Foreign Assistance
Strategic Workforce Planning Can Help USAID Address Current and Future Challenges Gao ID: GAO-03-946 August 22, 2003The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) oversees humanitarian and economic assistance--an integral part of the U.S. global security strategy--to more than 160 countries. GAO recommended in 1993 that USAID develop a comprehensive workforce plan; however, human capital management continues to be a high-risk area for the agency. GAO was asked to examine how changes in USAID's workforce over the past 10 years have affected the agency's ability to deliver foreign aid and to assess its progress in implementing a strategic workforce planning system.
USAID has evolved from an agency in which U.S. direct-hire staff directly implemented development projects to one in which U.S. direct-hire staff oversee the activities of contractors and grantees. Since 1992, the number of USAID U.S. direct-hire staff declined by 37 percent, but the number of countries with USAID programs almost doubled and, over the last 2 years, program funding increased more than 50 percent. As a result of these and other changes in its workforce and its mostly ad-hoc approach to workforce planning, USAID faces several human capital vulnerabilities. For example, attrition of experienced foreign service officers and inadequate training and mentoring have sometimes led to the deployment of staff who lack essential skills and experience. The agency also lacks a "surge capacity" to respond to evolving foreign policy priorities and emerging crises. With fewer and less experienced staff managing more programs in more countries, USAID's ability to oversee the delivery of foreign assistance is becoming increasingly difficult. USAID has taken steps toward developing a workforce planning and human capital management system that should enable the agency to meet its challenges and achieve its mission in response to the President's Management Agenda, but it needs to do more. For example, USAID has begun its workforce analysis but it has not yet conducted a comprehensive assessment of the skills and competencies of its current workforce and has not yet included its civil service and contracted employees in its workforce planning efforts. Because USAID has not adopted a strategic approach to workforce planning, it cannot ensure that it has addressed its workforce challenges appropriately and identified the right skill mix to carry out its assistance programs.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-03-946, Foreign Assistance: Strategic Workforce Planning Can Help USAID Address Current and Future Challenges
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
August 2003:
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE:
Strategic Workforce Planning Can Help USAID Address Current and Future
Challenges:
GAO-03-946:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-03-946, a report to congressional requesters
Why GAO Did This Study:
The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) oversees
humanitarian and economic assistance”an integral part of the U.S.
global security strategy”to more than 160 countries. GAO recommended
in 1993 that USAID develop a comprehensive workforce plan; however,
human capital management continues to be a high-risk area for the
agency.
GAO was asked to examine how changes in USAID‘s workforce over the
past 10 years have affected the agency‘s ability to deliver foreign
aid and to assess its progress in implementing a strategic workforce
planning system.
What GAO Found:
USAID has evolved from an agency in which U.S. direct-hire staff
directly implemented development projects to one in which U.S. direct-
hire staff oversee the activities of contractors and grantees. Since
1992, the number of USAID U.S. direct-hire staff declined by 37
percent, but the number of countries with USAID programs almost
doubled and, over the last 2 years, program funding increased more
than 50 percent. As a result of these and other changes in its
workforce and its mostly ad-hoc approach to workforce planning, USAID
faces several human capital vulnerabilities. For example, attrition of
experienced foreign service officers and inadequate training and
mentoring have sometimes led to the deployment of staff who lack
essential skills and experience. The agency also lacks a ’surge
capacity“ to respond to evolving foreign policy priorities and
emerging crises. With fewer and less experienced staff managing more
programs in more countries, USAID‘s ability to oversee the delivery of
foreign assistance is becoming increasingly difficult.
USAID has taken steps toward developing a workforce planning and human
capital management system that should enable the agency to meet its
challenges and achieve its mission in response to the President‘s
Management Agenda, but it needs to do more. For example, USAID has
begun its workforce analysis but it has not yet conducted a
comprehensive assessment of the skills and competencies of its current
workforce and has not yet included its civil service and contracted
employees in its workforce planning efforts. Because USAID has not
adopted a strategic approach to workforce planning, it cannot ensure
that it has addressed its workforce challenges appropriately and
identified the right skill mix to carry out its assistance programs.
What GAO Recommends:
To help USAID plan for changes in its workforce and continue
operations in an uncertain environment, we recommend that the USAID
Administrator develop and institutionalize a strategic workforce
planning and management system that takes advantage of strategic
workforce planning principles.
USAID noted that our report captured its complex workforce issues and
agreed with our findings and recommendations. USAID also referred to a
recently formed team that will carry out a comprehensive workforce
analysis and planning effort to identify and address its workforce
needs.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-946.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click
on the link above. For more information, contact Jess Ford at (202)
512-4268 or FordJ@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
USAID's Changing Workforce Affects Ability to Deliver Foreign
Assistance:
USAID's Progress in Implementing Strategic Workforce Planning
Principles Is Limited:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Scope and Methodology:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Selected Reports Related to USAID's Workforce Planning:
Appendix II: USAID Worldwide Foreign Assistance Programs Locations:
Appendix III: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International
Development:
Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
Acknowledgments:
Table:
Table 1: USAID U.S. Direct-Hire Presence, Fiscal Years 1992 and 2002:
Figures:
Figure 1: USAID U.S. Direct-Hire Workforce and Program Funding Levels,
Fiscal Years 1990-2003:
Figure 2: USAID's Workforce Profile as of December 31, 2002:
Figure 3: Principles for Effective Strategic Workforce Planning:
Abbreviations:
OMB: Office of Management and Budget:
USAID: United States Agency for International Development:
United States General Accounting Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
August 22, 2003:
The Honorable Christopher Shays,
Chairman
The Honorable Dennis J. Kucinich,
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International
Relations
Committee on Government Reform
House of Representatives:
Humanitarian and economic development assistance is an integral part of
U.S. global security strategy, particularly as the United States seeks
to diminish the underlying conditions of poverty and corruption that
may be linked to instability and terrorism. Since 1962, the U.S. Agency
for International Development (USAID) has managed more than $273
billion in such assistance.[Footnote 1] In fiscal year 2003, Congress
appropriated almost $11.5 billion to USAID, and the agency managed
programs in almost 160 countries. Agency staff often work in difficult
environments and under evolving program demands. More will be demanded
of USAID's staff as they implement large-scale relief and
reconstruction programs in Afghanistan and Iraq while continuing
traditional long-term development assistance programs.
USAID administers foreign aid through a decentralized staffing
structure, with its headquarters in Washington, D.C., and missions
located throughout the world. In 1993, we recommended that USAID
develop a comprehensive workforce planning and management system to
better identify staffing needs and requirements.[Footnote 2] However,
human capital management continues to be a high-risk area at USAID and
throughout much of the federal government.[Footnote 3] According to the
Office of Management Budget (OMB), the federal government--including
USAID--significantly downsized its workforce during the 1990s through
across-the-board cuts rather than targeted reductions aligned with
agency missions, and human resources planning remains weak in most
agencies. The President's Management Agenda, issued in fiscal year
2002, represents the administration's effort to improve the performance
of federal departments and agencies through 14 initiatives, including
human capital management. OMB concluded that without proper planning,
the skill mix of the federal workforce will not reflect tomorrow's
missions.[Footnote 4]
In light of USAID's long-standing workforce planning and management
problems, you expressed concern about its ability to manage and oversee
its foreign assistance programs. In particular, you expressed concern
about USAID's apparent inability to identify and readily address
staffing requirements. At your request, we examined (1) the changes in
USAID's workforce since fiscal year 1990 and their effect on the
agency's ability to deliver foreign assistance and (2) USAID's progress
in developing and implementing a strategic workforce planning system.
To accomplish our objectives, we analyzed personnel data and workforce
planning documents and interviewed knowledgeable USAID officials
representing the agency's regional, technical, and management bureaus
in Washington, D.C. We conducted fieldwork at seven overseas missions-
-the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Mali, Peru, Senegal, and the
West Africa Regional Program in Mali. We also evaluated USAID's
strategic workforce planning efforts in terms of workforce planning
principles used by leading organizations: ensuring the involvement of
agency leadership, employees, and stakeholders; determining current
skills and competencies and those needed; implementing strategies to
address critical staffing needs; and evaluating progress in achieving
human capital goals.
Results in Brief:
Since 1990, USAID has continued to evolve from an agency in which U.S.
direct-hire foreign service employees directly implemented development
projects to one with a declining number of direct-hire staff that
oversee the contractors and grantees who carry out most of its day-to-
day activities. Personal services contractors--chiefly foreign
national staff at overseas missions--play an increasing role in
managing the development activities that are designed, implemented, and
evaluated mainly by third-party contractors and grantees. As direct-
hire staff levels decreased by 37 percent since fiscal year 1992, the
number of countries with USAID programs almost doubled, and program
funding recently increased more than 57 percent--from $7.3 billion in
fiscal year 2001 to almost $11.5 billion in fiscal year 2003. As a
result of the decreases in U.S. direct-hire foreign service staff
levels, increasing program demands, and a mostly ad hoc approach to
workforce planning, USAID now faces several human capital
vulnerabilities. For example, attrition of its more experienced foreign
service officers, difficulty in filling overseas positions, and limited
opportunities for training and mentoring have sometimes led to (1) the
deployment of direct-hire staff who lack essential skills and
experience and (2) the reliance on contractors to perform most overseas
functions. In addition, USAID lacks a "surge capacity" to enable it to
respond quickly to emerging crises and changing strategic priorities.
As a result, according to USAID officials and a recent overseas
staffing assessment, the agency is finding it increasingly difficult to
manage the delivery of foreign assistance.
In response to the President's Management Agenda, USAID has taken steps
toward developing a comprehensive workforce planning and human capital
management system that should enable the agency to meet its challenges
and achieve its mission, but progress has been limited. In evaluating
USAID's efforts in terms of proven strategic workforce planning
principles, USAID has more to do. For example:
* The involvement of USAID leadership, employees, and stakeholders in
developing and communicating a strategic workforce plan has been mixed.
USAID's human resource office is drafting a human capital strategy, but
it has not yet been finalized or approved by such stakeholders as OMB
and the Office of Personnel Management. As a result, we cannot comment
on whether USAID employees and other stakeholders will have an active
role in developing and communicating the agency's workforce strategies.
* USAID has begun identifying the core competencies its future
workforce will need and is conducting a workforce analysis and planning
pilot at three headquarters units that will include an analysis of
current skills and will eventually cover the entire workforce. However,
it has not yet conducted a comprehensive assessment of the critical
skills and competencies of its current workforce. USAID is in the
process of determining the appropriate information technology
instrument and methodology that will permit the assessment of its
current workforce skills and competencies.
* USAID's strategies to address critical skill gaps are not
comprehensive and have not been based on a critical analysis of current
capabilities matched with future requirements. USAID has begun hiring
foreign service officers and Presidential Management Interns to replace
staff lost through attrition. However, the agency has not completed its
civil service recruitment plan and has not yet included personal
services contractors--the largest segment of its workforce--in its
agencywide workforce analysis and planning efforts.
* USAID has not created a system to monitor and evaluate its progress
toward reaching its human capital goals and ensuring that its efforts
continue under the leadership of successive administrators.
Because it has not yet institutionalized a comprehensive workforce
planning and management system, USAID cannot ensure that it has the
essential skills needed to carry out its ongoing and future programs.
To help USAID plan for changes in its workforce and continue operations
in an uncertain environment, we recommend that the USAID Administrator
develop and institutionalize a strategic workforce planning and
management system that takes advantage of strategic workforce planning
principles.
Background:
USAID is the lead U.S. agency for administering humanitarian and
economic assistance to about 160 countries. The USAID Administrator
reports to the Secretary of State and receives overall foreign policy
guidance from the Department of State. USAID operates its foreign
assistance programs from its offices in Washington, D.C., and from
missions and offices around the world.
In 1993, we reported that USAID had not adequately managed changes in
its overseas workforce and recommended that USAID develop a
comprehensive workforce planning and management system to better
identify staffing needs and requirements.[Footnote 5]
In the mid-1990s, USAID reorganized its activities around strategic
objectives and began reporting in a results-oriented format but had
made little progress in personnel reforms.[Footnote 6] In July 2002, we
reported that USAID could not quickly relocate or hire the staff needed
to implement a large-scale reconstruction and recovery program in Latin
America, and we recommended actions to help improve USAID's staffing
flexibility for future disaster recovery requirements.[Footnote 7]
Appendix I summarizes several reports and studies prepared by GAO and
others since 1989 that address USAID workforce planning and human
capital management issues.
Studies by several organizations, including GAO, have shown that highly
successful service organizations in both the public and private sectors
use effective strategic management approaches to prepare their
workforces to meet present and future mission requirements. We define
strategic workforce planning as focusing on long-term strategies for
acquiring, developing, and retaining an organization's workforce and
aligning human capital approaches that are clearly linked to achieving
programmatic goals. Based on work with the Office of Personnel
Management, other U.S. government agencies, the National Academy for
Public Administration, and the International Personnel Management
Association, we identified strategic workforce planning principles used
by leading organizations. According to these principles, an
organization's strategic workforce planning and management system
should (1) involve senior management, employees, and stakeholders in
developing, communicating, and implementing the workforce plan; (2)
determine the agency's current critical skills and competencies and
those needed to achieve program results; (3) develop strategies to
address gaps in critical skills and competencies; and (4) monitor and
evaluate progress and the contribution of strategic workforce planning
efforts in achieving program goals.
USAID's Changing Workforce Affects Ability to Deliver Foreign
Assistance:
USAID has changed from an agency of U.S. direct-hires that largely
provided direct, hands-on implementation of development projects to one
that manages and oversees the activities of contractors and grantees.
During the past decade, this trend has affected USAID's ability to
implement its foreign assistance program as the number of U.S. direct-
hire foreign service officers declined and much of USAID's direct-hire
workforce was replaced by foreign national personal services
contractors. In addition, while program funding remained relatively
stable from fiscal year 1990 through fiscal year 2000, it increased
from $7.3 billion in fiscal year 2001 to $11.5 billion in fiscal year
2003, and USAID's fewer direct hires are now responsible for programs
in more countries with little or no resident U.S. direct-hire presence.
Moreover, USAID operates in a difficult and uncertain environment that
presents unique challenges to its ability to plan and manage its
overseas workforce. Because USAID did not have a strategic workforce
planning system while these changes were underway, several human
capital vulnerabilities have surfaced. For example, an across-the-board
reduction in force for both the foreign service and the civil service,
followed by a 5-year decline in the number of U.S. direct-hires, has
left the agency with critical shortages of experienced mid-level staff
and in the pipeline of junior staff. In addition, 37 positions remain
vacant, and opportunities for training and mentoring staff are limited,
sometimes forcing the placement of staff who may lack essential skills
and experience. USAID also lacks a "surge" capacity to help it deal
with emerging crises and changing strategic priorities. According to
USAID documents and our discussions with agency officials, these
vulnerabilities are making it increasingly difficult for the agency to
adequately manage and oversee its foreign assistance activities.
USAID Staff Functions Have Evolved from Implementation to Management:
USAID's U.S. direct-hire workforce decreased from about 8,600 in 1962
to about 3,162 in 1990. USAID could not continue its hands-on project
approach as the number of U.S. direct hires, including foreign service
staff, declined and responsibilities for planning, financing, and
monitoring projects shifted to contractors, grantees, and host country
governments. As figure 1 shows, this trend has continued as the number
of U.S. direct-hire staff further decreased to 1,985 by December 2002.
The number of foreign national employees--both direct-hires and
personal services contractors--also decreased from 5,211 in fiscal year
1995 to 4,725 in fiscal year 2002. Furthermore, while program funding
levels remained relatively stable for most of this period, program
funding increased 57 percent from $7.3 billion in fiscal year 2001 to
$11.5 billion in fiscal year 2003.
Figure 1: USAID U.S. Direct-Hire Workforce and Program Funding Levels,
Fiscal Years 1990-2003:
[See PDF for image]
Notes: Workforce data exclude the Office of the Inspector General.
[End of figure]
U.S. direct-hire data for fiscal year 2003 are as of December 31, 2002.
Program funding information is in constant fiscal year 2003
appropriated dollars. Program funding includes supplementals and money
appropriated to the U.S. Department of Agriculture for Title II and
Title III food programs administered by USAID. Fiscal year 1990 also
includes Title I funding, but after January 1, 1991, the funds were
administered by the Department of Agriculture. Program funding does not
include operating expenses and is not adjusted for deobligations/
reobligations, rescissions, transfers, or miscellaneous trust funds.
As numbers of U.S. direct-hire staff declined, mission directors began
relying on other types of employees, primarily foreign national
personal services contractors, to manage mission operations and oversee
development activities implemented by third parties. In December 2002,
according to USAID's staffing report, the agency's workforce totaled
7,741, including 1,985 U.S. direct hires.[Footnote 8] Personal services
contractors made up more than two-thirds of USAID's total workforce,
including 4,653 foreign national contractors (see fig. 2). Of the 1,985
U.S. direct hires, 974 were foreign service officers, about 65 percent
of whom were posted overseas.
Figure 2: USAID's Workforce Profile as of December 31, 2002:
[See PDF for image]
Note: "Other" includes fellows and U.S. government staff from other
agencies employed under participating agency service agreements and
resource support service agreements.
[End of figure]
For our analysis, we used the workforce definition developed by USAID's
1990 Workforce Planning Working Group. This group defined the agency's
workforce as those who have a direct employer-employee relationship
with USAID. This includes the following staff categories:
* U.S. citizen direct-hire civil service in Washington, D.C;
* U.S. citizen direct-hire foreign service, most of whom serve at
overseas missions;
* foreign national (non-U.S. citizen) direct hires, whom USAID can
employ overseas for any foreign service-related mission, program, or
activity;[Footnote 9] and:
* personal services contractors, both U.S. and foreign nationals, who
are individuals on contract with USAID for the specific services of
that individual only.[Footnote 10]
In addition, USAID includes in its monthly staffing report other types
of nondirect-hire staff with an employer-employee relationship, such as
staff detailed from a number of organizations and other U.S. government
agencies and centrally contracted technical advisors.
Other individuals not directly employed by USAID also perform a wide
range of services in support of the agency's programs. These
individuals include employees of institutional or services contractors,
private voluntary organizations, and grantees.[Footnote 11] Last year,
we reported that USAID relies heavily on nongovernmental organizations
to deliver foreign assistance.[Footnote 12] In fiscal year 2000, USAID
directed about $4 billion of its $7.2 billion assistance funding to
nongovernmental organizations, including at least $1 billion to private
voluntary organizations (charities) working overseas. We further noted
that, although USAID generally chooses funding mechanisms that delegate
a large amount of program control to implementing organizations, it has
not compiled data on its use of specific types of funding or evaluated
their effectiveness. In addition to hiring third parties to implement
its programs, USAID also contracts with outside organizations to
provide contract management and oversight of large programs. As we
reported in July 2002,[Footnote 13] the agency hired several firms to
manage and oversee some of the contractors and grantees conducting
USAID hurricane reconstruction activities in Latin America. At present,
USAID is also planning to hire outside parties to oversee the large-
scale contracts recently awarded for reconstruction activities in Iraq.
Despite the reliance on personal services and institutional
contractors, USAID officials maintain that the direct-hire foreign
service officer is still the core of mission staffing. He or she works
toward achieving U.S. foreign policy goals, gives direction to the
country program, brings corporate knowledge and a better understanding
of agency guidance to the mission, and provides the authority needed to
work effectively with host country counterparts and other U.S.
government agencies. The quality and deployment of foreign national
contractors can vary among missions and regions. U.S. personal services
contractors are an important means for filling mission positions when
U.S. direct hires are not available. According to USAID regulations,
the terms of their contracts essentially allow personal services
contractors to perform almost the same duties as U.S. government
employees. About two-thirds work in technical positions, but many serve
as program and project development officers, controllers, executive
officers, and, occasionally, temporary mission directors--positions
that USAID considers inherently governmental. According to USAID
officials, as a matter of policy, the agency rarely delegates
inherently governmental functions.
According to mission officials, U.S. and foreign national contractors
are an integral part of the mission workforce, but they cannot replace
the agency commitment and experience that U.S. direct-hire foreign
service officers bring to the mission. In addition to filling in for
U.S. direct-hire staff, contractors, particularly foreign nationals,
typically make a career at USAID and provide needed continuity and
corporate knowledge of the country programs. However, officials noted
that, compared to direct-hire staff, personal services contractors
generally do not have the same level of agency commitment; do not fully
understand how the agency works and the political pressures that it
faces in Washington, D.C; are not subject to the same degree of
accountability; and have limited administrative and decisional
authorities. Furthermore, contractors cannot supervise U.S. direct-
hire staff, even if the contractor is very experienced and the direct-
hire is new to USAID. This further limits the training and mentoring
opportunities for new staff.
In addition to having reduced the number of U.S. direct hires, USAID
now manages programs in more countries with no U.S. direct-hire
presence, and its overseas structure has become more regional. Table 1
illustrates the changes in USAID's U.S. direct-hire overseas presence
between fiscal years 1992 and 2002. In fiscal year 1992, USAID managed
activities in 88 countries with no U.S. direct-hire presence. According
to USAID, in some cases, activities in these countries are very small
and require little management by USAID staff. However, in 45 of these
countries USAID manages programs of $1 million or more, representing a
more significant management burden on the agency. USAID also
increasingly provides administrative and program support to countries
from regional service platforms, which have increased from 2 to 26
between fiscal years 1992 and 2002.[Footnote 14] Appendix II contains a
complete list of the countries in which USAID operates.
Table 1: USAID U.S. Direct-Hire Presence, Fiscal Years 1992 and 2002:
USAID U.S. direct hires: Total number; 1992: 3,163[A]; 2002: 1,985[B];
Percentage change: (37).
USAID U.S. direct hires: Number assigned overseas; 1992: 1,082[A];
2002: 631[B]; Percentage change: (42).
USAID U.S. direct hires: Number of countries receiving USAID assistance
with U.S. direct-hire presence; 1992: 66[C]; 2002: 71[D]; Percentage
change: 7.
USAID U.S. direct hires: Number of countries receiving USAID assistance
with no U.S. direct-hire presence; 1992: 16[C]; 2002: 88[D]; Percentage
change: 450.
Sources: USAID and GAO.
[A] USAID's Monthly Workforce Profile Report, data as of September 30,
1992.
[B] USAID's Quarterly Worldwide Staffing Pattern Report, data as of
December 31, 2002.
[C] U.S. General Accounting Office, Foreign Assistance: A Profile of
the Agency for International Development, GAO/NSIAD-92-148
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 3, 1992).
[D] USAID's Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination data provided in
May 2003. USAID staff cautioned that this information was gathered last
year and may not be up to date.
[End of table]
USAID's Environment Affects Workforce Planning Capabilities:
Our data collection efforts in the field and at headquarters revealed
the unique environment in which USAID missions operate and its effect
on workforce planning and management efforts. With the exception of
Egypt, the missions we visited did not prepare formal and separate
workforce plans. USAID missions tend to be relatively small--mission
directors and office heads have almost daily contact with the staff and
are familiar with their skills and capabilities. Missions conduct their
workforce planning and staffing projections in conjunction with their
long-term--normally 5-year--country development strategies. Missions
provide information on resource needs in their annual reports and
budget submissions to their respective regional bureaus. USAID's Bureau
for Policy and Program Coordination allots staff years and funding to
the regional bureaus, which then apportion these resources among their
headquarters offices and overseas missions. According to the bureau,
the average mission has six U.S. direct-hire staff.
Officials noted the difficulties in adhering to a formal workforce plan
linked to country strategies in an uncertain foreign policy
environment. For example, following the events of September 11, 2001,
the Middle East and sub-Saharan African missions we visited--Egypt,
Mali, and Senegal--received additional work not anticipated when they
developed their country development strategies. Mali was seeking two
additional personal services contractors during the time of our visit,
including one to manage a new hunger initiative for Africa, and Egypt
was in the process of determining the staff needed to implement the
Middle East Partnership Initiative. In addition, the mission in Ecuador
had been scheduled to close in fiscal year 2003. However, this decision
was reversed due to political and economic events in Ecuador, including
a coup in 2000, the collapse of the financial system, and rampant
inflation. Program funding for Ecuador tripled from fiscal year 1999 to
fiscal year 2000, while staffing was reduced from 110 to 30 personnel
and the budget for the mission's operating expenses was reduced from
$2.7 million to $1.37 million.
Other factors unique to USAID's overseas work environment can affect
its ability to conduct workforce planning and attract and retain top
staff. These factors vary from country to country and among regions.
For example:
* USAID officials in Mali told us that hardship missions find it much
more difficult to attract U.S. staff.[Footnote 15] Foreign service
staff in Mali receive a hardship pay differential rate of 25 percent
and an additional 15 percent incentive pay. According to mission
officials, these pay incentives are essential for attracting high-
quality staff to Mali, and many of the staff with whom we met
acknowledged that the extra pay was a factor when they decided to bid
on the Mali positions.
* At several missions we visited--Egypt, Mali, and Peru--USAID
officials told us that the salaries set for foreign national employees
by the respective embassies make it difficult for missions to recruit
and retain the country's top professional talent.[Footnote 16] This was
particularly true in the poorest countries with limited human resource
capacities, such as Mali, where the mission director stated that it is
becoming increasingly difficult to compete with international financial
institutions and other donor organizations for the country's most
highly qualified professionals.
* Officials at all the missions we visited said that lengthy clearance
processes make it difficult to obtain staff in a timely manner and
manage their workforces. U.S. direct-hire staff and personal services
contractors must obtain both a security clearance and a medical
clearance before they report to work. As we reported in July
2002,[Footnote 17] in many cases it took 6 months to a year to hire
personal services contractors for the emergency hurricane
reconstruction program in Latin America, and much of that time was
spent waiting for clearances.
* USAID officials in several countries--particularly Ecuador, Mali, and
Senegal--also cited the agency's separately appropriated operating
expense budget as a factor in their ability to support and train U.S.
direct-hire staff.[Footnote 18] USAID missions are supposed to pay for
all U.S. direct-hire local expenses--such as housing, dependents'
education, travel, and training--from its operating expense budgets and
not from program funds. According to mission officials, operating
expense funds have not kept pace with rising fixed costs, such as rent,
facilities management, and foreign national salaries and benefits. As a
result, missions often opt for contractor staff who can be paid from
program funds. In addition, tight operating expense funds and the
limited number of U.S. direct-hire staff on board have led some
missions to restrict training opportunities for U.S. direct-hire staff.
Officials at the Mali and Senegal missions cited availability of
training for direct-hire staff as one of their major workforce
challenges.
Inadequate Attention to Workforce Planning Has Affected USAID's Ability
to Deliver Foreign Assistance:
Because USAID has not responded to its changing workforce requirements
with a strategic workforce planning approach, its ability to carry out
its mission has been weakened. In response to a combination of poor
technology investments and other budgetary pressures in the mid-1990s,
USAID implemented a reduction in force and froze hiring. However, the
downsizing was conducted across the board and was not linked to a
strategic vision or skills analysis. The agency lost a cadre of
experienced foreign service officers and 5 years elapsed before new
staff were hired to replace them. USAID officials noted that the
downsizings of the last decade have resulted in an insufficient
pipeline of junior and mid-level staff with the experience to take on
senior positions. As a result, several human capital vulnerabilities
have surfaced but have not been systematically addressed. For example:
* Increased attrition of U.S. direct hires since the reduction in force
in the mid-1990s led to the loss of the most experienced foreign
service officers, while the hiring freeze stopped the pipeline of new
hires at the junior level. The shortage of junior and mid-level
officers to staff frontline jobs and a number of unfilled positions
have created difficulties at some overseas missions.
* Having fewer U.S. direct hires managing more programs in more
countries has resulted in a workforce that is overstretched, raising
concerns about USAID's ability to provide effective accountability for
program results and financial management. As of December 31, 2002,
USAID reported it had 631 U.S. direct-hire staff overseas compared to
1,082 at the end of fiscal year 1992. However, USAID has not conducted
a comprehensive workload analysis to determine the extent to which
staff may be overburdened or unable to perform all required tasks.
* USAID does not have a "surge capacity" to respond to emergencies;
post-conflict situations, such as Afghanistan and Iraq; or new
strategic priorities, such as Pakistan and the Middle East.
* USAID has generally recruited staff for their technical and
development expertise, but they spend a significant portion of their
time managing contracts and grants, a responsibility for which some
staff have limited skills or training.
* Funding limitations and the shortage of U.S direct hires at USAID
missions have curtailed opportunities for on-the-job and formal
training and mentoring for both new staff and those taking on the most
senior mission positions. Those who have the knowledge and experience
have little time for training and mentoring, and the missions do not
have enough staff who can cover the tasks of those in training. This
has forced USAID to assign increasing numbers of less experienced staff
overseas who may not have the essential skills.
* According to senior USAID officials, the reductions in direct-hire
foreign service staff have limited the agency's ability to plan for
emerging development issues because staff must spend most of their time
preparing paperwork and monitoring activities. For example, USAID did
not have adequate staff with the knowledge, skills, and abilities to
quickly deal with such emerging issues as famine and human
immunodeficiency virus/acquired immune deficiency syndrome. Although
the agency eventually caught up with these issues, its ability to
anticipate development trends and demands has decreased.
USAID's Progress in Implementing Strategic Workforce Planning
Principles Is Limited:
USAID does not have a systematic method for determining its workforce
needs and for implementing strategies that will enable its staff to
meet the agency's numerous challenges and accomplish its strategic
mission. USAID is making limited progress in addressing the four
principles for effective strategic workforce planning that we
identified as key practices (see fig. 3).
Figure 3: Principles for Effective Strategic Workforce Planning:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Involvement of Agency Leaders, Employees, and Stakeholders in Strategic
Workforce Planning Is Limited:
USAID's senior management is developing a human capital strategy to
respond to the President's Management Agenda, but it has not identified
how it will significantly involve employees and other stakeholders in
developing and communicating the workforce strategies that result from
its efforts. We found that strategic workforce planning is most likely
to succeed if an agency's leadership sets the overall direction and
goals and involves employees and stakeholders in developing,
communicating, and implementing workforce and human capital strategies.
During the 1990s, USAID's downsizing efforts and budgetary constraints
took precedence over strategic workforce planning. Its human resource
office was understaffed and lacked experience in strategic workforce
planning, focusing mostly on collecting workforce data and hiring to
replace staff lost through attrition.
USAID's leadership has attempted to reform its management systems. It
established the Business Transformation Executive Committee in February
2002 to comply with the President's Management Agenda's initiatives,
and it appointed a Chief Human Capital Officer in May 2003 as required
by the Chief Human Capital Officers Act of 2002.[Footnote 19] In
December 2002, the business transformation committee formed a human
capital subcommittee, consisting of senior program and human resource
officials, to develop USAID's human capital strategy. USAID's human
capital strategy has not been finalized or approved by the Office of
Management and Budget and the Office of Personnel Management. In
addition, we were unable to determine whether the draft human capital
strategy is linked to the agency's overall strategic plan, as we
recommended in 1993. USAID's strategic plan for fiscal years 2004
through 2009--a joint plan with the State Department--is also in draft
and not planned for issuance until the end of fiscal year 2003.
In addition to its human capital strategy development, as part of the
effort to comply with the President's Management Agenda, the USAID
Administrator established a group in January 2003 to develop criteria
for overseas staffing and to rationalize the deployment of foreign
service officers overseas. The group subsequently developed--and the
Administrator approved--a template for staffing overseas missions that
gives most weight to the dollar size of the country program but also
considers the relative performance of the host governments and provides
some flexibility to the regional bureaus as necessary.
Involving employees and stakeholders in the strategic workforce
planning process is also important to encourage support and
understanding for its outcomes. According to a USAID senior official,
the human capital subcommittee has involved some internal groups in the
planning process through the use of working groups that include senior
and mid-level employees. In addition, according to USAID officials, the
Administrator has discussed his human capital initiatives and answered
questions at "town hall" meetings with USAID employees. However,
because the strategy is still in draft, we cannot comment on the extent
to which agency staff will be involved in implementing the strategy.
Historically, USAID has established many internal committees to analyze
workforce planning problems but has not always followed through in
implementing their recommendations.[Footnote 20] In addition,
according to senior USAID officials, the agency has not included
nongovernmental organizations and other implementing partners in the
development of its human capital strategy.
USAID's Efforts to Identify Critical Skills and Competencies Are
Limited by Inadequate Personnel Information:
USAID has begun to identify the core competencies needed by its
workforce, and it recently established a working group to conduct
workforce analysis and planning related to core USAID competencies.
However, it has not documented the critical skills and competencies of
its current workforce, and its personnel information system does not
always provide reliable and timely data. USAID must determine the
critical skills and competencies required to meet its current and
anticipated strategic program goals. This is especially important as
changes in national security, technology, and other factors alter the
environment within which foreign policy agencies operate. In addition,
like many other federal agencies, USAID's workforce is increasingly
eligible for retirement, creating an opportunity to refocus its
workforce competencies to those geared toward the critical skills and
competencies it will need in the future. To meet these challenges
effectively, USAID needs to know its present workforce skills and
competencies and identify those that are critical to achieving its
strategic goals.
Effective workforce planning and management require that human capital
staff and other managers base their workforce analyses and decisions on
complete, accurate, and timely personnel data. However, USAID's
personnel information system is not entirely accurate and does not
contain all of the information USAID needs for sound workforce decision
making. For example, a recent audit of USAID's human capital data by
its Inspector General found that the data collected through this
automated process were not current, consistent, totally accurate, or
complete.[Footnote 21] USAID is attempting to address its personnel
information system problems through a recently implemented Web-based
application that will allow for customized, centralized, and real-time
reporting. As of mid-June 2003, about 85 percent of the missions had
submitted data through the new system. Officials at the human resource
office, in responding to a draft of this report, expect this new system
to be fully operational in time to generate the September 30, 2003,
worldwide staffing report.
Nevertheless, USAID has no systematic or agencywide method to determine
the skills and competencies of its current staff. Although the new
personnel database will provide better information on the locations and
position categories of its staff, it is not designed to identify
current critical skills and competencies. According to officials from
the human resource office, the new system will provide the position
occupational code for all employees, but this will not include
information on current skills and abilities. However, as part of its
draft human capital strategy, in June 2003 USAID established a team to
carry out a comprehensive workforce analysis and planning effort. The
team will first develop a pilot workforce plan, including an analysis
of current skills and future needs, in three headquarters offices--
human resources, procurement, and global health. One of the working
group's tasks is to identify an appropriate tool to collect, store, and
manage data on competencies, training, and career development.
USAID's overseas assessment team also developed findings and made a
number of recommendations regarding USAID's model for delivering
assistance and the types of skills that the agency will need to meet
future program needs.[Footnote 22] For example, according to the team's
study, USAID's foreign service recruitment should focus more on basic
agency operational skills such as program and project development,
financial management, procurement, and legal expertise. The study notes
that these abilities are essential for missions in developing programs,
policies, and strategies; ensuring accountability; and representing
U.S. government interests with host government officials and other
stakeholders. Furthermore, according to the study, due to the shortage
of U.S. direct-hire foreign service staff, about 160 personal services
contractors currently serve in these positions, which USAID considers
inherently governmental functions and normally fills with U.S. direct-
hire staff.
USAID's Strategies to Address Critical Skill Gaps Are Not
Comprehensive:
Although USAID has implemented some recruitment strategies to address
attrition concerns and staffing gaps, the strategies are limited to
certain segments of the workforce. Furthermore, USAID cannot be certain
that these measures will be effective, because the recruitment plans
have not been based on analyses that match current skills with those
needed to meet future strategic goals. Our strategic human capital
model stresses the importance of developing human capital strategies--
the programs, policies, and processes that agencies use to build and
manage their workforces--that are tailored to agencies' unique
needs.[Footnote 23] Applying this principle to strategic workforce
planning means that agencies consider how hiring, training, staff
development, performance management, and other human capital strategies
can be used to eliminate gaps and gain the critical skills and
competencies needed in the future.
USAID has implemented specific workforce strategies for some segments
of its workforce to address shortages in critical skills and
competencies, but these efforts are not comprehensive. Since fiscal
year 1999, USAID has hired more than 200 mid-level foreign service
officers through its New Entry Professionals program and 47 civil
service employees through the Presidential Management Intern program.
The agency recently reinstituted its International Development Intern
program for junior foreign service officers and plans to make 15 offers
in March 2004. According to USAID officials, the agency is hiring staff
with updated technical and management skills. These measures are
important efforts to bring in experienced mid-level staff and junior
staff with new skill sets that can help shape the agency's future as
the current workforce becomes eligible for retirement. However, USAID
has not developed a workforce plan for its civil service staff--a
factor noted by OMB in its Presidential Management Agenda "scorecard"
of USAID's human capital management efforts. In responding to our draft
report, USAID stated that it will not refine its civil service
recruitment plan until its workforce analysis is complete. In the
meantime, the current civil service plan calls for hiring about 15
Presidential Management Interns a year, allowing offices to replace
civil service staff in accordance with approved reorganization plans,
and hiring above established ceilings for critical staff needs, such as
contracts officers. USAID also has not yet developed workforce plans
for its personal services contractors, who make up the majority of its
workforce, although USAID plans to do so in response to a
recommendation by its Inspector General.[Footnote 24]
In addition to its recruitment efforts, USAID has revived certain
training programs that were halted during the 1990s, such as executive
leadership training and management programs. However, these target
mostly senior management, according to a USAID survey of civil service
employees. In responding to our draft, USAID noted that its leadership
training is conducted at three levels--emerging, senior, and executive-
-and that its challenge is to broaden such training and make it more
available. USAID also noted that it needs to offer entry-level training
to all staff, not just foreign service officers. In addition, the
agency is revising its training curriculum to provide more online
training opportunities for all staff.
USAID's personnel information system has not always provided accurate
data, and the agency has not undertaken a comprehensive analysis of the
skills and competencies of its current staff and matched this data to
future requirements. As a result, USAID cannot ensure that its
recruitment plans accurately reflect its hiring needs. Since 1999,
missions have been required to submit staffing projections as part of
USAID's annual report and budget justification process. The human
resource office uses this information to develop its annual foreign
service recruitment and training plans. According to a human resource
official, the recent overseas staffing assessment will result in better
guidance to the field and to headquarters offices on reporting their
staffing needs.
USAID Has Not Created a System to Monitor and Evaluate Its Progress:
Because USAID's human capital strategy is still in draft and not yet
approved, we cannot comment on whether its action plan will have
specific timetables and indicators to evaluate its progress in meeting
its human capital goals and to help ensure that these efforts continue
under the leadership of successive administrators. Strategic workforce
planning entails the development and use of indicators to measure both
the progress in achieving human capital goals and how the outcomes of
these strategies can help an organization accomplish its mission and
programmatic goals. USAID has had difficulties in defining practical,
meaningful measures that assess the impact of human capital strategies
on program results. For example, USAID's fiscal year 2002 performance
plan continues to emphasize the agency's efforts to achieve activity-
oriented goals, such as the number of employees hired or trained, but
these measures do not help gauge how well USAID's human capital efforts
helped the agency achieve its programmatic goals. As a result, the link
between specific human capital strategies and strategic program
outcomes is not clear.
Conclusions:
USAID has evolved from an agency consisting primarily of U.S. direct-
hire foreign service officers who directly implemented development
projects to one in which foreign service officers manage and oversee
development programs and projects carried out by institutional
contractors and grantees. Since 1992, the number of U.S. direct-hire
staff has decreased by 37 percent, but the number of countries with
USAID programs has almost doubled. In addition, USAID program funding
increased 57 percent in fiscal years 2002 and 2003. As a result, USAID
has increasingly relied on contractor staff--primarily personal
services contractors--to manage its day-to-day activities overseas. In
addition to having fewer U.S. direct-hire foreign service officers to
provide direction and accountability for its foreign assistance
programs, USAID operates in overseas environments that present unique
challenges to its ability to manage a quality workforce. With fewer and
less experienced U.S. direct-hire staff managing increasing levels of
foreign assistance in more countries, along with expected increases in
program funds for Afghanistan and Iraq, significant funding increases
for the global initiative to fight human immunodeficiency virus/
acquired immune deficiency, and potential USAID involvement in the
Millennium Challenge Account, USAID's ability to provide oversight over
its foreign assistance activities and pursue U.S. foreign policy
objectives is becoming increasingly difficult. Because USAID has not
adopted a strategic approach to workforce planning and management, it
cannot ensure that it has addressed these challenges appropriately and
identified the right skill mix and competencies needed to carry out its
development assistance programs.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To help ensure that USAID can identify its future workforce needs and
pursue strategies that will help its workforce achieve the agency's
goals, we recommend that the USAID Administrator develop and
institutionalize a strategic workforce planning and management system
that reflects current workforce planning principles. This effort should
include the implementation of a reliable personnel information system,
an agencywide assessment of staff's skills and abilities, workforce
strategies that address identified staffing gaps in the foreign and
civil services, and a periodic evaluation of how these efforts
contribute toward the achievement of the agency's program goals.
Scope and Methodology:
To determine how workforce changes have affected USAID's ability to
carry out its mission, we reviewed the agency's workforce planning
documents and a number of internal and external reports on USAID's
human capital and workforce planning issues. We also interviewed
knowledgeable USAID officials representing the agency's regional,
technical, and management bureaus in Washington, D.C., and conducted
fieldwork at seven overseas missions--the Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
Egypt, Mali, Peru, Senegal, and the West Africa Regional Program in
Mali.[Footnote 25] To ensure consistency in our data collection
efforts, we used the same data collection instrument at each
location.[Footnote 26] We also administered a separate data collection
instrument at USAID's human resource office in Washington, D.C. In
examining the changes in USAID's workforce since 1990, we analyzed
personnel data provided by USAID and internal and external reports on
the changing roles of USAID's workforce. We did not formally verify the
accuracy of USAID's data; however, we noted in our findings that
USAID's personnel data were not entirely accurate, complete, or up to
date.
To examine USAID's progress in developing and implementing a strategic
workforce planning system, we evaluated the agency's efforts in terms
of principles used by leading organizations that we identified through
our work with the Office of Personnel Management, other U.S. government
agencies, the National Academy for Public Administration, and the
International Personnel Management Association. We analyzed USAID's
workforce planning documents, reviewed internal and external reports on
its human capital and workforce planning efforts, and interviewed
cognizant USAID officials at its Bureau for Management and its Bureau
for Policy and Program Coordination.
We conducted our work between July 2002 and June 2003 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
USAID provided written comments on a draft of this report (see app.
III). It concurred with our major findings and recommendations and
noted that our work grasped the agency's complex human capital
situation. USAID also reiterated that it recently established a working
group to carry out an integrated workforce analysis and planning
effort. According to USAID, this effort will assess the critical skills
and competencies of its workforce, identify the gaps between what the
agency currently has and what it will need in the future, and design
workforce strategies to fill those gaps. USAID also provided separate
technical comments on our draft, which we have incorporated as
appropriate.
As arranged with your office, we plan no further distribution of this
report for 30 days from the date of the report unless you publicly
announce its contents earlier. At that time, we will send copies to
interested congressional committees and to the Administrator, USAID;
the Secretary of State; and the Director, Office of Management and
Budget. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In
addition, this report will be available at no extra charge on the GAO
Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-4128 or at FordJ@gao.gov. Other contacts and
staff acknowledgments are listed in appendix IV.
Jess T. Ford, Director International Affairs and Trade:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Selected Reports Related to USAID's Workforce Planning:
Table 2: :
Report: Quainton, Anthony C.E. and Fulmer, Amanda M., Human Capital
Reform: 21st Century for USAID (Virginia, IBM Endowment for the
Business of Government: March 2003); Findings: * USAID needs increased
workforce planning, greater focus on recruitment, more training
opportunities, and increased retention; * Human resources department
is not effective; Recommendations: * Strengthen workforce planning and
better link workforce planning to the agency's mission..
Report: USAID Office of the Inspector General. Audit of USAID's Human
Capital Data, Audit Report Number 9-000-03-002-P (Washington, D.C.:
Dec. 20, 2002); Findings: * USAID's human capital data collected and
maintained was not up to date, consistent, totally accurate, or
complete; Recommendations: * Develop definitions and requirements so
reported data is on time, consistent, accurate, and complete; *
Provide training for staff members who enter and correct personnel
data; * Develop procedures for missions to attest to the accuracy of
their workforce data; * Institute process to collect data on the
reasons for employee attrition; * Develop workforce plans for USAID's
civil and nondirect-hire workforce..
Report: USAID Office of the Inspector General, Audit of USAID's
Workforce Planning for Procurement Officers, Audit Report Number 9-000-
03-001-P (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 13, 2002); Findings: * USAID has not
developed a comprehensive workforce plan that covers its entire
procurement workforce; Recommendations: * USAID needs to develop a
comprehensive workforce plan for the USAID procurement workforce..
Report: U.S. General Accounting Office, Foreign Assistance: Disaster
Recovery Program Addressed Intended Purposes but USAID Needs Greater
Flexibility to Improve Its Response Capability, GAO-02-787 (Washington,
D.C.: July 24, 2002); Findings: * Start-up challenges and obstacles
affected the initial pace of program implementation; * USAID lacked a
"surge capacity" to quickly design and implement a large-scale program
with relatively short time frames; Recommendations: * Implement
procedures to (1) allow USAID to quickly reassign key personnel, (2)
allow missions to expedite the hiring of contractor staff, and (3)
facilitate coordination with other U.S. government agencies involved in
reconstruction..
Report: U.S. Agency for International Development, USAID's Workforce
Analysis (Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2001); Findings: * Short-term
budget matters take precedence over long-term workforce planning
needs; * Lack of training; * Limited hiring of entry-level staff; *
Agency's program budget increased, but its workforce decreased for 10
years; Recommendations: * Foreign and civil service new hires must
possess managerial and analytical skills; * Agency must decide what
skills should be hired and what should be contracted..
Report: U.S. Agency for International Development, Human Resources
Business Area Analysis: Executive Summary (Washington, D.C.: August
1995); Findings: * USAID has significant barriers to workforce
planning; Recommendations: * Establish a workforce planning committee
to identify program needs on a continuing basis; * Reduce the number
of personnel backstops and develop qualifications in multiple skills
categories; * Create an inventory of staff work history, experience,
skills, and abilities; * Adopt a single unified personnel system..
Report: U.S. General Accounting Office, Foreign Assistance: AID
Strategic Direction and Continued Management Improvements Needed, GAO/
NSIAD-93-106 (Washington, D.C.: June 11, 1993); Findings: *
Responsibilities of workforce are changing; * Workforce lacked needed
skills; * USAID had not adequately planned for workforce needs; *
Ineffective placement, training, and recruitment constrained workforce
management; Recommendations: * Develop and implement a comprehensive
workforce planning and management capability as a systematic,
agencywide effort; * Institutionalize this capability to ensure its
continuation by successive administrations..
Report: U.S. Agency for International Development, Workforce Planning
Working Group Report (Washington, D.C.: 1991); Findings: * USAID does
not have an effective workforce planning system; Recommendations: *
Determine the desired general composition of the direct-hire workforce
and develop a plan for reshaping the workforce along those lines; *
Conduct an individual skills profile of the existing workforce and
analyze it in the context of the desired general composition of the
direct-hire workforce; * Restructure the personnel backstop system to
simplify, reduce, and thereby broaden categories..
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix II: USAID Worldwide Foreign Assistance Programs Locations:
Countries Receiving USAID Assistance with U.S. Direct-Hire Staff
Presence.
Africa Region; Countries Receiving USAID Assistance with U.S. Direct-
Hire Staff Presence: Angola; Benin; Democratic Republic of Congo;
Eritrea; Ethiopia; Ghana; Guinea; Kenya; Liberia; Madagascar; Malawi;
Mali; Mozambique; Namibia; Nigeria; Rwanda; Senegal; South Africa;
Tanzania; Uganda; Zambia; Zimbabwe.
Asia and the Near East Region; Countries Receiving USAID Assistance
with U.S. Direct-Hire Staff Presence: Cambodia; East Timor; Egypt;
Indonesia; Jordan; Lebanon; Mongolia; Morocco; Nepal; Pakistan;
Philippines; Sri Lanka; Thailand; West Bank and Gaza; Yemen.
Europe and Eurasia Region; Countries Receiving USAID Assistance with
U.S. Direct-Hire Staff Presence: Albania; Armenia; Azerbaijan; Bosnia
and Herzegovina; Bulgaria; Croatia; Georgia; Kazakhstan; Kosovo;
Kyrgyzstan; Moldova; Romania; Russia; Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia; Yugoslav Republic of Montenegro; Yugoslav Republic of
Serbia; Ukraine; Uzbekistan.
Latin America and the Caribbean Region; Countries Receiving USAID
Assistance with U.S. Direct-Hire Staff Presence: Bolivia; Brazil;
Colombia; Dominican Republic; Ecuador; El Salvador; Guatemala; Guyana;
Haiti; Honduras; Jamaica; Mexico; Nicaragua; Panama; Paraguay; Peru.
Countries Receiving USAID Assistance with No U.S. Direct-Hire Staff
Presence.
Africa Region; Countries Receiving USAID Assistance with U.S. Direct-
Hire Staff Presence: Botswana; Burkina Faso; Burundi; Cameroon; Cape
Verdi; Central Africa Republic; Chad; Comoro;s Congo (Brazzaville);
Cote d'Ivoire; Equatorial Guinea; Gabon; Guinea Bissau; Lesotho;
Mauritania; Mauritius; Niger; Sao Tome; Seychelles; Sierra Leone;
Somalia; Sudan; Swaziland; The Gambia; Togo.
Asia and the Near East Region; Countries Receiving USAID Assistance
with U.S. Direct-Hire Staff Presence: Algeria; Bahrain; China;
Djibouti; Hong Kong; Iraq; Israel; Kiribati; Laos; Malaysia;
Myanmar (Burma); Niue; North Korea; Oman; Palau; Papua New Guinea;
Samoa; Singapore; Solomon Islands; South Korea; Taiwan; Tajikistan;
Tonga; Tunisia; Turkey; Turkmenistan; Vanuatu; Vietnam.
Europe and Eurasia Region; Countries Receiving USAID Assistance with
U.S. Direct-Hire Staff Presence: Belarus; Cyprus; Czech Republic;
Estonia; Greece; Hungary; Ireland and Northern Ireland; Latvia;
Lithuania; Poland; Slovakia; Slovenia.
Latin America and the Caribbean Region; Countries Receiving USAID
Assistance with U.S. Direct-Hire Staff Presence: Anguilla; Antigua and
Barbuda; Argentina; Bahamas; Barbados; British Virgin Islands; Belize;
Cayman Islands; Chile; Costa Rica; Cuba; Dominica; Eastern Caribbean
and Windward Islands; Grenada; Montserrat; St. Kitts and Nevis;
St. Lucia; St. Vincent and the Grenadines; Suriname; Trinidad and
Tobago; Turks and Caicos Islands; Uruguay; Venezuela.
USAID Regional Service Platforms. Services include legal, executive
office, financial/controller, procurement, and program and project
development support services. Services vary among the 26 platforms; for
example, the regional office in Kenya provides all services to up to 14
countries, while the Honduras mission simply shares a contracts officer
with Nicaragua.
Africa Region; Countries Receiving USAID Assistance with U.S. Direct-
Hire Staff Presence: Benin; Botswana - Regional Center for Southern
Africa; Ghana; Guinea; Kenya - Regional Economic Development
Services Office for East and Southern Africa; Mali - West African
Regional Program; Senegal; South Africa.
Asia and the Near East Region; Countries Receiving USAID Assistance
with U.S. Direct-Hire Staff Presence: Bangladesh; Egypt; India;
Indonesia; Jordan; Pakistan; Philippines; Thailand - Regional
Development Office (planned).
Europe and Eurasia Region; Countries Receiving USAID Assistance with
U.S. Direct-Hire Staff Presence: Georgia - Caucasus Regional Office;
Hungary - Regional Services Center; Kazakhstan - Central Asia Regional
Office; Ukraine - West/Newly Independent States Regional Office.
Latin America and the Caribbean Region; Countries Receiving USAID
Assistance with U.S. Direct-Hire Staff Presence: Bolivia (La Paz);
Dominican Republic (Santo Domingo); El Salvador (San Salvador);
Guatemala (Guatemala City); Honduras (Tegucigalpa); Peru (Lima).
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International
Development:
United States Agency for International Development:
JUL 30 2003:
Mr. Jess T. Ford Director International Affairs and Trade U.S. General
Accounting Office 441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Ford:
I am pleased to provide the U.S. Agency for International Development's
(USAID's) formal response to the draft GAO report entitled "FOREIGN
ASSISTANCE: Strategic Workforce Planning Can Help USAID Address Current
and Future Challenges" (July 2003).
I wish to commend your team for the exemplary manner in which they
conducted this review and their fine work in grasping our complex Human
Capital situation. We concur in the major findings and recommendations.
The report could give greater visibility to a significant effort
underway. Last month USAID chartered a working group to carry out
comprehensive and integrated workforce analysis and workforce planning
that covers the entire workforce. It will assess the critical skills
and
competencies of our workforce; identify the gaps between what we have
and what we need for the future; and design the strategies for closing
those gaps.
Thank you for this opportunity to respond to the GAO draft report and
for the courtesies extended by your staff during the conduct of this
review. Please note that under separate cover we have submitted our
technical comments per your staff's instructions.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
John Marshall:
Assistant Administrator Bureau for Management:
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
Albert H. Huntington, III (202) 512-4140 Audrey Solis (202) 512-3042:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the above named individuals, Kimberley Ebner, Jeanette
Espinola, and Rhonda Horried made key contributions to this report.
Martin de Alteriis, Mark Dowling, Reid Lowe, and José M. Peña, III,
provided technical assistance.
FOOTNOTES
[1] U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Overseas Loans and
Grants and Assistance from International Organizations, July 1, 1945-
September 30, 2001. Figure equals $541 billion in fiscal year 2003
dollars and includes USAID's Food for Peace and title II section 416
emergency and development programs.
[2] U.S. General Accounting Office, Foreign Assistance: AID Strategic
Direction and Continued Management Improvements Needed, GAO/
NSIAD-93-106 (Washington, D.C.: June 11, 1993).
[3] U.S. General Accounting Office, High-Risk Series: An Update,
GAO-01-263 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 1, 2001).
[4] Office of Management and Budget, The President's Management Agenda,
Fiscal Year 2002.
[5] GAO/NSIAD-93-106.
[6] U.S. General Accounting Office, Foreign Assistance: Status of
USAID's Reforms, GAO-NSIAD-241-BR (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 24, 1996);
Foreign Assistance: USAID's Reengineering at Overseas Missions, GAO/
NSIAD-97-194 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 12, 1997).
[7] U.S. General Accounting Office, Foreign Assistance: Disaster
Recovery Program Addressed Intended Purposes, but USAID Needs Greater
Flexibility to Improve Its Response Capability, GAO-02-787 (Washington,
D.C.: July 24, 2002).
[8] All figures exclude the staff of USAID's Office of the Inspector
General, which includes 95 foreign service officers (51 posted
overseas) and 76 civil service staff in Washington, D.C.
[9] Most foreign national direct-hire staff have been converted to
personal services contractors.
[10] The Federal Acquisition Regulations define a personal services
contract as one that makes the contractor appear as a government
employee by the nature of the relationship that is established. USAID
is authorized by section 636(a)(3) of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961, as amended, to contract with individuals for personal services
abroad. USAID's personal services contractors may be U.S. citizens,
host-country nationals, or third-country nationals.
[11] In 1990, USAID estimated that this extended workforce was
approximately 10,000 individuals. For this report, USAID was unable to
provide an estimate.
[12] U.S. General Accounting Office, Foreign Assistance: USAID Relies
Heavily on Nongovernmental Organizations, but Better Data Needed to
Evaluate Approaches, GAO-02-471 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 25, 2002).
[13] GAO-02-787.
[14] Services include legal, executive office, financial/controller,
procurement, and program and project development support services.
Services vary among the 26 platforms due to security, ease of travel,
and other local concerns. For example, the regional office in Kenya
provides all services to up to 14 countries, while the Honduras mission
simply shares a contracts officer with Nicaragua.
[15] USAID considers selected missions in sub-Sahara Africa and other
areas "difficult to staff" missions. To entice staff to take these
assignments, USAID provides a differential pay incentive of 15 percent
in addition to the regular pay differential for hardship missions.
[16] Embassies generally set the grading and pay scales for foreign
national employees. Embassies' local hires are generally lower-graded
personnel, such as administrative staff, maintenance workers, and
drivers, while USAID must employ these staff as well as senior-level
economists and other technical experts and professionals.
[17] GAO-02-787.
[18] We plan to issue a separate report on the use of USAID's operating
expense account.
[19] Public Law 107-296, November 25, 2002.
[20] See appendix I for summaries of various studies related to USAID's
human capital issues.
[21] USAID Office of Inspector General, Audit of USAID's Human Capital
Data, Audit Report 9-000-03-002-P (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 20, 2002).
[22] U.S. Agency for International Development, Report of the Overseas
Working Group, May 2003.
[23] U.S. General Accounting Office, A Model of Strategic Human Capital
Management, GAO-02-373SP (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2002).
[24] Inspector General report, 9-000-03-002-P. USAID employs 116
personal services contractors at its headquarters in Washington, D.C.
and 5,124 at its overseas missions.
[25] We also examined mission workforce documents and interviewed
officials at USAID's mission to Indonesia. The mission was relocated to
Arlington, Virginia, following its evacuation in October 2002. It has
since been relocated back to Indonesia.
[26] We did not use the data collection instrument on our visit to the
Dominican Republic, which we visited in November 2002 to conduct survey
work and test our audit approach.
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