition, the Dakar consular section will be
increasing its consular officers for visa purposes from two to four and
may need additional staff in the future. As a result of increasing
regional responsibilities and more personnel, Embassy Dakar may require
additional Department of State support personnel as well.
In spite of Dakar‘s increasing regional role and responsibilities, the
post has difficulty attracting and retaining experienced foreign
service officers. Embassy officials indicated that senior foreign
service officers perceive the post as having a relatively high cost of
living, a low pay differential, and no available consumables. Hence,
many key positions are filled with inexperienced junior staff, placing
constraints on some offices in carrying out their mission.[Footnote 22]
Dakar: Cost of Operations:
Comprehensive information was not available to identify the total
annual operating costs for Embassy Dakar or for each agency at the
post. Cost data were incomplete and fragmented. For example, embassy
budget personnel estimated operating costs of at least $7.7 million,
not including American employee salaries or allowances. Available
Bureau of African Affairs budget data for the post estimated fiscal
year 2003 operating costs of at least $6 million, including State‘s
public diplomacy costs, post administered costs, and International
Cooperative Administrative Support Services[Footnote 23] expenses, but
these costs did not reflect the salaries and benefits of Department of
State and other U.S. agency American employees and the State bureau
allotments, such as for diplomatic security. If all costs were included
in a comprehensive budget, the total annual operating costs at the post
would be significantly higher than both estimates. Post and Bureau
officials agreed that fragmented and incomplete cost data make it
difficult for them to systematically and collectively approach
rightsizing initiatives and consider the relative cost-effectiveness of
rightsizing options.
Dakar: Consideration of Rightsizing Actions and Options:
Responses to the framework‘s questions regarding rightsizing actions
and other options at Embassy Dakar highlighted the impact of security
conditions on anticipated staffing increases and the need to define and
document the embassy‘s growing regional responsibilities as part of the
MPP process. They also highlighted potential opportunities for
competitively sourcing certain embassy services to the private sector,
as well as opportunities for streamlining warehouse operations. Embassy
officials are reluctant to purchase commercial goods and services from
the local economy due to quality and reliability concerns, and thus
they employ a large number of direct-hire personnel to maintain and
provide all post goods and services. If goods and services were
competitively sourced to the local economy, the number of direct hires
and costs could possibly be reduced. Opportunities also exist for
streamlining Embassy Dakar‘s warehousing operations, which could yield
cost savings.
The left box of figure 1 summarizes the main rightsizing issues that
were raised at Embassy Dakar in response to the framework‘s questions.
The box on the right side identifies possible corresponding rightsizing
actions and other options post decision makers could consider when
collectively assessing their rightsizing issues.
Figure 1: Applying the Rightsizing Framework in Dakar, Senegal:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Banjul: Physical and Technical Security:
Officials at the post in Banjul characterized the compound as having
good physical security and enough office space to accommodate
additional staff. The post chancery compound is a ’lock-and-leave“
facility, as it does not have the 24-hour presence of U.S. government
personnel. There are two leased vacant residential houses located
directly behind the chancery building but separated from the chancery
by a dividing wall. Embassy officials in Banjul have proposed buying
the houses but explained that it is difficult to justify the cost
because the purchase would put the embassy over its allotted number of
homes (i.e., giving it nine homes for seven personnel). Some officials
have suggested that the houses could be used for temporary duty
personnel working at the post. During our work, visiting officials from
the Immigration and Naturalization Service were using one of the houses
to conduct political asylum visa interviews. Usually, however, the
houses are vacant. According to the ambassador and the regional
security officer, if the vacant houses were to be leased by nonembassy
tenants, the chancery‘s physical security would be seriously
compromised.[Footnote 24] In addition, the regional security officer
expressed concerns regarding the training and quality of the security
contractor, particularly because the post does not have a Marine
detachment to back up the security guards.
Banjul: Mission Priorities and Requirements:
Much of Embassy Banjul‘s resources are devoted to supporting internal
post operations instead of focusing on external goals, such as
political reporting and public diplomacy. For example, more than 60
local hires carry out facilities maintenance and other post support
functions while only 3 of the 7 American direct-hire personnel address
the post‘s 3 main program goals in The Gambia--namely, reinforcing
democracy, increasing economic prosperity, and improving the
population‘s health. Since the consular officer is also responsible for
political and economic reporting, the post recently requested one
junior officer rotational position to help balance the duties in all
three areas. Over the past 2 years the number of nonimmigrant visa
applications in Banjul more than doubled--from 1,712 applications in
March 2000 to 4,635 applications in September 2002--while the
percentage of refused applications decreased from a high of 65 percent
in September 2000 to a low of 38 percent in September 2002. Post
officials said that the lack of a full-time consular officer may impede
the post‘s ability to focus on preventing fraudulent visa applications.
The post has also requested one dual-purpose local employee to back up
its growing public diplomacy and security assistance portfolios.
Banjul: Cost of Operations:
Banjul‘s primary post planning document, the MPP, did not include
comprehensive data on the total cost of operations. The Bureau of
African Affairs‘ budget for the post estimated total costs of at least
$1.7 million for fiscal year 2003. However, these estimates did not
include American salaries and other expenses, such as State Bureau
allotments.
The left box of figure 2 summarizes the main rightsizing issues that
were raised at Embassy Banjul in response to the framework‘s questions.
The box on the right identifies corresponding rightsizing actions and
other options post decision makers could consider when collectively
assessing their rightsizing issues.
Figure 2: Applying the Rightsizing Framework in Banjul, The Gambia:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Nouakchott: Physical and Technical Security:
Embassy Nouakchott officials characterize the post compound as having
good physical security, which has been upgraded since 1998. However,
the chancery does not meet security setback requirements, and compound
facilities have security deficiencies.[Footnote 25] Answering the
framework‘s questions regarding physical security did not indicate a
need to change the number of staff based on existing security
conditions at the embassy office buildings. However, embassy officials
said that the questions helped highlight the need to consider the
security risks and trade-offs associated with expected increases in the
number of personnel at post.
Nouakchott: Mission Priorities and Requirements:
When asked specific questions regarding mission priorities and
requirements, Embassy Nouakchott officials told us that the post has an
adequate number of personnel to meet current mission requirements and
priorities but that there are generally few bidders for positions at
the post. The Ambassador and Deputy Chief of Mission emphasized that an
increase or decrease of one employee greatly affects how the post
accomplishes its mission--more so than at a larger post, such as Dakar.
For example, the Regional Security Officer position is vacant and is
being covered on a temporary duty basis by Dakar‘s Assistant Regional
Security Officer. Also, the post currently has no positions for
political and public diplomacy officers. One officer may be assigned to
multiple positions owing to limited demand for certain services. For
example, the Consular Officer at Embassy Nouakchott is also responsible
for the duties of a commercial/economic officer. However, the post
hopes to add one full-time officer for political and human rights
reporting, according to the post‘s MPP.
Nouakchott: Cost of Operations:
Operating costs for the Nouakchott post are not fully documented in the
MPP or used to justify staffing levels. Embassy Nouakchott officials
roughly estimated total operating costs of about $4 million for fiscal
year 2003. The Bureau of African Affairs‘ budget for the post estimated
partial operating costs of only $2.1 million annually, but the estimate
did not include American salaries, diplomatic security, and other
costs.
The left box of figure 3 summarizes the main rightsizing issues that
were raised at Embassy Nouakchott in response to the framework‘s
questions. The box on the right side identifies corresponding
rightsizing actions and other options post decision makers could
consider when collectively assessing their rightsizing issues.
Figure 3: Applying the Rightsizing Framework in Nouakchott, Mauritania:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix II: Rightsizing Framework and Corresponding Questions:
Physical/technical security of facilities and employees: * What is the
threat and security profile of the embassy?
Physical/technical security of facilities and employees: * Has the
ability to protect personnel been a factor in determining staffing
levels at the embassy?
Physical/technical security of facilities and employees: * To what
extent are existing office buildings secure?
Physical/technical security of facilities and employees: * Is existing
space being optimally utilized?
Physical/technical security of facilities and employees: * Have all
practical options for improving the security of facilities been
considered?
Physical/technical security of facilities and employees: * Do issues
involving facility security put the staff at an unacceptable level of
risk or limit mission accomplishment?
Physical/technical security of facilities and employees: * What is the
capacity level of the host country police, military, and intelligence
services? [A].
Physical/technical security of facilities and employees: * Do security
vulnerabilities suggest the need to reduce or relocate staff?
Physical/technical security of facilities and employees: * Do health
conditions in the host country pose personal security concerns that
limit the number of employees that should be assigned to the post? [B].
Physical/technical security of facilities and employees: * What are the
staffing levels and mission of each agency?
Physical/technical security of facilities and employees: * How do
agencies determine embassy staffing levels?
Physical/technical security of facilities and employees: * Is there an
adequate justification for the number of employees at each agency
compared with the agency‘s mission?
Physical/technical security of facilities and employees: * Is there
adequate justification for the number of direct hire personnel devoted
to support and administrative operations?
Physical/technical security of facilities and employees: * What are the
priorities of the embassy? [C].
Physical/technical security of facilities and employees: * Does each
agency‘s mission reinforce embassy priorities?
Physical/technical security of facilities and employees: * To what
extent are mission priorities not being sufficiently addressed due to
staffing limitations or other impediments?
Physical/technical security of facilities and employees: * To what
extent are workload requirements validated and prioritized and is the
embassy able to balance them with core functions?
Physical/technical security of facilities and employees: * Do the
activities of any agencies overlap?
Physical/technical security of facilities and employees: * Given
embassy priorities and the staffing profile, are increases in the
number of existing staff or additional agency representation needed?
Physical/technical security of facilities and employees: * To what
extent is it necessary for each agency to maintain its current presence
in country, given the scope of its responsibilities and its mission?
Physical/technical security of facilities and employees: Could an
agency‘s mission be pursued in other ways?
Physical/technical security of facilities and employees: Does an agency
have regional responsibilities or is its mission entirely focused on
the host country?
Physical/technical security of facilities and employees: * What is the
embassy‘s total annual operating cost?
Physical/technical security of facilities and employees: * What are the
operating costs for each agency at the embassy?
Physical/technical security of facilities and employees: * To what
extent are agencies considering the full cost of operations in making
staffing decisions?
Physical/technical security of facilities and employees: * To what
extent are costs commensurate with overall embassy strategic
importance, with agency programs, and with specific products and
services?
Physical/technical security of facilities and employees: * What are the
security, mission, and cost implications of relocating certain
functions to the United States, regional centers, or to other
locations, such as commercial space or host country counterpart
agencies?
Physical/technical security of facilities and employees: * To what
extent could agency program and/or routine administrative functions
(procurement, logistics, and financial management functions) be handled
from a regional center or other locations?
Physical/technical security of facilities and employees: * Do new
technologies and transportation links offer greater opportunities for
operational support from other locations?
Physical/technical security of facilities and employees: * Do the host
country and regional environments suggest there are options for doing
business differently, that is, are there adequate transportation and
communications links and a vibrant private sector?
Physical/technical security of facilities and employees: * To what
extent is it practical to purchase embassy services from the private
sector?
Physical/technical security of facilities and employees: * Does the
ratio of support staff to program staff at the embassy suggest
opportunities for streamlining?
Physical/technical security of facilities and employees: * Can
functions be reengineered to provide greater efficiencies and reduce
requirements for personnel?
Physical/technical security of facilities and employees: * Are there
best practices of other bilateral embassies or private corporations
that could be adapted by the U.S. embassy?
Physical/technical security of facilities and employees: * To what
extent are there U.S. or host country legal, policy, or procedural
obstacles that may impact the feasibility of rightsizing options?
Source: GAO.
[A] We added this question based on the suggestion of Embassy Dakar‘s
regional security officer.
[B] We added this question based on the suggestion of officials at the
Office of Management and Budget.
[C] Embassy priorities are the U.S. government priorities in that
country.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Office of Management and Budget:
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503:
March 20, 2003:
Ms. Susan Westin:
Managing Director, International Affairs and Trade United States
General Accounting Office Washington D.C. 20548:
The Office of Management and Budget appreciates the opportunity to
provide comments on yodr draft report, ’Overseas Presence: Rightsizing
Framework Can Be Applied at Diplomatic Posts in Developing Countries.“
We fully support GAO‘s efforts to develop a rightsizing framework that
can be applied to all posts worldwide. The framework developed in this
and an earlier GAO report on the American Embassy in Paris is a
valuable contribution to the rightsizing framework.
OMB agrees with the GAO that mission priorities, cost and security are
key elements to the rightsizing framework. In addition, agencies should
consider workload requirements, options for information technology,
regionalization possibilities, and competitive sourcing opportunities
at each post.
The Administration‘s interagency rightsizing initiative is making
progress. In 2002, OMB compiled baseline worldwide staffing and cost
data, analyzed specific posts in the State Department‘s European
Bureau, and worked with the State Department to support the development
of the regional center in Frankfurt, Germany. The FY 2004 budget
proposes a capital surcharge as one incentive for agencies to review
their overseas staffing patterns.
We intend to make further progress this year by focusing on full
accounting for agency overseas costs and defining the parameters of a
more formal rightsizing methodology. We will also examine overseas
staffing procedures and authorities.
We greatly appreciate GAO‘s valuable contributions to this effort. If
you have any questions concerning this response, please contact, Ms.
Alexandra Gianinno of the International Affairs Division at (202) 395-
1483.
Sincerely,
Robin Cleveland
Associate Director National Security Programs:
Signed by Robin Cleveland:
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of State:
Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.
United States Department of State Washington, D.C. 20520:
Feb 25 2003:
Dear Ms. Westin:
We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, ’OVERSEAS
PRESENCE: Pightsizing Framework Can Be Applied at Diplomatic Posts in
Developing Countries,“ GAO-03-396, GAO Job Code 320125.
The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.
If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact Jay
Anania, Office of Management Policy at:
Sincerely,
Christopher B. Burnham
Assistant Secretary and Chief Financial Officer:
Signed by Christopher B. Burnham:
Enclosure:
As stated.
cc: GAO/IAT - John Brummet State/OIG - Mr. Atkins State/M/P - Mr. Jay
Anania:
Ms. Susan S. Westin, Managing Director, International Affairs and
Trade, U.S. General Accounting Office.
Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report OVERSEAS PRESENCE:
Rightsizing Framework Can Be Applied at Diplomatic Posts in Developing
Countries (GAO 03-396, GAO Job Code 320125):
This paper has two parts:
1. The Department of State‘s comments for insertion in ’Agency
Comments“ on page 12 of the GAO report.
2. Requested changes to the report.
Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report OVERSEAS PRESENCE:
Rightsizing Framework Can Be Applied at Diplomatic Posts in Developing
Countries (GAO 03-396, GAO Job Code 320125):
These Department of State comments repeat and expand upon those the
Department gave to GAO for the previous report OVERSEAS PRESENCE:
Framework for Assessing Embassy Staff Levels Can Support Ri ghtsizing
Initiatives (GAO-02-780), July 2002.
The Department of State welcomes GAO‘s work on developing a rightsizing
framework. GAO‘s questions lay out a common-sense approach that asks
the kinds of questions Chiefs of Mission (COMs) and other decision-
makers have always routinely addressed through formal and informal
processes when considering staffing issues. In the FY 2005 Mission
Performance Plan process, State has addressed many of the issues raised
in the GAO rightsizing questions. These reflected MPP policy priorities
and the management requirements to support them, including assessments
and justifications for staffing and resource levels. The aim is to
determine and plan for the necessary staffing and resources to support
agency international affairs programs and strategic objectives, with
State‘s overseas missions serving as the platform for numerous USG
agencies with overseas presence.
The GAO rightsizing questions provide a good foundation for State to
proceed to work with OMB and other agencies to improve the process for
determining overseas staffing levels. A number of the points raised in
the report, however, do not adequately reflect the current state of the
Department‘s planning; some suggestions on assessing costs and
priorities are already being undertaken.
We endorse GAO‘s definition of rightsizing:
Rightsizing [is] aligning the number and location of staff assigned
overseas with foreign policy priorities and security and other
constraints. Rightsizing may result in the addition or reduction of
staff, or a change in the mix of staff at a given embassy or consulate.
GAO lists the three elements of its rightsizing framework in an
unprioritized order of Security - Mission - Cost. We strongly believe
that the first priority is without question Mission. The first question
that must be answered before all others is whether the United States
has a compelling reason to be in a particular location. If the answer
is ’Yes,“ then it may be necessary to place personnel there, even in
the face of serious security concerns or excessive costs (e.g., the
opening of the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan). If the answer is
’No,“ the question of whether personnel can be securely or economically
located there is irrelevant.
Rationalizing the U.S. Government‘s overseas presence - an objective of
successive Administrations since the 1960s - is no easy task. Past
efforts to develop an interagency staffing methodology have not
succeeded. The 1999 Overseas Presence Advisory Panel:
(OPAP), for example, did not develop such a methodology, even though
its original charter charged it with ’preparing a report recommending
the criteria by which [the USG] might determine the location, size, and
composition of overseas posts in the coming decade.“:
It has been a long-standing policy of successive Administrations to
maintain lean overseas staffing for reasons of foreign policy,
security, and economy. President Bush‘s letter of instruction to chiefs
of mission (COMs) echoes those of his predecessors:
Every executive branch agency under your authority must obtain your
approval before changing the size, composition, or mandate of its staff
regardless of the employment category (or where located in your country
of assignment). I ask that you review programs, personnel, and funding
levels regularly, and ensure that all agencies attached to your Mission
do likewise. Functions that can be performed by personnel based in the
United States or at regional offices overseas should not be performed
at post.
The Department of State‘s diplomatic and consular posts serve as the
platform for many agencies. They are a critical factor in the success
of other agencies‘ initiatives, both joint and non joint with State.
The emphasis on security enhancement measures and improvements (rather
than a reduction in staff) may enable us to reduce security threats
while at the same time effectively achieving our policy priorities.
GAO posits that there is ’the need for the State Department and other
agencies to establish a systematic process for determining their
overseas staffing levels.“ This implies that there is a problem of
explosive growth in overseas staffing that needs to be reined in, and
that agencies assign staffing overseas without carefully considering
the elements of mission, security, and cost. In fact, the number of
American direct hire positions under the authority of Chiefs of Mission
at the end of FY 2002 stood at about 19,000, essentially the same level
as it did in FY 1995, and smaller than at its 1966 peak of 42,000.
(Since at least the 1950s, the Department of State has represented a
third or less of all American staffing in U.S. diplomatic posts.) This
level staffing is remarkable because it reflects ongoing rightsizing in
the redirection of resources by traditional foreign affairs agencies
(e.g., State, Defense, USAID, Commerce) to meet new challenges and a
growing presence by traditionally domestic agencies (e.g., Justice and
Treasury) to reflect national priorities such as combating terrorism.
The Department of State cannot speak for other agencies‘ processes for
determining overseas staffing levels. We believe, however, that the GAO
report would have benefited from a discussion of State‘s Overseas
Staffing Model (OSM), which the Department has used for years to assess
its own overseas staffing needs. The OSM was completed in 1996 and has
been run three times since then. It provides an objective, flexible
tool to measure what resources are needed to meet the President‘s and
the Secretary‘s foreign policy priorities and objectives. The OSM
provides Department management with an analytical tool to rationally
allocate full-time permanent American personnel resources worldwide in
line with the Administration‘s foreign policy objectives, the
International Affairs Strategic Goals, and Department priorities.
IT also allows the Department to assess resources needed to meet
legislated mandates and
to fulfill our responsibilities to support the full USG presence
overseas. This model, made up of seven components, identifies the
staffing requirements at overseas posts, based on specific categories
and criteria, and provides a comparative assessment of posts. It
evaluates each post rationally using key workload and host country
environmental factors.
In addition, current procedures for implementing NSDD 38 require
agencies proposing changes in the size, composition, or mandate of
their staffs to consider the policy to maintain lean overseas staffing;
Mission Performance Plan goals; alternative staffing arrangements; and
security, cost, and administrative support implications. (The
Department‘s standard NSDD 38 cable is attached for reference.):
With respect to cost of operations, the interagency MPP teams link
resources to desired service levels. Synchronization with the
International Cooperative Administrative Services Support (ICASS)
forward planning process also serves as an additional mechanism for
assessing operating costs and their distribution for each agency. ICASS
is the shared administrative support system through which more than 250
U.S. government entities at our overseas posts obtain essential
services and share costs of operating facilities and services. ICASS‘s
cost distribution system ensures that a more comprehensive estimate of
the cost of each agency‘s presence overseas is reflected in that
agency‘s budget.
State continues to work toward implementation of appropriate
rightsizing measures and improved embassy security. State plans to
incorporate additional elements of the GAO embassy rightsizing
questions, currently being developed, for the future MPP and BPP
processes. We look forward to continuing to work with GAO and the
Office of Management and Budget on rightsizing.
See comment 1.
See comment 2.
See comment 3.
See comment 4.
See comment 5.
The following are GAO‘s comments on the Department of State‘s letter
dated February 25, 2003.
GAO‘s Comments:
1. We did not set priorities for the elements in the framework that
appear in this report. Moreover, we believe that decision makers need
to consider security, mission, and cost collectively in order to weigh
the trade-offs associated with staffing levels and rightsizing options.
2. We did not imply that there is a problem of exploding growth in
overseas staffing levels that needs to be reined in. Our statement that
there is a need for a systematic process to determine overseas staffing
levels (i.e., rightsizing) was made on the basis that the elements of
security, mission, cost, and other rightsizing options are not
collectively addressed in a formal process to determine staffing levels
at overseas posts. On page 1 of the report, we state that rightsizing
may result in the addition, reduction, or change in the mix of staff.
3. We modified our report on page 7 to discuss the Overseas Staffing
Model.
4. We modified our report on pages 6-7 to more accurately describe the
National Security Decision Directive-38.
5. International Cooperative Administrative Support Services (ICASS) is
only one component of a post‘s total overseas costs and include the
costs of common administrative support, such as motor pool operations,
vehicle maintenance, travel services, mail and messenger services,
building operations, information management, and other administrative
services. However, this component does not cover all employee salaries
and benefits, all housing, office furnishings and equipment, diplomatic
security, representation, miscellaneous expenses, and other costs for
all agencies operating at a post. Total costs associated with each post
need to be considered when overseas staffing decisions are made.
[End of section]
FOOTNOTES
[1] U.S. General Accounting Office, Overseas Staffing: U.S. Government
Diplomatic Presence Abroad, GAO/T-NSIAD-95-136 (Washington, D.C.: Apr.
6, 1995). U.S. General Accounting Office, State Department: Overseas
Staffing Process Not Linked to Policy Priorities, GAO/NSIAD-94-228
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 20, 1994), and U.S. General Accounting Office,
Overseas Presence: Staffing at U.S. Diplomatic Posts, GAO/NSIAD-95-50S
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 28, 1994).
[2] We presented our framework in testimony in May 2002 and in a report
issued in July 2002. U.S. General Accounting Office, Overseas Presence:
Observations on a Rightsizing Framework, GAO-02-659T (Washington,
D.C.: May 1, 2002), and Overseas Presence: Framework for Assessing
Embassy Staff Levels Can Support Rightsizing Initiatives, GAO-02-780
(Washington, D.C.: July 26, 2002).
[3] We defined rightsizing as aligning the number and location of staff
assigned overseas with foreign policy priorities and security and other
constraints. Rightsizing may result in the addition or reduction of
staff, or a change in the mix of staff. The Department of State agreed
with this definition.
[4] Competitive sourcing involves using competition to determine
whether a commercial activity should be performed by government
personnel or contractors.
[5] GAO encourages decision makers to also formulate additional
questions to the framework as needed.
[6] GAO-02-780.
[7] GAO/T-NSIAD-95-136, GAO-NSIAD-95-50FS, and GAO-NSIAD-94-228.
[8] Former Secretary of State Albright appointed the Accountability
Review Boards to investigate the facts and circumstances surrounding
the 1998 embassy bombings in East Africa. Department of State, Report
of the Accountability Review Boards on the Embassy Bombings in Nairobi
and Dar Es Salaam (Washington, D.C.: January 1999).
[9] Former Secretary of State Albright established the panel following
the 1998 embassy bombings in Africa to consider the organization of
U.S. embassies and consulates. Department of State, America‘s Overseas
Presence in the 21st Century, The Report of the Overseas Presence
Advisory Panel (Washington, D.C.: November 1999).
[10] The Department of State implemented the special embassy program to
preclude growth at posts abroad where U.S. interests are limited, to
permit posts with limited resources to concentrate on essential
objectives by relieving them of lower priority work and to simplify and
streamline operations so that posts can operate more effectively and
efficiently. Embassies are designated as special embassy programs if
they have 30 or fewer U.S. citizen direct-hire positions or 15 or fewer
direct-hire Department of State positions.
[11] The Department of State assesses security requirements at each
overseas post based on standards in such categories as perimeter walls
and fences, facility setback, building material and blast protection,
compound accessibility, defense barriers, and other key elements of
security.
[12] Department of State‘s security requirement (12 FAH-6 H-111.4)
states that existing chanceries or consulates must have a standoff
distance of 100 feet between the protected side of the perimeter
barrier and the building exterior.
[13] The directive requires U.S. government agencies operating under
the authority of Chiefs of Mission (usually an ambassador) to seek
approval by the post‘s Chief of Mission on any proposed changes in the
size, composition, or mandate of their staff.
[14] U.S. Department of State, America‘s Overseas Presence in the 21ST
Century: The Report of the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999).
[15] MPPs are authoritative U.S. government strategy documents prepared
annually and covering all agencies at a post on the basis of the goals
set forth in the Department of State Strategic Plan and the
International Affairs Strategic Plan. The MPP sets priorities and makes
requests for staff and other resources, and ensures consistency among
agencies in country and with Washington headquarters.
[16] Each post we visited generated a post profile report from State‘s
intranet Web site. The reports contain staffing and other key data on
posts, including Department of State funding and allotments. However,
in all three cases, cost data were inaccurate or incomplete. The
reports also lacked comprehensive cost data on State‘s operations and
other agencies‘ programs.
[17] For the purposes of our work, comprehensive costs include salaries
and benefits, travel, allowances, housing, International Cooperative
Administrative Support Services, office furnishings and equipment,
information management, transportation, diplomatic security,
representation, other miscellaneous costs, and total costs of each
agency operating at a post.
[18] During our work at the embassy in Paris, we identified as many as
50 positions at the post that are commercial in nature and responsible
for providing services or goods that have the potential to be
competitively sourced to the private sector or performed at another
location.
[19] We found similar conditions at the U.S. embassy in Paris, where
household appliances and furniture were maintained separately by agency
and consolidating inventories could potentially reduce staffing and
other resource requirements.
[20] The Dakar post includes three main embassy office buildings,
separate USAID and Peace Corps compounds, and a separate warehousing
compound that includes a repair and maintenance facility. Two U.S.
Department of Treasury personnel work in the Central Bank of West
African States building.
[21] In October 2002, based on the fighting between rebel elements and
Ivoirian government forces, the Department of State ordered U.S.
government personnel in nonemergency positions and family members of
all U.S. government personnel in Cote d‘Ivoire to leave the country.
[22] In June 2002, we reported that diplomatic programs and management
controls at hardship posts could be vulnerable due to staffing
shortfalls, and posts‘ ability to carry out U.S. foreign policy
objectives effectively could be weakened. U.S. General Accounting
Office, Staffing Shortfalls and Ineffective Assignment System
Compromise Diplomatic Readiness at Hardship Posts, GAO-02-626
(Washington, D.C.: June 2002).
[23] The International Cooperative Administrative Support Services
system is the U.S. government‘s system for providing and sharing the
cost of common administrative support at its diplomatic and consular
posts.
[24] The chancery has a 78-foot setback in front and a more than 100-
foot setback on the side with the vacant houses. Without the buffer of
the vacant houses, the chancery would have a less than 20-foot setback.
[25] The Nouakchott post compound includes administrative buildings,
residences, and the American school. The main security concerns for the
Nouakchott post include older buildings and inadequate defense
barriers. There are plans to assign a Marine detachment to the post for
additional security.
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