U.S. Public Diplomacy
State Department Expands Efforts but Faces Significant Challenges Gao ID: GAO-03-951 September 4, 2003The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, focused attention on the need to improve public diplomacy efforts to cultivate a better public opinion of the United States abroad. However, recent opinion research indicates that many foreign publics, especially in countries with significant Muslim populations, view the United States unfavorably. GAO examined changes in the State Department's (State) public diplomacy efforts since September 11, whether State has an overall strategy for its public diplomacy programs, how it measures their effectiveness, and challenges it faces in implementing these programs.
Since September 11, State expanded its public diplomacy efforts in Muslim-majority countries considered to be of strategic importance in the war on terrorism. It significantly increased program funding and the number of Foreign Service officers in South Asia and the Near East. It also launched new initiatives targeting broader, younger audiences--particularly in predominantly Muslim countries--and plans to continue them in the future. After September 11, State acknowledged the lack of, and the need for, a comprehensive strategy that integrates all of its diverse public diplomacy activities. Such a strategy is still in the development stage. The absence of an integrated strategy could impede State's ability to direct its multifaceted efforts toward concrete and measurable progress. Furthermore, an interagency public diplomacy strategy has not been completed that would help State and other federal agencies convey consistent messages and achieve mutually reinforcing benefits overseas. State is not systematically and comprehensively measuring progress toward its public diplomacy goals. Its overseas performance measurement efforts focus on anecdotal evidence and program outputs, rather than indicate progress in changing foreign publics' understanding and opinions of the United States. State's efforts face significant challenges, including insufficient time and staff to conduct public diplomacy tasks. Public affairs officers responding to our survey said that burdensome administrative and budgetary processes divert their attention from public diplomacy programs. In addition, about 21 percent of Foreign Service officers in language-designated public diplomacy positions overseas lack sufficient foreign language skills. We also found that about 58 percent of public affairs officers responding to our survey believe the amount of time to attend public diplomacy training is inadequate.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-03-951, U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Expands Efforts but Faces Significant Challenges
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On December 31, 2003, this document was revised to add various
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Report to the Committee on International Relations, House of
Representatives:
September 2003:
U.S. Public Diplomacy:
State Department Expands Efforts but Faces Significant Challenges:
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-951] GAO-03-951:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-03-951, a report to the House Committee on
International Relations
Why GAO Did This Study:
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, focused attention on the
need to improve public diplomacy efforts to cultivate a better public
opinion of the United States abroad. However, recent opinion research
indicates that many foreign publics, especially in countries with
significant Muslim populations, view the United States unfavorably.
GAO examined changes in the State Department‘s (State) public
diplomacy efforts since September 11, whether State has an overall
strategy for its public diplomacy programs, how it measures their
effectiveness, and challenges it faces in implementing these programs.
What GAO Found:
Since September 11, State expanded its public diplomacy efforts in
Muslim-majority countries considered to be of strategic importance in
the war on terrorism. It significantly increased program funding and
the number of Foreign Service officers in South Asia and the Near
East. It also launched new initiatives targeting broader, younger
audiences”particularly in predominantly Muslim countries”and plans to
continue them in the future.
After September 11, State acknowledged the lack of, and the need for,
a comprehensive strategy that integrates all of its diverse public
diplomacy activities. Such a strategy is still in the development
stage. The absence of an integrated strategy could impede State‘s
ability to direct its multifaceted efforts toward concrete and
measurable progress. Furthermore, an interagency public diplomacy
strategy has not been completed that would help State and other
federal agencies convey consistent messages and achieve mutually
reinforcing benefits overseas.
State is not systematically and comprehensively measuring progress
toward its public diplomacy goals. Its overseas performance
measurement efforts focus on anecdotal evidence and program outputs,
rather than indicate progress in changing foreign publics‘
understanding and opinions of the United States.
State‘s efforts face significant challenges, including insufficient
time and staff to conduct public diplomacy tasks. Public affairs
officers responding to our survey said that burdensome administrative
and budgetary processes divert their attention from public diplomacy
programs. In addition, about 21 percent of Foreign Service officers in
language-designated public diplomacy positions overseas lack
sufficient foreign language skills. We also found that about 58
percent of public affairs officers responding to our survey believe
the amount of time to attend public diplomacy training is inadequate.
What GAO Recommends:
Among GAO‘s recommendations are that the Secretary of State develops a
strategy that considers private sector public relations techniques in
integrating its public diplomacy efforts and directing them toward
common and measurable objectives; and strengthens efforts to train
Foreign Service officers in foreign languages and public diplomacy.
State generally concurred with our recommendations.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-951.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click
on the link above. For more information, contact Jess T. Ford at (202)
512-4128 or fordj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
State Has Expanded Its Efforts in Muslim-majority Countries Since
September 11:
State Lacks a Strategy for Public Diplomacy Programs:
State Lacks Measurable Indicators of Progress Toward Public Diplomacy
Goals:
State Faces Other Significant Challenges:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Survey Development and Results:
Appendix III: Questionnaire for State Department Public Affairs
Officers:
Appendix IV: Comments from the State Department:
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Staff Acknowledgments:
Table:
Table 1: Increases in Public Diplomacy Resources by Region for Fiscal
Years 2001 through 2003:
Figures:
Figure 1: Key Uses of State's Public Diplomacy Budget Resources, Fiscal
Year 2003:
Figure 2: State's Organizational Structure for Public Diplomacy:
Figure 3: Typical Public Diplomacy Section at a Large U.S. Embassy:
Figure 4: Elements of a Typical Public Relations Strategy:
Abbreviations:
USAID: U.S. Agency for International Development:
USIA: U.S. Information Agency:
Letter September 4, 2003:
The Honorable Henry J. Hyde
Chairman
The Honorable Tom Lantos
Ranking Minority Member, Committee on International Relations
House of Representatives:
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, focused attention on the
need to improve U.S. public diplomacy efforts designed to promote
better appreciation of the United States abroad and greater receptivity
to its policies among foreign publics. Opinion research indicates that
publics in many foreign countries have unfavorable views of the United
States, and dislike for U.S. foreign policy poses a particularly
difficult diplomatic challenge. This is especially the case in
countries with significant Muslim populations. The approximately $1
billion nonmilitary budget for U.S. public diplomacy is almost evenly
divided between the State Department (State) and the Broadcasting Board
of Governors, which oversees the activities of U.S. government-
sponsored broadcasting overseas.[Footnote 1] This report focuses on the
State Department's public diplomacy efforts. A related report assesses
those of the Broadcasting Board of Governors.[Footnote 2]
This report examines (1) changes in State's public diplomacy resources
and programs since September 11, particularly in countries with
significant Muslim populations; (2) whether State has an overall
strategy for its public diplomacy programs; (3) how State measures
their effectiveness; and (4) what other significant challenges State
faces in executing these programs.
To address all of our objectives, we administered a survey to the heads
of public affairs sections at U.S. embassies worldwide covering such
issues as guidance from various State Department offices; sufficiency
of budgetary, staff, and other resources; and ability to adequately
measure performance. The response rate to our survey was 76 percent. To
grasp the range of State's key public diplomacy programs and how
programs and resources have changed since September 11, we reviewed
State budget requests, annual reports, and other program documentation.
We also met with officials in State's Office of the Undersecretary for
Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, the Bureau of Educational and
Cultural Affairs, the Bureau of Public Affairs, the Office of
International Information Programs, and regional bureaus. To assess
whether State has an overall strategy for its public diplomacy
programs, we reviewed relevant planning, program, and other
documentation. We also met with cognizant State officials and a number
of academics specializing in public diplomacy and international affairs
issues and private sector officials from U.S. public relations and
opinion research firms with international operations. To assess how
State measures the effectiveness of its public diplomacy programs and
to understand private sector methods for gauging the success of
persuasive techniques, we met with officials in State's Office of
Strategic and Performance Planning and the academic and private sector
officials mentioned above. To gain a firsthand view of the challenges
faced in executing public diplomacy programs overseas, we analyzed
program documentation and met with U.S. embassy officers, host-country
government officials, and private sector and nongovernmental
organization representatives in the United Kingdom, Morocco, and Egypt.
For further information on our overall scope and methodology, see
appendix I. For further information on the development and results of
our survey, see appendix II.
Results in Brief:
Since September 11, State has expanded its public diplomacy efforts in
Muslim-majority countries considered to be of strategic importance in
the war on terrorism. In the two fiscal years since the terrorist
attacks, State's overall public diplomacy budget increased by about 9
percent[Footnote 3] in real terms, with the largest percentage of
overseas increases going to two regions with significant Muslim
populationsæSouth Asia and the Near East. During this time, public
diplomacy funding for South Asia rose by 63 percent and for the Near
East by 58 percent.[Footnote 4] In the same period, authorized numbers
of Foreign Service officers in these two regions increased by 15
percent and 27 percent, respectively. Since September 11, State has
developed plans and programs that emphasize reaching a broader and
younger audience in countries with large Muslim populations. For
example, State launched the Shared Values initiative, the first phase
of which featured a series of minidocumentaries on Muslim life in
America to demonstrate that the United States is an open society, and
that Americans and Muslims share certain values and beliefs. State
estimates that the program reached approximately 288 million people in
the Middle East, South Asia, and East Asia. State's plans for future
years include new exchange programs for high school students, expanded
programs to teach English, and a continuation of the Shared Values
initiative.
After September 11, State acknowledged the lack of, and need for, a
strategy that integrates all of its diverse public diplomacy activities
and directs them toward common objectives. However, the strategy to
coordinate these efforts into a cohesive program is still in the
development stage. The absence of an integrated strategy may hinder
State's ability to plot and navigate a course to channel its
multifaceted programs toward concrete and measurable progress. State's
ability to develop an integrated strategy is complicated, in part, by
the lack of an interagency public diplomacy strategy to guide
governmentwide communication efforts. This makes it difficult to convey
consistent messages and thus achieve mutually reinforcing benefits.
State is not systematically and comprehensively measuring progress
toward its public diplomacy goals. State's overseas performance
measurement efforts emphasize anecdotal evidence and program outputs,
such as reporting favorable articles written by foreign journalists
after they complete tours in the United States or by counting the
number of speeches given by ambassadors, rather than gauging progress
in changing foreign publics' understanding and attitudes about the
United States. In addition, at the three overseas posts we visited, no
reporting requirements were in place to determine whether the posts'
annual performance targets were met. Public affairs officers generally
do not conduct systematic program evaluations and receive only limited
audience polling data to help measure progress. While establishing
direct links between public diplomacy programs and results is
difficult, the experiences of other U.S. government agencies and the
private sector in assessing information dissemination campaigns offer
some best practices, including the need to define success, what it will
take to get there, and how it should be measured. The absence of
concrete measures of progress limits State's ability to correct its
course of action or direct resources toward activities that offer a
greater likelihood of success.
State faces a number of additional challenges to its public diplomacy
efforts. Many public affairs officers reported having insufficient
resources to effectively conduct public diplomacy: more than 40 percent
of those we surveyed said the amount of time available to devote
exclusively to executing public diplomacy tasks was insufficient, and
more than 50 percent reported that the number of Foreign Service
officers available to perform such tasks was inadequate. Public affairs
officers also reported that the unique administrative and budgetary
requirements associated with their programs were burdensome and
hindered public diplomacy efforts overseas. About 21 percent of the
officers posted overseas in language designated positions have not
attained the level of language speaking proficiency required for their
positions, hampering their ability to engage with foreign publics.
Further, about 58 percent of the heads of embassy public affairs
sections reported that Foreign Service officers do not have adequate
time for training in the skills required to effectively conduct public
diplomacy.
This report makes several recommendations to the Secretary of State to
help improve State's planning, coordination, execution, and assessment
of U.S. public diplomacy efforts. State generally agreed with our
findings, conclusions, and recommendations. We have reprinted State's
comments in appendix IV.
Background:
State's overall public diplomacy goal is to inform, engage, and
influence global audiences. This goal is aimed at reaching out beyond
foreign governments to promote better appreciation of the United States
abroad, greater receptivity to U.S. policies among foreign publics, and
sustained access and influence in important sectors of foreign
societies. Public diplomacy is carried out through a wide range of
programs that employ person-to-person contacts; print, broadcast, and
electronic media; and other means. Traditionally, U.S. public diplomacy
focused on foreign elites--current and future overseas opinion leaders,
agenda-setters, and decision makers. However, the dramatic growth in
global mass communications and other trends have forced a rethinking of
this approach, and State has begun to consider techniques for
communicating with broader foreign audiences.
State's public diplomacy budget totaled an estimated $594 million in
fiscal year 2003. About 41 percent, or $245 million, is slated for the
International Visitor, Fulbright, and other educational and cultural
exchange programs. Roughly 38 percent, or about $226 million, of
State's public diplomacy budget goes to its regional bureaus, primarily
to cover the salaries, expenses, and activities of public diplomacy
officers posted at U.S. embassies. State embassy officers engage in
information dissemination, media relations, cultural affairs, and other
efforts. Around 12 percent, or about $71 million, funds speaker
programs, publications, and other activities. The remaining 9 percent,
or $51 million, funds programs related to public diplomacy, such as
programs carried out by the National Endowment for Democracy. Figure 1
shows the key uses of public diplomacy resources.
Figure 1: Key Uses of State's Public Diplomacy Budget Resources, Fiscal
Year 2003:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The U.S. government public diplomacy community primarily consists of
the White House, State,[Footnote 5] the Broadcasting Board of
Governors, the Department of Defense, and the Central Intelligence
Agency. Although it is not a central player in public diplomacy, the
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) also plays a role.
The Secretary of State serves as a member of the Broadcasting Board of
Governors--an arrangement that is intended to strengthen coordination
efforts between State and the Board. The U.S. Advisory Commission for
Public Diplomacy, a bipartisan panel created by Congress and appointed
by the President, provides advice on U.S. government public diplomacy
activities. Figure 2 illustrates State's organizational structure for
public diplomacy.
Figure 2: State's Organizational Structure for Public Diplomacy:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
State's Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs is
responsible for the overall leadership and coordination of State's
public diplomacy efforts. The Undersecretary coordinates the efforts of
the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, the Bureau of Public
Affairs, and the Office of International Information Programs. Public
diplomacy personnel are also located in State's regional and functional
bureaus and at overseas posts, but these individuals report to the
management of their own respective organizational entities and not to
the Undersecretary. Foreign Service officers in the public affairs
sections of U.S. embassies have primary responsibility for executing
many of the specific programs. While the Undersecretary does not manage
the staffing process for public diplomacy personnel stationed overseas,
she has authority over all program resources for both domestic and
overseas public diplomacy activities. However, all Foreign Service
officers posted overseas, including those in the public affairs
sections of U.S. embassies, report ultimately to the Chiefs-of-Mission
in their respective host countries. Figure 3 depicts the structure of a
typical public diplomacy section at a large U.S. embassy overseas.
Figure 3: Typical Public Diplomacy Section at a Large U.S. Embassy:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Public Opinion of the United States in Many Muslim-majority Countries
Has Worsened:
Favorable public opinion of the United States has declined worldwide in
recent years, according to a number of opinion research firms. A study
conducted by The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press in
2002 found that negative opinion of the United States was most
prevalent in the Muslim countries of the Middle East and in central
Asia, even in those:
whose governments have close ties to the United States.[Footnote 6] For
example, in Egypt, only 6 percent of those surveyed had a favorable
view of the United States. The study also showed that, between 1999 and
2002, favorable opinions of the United States declined from 52 percent
to 30 percent in Turkey and from 23 percent to 10 percent in Pakistan.
Another study released by the Pew Research Center in March 2003 showed
that public opinion of the United States further declined among its
allies due to antiwar sentiment and disapproval of the administration's
international policies.[Footnote 7] For example, public opinion of the
United States in Turkey further decreased from 30 percent to 12 percent
during the Iraq campaign. And the Pew Center's recent report, released
in June 2003, concluded that opinion of the United States in Muslim-
majority countries has remained negative, with negative feelings
increasing dramatically in several cases.[Footnote 8] While favorable
opinion of the United States in Turkey and Pakistan increased a few
points in spring 2003, the report showed a dramatic decrease in
favorable opinion in Morocco, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, and
many other countries over the past few years.
Zogby International released a poll in April 2002 that concluded that
Arabs and Muslims generally hold a favorable view of American movies,
television, science, technology, and education but have generally
unfavorable views of the United States when it comes to its policy
toward Muslim countries and Palestinians.[Footnote 9] U.S. policy
toward Muslim countries was given single-digit favorable ratings by
Egypt, Iran, Indonesia, Kuwait, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia. Public
opinion of U.S. policy toward the Palestinians in the same countries
ranked even lower overall.
State Has Expanded Its Efforts in Muslim-majority Countries Since
September 11:
Since September 11, State has expanded its efforts in Muslim-majority
countries that are considered strategically important in the war on
terrorism. State significantly increased the program funding and number
of Foreign Service officers in its bureaus of South Asian and Near
Eastern Affairs. State has also launched a number of new initiatives
targeting broader, younger audiences--particularly in predominantly
Muslim countries--and plans to continue these initiatives in the
future. These initiatives include expanding exchange programs targeting
citizens of Muslim countries, informing foreign publics about U.S.
policies in the war on terrorism, and demonstrating that Americans and
Muslims share certain values.
State Increased Resources in Muslim-majority Countries:
State has increased its public diplomacy resources overall since
September 11, with the largest relative overseas increases going to
Muslim-majority countries. In the two fiscal years since September 11,
State's public diplomacy resources increased from $544 million in
fiscal year 2001 to $594 million in fiscal year 2003, or about 9
percent in real terms. During the same period, the number of authorized
Foreign Service officers involved in public diplomacy overseas also
increased, from 484 to 539,[Footnote 10] or approximately 11 percent.
While State's bureau of Europe and Eurasia still receives the largest
overall share of overseas public diplomacy resources, the largest
percentage increases in such resources since September 11 occurred in
State's bureaus of South Asian and Near Eastern Affairs, where many
countries have significant Muslim populations.[Footnote 11] Public
diplomacy funding increased in South Asia from $24 million to $39
million and in the Near East from $39 million to $62 million, or by 63
and 58 percent, respectively. During the same period, authorized
American Foreign Service officers in South Asia increased from 27 to 31
and in the Near East from 45 to 57, or by 15 percent and 27 percent,
respectively. Table 1 shows the increases in public diplomacy resources
by region from fiscal year 2001 through 2003.
Table 1: Increases in Public Diplomacy Resources by Region for Fiscal
Years 2001 through 2003:
(Dollars in millions).
Region: South Asia:
Funding; 2001: $24; 2003[A]: $39; Percentage change: 63%.
Authorized officers; 2001: 27; 2003[A]: 31; Percentage change: 15%.
Region: Near East.
Funding; 2001: $39; 2003[A]: $62; Percentage change: 58%.
Authorized officers; 2001: 45; 2003[A]: 57; Percentage change: 27%.
Region: Africa.
Funding; 2001: $55; 2003[A]: $65; Percentage change: 18%.
Authorized officers; 2001: 79; 2003[A]: 89; Percentage change: 13%.
Region: East Asia and the Pacific.
Funding; 2001: $78; 2003[A]: $86; Percentage change: 9%.
Authorized officers; 2001: 80; 2003[A]: 83; Percentage change: 4%.
Region: Western Hemisphere.
Funding; 2001: $77; 2003[A]: $80; Percentage change: 4%.
Authorized officers; 2001: 92; 2003[A]: 99; Percentage change: 8%.
Region: Europe and Eurasia[B].
Funding; 2001: $161; 2003[A]: $160; Percentage change: 0%.
Authorized officers; 2001: 161; 2003[A]: 180; Percentage change: 12%.
Source: State Department.
[A] The 2003 funding estimates include approximately $20 million in
reprogrammed funds for educational and cultural exchanges from 2002:
[B] Estimates for Europe and Eurasia include costs for two staff
assigned to the European Office of the UN and Other International
Organizations in Geneva, Switzerland.
[End of table]
More Resources Directed to Exchange and Information Programs Focusing
on the Muslim World:
In 2002, State redirected 5 percent of its exchange resources to better
support the war on terrorism and to strengthen U.S. engagement with
Muslim countries. In 2003, State has continued to emphasize exchanges
with Muslim countries through its Partnership for Learning Program--
designed to target young and diverse audiences through academic and
professional exchanges such as the Fulbright, International Visitor,
and Citizen Exchange programs. State has also carried out increased
exchanges through its Middle East Partnership Initiative, which
includes computer and English language training for women newly
employed by the Afghan government and a program to assist women from
Arab countries and elsewhere in observing and discussing the U.S.
electoral process.
State's Office of International Information Programs has also developed
new initiatives to support the war on terrorism. It expanded its
interactive Web site in Arabic, Persian, and other languages to inform
broad audiences about U.S. policy initiatives, including the war on
terrorism. It launched a new Web site to provide information on changes
in U.S. visa policies and immigration procedures after September 11,
including those that predominantly affect citizens of Muslim-majority
countries. It employed staff to monitor Arab television and news
reports for misinformation and hostile propaganda targeted at the
United States and to counter that information by presenting the facts
through various media. In addition, it developed several products to
support the war on terror including the following:
* a print and electronic pamphlet titled The Network of Terrorism,
distributed in 36 languages via hard copy, the Web, and media
throughout the world, which documented the direct link between the
September 11 perpetrators and al Qaeda;
* a publication titled Iraq: From Fear to Freedom to inform foreign
audiences of the administration's policies toward Iraq;
* a print and electronic pamphlet titled Voices for Freedom in which
Iraq-born professionals describe the brutality of Saddam Hussein's
regime and their hopes for Iraq's future;
* an Arabic youth magazine; and:
* an 18-minute documentary dubbed in eight languages titled Rebuilding
Afghanistan, which depicts U.S. and allied efforts in the
reconstruction of Afghanistan.
Media Campaign Highlights Shared Values:
In 2002, State's Bureau of Public Affairs launched a campaign called
Shared Values to stimulate dialogue and increase understanding between
Americans and people from predominantly Muslim countries. State
developed a series of five short-form minidocumentaries to demonstrate
that the United States is an open society and not at war with Islam,
and that Americans and Muslims share certain values and beliefs. These
minidocumentaries were dubbed in Arabic, Bahasa, Urdu, and French.
State aired them via paid media for about 5 weeks during the holy month
of Ramadan in Indonesia, Pakistan, Kuwait, and Malaysia. Several
countries--Egypt, Morocco, and Lebanonædid not allow State to air the
documentaries because they viewed them as U.S. government propaganda.
However, State also aired the documentaries on Pan Arab media, which
consists of satellite broadcasts that reach audiences in a number of
Arab countries, including Egypt and Lebanon. State estimates that the
program reached approximately 288 million people in the Middle East,
South Asia, and East Asia.
To complement the paid media campaign, State disseminated print and
electronic pamphlets and other materials on the theme of Muslim life in
America; sent speakers to Kuwait, Lebanon, and Jordan to promote
additional interest in the Shared Values initiative; and held a
satellite town hall meeting between Americans and Indonesians. State
also worked with the Council of Muslim Americans for Understanding to
create an interactive Web site, in multiple languages, called "Open
Dialogue." The site is intended to create a forum for dialogue between
Muslim Americans and other Muslims of the world.
Plans for Future Programs in Muslim Countries Under Way:
State's Public Affairs Bureau will continue its Shared Values program
by conducting additional research, developing media products, and
conducting public relations efforts in the Muslim world. State plans to
work with private voluntary organizations, USAID, U.S. businesses, and
international journalists and broadcasters to develop print, video, and
other television stories to inform large audiences about U.S.-led
initiatives in developing countries. For example, in Egypt, where State
did not air the minidocumentaries, it worked with local Egyptian TV and
the Egyptian government to air three stories of USAID projects in the
country. State plans to continue partnerships with USAID and other
entities to demonstrate American generosity to audiences in Muslim-
majority countries and the rest of the world.
State has developed other plans and programs for the future that
emphasize a broader and younger audience in predominantly Muslim
countries. State's plans include exchange programs for high school
students with significant Muslim populations and expanded English
teaching programs to communicate American values to audiences overseas.
State plans to make more information available in Farsi and South Asian
languages. It also plans to dedicate 15 percent of its Speaker Program
budget to an "Impact Series" that will focus on key themes, one of the
first being "Outreach to the Muslim World." In addition, State is
working with the Smithsonian Institution to develop 15 multimedia
exhibits called "American Corners," which will provide access to
reference materials on the United States in selected Muslim-majority
countries.
State Lacks a Strategy for Public Diplomacy Programs:
The growth in programs to the Muslim world marks State's recognition of
the need to increase diplomatic channels to this population. However,
State lacks a comprehensive and commonly understood public diplomacy
strategy to guide implementation of these programs. The absence of an
integrated strategy could impede State's ability to direct its
multifaceted efforts toward concrete and measurable progress.
Furthermore, there is no interagency public diplomacy strategy to guide
State's and all federal agencies' communication efforts. This limits
the government's ability to convey consistent messages to overseas
audiences and thus achieve mutually reinforcing benefits.
State Does Not Have an Integrated Public Diplomacy Strategy:
After September 11, State acknowledged the lack of, and need for, a
strategy that integrates all of its diverse public diplomacy activities
and directs them toward common objectives. However, the strategy is
still in the development stage. The Acting Undersecretary for Public
Diplomacy and Public Affairs told us that she is creating a new office
of strategic planning to lead this effort. She said it was too early to
predict when such a strategy might be completed. She also noted that,
when the new Undersecretary is appointed, the direction of the strategy
could change.
State officials told us that such a strategy is particularly important
because State's public diplomacy operation is fragmented among the
various organizational entities within the agency. Public affairs
officers who responded to our survey indicated that the lack of a
strategy has hindered their ability to effectively execute public
diplomacy efforts overseas. More than 66 percent of public affairs
officers in one region reported that the quality of strategic guidance
from the Office of the Undersecretary in the last year and a half was
generally insufficient or very insufficient. More than 40 percent in
another region reported the same. We encountered similar complaints
during our overseas fieldwork. For example, in Morocco, the former
public affairs officer stated that so little information had been
provided from Washington on State's post-September 11 public diplomacy
strategy that he had to rely on newspaper articles and guesswork to
formulate his in-country public diplomacy plans.
Private Sector Public Relations Tools Could Be Relevant to State's
Needs:
Private sector public relations efforts and political campaigns use
sophisticated strategies to integrate complex communication efforts,
involving multiple players. Although State's public diplomacy efforts
extend beyond the activities of public relations firms, many of the
strategic tools that such firms employ are relevant to State's
situation.
We held a roundtable discussion with some of the largest public
relations firms in the United States to identify the key strategic
components of their efforts. According to these executives, initial
strategic decisions involve establishing the scope and nature of the
problem, identifying the target audience, determining the core
messages, and defining both success and failure. Subsequent steps
include conducting research to validate the initial decisions, testing
the core messages, carrying out prelaunch activities, and developing
information materials. Each of these elements contains numerous other
steps. Only when these steps are completed may the tactical program be
implemented. Further, the program must be implemented while
continuously measuring progress and adjusting tactics accordingly.
Figure 4 illustrates the elements of a typical public relations
strategy.
Figure 4: Elements of a Typical Public Relations Strategy:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The private sector officials emphasized the importance of synchronizing
these activities in a systematic way so that the efforts are mutually
reinforcing in advancing the campaign's overall objectives. They
pointed out that, without a carefully integrated plan, the various
elements are at risk of canceling one another out and possibly even
damaging the overall campaign.
A report by the Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy[Footnote 12]
and one issued in 2002 by the United Kingdom-based Foreign Policy
Center[Footnote 13] emphasized the importance of employing
communications consultants, pollsters, and media specialists to provide
relevant expertise to State on media trends, market trends, production
techniques, and emerging technologies. A report published by the
Council on Foreign Relations[Footnote 14] also recommended increased
private sector involvement, including the creation of an independent,
not-for-profit, Corporation for Public Diplomacy. The officials who
participated in our roundtable indicated a high level of interest in
State's public diplomacy efforts and conveyed their willingness to
assist State in developing its strategy.
Interagency Public Diplomacy Strategy Has Not Been Established:
To date, an interagency public diplomacy strategy that sets forth the
messages and means for governmentwide communication efforts to overseas
audiences has not been implemented. Because of their differing roles
and missions, the White House, State, and other public diplomacy
players often focus on different audiences and use varying means to
communicate with them. The idea of an interagency strategy would be to
consider the foreign publics in key countries and regions, the relevant
U.S. national interests there, what U.S. government communication
channels are available, and how to optimize their use in conveying
desired themes and messages.
The lack of an interagency strategy complicates the task of conveying
consistent messages and thus achieving mutually reinforcing benefits.
State officials told us that, without such a strategy, the risk of
making communication mistakes that are damaging to U.S. public
diplomacy efforts is high. They also said that the lack of a strategy
diminishes the efficiency and effectiveness of governmentwide public
diplomacy efforts. Reports by the Defense Science Board Task
Force,[Footnote 15] the Council on Foreign Relations,[Footnote 16] and
Wilton Park[Footnote 17]æan executive agency of the British Foreign and
Commonwealth Office, as well as reports by the Advisory Commission on
Public Diplomacy[Footnote 18] and National Defense
University,[Footnote 19] concluded that a sophisticated interagency
communications strategy is needed to synchronize agencies' target
audience assessments, messages, and capabilities.
Our overseas fieldwork in Egypt and Morocco underlined the importance
of interagency coordination. Embassy officers there told us that only a
very small percentage of the population was aware of the magnitude of
U.S. assistance being provided to their countries. Egypt is the second
largest recipient of U.S. assistance in the world, with assistance
totaling more than an estimated $1.9 billion in 2003. Assistance to
Morocco totaled more than an estimated $13 million in 2003. USAID and
embassy officials in both countries are currently testing new
approaches and cooperating more closely to better publicize USAID's
efforts; however, they noted that the idea of USAID taking a more
aggressive role in promoting its work was not necessarily universally
supported within USAID.
Most interagency communication coordination efforts have been ad hoc in
recent years. Immediately after September 11, the White House, State
Department, Department of Defense, and other agencies coordinated
various public diplomacy efforts on a day-to-day basis, and the White
House established a number of interim coordination mechanisms. One such
mechanism was the joint operation of the Coalition Information Centers
in Washington, London, and Islamabad, set up during the early stages of
U.S. military operations in Afghanistan in 2001. The centers were
designed to provide a rapid response capability for correcting
inaccurate news stories, proactively dealing with news items likely to
generate negative responses overseas, and optimizing reporting of news
favorable to U.S. efforts.
More recently, the White House established a more permanent
coordination mechanism. On January 21, 2003, the President issued an
executive order forming the White House Office of Global
Communications. The office is intended to coordinate strategic
communications from the U.S. government to overseas audiences. The
President also established a Strategic Communication Policy
Coordinating Committee, co-chaired by the State Department and the
National Security Council and to work closely with the Office of Global
Communications, to ensure interagency coordination in disseminating the
American message across the globe. It is the committee's long-term
objective to develop a National Communications Strategy. One high-level
State official told us that the war in Iraq had delayed efforts to
develop the strategy, and that it would not be in place until September
2003 at the earliest.
State Lacks Measurable Indicators of Progress Toward Public Diplomacy
Goals:
State is not systematically and comprehensively measuring progress
toward its public diplomacy goals. Its overseas performance measurement
efforts focus on anecdotal evidence and program outputs, rather than
gauging progress toward changing foreign publics' understanding and
attitudes about the United States. Public affairs officers responding
to our survey reported that their missions had insufficient staff to
conduct systematic program evaluations. In addition, limited
availability and use of polling data hamper State's ability to track
progress. Although it is difficult to establish direct links between
public diplomacy programs and results, other U.S. government agencies
and the private sector have some best practices for assessing
information dissemination campaigns, including the need to define
success and how it should be measured.
State's Current Performance Plan Does Not Include Measurable Indicators
of Progress:
State's current performance plan does not feature measurable indicators
of progress toward public diplomacy goals. State's agencywide fiscal
year 2003 performance plan includes a wide range of public diplomacy
activities that are used to address various strategic goals, but the
plan directly addresses only one type of public diplomacy activity--
educational and cultural exchanges--as a specific strategic and
performance goal in and of itself. The performance indicator that State
cites for this goal does not address the ultimate outcomes that are
desired for these programs. For example, State reported that 94 percent
of exchange program participants viewed their experiences as valuable,
based on "highly successful or valuable" ratings in program
evaluations.[Footnote 20] While it is useful to know that participants'
experiences were favorable, this information does not demonstrate
progress toward the more fundamental objective of achieving changes in
understanding and attitudes about the United States.
While State plans to improve its public diplomacy measures in 2004, its
plans still lack some important elements. For example, State cites the
intended use of independent surveys and polls to determine the success
of its programs, but it does not define what would constitute success,
nor does it specify what the surveys would measure or the frequency of
measurement. In other cases, State cites targets that are too vague to
measure. For example, its plans for evaluating international
information programs include the target, "evidence shows that
information provided has reached the intended user." State officials
acknowledged that these indicators and targets were not measurable and
stated they are working to develop more quantitative indicators that
can be measured. State also plans to measure public diplomacy
performance on a global basis rather than by geographic region, as
called for by the Office of Management and Budget.
Overseas Performance Measurement Efforts Emphasize Anecdotes and
Program Activity:
While performance measurement efforts at individual overseas posts vary
greatly, many focus on anecdotes or the amount of program activity in
their host country. For instance, posts might report on foreign press
coverage of conferences and speakers sponsored by U.S. embassies; on
favorable articles written by foreign journalists after they complete
tours in the United States; or on the activities of other former
exchange program participants. State has developed a database for posts
to record anecdotal evidence of results in specific instances. However,
posts are not required to follow up on exchange program participants on
a systematic or periodic basis. Other posts simply count the number of
public diplomacy activities that take place in their host country. For
example, some posts tally the number of speeches given by the
ambassador or the number of news articles placed in the host-country
media. While such measures shed light on the level of public diplomacy
activity, they reveal little in the way of overall program
effectiveness.
Overseas Posts Not Required to Report Whether Performance Targets Are
Met:
Notwithstanding the relative usefulness of individual posts'
performance measurement efforts, there are currently no reporting
requirements in place to determine whether posts' performance targets
are actually met. At one overseas post we visited, the post had
identified polling data showing that only 22 percent of the host-
country's citizens had a favorable view of the United States. The post
used that figure as a baseline with yearly percentage increases set as
targets. However, the former public affairs officer at the post told us
that he did not attempt to determine or report on whether the post had
actually achieved these targets because there was no requirement to do
so. Officials at the other two overseas posts we visited also cited the
lack of any formal reporting requirement for following up on whether
they met their annual performance targets. Officials in State's Office
of Strategic and Performance Planning said that such a requirement is
currently under consideration.
Insufficient Data and Resources Hinder Performance Measurement:
Public affairs officers at U.S. embassies generally do not conduct
systematic program evaluations. Moreover, they noted that measuring the
impact of public diplomacy programs is difficult because the full
effects of such programs may not be known for years. For example,
tracking the activities of former exchange program participants over
the course of many years is a labor-intensive effort. About 79 percent
of the respondents to our survey reported that staffing at their
missions was insufficient to conduct systematic program evaluations.
Many officers also reported that staffing at posts was insufficient to
carry out the long-range monitoring required to adequately measure
program effectiveness. Some officers said that this is especially
problematic at smaller posts, where public diplomacy sections may
consist of very few Foreign Service officers.
Even if sufficient staffing were available, State would still have
difficulty conducting long-range tracking of exchange participants
because it lacks a database with comprehensive information on its
various exchange program alumni. Although State's records are better
for more recent exchange participants, its ability to locate
individuals who participated prior to 1996 is limited. State had
planned to begin building a new worldwide alumni database with
comprehensive data, but Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs
officials told us that State had received insufficient funds to do so.
State officials told us that the new database would require about
$600,000 in additional funding.[Footnote 21] State is currently
considering less costly alternatives that involve using its existing
information systems. For example, State has hired contractors to review
the paper archives of exchange programs and convert alumni data to
electronic form. However, bureau officials said they lack the funds to
conduct the type of outreach necessary to verify and update alumni
addresses and other information. They estimated that such an outreach
effort would require approximately $3.4 million in additional
funding.[Footnote 22] State is requesting two new positions to assist
in the administration of alumni activities.
State's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs surveys exchange
program participants on their program experiences, their activities
afterwards, and their impressions of the programs' effects on them. The
bureau uses these and other data to evaluate specific exchange programs
every 5 to 7 years on a rotating basis. The bureau has also recently
initiated an effort to ask individuals who have completed exchange
programs to recall specific attitudes and knowledge before the programs
and how those had changed as a result of the programs. However, for
most of its exchange programs, State does not systematically conduct
pre-and post-program surveys that directly test and compare participant
attitudes and knowledge before and after participation. Evaluation
experts in the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs acknowledged
that conducting such surveys would provide more meaningful data on the
effectiveness of exchange programs, but bureau officials estimated that
such an approach would require approximately $2.2 million annually to
pretest all alumni about their attitudes. It would also require two
additional staff persons or hiring an evaluation firm to help with the
data collection and analysis.
Limited Polling Data Make Progress Assessments Difficult:
A number of public affairs officers suggested that expanded use of
overseas opinion research would provide a useful basis for measuring
public diplomacy progress. Private sector officials from public
relations and opinion research firms and the Ad Council agreed. Common
public relations firm measurement techniques include surveys and
polling to develop baseline data, immediate follow-up research, and
additional tracking polls over a period of time to identify long-term
changes. Reports by the Council on Foreign Relations,[Footnote 23]
Wilton Park,[Footnote 24]and the Defense Science Board Task
Force[Footnote 25] also emphasized the need for increased use of
foreign opinion research for public diplomacy efforts. The officials
who attended our roundtable noted that incorporating performance
measurement so pervasively into a campaign is costly. However, this
cost is considered essential to the campaign's success. The officials
estimated that, based on their experience with similar information
campaigns, of State's roughly $500 million to $600 million public
diplomacy budget, $30 million to $50 million should be spent on opinion
research and performance measurement. State's Bureau of Intelligence
and Research currently spends about $3.5 million annually on overseas
opinion research.
The director of the Office of Research in State's Bureau of
Intelligence and Research said that, with additional funding, State
could more regularly monitor foreign opinion overseas. Although State
conducts overseas opinion research on foreign perceptions of the United
States and its foreign policy in all but a handful of countries, it
does not have sufficient funds to conduct more than one or two surveys
in each country per year. The director told us that, in certain high
priority countries, he would like to conduct monthly surveys to track
fast-changing circumstances. Focus group studies in high priority
countries would also be helpful in providing more in-depth analyses of
attitudes. The official estimated that increased polling and focus
groups in high priority countries would require an estimated $1.5
million in additional annual funding. State could also employ advanced
"data mining" technology that would combine data collected in State's
research with that of other surveys to detect patterns that would help
researchers tie trends and shifts in opinion to specific events and
efforts. The official estimated that such technology would require a
one-time investment of roughly $1 million and an ongoing annual cost of
about $75,000. State could also explore using the Internet to conduct
overseas surveys, as a complement to conventional polling efforts. The
official said that this project could be launched for as little as
$200,000.
Even the limited polling that State does conduct is not fully utilized
by public affairs officers overseas. About 46 percent of our survey
respondents reported that they rarely, if ever, receive such data.
Thus, they may not always be aware of changes in foreign audiences'
attitudes toward the United States. The Broadcasting Board of Governors
also conducts audience research efforts in a number of foreign
countries that could be useful to public affairs officers. However, in
regions of the world where the Board broadcasts its programs, more than
91 percent of our survey respondents reported that they rarely, if
ever, receive such data. State officials told us that they provide both
the State polling data and the broadcasting audience research data to
the public diplomacy office directors in State's regional bureaus.
However, it is up to each regional bureau to review the data and ensure
that it reaches the appropriate public affairs officers overseas. State
officials told us that some regional bureaus are probably more diligent
in doing so than others, and that some public affairs officers may not
even be aware that such data are available to them. State plans to
emphasize the availability of such data in new public training courses
it is developing at the Foreign Service Institute.
Other U.S. Government Agencies and the Private Sector Offer Strategies
for Assessing Performance:
A recent GAO report on strategies for assessing U.S. government
information dissemination efforts recognized that establishing a causal
link between agency actions and the ultimate impact of such programs is
difficult.[Footnote 26] However, the report points out that by
systematically identifying the incremental outcomes expected at each
step, U.S. government agencies were able to construct a logical
framework, or logic model, that demonstrated how achieving short and
intermediate outcome goals could lead to a certain level of assurance
that expected results would be realized. For example, the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention constructed a logic model to gauge the
reinforcing effects of media and community-based campaigns to reduce
tobacco use. Short and intermediate outcome goals included changes in
knowledge and attitudes about tobacco use, adherence to and enforcement
of no-smoking regulations, reduced smoking initiation among young
people, and increased smoking cessation among adults. Long-term
outcomes included decreased smoking, reduced exposure to environmental
tobacco smoke, and reduced tobacco-related mortality. In State's case,
short-term outcomes for public diplomacy programs could include target
audience knowledge and awareness of U.S. principles, beliefs, and
policies. Intermediate outcomes could include positive changes in
attitude toward specific U.S. policies. Long-term outcomes could
include implementation of U.S. foreign policy issues prompted by U.S.
public diplomacy programs such as educational and cultural exchanges.
The private sector officials with whom we met agreed with our
assessment of the difficulty in establishing direct causal links
between public diplomacy programs and results. However, they noted that
establishing convincing correlations is a reasonable expectation. For
example, to measure the effectiveness of a campaign to promote the use
of seat belts, the Ad Council conducted precampaign attitudinal surveys
to gauge awareness and understanding of the importance of wearing seat
belts and then administered weekly surveys during the campaign to track
the progression of attitude shifts. It also counted the number of Web
site hits and 1-800 telephone calls that occurred in response to the
campaign. Ad Council officials told us that they ultimately established
correlations between these measures and Department of Transportation
statistics on seat belt deaths. Ad Council and other private sector
officials said that, to establish such correlations, effectiveness
measures must be incorporated into every aspect of a program from its
outset. The officials emphasized that before a program is even
launched, evaluators should establish a definition for success;
identify priorities; and determine what should be measured, how it
should be measured, and how frequently.
Although State's public diplomacy efforts extend beyond information
dissemination, many of the logic model concepts would still be
applicable to State's situation. Such an approach could be particularly
useful in evaluating the combined effect of State's wide-ranging public
diplomacy activities. Our report noted that for comprehensive
initiatives that combine various approaches to achieving a goal, a
logic model can help articulate how those approaches are intended to
assist and supplement one another. Evaluations of performance can then
assess the effects of an integrated set of efforts. The lack of an
integrated system for measuring public diplomacy performance hinders
State's ability to correct its course of action or to direct resources
toward activities that offer a greater likelihood of success. Officials
in State's Educational and Cultural Affairs bureau told us that they
are currently in the process of developing a performance measurement
system for the bureau's exchange programs that includes the components
identified in our report.
State Faces Other Significant Challenges:
State's public diplomacy efforts face some additional significant
challenges. Among them are insufficient time and staffing resources to
conduct public diplomacy tasks. Public affairs officers also reported
that burdensome administrative and budgetary processes often divert
their attention from public diplomacy programs. A significant number of
Foreign Service officers involved in public diplomacy efforts overseas
lack sufficient foreign language skills. In addition, many public
affairs officers reported that the amount of time available to attend
public diplomacy training is inadequate.
Insufficient Time and Staff:
More than 40 percent of the public affairs officers we surveyed
reported that the amount of time they had to devote exclusively to
executing public diplomacy tasks was insufficient. During our overseas
fieldwork, officers told us that, while they manage to attend U.S. and
other foreign embassy receptions and functions within their host
country capitals, it was particularly difficult to find time to travel
outside the capitals to interact with ordinary citizens. Some officers
said they were too busy and there was not enough staff to take such
trips. More than 50 percent of those responding to our survey reported
that the number of Foreign Service officers available to perform public
diplomacy duties was inadequate. Although State increased the actual
number of Americans in public diplomacy positions overseas from 414 in
fiscal year 2000 to 448 in fiscal year 2002, State still had a
shortfall of public diplomacy staff in 2002, based on the projected
needs identified in State's latest overseas staffing model. In 2002,
State's overseas staffing model projected the need for 512 staff in
these positions; however, 64 of these positions, or 13 percent, were
not filled.[Footnote 27]
We reported in 2002[Footnote 28] that as part of its Diplomatic
Readiness Initiative, State has launched an aggressive recruiting
program to rebuild the department's total workforce. Under this
initiative, State requested 1,158 new employees above attrition over
the 3-year period for fiscal years 2002 through 2004. However, it does
not have numerical targets for specific skill requirements such as
language proficiency or regional expertise. Although State officials
are optimistic that enough new hires are being brought in to address
the overall staffing shortage, there are no assurances that the
recruiting efforts will result in the right people with the right
skills needed to meet specific critical shortfalls.
Burdensome Administrative and Budgetary Processes:
Officers responding to our survey, those with whom we met overseas, and
numerous other State officials also pointed to the amount of extra time
public diplomacy practitioners are required to spend on administrative,
budgetary, and personnel matters due to the unique nature of the
program. They indicated that these processes had been a particular
problem for embassy public affairs sections since the former USIA
merged with State in 1999. At that time, USIA's administrative
personnel who were familiar with the administrative requirements of
public diplomacy activities became part of State's administrative
operations in Washington and at embassies overseas and were no longer
dedicated solely to public diplomacy activities. Public affairs
officers said that State's administrative processes were often too slow
and inflexible to handle the logistics and timing required to set up
media and cultural events and other program activities. Because these
activities are so different from those conducted in the course of
traditional government-to-government diplomacy, State management
officers are often unfamiliar with them.
For example, embassy public affairs section officials in one country
told us that the planned filming of USAID projects was held up because
embassy procedures did not allow making advance cash payments to the
television crew. Instead, the embassy preferred either making
electronic fund transfers in dollars or issuing checks. The officials
noted that, unlike in the United States, businesses in the developing
world usually demand cash payments in advance because they do not have
sufficient working capital to provide services and then wait for
payment. Also, the businesses often do not have bank accounts that can
accept electronic fund transfers in dollars. In this case, getting the
television crew paid and working required the head of the public
affairs section to become personally involved in persuading the embassy
administrative section to act.
Public affairs officers told us that this example is typical and that
having to continually intervene in resolving routine administrative
issues leaves them less time to actually conduct public diplomacy
efforts. State officials told us they recognized the problem and had
designated certain administrative personnel at some embassies to work
with public affairs sections to reduce the time spent by those sections
on administrative matters. However, the officials said there were still
insufficient numbers of such designated personnel.
Shortfalls in Foreign Language Skills:
Insufficient foreign language skills pose another problem for many
officers. As of December 31, 2002, 21 percent of the 332 Foreign
Service officers filling "language-designated" public diplomacy
positions overseas did not meet the foreign language speaking
requirements of their positions.[Footnote 29] The highest percentages
not meeting the requirements were in the Near East, where 30 percent of
the officers did not meet the requirement. Although State had no
language-designated positions for South Asia, it had eight language-
preferred[Footnote 30] positions, none of which were filled by officers
who had reading or speaking capability in those languages. It is
important to note that most of the foreign languages required in these
two regions are considered difficult to master, such as Arabic and
Urdu. In contrast, 85 percent of the officers filling French language-
designated positions and 97 percent of those filling Spanish language-
designated ones met the requirements. Officers' opinions on the quality
of the foreign language training they received also varied greatly by
region. For example, 67 percent of the officers in one region reported
that the quality of language training was either generally or very
sufficient, while 67 percent in another region reported that training
quality was generally or very insufficient.[Footnote 31]
Foreign Service officers posted at the overseas embassies we visited
and other State officials told us that having fluency in a host
country's language is important for effectively conducting public
diplomacy. The foreign government officials with whom we met in Egypt,
Morocco, and the United Kingdom agreed. They noted that, even in
countries where English is widely understood, speaking the host
country's language demonstrates respect for its people and its culture.
In Morocco, officers in the public affairs and other sections of the
embassy told us that, because their ability to speak Arabic was poor,
they conducted most embassy business in French. French is widely used
in that country, especially in business and government. However,
embassy officers told us that speaking Arabic would provide superior
entrée to the Moroccan public. The ability to speak country-specific
forms of Arabic and other more obscure dialects would generate even
more goodwill, especially outside the major cities.
Some Foreign Affairs officers pointed to State's policy of limiting
most overseas tours to 2 or 3 years as a factor that contributes to
insufficient language skills. They also said this policy makes it more
difficult to cultivate personal relationships that in some countries
take a long time to develop. They noted that the diplomatic corps of
some other countries with major overseas diplomatic presences allow
longer overseas tours and that their diplomats demonstrate superior
foreign language skills as a result. Officers at the embassies we
visited also noted that, because public diplomacy efforts should and
often do involve political and economic officers and others outside the
public affairs section, it is important that they be proficient in host
country languages as well. A number of officers in these other sections
told us that language proficiency was a problem for them as
well.[Footnote 32] State officials told us that they are aware of this
concern but that they rely on tools other than lengthened tours of duty
to foster language skills, such as offering pay incentives to officers
who are proficient in foreign languages used in certain countries.
Also, they said officers who have the required language proficiency
have a competitive advantage over those who do not in bidding for
overseas positions.
According to the department, the largest and most significant factor
limiting its ability to fill language-designated positions is its long-
standing staffing shortfall. As mentioned above, State's Diplomatic
Readiness Initiative is designed to replenish the ranks. Other planned
actions include bolstering efforts to recruit job candidates with
target language skills, sending language training supervisors to posts
to determine ways to improve training offerings, and developing a new
"language continuum" plan to guide efforts to meet the need for higher
levels of competency in all languages, especially those critical to
national security concerns.
Little Time for Training:
Time to attend public diplomacy training presents another challenge.
About 58 percent of the officers responding to our survey reported that
the amount of time available for such training is inadequate. In
September 2003, State plans to launch a new public diplomacy training
program, increasing the current 3 weeks of available public diplomacy
training to 19. It has also added public diplomacy components to its
training curriculum for certain officers outside the public diplomacy
cone, including economic and political officers, ambassadors, and
deputy chiefs of mission. Nonetheless, officers told us that unless a
significant "float" of Foreign Service officer staffing is established
for training, it would be difficult for officers to attend the
training. They noted that many of their posts had positions that were
vacant for some time before they began their tour there. Under these
circumstances, there was tremendous pressure to begin their tours as
soon as possible, leaving little or no time for training. State is
expecting staffing increases resulting from the Diplomatic Readiness
Initiative to enable it to create a "training float" that will allow
staff sufficient time to receive training in foreign languages and
other key skills.
Conclusions:
Since the war on terrorism began, the need for a positive American
message to the world has never been more important. Opinion research
reveals that many foreign publics, especially those in Muslim-majority
countries, have highly unfavorable perceptions of the United States,
and State has sought to enhance its public diplomacy efforts in these
countries. But the absence of an integrated and commonly understood
strategy for State's public diplomacy efforts makes it difficult for
State to direct its diverse efforts in a systematic manner to achieve
measurable results. The methods and techniques of private sector public
relations campaigns merit consideration in developing and implementing
such a strategy. Also, because State is not systematically and
comprehensively measuring progress toward its public diplomacy goals,
its ability to correct its course of action or to direct resources
toward activities that offer a greater likelihood of success is
limited. While the difficulty of measuring State's long-term influence
on audiences overseas should not be underestimated, private sector
public relations firms and other U.S. government agencies provide some
reasonable examples of where to begin. Shortfalls in staffing,
burdensome administrative and budgeting processes, Foreign Service
officers with insufficient foreign language proficiency, and
insufficient time for public diplomacy training pose additional
challenges for State.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To improve the planning, coordination, execution, and assessment of
U.S. public diplomacy efforts, we recommend that the Secretary of
State:
* develop and widely disseminate throughout the department a strategy
that considers the techniques of private sector public relations firms
in integrating all of State's public diplomacy efforts and directing
them toward achieving common and measurable objectives;
* consider ways to collaborate with the private sector to employ best
practices for measuring efforts to inform and influence target
audiences, including expanded use of opinion research and better use of
existing research;
* designate more administrative positions to overseas public affairs
sections to reduce the administrative burden;
* strengthen efforts to train Foreign Service officers in foreign
languages; and:
* program adequate time for public diplomacy training into State's
assignment process.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
State provided written comments on a draft of this report (see app.
IV). State generally concurred with the report's observations and
conclusions. State said that it intends to implement our
recommendations and that it has already begun taking measures to do so
in some areas.
While State agreed with our recommendation to consider ways to employ
private sector best practices for measuring the effectiveness of its
public diplomacy efforts, it said that the report did not adequately
describe the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs' efforts to
gauge the effectiveness of exchange programs. We have incorporated
additional information on these efforts into the report.
:
We are sending copies of this report to other interested members of
Congress, the Secretary of State, and the Chairman of the Broadcasting
Board of Governors. We also will make copies available to others upon
request. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on the
GAO Web site at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov] http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-4128. Other GAO contacts and staff
acknowledgments are listed in appendix V.
Jess T. Ford
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
Signed by Jess T. Ford:
[End of section]
Appendixes:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To obtain information on all of our objectives, especially those
related to public diplomacy effectiveness measures and critical public
diplomacy challenges, we administered a survey to the heads of public
affairs sections at U.S. embassies worldwide. The response rate to our
survey was 76 percent. See appendix II for further details on the
development and results of our survey.
To examine the range of the State Department's (State) key public
diplomacy programs and how programs and resources have changed since
September 11, we reviewed State budget requests, annual reports, and
other program documentation. We also met with officials in State's
Office of the Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs,
the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, the Bureau of Public
Affairs, the Office of International Information Programs, and regional
bureaus in Washington, D.C.
To assess whether State has an overall strategy for its public
diplomacy programs and how it measures the effectiveness of these
programs, we reviewed relevant planning, program, and other
documentation; analyzed survey results; and met with cognizant State,
academic, and private sector officials.
* We reviewed State's efforts to develop its own strategy and its
involvement in developing an interagency public diplomacy strategy.
* We reviewed State's current agencywide strategic and performance
plans, its agencywide plans for 2004, and the performance plans of
selected functional and regional bureaus and overseas missions.
* We analyzed State's performance measurement methods that were
identified in the results of our survey of public affairs officers at
U.S. embassies.
* We met with officials in State's Office of Strategic and Performance
Planning and Bureau for Intelligence and Research and with other State
officials involved in strategic and performance planning for public
diplomacy efforts in Washington, D.C.
* We discussed private sector methods for evaluating the effectiveness
of persuasive techniques with representatives of the Public Diplomacy
Institute at George Washington University, School of Media and Public
Affairs; Ketchum; and Weber Shandwick Worldwide, in Washington, D.C.;
and the Ad Council, in New York City. We also hosted roundtable
discussions in Washington, D.C., with high-level officials from some of
the largest public relations and opinion research firms in the United
States. The firms represented at these discussions included APCO
Worldwide; Fleishman-Hillard, Inc.; Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research,
Inc.; Hill and Knowlton, Inc.; Ketchum; The Pew Research Center for the
People and the Press; Porter Novelli International; Weber Shandwick
Worldwide; and Zogby International. We also received information from
Gallup International.
To identify the critical challenges faced in executing public diplomacy
programs, we reviewed relevant program and other documentation,
analyzed survey results, met with State officials domestically and
overseas, interviewed foreign government and nongovernmental
organization officials, and met with a number of other outside
observers of U.S. public diplomacy issues.
* We analyzed impediments to public diplomacy efforts that were
identified in the results of our survey of public affairs officers at
U.S. embassies.
* We analyzed data on State's foreign language designated public
diplomacy positions worldwide and compared them with data on the
numbers of officers actually meeting the designated language
requirements.
* We analyzed projected staffing needs identified in State's overseas
staffing model and compared them with data on the number of positions
actually filled.
* We met with officials in State's Office of the Undersecretary for
Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, the Bureau of Educational and
Cultural Affairs, the Bureau of Public Affairs, the Office of
International Information Programs, and regional bureaus in Washington,
D.C.
* We met with U.S. embassy officers, host-country government officials,
and private sector and nongovernmental organization representatives in
the United Kingdom, Morocco, and Egypt to gain a firsthand view of
public diplomacy challenges faced overseas. These countries were
selected based on congressional interest as well as their respective
geopolitical situations, strategic significance to the United States,
and roles in the war against terrorism. They were also selected to
provide an appropriate mix with respect to the scale of in-country U.S.
public diplomacy operations, the size of U.S. foreign assistance
efforts, the types of public diplomacy challenges faced, and the
methods used in conducting public diplomacy.
* We consulted with representatives of the Advisory Commission on
Public Diplomacy, the Council on Foreign Relations, and a number of
retired public diplomacy practitioners.
We conducted our work from May 2002 through May 2003 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Survey Development and Results:
To assess the State Department's public diplomacy performance
measurement efforts and identify critical challenges faced in executing
public diplomacy activities, we conducted a survey of the heads of
public affairs sections at U.S. embassies and certain U.S. missions to
international organizations and major U.S. consulates around the world.
The survey was conducted using a Web-based instrument from March 5 to
May 29, 2003.
The questionnaire was developed from October through December 2002 by
social science survey specialists and other individuals knowledgeable
about public diplomacy issues. We also obtained a series of comments
and feedback from key State Department staff in December 2002 and
January 2003. The questionnaire was then pretested in December 2002 and
January 2003 with five current and former State Department officials
who had served as heads of public affairs sections at U.S. embassies
overseas to ensure that the questionnaire was clear and unambiguous,
independent, and unbiased.
We developed our list of the study population based on information from
the Office of the Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public
Affairs, particularly concerning which missions to international
organizations and major consulates should be included in the survey. In
all, we sent the survey to the 156 individuals we identified as our
study population and received completed surveys from 118 of these, for
a 76 percent response rate. Members of the survey population were sent
an initial notification of the survey prior to the release of the
survey on the Web and an initial survey invitation when the survey was
released. These were followed by two reminder E-mails. The survey
population was also offered the opportunity to download a copy of the
questionnaire to fill in by hand and return via fax. Individuals who
had not responded after these measures received calls from the project
staff to explain the importance of the study and encourage them to
respond. An exception to this protocol was made for respondents serving
in the Near East during the Iraq conflict. Follow-up phone calls were
not made to those serving in countries in the region of the conflict.
Data for this study were entered directly into the Web instrument by
the respondents and converted into a database for analysis.
In appendix III, we present the results of the closed-ended questions
to our survey.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Questionnaire for State Department Public Affairs
Officers:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Comments from the State Department:
United States Department of State:
Washington, D.C. 20520:
AUG 20 2003:
Dear Ms. Westin:
We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "U.S. PUBLIC
DIPLOMACY: State Department Expands Efforts but Faces Significant
Challenges," GAO-03-951, GAO Job Code 320131.
The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.
If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact Jan
Brambilla, Under Secretary's Office for Public Diplomacy and Public
Affairs, at (202) 647-9109.
Sid L. Kaplan,
Acting Assistant Secretary for Resource Management and
Chief Financial Officer:
Signed by Sid L. Kaplan:
Enclosure:
As stated.
cc: GAO/IAT - John Brummet State/OIG - Luther Atkins State/R -
Charlotte Beers State/H - Paul Kelly:
Ms. Susan S. Westin, Managing Director, International Affairs and
Trade, U.S. General Accounting Office.
Department of State Comments on the Draft Report U.S. Public Diplomacy:
State Department Expands Efforts but Faces Significant Challenges (GAO-
03-951):
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 changed the lives, minds
and hearts of people throughout the world. A war on terrorism began and
continues today. We cannot effectively deal alone with threats and
challenges, which are common to all of humanity. Through effective
public diplomacy and exchanges we are building alliances of common
interests based on a foundation of trust and respect. The past year,
the Office of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public
Affairs has worked with department bureaus to support the War on
Terrorism, focusing on our commitment to both Afghanistan and Iraq, and
on the Muslim world through programs and funding. Our strategy
emphasizes policy advocacy supported by information about American
culture and values, as well as the multifaceted educational and people-
to-people programs of exchanges funded through the Bureau of
Educational and Cultural Affairs. We are also placing increased
emphasis on research and analysis, specifically of international media
coverage of key issues. Primary issues for American public diplomacy
are the War on Terrorism, including Afghanistan and Iraq, HIV/AIDS, and
strengthening relationships among the community of nations with which
we share common interests in advancing security, prosperity and
democracy.
The report makes five recommendations and we offer the following
comments for each recommendation.
* The Office of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public
Affairs will expand engagement with private sector public relations
firms to draw on their expertise in strategies and tactics for
influencing international public opinion. U.S. public diplomacy
strategy will necessarily flow from the foreign policy priorities set
by the President, and primary objectives will be formulated at a
strategic level: supporting the war on terrorism; advancing democracy
and prosperity. Specific objectives and the techniques to achieve them
will be determined on a regional or country-by-country basis. We
welcome the recommendation to consider private sector techniques as we
pursue "integrating all of State's public diplomacy efforts...":
Full integration of public diplomacy functions into all aspects of the
Department's work, policy formulation as well as implementation, is a
primary operational goal of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy
and Public Affairs and entire senior leadership of the Department.
* We agree with this recommendation and will continue to collaborate
with the private sector to measure the
effectiveness of public diplomacy activities; and programs "to inform
and influence target audiences."; We agree with the report's statement
that "it is difficult; to establish a
direct link between public diplomacy and results," (p. 14) given the
multiplicity of forces which affect public perceptions and the
complexity of issues involved. Nevertheless, we are committed to
determining, as far as possible, the effectiveness of various public
diplomacy programs on a global basis and the impact of resources
dedicated to them. Recently, we collaborated with the private sector to
measure the effectiveness of our Shared Values program geared toward
Muslim audiences. We expect that methods will be developed to evaluate
the effectiveness of all public diplomacy programs. Public diplomacy
will only be one factor which, along with the substance of policy,
concrete actions, and other outside influences, including competing
communications efforts, affects public perceptions and attitudes
towards, the United States and given issues. We note the reports
recognition that public opinion research to measure program
effectiveness in the way used by private firms is very costly. We will
explore with private sector partners the logic model concepts, which
could be applicable to State's situation.
* The regional executive directors are following-up with the respective
posts to determine the most efficient allocation of resources to
accomplish public diplomacy support.
* The report identified impediments for increased language training,
including staffing shortfalls. The Diplomatic Readiness Initiative is
working effectively to alleviate these shortfalls. GAO stressed the
importance of language fluency for PD officers and we agree with the
assessment.
* The report correctly notes that a significant "float" of foreign
service officer staffing will go far to alleviate current constraints
that used to be acute, especially when officers were needed at post
yesterday. Training was a luxury that could only be accommodated when
there was no pressure to assign officer.
The report does not adequately describe the Office of Program
Evaluation's role in the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs
(ECA). This office contracts with independent, external, professional
evaluators to conduct outcome and impact evaluations of its exchange
programs. Specific programs are evaluated every five to seven years on
a rotating basis to determine the extent to which they are achieving
their legislative mandates and program goals. Through questionnaires,
interviews and focus groups, the evaluators measure changes in
knowledge, understanding, attitudes and behavior of over 2,700
different ECA program alumni annually using internationally recognized
social science research and statistically valid methodologies,
including logic models--a requirement in all evaluation projects. With
an annual budget of $1.5 million, this unique office in the Department
has completed 20 evaluations using 13 separate evaluation firms since
1999.
We are committed to maintaining the highest standards in the
development and execution of our public diplomacy programs.
[End of section]
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Diana Glod (202) 512-8945:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the individual named above, key contributors to this
report included Rick Barrett, Lyric Clark, Janey Cohen, Michael Courts,
Rebecca Gambler, Edward Kennedy, Heather Von Behren, and Monica
Wolford.
(320131):
FOOTNOTES
[1] U.S. international broadcasting operations include the Voice of
America, WorldNet Television and Film Service, Radio/TV Marti, Radio
Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Free Asia, Radio Sawa, and Radio
Farda.
[2] U.S. General Accounting Office, U.S. International Broadcasting:
New Strategic Approach Focuses on Reaching Large Audiences but Lacks
Measurable Program Objectives, GAO-03-772 (Washington, D.C. July 15,
2003).
[3] Fiscal year 2003 figures are estimates. Percentage calculations
were computed using constant 2003 dollars.
[4] Public diplomacy funding for the regions was calculated by adding
public diplomacy funds allocated by regional bureau under the
Appropriation for Diplomatic and Consular Programs to funds allocated
by regional bureau under the Appropriation for Educational and Cultural
Exchange Programs.
[5] On October 1, 1999, the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) was
integrated into the State Department. The Office of the Undersecretary
for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs was created to oversee the
public diplomacy programs that USIA had administered. USIA's Office of
Research and Media Reaction was merged into State's Bureau of
Intelligence and Research. USIA's administrative support personnel and
functions were transferred into nonpublic diplomacy functions, such as
State's Bureau of Administration. USIA's international broadcasting
operations were taken over by the newly created Broadcasting Board of
Governors. Although State may provide policy guidance and advice, the
Board is independent from State.
[6] The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, What the
World Thinks in 2002, Pew Global Attitudes Project (Dec. 4, 2002). Pew
surveyed 38,000 people in 44 countries over a 4-month period (July
through October 2002) to assess how the publics of the world view their
lives, their nation, the world, and the United States. Muslim countries
surveyed included Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan, Turkey, and
Uzbekistan.
[7] The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, America's
Image Further Erodes, Europeans Want Weaker Ties, Pew Global Attitudes
Project (Mar. 18, 2003). Pew interviewed more than 5,500 people in
France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Poland, Russia, Turkey, the United
Kingdom, and the United States from March 10 through 17, 2003.
[8] The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, Views of a
Changing World, Pew Global Attitudes Project (June 2003).
[9] Zogby International, The Ten Nation Impressions of America Poll
(Apr. 11, 2002). Zogby International surveyed 10 Muslim countries
between March 4 to April 3, 2002, to determine how adults in certain
countries feel about American people and culture, and about U.S. policy
in the Middle East region. The countries surveyed included Egypt,
France, Indonesia, Iran, Kuwait, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia,
United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela.
[10] This number includes authorized Regional English Language Officers
overseas and authorized Information Officers overseas. Authorized
positions for domestic public diplomacy officers and Foreign Service
nationals overseas totaled approximately 688 and 1,702, respectively,
in fiscal year 2003. These numbers have remained relatively static
since September 11.
[11] These countries include Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh,
Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman,
Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates,
and Yemen.
[12] U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, Building America's
Public Diplomacy Through a Reformed Structure and Additional Resources
(Washington, D.C. September 2002).
[13] Mark Leonard, Foreign Policy Center, Public Diplomacy (London,
United Kingdom: 2002).
[14] Independent Task Force on Public Diplomacy, Public Diplomacy: A
Strategy for Reform, Council on Foreign Relations, (July 30, 2002).
[15] Defense Science Board Task Force, Managed Information
Dissemination (Washington, D.C. October 2001).
[16] Public Diplomacy: A Strategy for Reform.
[17] Wilton Park, Changing Perceptions: Review of Public Diplomacy
(United Kingdom: March 2002).
[18] U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, Building America's
Public Diplomacy through a Reformed Structure and Additional Resources
(Washington, D.C. September 2002).
[19] National Defense University, Winning with Words: Strategic
Communications and the War on Terrorism (Washington, D.C. 2002).
[20] This figure was reported in State's most recent performance and
accountability report, for fiscal year 2002.
[21] This money was cut from the fiscal year 2004 request, but State
intends to request it again in fiscal year 2005.
[22] Funding for this program was also cut from the fiscal year 2004
request.
[23] Public Diplomacy: A Strategy for Reform.
[24] Changing Perceptions: Review of Public Diplomacy.
[25] Managed Information Dissemination.
[26] U.S. General Accounting Office, Program Evaluation: Strategies for
Assessing How Information Dissemination Contributes to Agency Goals,
GAO-02-923 (Washington, D.C. Sept. 30, 2002).
[27] State's overseas staffing model operates on a 2-year cycle. Fiscal
year 2002 is the latest year for which data are available on the
numbers of positions actually filled.
[28] U.S. General Accounting Office, State Department: Staffing
Shortfalls and Ineffective Assignment System Compromise Diplomatic
Readiness at Hardship Posts, GAO-02-626 (Washington, D.C. June 18,
2002).
[29] Language-designated positions are graded for both speaking and
reading proficiency. Most officers who do not meet one requirement do
not meet the other one either, so the percentages are similar. For
purposes of clarity, our figures refer only to the requirements for
speaking proficiency.
[30] These are positions for which language capability is preferred but
not required.
[31] GAO reported on the insufficient language proficiency of Foreign
Service officers in 2002. See U.S. General Accounting Office, Foreign
Languages: Human Capital Approach Needed to Correct Staffing and
Proficiency Shortfalls, GAO-02-375 (Washington, D.C. Jan. 31, 2002).
[32] State would not provide updated information on the language
proficiency of officers outside the public diplomacy cone, as they
considered this information to be outside the scope of our review.
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