Drug Control
Financial and Management Challenges Continue to Complicate Efforts to Reduce Illicit Drug Activities in Colombia
Gao ID: GAO-03-820T June 3, 2003
The United States has been providing assistance to Colombia since the early 1970s to help reduce illicit drugs. In 1999, the Colombian government introduced Plan Colombia--program that, among other things, proposed reducing illicit drug activities by 50 percent over 6 years. In fiscal years 2000-03 alone, the United States provided more than $2.5 billion in counternarcotics assistance. Despite this aid, Colombia remains the world's leading producer and distributor of cocaine and a major source of the heroin used in the United States. This testimony discusses the status of U.S. counternarcotics assistance to the Colombian Army and for a U.S.-supported Colombian police aerial eradication program. It also addresses challenges Colombia and the United States face in sustaining these programs.
In fiscal years 2000-03, the United States provided about $640 million in assistance to train and equip a Colombian Army counternarcotics brigade and supply the army with 72 helicopters and related support. Most of this assistance has been delivered and is being used for counternarcotics operations. In recent years, the Colombian National Police aerial eradication program has had mixed results. Since 1995, coca cultivation rose in every year until 2002 and opium poppy cultivation remained relatively steady until 2001. But, for 2002, the U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy reported that net coca cultivation in Colombia decreased 15 percent and net opium poppy cultivation decreased 25 percent--the second yearly decline in a row. U.S. officials attributed this success primarily to the Colombian government's willingness to eradicate coca and poppy plants without restriction. Although the U.S.-supported counternarcotics program in Colombia has recently begun to achieve some of the results envisioned in Plan Colombia, Colombia and the United States must continue to deal with financial and management challenges. Neither the Colombian Army nor the Colombian National Police can sustain ongoing counternarcotics programs without continued U.S. funding and contractor support for the foreseeable future. According to U.S. embassy officials, these programs alone may cost up to $230 million per year, and future costs for some other programs have not been determined. Because of overall poor economic conditions, the government of Colombia's ability to contribute more is limited, but the continuing violence from Colombia's long-standing insurgency limits the government's ability to institute economic, social, and political improvements. Moreover, Colombia faces continuing challenges associated with the need to ensure it complies with human rights standards and other requirements in order for U.S. assistance to continue. As GAO noted in 2000, the total costs of the counternarcotics programs in Colombia were unknown. Nearly 3 years later, the Departments of State and Defense have still not developed estimates of future program costs, defined their future roles in Colombia, identified a proposed end state, or determined how they plan to achieve it.
GAO-03-820T, Drug Control: Financial and Management Challenges Continue to Complicate Efforts to Reduce Illicit Drug Activities in Colombia
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Testimony:
Before the Caucus on International Narcotics Control, U.S. Senate:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 9:30 a.m. EDT:
Tuesday, June 3, 2003:
Drug Control:
Financial and Management Challenges Continue to Complicate Efforts to
Reduce Illicit Drug Activities in Colombia:
Statement of Jess T. Ford, Director
International Affairs and Trade:
GAO-03-820T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-03-820T, testimony before the Caucus on
International Narcotics Control, U.S. Senate
Why GAO Did This Study:
The United States has been providing assistance to Colombia since the
early 1970s to help reduce illicit drugs. In 1999, the Colombian
government introduced Plan Colombiaža program that, among other
things, proposed reducing illicit drug activities by 50 percent over 6
years. In fiscal years 2000-03 alone, the United States provided more
than $2.5 billion in counternarcotics assistance. Despite this aid,
Colombia remains the world‘s leading producer and distributor of
cocaine and a major source of the heroin used in the United States.
This testimony discusses the status of U.S. counternarcotics
assistance to the Colombian Army and for a U.S.-supported Colombian
police aerial eradication program. It also addresses challenges
Colombia and the United States face in sustaining these programs.
what GAO Found:
In fiscal years 2000-03, the United States provided about $640 million
in assistance to train and equip a Colombian Army counternarcotics
brigade and supply the army with 72 helicopters and related support.
Most of this assistance has been delivered and is being used for
counternarcotics operations.
In recent years, the Colombian National Police aerial eradication
program has had mixed results. Since 1995, coca cultivation rose in
every year until 2002 and opium poppy cultivation remained relatively
steady until 2001. But, for 2002, the U.S. Office of National Drug
Control Policy reported that net coca cultivation in Colombia
decreased 15 percent and net opium poppy cultivation decreased 25
percent”the second yearly decline in a row. U.S. officials attributed
this success primarily to the Colombian government‘s willingness to
eradicate coca and poppy plants without restriction.
Although the U.S.-supported counternarcotics program in Colombia has
recently begun to achieve some of the results envisioned in Plan
Colombia, Colombia and the United States must continue to deal with
financial and management challenges. Neither the Colombian Army nor
the Colombian National Police can sustain ongoing counternarcotics
programs without continued U.S. funding and contractor support for the
foreseeable future. According to U.S. embassy officials, these
programs alone may cost up to $230 million per year, and future costs
for some other programs have not been determined. Because of overall
poor economic conditions, the government of Colombia‘s ability to
contribute more is limited, but the continuing violence from
Colombia‘s long-standing insurgency limits the government‘s ability to
institute economic, social, and political improvements. Moreover,
Colombia faces continuing challenges associated with the need to
ensure it complies with human rights standards and other requirements
in order for U.S. assistance to continue. As GAO noted in 2000, the
total costs of the counternarcotics programs in Colombia were
unknown. Nearly 3 years later, the Departments of State and Defense
have still not developed estimates of future program costs, defined
their future roles in Colombia, identified a proposed end state, or
determined how they plan to achieve it.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-820T.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click
on the link above. For more information, contact Jess T. Ford at (202)
512-4268 or FordJ@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Caucus:
I am pleased to be here to discuss GAO's work on U.S. counternarcotics
assistance to Colombia. Today we will highlight the preliminary
findings from our ongoing review of U.S. assistance to Colombia. Our
draft report is with the responsible agencies for comment; we expect to
issue a final report in mid-June. I will focus my comments on (1) the
status of U.S. counternarcotics assistance to the Colombian Army in
fiscal years 2000-03 and how this assistance has been used, (2) what
the U.S.-supported Colombian National Police aerial eradication program
has accomplished in recent years, and (3) what challenges Colombia and
the United States face in sustaining these programs.
In 1999, the Colombian government introduced Plan Colombia--a
$7.5 billion program that, among other things, proposed reducing the
cultivation, processing, and distribution of illegal narcotics by 50
percent over 6 years.[Footnote 1] A key component of the Colombian-U.S.
counternarcotics strategy was the creation of a Colombian Army 2,285-
man counternarcotics brigade, for which the United States agreed to
provide helicopters to help it move around southern Colombia to reduce
cocaine production and trafficking. Closely allied with this objective
was U.S. support for the Colombian National Police's aerial eradication
program to significantly reduce, if not eliminate, coca and opium poppy
cultivation.[Footnote 2]
Summary:
In fiscal years 2000-03, the United States provided about $640 million
to train and equip the Colombian Army counternarcotics brigade and
supply the army with 72 helicopters and related training, maintenance,
and operational support. Most of this assistance has been delivered and
is being used for counternarcotics operations. However, some problems
were encountered. For example,
* After a successful first year of operations, the brigade's results
dropped off in 2002. U.S. and Colombian officials attribute this, in
part, to coca growers and producers moving out of the brigade's range
in southern Colombia. In late 2002, with U.S. assistance, the Colombian
Army reorganized the brigade and gave it authority to operate anywhere
in the country. This change, according to U.S. embassy and Colombian
Army officials, will improve the brigade's ability to conduct
operations against high-value, drug-trafficking targets, such as
cocaine production laboratories and the leadership of insurgent groups
involved in drug-trafficking activities. One of the brigade's retrained
battalions has been operating in Narino department since early May
2003.
* Some initial impediments slowed the delivery and operational use of
the helicopters. The start of entry-level helicopter pilot training was
delayed 5 months while the United States determined who would provide
and fund the training. The delivery of 25 UH-II helicopters was delayed
5 months while the United States and Colombia decided what type of
engine to use in the aircraft. U.S. funding for the brigade's
operations was slowed for a total of about 5 months in 2002 because the
Department of State did not meet congressional deadlines for reporting
on Colombia's progress in addressing human rights violations.
U.S. assistance to support the helicopters provided as part of Plan
Colombia was originally planned to end in 2006 with the Colombian Army
taking over the responsibilities of operating and maintaining the
aircraft. However, U.S. embassy and Colombian officials stated that a
continued level of U.S. assistance will be needed beyond this date
because the army is not expected to have the personnel trained or the
resources necessary. Although U.S. embassy officials stated that they
have not officially estimated what this assistance level will be, they
tentatively projected that it would cost between $100 million and
$150 million a year to sustain ongoing counternarcotics programs. In
addition, other recently initiated U.S. programs will require
additional support.
In recent years, the Colombian National Police aerial eradication
program has had mixed results. Since 1995, net coca cultivation rose in
every year until 2002 and net opium poppy cultivation remained between
6,100 to 7,500 hectares. But in recent months, the Office of National
Drug Control Policy reported that:
* net coca cultivation in Colombia decreased 15 percent in 2002, from
169,800 hectares in 2001 to 144,450 hectares, and:
* net opium poppy cultivation in Colombia decreased 25 percent in 2002,
from 6,500 hectares in 2001 to 4,900 hectares--the second yearly
decline in a row.
U.S. embassy officials attributed this recent success primarily to the
current Colombian government's willingness to spray coca and poppy
plants without restriction in all areas of the country. However, since
at least 1998, U.S. embassy officials have been concerned with the
rising U.S. presence in Colombia and the associated costs of the aerial
eradication program. At the time, the embassy began developing a 3-year
plan to have the Colombian National Police assume control over the
program; but, for various reasons, the police never agreed to the plan.
Since then, contractor involvement and the associated costs have
continued to rise, and the Colombian National Police are not yet able
to assume more control of the aerial eradication program. In fiscal
year 1998, U.S. embassy officials reported that the costs for the U.S.
contractor, fuel, herbicide, and related support totaled $48.5 million.
For fiscal year 2003, U.S. embassy officials estimated that the
comparable costs totaled $86.3 million. Much of this increase occurred
between fiscal years 2002 and 2003 to support the additional spray
aircraft, multiple operating locations, and the anticipated
continuation of spray operations throughout Colombia. According to U.S.
embassy officials, these costs are expected to remain relatively
constant for the next several years.
Although the U.S.-supported counternarcotics program has recently shown
some of the results envisioned when Plan Colombia was first introduced,
Colombia and the United States continue to face financial and
management challenges in sustaining programs in Colombia.
* Colombia's financial resources are limited. Neither the Colombian
Army nor the Colombian National Police can sustain ongoing
counternarcotics programs without continued U.S. funding and contractor
support for the foreseeable future. According to U.S. embassy
officials, ongoing programs alone may cost up to $230 million per year,
and future costs for some other programs have not been determined.
* Colombia also continues to face challenges associated with its
political and economic instability fostered by its long-standing
insurgency and, for U.S. assistance to continue, the need to ensure
that (1) the military and police comply with human rights standards,
(2) the aerial eradication program meets certain environmental
conditions, and (3) alternative development is provided in areas
subject to aerial eradication.
Colombia is a longtime ally and significant trading partner of the
United States and, therefore, its economic and political stability is
important to the United States as well as the Andean region. Colombia's
long-standing insurgency and the insurgents' links to the illicit drug
trade complicate its efforts to tap its natural resources and make
systemic economic reforms. Solving these problems is important to
Colombia's future stability. On the other hand, recent world events--
from the global war on terrorism to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq--
have diverted scarce U.S. resources and made it paramount that the
United States fully consider the resources committed to its overseas
assistance programs. As we noted in 2000, the total costs of the
counternarcotics programs in Colombia were unknown. Nearly 3 years
later, the Departments of State and Defense have still not developed
estimates of future program costs, defined their future roles in
Colombia, identified a proposed end state, or determined how they plan
to achieve it.
Background:
The United States has provided assistance to help reduce illegal drug
production and trafficking activities in Colombia since the 1970s. Yet,
Colombia is still the world's leading cocaine producer and distributor
and a major source of the heroin used in the United States. According
to State, Colombia provides 90 percent of the cocaine and about 40
percent of the heroin entering the United States. The Drug Enforcement
Administration reports that several billion dollars flow into Colombia
each year from the cocaine trade alone, and this vast amount of drug
money has helped the country's two largest insurgency groups--the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and the National Liberation
Army--gain unprecedented economic, political, and social power and
influence. The insurgents exercise some degree of control over 40
percent of Colombia's territory east and south of the Andes where much
of the coca is grown.
In an effort to address the influx of cocaine and heroin from Colombia,
the United States has funded a counternarcotics strategy in Colombia
that includes programs for interdiction, eradication, and alternative
development, which must be carefully coordinated to achieve mutually
reinforcing results. Besides assistance for the Colombian Army
counternarcotics brigade and the Colombian National Police aerial
eradication program, the United States has supported Colombian efforts
to interdict illicit-drug trafficking along rivers and in the air as
well as alternative development, judicial sector reform, and internally
displaced persons programs. The Departments of Defense and State have
provided most of the funding and State, through its Bureau for
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and Narcotics
Affairs Section in the U.S. Embassy Bogotá, oversees the program. In
fiscal years 2000 through 2003, the United States provided more than
$2.5 billion to Colombia for counternarcotics assistance. (See table
1.) For fiscal year 2004, the administration has proposed an additional
$700 million in aid.
Table 1: U.S. Counternarcotics Assistance to Colombia, Fiscal Years
2000-03:
Dollars in millions.
Agency: State; Fiscal years: 2000[A]: $774.9;
Fiscal years: 2001: $48.0;
Fiscal years: 2001: 275.4;
Fiscal years: 2003[B]: (estimated): $452.0;
Total: $1,550.3.
Agency: DOD; Fiscal years: 2000[A]: 128.5;
Fiscal years: 2001: 190.2; Fiscal years:
2001: 119.1; Fiscal years: 2003[B]: (estimated):
149.9; Total: $587.7.
Agency: USAID[C]; Fiscal years: 2000[A]: 123.5;
Fiscal years: 2001: 0; Fiscal years:
2001: 104.5; Fiscal years: 2003[B]: (estimated):
151.0; Total: $379.0.
Total; Fiscal years: 2000[A]: $1,026.9;
Fiscal years: 2001: $238.2; Fiscal
years: 2001: $499.0; Fiscal years: 2003[B]:
(estimated): $752.9; Total: $2,517.0.
Source: Departments of Defense and State and the U.S. Agency for
International Development.
[A] INCLUDES FUNDS APPROPRIATED FOR PLAN COLOMBIA THROUGH THE EMERGENCY
SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS A] ct, Fiscal Year 2000 (Division B of P.L.
106-246).
[B] Includes $93 million in Foreign Military Financing funds
appropriated in the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Appropriations Act, 2003 (Division E, Title III of P.L. 108-7);
$34 million appropriated to State and $34 million appropriated to
Defense in the Supplemental Appropriations Act to Support Department of
Defense Operations in Iraq for Fiscal Year 2003 (P.L. 108-11); and
$37.1 million for Foreign Military Financing allotted from fiscal year
2003 supplemental appropriations.
[C] In fiscal years 2000-03, State transferred $375 million to the U.S.
Agency for International Development for alternative development,
judicial sector reform, and internally displaced persons programs.
[End of table]
Following increased violence in Colombia during early 2002, the
Congress provided "expanded authority" for the use of U.S. assistance
to Colombia, which enabled the Colombian government to use the U.S.-
trained and -equipped counternarcotics brigade, U.S.-provided
helicopters, and other U.S. counternarcotics assistance to fight groups
designated as terrorist organizations as well as to fight drug
trafficking. Similar authority was provided for fiscal year 2003 and is
being sought for fiscal year 2004.
Assistance to the Colombian Army Has Been Delivered, but Problems Were
Encountered:
U.S. assistance to the Colombian Army during fiscal years 2000-
03--$640 million for the counternarcotics brigade, 72 helicopters, and
related support--has, for the most part, been delivered and is being
used for counternarcotics operations. However, both the United States
and the Colombian Army experienced some unanticipated problems that
delayed the operational use of the helicopters. In addition, U.S.
support will be needed for the foreseeable future to sustain
operations.
Status of the Brigade:
The United States initially agreed to train and equip a Colombian Army
counternarcotics brigade of three battalions and a total of about 2,285
professional and conscripted soldiers. The United States provided the
counternarcotics brigade with about $45 million in training and
equipment--from weapons and ammunition to rations, uniforms, and
canteens. The brigade's primary mission was to plan and conduct
interdiction operations against drug-trafficking activities, including
destroying illicit drug-producing facilities, and, when called upon, to
provide security in insurgent-controlled areas where aerial eradication
operations were planned. According to U.S. and Colombian officials, the
brigade was highly effective in 2001--for example, it destroyed 25
cocaine hydrochloride laboratories[Footnote 3]--but was less successful
in 2002, when it destroyed only 4 such labs. U.S. embassy officials
stated that the brigade became less effective because the insurgents
moved their drug-producing activities, such as the laboratories, beyond
the brigade's reach. In addition, according to these officials, the
brigade became more involved in protecting infrastructure, such as
bridges and power stations, and performing base security. Moreover, the
aerial eradication program did not call on the brigade to provide
ground security on very many occasions, essentially planning spray
missions in the less threatening areas.
In August 2002, U.S. embassy and Colombian military officials agreed to
restructure the brigade to make it a rapid reaction force capable of
making quick, tactical strikes on a few days' notice. As part of this
restructuring, the Colombian Army designated the brigade a national
asset capable of operating anywhere in Colombia rather than just in its
prior area of responsibility in southern Colombia. The newly
restructured brigade consists of three combat battalions and a support
battalion with a total of about 1,900 soldiers, all of whom are
professional. Two of the combat battalions have been retrained. The
third combat battalion should be retrained by mid-June 2003. This
change, according to U.S. embassy and Colombian Army officials, will
improve the brigade's ability to conduct operations against high-value,
drug-trafficking targets, such as laboratories containing cocaine and
the leadership of insurgent groups involved in drug-trafficking
activities. One of the retrained battalions has been operating in
Narino department since early May 2003.
Status of the Helicopters:
A key component of U.S. assistance for Plan Colombia was enhancing the
brigade's air mobility. To do this, the United States provided the
Colombian Army with 33 UH-1N helicopters, 14 UH-60 Black Hawk
helicopters, and 25 UH-II helicopters.[Footnote 4]
* The 33 UH-1N helicopters were supposed to serve as interim aircraft
until the UH-60 and UH-II helicopters funded under Plan Colombia were
delivered. The UH-1Ns were delivered in stages between November 1999
and March 2001. Since flying their first mission in December 2000, the
helicopters have logged 19,500 hours in combat and have supported more
than 430 counternarcotics brigade operations. Colombian Army personnel
are qualified as pilots and mechanics, but many of the experienced
pilots and mechanics who operate and maintain the aircraft are provided
through a U.S. contractor.
* The UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters were delivered between July and
December 2001 but did not begin support operations for the brigade
until November 2002 because of a shortage of fully qualified Colombian
Army pilots. Forty-two Colombian Army personnel have completed the
minimum UH-60 pilot training, of which 13 have qualified as pilot-in-
command. U.S.-funded contract pilots fill in as pilots-in-command. In
addition, a U.S.-funded contractor continues to maintain the
helicopters and provide maintenance training.
* State procured 25 UH-II helicopters under Plan Colombia and planned
to deliver them to the Colombian Army between November 2001 and June
2002. However, they were delivered between March and November 2002
instead because the Colombian military was considering whether to use a
more powerful engine in the helicopters than the one usually installed.
Ultimately it decided to use the more common engine. According to NAS
officials, although some of the UH-II helicopters are being used for
missions, all the helicopters will not be operational until June 2003.
As of January 2003, 25 Colombian Army pilots had completed their
initial training and 21 of these pilots are completing the training
needed to qualify for operational missions. However, contractor pilots
continue to supplement Colombian Army pilots and a U.S.-funded
contractor continues to provide maintenance support.
Problems with Pilot and Mechanic Training:
Although all the U.S.-provided helicopters are in Colombia, a number of
unanticipated problems in training Colombian Army pilots and mechanics
to operate and maintain the helicopters were encountered. Some of these
problems continue to limit the Colombian Army's ability to operate and
maintain the aircraft. Primarily, the Colombian Army will have to
continue to rely on contractor support because it will not have enough
trained pilots-in-command and senior mechanics for the foreseeable
future.
* When the United States agreed to provide the UH-60 and UH-II
helicopters for the Colombian Army in July 2000, the assistance for
Plan Colombia did not include any funds to train the Colombian pilots
and mechanics needed to operate and maintain the helicopters. About 6
months after passage of U.S. assistance for Plan Colombia, Defense
agreed to provide the training and reported that it would transfer up
to $20 million from other counternarcotics projects in Colombia to pay
for it.
* A training plan was approved in mid-2001. Although the plan provided
training for Colombian Army personnel to meet the minimum
qualifications for a pilot and mechanic, it did not include the
additional training necessary to fly missions in a unit or to become a
senior mechanic. Basic training for 117 helicopter pilots--known as
initial entry rotary wing training--began in November 2001 and is
projected to be completed by December 2004. This training is intended
to provide a pool or pipeline of pilots for more advanced training to
fly specific helicopters. In addition, according to U.S. embassy
officials, a new pilot takes an average of 2 to 3 years to progress to
pilot-in-command.
* According to U.S. embassy and contractor officials, 105 out of 159
Colombian Army personnel have completed the basic UH-60 and UH-II
maintenance training and are taking more advanced training to qualify
as senior mechanics. These officials told us that the remaining 54
personnel will receive the contractor-provided basic training in the
near future, but they did not know when it would begin. Moreover, these
officials also told us that it typically takes 3 to 5 years for
mechanics to gain the experience necessary to become fully qualified on
specific helicopter systems, in particular the UH-60 Black Hawks.
* The Colombian Army Aviation Battalion is responsible for providing
helicopters and other aircraft and personnel for all Colombian Army
missions with an aviation component, including counternarcotics and
counterinsurgency operations throughout Colombia. Information provided
by the Colombian Aviation Battalion shows that it is staffed at only 80
percent of its required levels and that, over the past several years,
it has received between 60 percent to 70 percent of its requested
budget for logistics and maintenance. The Colombian military's decision
to continue using the UH-1N helicopters in addition to the UH-60 and
UH-II helicopters will also make it more difficult for the Aviation
Battalion to provide the numbers of personnel needed to operate and
maintain the helicopters. State originally intended that the UH-1N
helicopters would not be used after the UH-60 and UH-II helicopters
were available to support operations.
* According to bilateral agreements between Colombia and the United
States, the Colombian Army must ensure that pilots and mechanics who
receive U.S. training be assigned to positions using their training for
a minimum of 2 years. This has not always been the case. For example,
although 19 Colombian Army personnel were qualified to serve as pilots-
in-command on UH-1N helicopters, only 1 pilot was assigned to serve in
this position. The remaining pilots-in-command were provided by a U.S.
contractor.
* Of the funds appropriated for fiscal year 2002, $140 million was used
to support Colombian Army counternarcotics efforts. Most of this amount
was used for U.S.-provided helicopter operations and maintenance,
logistical, and training support. However, not all the funding could be
released until the Secretary of State certified, in two separate
reports to appropriate congressional committees,[Footnote 5] that the
Colombian military was making progress meeting certain human rights
conditions. Because State was late in providing these reports, the U.S.
embassy could not use this funding for operations and training on two
occasions for a total of about 5 months during 2002.[Footnote 6] These
delays resulted in fewer counternarcotics operations and limited the
training and experience Colombian Army pilots could obtain to qualify
as pilots-in-command.
Continued U.S. Support Needed to Sustain Operations:
U.S. assistance to support the helicopters provided as part of Plan
Colombia was originally planned to end in 2006 with the Colombian Army
taking over these responsibilities. However, U.S. embassy and Colombian
Army officials stated that a continued level of U.S. contractor
presence will be needed beyond this date because the Aviation Battalion
is not expected to have the personnel trained or the resources
necessary. Although the embassy officials stated that they have not
officially estimated what this assistance level will be, they
tentatively projected that it would cost between $100 million and
$150 million annually to sustain the U.S.-supported counternarcotics
programs. Moreover, other recently initiated U.S. programs will likely
require U.S. assistance and contractor support, but the long-term costs
of sustaining such programs are not known.
Colombia's Aerial Eradication Program Has Had Mixed Results:
Since the early 1990s, State's Bureau for International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement Affairs (through the U.S. Embassy's Narcotics Affairs
Section (NAS) and the Office of Aviation) has supported the Colombian
National Police's efforts to significantly reduce, if not eliminate,
the cultivation of coca and opium poppy. However, for the most part,
the net hectares of coca under cultivation in Colombia continued to
rise until 2002, and the net hectares of opium poppy under cultivation
remained relatively steady until 2001-02.[Footnote 7] In addition, the
U.S. embassy has made little progress in having the Colombian National
Police assume more responsibility for the aerial eradication program,
which requires costly U.S. contractor assistance to carry out.
Recent Progress in Reducing Net Cultivation of Coca and Poppy:
As shown in figure 1, the number of hectares under coca cultivation
rose more than threefold from 1995 to 2001--from 50,900 hectares to
169,800 hectares--despite substantially increased eradication
efforts.[Footnote 8] But in 2002, the Office of Aviation estimated that
the program eradicated 102,225 hectares of coca--a record high. In
March 2003, the Office of National Drug Control Policy reported for the
first time since before 1995 a net reduction in coca cultivation in
Colombia--from 169,800 hectares to 144,450 hectares--a 15 percent
decline.
Figure 1: Net Hectares of Coca under Cultivation and Hectares
Eradicated in Colombia, 1995-2002:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
As shown in figure 2, the net hectares of opium poppy under cultivation
varied between 6,100 and 6,600 for the period 1995-98 but rose to 7,500
hectares in 1999 and 2000. In 2001, the net hectares of poppy estimated
under cultivation declined to 6,500 and, in 2002, further declined to
4,900--nearly a 35 percent reduction in net cultivation over the past 2
years.
Figure 2: Net Hectares of Poppy under Cultivation and Hectares
Eradicated in Colombia, 1995-2002:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
U.S. embassy officials attributed the recent unprecedented reductions
in both coca and poppy cultivation primarily to the current Colombian
government's willingness to allow the aerial eradication program to
operate in all areas of the country. They also noted that:
* the number of spray aircraft had increased from 10 in July 2001 to 17
in January 2003;
* recently acquired spray aircraft can carry up to twice the herbicide
as the older aircraft; and:
* as of January 2003, aircraft were flying spray missions from three
forward operating locations--a first for the program.
The ability to keep an increased number of spray aircraft operating out
of three bases was made possible, at least in part, because the U.S.
embassy hired a contractor to work with the Colombian National Police
to, among other things, help maintain their aircraft. As a result, the
availability of police aircraft for the spray program increased.
Moreover, in August 2002, the Colombian government allowed the police
to return to a higher strength herbicide mixture that, according to
embassy officials, improved the spray's effectiveness.[Footnote 9]
These officials project that the aerial eradication program can reduce
the amount of coca and poppy cultivation to 30,000 hectares and 5,000
hectares, respectively, by 2005 or 2006, assuming the police continue
the current pace and can spray in all areas of Colombia.
Colombian National Police Have Not Assumed Control over Aerial
Eradication Operations:
As we reported in 2000,[Footnote 10] beginning in 1998, U.S. embassy
officials became concerned with the rising U.S. presence in Colombia
and the associated costs of the aerial eradication program. At the
time, the embassy began developing a 3-year plan to have the Colombian
National Police assume increased operational control over the program.
But for various reasons, the police did not agree to the plan. Since
then, contractor involvement and the associated costs have continued to
rise and the Colombian National Police are not yet able to assume more
control of the aerial eradication program.
As shown in table 2, in fiscal year 1998, the Office of Aviation
reported that the direct cost for a U.S. contractor providing aircraft
maintenance and logistical support and many of the pilots was $37.8
million. In addition, NAS provided $10.7 million for fuel, herbicide,
and related support, for a total of $48.5 million. For fiscal year
2003, the comparable estimates for contractor and NAS-provided support
were $41.5 million and $44.8 million, respectively, for a total of
$86.3 million. Most of this increase occurred between fiscal years 2002
and 2003 and is for the most part to support the additional spray
aircraft, multiple operating locations, and the anticipated
continuation of spray operations throughout Colombia. According to NAS
and Office of Aviation officials, these costs are expected to remain
relatively constant for the next several years.
Table 2: U.S. Support for the Aerial Eradication Program, Fiscal Years
1998-2004:
Dollars in millions:
Cognizant office: Office of Aviation; Fiscal
years: 1998: $37.8; Fiscal years: 1999: $36.8; Fiscal years: 2000:
$52.5[A]; Fiscal years: 2001: $38.0; Fiscal years: 2002: $38.2;
Fiscal years: 2003 (estimated): $41.5; Fiscal years: 2004 (proposed):
$45.0; Total: $289.8.
Cognizant office: Narcotics Affairs Section;
Fiscal years: 1998: 10.7; Fiscal years: 1999: 14.1; Fiscal years:
2000: 20.9; Fiscal years: 2001: 11.1; Fiscal years: 2002: 17.6;
Fiscal years: 2003 (estimated): 44.8[B]; Fiscal years: 2004
(proposed): 44.2; Total: $163.4.
Cognizant office: Total; Fiscal years: 1998:
$48.5; Fiscal years: 1999: $50.9; Fiscal years: 2000: $73.4; Fiscal
years: 2001: $49.1; Fiscal years: 2002: $55.8; Fiscal years: 2003
(estimated): $86.3; Fiscal years: 2004 (proposed): $89.2; Total: $453.2.
Source: U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics
and Law Enforcement Affairs and the Office of Aviation.
[A] Includes $20 million for additional spray aircraft.
[B] In addition, NAS paid $38.8 million for a contractor to support the
Colombian National Police Aviation Service. NAS could not readily
identify the proportion of this contract that is related to aerial
eradication. NAS officials stated that they expect this expenditure to
continue for the next 2 years and possibly up to 4 years.
[End of table]
The Colombian National Police do not provide funding per se for the
aerial eradication program and, therefore, the value of its
contributions is more difficult to quantify. In recent years, the
police have provided helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft for spray
mission support and the use of many of its facilities throughout
Colombia. In addition, the police have about 3,600 personnel assigned
to counternarcotics missions and estimate that 84 are directly
supporting the aerial eradication program.
U.S. Efforts to Improve Police Capacity for Aerial Eradication:
To help the Colombian National Police increase its capacity to assume
more responsibility for the aerial eradication program, NAS has
initiated several efforts.
In February and March 2002, the Office of Aviation conducted an
Aviation Resource Management Survey of the Colombian National Police
Aviation Service. According to Office of Aviation officials, these
surveys are intended to provide a stringent on-site assessment of
flight operations from management and safety to logistics and
maintenance. The survey team made a number of critical observations.
For example,
* The Aviation Service's organizational structure, lines of authority,
and levels of responsibility were not clear. Relying on an overly
centralized command structure resulted in unnecessary delays and the
cancellation of some planned aerial eradication missions because the
commanding general could not be reached.
* The Aviation Service did not have a formal flying hour program to
help forecast its budgetary requirements and enhance maintenance
scheduling.
* About 35 percent of the maintenance staff were inexperienced.
According to the survey team, this could result in improper maintenance
procedures being performed, which could adversely affect flight safety
and endanger lives.
* Management of items needing repair and control of spare parts were
deficient. The survey team found 230 items awaiting repair--some from
August 1998--and more than $4 million in UH-1H helicopter blades and
parts stored outside and unprotected.
As a result of the survey, in July 2002, a NAS contractor (a $38.8
million, 1-year contract with options for 4 additional years) began
providing on-the-job maintenance and logistical training to the
Aviation Service and helping the police address many of the issues
raised by the Aviation Resource Management Survey team. Embassy
officials noted that a more formal flying hour program has improved the
availability rates of many of the Aviation Service's aircraft. For
example, the availability rate of the Aviation Service's UH-II
helicopters--often used to support aerial eradication missions--
increased from 67 percent in January 2002 to 87 percent in December
2002. According to these officials, improved availability rates made it
easier to schedule and conduct spray missions.
In addition, NAS has begun a program for training pilots to fly T-65
spray planes and plans to start training for search and rescue
personnel who accompany the planes. U.S. officials stated that the
contractor presence should decline and the police should be able to
take over more of the eradication program by 2006, when NAS estimates
that coca and poppy cultivation will be reduced to "maintenance
levels"--30,000 hectares and 5,000 hectares, respectively.
Financial and Management Challenges Continue to Complicate Efforts to
Reduce Illicit Drug Activities:
The U.S.-supported counternarcotics program in Colombia has recently
begun to achieve some of the results envisioned in 1999-2000. However,
Colombia and the United States must continue to deal with financial and
management challenges.
* Under the original concept of Plan Colombia, the Colombian government
had pledged $4 billion and called on the international community to
provide $3.5 billion. Until recently, Colombia had not provided any
significant new funding for Plan Colombia and, according to U.S.
embassy and Colombian government officials, anticipated international
assistance for Plan Colombia--apart from that provided by the United
States--did not materialize as envisioned. But because of overall poor
economic conditions, the government of Colombia's ability to contribute
more is limited.
* The Colombian government has stated that ending the civil conflict is
central to solving Colombia's problems--from improving economic
conditions to stemming illicit drug activities. A peaceful resolution
to the long-standing insurgency would help stabilize the nation, speed
economic recovery, help ensure the protection of human rights, and
restore the authority and control of the Colombian government in the
coca-growing regions. The continuing violence limits the government's
ability to institute economic, social, and political improvements.
* For U.S. assistance to continue, Colombia faces continuing challenges
associated with the need to ensure that the army and police comply with
human rights standards, that the aerial eradication program meets
certain environmental conditions, and that alternative development is
provided in areas subject to aerial eradication.
Overall, neither the Colombian Army nor the Colombian National Police
can sustain ongoing counternarcotics programs without continued U.S.
funding and contractor support for the foreseeable future. According to
U.S. embassy officials, these programs alone may cost up to
$230 million per year, and future costs for some recently initiated
programs have not been determined. In addition, we note that this
estimate does not include future funding needed for other U.S. programs
in Colombia, including other aerial and ground interdiction efforts;
the police Aviation Service's U.S.-funded contractor; and alternative
development, judicial sector reform, and internally displaced persons
programs.
In recent years, world events--from the global war on terrorism to the
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq--have diverted scarce U.S. resources and
made it paramount that the United States fully consider the resources
committed to its overseas assistance programs. As we noted in 2000, the
total costs of the counternarcotics programs in Colombia were unknown.
Nearly 3 years later, the Departments of State and Defense have still
not developed estimates of future program costs, defined their future
roles in Colombia, identified a proposed end state, or determined how
they plan to achieve it.
Scope and Methodology:
In conducting our work, we reviewed pertinent planning, implementation,
and related documentation and met with cognizant U.S. officials at the
Departments of State and Defense, Washington, D.C.; the U.S. Southern
Command headquarters, Miami, Florida; and the U.S. Embassy in Bogotá,
Colombia. In Colombia, we interviewed Colombian military, police, and
government officials and visited the Colombian Army bases at Larandia,
Tolemaida, and Tres Esquinas and other sites in the primary coca-
growing regions of Colombia. In addition, we observed a Colombian Army
counternarcotics brigade airlift operation and several aerial
eradication missions.
We also discussed this testimony with cognizant officials from State's
Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and its
Office of Aviation and State's Bureau for Western Hemisphere Affairs.
They generally concurred with our treatment of the issues presented.
We conducted our work between July 2002 and May 2003 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my
prepared statement. I will be happy to answer any questions you may
have.
Contacts and Acknowledgments:
For future contacts regarding this testimony, please call Jess Ford at
(202) 512-4268 or Albert H. Huntington, III, at (202) 512-4140.
Individuals making key contributions to this testimony included Jocelyn
Cortese, Allen Fleener, Ronald Hughes, Jose Pena, George Taylor, Kaya
Taylor, and Janey Cohen. Rick Barrett and Ernie Jackson provided
technical assistance.
FOOTNOTES
[1] For more information on U.S. assistance for Plan Colombia, see U.S.
General Accounting Office, Drug Control: U.S. Assistance to Colombia
Will Take Years to Produce Results, GAO-01-26 (Washington, D.C.: Oct.
17, 2000).
[2] The leaves of the coca plant are the raw ingredient of cocaine, and
opium poppy is used to produce heroin. The aerial eradication program
involves spraying the coca and poppy plants from low-flying airplanes
with an herbicide that attacks the root system and kills the plant.
[3] The laboratories are used in the final stages of processing coca
into cocaine and are considered high-value targets.
[4] Of the 33 UH-1Ns, 28 remain available for use by the brigade; 1
crashed on a mission and 4 were transferred to support the aerial
eradication program.
[5] Section 567 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and
Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2002 (P.L. 107-115). Specifically,
the act provided that not more than 60 percent of the funds could be
obligated until after the Secretary of State made a determination and
certification that the Colombian military was (1) suspending members of
the Colombian Armed Forces who have been creditably alleged to have
committed gross violations of human rights, (2) cooperating with
civilian prosecutors and investigators, and (3) severing links between
the Armed Forces and paramilitary groups. In addition, the remaining
40 percent of the funds could be obligated only after June 1, 2002, and
after the Secretary of State made a second determination and
certification with respect to the same conditions.
[6] According to U.S. embassy political section personnel, they
encountered difficulties developing the information required to make
the human rights determination and certification. The first report was
issued on May 1, 2002--almost 2 months later than State's target date.
The second report was issued on September 9, 2002--almost 3 months
later than State's target date.
[7] The estimates of net hectares of coca and opium poppy under
cultivation are prepared annually by the U.S. Director of Central
Intelligence, Crime and Narcotics Center. See U.S. General Accounting
Office, Drug Control: Coca Cultivation and Eradication Estimates in
Colombia, GAO-03-319R (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 8, 2003).
[8] The number of hectares eradicated is provided by the Office of
Aviation and is based on the number of net hectares sprayed multiplied
by an estimated "kill rate." Although many thousands of hectares of
coca and poppy are killed, coca and poppy farmers often replant in the
same or other areas, which helps explain why the number of hectares
under cultivation often does not decline.
[9] In March 2002, the previous Colombian government reduced the
strength of the spray mixture because of environmental concerns.
[10] GAO-01-26.