Drug Control
Specific Performance Measures and Long-Term Costs for U.S. Programs in Colombia Have Not Been Developed Gao ID: GAO-03-783 June 16, 2003The United States has been providing assistance to Colombia since the early 1970s to help reduce illegal drug activities. In fiscal years 2000-03 alone, the United States provided over $2.5 billion. Despite this assistance, Colombia remains the world's leading producer and distributor of cocaine and a major source of the heroin used in the United States. The report discusses the status of U.S. counternarcotics assistance to the Colombian Army and for a U.S.-supported Colombian police aerial eradication program. It also addresses challenges Colombia and the United States face in sustaining these programs.
In fiscal years 2000-03, the United States provided about $640 million in assistance to train and equip a Colombian Army counternarcotics brigade and supply the army with 72 helicopters and related support. Nearly all this assistance has been delivered and is being used for counternarcotics operations. However, the Colombian Army cannot operate and maintain the U.S.-provided helicopters at current levels without U.S. support because it does not yet have sufficient numbers of qualified pilots and mechanics. U.S. officials estimate that up to $150 million a year is needed to sustain the ongoing programs. In recent years, the Colombian National Police aerial eradication program has had mixed results. Since 1995, coca cultivation rose in every year until 2002 and opium poppy cultivation remained relatively steady until 2001. But, for 2002, the U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy reported that net coca cultivation in Colombia decreased 15 percent, and net opium poppy cultivation decreased 25 percent--the second yearly decline in a row. U.S. officials attributed this success primarily to the Colombian government's willingness to spray coca and poppy plants without restriction. These officials estimate that about $80 million a year is needed to continue the program at its current pace. Although the U.S.-backed counternarcotics program in Colombia has begun to achieve some of the results originally envisioned, Colombia and the United States must deal with financial and management challenges. As GAO noted in 2000, the total costs of the counternarcotics programs in Colombia were unknown. Nearly 3 years later, the Departments of State and Defense have still not developed estimates of future program costs, defined their future roles in Colombia, identified a proposed end state, or determined how they plan to achieve it. Colombia's ability to contribute more is limited, and it continues to face challenges associated with its long-standing insurgency and the need to ensure it complies with human rights standards and other requirements in order for U.S. assistance to continue.
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Director: Team: Phone:GAO-03-783, Drug Control: Specific Performance Measures and Long-Term Costs for U.S. Programs in Colombia Have Not Been Developed
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Report to Congressional Committees:
June 2003:
Drug Control:
Specific Performance Measures and Long-Term Costs for U.S. Programs in
Colombia Have Not Been Developed:
GAO-03-783:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-03-783, a report to congressional committees
Why GAO Did This Study:
The United States has been providing assistance to Colombia since the
early 1970s to help reduce illegal drug activities. In fiscal years
2000-03 alone, the United States provided over $2.5 billion. Despite
this assistance, Colombia remains the world‘s leading producer and
distributor of cocaine and a major source of the heroin used in the
United States.
The report discusses the status of U.S. counternarcotics assistance to
the Colombian Army and for a U.S.-supported Colombian police aerial
eradication program. It also addresses challenges Colombia and the
United States face in sustaining these programs.
What GAO Found:
In fiscal years 2000-03, the United States provided about $640 million
in assistance to train and equip a Colombian Army counternarcotics
brigade and supply the army with 72 helicopters and related support.
Nearly all this assistance has been delivered and is being used for
counternarcotics operations. However, the Colombian Army cannot
operate and maintain the U.S.-provided helicopters at current levels
without U.S. support because it does not yet have sufficient numbers
of qualified pilots and mechanics. U.S. officials estimate that up to
$150 million a year is needed to sustain the ongoing programs.
In recent years, the Colombian National Police aerial eradication
program has had mixed results. Since 1995, coca cultivation rose in
every year until 2002 and opium poppy cultivation remained relatively
steady until 2001. But, for 2002, the U.S. Office of National Drug
Control Policy reported that net coca cultivation in Colombia
decreased 15 percent, and net opium poppy cultivation decreased 25
percent”the second yearly decline in a row. U.S. officials attributed
this success primarily to the Colombian government‘s willingness to
spray coca and poppy plants without restriction. These officials
estimate that about $80 million a year is needed to continue the
program at its current pace.
Although the U.S.-backed counternarcotics program in Colombia has
begun to achieve some of the results originally envisioned, Colombia
and the United States must deal with financial and management
challenges. As GAO noted in 2000, the total costs of the
counternarcotics programs in Colombia were unknown. Nearly 3 years
later, the Departments of State and Defense have still not developed
estimates of future program costs, defined their future roles in
Colombia, identified a proposed end state, or determined how they plan
to achieve it. Colombia‘s ability to contribute more is limited, and
it continues to face challenges associated with its long-standing
insurgency and the need to ensure it complies with human rights
standards and other requirements in order for U.S. assistance to
continue.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Secretary of State, in consultation with the
Secretary of Defense, establish clear objectives, including developing
specific performance measures, and estimate future U.S. funding
requirements for the programs with the Colombian Army and the
Colombian National Police.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-783.
To view the full report, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Jess T. Ford, (202) 512-
4268, FordJ@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
U.S. Assistance to the Colombian Army Has Been Delivered, but Problems
Were Encountered:
Colombia's Aerial Eradication Program Has Had Mixed Results:
Financial and Management Challenges Continue to Complicate Efforts to
Reduce Illicit Drug Activities:
Conclusions:
Recommendation for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Scope and Methodology:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of State:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Acknowledgments:
Tables Table 1: U.S. Counternarcotics Assistance to Colombia, Fiscal
Years 2000-03:
Table 2: U.S. Support for the Aerial Eradication Program, Fiscal
Years 1998-2004:
Figures:
Figure 1: Coca- and Poppy-Growing Areas in Colombia, 2001-02:
Figure 2: Net Hectares of Coca under Cultivation and Hectares
Eradicated in Colombia, 1995-2002:
Figure 3: Net Hectares of Poppy under Cultivation and Hectares
Eradicated in Colombia, 1995-2002:
Abbreviations:
EPA: Environmental Protection Agency:
NAS : Narcotics Affairs Section, U.S. Embassy, Bogotá:
USAID: U.S. Agency for International Development:
Letter June 16, 2003:
The Honorable Mitch McConnell,
Chairman
The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy,
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Foreign Operations,
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate:
The Honorable Charles E. Grassley,
Chairman
Caucus on International Narcotics Control
United States Senate:
The United States has been providing assistance to Colombia since the
early 1970s to help reduce illegal drug production and trafficking
activities. Despite this assistance, Colombia remains the world's
leading producer and distributor of cocaine and a major source of the
heroin used in the United States. Recognizing that illicit drug
activities are a serious problem in Colombia, the Colombian government
in October 1999 announced a $7.5 billion plan, known as Plan Colombia,
which among other things proposed reducing the cultivation, processing,
and distribution of illegal narcotics by 50 percent over
6 years.[Footnote 1] In fiscal years 2000 through 2003, the United
States provided over $2.5 billion to Colombia for counternarcotics
assistance.[Footnote 2] For fiscal year 2004, the administration has
proposed an additional $700 million in assistance to address many of
the same purposes. However, insurgent groups involved in illicit drug
activities control more than 40 percent of Colombia's territory, making
Colombian government and U.S. interdiction and eradication operations
immensely difficult and
dangerous and leaving illicit-drug growers with few legal alternatives
to earn a living.[Footnote 3]
A key component of the Colombian-U.S. counternarcotics strategy was
forming a Colombian Army 2,285-man counternarcotics brigade and
providing it with helicopters to move the troops around southern
Colombia where much of the coca was being grown.[Footnote 4] The
brigade's primary mission was to plan and conduct interdiction
operations against cocaine producers and traffickers. Closely allied
with the brigade's objective was the Colombian National Police's goal
to significantly reduce, if not eliminate, coca and opium poppy
cultivation through aerial eradication.[Footnote 5] In some of the
insurgent-controlled areas of the country, the brigade was supposed to
provide security for the eradication program. Various components of the
Department of Defense--primarily with funding from the Department of
State--provided the training and equipment for the counternarcotics
brigade conditional on the Colombian military's respect for human
rights. State's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs has supported the police aerial eradication program.
You expressed concern that U.S. counternarcotics assistance provided to
the Colombian Army was slow to arrive and has not been used as
originally envisioned and that the aerial eradication program has
little to show for its efforts. In response to your concerns, we
determined (1) the status of U.S. counternarcotics assistance provided
to the Colombian Army in fiscal years 2000-03, and how this assistance
is being used; (2) what the U.S.-supported Colombian National Police
aerial eradication program has accomplished in recent years; and (3)
what challenges Colombia and the United States face in sustaining these
programs.
:
To address these objectives, we reviewed pertinent planning,
implementation, and related documentation and met with cognizant U.S.
officials at the Departments of State and Defense, Washington, D.C.;
the U.S. Southern Command headquarters, Miami, Florida; and the U.S.
Embassy in Bogotá, Colombia. In Colombia, we interviewed Colombian
military, police, and government officials and visited Colombian Army
bases at Larandia, Tolemaida, and Tres Esquinas and aerial eradication
operational sites in the primary coca-growing regions of Colombia. In
addition, we observed a Colombian Army counternarcotics brigade airlift
operation and several aerial eradication missions.
Results in Brief:
In fiscal years 2000-03, the United States provided about $640 million
in assistance to train and equip a Colombian Army counternarcotics
brigade and supply the army with 72 helicopters and related training,
maintenance, and operational support. Nearly all this assistance has
been delivered and is being used for counternarcotics operations.
However, some problems were encountered. For example,
* After having a successful first year of operations during 2001, the
counternarcotics brigade's success trailed off in 2002. According to
U.S. and Colombian officials, this was due in part to the coca growers
and producers moving out of the brigade's range. In late 2002, the
Colombian Army, with U.S. assistance, reorganized the brigade and gave
it authority to operate anywhere in the country rather than just in its
formerly limited area of responsibility in southern Colombia.
* The United States delayed the start of entry-level helicopter pilot
training nearly 6 months due to uncertainty over who would conduct the
training and how it would be funded. To resolve the issue, Defense used
$20 million from other counternarcotics projects to pay for the
training.
* The delivery of 25 UH-II helicopters was delayed 5 months while the
Colombian military considered using a different engine from the one
usually installed. After numerous discussions, Colombia decided to use
the more common engine.
* U.S. funds for the brigade were not available for a total of about
5 months in 2002 because State did not meet congressional deadlines for
reporting on Colombia's progress in addressing human rights violations.
This slowed the brigade's operations and helicopter pilot training.
* The Colombian Army cannot operate and maintain the U.S.-provided
helicopters at current levels without continued U.S. contractor support
because it does not yet have sufficient numbers of qualified pilots and
mechanics. U.S. Embassy Bogotá officials estimate that up to $150
million a year is needed to sustain the ongoing programs; additional
assistance may be needed for other recently initiated efforts.
In recent years, the Colombian National Police aerial eradication
program has had mixed results. Since 1995, net coca cultivation rose in
every year until 2002 and net opium poppy cultivation remained between
6,100 to 7,500 hectares. But, in recent months, the Office of National
Drug Control Policy reported that:
* net coca cultivation in Colombia decreased 15 percent in 2002, from
169,800 hectares to 144,450 hectares, and:
* net opium poppy cultivation in Colombia decreased 25 percent in 2002,
from 6,500 hectares to 4,900 hectares--the second yearly decline in a
row.
U.S. Embassy Bogotá officials attributed this recent success primarily
to the current Colombian government's willingness to spray coca and
poppy plants without restriction in all areas of the country. They also
noted that the number of spray aircraft available had increased from 10
in July 2001 to 17 in January 2003, and a U.S. contractor began helping
the Colombian National Police to, among other things, maintain its
aircraft, resulting in greater availability for spray missions. These
officials estimate that about $80 million a year is needed to continue
the program at its current pace.
Although the U.S.-backed counternarcotics program in Colombia has
recently begun to achieve some of the results envisioned in 1999-2000,
Colombia and the United States must continue to deal with financial and
management challenges. As we reported in 2000, the total costs and
specific programs required to meet Plan Colombia's counternarcotics
goals were unknown, and a significant reduction in illicit drug
production and trafficking activities would likely take years.[Footnote
6] Nearly 3 years later, Colombia and the United States have not
established specific performance measures for assessing progress and
time frames for achieving stated objectives nor have they identified
sources of funding for sustaining ongoing programs. Until recently,
Colombia had not provided any significant new funding for its defense
needs, and anticipated international assistance for Plan Colombia--
apart from that provided by the United States--did not materialize as
envisioned.[Footnote 7] Because of economic problems, the government of
Colombia's ability to contribute more is limited. Moreover, Colombia
faces continuing challenges associated with its long-standing
insurgency and the need to ensure it complies with human rights
standards and other requirements in order for U.S. assistance to
continue.
We are recommending that the Secretary of State, in consultation with
the Secretary of Defense, establish clear objectives, including
developing specific performance measures, and estimate future U.S.
funding requirements for the programs with the Colombian Army and the
Colombian National Police.
Background:
The United States has supported Colombia's efforts to reduce drug-
trafficking activities and stem the flow of illegal drugs entering the
United States for more than 2 decades. Despite Colombian and U.S.
efforts to disrupt drug-trafficking activities, the U.S. government has
not reported any net reduction in the processing or export of refined
cocaine to the United States.[Footnote 8] According to State, Colombia
provides 90 percent of the cocaine and approximately 40 percent of the
heroin entering the United States. To further complicate matters, the
country's two largest insurgent groups--the Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Colombia and the National Liberation Army--and paramilitary groups
have expanded their involvement in drug trafficking. According to a
State official, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and the
paramilitary United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia are involved in
every facet of narcotics trafficking, including cultivating,
processing, and transporting. The insurgents exercise some degree of
control over 40 percent of Colombia's territory east and south of the
Andes--which, as illustrated in figure 1, includes the primary coca-
growing regions of Colombia. According to the Drug Enforcement
Administration, several billion dollars flow into Colombia each year
from the cocaine trade alone. This vast amount of drug money has made
it possible for these organizations to gain unprecedented economic,
political, and social power and influence.
Figure 1: Coca-and Poppy-Growing Areas in Colombia, 2001-02A:
[See PDF for image]
[A] The growing areas for coca are based on 2002 estimates; the growing
areas for poppy are based on 2001 estimates.
[End of figure]
:
In an effort to address the influx of cocaine and heroin from Colombia,
the United States has funded a counternarcotics strategy in Colombia
that includes programs for interdiction, eradication, and alternative
development which must be carefully coordinated to achieve mutually
reinforcing results. Besides assistance for the Colombian Army
counternarcotics brigade and the Colombian National Police aerial
eradication program, the United States has supported Colombian efforts
to interdict illicit-drug trafficking along rivers and in the air and
alternative development, judicial sector reform, and internally
displaced persons programs.
State and Defense have provided most of the counternarcotics funding
and State, through its Bureau for International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs and Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) in the U.S.
Embassy Bogotá, oversees the program. In addition, the Military Group
in the U.S. Embassy Bogotá manages much of the assistance to the
Colombian military. Since the introduction of Plan Colombia in fiscal
year 2000, the United States has provided more than $2.5 billion in
assistance. (See table 1.):
Table 1: U.S. Counternarcotics Assistance to Colombia, Fiscal Years
2000-03:
Dollars in millions.
State; Fiscal years: 2000[A]: $774.9; Fiscal years: 2001: $48.0;
Fiscal years: 2002: $275.4; Fiscal years: 2003[B]: (estimated):
$452.0; Total: $1,550.3.
Defense; Fiscal years: 2000[A]: 128.5; Fiscal years: 2001: 190.2;
Fiscal years: 2002: 119.1; Fiscal years: 2003[B]: (estimated):
149.9; Total: $587.7.
USAID[C]; Fiscal years: 2000[A]: 123.5; Fiscal years: 2001: 0;
Fiscal years: 2002: 104.5; Fiscal years: 2003[B]: (estimated):
151.0; Total: $379.0.
Total; Fiscal years: 2000[A]: $1,026.9; Fiscal years: 2001: $238.2;
Fiscal years: 2002: $499.0; Fiscal years: 2003[B]: (estimated):
$752.9; Total: $2,517.0.
Source: Departments of State and Defense and the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID).
[A] Includes funds appropriated for Plan Colombia through the Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act, Fiscal Year 2000 (Division B of P.L.
106-246).
[B] Includes $93 million in Foreign Military Financing funds
appropriated in the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Appropriations Act, 2003 (Division E, Title III of P.L. 108-7); $34
million appropriated to State and $34 million appropriated to Defense
in the Supplemental Appropriations Act to Support Department of
Defense Operations in Iraq for Fiscal Year 2003 (P.L. 108-11); and
$37.1 million for Foreign Military Financing allotted from fiscal year
2003 supplemental appropriations.
[C] In fiscal years 2000-03, State transferred $375 million to USAID
for alternative development, judicial sector reform, and internally
displaced persons programs.
[End of table]
In response to increased violence in Colombia during early 2002 and the
recognition that the insurgents and illicit drug activities are
inextricably linked, the Congress provided "expanded authority" for the
use of the U.S. assistance to Colombia. This authority enables the
government of Colombia to use the U.S.-trained and -equipped
counternarcotics brigade, the U.S.-provided helicopters, and other
U.S.-provided counternarcotics assistance to fight groups designated as
terrorist organizations as well as to fight drug trafficking.[Footnote
9] Similar authority was provided for fiscal year 2003[Footnote 10] and
is being sought for fiscal year 2004. For fiscal year 2004, the
administration has requested about $700 million in funding for
Colombia.
U.S. Assistance to the Colombian Army Has Been Delivered, but Problems
Were Encountered:
During fiscal years 2000-03, the United States provided about $640
million in assistance to the Colombian Army for initial training and
equipment for the counternarcotics brigade and for 72 helicopters and
related operational, maintenance, and training support. These
helicopters were intended to transport the counternarcotics brigade on
counternarcotics missions. Nearly all this assistance has been
delivered and is being utilized by the counternarcotics brigade in
conducting operations. However, both the United States and the
Colombian Army experienced some unanticipated problems that delayed the
operational use of the helicopters. In addition, U.S. support will be
needed for the foreseeable future to sustain operations.
Status of the Brigade:
The United States originally agreed to provide training and equipment
for a Colombian Army counternarcotics brigade made up of three
battalions and a headquarters staff with a total of about 2,285
professional and conscripted soldiers. The battalions became
operational in December 1999, December 2000, and May 2001,
respectively. The counternarcotics brigade was assigned to the
Colombian military's Joint Task Force-South, which was headquartered at
Tres Esquinas in Caqueta--one of the principal coca-growing regions of
Colombia. The task force comprised units from the Colombian Army, Air
Force, and Marine Corps and was tasked with the overall military
mission of regaining government control over southern Colombia,
primarily in the Putumayo and Caqueta departments.
The United States provided the counternarcotics brigade with about
$45 million in training and equipment--from weapons and ammunition to
rations, uniforms, and canteens. The brigade's primary mission was to
plan and conduct interdiction operations against drug trafficking
activities, including destroying illicit drug-producing facilities,
and, when called upon, to provide security in insurgent-controlled
areas where aerial eradication operations were planned.
Although the Colombian Army's counternarcotics brigade has achieved
some success, the Colombian military has not regained control over
large parts of the country where coca and opium poppy are grown.
According to U.S. and Colombian officials, the counternarcotics brigade
was highly effective during 2001 but somewhat less effective during
2002. For example, during 2001 the brigade destroyed 25 cocaine
hydrochloride laboratories while in 2002 it destroyed only 4
laboratories.[Footnote 11] U.S. embassy officials stated that the
brigade became less effective because the insurgents moved their drug
producing activities, such as the laboratories, beyond the reach of the
brigade. In addition, according to these officials, the brigade became
more involved in protecting infrastructure, such as bridges and power
stations, and performing base security. Moreover, the aerial
eradication program did not call on the brigade to provide ground
security on very many occasions, essentially planning spray missions in
the less threatening areas.
In August 2002, U.S. embassy and Colombian military officials agreed to
restructure the brigade to make it a rapid reaction force capable of
making quick, tactical strikes on a few days' notice. As part of this
restructuring, the Colombian Army designated the brigade a national
asset capable of operating anywhere in Colombia rather than just in its
prior area of responsibility in southern Colombia. The newly
restructured brigade consists of three combat battalions and a support
battalion with a total of about 1,900 soldiers, all of whom are
professional. Two of the combat battalions have been retrained. The
third combat battalion should be retrained by mid-June 2003. This
change, according to NAS, Military Group, and Colombian Army officials,
will improve the brigade's ability to conduct operations against high-
value, drug-trafficking targets, such as laboratories containing
cocaine and the leadership of insurgent groups involved in drug-
trafficking activities. One of the retrained battalions has been
operating in Narino department since early May.
Status of the Helicopters:
A key component of U.S. assistance for Plan Colombia was enhancing the
air mobility of the counternarcotics brigade. To accomplish this, the
United States provided the Colombian Army with 33 UH-1N helicopters, 14
UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters, and 25 UH-II helicopters.[Footnote 12]
The helicopters were provided to give the brigade the airlift needed to
transport its personnel in the Joint Task Force-South's area of
responsibility in southern Colombia. Both the UH-1Ns and the UH-60
Black Hawks are operational; the UH-IIs are scheduled for full
operations later this year. However, the Colombian Army continues to
need U.S. assistance and contractor pilots and mechanics to fly the
aircraft.
UH-1Ns:
In September 1999, State and Defense initiated a plan to provide the
Colombian Army with 33 UH-1N helicopters that State had purchased from
Canada to support the counternarcotics brigade. The helicopters were
intended to serve as interim aircraft until the UH-60 and UH-II
helicopters funded by the United States as part of Plan Colombia were
delivered. The UH-1N helicopters were delivered in various stages
between November 1999 and March 2001.[Footnote 13] According to the
U.S. embassy, the helicopters flew their first mission in December
2000. Since then, the helicopters have flown 19,500 hours in combat and
have supported more than 430 counternarcotics operations for the
brigade. Although Colombian Army personnel are qualified as pilots and
mechanics, many of the experienced pilots and mechanics who operate and
maintain the helicopters are provided through a U.S.-funded contractor.
For example, 20 contractor personnel serve as pilots-in-command when
flying operations.
UH-60s:
With the $208 million provided as U.S. assistance under Plan Colombia
for UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters, State and Defense procured 14
helicopters, a 2-year spare parts package, and a 1-year contractor
support package. The helicopters were delivered between July 2001 and
December 2001. However, the helicopters did not begin to support
operations of the counternarcotics brigade until November 2002 because
of the lack of Colombian Army pilots who met the minimum qualifications
needed to operate the helicopters. Forty-two Colombian Army personnel
have completed the minimum UH-60 pilot training, 13 have qualified as
pilot-in-command. U.S.-funded contract pilots fill in as pilots-in-
command. In addition, a U.S.-funded contractor continues to maintain
the helicopters and provide maintenance training.
UH-IIs:
With the $60 million provided as U.S. assistance under Plan Colombia
for UH-II helicopters, State procured 25 aircraft. The original plan
was to deliver the UH-II helicopters to the Colombian Army between
November 2001 and June 2002. However, the 25 helicopters were delivered
between March 2002 and November 2002. This 5-month delay occurred
because the Colombian military considered using a different engine than
the one usually installed because it may have been easier to maintain.
After numerous discussions, Colombia decided to use the more commonly
used engine.
According to NAS officials, although some of the UH-II helicopters are
being used for missions, all the helicopters will not be operational
until June 2003. As of January 2003, 25 Colombian Army pilots had
completed their initial training and 21 of these pilots are completing
the training needed to qualify for operational missions. However,
contractor pilots continue to supplement Colombian Army pilots and a
U.S.-funded contractor continues to provide maintenance support.
Problems in Training Helicopter Pilots and Mechanics:
Although all the U.S.-provided helicopters are in Colombia, a number of
unanticipated problems were encountered in training Colombian Army
pilots and mechanics to operate and maintain the helicopters. Some of
these problems continue to limit the Colombian Army's ability to
operate and maintain the aircraft. Primarily, the Colombian Army will
have to continue to rely on contractor support because it will not have
enough trained pilots-in-command and senior mechanics for the
foreseeable future.
Funding for Initial Training Was Not Provided:
When the United States agreed to provide the UH-60 and UH-II
helicopters for the Colombian Army in July 2000, the assistance for
Plan Colombia did not include any funds to train the Colombian pilots
and mechanics needed to operate and maintain the helicopters. In
October 2000--about 3 months after passage of U.S. assistance for Plan
Colombia--State reported that, although the Colombian military had
qualified pilots and support personnel, it did not have the numbers of
personnel required to field and operate the new helicopters. State
requested that Defense provide the training needed for the pilots and
mechanics. Although Defense agreed to provide the training, it took an
additional 3 months to decide that the U.S. Army would be responsible
and to identify a funding source. In February 2001, Defense reported
that it would transfer up to $20 million from other counternarcotics
projects in Colombia for this training.
Training Has Not Been Completed:
A training plan was approved in mid-2001. Although the plan provided
training for Colombian Army personnel to meet the minimum
qualifications for a pilot and mechanic, it did not include the
additional training necessary to fly missions in a unit or to become a
senior mechanic. Basic training for 117 helicopter pilots--known as
initial entry rotary wing training--began in November 2001 and is
projected to be completed by December 2004. This training is intended
to provide a pool or pipeline of pilots for more advanced training to
fly specific helicopters. In addition, according to NAS officials, a
new pilot takes an average of 2 to 3 years to progress to pilot-in-
command.
* Specific UH-60 pilot training for 42 personnel began in August 2001
and was completed in September 2002.
* Specific UH-II pilot training for 75 personnel began in May 2002 and
is projected to be completed in December 2003.
In addition, according to NAS and U.S. contractor officials, 105 out of
159 Colombian Army personnel have completed the basic UH-60 and UH-II
maintenance training and are taking more advanced training to qualify
as senior mechanics. These officials told us that the remaining 54
personnel will receive the contractor-provided basic training in the
near future, but they did not know when it would begin. NAS and U.S.
contractor officials also told us that it typically takes 3 to 5 years
for mechanics to gain the experience necessary to become fully
qualified on specific helicopter systems, in particular the UH-60 Black
Hawks.
Colombian Army Support Is Limited:
The Colombian Army Aviation Battalion is responsible for providing
helicopters and other aircraft and personnel for all Colombian Army
missions with an aviation component, including counternarcotics and
counterinsurgency operations throughout Colombia. Information provided
by the Colombian Aviation Battalion shows that it is staffed at only 80
percent of its required levels and, over the past several years, it has
received between 60 percent to 70 percent of its requested budget for
logistics and maintenance. According to Colombian Army personnel,
current plans indicate that the missions the battalion needs to support
will be expanding, but they do not know if they will have sufficient
resources to meet these demands.
The decision by the Colombian military to continue using the UH-1N
helicopters in addition to the UH-60 and UH-II helicopters will make it
more difficult for the Aviation Battalion to provide the numbers of
personnel needed to operate and maintain the helicopters. State
originally intended that the UH-1N helicopters would only be used by
the counternarcotics brigade until the UH-60 and UH-II helicopters were
available to support operations. However, in 2002, the Colombian
military requested and received approval from the United States to
continue using these helicopters. NAS and Military Group officials
stated that this means the number of pilots and mechanics needed to
operate all the aircraft increases the total requirement for the
Aviation Battalion. For example, the battalion will have to have a
total of 84 additional Colombian Army personnel qualified to serve as
pilots-in-command (42) and co-pilots (42). Even though the U.S.-funded
contractor has trained Colombian Army personnel since the UH-1N's
initial delivery in 1999, only 61 Colombian Army personnel remain in
the program.
Trained Personnel Were Not Available:
According to bilateral agreements between Colombia and the United
States, the Colombian Army must ensure that pilots and mechanics who
receive U.S. training be assigned to positions using their training for
a minimum of 2 years. This has not always been the case. For example,
* According to U.S. embassy data, at least 105 Colombian Army personnel
have completed the basic helicopter maintenance course. As of January
2003, 65 of these individuals were scheduled to receive additional
training that would enable them to become fully qualified mechanics who
can perform maintenance without U.S.-contractor oversight. Of these, 22
had not reported for training. Neither the Military Group nor the
Aviation Battalion could provide us the location of these individuals.
* According to U.S. contractor personnel, at least 10 pilots-in-command
should be available to fly missions.[Footnote 14] Although 19 Colombian
Army personnel were qualified to serve as pilots-in-command on UH-1N
helicopters, as of January 2003, only one pilot was assigned to serve
in this position. The remaining nine pilots-in-command were provided by
the U.S. contractor. Again, neither the Military Group nor the Aviation
Battalion could provide us the location of these individuals.
Operations and Training Slowed for 5 Months:
Of the funds appropriated for fiscal year 2002, $140 million was used
to support Colombian Army counternarcotics efforts. Most of this went
to support U.S.-provided helicopter operations, maintenance,
logistical, and training support. However, not all the funding could be
released until the Secretary of State certified, in two separate
reports to appropriate congressional committees,[Footnote 15] that the
Colombian military was making progress meeting certain human rights
conditions. According to U.S. embassy political section personnel, they
encountered difficulties developing the information required to make
the human rights determination and certification. Because State was
late in providing these reports, the U.S. embassy could not use this
funding for operations and:
training on two occasions for a total of about 5 months during
2002.[Footnote 16] According to NAS, these delays resulted in fewer
counternarcotics operations and limited the training and experience
Colombian Army pilots could obtain to qualify as pilots-in-command.
Continued U.S. Support Needed to Sustain Operations:
U.S. assistance to support the helicopters provided as part of Plan
Colombia was originally planned to end in 2006 with the Colombian Army
taking over these responsibilities. However, NAS, Military Group, and
Colombian Army officials stated that a continued level of U.S.
contractor presence will be needed beyond this date because the
Aviation Battalion is not expected to have the personnel trained or the
resources necessary. Although Military Group officials stated that they
have not officially estimated what this assistance level will be, they
tentatively projected that it would cost between $100 million and
$150 million annually to sustain the U.S.-supported counternarcotics
programs. Moreover, other recently initiated U.S. programs will likely
require U.S. assistance and contractor support, but the long-term costs
of sustaining such programs are not known.
Infrastructure Units:
In 2002, the United States agreed to provide $104 million in training
and equipment to Colombian Army units whose primary mission is to
protect important infrastructure but whose initial mission is to
minimize terrorist attacks along 110 miles of the Cano Limon pipeline
in the Arauca department. The units will focus on patrolling,
reconnaissance, and immediate reaction in the area of the pipeline and
key facilities.
Of the $104 million, $6 million is for ongoing U.S. Special Forces
training and $98 million is for procuring 2 UH-60 and 4 UH-II
helicopters and associated training and ground support. NAS and
Military Group officials indicated that some level of contractor
support will likely be needed for the foreseeable future because the
Colombian Army Aviation Battalion does not have sufficient numbers of
trained pilots and mechanics to operate and maintain the helicopters.
Commando Battalion:
In 2002, the Colombian military decided to form a Commando Battalion
whose mission will be to conduct operations against high-value targets
including the capture of high-level leaders of insurgent and
paramilitary units. The United States has agreed to provide the
battalion with training and equipment. Although the costs of training
are not readily available, Military Group officials estimated that the
United States will provide about $5 million in equipment, including
weapons and ammunition, communication equipment, night-vision devices,
and other individual equipment.
Planning Assistance Teams:
Also in early 2003, the United States began assigning U.S. military
personnel to selected Colombian military units for up to 179 days.
These personnel advise the commander and help plan attacks on drug
trafficking and related insurgent targets. Military Group officials did
not know when--or if--personnel or funds would be approved for all the
planned teams because of other priorities, such as deployments to
Afghanistan and Iraq. According to Military Group officials, these
teams could cost about $8 million annually if all become operational.
Colombia's Aerial Eradication Program Has Had Mixed Results:
Since the early 1990s, State's Bureau for International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement Affairs (through the U.S. Embassy Bogotá NAS and the
bureau's Office of Aviation) has supported the Colombian National
Police's efforts to significantly reduce, if not eliminate, the
cultivation of coca and opium poppy. However, for the most part, the
net hectares of coca under cultivation in Colombia continued to rise
until 2002, and the net hectares of opium poppy under cultivation
remained relatively steady until 2001-02.[Footnote 17] In addition, the
U.S. Embassy Bogotá has made little progress in having the Colombian
National Police assume more responsibility for the aerial eradication
program, which requires costly U.S. contractor assistance to carry out.
:
Recent Progress in Reducing Net Cultivation of Coca and Poppy:
As shown in figure 2, the number of hectares under coca cultivation
rose more than threefold from 1995 to 2001--from 50,900 hectares to
169,800 hectares--despite substantially increased eradication
efforts.[Footnote 18] But in 2002, the Office of Aviation estimated
that the program eradicated 102,225 hectares of coca--a record high. In
March 2003, the Office of National Drug Control Policy reported for the
first time since before 1995 a net reduction in coca cultivation in
Colombia--from 169,800 hectares to 144,450 hectaresća 15 percent
decline.
Figure 2: Net Hectares of Coca under Cultivation and Hectares
Eradicated in Colombia, 1995-2002:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
As shown in figure 3, the net hectares of opium poppy under cultivation
varied between 6,100 and 6,600 for the period 1995-98 but rose to 7,500
hectares in 1999 and 2000. In 2001, the net hectares of poppy estimated
under cultivation declined to 6,500 and, in 2002, further declined to
4,900--nearly a 35 percent reduction in net cultivation over the past 2
years.
Figure 3: Net Hectares of Poppy under Cultivation and Hectares
Eradicated in Colombia, 1995-2002:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
NAS and Office of Aviation officials attributed the recent
unprecedented reductions in both coca and poppy cultivation primarily
to the current Colombian government's willingness to allow the aerial
eradication program to operate in all areas of the country. They also
noted that:
* the number of spray aircraft had increased from 10 in July 2001 to 17
in January 2003;
* recently acquired spray aircraft can carry up to twice the herbicide
as the older aircraft; and:
* as of January 2003, aircraft were flying spray missions from three
forward operating locations--a first for the program, according to NAS
officials.
The ability to keep an increased number of spray aircraft operating out
of three bases was made possible, at least in part, because NAS hired a
contractor to work with the Colombian National Police to, among other
things, help maintain their aircraft. As a result, the availability of
the police aircraft needed for the spray program increased. Moreover,
in August 2002, the Colombian government allowed the police to return
to a higher strength herbicide mixture which, according to NAS
officials, improved the spray's effectiveness.[Footnote 19] NAS
officials project that the aerial eradication program can reduce the
amount of coca and poppy cultivation to 30,000 hectares and 5,000
hectares, respectively, by 2005 or 2006, assuming the police continue
the current pace and can spray in all areas of Colombia.
Colombian National Police Have Not Assumed Control over Aerial
Eradication Operations:
As we reported in 2000,[Footnote 20] beginning in 1998, U.S. embassy
officials became concerned with the rising U.S. presence in Colombia
and associated costs of the aerial eradication program. At the time,
the embassy began developing a 3-year plan to have the Colombian
National Police assume increased operational control over the program.
But for various reasons, the police never agreed to the plan. Since
then, contractor involvement and the associated costs have continued to
rise and the Colombian National Police are not yet able to assume more
control of the aerial eradication program.
As shown in table 2, in fiscal year 1998, the Office of Aviation
reported that the direct cost for the U.S. contractor providing
aircraft maintenance and logistical support and many of the pilots was
$37.8 million. In addition, NAS provided $10.7 million for fuel,
herbicide, and related support for a total of $48.5 million. For fiscal
year 2003, the comparable estimates for contractor and NAS-provided
support were $41.5 million and $44.8 million, respectively, for a total
of $86.3 million. Most of this increase occurred between fiscal years
2002 and 2003 to support the additional spray aircraft, multiple
operating locations, and the anticipated continuation of spray
operations throughout Colombia. According to NAS and Office of Aviation
officials, these costs are expected to remain relatively constant for
the next several years.
Table 2: U.S. Support for the Aerial Eradication Program, Fiscal Years
1998-2004:
Dollars in millions.
Office of Aviation; Fiscal years: 1998: $37.8;
Fiscal years: 1999: $36.8;
Fiscal years: 2000: $52.5[A];
Fiscal years: 2001: $38.0;
Fiscal years: 2002: $38.2;
Fiscal years: 2003: (estimated): $41.5;
Fiscal years: 2004: (proposed): $45.0; Total: $289.8.
Narcotics Affairs Section; Fiscal years: 1998: 10.7;
Fiscal years: 1999: 14.1;
Fiscal years: 2000: 20.9;
Fiscal years: 2001: 11.1;
Fiscal years: 2002: 17.6;
Fiscal years: 2003: (estimated): 44.8[B];
Fiscal years: 2004: (proposed): 44.2;
Total: $163.4.
Total; Fiscal years: 1998: $48.5;
Fiscal years: 1999: $50.9;
Fiscal years: 2000: $73.4;
Fiscal years: 2001: $49.1;
Fiscal years: 2002: $55.8;
Fiscal years: 2003: (estimated): $86.3;
Fiscal years: 2004: (proposed): $89.2;
Total: $453.2.
Source: U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics
and Law Enforcement Affairs and the Office of Aviation.
[A] Includes $20 million for additional spray aircraft.
[B] In addition, NAS paid $38.8 million for a contractor to support the
Colombian National Police Aviation Service. NAS could not readily
identify the proportion of this contract that is related to aerial
eradication. NAS officials stated that they expect this expenditure to
continue for the next 2 years and possibly up to 4 years.
[End of table]
The Colombian National Police do not provide funding per se for the
aerial eradication program and, therefore, the value of its
contributions are more difficult to quantify. In recent years, the
police have provided helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft for spray
mission support and the use of many of its facilities throughout
Colombia. In addition, the police have about 3,600 personnel assigned
to counternarcotics missions and estimate that 84 are directly
supporting the aerial eradication program.
U.S. Efforts to Improve Police Capacity for Aerial Eradication:
To help the Colombian National Police increase its capacity to assume
more responsibility for the aerial eradication program, NAS has
initiated several efforts. In addition to hiring a contractor to help
with the Aviation Service's operations, NAS has initiated a program to
train T-65 spray plane pilots and plans to begin training search and
rescue personnel so they can accompany the aerial eradication missions.
NAS officials stated that the contractor presence should decline and
the police should be able to take over more of the eradication program
by 2006, when NAS estimates that coca and poppy cultivation will be
reduced to "maintenance levels"--30,000 hectares and 5,000 hectares,
respectively.
Aviation Service Operations:
In February and March 2002, the Office of Aviation conducted an
Aviation Resource Management Survey of the Colombian National Police
Aviation Service.[Footnote 21] According to Office of Aviation
officials, these surveys are intended to provide a stringent on-site
assessment of flight operations from management and safety to logistics
and maintenance. The study noted that the Aviation Service has some
unique circumstances that have made its operations difficult to manage.
In particular, it grew from 579 personnel in 1995 to 1,232 in 2002 and
operates 8 different types of rotary-wing and 9 different types of
fixed-wing aircraft. Nevertheless, the team made a number of critical
observations. For example,
* The Aviation Service's organizational structure, lines of authority,
and levels of responsibility were not clear. In most cases, only the
commanding general was allowed to commit resources and make operational
decisions. This reliance on an overly centralized command structure
resulted in unnecessary delays and, NAS officials told us, the
cancellation of some planned aerial eradication missions because the
commanding general could not be reached.
* The Aviation Service did not have a formal flying hour program. A
flying hour program is used to forecast budgetary requirements. It
takes into account the operational use and training requirements for
each aircraft and the various missions it performs and equates each
flight hour to a cost average for fuel and spare parts, which
constitute the majority of an aviation organization's annual expenses.
The lack of a flying hour program has prevented the police from more
accurately forecasting budgetary requirements. Moreover, according to
NAS, maintenance scheduling is enhanced when the number of flight hours
can be projected, which contributes to higher aircraft availability
rates.
* About 35 percent of the maintenance staff were inexperienced.
According to the survey team, this could result in improper maintenance
procedures being performed, which could adversely affect flight safety
and endanger lives. In addition, all locations the team visited had
deficiencies in standard maintenance procedures and practices. For
example, the survey team found that a UH-60 Black Hawk with gunshot
damage to a fuel cell was used in several local area flights. While
fuel cells are self-sealing to enable an aircraft to return to base for
repairs after sustaining damage, aircraft are not supposed to be
routinely flown in this condition.
* Management of items needing repair and control of spare parts was
deficient. The survey team found 236 items awaiting repair--some from
August 1998. The team also found more than $4 million in UH-1H
helicopter blades and parts stored outside and unprotected.
* The Aviation Service's safety program did not have formal risk
management practices to ensure that all risk factors--such as weather,
crew experience, and mission complexity--are taken into account. In
addition, the team observed a majority of helicopter gunners failing to
take basic safety precautions, such as ensuring that their machine guns
and mini-guns were rendered harmless when personnel were around the
aircraft, especially during refueling and rearming operations.
To help correct these and other deficiencies, the survey team made
numerous recommendations for specific improvements. Overall, the team
rated the Aviation Service's operational and maintenance procedures as
poor but concluded that it had an excellent chance for improvement over
the next 2 to 3 years due to the dedication of its young officers.
As a result of the survey, in July 2002, a NAS contractor (a $38.8
million, 1-year contract with options for 4 additional years) began
providing on-the-job maintenance and logistical training to the
Aviation Service and helping the police address many of the issues
raised by the Aviation Resource Management Survey team. NAS officials
already noted that a more formal flying hour program has improved the
availability rates of many of the aircraft in the Aviation Service's
inventory. For example, the availability rate of the Aviation Service's
UH-II helicopters--often used to support aerial eradication missions--
increased from 67 percent in January 2002 to 87 percent in December
2002. Similar improvements also occurred for other Aviation Service
aircraft, such as UH-60 Black Hawk and Bell 212 helicopters. According
to NAS, the improved availability rates made it easier to schedule and
conduct spray missions.
T-65 Pilot Training:
According to NAS officials, the police managed the T-65 pilot program
prior to July 2002, but the police repeatedly violated Office of
Aviation standard operating procedures by requiring pilots to fly
without adequate rest and in poor weather. As a result, NAS took
tighter control of the program in April 2003. As currently planned, the
program will train 21 Colombian pilots, 4 of whom will eventually be
hired to fly the T-65s. The training will enable pilots to fly T-65
spray missions in both flat and mountainous areas.
Search and Rescue Training:
NAS is also planning to initiate a program in mid-2003 to standardize
and modernize the police's search and rescue capabilities. Currently,
the Office of Aviation contractor provides all search and rescue
coverage for the aerial eradication program. The training will make it
possible for the police to provide search and rescue coverage for some
spray missions by standardizing its operating procedures to make them
compatible with the Office of Aviation's. The program will also allow
the police to replace much of its current equipment, which is
antiquated or not standard. According to NAS officials, the program
should be fully operational in about a year and self-sufficient in
about 3 to 5 years.
Financial and Management Challenges Continue to Complicate Efforts to
Reduce Illicit Drug Activities:
The U.S.-supported counternarcotics program in Colombia has recently
begun to achieve some of the results envisioned in 1999-2000. However,
Colombia and the United States must continue to deal with financial and
management challenges. In addition, Colombia faces continuing
challenges associated with its long-standing insurgency. Moreover, for
U.S. assistance to continue, Colombia needs to ensure that the army and
police comply with human rights standards, that the aerial eradication
program meets certain environmental conditions, and that alternative
development is provided in areas subject to aerial eradication.
Performance Measures and Specific Time Frames Have Not Been Developed:
In 2000, we noted that the Colombian government had not finalized plans
for funding, sequencing, and managing activities included in Plan
Colombia and that State and Defense had not completed their
implementation plans to support Plan Colombia. We concluded that if
Colombia or the United States did not follow through on its portion of
Plan Colombia, including identifying sources of funding, Plan Colombia
could not succeed as envisioned.[Footnote 22] Nearly 3 years later,
Colombia and the United States still have not defined performance
measures or identified specific time frames for completing ongoing
counternarcotics programs.
After the new Colombian administration was inaugurated in August 2002,
it drafted a National Security Strategy to define Colombia's vital
interests, principal threats, and short-and long-term objectives.
According to State officials, as of April 2003, the National Security
Strategy had not been finalized and was being held up while the
Colombian military and police complete their strategy for dealing with
the insurgents, including reclaiming the insurgent-controlled areas of
Colombia and stemming illicit drug activities.
As for the United States, we were told that in 2002, the President
tasked State to prepare a comprehensive, fully integrated political-
military implementation plan to reflect appropriate U.S. support for
Colombia's National Security Strategy. The plan is supposed to include
a statement of the overall mission, goals, objectives, performance
standards, timelines, measures of effectiveness, and desired end state
and outcomes. However, according to State officials, development of
this plan has not begun because Colombia has not released its National
Security Strategy and the related military and police strategy.
Colombian Financial Resources Are Limited:
Under the original concept of Plan Colombia, the Colombian government
pledged $4 billion and called on the international community to provide
$3.5 billion. Until recently, Colombia had not provided any significant
new funding for Plan Colombia and, according to U.S. embassy and
Colombian government officials, anticipated international assistance
for Plan Colombia--apart from that provided by the United States--did
not materialize as envisioned. But because of overall poor economic
conditions, the government of Colombia's ability to contribute more is
limited.
Since 1999, a combination of domestic and foreign events has limited
Colombia's economic growth. Domestically, insurgent and paramilitary
organizations remained active and derailed the peace process. According
to the International Monetary Fund, the insurgency's threats and
attacks displaced thousands of people, hindered investment, affected
oil production, and forced the government to increase military
expenditures. Externally, the price of coffee--a traditionally major
Colombian export--reached historically low levels, trade with some
neighboring countries fell as their economies under performed, and
foreign private financing to Colombia was limited by the continuing
insurgency and political developments in the region during 2002. By
mid-2002, Colombian finance officials estimated that Colombia's
economic growth was below 2 percent and its combined public sector
deficit would likely exceed 5 percent of gross domestic product.
In August 2002, the new Colombian administration announced a series of
decrees and proposals to increase defense expenditures and strengthen
the overall economy. Initially, the administration issued a decree
establishing a one-time tax on wealth that was supposed to raise about
$860 million. According to State, about $320 million of this amount
would likely be spent on the military. To help maintain this increased
revenue, the administration also submitted to the Colombian Congress a
package of economic and administrative reforms. Most were approved in
December 2002, but some reforms also require approval through a public
referendum planned for later in 2003. The overall reform program calls
for tax measures to raise revenues and a freeze on most current
expenditures for 2 years. In addition, structural reforms, particularly
changes in the government pension system and organizational
streamlining, are planned to reduce expenditures.[Footnote 23]
However, passage of the reforms subject to referendum is far from
certain and, according to U.S. Embassy Bogotá and Colombian government
officials, Colombia's ability to provide additional funding to sustain
the counternarcotics programs without a greatly improved economy is
virtually nonexistent.
Insurgency and Human Rights Conditions Complicate Counternarcotics
Efforts:
The Colombian government has stated that ending the civil conflict is
central to solving Colombia's problems--from improving economic
conditions to stemming illicit drug activities. A peaceful resolution
to the long-standing insurgency would help stabilize the nation, speed
economic recovery, help ensure the protection of human rights, and
restore the authority and control of the Colombian government in the
coca-growing regions. The continuing violence limits the government's
ability to institute economic, social, and political improvements.
:
The Colombian government has stated that it is committed to protecting
the human rights of its citizens. State and Defense officials
reiterated that they will not assist those who violate the basic tenets
of human rights, and State officials said they will apply the strictest
human rights standards before approving the provision of assistance to
Colombian military and police units. Nevertheless, human rights
organizations continue to allege that individuals in the Colombian
armed forces have been involved with or condoned human rights
violations and that they do so with impunity. If this is the case,
Colombia's failure to adhere to U.S. human rights policies could delay
or derail planned counternarcotics activities.
The appropriations act for fiscal year 2003 makes $700 million
available for Colombia and other Andean ridge countries, but it imposed
some restrictions on the availability of 25 percent of the funds
provided for the Colombian armed forces until the Secretary of State
makes certain certifications. The Secretary of State must certify that
Colombia's armed forces are making progress in meeting human rights
standards and, among other things, executing orders to capture
paramilitary leaders to lift the restriction on 12.5 percent of the
funds. To obligate the remaining 12.5 percent, the Secretary must
certify after July 31, 2003, that Colombia continues to make progress
in meeting the conditions in the initial certification.[Footnote 24]
Environmental and Alternative Development Conditions May Limit Aerial
Eradication Efforts:
The appropriations act for fiscal year 2003 also requires that the
aerial eradication program meet certain environmental conditions in its
use of herbicide and that alternative development programs be available
in the areas affected by the spray program. Otherwise, funds provided
in the act that are used to purchase herbicide for the aerial
eradication program may not be spent. State officials are still trying
to determine the ramifications of the restrictions, but State and NAS
officials are concerned that these requirements could delay funding
needed to purchase herbicide and result in a temporary suspension of
the program, making it more difficult for the program to achieve its
ambitious goals. Such a suspension would also likely undermine the
progress made in 2002 by allowing the coca and poppy farmers to
reestablish their fields.
The 2003 appropriations act's environmental conditions require the
Secretary of State, after consultation with the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), to certify that (1) the
herbicide mixture is being used in accordance with EPA requirements,
the Colombian Environmental Management Plan, and any additional
controls that EPA may recommend; (2) the mixture does not pose
unreasonable risks or adverse effects to humans or the environment; and
(3) complaints of harm to health or licit crops are evaluated and fair
compensation is paid for meritorious claims.[Footnote 25] According to
NAS and Office of Aviation officials, similar conditions in the fiscal
year 2002 appropriations act almost resulted in a suspension of the
aerial eradication program in October 2002 because of delays in
finalizing the required reports. The program was able to continue
operations by using prior-year funds but, at one point, had only a 10-
day supply of herbicide available.
The 2003 appropriations act's alternative development conditions
require that, in areas[Footnote 26] where security permits, USAID,
Colombian government, or other organizations implement alternative
development programs for small growers whose coca and poppy plants are
targeted for spraying. According to State, NAS, and USAID officials,
alternative development programs are not being implemented in all the
specific areas sprayed because of concerns about physical security and
the economic feasibility of implementing such programs in some
locations.
As of March 31, 2003, USAID reported accrued expenditures of about
$51.6 million for alternative development projects and projected that
expenditures for April through June 2003 would exceed $13.5 million.
USAID officials also said that the agency had 247 alternative
development projects benefiting more than 22,800 families in
9 departments where coca or opium poppy are grown.
Conclusions:
Colombia is a long-time ally and significant trading partner of the
United States; therefore, its economic and political stability is
important to the United States as well as the Andean region. Colombia's
long-standing insurgency and the insurgents' links to the illicit drug
trade complicate its efforts to tap its natural resources and make
systemic economic reforms. Solving these problems is important to
Colombia's future stability.
Colombia and the United States continue to face financial and
management challenges in implementing and sustaining counternarcotics
and counter-insurgency programs in Colombia. Neither the Colombian Army
nor the Colombian National Police have the capacity to manage ongoing
counternarcotics programs without continued U.S. funding and contractor
support. Colombia's financial resources are limited and its economy is
weak and thus will need U.S. assistance for the foreseeable future.
According to U.S. embassy officials, these programs alone may cost up
to $230 million per year, and future costs for some recently initiated
army and police programs have not been determined. In addition, we note
that this estimate does not include future funding needed for other
U.S. programs in Colombia, including other aerial and ground
interdiction efforts; the police Aviation Service's U.S.-funded
contractor; and alternative development, judicial sector reform, and
internally displaced persons programs.
In recent years, world events--from the global war on terrorism to the
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq--have diverted scarce U.S. resources and
made it paramount that the United States fully consider the resources
committed to its overseas assistance programs. As we noted in 2000, the
total costs of the counternarcotics programs in Colombia were unknown.
Nearly 3 years later, the Departments of State and Defense have still
not developed estimates of future program costs, defined their future
roles in Colombia, identified a proposed end state, or determined how
they plan to achieve it.
Recommendation for Executive Action:
Because Colombia continues to face serious obstacles in substantially
curtailing illicit narcotics activities and resolving its long-standing
insurgency, we recommend that the Secretary of State, in consultation
with the Secretary of Defense, examine the U.S. assistance programs to
the Colombian Army and the Colombian National Police to (1) establish
clear objectives for the programs reflecting these obstacles and (2)
estimate future annual funding requirements for U.S. support. This
analysis should designate specific performance measures for assessing
progress, define the roles of U.S. personnel and contractors, and
develop a timeline for achieving the stated objectives. The Secretary
should provide this information to the Congress for consideration in
the fiscal year 2005 appropriations cycle.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
State and Defense provided written comments on a draft of this report.
See appendixes I and II, respectively.
Both concurred with our recommendation. State said it very much agreed
with the overall findings and, in particular, the recognition that
continued U.S. programs will be needed for the foreseeable future to
sustain operations in Colombia and achieve U.S. foreign policy goals.
It further said that the time is appropriate for a comprehensive review
of U.S. programs with the Colombian Army and the Colombian National
Police and intends to address our recommendation for providing key
program information to the Congress beginning in the fiscal year 2005
appropriations cycle. Defense stated that it would work with State to
establish clear objectives and would coordinate with State and other
agencies involved to develop performance measures. Defense added that,
once performance measures are established, it would augment staff at
the U.S. Embassy Bogotá Military Group to collect information for
measuring progress.
Scope and Methodology:
To determine the status of U.S. counternarcotics assistance provided to
the Colombian Army in fiscal years 2000-03, and how this assistance has
been used, we reviewed pertinent planning, implementation, and related
documentation and met with cognizant U.S. officials at the Departments
of State and Defense, Washington, D.C.; the U.S. Southern Command
headquarters, Miami, Florida; and the U.S. Embassy in Bogotá, Colombia.
We also met with U.S.-funded contractor representatives at various
Colombian Army bases; the Colombian Army Aviation Battalion commander
and his staff at Tolemaida; and the counternarcotics brigade commander
and his staff at Larandia and Tres Esquinas. In addition, we observed a
Colombian Army counternarcotics brigade airlift operation.
To determine what the U.S.-supported Colombian National Police aerial
eradication program has accomplished in recent years, we reviewed
pertinent documentation and met with cognizant officials at the
Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs in Washington, D.C., and the Office of Aviation
headquarters office at Patrick Air Force Base, Florida. In Colombia, we
met with Office of Aviation officials and contractor representatives at
the Office of Aviation headquarters office at the El Dorado
International Airport in Bogotá; the Colombian National Police base at
Guaymaral; and operational sites at Larandia, San Jose del Guaviare,
Santa Ana, and Villa Garzon in the primary coca-growing regions of
Colombia. We also met with the Colombian National Police deputy
commander and other police officials. In addition, we observed several
aerial eradication operations--from loading the herbicide and refueling
the spray planes to the actual spray missions.
To determine what challenges Colombia and the United States face in
sustaining these programs, we met with numerous U.S. and Colombian
officials to obtain their views on the issues discussed in this report.
In Colombia, we interviewed U.S. embassy officials, including the
Ambassador; Deputy Chief of Mission; and others from the Narcotics
Affairs Section, the Military Group, the U.S. Agency for International
Development, and the Drug Enforcement Administration. We also
interviewed Colombian Army, police, and other government officials,
including officials from the Colombian Ministries of Defense and
Finance and Colombia's National Planning Department.
We conducted our work between July 2002 and May 2003 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
:
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days
from the date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies of this
report to the interested congressional committees and the Secretaries
of State and Defense. We will also make copies available to others upon
request. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on the
GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
call me at (202) 512-4268 or contact me at FordJ@gao.gov. An additional
contact and staff acknowledgments are listed in appendix III.
Jess T. Ford,
Director
International Affairs and Trade:
Signed by Jess T. Ford:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of State:
United States Department of State Washington, D. C. 20520:
Dear Ms. Westin:
We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "DRUG
CONTROL: Specific Performance Measures and Long-term Costs for U.S.
Programs in Colombia Have not Been Developed," GAO-03-783, GAO Job Code
320135.
The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.
If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact
Stuart Lippe, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, at (202) 647-4208.
Sincerely,
Christopher B. Burnham
Assistant Secretary and Chief Financial Officer:
Enclosure:
As stated.
cc: GAO/IAT - Al Huntington State/OIG - Luther Atkins State/WHA - J.
Curtis Struble State/INL - Paul E. Simons:
Ms. Susan S. Westin, Managing Director, International Affairs and
Trade, U.S. General Accounting Office.
Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report DRUG CONTROL: Specific
Performance Measures and Long-term Costs for U.S. Programs in Colombia
Have not Been Developed, (GAO-03-783, Job Code 320135):
We appreciate having had the opportunity to meet with the GAO team led
by Mr. A. H. Huntington and to review your draft report: Drug Control:
Specific Performance Measures:
and Long-term Costs for U.S. Programs in Colombia Have not Been
Developed, (GAO-03-783, GAO Code 320135). That report assesses
developments since the October 2000 GAO report Drug Control: U.S.
Assistance to Colombia Will Take Years to Produce Results, (GAO Job
Code 711503).
The Department of State very much agrees with the overall findings,
and, in particular, the recognition that continued U.S. programs will
be needed for the foreseeable future to sustain operations to support
Plan Colombia and achieve U.S. policy goals.
Those policy goals were described in the Department's December 3, 2002,
report to Congress on "United States Policy Towards Colombia and Other
Related Issues" as:
"U.S. policy towards Colombia supports the Colombian Government's
efforts to strengthen its democratic institutions, promote respect for
human rights and the rule of law, intensify counter-narcotics efforts,
foster socio-economic development, address immediate humanitarian
needs, and end the threats to democracy posed by narcotics trafficking
and terrorism.":
That report also described the challenges Colombia faces and some of
the progress achieved, as well as benchmarks to be accomplished.
In a dynamic and challenging situation such as that confronting
Colombia, the development of program plans and funding requirements is
an evolving process. With that in mind, our performance measures and
cost expectations have been shared with Congress. Since the beginning
of U.S. support to Plan Colombia in 2000, the Department of State,
through reports such as that described above, as well as the annual
budget processes, required Congressional:
Notifications, formal testimony, and numerous briefings, has sought to
keep the Congress informed of plans and requirements to achieve our
policy goals and to work closely to include and address Congressional
concerns and desires. The Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary and
the Under Secretary for Political Affairs and appropriate Assistant
Secretaries have been active in responding to Congress and providing
information on planned future programs and their costs.
Nearly three years into our support for Plan Colombia, it is now
appropriate for a more comprehensive review, just as GAO recommends.
The Department of State concurs with:
the GAO's recommendation, that "the Secretary of State, in consultation
with the Secretary of Defense, establish clear objectives, including
developing specific performance measures, and estimate future U.S.
funding requirements for the programs with the Colombian Army and the
Colombian National Police." It is our intention to provide this
information on a multi-year basis to the Congress for consideration
beginning in the fiscal year 2005 appropriations cycle.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2500:
SPECIAL OPERATIONS/ LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT:
Mr. Jess T. Ford:
Director, International Affairs and Trade U.S. General Accounting
Office:
441 G Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Ford:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report, "Drug Control: Specific Performance Measures and Long-term
Costs for U.S. Programs in Colombia Have not Been Developed," dated May
15, 2003 (GAO Code 320135/GAO-03-783).
The DoD reviewed the draft report and concurs with the recommendations.
Specific comments for each recommendation are enclosed. My action
officer for this is Mr. Robert Vierkant, (703) 697-5752,
robert.vierkant(a),osd.mil.
We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the draft report.
Sincerely,
Andre D. Hollis:
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counterncarcotics:
Signed by Andre D. Hollis:
Enclosure: As stated:
GAO DRAFT REPORT - DATED MAY 15, 2003 GAO CODE 320135/GAO-03-783:
"DRUG CONTROL: SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE MEASURES AND LONG-TERM COSTS FOR
U.S. PROGRAMS IN COLOMBIA HAVE NOT BEEN DEVELOPED":
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DoD) COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATION:
RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of State
(DoS), in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, examine the U.S.
assistance programs to the Colombian Army and the Colombian National
Police to:
Establish clear objectives for the programs reflecting the obstacles of
substantially curtailing illicit narcotics activities and resolving its
long-standing insurgency. (Page 33 of draft report).
DOD RESPONSE: Concur. DoD is prepared to work with DoS to establish
clear program objectives. The Government of Colombia is working on a
National Security Strategy, which should be the base document from
which program objectives can be produced. Once clear objectives have
been established, DoD will fully coordinate with DoS and the
interagency on establishing performance measures for counternarcotics
programs in Colombia. DoD will also establish an augmentee at the
Military Group in Bogota to collect performance measures, once
established.
RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of State, in
consultation with the Secretary of Defense, examine the U.S. assistance
programs to the Colombian Army and the Colombian National Police to:
Estimate future annual funding requirements for U.S. support. (Page 33
of draft report).
DOD RESPONSE: Concur. DoD does estimate future annual funding
requirements for support to Colombia. An additional $25M has been
identified to support the sustainment of Colombia programs in FY2004
through 2009.
A team from the United States Southern Command travels to Colombia
several times a year to assess future funding requirements with the
Country Team. From this assessment and other information, DoD develops
a funding plan.
Over the past two years, DoD coordinated Colombia funding requirements
with DoS. Coordination meetings with DoS are held quarterly to review
Colombia program funding requirements. The last meeting was held April
21, 2003 and reviewed DoD counternarcotics funding, DoS/INL funding,
and Foreign Military Financing (FMF) for Colombia through FY05. We will
continue this funding estimate and coordination process.
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact: A.H. Huntington, III (202) 512-4140
Acknowledgments: In addition to the above named individual, Jocelyn
Cortese, Allen Fleener, Ronald Hughes, Jose Pena, George Taylor, Kaya
Taylor, and Janey Cohen. Rick Barrett and Ernie Jackson provided
technical assistance.
[End of section]
FOOTNOTES
[1] Although the government of Colombia announced Plan Colombia in
1999, U.S. funding for counternarcotics purposes was not approved until
July 2000, leading to some uncertainty about when the 6-year goal was
to be achieved. The current Colombian government has announced that it
intends to eliminate coca cultivation by August 2006.
[2] For a more complete explanation of U.S. assistance originally
planned for Plan Colombia, see our report titled Drug Control: U.S.
Assistance to Colombia Will Take Years to Produce Results, GAO-01-26
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 17, 2000).
[3] The United States has supported alternative development programs in
Colombia, but because of the lack of security in the illicit-drug
growing regions, these efforts have been slow to get started. See our
report titled Drug Control: Efforts to Develop Alternatives to Illicit
Crops in Colombia Have Made Little Progress and Face Serious Obstacles,
GAO-02-291 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 8, 2002).
[4] The leaves of the coca plant are the raw ingredient of cocaine, and
opium poppy is used to produce heroin.
[5] The aerial eradication program involves spraying the coca and poppy
plants from low-flying airplanes with an herbicide that attacks the
root system and kills the plant.
[6] GAO-01-26.
[7] Under the original concept of Plan Colombia, the Colombian
government pledged $4 billion and called on the international community
to provide $3.5 billion.
[8] Estimates of the amount of cocaine produced in Colombia have almost
tripled since 1995--from 230 metric tons to 730 metric tons in 2001.
[9] The 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act for Further Recovery From
and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States (P.L. 107-206,
Aug. 2, 2002). Similar language was included in the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (P.L. 107-306, Nov. 27, 2002)
for intelligence assistance provided in fiscal years 2002 and 2003 as
well as any unobligated funds available to the intelligence community
for prior fiscal years.
[10] Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (P.L. 108-7, Feb. 20, 2003).
[11] Hydrochloride laboratories are used in the final stages of
processing coca into cocaine and are considered high-value targets.
[12] Of the 33 UH-IN helicopters, 28 remain available for use by the
counternarcotics brigade. One crashed on a mission and four were
transferred to support the aerial eradication program.
[13] State sent 18 helicopters prior to the approval of U.S. assistance
for Plan Colombia. Plan Colombia provided $60 million to complete the
delivery and support of the remaining 15 helicopters.
[14] Although 14 helicopters are available for operations during a
given time period, 10 or fewer are typically used to support an
operation.
[15] Section 567 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and
Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2002 (P.L. 107-115). Specifically,
the act provided that not more than 60 percent of the funds could be
obligated until after the Secretary of State made a determination and
certification that the Colombian Military was (1) suspending members of
the Colombian Armed Forces who have been creditably alleged to have
committed gross violations of human rights, (2) cooperating with
civilian prosecutors and investigators, and (3) severing links between
the Armed Forces and paramilitary groups. In addition, the remaining
40 percent of the funds could be obligated only after June 1, 2002, and
after the Secretary of State made a second determination and
certification with respect to the same conditions.
[16] The first report was issued on May 1, 2002--almost 2 months later
than State's target date. The second report was issued on September 9,
2002--almost 3 months later than State's target date.
[17] The estimates of net hectares of coca and opium poppy under
cultivation are prepared annually by the U.S. Director of Central
Intelligence, Crime and Narcotics Center. See also our report Drug
Control: Coca Cultivation and Eradication Estimates in Colombia, GAO-
03-319R (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 8, 2003).
[18] The number of hectares eradicated is provided by the Office of
Aviation and is based on the number of net hectares sprayed multiplied
by an estimated "kill rate." Although many thousands of hectares of
coca and poppy are killed, coca and poppy farmers often replant in the
same or other areas, which helps explain why the number of hectares
under cultivation often does not decline.
[19] In March 2002, the previous Colombian government reduced the
strength of the spray mixture because of environmental concerns.
[20] GAO-01-26.
[21] At about the same time, State began an investigation into a
reported diversion of $2 million in U.S. funding for the police.
According to NAS officials, the police had resisted having the Aviation
Resource Management Survey done until news of the alleged diversion
became public.
[22] GAO-01-26.
[23] Colombia also entered into an arrangement with the International
Monetary Fund in January 2003. The fund agreed to provide $2.1 billion
in stand-by credit through 2004 based on the reforms taken and
proposed. However, Colombian finance officials said they do not intend
to draw on these funds.
[24] P.L. 108-7, the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003.
[25] In addition, the conference report accompanying the legislation
directs the Secretary of State to submit a report, no later than 90
days after enactment, describing (1) the steps the department is taking
to enhance environmental safeguards of the fumigation program,
including implementing the recommendations of the EPA in a separate
fiscal year 2002 fumigation report; (2) the department's plan to
conduct an independent, long-term program to monitor the health and
environmental effects of the fumigation program, including conducting
soil and water tests in areas sprayed, toxicity tests on the spray
formulation, and ground verification missions to evaluate over spray;
and (3) steps taken to implement environmental training programs for
spray pilots.
[26] The term "areas" is not defined in the legislation. State is in
the process of creating guidelines for implementing and complying with
the act.
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