Border Security
New Policies and Procedures Are Needed to Fill Gaps in the Visa Revocation Process Gao ID: GAO-03-908T June 18, 2003The National Strategy for Homeland Security calls for preventing the entry of foreign terrorists into our country and using all legal means to identify; halt; and where appropriate, prosecute or bring immigration or other civil charges against terrorists in the United States. GAO reported in October 2002 that the Department of State had revoked visas of certain persons after it learned they might be suspected terrorists, raising concerns that some of these individuals may have entered the United States before or after State's action. Congressional requesters asked GAO to (1) assess the effectiveness of the visa revocation process and (2) identify the policies and procedures of State, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that govern their respective actions in the process.
Our analysis shows that the visa revocation process was not being fully utilized as an antiterrorism tool. The visa revocation process broke down when information on individuals with revoked visas was not shared between State and appropriate immigration and law enforcement offices. It broke down even further when individuals had already entered the United States prior to revocation. INS and the FBI were not routinely taking actions to investigate, locate, or resolve the cases of individuals who remained in the United States after their visas were revoked. In our review of 240 visa revocations, we found that (1) appropriate units within INS and the FBI did not always receive notifications of all the revocations; (2) names were not consistently posted to the agencies' watch lists of suspected terrorists; (3) 30 individuals whose visas were revoked on terrorism grounds had entered the United States and may still remain; and (4) INS and the FBI were not routinely taking actions to investigate, locate, or resolve the cases of individuals who remained in the United States after their visas were revoked. These weaknesses resulted from the U.S. government's limited policy guidance on the process. None of the agencies have specific, written policies on using the visa revocation process as an antiterrorism tool.
GAO-03-908T, Border Security: New Policies and Procedures Are Needed to Fill Gaps in the Visa Revocation Process
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and
International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of
Representatives:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EST:
Wednesday, June 18, 2003:
Border Security:
New Policies and Procedures Are Needed to Fill Gaps in the Visa
Revocation Process:
Statement of Jess T. Ford, Director International Affairs and Trade:
GAO-03-908T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-03-908T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations,
Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
The National Strategy for Homeland Security calls for preventing the
entry of foreign terrorists into our country and using all legal means
to identify; halt; and where appropriate, prosecute or bring
immigration or other civil charges against terrorists in the United
States. GAO reported in October 2002 that the Department of State had
revoked visas of certain persons after it learned they might be
suspected terrorists, raising concerns that some of these individuals
may have entered the United States before or after State‘s action.
Congressional requesters asked GAO to (1) assess the effectiveness of
the visa revocation process and (2) identify the policies and
procedures of State, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS),
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that govern their
respective actions in the process.
What GAO Found:
Our analysis shows that the visa revocation process was not being
fully utilized as an antiterrorism tool. The visa revocation process
broke down when information on individuals with revoked visas was not
shared between State and appropriate immigration and law enforcement
offices. It broke down even further when individuals had already
entered the United States prior to revocation. INS and the FBI were
not routinely taking actions to investigate, locate, or resolve the
cases of individuals who remained in the United States after their
visas were revoked. In our review of 240 visa revocations, we found
that
* appropriate units within INS and the FBI did not always receive
notifications of all the revocations;
* names were not consistently posted to the agencies‘ watch lists of
suspected terrorists;
* 30 individuals whose visas were revoked on terrorism grounds had
entered the United States and may still remain; and
* INS and the FBI were not routinely taking actions to investigate,
locate, or resolve the cases of individuals who remained in the United
States after their visas were revoked.
These weaknesses resulted from the U.S. government‘s limited policy
guidance on the process. None of the agencies have specific, written
policies on using the visa revocation process as an antiterrorism
tool.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO makes recommendations to the Department of Homeland Security, in
conjunction with the Departments of State and Justice, to develop
specific policies and procedures for the interagency visa revocation
process to ensure that when State revokes a visa because of terrorism
concerns, the appropriate units within State, INS, and the FBI are
notified immediately and that proper actions are taken.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here to discuss the report[Footnote 1] we are
issuing today on the need for new policies and procedures to fill gaps
in the visa revocation process. As you are aware, Mr. Chairman, in the
National Strategy for Homeland Security[Footnote 2] the President said
that the U.S. government has no more important mission than protecting
the homeland from future terrorist attacks. Our report calls for new
policies and procedures to ensure that when the Department of State
revokes a visa because of terrorism concerns, homeland security and law
enforcement agencies that protect our country are promptly notified of
this information and take appropriate action. Since the September 11
attacks, State's Bureau of Consular Affairs has been receiving an
increased volume of information from the intelligence community, law
enforcement agencies, and other sources on suspected terrorists. In
some cases, the department decided to revoke visas of certain
individuals when it received potentially derogatory information on them
after issuing the visas. This issue was raised in our October 2002
report on strengthening the visa process as an antiterrorism
tool.[Footnote 3] In that report, we found that the State Department
had revoked the visas of certain individuals after learning that they
might be suspected terrorists, raising concerns that some of these
people may have entered the United States before or after their visas
were revoked.
At your request, Mr. Chairman, and that of Senator Grassley, we
evaluated how the visa revocation process is being used as an
antiterrorism tool. We (1) assessed the effectiveness of the visa
revocation process, specifically (a) the steps State took to notify
appropriate units within the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS),[Footnote 4] which is now part of the Department of Homeland
Security, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of revocations
and the procedures used by the three agencies to post lookouts on these
revocations to their terrorist watch lists; [Footnote 5] (b) whether
any of the individuals whose visas had been revoked were able to enter
the United States before or after the revocation; and (c) the actions
taken by INS and the FBI to investigate; locate; and, where
appropriate, clear, remove, or prosecute the individuals who did enter
the United States and may still remain here after their visas have been
revoked; and (2) determined the policies and procedures of the State
Department, INS, and the FBI that govern their respective actions in
the visa revocation process. Our work focused on all 240 of State's
visa revocations on terrorism grounds from September 11, 2001, through
December 31, 2002.
Summary:
Our analysis shows that the visa revocation process is not being fully
utilized as an antiterrorism tool. The visa revocation process could be
more aggressively used to prevent suspected terrorists from entering
the country and to alert homeland security and law enforcement agencies
that individuals who entered before their visas were revoked might be
security risks. However, we found that, in practice, the process broke
down when information on visa revocations was not shared between State
and appropriate immigration and law enforcement offices. It broke down
even further when the individuals in question had already entered the
United States prior to revocation. INS and the FBI were not routinely
taking actions to investigate,[Footnote 6] locate, or resolve the cases
of individuals who remained in the United States after their visas were
revoked. Depending on the results of the investigations, the cases
could be resolved by clearing persons who were wrongly suspected of
terrorism, removing suspected terrorists from the country, or
prosecuting suspected terrorists on criminal charges.
In our review of the 240 visa revocations, we found numerous cases
where notification of the revocation did not reach appropriate units
within INS and the FBI and cases where lookouts were not posted to the
agencies' watch lists of suspected terrorists. We also found evidence
that 30 individuals whose visas were revoked because of terrorism
concerns entered the United States and may still remain in the
country.[Footnote 7] Additionally, INS and the FBI were not routinely
taking actions to investigate, locate, or resolve the cases of
individuals who remained in the United States after their visas were
revoked. I would like to expand on these weaknesses in the process, and
then comment on the U.S. government's lack of a specific policy on visa
revocations. Finally, I will outline the recommendations we have
developed to strengthen the visa revocation process as an antiterrorism
tool. In general, we recommend the development of specific policies and
procedures to ensure that persons whose visas have been revoked because
of potential terrorism concerns be denied entry to the United States
and those who may already be in the United States be investigated to
determine if they pose a security threat.
Weaknesses in Notification and Watch List Procedures:
In our review of the 240 visa revocations, we found examples where
information on visa revocations did not flow between the State
Department and appropriate units overseas and within INS and the FBI.
State Department officials from the Visa Office told us that when they
revoke a visa in Washington, they are supposed to take the following
steps: (1) notify consular officers at all overseas posts that the
individual is a suspected terrorist by entering a lookout on the person
into State's watch list, the Consular Lookout and Support System, known
as CLASS; (2) notify the INS Lookout Unit via a faxed copy of the
revocation certificate so that the unit can enter the individual into
its watch list and notify officials at ports of entry; and (3) notify
the issuing post via cable so that the post can attempt to contact the
individual to physically cancel his visa. Information-only copies of
these cables are also sent to INS's and FBI's main communications
enters. State officials told us they rely on INS and FBI internal
distribution mechanisms to ensure that these cables are routed to
appropriate units within the agencies.
Figure 1 demonstrates gaps that we identified in the flow of
information from State to INS and the FBI, and within these agencies,
as well as the resulting inconsistencies in the posting of lookouts to
the agencies' respective watch lists.
Figure 1: Diagram of Gaps in the Visa Revocation Notification System
and Watch List Procedures:
[See PDF for image]
[A] Now within the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection.
[B] Now within the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement.
[End of figure]
The top arrow in the diagram shows the extent of communication on visa
revocations between the State Department's Bureau of Consular Affairs
and State's overseas consular posts. We found that State had not
consistently followed its informal policy of entering a lookout into
its CLASS lookout system at the time of the revocation. State officials
said that they post lookouts on individuals with revoked visas in CLASS
so that, if the individual attempts to get a new visa, consular
officers at overseas posts will know that the applicant has had a
previous visa revoked and that a security advisory opinion on the
individual is required before issuing a new visa. Without a lookout, it
is possible that a new visa could be issued without additional security
screening. We reviewed CLASS records on all 240 individuals whose visas
were revoked and found that the State Department did not post lookouts
within a 2-week period of the revocation on 64 of these individuals.
The second arrow depicts the information flow on revocations between
State and the INS Lookout Unit, which is the inspections unit that
posts lookouts on INS's watch list to prevent terrorists (and other
inadmissible aliens) from entering the United States. Officials from
the INS Lookout Unit told us they had not received any notice of the
revocations from State in 43 of the 240 cases. In another 47 cases, the
INS Lookout Unit received the revocation notice only via a cable;
however, these cables took, on average, 12 days to reach the Lookout
Unit, although in one case it took 29 days. An official from the INS
communications center told us that, because State's cables were marked
"information only," they were routed through the Inspections division
first, which was then supposed to forward them to the Lookout Unit. He
told us that if the cables had been marked as "action" or "urgent,"
they would have been sent immediately to the Lookout Unit. In cases
where the INS Lookout Unit could document that it received a
notification, it generally posted information on these revocations in
its lookout database within one day of receiving the notice. When it
did not receive notification, it could not post information on these
individuals in its lookout database, precluding INS inspectors at ports
of entry from knowing that these individuals had had their visas
revoked.
The third arrow on the diagram shows the communication between State
and INS's National Security Unit that is responsible for
investigations. This broken arrow shows that the State Department did
not send copies of the faxed revocation certificates or cables to the
unit. Further, in cases where the INS Lookout Unit received the
revocation notification from State, INS Lookout Unit officials said
that they did not routinely check to see whether these individuals had
already entered the United States or notify investigators in the
National Security Unit of the visa revocations. Without this
notification, the National Security Unit would have no independent
basis to begin an investigation. In May 2003, an official from the
Lookout Unit said that her unit recently established a procedure in
which, upon receiving notification of a revocation, she will query the
Interagency Border Inspection System to determine if the individual
recently entered the country. She will then give this information to
investigators in the National Security Unit, which is now part of the
Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement.
The bottom arrow on the diagram shows the information flow on visa
revocations from State to the FBI's Counterterrorism units. We found
that that these units did not consistently receive information on visa
revocations. FBI officials said that the agency's main communications
center received the notifications but the officials could not confirm
if the notifications were then distributed internally to the
appropriate investigative units at the FBI or to the agency's watch
list unit, known as the Terrorist Watch and Warning Unit. The
Department of Justice said that to add a person to its watch
list,[Footnote 8] additional information must be provided to the FBI,
such as the person's full name, complete date of birth, physical
descriptors, and watch list-specific classification information. The
revocation notifications did not include most of this information.
Individuals with Revoked Visas May Be in the United States:
Our analysis shows that thirty individuals with revoked visas have
entered the United States and may still remain in the country. Twenty-
nine of these individuals entered before State revoked their visas. An
additional person who may still be in the country entered after his
visa was revoked. INS inspectors allowed at least three other people to
enter the country even though their visas had already been revoked,
largely due to breakdowns in the notification system. These three
people have left the country.
Despite these problems, we noted cases where the visa revocation
process prevented possible terrorists from entering the country or
cleared individuals whose visas had been revoked. For example, INS
inspectors successfully prevented at least 14 of the 240 individuals
from entering the country because the INS watch list included
information on the revocation action or had other lookouts on them. In
addition, State records showed that a small number of people reapplied
for a new visa after the revocation. State used the visa issuance
process to fully screen these individuals and determined that they did
not pose a security threat.
INS and the FBI Did Not Routinely Take Action on Individuals with
Revoked Visas Who Had Entered the United States:
The INS and the FBI did not routinely attempt to investigate or locate
any of the individuals whose visas were revoked and who may be in the
country.
Due to congressional interest in specific cases, INS investigators
located four of the persons in the United States but did not attempt to
locate other revoked visa holders who may have entered the country. INS
officials told us that they generally do not investigate these cases
because it would be challenging to remove these individuals unless they
were in violation of their immigration status even if the agency could
locate them. A visa revocation by itself is not a stated grounds for
removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Investigators
from INS's National Security Unit said they could investigate
individuals to determine if they were violating the terms of their
admission, for example by overstaying the amount of time they were
granted to remain in the United States, but they believed that under
the INA, the visa revocation itself does not affect the alien's legal
status in the United States--even though the revocation was for
terrorism reasons. They and other Homeland Security officials raised a
number of legal issues associated with removing an individual from the
country after the person's visa has been revoked. Our report discusses
these issues in detail.
FBI officials told us that they did not routinely attempt to
investigate and locate individuals with revoked visas who may have
entered the United States. They said that State's method of notifying
them did not clearly indicate that visas had been revoked because the
visa holder may pose terrorism concerns. Further, the notifications
were sent as "information only" and did not request specific follow-up
action by the FBI. Moreover, State did not attempt to make other
contact with the FBI that would indicate any urgency in the matter.
Systemic Weaknesses Were the Result of Limited Guidance on Visa
Revocation Process:
The weaknesses I have outlined above resulted from the U.S.
government's limited policy guidance on the visa revocation process.
Our analysis indicates that the U.S. government has no specific policy
on the use of visa revocations as an antiterrorism tool and no written
procedures to guide State in notifying the relevant agencies of visa
revocations on terrorism grounds. State and INS have written procedures
that guide some types of visa revocations; however, neither they nor
the FBI has written internal procedures for notifying their appropriate
personnel to take specific actions on visas revoked by State Department
headquarters officials, as was the case for all the revoked visas
covered in our review. While State and INS officials told us they use
the visa revocation process to prevent suspected terrorists from
entering the United States, neither they nor FBI officials had policies
or procedures that covered investigating, locating, and taking
appropriate action in cases where the visa holder had already entered
the country.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the visa process could be an important
tool to keep potential terrorists from entering the United States.
Ideally, information on suspected terrorists would reach the State
Department before it decides to issue a visa. However, there will
always be some cases when the information arrives too late and State
has already issued a visa. Revoking a visa can mitigate this problem,
but only if State promptly notifies appropriate border control and law
enforcement agencies and if these agencies act quickly to (1) notify
border control agents and immigration inspectors to deny entry to
persons with a revoked visa, and (2) investigate persons with revoked
visas who have entered the country. Currently there are major gaps in
the notification and investigation processes. One reason for this is
that there are no specific written policies and procedures on how
notification of a visa revocation should take place and what agencies
should do when they are notified. As a result, there is heightened risk
that suspected terrorists could enter the country with a revoked visa
or be allowed to remain after their visa is revoked without undergoing
investigation or monitoring.
State has emphasized that it revoked the visas as a precautionary
measure and that the 240 persons are not necessarily terrorists or
suspected terrorists. State cited the uncertain nature of the
information it receives from the intelligence and law enforcement
communities on which it must base its decision to revoke an
individual's visa. We recognize that the visas were revoked as a
precautionary measure and that the persons whose visas were revoked may
not be terrorists. However, the State Department determined that there
was enough derogatory information to revoke visas for these persons
because of terrorism concerns. Our recommendations, which are discussed
below, are designed to ensure that persons whose visas have been
revoked because of potential terrorism concerns be denied entry to the
United States and those who may already be in the United States be
investigated to determine if they pose a security threat.
To remedy the systemic weaknesses in the visa revocation process, we
are recommending that the Secretary of Homeland Security, who is now
responsible for issuing regulations and administering and enforcing
provisions of U.S. immigration law relating to visa issuance, work in
conjunction with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General to:
* develop specific policies and procedures for the interagency visa
revocation process to ensure that notification of visa revocations for
suspected terrorists and relevant supporting information are
transmitted from State to immigration and law enforcement agencies, and
their respective inspection and investigation units, in a timely
manner;
* develop a specific policy on actions that immigration and law
enforcement agencies should take to investigate and locate individuals
whose visas have been revoked for terrorism concerns and who remain in
the United States after revocation; and:
* determine if any persons with visas revoked on terrorism grounds are
in the United States and, if so, whether they pose a security threat.
In commenting on our report, Homeland Security agreed that the visa
revocation process should be strengthened as an antiterrorism tool.
State and Justice did not comment on our recommendations.
I would be happy to answer any questions you or other members of the
subcommittee may have.
Contacts and Acknowledgments:
For future contacts regarding this testimony, please call Jess Ford or
John Brummet at (202) 512-4128. Individuals making key contributions to
this testimony included Judy McCloskey, Kate Brentzel, Mary Moutsos,
and Janey Cohen.
FOOTNOTES
[1] U.S. General Accounting Office, Border Security: New Policies and
Procedures Needed to Fill Gaps in the Visa Revocation Process
(Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2003).
[2] Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland
Security (Washington, D.C.: July 2002).
[3] U.S. General Accounting Office, Border Security: Visa Process
Should Be Strengthened as an Antiterrorism Tool, GAO-03-132NI
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2002).
[4] On March 1, 2003, INS became part of three units within the
Department of Homeland Security. INS inspection functions transferred
to the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection; its investigative and
enforcement functions transferred to the Bureau of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement; and its immigration services function became part
of the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services. Because our work
focused on visa revocation cases that took place before the March 1
reorganization, our report refers to the U.S. government's immigration
agency as INS.
[5] These watch lists are automated databases that contain information
about individuals who are known or suspected terrorists so that these
individuals can be prevented from entering the country, apprehended
while in the country, or apprehended as they attempt to exit the
country. Specific entries on watch lists are sometimes referred to as
"lookouts."
[6] The Attorney General's Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering
Enterprise and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations provide for
graduated levels of investigative activity by the FBI, allowing the
bureau to act well in advance of the commission of planned terrorist
acts or other federal crimes. The three levels of investigative
activity defined in the guidelines are (1) the prompt and extremely
limited checking of initial leads; (2) preliminary inquiries; and (3)
full investigations. In this testimony, we are not prescribing which
level of investigative activity is appropriate for persons with revoked
visas who may be in the United States.
[7] This number is based on our analysis of data we received from INS
as of May 19, 2003. On May 20 and 21, the INS and FBI, respectively,
provided additional information related to this matter. Because of the
nature and volume of this data, we were not able to fully analyze it in
time for this testimony. The data could show that the number of persons
is higher or lower than 30.
[8] This watch list, known as the Violent Gang and Terrorist
Organization File, is accessed by local and state law enforcement
officials via the National Crime Information Center.
