Foreign Assistance
USAID Needs to Improve Its Workforce Planning and Operating Expense Accounting Gao ID: GAO-03-1171T September 23, 2003USAID oversees humanitarian and economic assistance--an integral part of the U.S. global security strategy--to more than 160 countries. GAO recommended in 1993 that USAID develop a comprehensive workforce plan; however, human capital management continues to be a high-risk area for the agency. GAO was asked to testify on how changes in USAID's workforce over the past 10 years have affected its ability to deliver foreign aid, the agency's progress in implementing a strategic workforce planning system, and whether its reported operating expenses reflect the full costs of delivering foreign aid.
USAID has evolved from an agency in which U.S. direct-hire staff directly implemented development projects to one in which U.S. direct-hire staff oversee the activities of contractors and grantees. Since 1992, the number of USAID U.S. direct-hire staff declined by 37 percent, but the number of countries with USAID programs doubled and, over the last 2 years, program funding increased more than 78 percent. As a result of these and other changes in its workforce and its mostly ad-hoc approach to workforce planning, USAID faces several human capital vulnerabilities. For example, attrition of experienced foreign service officers and inadequate training and mentoring have sometimes led to the deployment of staff who lack essential skills and experience. The agency also lacks a "surge capacity" to respond to evolving foreign policy priorities and emerging crises. With fewer and less experienced staff managing more programs in more countries, USAID's ability to oversee the delivery of foreign assistance is becoming increasingly difficult. USAID has taken steps toward developing a workforce planning and human capital management system that should enable the agency to meet its challenges and achieve its mission, but it needs to do more, such as conducting a comprehensive skills assessment and including its civil service and contracted employees in its workforce planning efforts. USAID's reported that operating expenses do not always reflect the full costs of administering foreign assistance because the agency pays for some support and oversight activities done by contractors with program funds. As a result, the amount of program funds directly benefiting foreign recipients is likely overstated.
GAO-03-1171T, Foreign Assistance: USAID Needs to Improve Its Workforce Planning and Operating Expense Accounting
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Testimony Before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging
Threats, and International Relations, House Committee on Government
Reform:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT:
Tuesday, September 23, 2003:
Foreign Assistance:
USAID Needs to Improve Its Workforce Planning and Operating Expense
Accounting:
Statement of Jess T. Ford, Director International Affairs and Trade:
GAO-03-1171T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-03-1171T, a report to Subcommittee on National
Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, House
Committee on Government Reform
Why GAO Did This Study:
USAID oversees humanitarian and economic assistance”an integral part
of the U.S. global security strategy”to more than 160 countries. GAO
recommended in 1993 that USAID develop a comprehensive workforce plan;
however, human capital management continues to be a high-risk area for
the agency.
GAO was asked to testify on how changes in USAID‘s workforce over the
past 10 years have affected its ability to deliver foreign aid, the
agency‘s progress in implementing a strategic workforce planning
system, and whether its reported operating expenses reflect the full
costs of delivering foreign aid.
What GAO Found:
USAID has evolved from an agency in which U.S. direct-hire staff
directly implemented development projects to one in which U.S. direct-
hire staff oversee the activities of contractors and grantees. Since
1992, the number of USAID U.S. direct-hire staff declined by 37
percent, but the number of countries with USAID programs doubled and,
over the last 2 years, program funding increased more than 78 percent.
As a result of these and other changes in its workforce and its mostly
ad-hoc approach to workforce planning, USAID faces several human
capital vulnerabilities. For example, attrition of experienced foreign
service officers and inadequate training and mentoring have sometimes
led to the deployment of staff who lack essential skills and
experience. The agency also lacks a ’surge capacity“ to respond to
evolving foreign policy priorities and emerging crises. With fewer and
less experienced staff managing more programs in more countries,
USAID‘s ability to oversee the delivery of foreign assistance is
becoming increasingly difficult. USAID has taken steps toward
developing a workforce planning and human capital management system
that should enable the agency to meet its challenges and achieve its
mission, but it needs to do more, such as conducting a comprehensive
skills assessment and including its civil service and contracted
employees in its workforce planning efforts.
USAID‘s reported that operating expenses do not always reflect the
full costs of administering foreign assistance because the agency pays
for some support and oversight activities done by contractors with
program funds. As a result, the amount of program funds directly
benefiting foreign recipients is likely overstated.
What GAO Recommends:
To help USAID plan for changes in its workforce and continue
operations in an uncertain environment, we recommended that the USAID
Administrator institutionalize a strategic workforce planning and
management system that takes advantage of strategic workforce planning
principles.
USAID agreed with our findings and recommendation and noted it has
recently undertaken some efforts to improve management of its
workforce.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-1171T.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click
on the link above. For more information, contact Jess Ford at (202)
512-4268 or fordj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss our report on USAID's
workforce planning[Footnote 1] and highlight the preliminary findings
from our ongoing review of USAID's operating expense account. The
workforce report is being released today. Humanitarian and economic
development assistance is an integral part of U.S. global security
strategy, particularly as the United States seeks to diminish the
underlying conditions of poverty and corruption that may be linked to
instability and terrorism. In fiscal year 2003, USAID expects to
obligate about $13 billion and manage programs in about 160 countries.
Agency staff often work in difficult environments and under evolving
program demands. More will be demanded of USAID's staff as they
implement large-scale relief and reconstruction programs in Afghanistan
and Iraq while continuing traditional long-term development assistance
programs.
As a result, it is essential that USAID develop a strategic approach to
its workforce planning so that it can identify and attain the
essentials skills it needs to accomplish its goals. It is also
important that USAID identify and report accurate costs on
administering its foreign aid programs. My statement today will cover
these two broad areas.
I will focus most of my statement on our review of USAID's workforce
planning. I will discuss some of USAID's human capital challenges,
including its recent efforts to staff missions in Afghanistan and Iraq,
and the status of its efforts to develop a strategic workforce planning
system. Regarding USAID's operating expense account, I will focus on
how the agency's reporting of operating expenses does not always
capture the full cost of administering foreign assistance.
Summary:
USAID's workforce has undergone many changes over the years. For
example, the number of U.S. direct-hire staff, including foreign
service officers, has dropped 37 percent from 3,163 in 1992 to 1,985 in
December 2002; and the agency has increasingly relied on personal
services and institutional contractors to implement its humanitarian
and development assistance projects and manage the day-to-day
activities of overseas missions. At the same time, while the number of
countries with USAID activities has almost doubled, program funding
levels have remained relatively level, with significant increases in
2003.
However, as we reported in 1993 and still find today, USAID has not
developed a comprehensive, strategic workforce planning system that
would help it manage these changes. As a result, the agency faces a
number of human capital challenges, such as difficulties in filling
overseas positions, a lack of mentoring and training opportunities for
new staff, and the lack of a "surge capacity" to quickly respond to
post-emergency and disaster situations. These vulnerabilities are
reflected in the agency's difficulties in staffing the missions in
Afghanistan and Iraq. As of early September, the Kabul mission had 61
vacancies, including 5 for direct-hire foreign service officers, and
the Baghdad mission had 13 vacancies that will most likely be filled by
contract staff.
Recently, and particularly in response to the President's Management
Agenda, USAID has taken a number of preliminary steps to determine the
workforce it needs now and in the future and devise strategies for
achieving these goals. However, in comparing USAID's efforts to proven
principles for strategic workforce planning, more work needs to be
done. Accordingly, we recommend that USAID develop and implement a
strategic workforce planning system to help it manage the changes in
its workforce and overseas environment.
USAID's operating expenses are a separate line-item appropriation
intended to clearly identify the agency's "cost of doing business." In
fiscal year 2003, USAID expects to obligate about $668 million for
operating expenses. However, USAID's reported operating expense
obligations do not always reflect all the costs associated with
managing its foreign aid program primarily because missions sometimes
pay contractors performing administrative or oversight duties with
program funds. Distinguishing between funds spent on operating expenses
and funds benefiting foreign recipients is not always clear; and, as a
result, the amount spent for program funds is likely overstated.
Background:
In 1993, we reported that USAID had not adequately managed changes in
its overseas workforce and recommended that USAID develop a
comprehensive workforce planning system to better identify staffing
needs and requirements.[Footnote 2] In the mid-1990s, USAID reorganized
its activities around strategic objectives and began reporting in a
results-oriented format but had made little progress in personnel
reforms.[Footnote 3] In July 2002, we reported that USAID could not
quickly relocate or hire the staff needed to implement a large-scale
reconstruction and recovery program in Latin America, and we
recommended actions to help improve USAID's staffing flexibility for
future disaster recovery requirements.[Footnote 4]
Studies by several organizations, including GAO, have shown that highly
successful service organizations use strategic management approaches to
prepare their workforces to meet present and future mission
requirements. We define strategic workforce planning as focusing on
long-term strategies for acquiring, developing, and retaining an
organization's workforce and aligning human capital approaches that are
clearly linked to achieving programmatic goals. Based on work with the
Office of Personnel Management and other entities, we identified
strategic workforce planning principles used by leading organizations.
According to these principles, a strategic workforce planning and
management system should (1) involve senior management, employees, and
stakeholders in developing, communicating, and implementing the
workforce plan; (2) determine the agency's current critical skills and
competencies and those needed to achieve program results; (3) develop
strategies to address gaps in critical skills and competencies; and (4)
monitor and evaluate progress and the contribution of strategic
workforce planning efforts in achieving program goals.
Until the mid-1970s, about two thirds of USAID's operating expenses
were funded from appropriations to program accounts, and the rest were
funded from a separate administrative expenses account.[Footnote 5] In
1976, Congress began providing a line-item appropriation for operating
expenses separate from USAID's humanitarian and economic development
assistance programs.[Footnote 6] The accompanying Senate report noted
that USAID's "cost of doing business" would be better managed if these
funds were separately appropriated.[Footnote 7] Congress authorized
USAID's separate operating expense account the following year.[Footnote
8] USAID's criteria for determining the expenses to be paid from
operating expense funds are based on guidance it has received from
Congress as well as its assessment of who benefits from a particular
activity--the agency or the intended program recipient. For example,
congressional reports in the late 1970s directed USAID to fund the
costs of all full-time staff in permanent positions from the operating
expense account. [Footnote 9]
Strategic Workforce Planning Can Help USAID Address Current and Future
Challenges:
USAID faces a number of challenges in developing and implementing a
strategic workforce plan. Its overseas missions operate in a changing
foreign policy environment often under very difficult conditions.
USAID's workforce, particularly its U.S. direct-hire foreign service
officers, has decreased over the years; but in recent years program
dollars and the number of countries with USAID activities have
increased. These factors have combined to produce certain human capital
vulnerabilities that have implications for the agency's ability to
effectively carry out and oversee foreign assistance. A strategic
approach to workforce planning and management can help USAID identify
the workforce it needs and develop strategies for attaining this
workforce that will last throughout successive administrations.
USAID Faces Challenges in Workforce Planning:
Since 1990, USAID has continued to evolve from an agency in which U.S.
direct-hire foreign service employees directly implemented development
projects to one with a declining number of direct-hire staff who
oversee the contractors and grantees carrying out most of its day-to-
day activities. As numbers of U.S. direct-hire staff declined, mission
directors began relying on other types of employees, primarily foreign
national personal services contractors, to manage mission operations
and oversee development activities implemented by third parties. In
December 2002, according to USAID's staffing report, the agency's
workforce totaled 7,741, including 1,985 U.S. direct-hires.[Footnote
10] Personal services contractors made up more than two-thirds of
USAID's total workforce, including 4,653 foreign national contractors.
Of the 1,985 U.S. direct-hires, 974 were foreign service officers,
about 65 percent of whom were posted overseas. Other individuals not
directly employed by USAID also perform a wide range of services in
support of the agency's programs. These individuals include employees
of institutional or services contractors, private voluntary
organizations, and grantees.[Footnote 11]
In addition to having reduced the number of U.S. direct hires, USAID
now manages programs in more countries with no USAID direct-hire
presence, and its overseas structure has become more regional. Table 1
illustrates the changes in USAID's U.S. direct-hire overseas presence
between fiscal years 1992 and 2002. In fiscal year 2002, USAID managed
activities in 88 countries with no U.S. direct-hire presence. According
to USAID, in some cases, activities in these countries are very small
and require little management by USAID staff. However, in 45 of these
countries USAID manages programs of $1 million or more, representing a
more significant burden on the agency. USAID also increasingly provides
administrative and program support to countries from regional service
platforms, which have increased from 2 to 26 between fiscal years 1992
and 2002.[Footnote 12] Program funding also recently increased about 78
percent--from $7.3 billion in fiscal year 2001 to about $13 billion in
fiscal year 2003.
Table 1: USAID U.S. Direct-Hire Presence, Fiscal Years 1992 and 2002:
USAID U.S. direct hires: Total number; Fiscal year 1992: 3,163[A];
Fiscal year 2002: 1,985[B]; Percentage change: (37).
USAID U.S. direct hires: Number assigned overseas; Fiscal year 1992:
1,082[A]; Fiscal year 2002: 631[B]; Percentage change: (42).
USAID U.S. direct hires: Number of countries receiving USAID assistance
with U.S. direct-hire presence; Fiscal year 1992: 66[C]; Fiscal year
2002: 71[D]; Percentage change: 7.
USAID U.S. direct hires: Number of countries receiving USAID assistance
with no U.S. direct-hire presence; Fiscal year 1992: 16[C]; Fiscal year
2002: 88[D]; Percentage change: 450.
Sources:
[A] USAID's Monthly Workforce Profile Report, data as of September 30,
1992.
[B] USAID's Quarterly Worldwide Staffing Pattern Report, data as of
December 31, 2002.
[C] U.S. General Accounting Office, Foreign Assistance: A Profile of
the Agency for International Development, GAO/NSIAD-92-148
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 3, 1992).
[D] USAID's Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination data provided in
May 2003. USAID staff cautioned that this information was gathered in
2002 and may not be up to date.
[End of table]
As a result of the decreases in U.S. direct-hire foreign service staff
levels, increasing program demands, and a mostly ad-hoc approach to
workforce planning, USAID now faces several human capital
vulnerabilities. For example, the attrition of its more experienced
foreign service officers, its difficulties in filling overseas
positions, and limited opportunities for training and mentoring have
sometimes led to the deployment of direct-hire staff who do not have
essential skills and experience and the reliance on contractors to
perform many functions. In addition, USAID lacks a "surge capacity" to
enable it to respond quickly to emerging crises and changing strategic
priorities. As a result, according to USAID officials and a recent
overseas staffing assessment, the agency is finding it increasingly
difficult to manage the delivery of foreign assistance.
In addition, USAID works in an overseas environment that presents
unique challenges to workforce planning. Mission officials noted the
difficulties in adhering to a formal workforce plan linked to country
strategies in an uncertain foreign policy environment. For example,
following the events of September 11, 2001, the Middle East and sub-
Saharan African missions we visited--Egypt, Mali, and Senegal--received
additional work that was not anticipated when they developed their
country development strategies and work plans. Also, the mission in
Ecuador had been scheduled to close in fiscal year 2003. However, this
decision was reversed due to political and economic events in Ecuador,
including a coup in 2000, the collapse of the financial system, and
rampant inflation. Program funding for Ecuador tripled from fiscal year
1999 to fiscal year 2000, while staffing was reduced from 110 to 30
personnel; and the budget for the mission's operating expenses was
reduced from $2.7 million to $1.37 million. During our field work, we
found that other factors unique to USAID's overseas work environment
can affect its ability to conduct workforce planning and attract and
retain top staff. These factors vary from country to country and among
regions and include difficulties in attracting staff to hardship posts,
inadequate salaries and benefits for attracting the top host country
professionals, and lengthy clearance processes for locally contracted
staff.
USAID's workforce challenges are illustrated by its difficulties in
staffing hardship posts like Afghanistan and Iraq. As of September 4,
2003, according to USAID's new personnel data system, the mission in
Kabul had 42 full-time staff--7 foreign service officers and 35
personal service contractors, mostly local hires. However, the mission
had 61 vacancies, including 5 vacancies for foreign service
officers.[Footnote 13] In Iraq, as of September 15, 2003, the mission
had 13 USAID direct-hire staff; 3 additional U.S. government employees;
and about 60 personal services and institutional contractors. The
mission had 13 vacancies that will most likely be filled by contract
staff.
USAID's human resource office is in its annual bidding process for
foreign service positions. When that process is complete, the office
expects to have a better picture of replacements for current staff in
Afghanistan and Iraq as well as additional placements. According to
USAID staff, the agency is having trouble attracting foreign service
officers to these posts because in-country conditions are difficult and
tours are unaccompanied. USAID's average staff age is in the late
forties, and this age group is generally attracted to posts that can
accommodate families. Both posts are responsible for huge amounts of
foreign aid--in fiscal year 2003 alone, USAID's assistance for
Afghanistan and Iraq is expected to total $817 million and $1.6
billion, respectively. USAID faces serious accountability and quality
of life issues as it attempts to manage and oversee large-scale,
expensive reconstruction programs in countries with difficult
conditions and inadequate numbers of both foreign service and local
hire staff.
USAID's Workforce Planning Efforts:
In response to the President's Management Agenda, USAID has taken steps
toward developing a comprehensive workforce planning and human capital
management system that should enable the agency to meet its challenges
and achieve its mission, but progress so far is limited. In evaluating
USAID's efforts in terms of proven strategic workforce planning
principles, USAID has more to do. For example:
* The involvement of USAID leadership, employees, and stakeholders in
developing and communicating a strategic workforce plan has been mixed.
USAID's human resource office is drafting a human capital strategy, but
at the time of our review it had not yet been finalized or approved by
such stakeholders as OMB and the Office of Personnel Management. As a
result, we cannot comment on whether USAID employees and other
stakeholders will have an active role in developing and communicating
the agency's workforce strategies.
* USAID has begun identifying the core competencies its future
workforce will need, and a working group is conducting a comprehensive
workforce analysis and planning pilot at three headquarters units that
will include an analysis of current skills. However, it has not yet
conducted a comprehensive assessment of the critical skills and
competencies of its current workforce. USAID hopes to have a contractor
in place by the end of September, 2003, to assist the working group in
identifying critical competencies and devising strategies to close
skill gaps. USAID is also in the process of determining the appropriate
information technology instrument and methodology that will permit the
assessment of its current workforce skills and competencies.
* USAID's strategies to address critical skill gaps are not
comprehensive and have not been based on a critical analysis of current
capabilities matched with future requirements. USAID has begun hiring
foreign service officers and Presidential Management Interns to replace
staff lost through attrition. However, the agency has not completed its
civil service recruitment plan and has not yet included personal
services contractors--the largest segment of its workforce--in its
agencywide workforce analysis and planning efforts. According to USAID
human resource staff, the civil service recruitment plan will be
completed after conducting the competency analysis for civil service
staff.
* USAID has not created a system to monitor and evaluate its progress
toward reaching its human capital goals and ensuring that its efforts
continue under the leadership of successive administrators.
* Because it does not have a comprehensive workforce planning and
management system, USAID cannot ensure that it has the essential skills
needed to carry out its ongoing and future programs. To help USAID plan
for changes in its workforce and continue operations in an uncertain
environment, our report recommends that the USAID Administrator develop
and institutionalize a strategic workforce planning and management
system that takes advantage of strategic workforce planning principles.
USAID's Operating Expense Account Does Not Reflect the Full Cost of
Delivering Foreign Assistance:
USAID's operating expense account does not fully reflect the agency's
cost of delivering foreign assistance, primarily because the agency
pays for some administrative activities done by contractors with
program funds. As we noted in our recent report, USAID's overseas
missions have increasingly hired personal services contractors to
manage USAID's development activities due to declining numbers of U.S.
direct-hire staff.[Footnote 14] According to USAID guidance, contractor
salaries and related support can be paid from program funds when the
expenses are benefiting a particular program or project. In some cases,
however, the duties performed by contractors, especially personal
services contractors, are indistinguishable from those done by U.S.
direct-hire staff. One senior level USAID program planning officer told
us that 10 to 15 percent of program funds may be a more realistic
estimate of USAID's cost of doing business, as opposed to the 8.5
percent average since fiscal year 1995 that we calculated based on our
analysis of USAID reported data.
* A recent USAID internal study identified about 160 personal services
contractors who were performing inherently governmental
duties,[Footnote 15] but these costs are not always reported as
operating expenses.
* Recent data collection efforts by USAID indicate that the agency will
likely obligate approximately $350 million in program funds for
operating expenses incurred during fiscal year 2003.
Because USAID's cost of doing business is not always separated from its
humanitarian and development programs--the original intent behind
establishing the separate operating expense account, the amount of
program funds that directly benefits a foreign recipient is likely
overstated.
Scope and Methodology:
Overall, to accomplish our objectives, we analyzed personnel data,
workforce planning documents, and obligations data reported by USAID in
its annual budget justification documents. We did not verify the
accuracy of USAID's reported data. We also interviewed cognizant USAID
officials representing the agency's regional, technical, and management
bureaus in Washington, D.C., and conducted fieldwork at seven overseas
missions--the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Mali, Peru, Senegal,
and the West Africa Regional Program in Mali.
* To examine USAID's progress in developing and implementing a
strategic workforce planning system, we evaluated the agency's efforts
in terms of workforce planning principles used by leading
organizations: ensuring the involvement of agency leadership,
employees, and stakeholders; determining current skills and
competencies and those needed; implementing strategies to address
critical staffing needs; and evaluating progress in achieving human
capital goals.
* To determine whether USAID's operating expenses reflect its cost of
doing business, we reviewed USAID reports and obligations data and
discussed the matter with cognizant officials at USAID, the Department
of State, and the Office of Management and Budget. We also reviewed
mission staffing reports to determine whether staff were funded from
the operating expense account or program funds and discussed staff
duties with cognizant mission officials.
We obtained written comments on a draft of our report on USAID's
workforce planning and discussed our preliminary findings from our
review of USAID's operating expense account with cognizant USAID
officials. Overall, USAID agreed with our findings and concurred with
our recommendation to implement a strategic workforce planning system.
Our review was conducted between July 2002 and September 2003 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my
prepared statement. I will be happy to answer any questions you may
have.
Contacts and Acknowledgments:
For future contacts regarding this testimony, please call Jess Ford at
(202) 512-4268 or Al Huntington at (202) 512-4140. Individuals making
key contributions to this testimony included Kimberly Ebner, Jeanette
Espinola, Emily Gupta, Rhonda Horried, and Audrey Solis. Mark Dowling,
Reid Lowe, and Jose Pena provided technical assistance.
FOOTNOTES
[1] U.S. General Accounting Office, Foreign Assistance: Strategic
Workforce Planning Can Help USAID Address Current and Future
Challenges, GAO-03-946 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 22, 2003).
[2] GAO/NSIAD-93-106.
[3] U.S. General Accounting Office, Foreign Assistance: Status of
USAID's Reforms, GAO-NSIAD-241-BR (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 24, 1996);
Foreign Assistance: USAID's Reengineering at Overseas Missions, GAO/
NSIAD-97-194 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 12, 1997).
[4] U.S. General Accounting Office, Foreign Assistance: Disaster
Recovery Program Addressed Intended Purposes, but USAID Needs Greater
Flexibility to Improve Its Response Capability, GAO-02-787 (Washington,
D.C.: July 24, 2002).
[5] The administration's budget request for fiscal year 1975 identified
11 separate funding accounts from which administrative expenses would
be funded.
[6] P.L. 94-330.
[7] S. Rept. 94-704.
[8] P.L. 95-88, Sec. 129, 22 U.S.C. 2427.
[9] H. Rept. 95-701 and S. Rept. 95-1194.
[10] All figures exclude the staff of USAID's Office of the Inspector
General, which includes 95 foreign service officers (51 posted
overseas) and 76 civil service staff in Washington, D.C.
[11] In 1990, USAID estimated this extended workforce was approximately
10,000 individuals. For this report, USAID was unable to provide an
estimate.
[12] Services include legal, executive office, financial/controller,
procurement, and program and project development support services.
Services vary among the 26 platforms due to security, ease of travel,
and other local concerns. For example, the regional office in Kenya
provides all services to up to 14 countries, while the Honduras mission
simply shares a contracts officer with Nicaragua.
[13] The foreign service vacancies included a supervisory program
officer, a supervisory general development officer, two general
development officers in the rural sector development office, and an
economic development officer. The vacancies of contractor staff ranged
from professionals with technical program or financial management
skills to numerous support positions, such as secretaries, clerks,
drivers, and maintenance workers.
[14] GAO-03-946.
[15] U.S. Agency for International Development, Report of the Overseas
Working Group, May 2003. USAID guidance states that salaries and
support for nondirect-hire staff performing inherently governmental
functions should be funded from the operating expenses account (ADS
601.5.7).
