Border Security
New Policies and Increased Interagency Coordination Needed to Improve Visa Process Gao ID: GAO-03-1013T July 15, 2003Since September 11, 2001, visa operations have played an increasingly important role in ensuring the national security of the United States. The Departments of State, Homeland Security, and Justice, as well as other agencies, are involved in the visa process. Each plays an important role in making security decisions so that potential terrorists do not enter the country. In two GAO reports, we assessed the effectiveness of the visa process as an antiterrorism tool.
Our analysis of the visa process shows that the Departments of State, Homeland Security, and Justice could more effectively manage the visa process if they had clear and comprehensive policies and procedures and increased agency coordination and information sharing. In our October 2002 report on the visa process as an antiterrorism tool, we found that State did not provide clear policies on how consular officers should balance national security concerns with the desire to facilitate legitimate travel when issuing visas; and State and Justice disagreed on the evidence needed to deny a visa on terrorism grounds. In our June 2003 report, we found that State had revoked visas for terrorism concerns but that the revocation process was not being used aggressively to alert homeland security and law enforcement agencies that individuals who entered the country before their visas were revoked might be security risks; and the process broke down when information on revocations was not being shared between State and appropriate immigration and law enforcement officials. These weaknesses diminish the effectiveness of the visa process in keeping potential terrorists out of the United States.
GAO-03-1013T, Border Security: New Policies and Increased Interagency Coordination Needed to Improve Visa Process
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Testimony:
Before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, Border
Security and Citizenship:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 2:30 p.m. EDT:
Tuesday, July 15, 2003:
Border Security:
New Policies and Increased Interagency Coordination Needed to Improve
Visa Process:
Statement of Jess T. Ford Director, International Affairs and Trade:
GAO-03-1013T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-03-1013T, a testimony before the Senate Judiciary
Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security and Citizenship
Why GAO Did This Study:
Since September 11, 2001, visa operations have played an increasingly
important role in ensuring the national security of the United States.
The Departments of State, Homeland Security, and Justice, as well as
other agencies, are involved in the visa process. Each plays an
important role in making security decisions so that potential
terrorists do not enter the country. In two GAO reports, we assessed
the effectiveness of the visa process as an antiterrorism tool.
What GAO Found:
Our analysis of the visa process shows that the Departments of State,
Homeland Security, and Justice could more effectively manage the visa
process if they had clear and comprehensive policies and procedures
and increased agency coordination and information sharing. In our
October 2002 report on the visa process as an antiterrorism tool, we
found that
* State did not provide clear policies on how consular officers should
balance national security concerns with the desire to facilitate
legitimate travel when issuing visas; and
* State and Justice disagreed on the evidence needed to deny a visa on
terrorism grounds.
In our June 2003 report, we found that State had revoked visas for
terrorism concerns but that
* The revocation process was not being used aggressively to alert
homeland security and law enforcement agencies that individuals who
entered the country before their visas were revoked might be security
risks; and
* The process broke down when information on revocations was not being
shared between State and appropriate immigration and law enforcement
officials.
These weaknesses diminish the effectiveness of the visa process in
keeping potential terrorists out of the United States.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO made numerous recommendations to strengthen the visa process as an
antiterrorism tool. Among them, GAO recommended that the Department of
Homeland Security, in conjunction with the Departments of State and
Justice, develop specific policies and procedures for the interagency
visa revocation process to ensure that when State revokes a visa
because of terrorism concerns, the appropriate units within State,
Homeland Security, and the FBI are notified immediately and that
proper actions are taken.
State said it is using our recommendations as a roadmap for making
improvements in the visa process. Homeland Security agreed that the
visa process should be strengthened as an antiterrorism tool.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-1013T.
To view the full testimony, including the scope and methodology, click
on the link above. For more information, contact Jess T. Ford at (202)
512-4128 or fordj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here to discuss our recent work on the visa process
and some of the ways we believe this process could be strengthened as
an important part of our country's border security strategy. Mr.
Chairman, citizens of other countries seeking to enter the United
States temporarily for business, tourism, and other reasons generally
must apply for and obtain a U.S. travel document, called a nonimmigrant
visa, at U.S. embassies or consulates abroad before arriving at U.S.
ports of entry. In deciding who should and should not receive a visa,
consular officers must perform a risk assessment that balances the need
to facilitate legitimate travel with the need to protect the United
States against potential terrorists and to deter others whose entry is
considered likely to be harmful to U.S. national interests. Consular
officers also need to delicately balance U.S. national security
interests with other interests such as promoting U.S. business,
tourism, education and cultural exchanges, and the overall health of
our economy.
Since September 11, 2001, visa operations have played an increasingly
important role in ensuring the national security of the United States.
The Departments of State, Homeland Security, and Justice, as well as
other agencies, are involved in the visa process, with each playing an
important role in making security decisions.
My testimony today is based on two of our recent reports[Footnote 1] on
the visa process that contained observations and recommendations on
ways in which national and border security could be strengthened
through the visa process, implementation of clear visa policies and
guidelines, and sharing of information and data. The first report
focused on the effectiveness of the visa process as an antiterrorism
tool and recommended ways that the process could be strengthened as a
screen against terrorists. The second report provides examples of how
weaknesses in policy and interagency coordination are affecting border
security. In addition to my comments based on the two reports, I will
provide a brief overview of an emerging visa policy issue that warrants
oversight.
Summary:
Our analysis of the visa process shows that the Departments of State,
Homeland Security, and Justice could more effectively manage the visa
function if they had clear and comprehensive policies and procedures
and increased agency coordination and information sharing. Our October
2002 report addressed the need for a clear policy on how to balance
national security concerns with the desire to facilitate legitimate
travel when issuing visas. It also addressed the need for more
coordination and information sharing to realize the full potential of
the visa process. In addition, there is a need for more human resources
and more training for consular officers. We made several
recommendations to the Department of State and the new Department of
Homeland Security to improve this process. State reported that it plans
to use our recommendations as a road map for improving the visa
process.
Our June 2003 report also pointed out that the U.S. government does not
have a clear and comprehensive policy on the interagency visa
revocation process. This process should be used more aggressively to
alert homeland security and law enforcement agencies that individuals
who entered the country before their visas were revoked might be
security risks. However, we found that the process broke down because
information on visa revocations was not shared between State and
appropriate immigration and law enforcement offices. It broke down even
further when individuals in question had already entered the United
States prior to revocation. In our review of the 240 visas that were
revoked for terrorism concerns between September 11, 2001 and December
31, 2002, we found numerous cases where notifications of the
revocations did not reach appropriate units within the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS)[Footnote 2] and FBI. We also found
evidence that individuals whose visas were revoked because of terrorism
concerns entered the United States and may still remain in the country.
We have made recommendations to the Departments of Homeland Security,
State, and Justice to improve the revocation process. Homeland Security
agreed that the visa revocation process needed to be strengthened.
State has directed that, beginning August 1, posts interview all
foreign individuals, with a few exceptions, seeking to visit the United
States prior to visa issuance. The purpose of this guidance is to
tighten the visa process. The new regulations may result in delays if
posts do not have adequate resources to handle the number of
interviews.
Mr. Chairman, I now want to provide additional details on the policies,
procedures, and coordination that we described in our reports.
Visa Process Should Be Strengthened as an Antiterrorism Tool:
The September 11 attacks illustrated the vulnerabilities in the visa
process when it became known that all 19 of the terrorist hijackers had
been issued visas to enter the United States. Before the attacks, the
State Department's visa operations focused primarily on screening
applicants to determine whether they intended to work or reside
illegally in the United States. In deciding on who should receive a
visa, consular officers relied on the State Department's consular
"lookout" system, a name check system that incorporates information
from many agencies, as the primary basis for identifying potential
terrorists.[Footnote 3] Consular officers were encouraged to facilitate
legitimate travel and, at some posts we visited, faced pressure to
issue visas. The State Department gave overseas consular sections
substantial discretion in determining the level of scrutiny applied to
visa applications and encouraged streamlined procedures to provide
customer service and deal with a large workload. As a result, according
to State Department officials and documents, consular sections
worldwide adopted practices that reduced the review time for visa
applications. For example, some posts decided not to interview
applicants who appeared likely to return to their country at the end of
their allotted time in the United States.
Since the terrorist attacks, the U.S. government has introduced some
changes to strengthen the visa process. For example, the State
Department has, with the help of other agencies, almost doubled the
number of names and the amount of information in the lookout system.
Further, the Department began seeking new or additional interagency
clearances on selected applicants to screen out terrorists, although
these checks were not always completed by other U.S. agencies in a
thorough or timely manner. We also observed that consular officers at
some of the posts we visited were spending more time reviewing visa
applications and interviewing applicants; they were able to do so, at
least temporarily, because the number of visa applications decreased
dramatically after September 11.
While these actions have strengthened the visa process, our work in
2002 showed that there were widely divergent practices and procedures
among and within overseas posts regarding (1) the authority of consular
officers to deny questionable applicants a visa, (2) the role of the
visa process in ensuring national security, and (3) the types of
changes in posts' visa policies and procedures that are appropriate
given the need for heightened border security. Also, the Departments of
State and Justice disagreed on the evidence needed to deny a visa on
terrorism grounds. Most consular officers at the posts we visited
stated that more comprehensive guidance and training would help them
use the visa process as an antiterrorism tool to detect questionable
applicants. In July 2002, the Secretary of State acknowledged that the
visa process needed to be strengthened and indicated that the State
Department is working to identify areas for improvement.
In addition, the State Department has stressed that it must have the
best interagency information available on persons who are potential
security risks in order to make good visa decisions. The additional
data received from the intelligence and law enforcement community has
increased State's access to information for use in the visa
adjudication process. In addition, State indicated that it will work
with Homeland Security to establish the systems and procedures that
will ensure seamless sharing of information in the future.
We also found that human capital limitations are a concern, as some
consular sections may need more staff if the number of visa applicants
returns to pre-September 11 levels or if State continues to institute
new security checks for visa applicants. At some posts the demand for
visas combined with increased workload per visa applicant still
exceeded available staff, as evidenced by the waiting time for a visa
appointment and in overtime of consular staff. Moreover, several posts
we visited reported that they could manage their existing workload with
current staffing but would need more staff if they faced an increase in
either security clearance procedures or visa applications.
In our October 2002 report, we concluded that the visa process could be
an important tool to keep potential terrorists from entering the United
States but that weaknesses limited its effectiveness as an
antiterrorism tool. The State Department needed to improve
implementation of the visa process to increase its effectiveness and
consistency among posts.
To strengthen the visa process as an antiterrorism tool, we recommended
that the Secretary of State, in consultation with appropriate agencies,
* establish clear policy on addressing national security concerns
through the visa process that is balanced with the desire to facilitate
legitimate travel, provide timely customer service, and manage
workloads;
* develop comprehensive, risk-based guidelines and standards on how
consular affairs should use the visa process as a screen against
potential terrorists;
* reassess staffing for visa operations in light of the current and
anticipated number of visa applications and, if appropriate, request
additional human resources to ensure that consular sections have
adequate staff with necessary skills; and:
* provide consular training courses to improve interview techniques,
recognize fraudulent documents, understand terrorism trends, and better
use the name check system.
To address visa issues requiring coordination and actions across
several agencies, we recommended that the Department of Homeland
Security coordinate with appropriate agencies to:
* establish governmentwide guidelines on the level of evidence needed
to deny a visa on terrorism grounds under provisions of the Immigration
and Nationality Act;
* reassess interagency headquarters' security checks on visa applicants
to verify that all the checks are necessary and promptly conducted, and
provide clear guidance to overseas posts and headquarters agencies on
their roles in conducting these checks;
* consider reassessing, on an interagency basis, visas issued before
the implementation of the new security checks;
* reexamine visa operations on a regular basis to ensure that the
operations effectively contribute to the overall national strategy for
homeland security; and:
* ensure that law enforcement and intelligence agencies promptly
provide information to the State Department on persons who may pose a
security risk and, therefore, should not receive visas.
In its response to our recommendations, the Department of State noted
that it has acted on or is currently acting on some of the issues we
reported and continues to reexamine its visa process. Moreover, in
January 2003, the Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs reported
that State plans to use our recommendations as a roadmap for
improvements within the Bureau of Consular Affairs and in consular
sections around the world. State has also indicated that it is
currently undertaking a number of initiatives to review visa policies,
staffing, and training needs. Furthermore, State said it is looking at
refining various screening programs and will coordinate with other
agencies to reassess interagency headquarters' security checks.
New Policies and Procedures Are Needed to Fill Gaps in the Visa
Revocation Process:
In our recent work on visa revocations, we again found weaknesses
caused by the lack of comprehensive policies and coordination between
agencies. The visa revocation process can be an important tool to
prevent potential terrorists from entering the United States. Ideally,
information on suspected terrorists would reach the Department of State
before it decides to issue a visa; however, there will always be some
cases in which the information arrives after the visa has been issued.
Revoking a visa can mitigate this problem, but only if State notifies
the appropriate agencies and if those agencies take appropriate actions
to deny entry or investigate persons with a revoked visa. In our June
2003 report, we identified the policies and procedures of several
agencies that govern the visa revocation process and determined the
effectiveness of the process. We focused on all 240 visas that State
revoked for terrorism concerns from September 11, 2001, to December 31,
2002.
Our analysis indicated that the U.S. government has no specific written
policy on the use of visa revocations as an antiterrorism tool and no
written procedures to guide State in notifying relevant agencies of
visas that have been revoked on terrorism grounds. State and INS have
written procedures that guide some types of visa revocations; however,
neither they nor the FBI has written internal procedures for notifying
appropriate personnel to take action on visas revoked by the State
Department. State and INS officials could articulate their informal
policies and procedures for how and what purpose their agencies have
used the process to keep terrorists out of the United States, but
neither they nor FBI officials had specific policies or procedures that
covered investigating, locating, or taking appropriate action in cases
where the visa holder had already entered the country.
The lack of formal, written policies and procedures may have
contributed to systemic weaknesses in the visa revocation process that
increase the probability of a suspected terrorist entering or remaining
in the United States. At the time of visa revocation, State should
notify its consular officers at overseas posts, the Department of
Homeland Security, and the FBI. State would have to provide notice of
revocation, along with supporting evidence to the appropriate units
within Homeland Security and the FBI, which would allow them to take
appropriate action. In our review of the 240 visa revocations, we found
that (1) appropriate units within INS and the FBI did not always
receive timely notification of the revocations; (2) lookouts were not
consistently posted to the agencies' watch lists; (3) 30 individuals
whose visas were revoked on terrorism grounds entered the United States
and may still remain in the country;[Footnote 4] (4) INS investigators
were not usually notified of individuals with revoked visas who had
entered the United States and therefore did not open investigations on
them; and (5) the FBI did not investigate individuals with revoked
visas unless these individuals were also in TIPOFF. For instance:
* In a number of cases, notification between State and the appropriate
units within INS did not take place or was not completed in a timely
manner. For example, INS officials said they did not receive any notice
of the revocations from State in 43 of the 240 cases. In another 47
cases, the INS Lookout Unit received the revocation notice only via a
cable, which took, on average, 12 days to reach the Unit.
* In cases in which the INS Lookout Unit had received notification, it
generally posted information on these revocations in its lookout
database within 1 day of receiving the notice. In cases where it was
not notified, it could not post information on these individuals in its
lookout database, which precluded INS inspectors at ports of entry from
knowing that these individuals had had their visas revoked. Moreover,
the State Department neglected to enter the revocation action for 64 of
the 240 cases into its own watch list.
* GAO's analysis of INS arrival and departure data indicates that 29
individuals entered the United States before their visas were revoked
and may still remain in the country. These data also show that INS
inspectors admitted at least four other people after the visa
revocation, one of whom may still remain in the country. However, in
testimony on June 18, 2003, the FBI said that none of these 30
individuals posed a terrorist threat since they were not in TIPOFF, a
State-operated interagency terrorist watch list that FBI's Foreign
Terrorist Tracking Task Force monitors. State Department officials told
us during our review that State relied on sources of information in
addition to TIPOFF in making visa revocation decisions. INS inspectors
prevented at least 14 others from entering the country because the INS
watch list included information on the revocation action or had another
lookout on them.
* INS investigators said they did not open cases on these individuals
with revoked visas who had entered the United States because their unit
had not been notified that State had revoked visas because of terrorism
concerns and that these persons had entered the country. They added
that, in the 10 cases that were referred to them, they conducted a full
investigation of possible immigration violations. INS officials said
that it would be challenging to remove individuals with revoked visas
who had entered the United States unless they were in violation of
their immigration status. Homeland Security officials said that the
issue of whether a visa revocation, after an individual is admitted on
that visa, has the effect of rendering the individuals out-of-status is
unresolved legally.
* FBI officials told us they were not concerned about individuals whose
visas were revoked because of terrorism concerns unless the
individuals' names were in TIPOFF. They said that they had a system in
place to monitor individuals in TIPOFF who enter the country but that
they would not investigate individuals who were not in TIPOFF based
solely on the revocation notice from State. FBI's position indicates
that FBI is not taking into account all sources of information that
State uses in determining if a person may pose a terrorism threat.
We concluded that the visa process could be an important tool to keep
potential terrorists from entering the United States. However, there
are currently major gaps in the notification and investigation
processes. One reason for this is that there are no comprehensive
written policies and procedures on how notification of a visa
revocation should take place and what agencies should do when they are
notified. As a result, there is heightened risk that persons who State
believed should not have been issued a visa because of terrorism
concerns could enter the country with revoked visas or be allowed to
remain after their visas are revoked without undergoing investigation
or monitoring.
To strengthen the visa revocation process as an antiterrorism tool, we
recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security, in conjunction
with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General:
* develop specific policies and procedures for the interagency visa
revocation process to ensure that notification of visa revocations for
suspected terrorists and relevant supporting information is transmitted
from State to immigration and law enforcement agencies and their
respective inspection and investigation units in a timely manner;
* develop a specific policy on actions that immigration and law
enforcement agencies should take to investigate and locate individuals
whose visas have been revoked for terrorism concerns and who remain in
the United States after revocation; and:
* determine if persons with visas revoked on terrorism grounds are in
the United States and, if so, whether they pose a security threat.
In response to our recommendations, the Department of State testified
that the Bureau of Consular Affairs is engaged in an effort to
formalize standard operating procedures. The Department of Homeland
Security also remarked that it was working to better standardize its
procedures. The FBI determined that 47 of the 240 persons with revoked
visas were in TIPOFF and therefore could pose a terrorism threat but
that it had no indication that any of these individuals were in the
country.
Plans to Tighten the Visa Process:
The Department of State has recently issued guidance to its posts about
using the visa process as an antiterrorism tool. In May 2003, the
Secretary of State announced that, by August 1, 2003, with a few
exceptions, all foreign individuals seeking to visit the United States
would be interviewed prior to receiving a visa. The purpose of this
guidance is to tighten the visa process to protect U.S. security and to
prepare for the eventual fingerprinting of applicants that State must
undertake to meet the legislated mandate to include a biometric
identifier with issued visas. To comply with the new guidance, some
posts may have to make substantial changes in how they handle
nonimmigrant applications. State acknowledges that posts may find that
personnel or facility resources are not adequate to handle the
additional number of interviews. Even though State expects interview
backlogs, the Department has indicated that posts are to implement the
interview requirement with existing resources.
It is not certain what impact the new policy will have on visa
issuance. However, education, business, and government officials have
expressed concern that it was already taking too long to issue visas
and that without a commensurate increase in resources to accommodate
the heavier workload that may result from the new requirement, there
could be serious delays for those seeking to visit the United States.
In March 2003, the House Committee on Science held a hearing on
"Dealing with Foreign Students and Scholars in the Age of Terrorism:
Visa Backlogs and Tracking Systems." In June 2003, the House Committee
on Small Business held a hearing on "The Visa Approval Backlog and its
Impact on American Small Business. " In both hearings, higher education
and business leaders and agency officials testified on the negative
impacts of delays in issuing visas. The testimonies also highlighted
the difficulties of balancing national security interests with the
desire to facilitate travel. At the request of the House Committee on
Science, we are currently examining the amount of time taken to
adjudicate visa applications from foreign science students and
scholars. As part of this work, we will be looking at how the new
interview policy will affect the process.
Before I conclude my statement, I would like to raise some questions
that the subcommittee may want to consider in its oversight role:
* Have the Departments of State, Homeland Security, and Justice reached
agreement on how best to communicate information on individuals who
should not be issued visas and on individuals whose visas have been
revoked?
* Have the Departments of State, Homeland Security, and Justice agreed
on the level of evidence needed to deny and revoke visas?
* Does the Department of State have adequate number of trained staff
for visa processing, especially if the number of visa applicants or
security checks increase?
* Do the Departments of Homeland Security and Justice agree on whether
persons who are in the country and have visas that have been revoked on
terrorism concerns should be investigated and, if so, by which agency?
Mr. Chairman, I would like to reiterate our two overarching areas of
concern for U.S. visa policy. First, the U.S. government needs to have
clear, comprehensive policies governing U.S. visa processes and
procedures so that all agencies involved agree on the level of security
screening for foreign nationals both at our consulates abroad and at
ports of entry. These policies should balance the need for national
security with the desire to facilitate legitimate travel to the United
States. The Departments of State and Homeland Security should
coordinate to establish governmentwide guidelines on the level of
evidence needed to deny a visa. There should also be a specific policy
for the interagency visa revocation process, including the actions that
immigration and law enforcement agencies should take to investigate and
locate individuals with revoked visas who have entered the country.
The second area of concern is the continued need for coordination and
information sharing among agencies. If our intelligence or law
enforcement community is concerned that an individual poses a security
risk, we have to make sure that this information is communicated to the
State Department so that consular officers can deny and, if need be,
revoke visas in a timely manner. Similarly, when State revokes a visa
for terrorism concerns, we have to make sure that full information on
the revocation is communicated to immigration and law enforcement
agencies.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer
any questions that you or members of the subcommittee may have.
Contacts and Acknowledgements:
For future contacts regarding this testimony, please call Jess Ford at
(202) 512-4128. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony
included John Brummet, Andrea Miller, Kate Brentzel, Janey Cohen, Lynn
Cothern, and Suzanne Dove.
FOOTNOTES
[1] U.S. General Accounting Office, Border Security: Visa Process
Should Be Strengthened as an Antiterrorism Tool, GAO-03-132NI
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2002) and U.S. General Accounting Office,
Border Security: New Policies and Procedures Are Needed to Fill Gaps in
the Visa Revocation Process, GAO-03-798 (Washington, D.C.: June 18,
2003).
[2] On March 1, 2003, INS became part of three units within the
Department of Homeland Security. INS inspection functions transferred
to the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection; its investigative and
enforcement functions transferred to the Bureau of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement; and its immigration services function became part
of the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services. Because our work
focused on visa revocation cases that took place before the March 1
reorganization, our report referred to the U.S. government's
immigration agency as "INS."
[3] U.S. General Accounting Office, Information Technology: Terrorist
Watch Lists Should Be Consolidated to Promote Better Integration and
Sharing GAO-03-322 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 15, 2003). We recommended a
series of actions including that the Department of Homeland Security
and other agencies that have and use watch lists lead an effort to
standardize and consolidate the federal government's watch list
structures and policies.
[4] This number is based on our analysis of data we received from INS
as of May 19, 2003. On May 20 and 21, INS and the FBI, respectively,
provided additional information related to this matter. We were not
able to complete analysis of the data prior to the release of our
report due to the nature and volume of the data. The data could show
that the actual number of persons is higher or lower than 30.
