U.S. Public Diplomacy
State Department and the Broadcasting Board of Governors Expand Efforts in the Middle East but Face Significant Challenges Gao ID: GAO-04-435T February 10, 2004The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, were a dramatic reminder of the importance of our need to cultivate a better public opinion of the United States abroad. Yet recent opinion research indicates that foreign publics, especially in countries with large Muslim populations, view the United States unfavorably. GAO issued two studies in 2003 that examined changes in U.S. public diplomacy resources and programs since September 11 within the State Department (State) and the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG); the U.S. government's strategies for its public diplomacy programs and how it measures their effectiveness; and the challenges that remain in executing U.S. public diplomacy efforts. Although the studies did not focus exclusively on the Middle East, they identified systemic problems that would apply to public diplomacy activities there.
Since September 11, State has expanded its public diplomacy efforts in Muslim-majority countries considered to be of strategic importance in the war on terrorism. It significantly increased resources in South Asia and the Near East and launched new initiatives targeting broader, younger audiences--particularly in predominantly Muslim countries. Also since September 11, the BBG has initiated several new programs focused on attracting larger audiences in priority markets, including Radio Sawa and Arabic language television in the Middle East, the Afghanistan Radio Network, and Radio Farda in Iran. State and BBG have increased their efforts to support the war on terrorism. However, State does not have a strategy that integrates all of its diverse public diplomacy activities and directs them toward common objectives. In addition, we found that while the BBG did have a strategic plan, the plan lacked a long-term strategic goal or related program objective to gauge the Board's success in increasing audience size, the key focus of its plan. Furthermore, there is no interagency strategy to guide State's, BBG's, and all federal agencies' communication efforts and thus ensure consistent messages to overseas audiences. In addition to strategy deficiencies, we found that State and the BBG were not systematically and comprehensively measuring progress toward the goals of reaching broader audiences and increasing publics' understanding about the United States. In addition to weaknesses in planning and performance measurement, State and BBG face several internal challenges in carrying out their programs. Challenges at State include insufficient public diplomacy resources and a lack of officers with foreign language proficiency. The BBG also faces a number of media market, organizational, and resource challenges that may hamper its efforts to generate large audiences in priority markets.
GAO-04-435T, U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department and the Broadcasting Board of Governors Expand Efforts in the Middle East but Face Significant Challenges
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Testimony Before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging
Threats, and International Relations; Committee on Government Reform;
House of Representatives:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 2:00 p.m. EST:
Tuesday, February 10, 2004:
U.S. Public Diplomacy:
State Department and the Broadcasting Board of Governors Expand Efforts
in the Middle East but Face Significant Challenges:
Statement of Jess T. Ford, Director International Affairs and Trade:
GAO-04-435T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-04-435T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations;
Committee on Government Reform; House of Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, were a dramatic reminder
of the importance of our need to cultivate a better public opinion of
the United States abroad. Yet recent opinion research indicates that
foreign publics, especially in countries with large Muslim
populations, view the United States unfavorably. GAO issued two
studies in 2003 that examined changes in U.S. public diplomacy
resources and programs since September 11 within the State Department
(State) and the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG); the U.S.
government‘s strategies for its public diplomacy programs and how it
measures their effectiveness; and the challenges that remain in
executing U.S. public diplomacy efforts. Although the studies did not
focus exclusively on the Middle East, they identified systemic
problems that would apply to public diplomacy activities there.
GAO made several recommendations to State and the BBG to address
planning and performance issues. For example, GAO recommended that
State develop a strategy to integrate its public diplomacy efforts and
direct them toward common measurable objectives, and that BBG revise
its strategic plan to include key measurable objectives. Both agencies
have made some progress toward implementing our recommendations.
What GAO Found:
Since September 11, State has expanded its public diplomacy efforts in
Muslim-majority countries considered to be of strategic importance in
the war on terrorism. It significantly increased resources in South
Asia and the Near East and launched new initiatives targeting broader,
younger audiences”particularly in predominantly Muslim countries. Also
since September 11, the BBG has initiated several new programs focused
on attracting larger audiences in priority markets, including Radio
Sawa and Arabic language television in the Middle East, the
Afghanistan Radio Network, and Radio Farda in Iran.
State and BBG have increased their efforts to support the war on
terrorism. However, State does not have a strategy that integrates all
of its diverse public diplomacy activities and directs them toward
common objectives. In addition, we found that while the BBG did have a
strategic plan, the plan lacked a long-term strategic goal or related
program objective to gauge the Board‘s success in increasing audience
size, the key focus of its plan. Furthermore, there is no interagency
strategy to guide State‘s, BBG‘s, and all federal agencies‘
communication efforts and thus ensure consistent messages to overseas
audiences. In addition to strategy deficiencies, we found that State
and the BBG were not systematically and comprehensively measuring
progress toward the goals of reaching broader audiences and increasing
publics‘ understanding about the United States.
In addition to weaknesses in planning and performance measurement,
State and BBG face several internal challenges in carrying out their
programs. Challenges at State include insufficient public diplomacy
resources and a lack of officers with foreign language proficiency.
The BBG also faces a number of media market, organizational, and
resource challenges that may hamper its efforts to generate large
audiences in priority markets.
What GAO Recommends:
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-435T.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click
on the link above. For more information, contact Jess T. Ford at
(202) 512-4128 or fordj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss issues surrounding U.S. public
diplomacy, particularly in the Middle East. The terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, were a dramatic reminder of the importance of our
need to cultivate a better public opinion of the United States abroad.
Yet recent opinion research indicates that foreign publics, especially
in countries with large Muslim populations, view the United States
unfavorably. Last September, we reported for the House International
Relations Committee on the State Department's public diplomacy
efforts.[Footnote 1] Earlier, in July, we issued a report for that
committee on the progress that the Broadcasting Board of Governors
(BBG)--the agency responsible for nonmilitary U.S. international
broadcasting--has made in developing a new strategic approach aimed at
reversing declining audience trends and supporting U.S. strategic
objectives such as the war on terrorism.[Footnote 2] The Department of
State and the BBG share an annual budget of more than $1 billion for
public diplomacy activities. Although neither of our reports focused
exclusively on the Middle East, each identified systemic problems that
would apply to public diplomacy activities there.
Mr. Chairman, you asked us to discuss our conclusions and
recommendations from these reports and, where possible, to cite
specific examples of public diplomacy actions and issues we observed
during our fieldwork in the Middle East.[Footnote 3] Today I will talk
about (1) changes in U.S. public diplomacy resources and programs since
September 11; (2) the government's strategies for its public diplomacy
programs and how it measures their effectiveness; and (3) the
challenges that remain in executing U.S. public diplomacy efforts. As
part of our work, we surveyed top officials of public affairs sections
at U.S. embassies worldwide on such issues as guidance from various
State Department offices; sufficiency of budgetary, staff, and other
resources; and ability to adequately measure performance.[Footnote 4]
We met with cognizant State officials, individual members of the BBG,
and senior members of each broadcast entity to discuss management
issues. We also met with academics specializing in public diplomacy and
international affairs issues, and private sector officials from U.S.
public relations and opinion research firms with international
operations. While several government entities conduct public diplomacy
activities, my comments will focus on State's and the BBG's efforts
since they were the subject of our work.[Footnote 5]
Summary:
Since September 11, both State and the BBG have expanded their public
diplomacy efforts in Muslim-majority countries considered to be of
strategic importance in the war on terrorism. In the two fiscal years
since the terrorist attacks, State increased its public diplomacy
funding and staffing and expanded its programs in two regions with
significant Muslim populations--South Asia and the Near East. Among
other efforts, State is emphasizing exchange programs targeting young
and diverse audiences, including high school students. State is also
expanding its American Corners program, which provides information
about the United States to foreign audiences through partnerships
between U.S. embassies and local institutions. In addition, since
September 11, the Broadcasting Board of Governors has initiated several
new programs focusing on attracting larger audiences in priority
markets, including Radio Sawa in the Middle East; the Afghanistan Radio
Network; and Radio Farda in Iran. Estimated start-up and recurring
costs for these three projects through fiscal year 2003 totaled about
$116 million. The Board is also scheduled to launch an Arabic language
television network in the Middle East in mid-February 2004.
Although State and BBG have increased their efforts to support the war
on terrorism, we reported that State had not developed a comprehensive
strategy that integrates all of its diverse public diplomacy activities
and directs them toward common objectives, and that neither State nor
the BBG has focused on measuring progress toward long-term goals. The
absence of an integrated strategy may hinder State's ability to channel
its multifaceted programs toward concrete and measurable progress. In
comparison, the Broadcasting Board of Governors in July 2001 initiated
a 5-year strategic approach to international broadcasting known as
"Marrying the Mission to the Market," which emphasizes the need to
reach large audiences by applying modern broadcast techniques and
strategically allocating resources to focus on high-priority broadcast
markets, such as the Middle East. However, the plan lacked a single
goal or related program objective to gauge its success in reaching
larger audiences in priority areas. While State, BBG, and other
entities in the U.S. government conducting public diplomacy have
different roles and missions, it is important to note that there also
is no interagency public diplomacy strategy setting forth the messages
and means for governmentwide communication to overseas audiences.
According to State officials, without such a strategy, the risk of
making communication mistakes that are damaging to U.S. public
diplomacy efforts is high. In addition to strategy deficiencies, we
found that State and the BBG were not systematically and
comprehensively measuring progress toward the goals of reaching broader
audiences and increasing publics' understanding about the United
States. Since our reports were issued, both agencies have taken steps
to address our recommendations.
In addition to weaknesses in planning and performance measurement,
State and BBG face several internal challenges in carrying out their
programs. According to public affairs officers at the State Department,
these challenges include insufficient resources to effectively conduct
public diplomacy and a lack of public diplomacy officers with foreign
language proficiency. More than 40 percent of the public affairs
officers we surveyed said the amount of time available to devote
exclusively to executing public diplomacy tasks was insufficient, and
more than 50 percent reported that the number of Foreign Service
officers available to perform such tasks was inadequate. Further, about
21 percent of the officers posted overseas in language designated
positions have not attained the level of language speaking proficiency
required for their positions, hampering their ability to engage with
foreign publics. In addition, about 58 percent of the heads of embassy
public affairs sections reported that Foreign Service officers do not
have adequate time for training in the skills required to effectively
conduct public diplomacy. The Broadcasting Board of Governors also
faces resource issues, as well as a number of media market,
organizational, and resource challenges that may hamper its efforts to
generate large audiences in priority markets. These challenges include
outmoded programs and poor signal quality; the disparate structure of
the agency, which consists of seven separate broadcast entities and a
mix of federal and grantee organizations collectively managed by a
part-time Board; and the resource-intensive job of broadcasting 97
language services to more than 125 broadcast markets worldwide.
We made several recommendations to the Secretary of State and the BBG
to address planning and performance issues that they generally agreed
to implement but progress to date has been mixed. Among other things,
we recommended that State develop a strategy that considers private
sector public relations techniques in integrating its public diplomacy
efforts; improve performance measurement; and strengthen efforts to
train Foreign Service officers in foreign languages and public
diplomacy. In response to our recommendations, State is currently
studying how to integrate private sector techniques into its programs.
State also plans to establish a new office of strategic planning for
public diplomacy. Regarding our recommendation to strengthen
performance measurement efforts, State officials told us they are
exploring ways to do so and State's Bureau of Educational and Cultural
Affairs has, among other things, begun conducting limited pre-and post-
testing of its program participants' understanding of the United
States. State acknowledged the need to strengthen training of Foreign
Service officers and told us that the primary obstacle to doing so is
insufficient staffing to allow time for training. Officials said they
have already begun to address staffing gaps by stepping up recruitment
efforts as part of the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative.
In response to our recommendations to the BBG, the Board has revised
its strategic plan to create a single strategic goal of maximizing
impact in areas of priority U.S. interest and made audience size a key
performance measure. The Board has added broadcast credibility and,
according to Board officials, plans to add audience awareness and
whether broadcasting entities are achieving their mandated missions.
Finally, the Board recently completed a review of language service
overlap that identified about $9.7 million in potential savings.
However, the Board has yet to revise its strategic plan to include
details on implementation strategies, resource requirements, and
project time frames for the various initiatives supporting its
strategic goal of maximizing program impact.
Background:
The key objectives of U.S. public diplomacy are to engage, inform, and
influence overseas audiences. Public diplomacy is carried out through a
wide range of programs that employ person-to-person contacts; print,
broadcast, and electronic media; and other means. Traditionally, U.S.
public diplomacy focused on foreign elites--current and future overseas
opinion leaders, agenda-setters, and decision makers. However, the
dramatic growth in global mass communications and other trends have
forced a rethinking of this approach, and State has begun to consider
techniques for communicating with broader foreign audiences. The BBG,
as the overseer of U.S. international broadcasting efforts, supports
U.S. public diplomacy's key objectives by broadcasting fair and
accurate information about the United States, while maintaining its
journalistic independence as a news organization. The BBG manages and
oversees the Voice of America (VOA), WorldNet Television, Radio/TV
Marti, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Sawa, Radio Farda, the
Afghanistan Radio Network, and Radio Free Asia. Radio Sawa and Radio
Farda (Iran) provide regional and local news to countries in the Middle
East.
Together, State and the BBG spend in excess of $1 billion on public
diplomacy programs each year. State's public diplomacy budget totaled
an estimated $628 million in fiscal year 2004. About 51 percent, or
$320 million, is slated for the Fulbright and other educational and
cultural exchange programs. The remainder covers mostly salaries and
expenses incurred by State and embassy officers engaged in information
dissemination, media relations, cultural affairs, speaker programs,
publications, and other activities. BBG's budget for fiscal year 2004
is $546 million. This includes more than $42 million for radio and
television broadcasting to the Middle East. Since initiating the
language service review process in 1999, the Board has reduced the
scope of operations of more than 25 language services and reallocated
about $19.7 million in funds, with the majority redirected toward
Central Asia and the Middle East, including $8 million for Radio Farda
service to Iran. Figure 1 shows the key uses of public diplomacy
resources by State and the BBG.
Figure 1: Key Uses of U.S. Public Diplomacy Budget Resources for State
Department and the Broadcasting Board of Governors, Fiscal Year 2003
Estimates:
[See PDF for image]
[A] Estimate includes $11 million for Radio Sawa.
[B] Estimate includes $3 million for Radio Farda.
[End of figure]
More Public Diplomacy Resources Shifting to Muslim-Majority Countries:
Since September 11, State has expanded its efforts in Muslim-majority
countries that are considered strategically important in the war on
terrorism. State significantly increased the program funding and number
of Foreign Service officers in its bureaus of South Asian and Near
Eastern Affairs. State has also launched a number of new initiatives
targeting broader, younger audiences--particularly in predominantly
Muslim countries--that include expanding exchange programs targeting
citizens of Muslim countries, informing foreign publics about U.S.
policies in the war on terrorism, and demonstrating that Americans and
Muslims share certain values. The BBG has also targeted recent
initiatives to support the war on terrorism, including Radio Sawa in
the Middle East; the Afghanistan Radio Network; and the new Radio Farda
service to Iran. In addition, the Board plans to further expand its
presence in the Middle East through the launch of a Middle East
Television Network scheduled for launch in mid-February 2004.
State Has Increased Resources and Programs in the Middle East:
Since September 11, 2001, the State Department has increased its
resources and launched various new initiatives in predominantly Muslim
countries. For example, while State's bureau of Europe and Eurasia
still receives the largest overall share of overseas public diplomacy
resources, the largest percentage increases in such resources since
September 11 occurred in State's bureaus of South Asian and Near
Eastern Affairs, where many countries have significant Muslim
populations.[Footnote 6] Public diplomacy funding increased in South
Asia from $24 million to $39 million and in the Near East from $39
million to $62 million, or by 63 and 58 percent, respectively, from
fiscal year 2001 through 2003. During the same period, authorized
American Foreign Service officers in South Asia increased from 27 to 31
and in the Near East from 45 to 57, or by 15 percent and 27 percent,
respectively.
Furthermore, in 2002, State redirected 5 percent of its exchange
resources to better support the war on terrorism and to strengthen U.S.
engagement with Muslim countries. In 2003, State has continued to
emphasize exchanges with Muslim countries through its Partnership for
Learning Program--designed to target young and diverse audiences
through academic and professional exchanges such as the Fulbright,
International Visitor, and Citizen Exchange programs. According to
State, under this program, 170 high school students from predominantly
Islamic countries have already arrived and are living with American
families and studying at local high schools. State has also carried out
increased exchanges through its Middle East Partnership Initiative,
which includes computer and English language training for women newly
employed by the Afghan government and a program to assist women from
Arab countries and elsewhere in observing and discussing the U.S.
electoral process. In addition, State is expanding its American Corners
program, which uses space in public libraries and other public
buildings abroad to provide information about the United States. In
fiscal year 2004, State is planning to establish 58 American Corners in
the Middle East and South Asia. In fiscal year 2005, State plans to
open 10 in Afghanistan and 15 in Iraq.
State's Office of International Information Programs has also developed
new initiatives to support the war on terrorism, including a print and
electronic pamphlet titled The Network of Terrorism, distributed in 36
languages via hard copy, the Web, and media throughout the world, which
documented the direct link between the September 11 perpetrators and al
Qaeda; and a publication titled Iraq: From Fear to Freedom to inform
foreign audiences of the administration's policies toward Iraq.
New BBG Initiatives Target Large Audiences in Priority Markets:
Several of the BBG's new initiatives focus on reaching large audiences
in priority markets and supporting the war on terrorism. The first of
these programs, Radio Sawa in the Middle East, was launched in March
2002 using modern, market-tested broadcasting techniques and practices,
such as the extensive use of music formats. Radio Sawa replaced the
poorly performing VOA Arabic service, which had listening rates at
around 2 percent of the population. According to BBG survey research,
Radio Sawa is reaching 51 percent of its target audience and is ranked
highest for news and news trustworthiness in Amman, Jordan. Despite
such results, it remains unclear how many people Radio Sawa is actually
reaching throughout the entire Middle East because audience research
has been performed only in select markets. Further, the State Inspector
General and the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and
Muslim World have raised questions about whether Radio Sawa has focused
more on audience size and composition than on potential impact on
attitudes in the region. The BBG has also launched the Afghanistan
Radio Network and a language service to Iran called Radio Farda.
Estimated costs for these three initiatives through fiscal year 2003
are about $116 million. In addition, the Board is launching an Arabic
language television network in the Middle East in mid-February 2004.
Strategy Deficiencies, Inability to Gauge Progress Toward Goals Hinder
U.S. Public Diplomacy Efforts:
While the growth in programs to the Muslim world marks State's
recognition of the need to increase diplomatic channels to this
population, State still lacks a comprehensive and commonly understood
public diplomacy strategy to guide these programs. In contrast to
State, the BBG has a strategic plan that focuses on a market-based
approach to increasing audience size in priority markets. Furthermore,
there is no interagency strategy to guide State's and all federal
agencies' communication efforts and thus ensure consistent messages to
overseas audiences. In addition, State and the BBG lacked adequate
measures of progress toward reaching its public diplomacy goals. Since
our report, State and the Board have focused on improving their
performance measures.
State Does Not Have an Integrated Strategy to Guide its Operations but
BBG Does:
After September 11, State acknowledged the lack of, and need for, a
strategy that integrates all of its diverse public diplomacy activities
and directs them toward common objectives, but to date, that strategy
is still in the development stage. State officials told us that such a
strategy is particularly important because State's public diplomacy
operation is fragmented among the various organizational entities
within the agency. Public affairs officers who responded to our survey
indicated that the lack of a strategy has hindered their ability to
effectively execute public diplomacy efforts overseas. More than 66
percent of public affairs officers in one region reported that the
quality of strategic guidance from the Office of the Undersecretary in
the last year and a half (October 2001 through March 2003) was
generally insufficient or very insufficient. More than 40 percent in
another region reported the same. We encountered similar complaints
during our overseas fieldwork. For example, in Morocco, the former
public affairs officer stated that so little information had been
provided from Washington on State's post-September 11 public diplomacy
strategy that he had to rely on newspaper articles and guesswork to
formulate his in-country public diplomacy plans.
In contrast to State's lack of strategy, BBG has introduced a market-
based approach to international broadcasting that aims to generate
large listening audiences in priority markets that the Board believes
it must reach to effectively meet its mission. Early implementation of
this strategy has focused on markets relevant to the war on terrorism,
in particular the Middle East. The Board's vision is to create a
flexible, multimedia, research-driven U.S. international broadcasting
system that addresses the many challenges we noted in our report,
including that the Board is faces a diverse organizational structure
consisting of several broadcast entities with differing missions,
broadcast approaches, and constituencies.
Interagency Public Diplomacy Strategy Has Not Been Established:
Mr. Chairman, we believe it is especially important to emphasize as of
February 4, 2004, no interagency public diplomacy strategy has been
implemented that lays out the messages and means for governmentwide
communication efforts to overseas audiences. The absence of an
interagency strategy complicates the task of conveying consistent
messages and thus achieving mutually reinforcing benefits. State
officials told us that, without such a strategy, the risk of making
communication mistakes that are damaging to U.S. public diplomacy
efforts is high. They also said that the lack of a strategy diminishes
the efficiency and effectiveness of governmentwide public diplomacy
efforts.
Our overseas fieldwork in Egypt and Morocco underlined the importance
of interagency coordination. Embassy officers there told us that only a
very small percentage of the population was aware of the magnitude of
U.S. assistance being provided to their countries. Egypt is the second
largest recipient of U.S. assistance in the world, with assistance
totaling more than an estimated $1.9 billion in 2003. Assistance to
Morocco totaled more than an estimated $13 million in 2003.
Most interagency communication coordination efforts have been ad hoc in
recent years. Immediately after September 11, the White House, State
Department, Department of Defense, and other agencies coordinated
various public diplomacy efforts on a day-to-day basis, and the White
House established a number of interim coordination mechanisms. One such
mechanism was the joint operation of the Coalition Information Centers
in Washington, London, and Islamabad, set up during the early stages of
U.S. military operations in Afghanistan in 2001. The centers were
designed to provide a rapid response capability for correcting
inaccurate news stories, proactively dealing with news items likely to
generate negative responses overseas, and optimizing reporting of news
favorable to U.S. efforts.
In January 2003, the President established a more permanent
coordination mechanism, the White House Office of Global
Communications, which is intended to coordinate strategic
communications from the U.S. government to overseas audiences. The
President also established a Strategic Communication Policy
Coordinating Committee, co-chaired by the State Department and the
National Security Council and to work closely with the Office of Global
Communications, to ensure interagency coordination in disseminating the
American message across the globe. Although it is the committee's long-
term objective to develop a National Communications Strategy, according
to State officials, the committee has not met since March 2003.
State Lacks Measures of Progress Toward Public Diplomacy Goals:
Mr. Chairman, in addition to deficiencies in public diplomacy
strategies, we found that State is not systematically and
comprehensively measuring progress toward its public diplomacy goals.
Its overseas performance measurement efforts focus on anecdotal
evidence and program outputs, rather than gauging progress toward
changing foreign publics' understanding and attitudes about the United
States. Some posts judge the effectiveness of their public diplomacy
efforts by simply counting the number of public diplomacy activities
that occur in their host country--for example, the number of speeches
given by the ambassador or the number of news articles placed in the
host-country media. While such measures shed light on the level of
public diplomacy activity, they reveal little in the way of overall
program effectiveness.
State currently has no reporting requirements in place to determine
whether posts' performance targets are actually met. At one overseas
post we visited, the post had identified polling data showing that only
22 percent of the host country's citizens had a favorable view of the
United States--a figure the post used as a baseline with yearly
percentage increases set as targets. However, the former public affairs
officer at the post told us that he did not attempt to determine or
report on whether the post had actually achieved these targets because
there was no requirement to do so. Officials at the other two overseas
posts we visited also cited the lack of any formal reporting
requirement for following up on whether they met their annual
performance targets. An official in State's Office of Strategic and
Performance Planning said that they have now begun to require posts to
report on whether they have met performance targets.
Furthermore, public affairs officers at U.S. embassies generally do not
conduct systematic program evaluations. About 79 percent of the
respondents to our survey reported that staffing at their missions was
insufficient to conduct systematic program evaluations and many
officers also reported that staffing at posts was insufficient to carry
out the long-range monitoring required to adequately measure program
effectiveness. Even if sufficient staffing were available, State would
still have difficulty conducting long-range tracking of exchange
participants because it lacks a database with comprehensive information
on its various exchange program alumni. State had planned to begin
building a new worldwide alumni database with comprehensive data
linking all of its various exchange programs. However, Bureau of
Educational and Cultural Affairs officials told us they had received
insufficient funds to do so, and thus are seeking to improve existing
information systems for individual exchange programs.
Private Sector Public Relations Tools Could Be Relevant to State's
Needs:
Mr. Chairman, during our audit work, we learned that private sector
public relations efforts and political campaigns use sophisticated
strategies to integrate complex communication efforts involving
multiple players. Although State's public diplomacy efforts extend
beyond the activities of public relations firms, many of the strategic
tools that such firms employ are relevant to State's situation. While
it is difficult to establish direct links between public diplomacy
programs and results, other U.S. government agencies and the private
sector have best practices for assessing information disseminating
campaigns, including the need to define success and how it should be
measured. Executives from some of the largest public relations firms in
the United States told us that initial strategic decisions involve
establishing the scope and nature of the problem, identifying the
target audience, determining the core messages, and defining both
success and failure. Subsequent steps include conducting research to
validate the initial decisions, testing the core messages, carrying out
pre-launch activities, and developing information materials. Each of
these elements contains numerous other steps that must be completed
before implementing a tactical program. Further, progress must be
measured continuously and tactics adjusted accordingly.
BBG Has Made Progress in Measuring Performance:
In conducting our work on the BBG strategic plan, we found that the
plan did not include a single goal or related program objective
designed to gauge progress toward increasing audience size, even though
its strategy focuses on the need to reach large audiences in priority
markets. We also found that the plan lacked measurable program
objectives to support its strategic goals, including a measure of
broadcaster credibility. The Board has taken several steps to address
the recommendations we made in our report. First, the Board created a
single strategic goal to focus on the key objective of maximizing
impact in areas of priority interest to the United States and made
audience size a key performance measure. Second, the Board has added
broadcast credibility and plans to add the additional performance
measures we recommended, including audience awareness and whether
broadcast entities are achieving their mandated missions.
A Number of Internal Challenges Hamper U.S. Public Diplomacy
Activities:
Mr. Chairman, I have discussed the expansion of U.S. public diplomacy
resources to areas of the world thought to breed terrorist activities
and the need for a more cohesive, integrated U.S. public diplomacy
strategy with measurable indicators of progress. There are other
challenges our government faces in executing successful public
diplomacy activities. According to public affairs officers, these
challenges include insufficient time and staffing resources to conduct
public diplomacy tasks. In addition, many public affairs officers
reported that the time available to attend public diplomacy training is
inadequate. Furthermore, a significant number of Foreign Service
officers involved in public diplomacy efforts overseas lack sufficient
foreign language skills. The Board's key challenge in executing its
strategy is how to generate large audiences while dealing with a number
of media market, organizational, and resources issues.
Insufficient Time and Staff:
More than 40 percent of the public affairs officers we surveyed
reported that the amount of time they had to devote exclusively to
executing public diplomacy tasks was insufficient. During our overseas
fieldwork, officers told us that, while they manage to attend U.S. and
other foreign embassy receptions and functions within their host
country capitals, it was particularly difficult to find time to travel
outside the capitals to interact with ordinary citizens. More than 50
percent of those responding to our survey reported that the number of
Foreign Service officers available to perform public diplomacy duties
was inadequate. Although State increased the actual number of Americans
in public diplomacy positions overseas from 414 in fiscal year 2000 to
448 in fiscal year 2002, State still had a shortfall of public
diplomacy staff in 2002, based on the projected needs identified in
State's 2002 overseas staffing model. In 2002, State's overseas
staffing model projected the need for 512 staff in these positions;
however, 64 of these positions, or 13 percent, were not filled.
[Footnote 7] In addition, about 58 percent of the heads of embassy
public affairs sections reported that Foreign Service officers do not
have adequate time for training in the skills required to effectively
conduct public diplomacy.
We reported in 2002[Footnote 8] that as part of its Diplomatic
Readiness Initiative, State has launched an aggressive recruiting
program to rebuild the department's total workforce. Under this
initiative, State requested 1,158 new employees above attrition over
the 3-year period for fiscal years 2002 through 2004, and according to
State officials, the department has met its hiring goals under this
initiative for fiscal years 2002 and 2003. However, it does not have
numerical targets for specific skill requirements such as language
proficiency or regional expertise. Although State officials are
optimistic that enough new hires are being brought in to address the
overall staffing shortage, there are no assurances that the recruiting
efforts will result in the right people with the right skills needed to
meet specific critical shortfalls.
Shortfalls in Foreign Language Skills:
Insufficient foreign language skills pose another problem for many
officers. As of December 31, 2002, 21 percent of the 332 Foreign
Service officers filling "language-designated" public diplomacy
positions overseas did not meet the foreign language speaking
requirements of their positions.[Footnote 9] The highest percentages
not meeting the requirements were in the Near East, where 30 percent of
the officers did not meet the requirement. Although State had no
language-designated positions for South Asia, it had eight language-
preferred[Footnote 10] positions, none of which was filled by officers
who had reading or speaking capability in those languages. It is
important to note that most of the foreign languages required in these
two regions are considered difficult to master, such as Arabic and
Urdu. In contrast, 85 percent of the officers filling French language-
designated positions and 97 percent of those filling Spanish language-
designated ones met the requirements. Officers' opinions on the quality
of the foreign language training they received also varied greatly by
region.
Foreign Service officers posted at the overseas embassies we visited
and other State officials told us that having fluency in a host
country's language is important for effectively conducting public
diplomacy. The foreign government officials with whom we met in Egypt,
Morocco, and the United Kingdom agreed. They noted that, even in
countries where English is widely understood, speaking the host
country's language demonstrates respect for its people and its culture.
In Morocco, officers in the public affairs and other sections of the
embassy told us that, because their ability to speak Arabic was poor,
they conducted most embassy business in French. French is widely used
in that country, especially in business and government. However,
embassy officers told us that speaking Arabic would provide superior
entrée to the Moroccan public. The ability to speak country-specific
forms of Arabic and other more obscure dialects would generate even
more goodwill, especially outside the major cities.
According to the department, the largest and most significant factor
limiting its ability to fill language-designated positions is its long-
standing staffing shortfall, which State's Diplomatic Readiness
Initiative is designed to fill. Other planned actions include
bolstering efforts to recruit job candidates with target language
skills, sending language training supervisors to posts to determine
ways to improve training offerings, and developing a new "language
continuum" plan to guide efforts to meet the need for higher levels of
competency in all languages, especially those critical to national
security concerns.
Outdated Broadcast Services and Structure Pose Challenges to Expanding
in Priority Markets:
The Broadcasting Board of Governors has its own set of public diplomacy
challenges, key among them is how to achieve large audiences in
priority markets while dealing with (1) a collection of outdated and
noncompetitive language services, (2) a disparate organizational
structure consisting of seven separate broadcast entities and a mix of
federal agency and grantee organizations that are managed by a part-
time Board of Governors, and (3) the resource challenge of broadcasting
in 97 language services to more than 125 broadcast markets worldwide.
Although its strategic plan identifies a number of solutions to the
competitive challenges the Board faces and provides a new
organizational model for U.S. international broadcasting[Footnote 11],
we found that the Board's plan did not include specifics on
implementation strategies, resource requirements, project time frames,
or a clear vision of the Board's intended scope-of-operations. The
Board recently completed a review of the overlap issue and identified
six approaches to addressing the problem while still meeting the
discrete missions of the Voice of America and other broadcast entities.
All of the Board's overlapping services were assessed against this
analytical framework and over $9.7 million in potential savings for
priority initiatives were identified.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to
respond to any questions you or other members of the subcommittee may
have at this time.
Contacts and Acknowledgments:
For future contacts regarding this testimony, please call Jess Ford or
Diana Glod at (202) 512-4128. Individuals making key contributions to
this testimony included Lyric Clark, Janey Cohen, Michael Courts,
Melissa Pickworth, Edward Kennedy, and Michael ten Kate.
FOOTNOTES
[1] U.S. General Accounting Office, U.S. Public Diplomacy: State
Department Expands Efforts but Faces Significant Challenges, GAO-03-951
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 4, 2003).
[2] U.S. General Accounting Office, U.S. International Broadcasting:
New Strategic Approach Focuses on Reaching Large Audience but Lacks
Measurable Program Objectives, GAO-03-772 (Washington, D.C.: July 15,
2003).
[3] We conducted our Middle East fieldwork in Morocco and Egypt. We
also conducted fieldwork in the United Kingdom.
[4] GAO surveyed 156 public affairs officers from March through May
2003, of which 118 completed their responses for a 76 percent response
rate.
[5] We conducted our work in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.
[6] These countries include Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh,
Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman,
Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates,
and Yemen.
[7] State's overseas staffing model operates on a 2-year cycle. Fiscal
year 2002was the latest year for which data were available on the
numbers of positions actually filled.
[8]
U.S. General Accounting Office, State Department: Staffing Shortfalls
and Ineffective Assignment System Compromise Diplomatic Readiness at
Hardship Posts, GAO-02-626 (Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2002).
[9] Language-designated positions are graded for both speaking and
reading proficiency. Most officers who do not meet one requirement do
not meet the other one either, so the percentages are similar. For
purposes of clarity, our figures refer only to the requirements for
speaking proficiency.
[10] These are positions for which language capability is preferred but
not required.
[11] The Board views the separate entities as part of a "single system"
under the Board's direct control and authority.
