Afghanistan Reconstruction
Deteriorating Security and Limited Resources Have Impeded Progress; Improvements in U.S. Strategy Needed Gao ID: GAO-04-403 June 2, 2004In October 2001, in response to the Taliban regime's protection of al Qaeda terrorists who attacked the United States, coalition forces forcibly removed the regime from Afghanistan. In December 2002, Congress passed the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act authorizing assistance funds to help Afghanistan rebuild a stable, democratic society. The act directed GAO to monitor the implementation of U.S. humanitarian and development assistance. This report analyzes, for fiscal years 2002-2003, (1) U.S. obligations and expenditures in Afghanistan, (2) results of assistance projects, (3) the assistance coordination mechanisms and strategy, and (4) major obstacles that affected the achievement of U.S. goals.
Of the $900 million that the U.S. government spent on nonsecurity-related assistance in Afghanistan in fiscal years 2002-2003, over 75 percent supported humanitarian efforts, including emergency food and shelter, and over 20 percent supported longer-term reconstruction. USAID, the Department of State, and the Department of Defense spent $508 million, $254 million, and $64 million, respectively, for humanitarian, quick-impact, and some longer-term projects. U.S. funding represented about 38 percent of the $3.7 billion the international community disbursed over the 2-year period. U.S. humanitarian and short-term assistance benefited Afghanistan, but longerterm reconstruction efforts achieved limited results by the end of fiscal year 2003 due to late funding. By providing food and shelter to returning refugees and other vulnerable populations, early U.S. assistance helped avert a humanitarian crisis. USAID's and Defense's quick-impact projects also helped rebuild smallscale infrastructure such as schools and bridges. USAID initiated several longerterm reconstruction activities, such as repairing the Kabul-Kandahar road and starting a democracy program. However, because of delays in funding most major assistance contracts were not signed until summer 2003, limiting the results in fiscal years 2002-2003. U.S. coordination mechanisms for Afghanistan assistance were generally effective, but international assistance was not well coordinated in fiscal years 2002-2003. In addition, the United States lacked a complete and integrated assistance strategy, which hampered the U.S. government's ability to focus available resources and hold itself accountable for measurable results. Further, U.S. officials responsible for coordinating efforts lacked complete financial data, which hindered their ability to oversee the assistance. In fiscal years 2002-2003, Afghanistan confronted many obstacles that other postconflict nations have faced, such as multiple competing parties. In addition, security deteriorated and opium production increased, thereby jeopardizing U.S. reconstruction efforts. Lack of staff, poor working conditions, and delayed reconstruction funding further impeded U.S. efforts. In September 2003, to expedite progress, the U.S. government announced the "Accelerating Success" initiative, providing $1.76 billion for reconstruction in 2004.
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Director: Team: Phone:GAO-04-403, Afghanistan Reconstruction: Deteriorating Security and Limited Resources Have Impeded Progress; Improvements in U.S. Strategy Needed
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Report to Congressional Committees:
June 2004:
AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION:
Deteriorating Security and Limited Resources Have Impeded Progress;
Improvements in U.S. Strategy Needed:
GAO-04-403:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-04-403, a report to the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations and the House Committee on International Relations
Why GAO Did This Study:
In October 2001, in response to the Taliban regime‘s protection of al
Qaeda terrorists who attacked the United States, coalition forces
forcibly removed the regime from Afghanistan. In December 2002,
Congress passed the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act authorizing
assistance funds to help Afghanistan rebuild a stable, democratic
society. The act directed GAO to monitor the implementation of U.S.
humanitarian and development assistance. This report analyzes, for
fiscal years 2002-2003, (1) U.S. obligations and expenditures in
Afghanistan, (2) results of assistance projects, (3) the assistance
coordination mechanisms and strategy, and (4) major obstacles that
affected the achievement of U.S. goals.
What GAO Found:
Of the $900 million that the U.S. government spent on nonsecurity-
related assistance in Afghanistan in fiscal years 2002-2003, over 75
percent supported humanitarian efforts, including emergency food and
shelter, and over 20 percent supported longer-term reconstruction.
USAID, the Department of State, and the Department of Defense spent
$508 million, $254 million, and $64 million, respectively, for
humanitarian, quick-impact, and some longer-term projects. U.S. funding
represented about 38 percent of the $3.7 billion the international
community disbursed over the 2-year period.
U.S. humanitarian and short-term assistance benefited Afghanistan, but
longer-term reconstruction efforts achieved limited results by the end
of fiscal year 2003 due to late funding. By providing food and shelter
to returning refugees and other vulnerable populations, early U.S.
assistance helped avert a humanitarian crisis. USAID‘s and Defense‘s
quick-impact projects also helped rebuild small-scale infrastructure
such as schools and bridges. USAID initiated several longer-term
reconstruction activities, such as repairing the Kabul–Kandahar road
and starting a democracy program. However, because of delays in funding
most major assistance contracts were not signed until summer 2003,
limiting the results in fiscal years 2002-2003.
U.S. coordination mechanisms for Afghanistan assistance were generally
effective, but international assistance was not well coordinated in
fiscal years 2002-2003. In addition, the United States lacked a
complete and integrated assistance strategy, which hampered the U.S.
government‘s ability to focus available resources and hold itself
accountable for measurable results. Further, U.S. officials responsible
for coordinating efforts lacked complete financial data, which hindered
their ability to oversee the assistance.
In fiscal years 2002-2003, Afghanistan confronted many obstacles that
other postconflict nations have faced, such as multiple competing
parties. In addition, security deteriorated and opium production
increased, thereby jeopardizing U.S. reconstruction efforts. Lack of
staff, poor working conditions, and delayed reconstruction funding
further impeded U.S. efforts. (See fig. 1.) In September 2003, to
expedite progress, the U.S. government announced the ’Accelerating
Success“ initiative, providing $1.76 billion for reconstruction in
2004.
Obstacles to U.S. Reconstruction Efforts in Afghanistan, Fiscal Years
2002-2003:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
To improve oversight, GAO recommends that USAID revise its strategy to
delineate goals, resource levels, and a schedule of program
evaluations. GAO also recommends that State produce an annual
consolidated budget report and semiannual reports on obligations and
expenditures. In its comments, USAID committed to preparing a more
detailed strategy. State commented that it considers its financial
reporting sufficient. We continue to believe improvements are needed.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-403.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact David Gootnick at (202)
512-3149, or GootnickD@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
U.S. Funding Focused on Humanitarian Aid, Represented Sizable Portion
of International Assistance:
U.S. Humanitarian Assistance Helped Avert Famine; Longer-term
Reconstruction Efforts Had Limited Results:
Coordination Mechanisms Established, but U.S. Strategy and Financial
Data Were Incomplete; International Assistance Coordination Remained
Weak:
Achievement of U.S. Goals Uncertain Given Precedents, Obstacles:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Summary of the Key Provisions of the Bonn Agreement:
Appendix III: Summary of the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002:
Appendix IV: Fiscal Years 2002-2003 Obligations and Expenditures for
Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance by U.S. Agencies:
Appendix V: Major Donors' Reported Pledges and Disbursements for
Assistance to Afghanistan for Fiscal Years 2002-2003:
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of State:
Appendix VII: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International
Development:
Appendix VIII: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Development Indicators for Afghanistan versus the Average for
Low-Income Countries and the United States:
Table 2: Total assistance authorized: $3.3 billion between FY 2003 and
2006:
Table 3: Earmarks: $170 million development assistance of $425 million
total between FY 2003 and 2006:
Table 4: Required strategies and reports to be submitted to the House
Committee on International Relations, Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, and both Appropriations committees:
Figures:
Figure 1: Map of Afghanistan, Including Provinces and Major Roads:
Figure 2: Political History of Afghanistan, 1749-2004:
Figure 3: Obligations and Expenditures, by Type, Fiscal Years 2002-2003
Figure 4: Percentages of U.S. Reconstruction Assistance Expended by
Agencies, Fiscal Years 2002-2003:
Figure 5: USAID and Defense (PRT) Obligations and Number of Projects, by
Province:
Figure 6: U.S. Assistance as a Percentage of International Assistance:
Figure 7: WFP Distribution of U.S.-Provided Food in Afghanistan:
Figure 8: Fatmasti Irrigation Canal outside Bamian, Afghanistan:
Figure 9: PRT-Funded Construction of Provincial-level College in Bamian
Province, Afghanistan:
Figure 10: Infrastructure Rehabilitation:
Figure 11: Economic Governance:
Figure 12: Health Care:
Figure 13: Education:
Figure 14: Agriculture:
Figure 15: Democracy Strengthening:
Figure 16: Gender Equity:
Figure 17: Major U.S. Interagency Afghan Assistance Coordination
Mechanisms In Use During Fiscal Years 2002-2003:
Figure 18: International Afghan Assistance Coordination Mechanisms,
Fiscal Years 2002-2003:
Figure 19: Postconflict Characteristics That Impeded Stability in Other
Countries Versus Afghanistan:
Figure 20: Time Line of USAID Funding for Reconstruction Assistance to
Afghanistan:
Figure 21: Division of Responsibility for Repairing the 482-kilometer
Kabul-Kandahar Highway:
Abbreviations:
HHS: Health and Human Services:
IOM: International Organization for Migration:
OFDA: Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance:
OTI: Office of Transition Initiatives:
PRT: Provincial Reconstruction Team:
RAMP: Rebuilding Agricultural Markets Program:
REACH: Rural Expansion of Afghanistan's Community-Based Health Care:
REFS: Rehabilitation of Economic Facilities and Services Program:
U.N.: United Nations:
UNDP: United Nations Development Program:
USAID: United States Agency for International Development:
WFP: U.N. World Food Program:
Letter June 2, 2004:
The Honorable Richard G. Lugar:
Chairman:
The Honorable Joseph R. Biden:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Foreign Relations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Henry J. Hyde:
Chairman:
The Honorable Tom Lantos:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on International Relations:
House of Representatives:
Twenty-three years of war and destructive domestic policies and more
than 5 years of drought destroyed Afghanistan's government, judicial,
economic, and social institutions and its transportation, health,
sanitation, and other infrastructure. In October 2001, responding to
its protection of al Qaeda terrorists who had attacked the United
States, Coalition forces forcibly removed the Taliban regime. With the
passage of the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act in December 2002,
Congress authorized the use of federal funds for the delivery of
humanitarian, development, and security assistance to
Afghanistan.[Footnote 1] The act articulates U.S. policy goals in
Afghanistan that include the creation of a stable Afghan society that
is not a threat to itself or others and is not a base for terrorism.
Section 106 of the act directs the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO)
to monitor U.S. humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to
Afghanistan. To meet this requirement and provide Congress with a
comprehensive accounting of U.S. humanitarian and reconstruction
assistance to Afghanistan for the fiscal year 2002-2003 period, we (1)
analyzed U.S. obligations and expenditures; (2) identified the results
of assistance projects through September 30, 2003; (3) evaluated U.S.
and international assistance coordination mechanisms and the U.S.
assistance strategy; and (4) examined the major obstacles that affected
the achievement of U.S. policy goals and the reconstruction
effort.[Footnote 2]
To address these issues, we collected and analyzed information from the
U.S. Departments of Agriculture, Defense, Health and Human Services,
Justice, State, and Treasury; the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID); the United Nations (U.N.); the Afghan government;
and nongovernmental organizations and private contractors responsible
for implementing U.S. government-funded projects. This effort included
analyzing data on obligations and expenditures by U.S. government
agencies that provided assistance to Afghanistan in fiscal years 2002
and 2003. We conducted reliability checks on the financial data
provided by U.S. agencies and, based on these checks, concluded that
the data are sufficiently reliable for the purposes used. Because the
U.S. assistance is provided as part of a larger international effort,
we included information on the contributions provided by international
donors. Finally, we traveled to Afghanistan in October 2003 to examine
U.S. assistance-related operations in country. While in Afghanistan, we
spoke with officials from U.S., U.N., and nongovernmental
organizations; private contractors; and the Afghan government. However,
the number and location of project sites we visited in Afghanistan was
limited because of Department of State security restrictions. We
conducted our review from August 2003 through April 2004 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. (For further
details of our scope and methodology, see app. I.):
Results in Brief:
In fiscal years 2002-2003, the U.S. obligated $1.4 billion and spent
$900 million, or more than half its obligations for nonsecurity-related
assistance to Afghanistan. Of the $900 million that the U.S. government
spent, over 75 percent supported short-term, humanitarian assistance,
including emergency food and shelter, and over 20 percent supported
longer-term reconstruction needs. USAID, the largest provider of
nonsecurity-related assistance, spent about $508 million on both
humanitarian and reconstruction projects. During the same period, the
Department of State spent $254 million, mainly on refugee and
humanitarian assistance, and the Department of Defense spent $64
million on food assistance and quick-impact projects. Most of the
funding by USAID and Defense supported local projects in 31 of
Afghanistan's 32 provinces, particularly in 4 of the most heavily
populated. Overall, U.S. funding represented about 38 percent of the
$3.7 billion disbursed by the international community for nonsecurity-
related assistance to Afghanistan in fiscal years 2002-2003.
U.S. humanitarian and small-scale, quick-impact projects benefited
Afghanistan in fiscal years 2002-2003, but longer-term reconstruction
efforts had achieved limited results by the end of fiscal year 2003 due
to delayed funding. USAID and the Departments of Agriculture and State
provided humanitarian assistance, including emergency food, health
care, sanitation, and shelter, which helped avert a famine and
reintegrate returning refugees. In addition, to assist Afghanistan in
its transition from humanitarian relief to reconstruction of its
infrastructure and civil society, USAID and Defense implemented small-
scale, quick-impact projects such as renovating or rebuilding schools,
clinics, bridges, and irrigation canals. Further, under USAID's
leadership, a number of longer-term reconstruction activities in a
number of sectors achieved limited results. However, notable
accomplishments include building a road from Kabul to Kandahar,
establishing a democracy and governance program, and helping farmers
reestablish farm production.
Although the U.S. government established coordination mechanisms for
its assistance efforts in Afghanistan in fiscal years 2002-2003, it
lacked a complete operational strategy; in addition, coordination of
international assistance was weak. A number of mechanisms to coordinate
U.S. assistance were established and, in general, U.S. officials
believed that U.S. assistance was well coordinated. The United States
did not have a comprehensive strategy to direct its assistance efforts
until June 2003. In addition, USAID's operational strategy did not
clearly articulate measurable goals or other details. U.S. officials
responsible for coordinating assistance efforts also lacked financial
data necessary for program oversight and coordination. Without a
comprehensive strategy or adequate financial data, the ability of the
U.S. government to ensure progress toward development goals and make
informed resource allocation decisions was impaired. Further,
international assistance was not well coordinated in 2002, and efforts
by the Afghan government to improve coordination in 2003 had not
succeeded.
In fiscal years 2002-2003, the postconflict environment in Afghanistan
threatened progress toward U.S. policy goals, and poor security,
increasing opium cultivation, and inadequate resources impeded U.S.
reconstruction efforts. Afghanistan faces many of the same obstacles
that other nations have faced after civil conflict, such as multiple
competing parties. Throughout fiscal years 2002-2003, terrorists
attacked U.S., international, and Afghan government targets, and
criminal activity by warlords and clashes between rival factions
increased the overall climate of insecurity. In addition, record levels
of opium production and associated revenues threatened Afghanistan's
stability by funding the activities of terrorists and warlords.
Further, small staff size, inadequate working conditions, and the
timing of funding for reconstruction impeded U.S. efforts. To increase
funding and expedite progress, in September 2003, the U.S. government
announced an initiative called "Accelerating Success" that would
provide an additional $1.76 billion for reconstruction projects in
Afghanistan in fiscal year 2004.
We are recommending that USAID revise its operational strategy for its
assistance program in Afghanistan. The revised strategy should
delineate measurable goals, specific time frames, resource levels,
external factors that could significantly affect the achievement of
goals, and a schedule for program evaluations that assess progress
against the strategy's goals. To improve management and oversight of
U.S. assistance to Afghanistan, we are also recommending that the
Department of State produce an annual consolidated budget for all U.S.
assistance to Afghanistan and report to Congress semiannually on
obligations and expenditures for the assistance provided.
We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of State and
Defense and to USAID. State and USAID commented that they concurred
with much of the information presented on the situation in Afghanistan
for the period covered by our review. They also provided additional
information on more recent activities taken and progress made. USAID
and the Department of Defense also provided technical comments, which
we incorporated where appropriate.
In response to our recommendation that USAID revise its operational
strategy for Afghanistan to include details such as measurable goals,
timeframes, and required resources, USAID said that its less
comprehensive "interim" strategy was appropriate given the situation in
Afghanistan during the early phases of the ongoing efforts.
Nonetheless, USAID said that it was committed to developing a standard
strategic plan for Afghanistan during 2004, which is consistent with
our recommendation. The Department of State disagreed with our finding
that the United States lacks a complete and integrated assistance
strategy, citing its December 15, 2003, report to Congress "Fiscal Year
2004 Strategic and Financial Plan for Reconstruction and Related
Activities in Afghanistan" as meeting this need. We found that most of
the strategies that were published during fiscal years 2002-2003 lacked
details on funding and other resources, measurable goals, timeframes,
as well as a means to measure progress. However, in the report, we cite
the State Department's June 2003 Mission Performance Plan as meeting
many of the requirements for a government-wide operational strategy.
While the fiscal year 2004 plan cited by the State Department in its
comments includes more details on the U.S. assistance budget for
Afghanistan, it lacks operational details including time frames,
measurable goals, and a means to measure progress towards those goals.
In response to our recommendation that State produce an annual
consolidated budget for all U.S. assistance to Afghanistan and report
to Congress semiannually on obligations and expenditures, State
emphasized that policy makers are provided with information on U.S.
obligations weekly and that there is close interagency collaboration on
all funding issues. We disagree. As we reported, complete and readily
accessible obligation and expenditure data was not available and
consequently, it is difficult to determine the extent to which U.S.
assistance dollars are being used to achieve measurable results on the
ground in Afghanistan. Specifically, we found that (1) governmentwide
expenditure data on U.S. assistance to Afghanistan is not collected,
(2) obligation data are collected on an ad hoc basis, and (3) the
Coordinator's office experienced difficulty in consistently collecting
complete and accurate obligation data from U.S. government agencies.
Regular reporting of both obligations and expenditures for U.S.
assistance to Afghanistan would provide the State Coordinator and
Congress a more complete picture of what funds have been spent on the
ground on visible projects.
Background:
Afghanistan is a mountainous, arid, land-locked country with limited
natural resources, bordered by Pakistan to the east and south;
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and China to the north; and Iran
to the west (see fig. 1). At 647,500 square kilometers, Afghanistan is
slightly smaller than the state of Texas; its population, estimated at
27.8 million, is ethnically diverse, largely rural, and mostly
uneducated. The country is divided into 32 provinces, over 300
districts, and approximately 30,000 villages.
Figure 1: Map of Afghanistan, Including Provinces and Major Roads:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Afghanistan is an extremely poor country. As shown in table 1,
development indicators published by the World Bank and the U.N. rank
Afghanistan at the bottom of virtually every category, including
malnutrition; infant, child, and maternal mortality; life expectancy;
and literacy.
Table 1: Development Indicators for Afghanistan versus the Average for
Low-Income Countries and the United States:
Indicator: Infant mortality;
Afghanistan[A]: 165 per 1000 live births;
Average, low-income country[B]: 80 per 1000 live births;
United States: 7 per 1000 live births.
Indicator: Under 5 mortality;
Afghanistan[A]: 257 per 1000 live births;
Average, low-income country[B]: 121 per 1000 live births;
United States: 8 per 1000 live births.
Indicator: Maternal mortality;
Afghanistan[A]: 1600 per 100,000 live births;
Average, low-income country[B]: 671 per 100,000 live births;
United States: 17 per 100,000 live births.
Indicator: Life expectancy;
Afghanistan[A]: 43 males/44 females;
Average, low-income country[B]: 58 males/60 females;
United States: 75 males/81 females.
Indicator: Percentage of children under 12 months immunized against
diphtheria and measles;
Afghanistan[A]: 45%;
Average, low-income country[B]: 60%;
United States: 93%.
Indicator: Percentage of population undernourished;
Afghanistan[A]: 70%;
Average, low-income country[B]: 25%;
United States: N/A.
Indicator: Percentage of rural population with access to improved water
source;
Afghanistan[A]: 11%;
Average, low-income country[B]: 69%;
United States: 100%.
Indicator: Percentage of rural population with access to improved
proper sanitation;
Afghanistan[A]: 8%;
Average, low-income country[B]: 31%;
United States: 100%.
Indicator: Literacy--age 15 and over;
Afghanistan[A]: 51% males/21% females;
Average, low-income country[B]: 72% males/53% females;
United States: 97% males/97% females.
Sources: The World Bank and U.N.
[A] Data as of most recent year available.
[B] Low-income countries are defined as countries with an annual per
capita gross national income of less than $735. (Afghanistan's 2002 per
capita gross national income was $250).
[End of table]
Over the last 2 decades, political conflicts ravaged Afghanistan. The
country was subject to ethnic rivalry led by provincial warlords,
communist invasion, and fundamental Islamic control, all of which
limited development (see fig. 2). Factional control of the country
following the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989, coupled with the
population's fatigue of fighting, allowed a fundamental Islamic group,
the Taliban, to seize control of the country. Although the Taliban
regime provided some political stability during the late 1990s, its
destructive policies, highlighted in its repressive treatment of women,
and its continuing war with the opposition Northern Alliance further
impeded international aid and development.
Figure 2: Political History of Afghanistan, 1749-2004:
[See PDF for image]
[A] The Durrani tribe ruled over most of what is present-day
Afghanistan--despite domestic turmoil and foreign encroachment--from
1749 through 1978.
[End of figure]
In December 2001, less than 2 months after U.S. and coalition forces
forcibly removed the Taliban regime, an international summit in Bonn,
Germany, established a framework for a new Afghan government,[Footnote
3] which focused on an ambitious 30-month timeline for writing a new
constitution by the end of October 2003 and holding democratic
elections by June 2004.[Footnote 4] The framework, known as the Bonn
Agreement, was endorsed by the U.N. Security Council on December 6,
2001, through UN Resolution 1383. (See app. II for additional
information on the Bonn Agreement.):
In December 2002, the United States passed the Afghanistan Freedom
Support Act of 2002 and increased its assistance to Afghanistan. (See
app. III for details on the types and purposes of the assistance
authorized by the act.) The goal of the U.S. government in Afghanistan
is to firmly establish a democratic nation inhospitable to
international terrorism, drug trafficking and cultivation; at peace
with its neighbors; and able to provide its own internal and external
security. U.S. efforts in support of this goal are intended to help
create national security institutions, provide humanitarian and
reconstruction assistance, and reinforce the primacy of the central
government over Afghanistan's provinces. Title I, Section 104(a) of the
act states that in general, the President is strongly urged to
designate, within the Department of State, a coordinator who shall
among other things be responsible for:
* designing an overall strategy to advance U.S. interests in
Afghanistan;
* ensuring program and policy coordination among U.S. agencies carrying
out the policies set forth in this title;
* pursuing Afghanistan assistance coordination with other countries and
international organizations; and:
* ensuring proper management, implementation, and oversight by agencies
responsible for Afghan assistance programs.
USAID[Footnote 5] provides U.S. assistance to underdeveloped countries
through U.N. agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and private
contractors. The main organizational units responsible for managing
USAID's reconstruction programs and operations in Afghanistan in fiscal
years 2002-2003 were the agency's mission in Kabul, Afghanistan; the
Bureau for Asia and the Near East; and the Bureau for Democracy,
Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance through the Office of U.S.
Foreign Disaster Assistance, Office of Food for Peace, Office of
Transition Initiatives (OTI), and Office for Democracy and
Governance.[Footnote 6] Other U.S. government agencies provided
additional assistance, including the Department of Defense through its
provincial reconstruction teams (PRT) located at sites throughout
Afghanistan. In fiscal years 2002-2003, the PRTs ranged in size from 50
to 100 civilian and military personnel, including civil affairs units,
force protection soldiers, and representatives of the Departments of
Agriculture and State and USAID. The teams are intended to deliver
assistance that advances military goals and provide security in an
effort to increase the reach of the Afghan central government in the
provinces and allow assistance agencies to implement projects. By late
2003, Defense established PRTs in Bamian, Kunduz, Gardez, and Mazar-I-
Sharif.
U.S. Funding Focused on Humanitarian Aid, Represented Sizable Portion
of International Assistance:
In fiscal years 2002-2003, the United States spent the majority of its
nonsecurity-related funding to Afghanistan on humanitarian and quick-
impact projects, and it contributed approximately one-third of the
international funding disbursed in Afghanistan.[Footnote 7] Of the 10
U.S. agencies providing assistance to Afghanistan, USAID provided the
largest amount, for both humanitarian and reconstruction assistance,
and the Department of State provided the second largest amount,
primarily for humanitarian assistance. USAID and the Department of
Defense obligated[Footnote 8] a total of $283 million for nationwide
programs and $564 million for localized program assistance in 31
provinces. The United States accounted for 38 percent of the $3.7
billion in nonsecurity-related international funding disbursed in
Afghanistan in fiscal years 2002-2003.[Footnote 9]
U.S. Assistance Focused on Humanitarian and Quick-Impact Projects:
The U.S. government obligated $1.4 billion for assistance to
Afghanistan in fiscal years 2002-2003, including $782 million for
humanitarian and quick-impact projects and $647 million for strategic,
longer-term reconstruction projects. U.S. agencies spent[Footnote 10]
$900 million, of which $686 million, or over 75 percent, was spent on
humanitarian and quick-impact projects and about $214 million, or over
20 percent, was spent on longer-term reconstruction needs. (See fig.
3.):
Figure 3: Obligations and Expenditures, by Type, Fiscal Years 2002-
2003:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
USAID and State Provided Most U.S. Assistance:
Of the 10 U.S. government departments and agencies involved in
assistance to Afghanistan in fiscal years 2002-2003,USAID provided the
largest amount of assistance, for both humanitarian and reconstruction
needs. USAID obligated $942 million, of which it spent about $508
million by September 2003. It provided both short-term assistance--
emergency, humanitarian, and quick-impact projects--and longer-term
reconstruction and development-oriented assistance, such as
revitalizing infrastructure, improving health and education,
strengthening the economy, and supporting democracy and governance. The
Department of State provided the next largest amount, obligating $287
million in fiscal years 2002-2003 and spending $254 million of that
amount. State's programs were targeted mainly to refugee and
humanitarian assistance, including demining, and also included funding
for counterdrug programs and building a police force. The Department of
Defense obligated $71 million and spent $64 million, primarily for
provincial-level, short-term projects implemented through its PRTs and
for humanitarian daily rations that it air-dropped early in fiscal year
2002. In addition, seven other U.S. government agencies obligated $128
million and spent $74 million for a variety of both humanitarian and
reconstruction activities. (See fig. 4.):
Figure 4: Percentages of U.S. Reconstruction Assistance Expended by
Agencies, Fiscal Years 2002-2003:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Most Funding Supported Provincial Projects:
In an effort to expand the reach of the Afghan government--a major U.S.
and Afghan government priority--most USAID and Defense assistance
funding was spent on projects implemented at the provincial level.
Specifically, USAID and Defense obligated $283 million for nationwide
programs and $564 million for provincial-level assistance across 31
provinces.[Footnote 11] Kabul received the most provincial-level
assistance, $70.4 million for 148 projects, while Konar received the
least, $121,350 for one project. Although assistance was provided in
virtually all of Afghanistan's provinces,[Footnote 12] five provinces
received approximately half of provincial-level program assistance.
Four of these provinces--Kabul, Kandahar, Balkh, and Hirat--have major
population centers, and the fifth, Badakshan, is increasingly important
to the opium trade. (See fig. 5.):
Figure 5: USAID and Defense (PRT) Obligations and Number of Projects,
by Province:
[See PDF for image]
Note: The figure above does not include the Department of Defense's
humanitarian food drops conducted in fiscal year 2002.
[End of figure]
U.S. Was Largest International Donor:
In fiscal years 2002-2003, international donors pledged $9.7 billion
for assistance to Afghanistan. (See app. V for details.) International
disbursements for the 2-year period totaled approximately $3.7 billion,
of which U.S. obligations accounted for approximately 38 percent, or
$1.4 billion--the largest amount donated (see fig. 6). Like U.S.
funding, most international funding was directed to meet humanitarian
needs rather than major reconstruction efforts. According to the Center
on International Cooperation, as of May 2003, $947 million of the
international disbursements had been used to begin reconstruction
projects.[Footnote 13]
Figure 6: U.S. Assistance as a Percentage of International Assistance:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
U.S. Humanitarian Assistance Helped Avert Famine; Longer-term
Reconstruction Efforts Had Limited Results:
In fiscal years 2002-2003, humanitarian and quick-impact assistance
benefited Afghanistan, but longer-term reconstruction efforts achieved
limited results. U.S. humanitarian aid helped overcome emergency
conditions and jump-start the recovery effort. In addition, quick-
impact projects helped Afghanistan transition from the emergency to the
reconstruction phase. However, because of delayed funding, most major
contracts for reconstruction activities were not signed until summer
2003, limiting the results achieved by the end of that fiscal year.
Humanitarian Assistance Helped Vulnerable Populations and Averted
Famine:
In fiscal years 2002-2003, to help redress the complex humanitarian
crisis in Afghanistan, the U.S. government provided emergency
assistance that helped avert a famine, significantly reduce the
suffering of the most vulnerable Afghans, and assist the return of
refugees. USAID's Office of Food for Peace provided Afghanistan with
355,270 metric tons of wheat and other emergency food assistance
(valued at $206.4 million) through P.L. 480, Title II, and the
Department of Agriculture provided 79,600 metric tons of surplus wheat
(valued at $38.7 million) through the 416(b) program.[Footnote 14] The
United States provided most of its food assistance to Afghanistan
through the U.N. World Food Program (WFP),[Footnote 15] as well as the
U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization and nongovernmental
organizations. (See fig. 7.) Over the 2-year period, the United States
provided over 60 percent of all international food assistance received
by Afghanistan. According to the WFP, the food assistance provided by
the United States and the international community helped avert famine
in Afghanistan.[Footnote 16]
Figure 7: WFP Distribution of U.S.-Provided Food in Afghanistan:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
USAID also provided other emergency assistance in fiscal years 2002-
2003. According to USAID reports, the Office of Foreign Disaster
Assistance provided $137.8 million to meet the basic needs of
internally displaced people and other vulnerable Afghans. The funding
supported health and nutrition programs, agricultural and other income-
generating rehabilitative work in rural areas, and logistics for
coordinating humanitarian and food assistance countrywide. According to
USAID, the office, through its cash-for-work programs, supported more
than 4,000 small rehabilitation projects, including repairs to
approximately 2,600 kilometers of roads, 1,500 wells and irrigation
systems, and more than 100 schools and hospitals, benefiting selected
communities throughout the country.
The Department of State's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration
provided $234 million to assist returning refugees. This assistance,
disbursed primarily through the UN High Commissioner for Refugees,
supported the voluntary return and reintegration of 2.2 million
refugees and internally displaced people to their homes in Afghanistan.
The U.S. assistance also provided shelter; water and sanitation;
primary, reproductive, maternal, and child health care; food and
nutrition; primary education; mine education and awareness; and
economic assistance and training to refugees and internally displaced
people.
Quick-Impact Projects Transitioned U.S. Assistance from Relief to
Reconstruction:
USAID's OTI[Footnote 17] and the Department of Defense's PRTs
implemented small-scale, quick-impact projects. These projects aimed to
extend the reach of the Afghan central government by providing benefits
to rural communities and to facilitate the transition to longer-term
reconstruction programs. Both OTI and the PRTs engaged in clinic and
school reconstruction, bridge rehabilitation, irrigation construction,
and other locally determined, small-scale projects.
In fiscal years 2002-2003, OTI expended $18 million for 435 projects.
(On average, each project cost $42,465.) By October 2003, 66 percent of
the projects had been completed. In a November 2003 assessment, OTI
concluded that its efforts had increased the Afghan state's ability to
function, enhanced the independent media's ability to promote public
information, and facilitated infrastructure improvements in hundreds of
communities. However, OTI also concluded that these gains had not yet
achieved its objective of building citizen confidence in the ability of
the central Afghan government. Few Afghans interviewed by OTI during
the assessment were aware that the U.S. government or the Afghan
central government had supported a specific project. (See fig. 8 for an
example of an OTI project.):
Figure 8: Fatmasti Irrigation Canal outside Bamian, Afghanistan:
[See PDF for image]
Note: A USAID OTI grant of $25,139 funded the rehabilitation of the 2.5
kilometer Fatmasti irrigation canal in Bamian province. The canal
irrigates 60 hectares of land and benefits 600 families (or
approximately 3,600 individuals).
[End of figure]
The Department of Defense's quick-impact projects were similar in size
and scope to those implemented by USAID's OTI. In fiscal years 2002-
2003, Defense granted $20 million for 451 projects in Afghanistan
through its PRTs.[Footnote 18] (On average, the projects cost $45,000
each.) Sixty-four percent of them were completed by December 2003. The
PRTs implemented projects designed to help (1) advance U.S. military
goals, (2) build goodwill among the local population, (3) increase the
visibility of U.S. support, and (4) extend the reach of the Afghan
central government. Although no formal evaluation of the overall PRT
effort had been completed as of October 2003, officials at the
Departments of State and Defense said that the activities of civil
affairs teams appeared to have a positive effect on security and were a
useful tool for expanding local support for both the U.S. presence and
the Afghan government. However, the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan
Relief reported that as currently structured, the PRTs lack the
resources or mandate to either solve the security situation in
Afghanistan or significantly contribute to reconstruction.[Footnote
19] (Fig. 9 shows one example of a PRT project.):
Figure 9: PRT-Funded Construction of Provincial-level College in Bamian
Province, Afghanistan:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Nascent Longer-Term Reconstruction Efforts Achieved Limited Results:
USAID's longer-term reconstruction efforts in fiscal years 2002-2003
achieved limited results because of delays in funding. To help the
Afghan government extend its influence throughout the country, USAID
organized its longer-term assistance into six sectors: infrastructure
rehabilitation, economic governance, democracy strengthening,
education, health, and agriculture.[Footnote 20] The agency also
integrated elements to promote gender equity into each sector. Most of
the contracts for longer-term reconstruction assistance in each of the
six sectors were not signed until summer 2003, due to delayed funding,
limiting what USAID could achieve in that fiscal year.
The following presents U.S. efforts in each sector. The goals listed in
figures 10-16 portray USAID's goals and objectives as stated in early
planning and reporting documents. Since many of the projects created
under the six sectors continued work begun through the quick-impact
projects, USAID has not disaggregated their achievements. We include
information on some quick-impact projects, as well as longer-term
reconstruction projects. Also, since USAID does not track expenditures
by the six sectors, we do not include information on total amounts
spent by sector.
Figure 10: Infrastructure Rehabilitation:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Infrastructure rehabilitation. By the end of fiscal 2003, USAID had
built or rehabilitated several physical infrastructure projects, most
notably the Kabul-Kandahar road. Many of the early physical
infrastructure projects handled through the quick-impact programs used
local or low-technology procedures in order to speed implementation.
For example, the OTI projects applied stone, gravel, and dirt to
improve transport over secondary and tertiary roads. By contrast, a
contract for the longer-term Rehabilitation of Economic Facilities and
Services infrastructure program (REFS), signed in September 2002,
provided engineering and construction services for the production of
paved roads and seismically sound buildings.
The Kabul-Kandahar road, a U.S. presidential priority, represents a
significant political symbol within Afghanistan and is the main
transport route for north-south trade from Central Asia to the Indian
Ocean. In about 17 months, under the REFS contract, USAID contractors
demined, graded, and installed the first layer[Footnote 21] of pavement
on a segment of highway stretching 389 kilometers (approximately the
distance from Washington, D.C., to New York, N.Y.).[Footnote 22] As a
result, travel between the two cities was reduced from several days to
about 6 hours. The road requires two more layers of asphalt and the
construction of bridges and culverts; the estimated project completion
date is October 2004. The prime contractor for the REFS program was
also responsible for constructing schools and clinics listed as
objectives under the education and health sectors. However, as of the
end of fiscal 2003, although OTI and the PRTs built and rehabilitated
schools and clinics, none of the more sophisticated buildings included
in the infrastructure contract had been built.
In addition to the USAID infrastructure projects, State identified
communications as an infrastructure element essential to meeting the
long-term security needs of Afghanistan. USAID provided for voice and
e-mail communication between the central government in Kabul and all 32
provinces by installing a high-frequency radio communications network.
The U.S. Trade and Development Agency provided short-term advisors to
create a strategic plan for telecommunications development. By October
2003, two telephone companies had established service in Afghanistan,
but according to USAID and others, connectivity was still unreliable.
Figure 11: Economic Governance:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Economic governance. When the U.S. government began its reconstruction
efforts in Afghanistan, the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank--
necessary to set fiscal policy and handle the country's reconstruction
cash flow, respectively--were operating at an elementary level. USAID
helped to reestablish the Ministry of Finance, create a central bank of
Afghanistan and a new currency, and reform the customs process. To do
this, USAID awarded a contract for its Sustainable Economic Policy and
Institutional Reform Support program in November 2002. Under the
program, USAID helped rehabilitate the ministry building and provided
advisors to retrain the bank's staff. In addition, USAID helped the
central bank establish and distribute a new national currency (the
"afghani"). This involved collecting and destroying an estimated 13
trillion of the greatly devalued, previously existing afghanis and the
disparate currencies printed by warlords. USAID supported the
commercial bank sector by assisting in legal and regulatory reform and
training financial sector officials. As a result, international
commercial banks began to receive licenses in the fall of 2003.
Further, USAID helped to partially rehabilitate the Kabul customs house
and airport customs facilities, streamline customs processes, and
establish a tax identification number system for traders. Despite these
and other efforts aimed at encouraging the provinces to remit revenue
to the central government, according to the UN and others, warlords
continued to keep large portions in their own regions, undermining the
authority of the central government.
Figure 12: Health Care:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Health care. In November 2002, USAID, with assistance from the UN
Population Fund, Japan's aid agency, and the European Commission,
completed a comprehensive assessment of health facilities, services,
personnel, and supplies available throughout the country. This effort
helped Afghanistan's Ministry of Health to establish a national health
strategy and national health priorities. All grants for health sector
activities must address the priorities established in the ministry's
strategy. The study found that Afghanistan has approximately one health
facility per 27,000 inhabitants. It also established that nearly 40
percent of existing basic care facilities employ no female health
workers. (According to cultural norms, it is taboo for women to receive
care from male health care workers.):
Other health achievements included providing grants to NGOs to operate
over 160 health facilities--covering an area where 3.9 million Afghans
live--constructing or rehabilitating 140 health facilities, training
over 1,700 health workers, participating in the campaign to immunize 90
percent of the population against measles, and improving approximately
3,600 rural potable waterworks. To expand U.S. support for
Afghanistan's health sector goals, USAID established its Rural
Expansion of Afghanistan's Community-Based Health Care program through
a contract signed in May 2003, as a continuation of previously begun
work.
Figure 13: Education:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Education. By the end of fiscal year 2003, USAID, through quick-impact
projects, had repaired or constructed approximately 200 schools,
provided more than 25 million textbooks, trained over 3,000 teachers,
and supplemented approximately 50,000 teachers' salaries with vegetable
oil. (The oil represented 26 percent of the teachers' monthly income.)
To assist Afghanistan with longer-term education goals, USAID created
the Afghanistan Primary Education Program through a contract signed in
June 2003. Early efforts in this program included developing and
beginning to disseminate an accelerated learning curriculum for girls,
who were not educated under the Taliban.[Footnote 23] USAID plans to
train 30,000 classroom teachers between fiscal years 2003 and 2006. The
prime education contractor in charge of the training referred to the
educators it will train as "mentors" because they will not have the
same qualifications as formally trained teachers.
Figure 14: Agriculture:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Agriculture. Through quick-impact projects, USAID helped farmers
reestablish agricultural production by distributing approximately
9,300 metric tons of seed and 12,400 metric tons of
fertilizer,[Footnote 24] and by rehabilitating more than 7,000 rural
irrigation structures. USAID also helped improve the rural economy by
repairing over 70 bridges and tunnels and more than 7,000 kilometers of
secondary and tertiary roads and by employing the equivalent of 1
million Afghans for 1 month. In July 2003, the agency awarded a
contract for the Rebuilding Agricultural Markets Program, aimed at
increasing the food security and incomes of the rural population.
However, as of October 2003, work under this contract had not yet
begun.
Figure 15: Democracy Strengthening:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Democracy strengthening. USAID established two democracy and governance
programs, one to help implement the political goals set by the Bonn
Agreement and the other to bolster the civil society, media, and
political parties. Through the beginning efforts of these programs, in
conjunction with the quick-impact activities, the United States
provided key technical assistance, civic education, and logistics
support for the emergency loya jirga (grand council) to establish the
interim government, and for the second loya jirga to ratify a new
constitution. USAID also provided over 130 advisers to the Afghan
ministries and funded approximately 880 staff positions. In addition,
USAID supported the creation of radio stations and trained over 320
journalists to aid the development of a free and independent media. As
of October 2003, USAID and the international community had helped the
Afghan government establish judicial reform, human rights, and
constitutional commissions. Further, USAID commissioned designs for a
provincial courthouse and a judicial complex in Kabul. USAID's
cooperative agreement with the Consortium for Elections and Political
Process Strengthening, establishing the democracy strengthening
program, was not signed until July 2003.[Footnote 25]
Figure 16: Gender Equity:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Gender equity. USAID did not create separate women's projects but
rather included elements promoting gender equity in its
programs.[Footnote 26] For example, some quick-impact infrastructure
projects incorporated women's labor into the construction process. In
Kunduz, where USAID helped a community build a retaining wall, women
participated and earned income by making wire screens to contain rocks
placed in the wall by the men. In addition, USAID facilitated the
involvement of women in the loya jirgas (women accounted for 20 percent
of the delegates at the December 2003 constitutional loya jirga) and in
the Afghan government by rehabilitating 15 day care centers in ministry
buildings to encourage Afghan women to return to work. USAID also
encouraged the return of girls to the classroom by creating an
accelerated education program.[Footnote 27] USAID also made maternal
care one of its primary health goals. However, Afghan society still
limits women's travel and work, which complicates attempts to educate,
train, or provide medical care to them, and nearly 40 percent of
existing health care facilities employ no female health workers.
Further, several girls' schools have been set on fire to protest
educating women, and a female loya jirga representative's life was
threatened when she expressed her negative opinion about the
government's collaboration with warlords.
Coordination Mechanisms Established, but U.S. Strategy and Financial
Data Were Incomplete; International Assistance Coordination Remained
Weak:
In fiscal years 2002-2003, the U.S. government established several
mechanisms to coordinate its assistance effort in Afghanistan, but it
lacked a comprehensive reconstruction strategy. Although U.S. agency
officials characterized coordination as effective overall, some
problems occurred. In addition, key operational components of the
strategies intended to guide the reconstruction effort were incomplete
or were not drafted until the latter half of fiscal 2003. Further,
coordination officials lacked complete and accurate financial data
needed for effective program management. Meanwhile, international
assistance coordination was weak in 2002, with limited improvements
introduced through the consultative group mechanism in 2003.
U.S. Efforts Were Coordinated, but Minor Problems Occurred:
U.S. assistance to Afghanistan in fiscal years 2002-2003 was
coordinated through a number of mechanisms; however, some problems
occurred. U.S. efforts were coordinated in Washington through the
Afghanistan Reconstruction Office, the Policy Coordinating Committee,
the Deputies' Committee, and the Principals' Committee, and in
Afghanistan through the U.S. Embassy country team. (See fig. 17.)
According to Department of State officials, interagency coordination
among the Afghanistan Reconstruction Office, agencies delivering
assistance, and the embassy country team was routine and daily. In
addition, these officials stated that the formal, hierarchical,
interagency committee structure provided a uniform process for making
policy-level decisions and keeping the President informed.
Figure 17: Major U.S. Interagency Afghan Assistance Coordination
Mechanisms In Use During Fiscal Years 2002-2003:
[See PDF for image]
[A] In October 2003, a national security decision directive eliminated
the Policy Coordinating Committee and established the Afghanistan
Interagency Operating Group in its place.
[B] In October 2003, the Afghanistan Reconstruction office became the
Office for Afghanistan. The office's functions are codified in section
104 of the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act. The office subsumed the
Afghanistan Desk.
[C] In October, the Afghanistan Reconstruction Group was established
within the U.S. Embassy, Kabul.
[End of figure]
U.S. officials from several agencies we spoke to stated that, overall,
the U.S. government's coordination of the Afghan assistance effort in
fiscal years 2002-2003 was effective. According to officials from USAID
and the Departments of Agriculture, State, and Commerce, coordination
efforts were successful and the policy coordination committee succeeded
in bringing all of the agencies together to discuss pertinent issues
and make collective decisions. USAID's former mission director in
Afghanistan emphasized that the daily meetings of the country team and
other assistance sector-based teams ensured good coordination within
the embassy.
Although U.S. officials stated that coordination among agencies was
generally good, several cited examples of coordination problems. For
example, USAID officials said that whereas USAID worked closely with
Afghan government ministries on the selection and location of projects,
the PRTs focused on projects chosen by local authorities. Consequently,
the PRTs implemented projects that were not included in national plans
developed by the central government.[Footnote 28] In addition, USAID
officials and Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) officials
confirmed that coordination problems involving the two organizations'
efforts in Afghanistan's health sector had occurred. Specifically, HHS
rehabilitated the Rabia Balkhi Hospital in Kabul, rather than focus
efforts on rural health clinics where the Afghan Ministry of Health and
USAID had determined the need for assistance was greater. In another
example, Department of State staff stated that USAID did not share
information on its demining activities and that staff turnover and
inconsistent operating procedures within the Department of Defense made
coordinating demining efforts difficult.
Strategic Guidance Was Incomplete, Financial Data Was Lacking:
The U.S. government's strategies for directing its reconstruction
efforts in Afghanistan evolved during fiscal years 2002-2003, and key
operational components of the strategies were incomplete or not drafted
until the latter half of fiscal year 2003.[Footnote 29] In addition,
coordination officials lacked complete and accurate financial data
needed for effective program management.
Strategic Guidance Evolved Over Time:
Various strategies pertaining to U.S. assistance efforts were developed
during the fiscal 2002-2003 period. Several levels of strategies, from
the President's office down to the USAID mission, are designed to guide
U.S. assistance efforts in Afghanistan, focus resources, and hold
agencies accountable for their efforts.[Footnote 30] In February 2003,
the President published a broad strategy for meeting the immediate and
long-term security needs of Afghanistan in response to the Afghanistan
Freedom Support Act requirements.[Footnote 31] The President's strategy
is intentionally broad and, therefore, lacks operational details, such
as time frames and measurable goals. In June 2003, 18 months after the
signing of the Bonn Agreement, the Department of State published its
first mission performance plan to guide U.S. efforts in Afghanistan for
fiscal years 2003-2006.[Footnote 32] This plan is organized around five
strategic goals for the reconstruction effort and one management goal
pertaining to Department of State facilities in Afghanistan. The
mission plan provides an estimate, by appropriation account, of the
financial resources needed. Further, the plan (1) describes specific
tactics and activities to be undertaken and assigns responsibility for
each activity to USAID and other offices of the agencies housed within
the U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan and (2) defines baseline data,
performance indicators, and targets for achieving each performance
goal. As the key U.S. agency for reconstruction of Afghanistan, USAID
is responsible for developing a more detailed strategy and subordinate
plans and programs to carry out its responsibilities.
USAID Strategy Lacked Operational Details:
The USAID mission in Afghanistan developed an interim strategy and
action plan in August 2002. However, these documents did not clearly
articulate measurable goals or provide details on time frames,
resources, responsibilities, objective measures, or means to evaluate
progress for each of the sectors targeted by the strategy.[Footnote 33]
USAID directives require that interim strategies include a description
of how or when the strategy would be replaced by a standard strategic
plan. The interim strategy for Afghanistan does not contain the
required description. USAID's guidelines and directives state that
country-level strategies and plans should address, among other things,
strategic objectives, key country-level problems, programmatic
approaches, baseline data and targets, performance indicators and the
means to measure progress, fundamental assumptions, and resources
required to implement the plan. Although USAID developed a number of
measurable goals for various sectors during fiscal years 2002-2003,
these goals and the resources and methods designed to achieve them were
included in numerous project documents and contracts rather than stated
in a comprehensive strategy as called for by USAID guidelines.
Further, according to USAID officials, although USAID Washington
reviewed the strategy and action plan, the documents were not vetted
through USAID's standard strategy review process; instead an
abbreviated process was used to assess clarity, feasibility, compliance
with agency policies, delineation of expected results, and congruency
with available resources. The former mission director in Afghanistan
stated that the time and resources needed to develop and approve a
strategy through the normal USAID operating procedures were not
available when the strategy documents were developed and that a waiver
for meeting standard strategy-related requirements was granted in
February 2002.[Footnote 34]
In January 2003, USAID officials responsible for the agency's efforts
in Afghanistan requested a second waiver and promised to draft a
strategy according to USAID guidelines within 6 months of the waiver's
approval. According to USAID documents, no strategy was drafted because
the situation in Afghanistan was too dynamic, preventing USAID from
taking a proactive approach to its efforts including the development of
a strategy. A third waiver was approved in February 2004 that exempts
USAID from developing the strategy until February 2005. As a result,
more than 3 years will have passed between the time USAID began
providing postconflict assistance to Afghanistan and the completion of
a USAID assistance strategy for Afghanistan. The lack of a complete
country strategy impedes USAID's ability to ensure progress toward
development goals, make informed resource allocation decisions, and
meet agency and congressional accountability reporting requirements on
the effectiveness of agency programs.
Comprehensive Financial Data Was Not Readily Available:
The coordinator for U.S. assistance to Afghanistan, as well as others
responsible for the coordination of U.S. assistance, lacked complete
and accurate financial data in fiscal years 2002-2003. Program managers
need financial data to, among other things, monitor performance,
allocate resources, and determine whether strategic goals are being
met. Further, relevant information needs to be identified, collected,
and distributed in a form and time frame so that duties can be
performed efficiently.[Footnote 35] Most of the agencies providing
assistance to Afghanistan could not readily provide complete or
accurate data on assistance obligations and expenditures, and some
agencies were unable to disaggregate the information by fiscal year or
province. Consequently, over the course of our review, we worked with
the agencies to obtain reliable data. In fiscal years 2002-2003, the
Coordinator's office did not require U.S. agencies to regularly report
obligation and expenditure data.[Footnote 36] As a result, the
Coordinator for U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan lacked information that
could have helped decision-makers manage the overall assistance effort,
including the targeting of resources to key efforts.
International Assistance Coordination Was Weak:
Despite efforts to synchronize multiple donors' efforts, coordination
of international assistance was weak in 2002 and problems remained in
2003.[Footnote 37] The Bonn Agreement urged donors to defer
responsibility for assistance coordination to the Afghan government.
According to the UN, coordination is the responsibility of the Afghan
government; efforts by the aid community should reinforce national
authorities; and the international community should operate, and relate
to the Afghan government, in a coherent manner rather than through a
series of disparate relationships.[Footnote 38]
In April 2002, the Afghan government initiated efforts to exert
leadership over the highly fragmented reconstruction process. To
accomplish this task, the government published its National Development
Framework, which provided a vision for a reconstructed Afghanistan and
broadly established national goals and policy directions. In addition,
the Afghan government established a government-led coordination
mechanism, the implementation group, to bring coherence to the
international community's independent efforts and broad political
objectives. The mechanism's structure was based on the National
Development Framework. Individual coordination groups, led by Afghan
ministers and composed of assistance organizations, were established
for each of the 12 programs in the framework.
The implementation group mechanism proved to be largely ineffective. In
August 2002, officials from the Afghan government, the UN, the
Department of State, and USAID, as well as a number of nongovernmental
bodies, expressed concern over the lack of meaningful and effective
coordination of assistance in Afghanistan. For example, the Ministers
of Foreign Affairs, Rural Rehabilitation and Development, Irrigation,
and Agriculture stated that the donor community's effort to coordinate
with the government was poor to nonexistent. The ineffectiveness of the
implementation group mechanism resulted from its inability to overcome
several impediments. First, each bilateral, multilateral, and
nongovernmental assistance agency had its own mandate (established by
implementing legislation or charter) and sources of funding, and each
donor pursued development efforts in Afghanistan independently. Second,
the international community asserted that the Afghan government lacked
the capacity and resources to effectively assume the role of
coordinator and, that these responsibilities therefore could not be
delegated to the government. Third, no single entity within the
international community had the authority and mandate to direct the
efforts of the myriad bilateral, multilateral, and nongovernmental
organizations providing assistance.
In December 2002, the Afghan government replaced the implementation
group with the consultative group mechanism to increase the
effectiveness and efficiency of assistance coordination in support of
the goals and objectives in the National Development
Framework.[Footnote 39] The consultative group mechanism in Afghanistan
is similar to the implementation group in (1) its National Development
Framework-based hierarchical structure and stated goals, (2) the role
of the Afghan government, and (3) the membership and leadership of
sector-specific groups.[Footnote 40] (See fig. 18.):
Figure 18: International Afghan Assistance Coordination Mechanisms,
Fiscal Years 2002-2003:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
By the end of fiscal year 2003, the consultative group had not
surmounted the conditions that prevented the implementation group from
effectively coordinating assistance. In an August 2003 review of the
status of the consultative group process, the Afghan government stated
that the terms of reference for the sectoral groups were unclear and
too broad, the groups were too large and lacked strong leadership,
member commitment was uneven, and the overall potential of the
mechanism was not utilized. In October 2003, the Minister of Rural
Rehabilitation and Development stated that the consultative group
process had not yet proven effective, that the consultative groups were
too large to be effective decision-making bodies, and that assistance
organizations continued to implement projects not included in the
Afghan government's national budget and priorities. The Minister of
Agriculture stated that despite the efforts of consultative groups to
coordinate donor efforts, donor governments and assistance agencies
continued to develop their own strategies and implement projects
outside the Afghan government's national budget.
Achievement of U.S. Goals Uncertain Given Precedents, Obstacles:
The attainment of the U.S. goal of a stable, democratic Afghanistan
remained uncertain given the historical precedents and the current
Afghan environment, where numerous obstacles threatened reconstruction
efforts in fiscal years 2002-2003. Afghanistan exhibits many of the
characteristics that other nations have faced in their efforts to
transition from a postconflict environment to a stable democracy. In
fiscal years 2002-2003, deteriorating security and increasing opium
cultivation in particular jeopardized U.S. reconstruction efforts, and
efforts to counter these obstacles have had little success. Other
hindrances to U.S. reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan during this
period included small staff size, inadequate working conditions and
equipment, and the timing of funding for reconstruction activities. In
September 2003, the U.S. government announced an initiative called
"Accelerating Success" to increase funding and expedite projects.
Afghanistan Exhibits Characteristics That Threatened Success in Other
Postconflict Nations:
Afghanistan displays many of the characteristics that have obstructed
transitions to peace and stability in other postconflict countries.
Analyses conducted by various experts on postconflict reconstruction
have identified a number of such characteristics, including multiple
competing parties, valuable and disposable resources such as opium, and
a weakened state.[Footnote 41] In addition, our past work has shown
that despite variations in postconflict situations, efforts to rebuild
require a secure environment, adequate resources, and the support of
the host government and civil society.[Footnote 42] Figure 19 compares
characteristics of Afghanistan that we--and experts from the World Bank
and other nongovernmental institutions--found to have affected
reconstruction in other postconflict countries.
Figure 19: Postconflict Characteristics That Impeded Stability in Other
Countries Versus Afghanistan:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Pervasive Insecurity Threatened Reconstruction:
Terrorist attacks by the Taliban and al Qaeda and the criminal activity
of warlords contributed to the overall environment of insecurity
throughout Afghanistan and threatened the U.S. reconstruction effort in
fiscal years 2002-2003. In March 2002, in a report to the UN Security
Council, the UN Secretary General stated that security will remain the
essential requirement for protecting the peace process in Afghanistan.
In a report to the council 1 year later, he identified security as the
most serious challenge to the peace process. Others in the
international community, including the United States, recognize
security as a prerequisite for the implementation of reconstruction
efforts.
According to UN, nongovernmental organization, and U.S. reports, the
security situation deteriorated throughout 2003. Incidents over the 2-
year period included:
* numerous skirmishes between coalition, al Qaeda, and Taliban troops
in the border regions between Afghanistan and Pakistan;
* the attempted assassinations of the Minister of Defense and the
President;
* the assassination of Vice President Qadir;
* the murder of an International Committee of the Red Cross worker;
* attacks on contractors working on USAID's Kabul-Kandahar road project
that resulted in 14 injuries and 9 deaths;
* rocket attacks on U.S. and international military installations;
* sniper fire and grenade attacks on UN and nongovernmental
organization vehicles and offices; and:
* bombings in the center of Kabul and Kandahar, at the International
Security Assistance Force headquarters, and of UN compounds.[Footnote
43]
The increase in violence against aid organizations forced suspensions
of assistance activities. For example, attacks against deminers forced
the UN to suspend all humanitarian demining activities in 10 provinces
in May 2003 including demining activities along the Kabul-Kandahar
road. Similarly, the killings of three nongovernmental organization
staff in August 2003 and a UN High Commissioner for Refugees staff
member in November 2003 resulted in, among other things, the agency's
removing its international staff and its reduced ability to deliver
assistance to refugees and internally displaced people.
Furthermore, the criminality of the warlords' private armies continued
to destabilize the country and impede reconstruction, according to the
Department of State, the UN, Human Rights Watch, and other
international experts. The warlords foster an illegitimate economy
fueled by the smuggling of arms, drugs, and other goods. They also, in
violation of the Bonn Agreement, control private armies of tens of
thousands of armed men and illegally withhold hundreds of millions of
dollars in customs duties collected at border points in the regions
they control, depriving the central government of revenues needed to
fund the country's central government and reconstruction effort.
Repeated violent clashes among the warlords continued throughout fiscal
years 2002-2003, forcing USAID and other assistance agencies to
periodically suspend their assistance activities in the affected areas.
The situation is further complicated by the fact that the United States
uses warlord-commanded militias in its continuing counterinsurgency
effort against the Taliban. The militia forces also provide security
for PRTs. For example, troops commanded by one of the warlords in
control of Hirat and its adjoining provinces provide security to U.S.
civil affairs units stationed in Hirat.
The United States and the international community have taken several
steps to improve security in Afghanistan. First, beginning in 2002, the
Department of Defense established PRTs in several locations in
Afghanistan. These company-sized units of 50 to 100 soldiers were
charged with enhancing security over immense geographical areas in an
effort to create a safe environment for reconstruction activities. For
example, the PRT in Gardez, with 77 security personnel and 52 other
personnel, had an area of responsibility that covered five provinces
with a total land area of 70,000 square kilometers--an area about the
size of South Carolina. Nongovernmental organization officials, as well
as others, have criticized the size of the PRTs, stating that the units
were too small to provide security for their areas of responsibility or
create a secure environment for reconstruction projects.
In 2002, Department of Defense began funding efforts to help establish
a national army in Afghanistan. As of late fiscal 2003, its efforts to
train the first corps of the new army had fallen behind schedule, due
in part to higher than expected rates of attrition among Afghan
recruits. As of September 2003, approximately 5,500 soldiers had been
trained. In 2003, the Department of State and the German government
(the designated lead nation for police training in Afghanistan) began
implementing plans to train 20,000 Afghan police by June 2004 and
50,000 by the end of 2005. By March 2004, 9,000 officers received
training. Finally, the U.S. government considers the demobilization and
reintegration of the warlords' forces a prerequisite for improving the
country's security and succeeding in the international recovery
effort.[Footnote 44] According to the Department of State, this program
is critical to efforts to reduce the destabilizing presence of these
militias. As of March 2004, 5,200 soldiers had been disarmed.
Opium Production Threatened Stability:
The illicit international trade in Afghan opiates also threatened
Afghanistan's stability during fiscal years 2002-2003. The drug trade
provided income for terrorists and warlords, fueling the factions that
worked against stability and national unity.[Footnote 45] According to
UN and International Monetary Fund estimates, in 2002, Afghan farmers
produced 3,422 metric tons of opium, providing $2.5 billion in
trafficking revenue. This amount was equal to 68 percent of the total
international assistance to Afghanistan disbursed for that year, or
nearly 4.5 times the Afghan government's 2003 operating
budget.[Footnote 46] In 2003, UN estimates indicated that opium
production in the country increased to approximately 3,600 metric tons,
the second largest harvest in the country's history. Further, heroin
laboratories have proliferated in Afghanistan in recent years. As a
result of the increased poppy production and in-country heroin
production, greater resources were available to Afghan criminal
networks and others at odds with the central government. According to
the Department of State, at the provincial and district levels, drug-
related corruption is believed to be pervasive. Involvement ranges from
direct participation in the criminal enterprise, to benefiting
financially from taxation or other revenue streams generated by the
narcotics trade.[Footnote 47] The International Monetary Fund and
Afghanistan's Minister of Finance have stated that the potential exists
for Afghanistan to become a "narcostate," in which all legitimate
institutions are infiltrated by the power and wealth of drug
traffickers.
The overall increase in opium production in 2002-2003 occurred despite
the counternarcotics efforts implemented by the Afghan
government[Footnote 48] and a number of international donors. During
the 2-year period, the Afghan government and the international
community, with funding from the United Kingdom and the United States,
instituted alternative livelihood and poppy eradication programs in
Afghanistan.[Footnote 49] Total U.S. funding dedicated to
counternarcotics was $23.4 million in fiscal 2002. The Department of
State did not request or receive funding for counternarcotics efforts
in fiscal 2003. Although the programs failed to stem the increase in
opium production, the long-term effects of these programs remain to be
seen.
Inadequate U.S. Resources Hindered Reconstruction:
During fiscal years 2002-2003, limited resources further obstructed
U.S. reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. The USAID mission in Kabul
was insufficiently staffed to carry out its responsibilities. In
addition, inadequate working conditions and equipment--including
cramped workspace, limited mobility, and unreliable communications and
transportation equipment--hindered the implementation of assistance
activities. Further, most reconstruction funding was not available
until mid-fiscal year 2003. To help expedite reconstruction efforts and
create more visible results, the U.S. initiated an "Accelerating
Success" program in fiscal year 2004.
Lack of Staff Prevented Management and Oversight of Assistance Efforts:
The USAID mission in Kabul was inadequately staffed to accomplish its
management and oversight responsibilities. In its August 2002 action
plan for assistance to Afghanistan, USAID stated that the number of
positions it was allotted (12 slots) through the embassy's staffing
allocation process was clearly inadequate to design and implement the
large program planned for Afghanistan. USAID's mission in Afghanistan
managed a $505 million program in 2003, one of the largest in the
world; however, its staff size is one of the smallest. On average, an
overseas USAID mission has a staff of 73 and a budget of approximately
$51 million, or one staff member per about $700,000. In Afghanistan,
that ratio in fiscal year 2003 was approximately one staff member per
about $13 million. Although USAID/ Kabul indicated in its 2003 staffing
plan that it needed 113 staff, only 39 of these positions were filled
during the year.
In its March 2003 risk assessment, USAID's Inspector General cited
delays in the assignment and retention of qualified personnel as one of
three material weaknesses in USAID's system of management controls in
Afghanistan.[Footnote 50] It also reported that the risks associated
with this material weakness were amplified by, among other things, the
magnitude of the funding being provided to Afghanistan and the pressure
to implement projects in extremely short time frames. In August 2003,
we reported that as a result of the decreases in U.S. direct-hire
foreign service staff levels, increasing program demands, and a mostly
ad hoc approach to workforce planning, USAID faces several human
capital vulnerabilities, including the lack of a "surge capacity" to
respond to emergencies such as postconflict situations in Afghanistan
and Iraq.[Footnote 51]
Because of the small number of USAID staff in Afghanistan and the
numerous vacancies, staff members were often required to work long
hours and take on additional responsibilities. For example, from March
2002 through June 2003, USAID's General Development Officer also
periodically served as USAID's Acting Deputy Mission Director and
Acting Mission Director and as the Department of State's Acting Deputy
Chief of Mission and Chargé d'Affaires. During our visit in October
2003, USAID's mission had been without a Director for two months. At
the time, the Acting Mission Director was also the Cognizant Technical
Officer overseeing the largest USAID project in Afghanistan. USAID
tried to compensate for the gaps by deploying staff to Kabul on
temporary duty. However, this did not ensure the continuity needed to
administer a program effectively and efficiently.
As a result of the small staff size, staff members were overworked and
found it difficult to keep up with their myriad responsibilities,
including monitoring and evaluating projects.[Footnote 52] The lack of
monitoring was evidenced by the USAID staffs' inability to provide us
with the exact location of the projects we asked to visit. In its
December 2003 midterm program assessment of projects in Afghanistan,
OTI noted that deficiencies in monitoring at construction sites
contributed to a high rate of faulty construction, serious post-
construction problems, and added costs.
Inadequate Working Conditions and Equipment Constrained Assistance
Efforts:
Inadequate working conditions and equipment--such as cramped workspace,
limited mobility, and unreliable communications and transportation
equipment--also hindered the implementation of assistance activities.
In its August 2002 action plan for Afghanistan, USAID stated that
without adequate working and living space, it might not be able to
achieve its goals. In its March 2003 risk assessment for USAID
activities in Afghanistan, USAID's Inspector General cited unsuitable
working and living conditions as material weaknesses, stating that
existing conditions in Afghanistan were "unsuitable for carrying out
program design and implementation in an effective and efficient
manner." During our visit in October 2003, we found that staff at the
USAID mission faced severe space constraints. For example, we observed
as many as eight USAID staff, their files, and office furniture and
equipment sharing one small office. USAID took steps to obtain
additional space at the embassy and in other U.S. locations in Kabul,
but it was not available during fiscal year 2003.
In addition, Department of State security restrictions, imposed due to
increasing levels of insecurity, severely limited USAID staff's ability
to travel to field sites and monitor ongoing reconstruction efforts. In
its March 2003 assessment, USAID's Inspector General cited the security
restrictions as another material weakness, stating that staff members
are not able to travel to project sites and monitor project
implementation in an adequate manner with the frequency required. To
improve its ability to monitor field sites, USAID contracted for
program managers through the International Organization for Migration
(IOM).[Footnote 53] Although some IOM staff contracted by USAID are
U.S. citizens, they are not bound by the same security rules as direct-
hire USAID staff and, therefore, can visit projects in the field.
However, despite this action, we found that USAID was unable to
adequately monitor projects.
The limitations on mobility made communications capability essential.
However, according to U.S. and international officials in Afghanistan,
e-mail and cellular phone service is intermittently reliable within
Kabul and less reliable between provinces, making it difficult to
contact staff and contractors in the field. PRT staff stated that they
lacked adequate mobile secure communications equipment, and some had to
purchase their own geographic positioning systems.
In addition, PRT staff in the field relied on old vehicles that the
United States leased from local vendors. The frequent breakdown of the
vehicles and the lack of replacement parts severely limited staff's
ability to carry out their responsibilities. For example, according to
PRT officials we spoke with, most of the vehicles used are
approximately 10 years old--with some having logged more than 100,000
miles--break down frequently, and are not designed for the rigorous
terrain of Afghanistan. For example, senior PRT officials in Hirat told
us that, in 2003, they made two unsuccessful attempts to reach
Chaghcharan, the capital of Ghor, the province adjoining Hirat
province. During a third attempt, one vehicle experienced 14 flat tires
in 3 days.[Footnote 54] The PRT staff said that because the vehicles
were in such poor condition, the staff spent much of their time on the
road searching for spare parts and repairing vehicles instead of
identifying assistance needs and implementing projects.
Funding Delays Slowed Reconstruction Efforts:
Although the United States provided significant humanitarian assistance
to Afghanistan in fiscal 2002, very little money was available to USAID
for reconstruction until the second half of fiscal year 2003. USAID
considers adequate funding a prerequisite for the success of the
reconstruction effort. However, according to USAID officials, because
they did not know when they would receive additional funding, they were
unable to develop and plan for long-term resource-intensive
reconstruction projects and instead focused on short-term projects that
required less money; some of these served as pilots for the longer-term
projects begun later in fiscal year 2003.
During fiscal years 2002-2003, funding for reconstruction projects in
Afghanistan was allocated to USAID programming offices in four
increments. According to USAID, an initial allotment for $52 million
for reconstruction was made in February 2002; at the time, the
programming offices were assured that more funding was imminent. About
8 months later, USAID obtained an additional $40 million; however, some
of the money was used for emergency winterization measures, such as
providing food and shelter, to stave off another humanitarian crisis.
Since there was no Afghanistan--specific request for fiscal 2002, $80
million was supplemental funding, while the remaining $12 million was
reprogrammed funds from existing assistance accounts. As a result,
USAID was able to initiate only two major reconstruction programs,
infrastructure rehabilitation and the reform and development of
economic governance, by the first anniversary of the Bonn Agreement in
late 2002.[Footnote 55] In contrast, the rate of funding for rebuilding
Iraq was much faster. Specifically, in less than 1 month after the U.S.
announced an end to major hostilities in Iraq, USAID obligated $118
million for reconstruction activities from the Iraq Relief and
Reconstruction Fund account. By the end of December 2003, 7 months
later, USAID obligated about $1.5 billion for Iraq reconstruction from
this account.
Although there was no specific request for funding for Afghanistan
included in the President's fiscal year 2003 budget, funding became
available when Congress appropriated $295.5 million for Afghanistan in
February 2003. USAID officials reported that the allotments from this
appropriation began in April 2003, and USAID targeted about $265
million toward longer-term reconstruction projects and $30 million for
short-term projects. In April 2003, Congress passed the fiscal 2003
supplemental appropriations bill that included $167 million for
Afghanistan. The allotments from this appropriation began in June 2003.
All of this funding was used for longer-term reconstruction. (See fig.
20.):
Figure 20: Time Line of USAID Funding for Reconstruction Assistance to
Afghanistan:
[See PDF for image]
[A] Public Law 107-38, 2001 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act
for Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United
States:
[B] Public Law 107-115, Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and
Related Programs Act, 2002:
[C] Public Law 107-117, Department of Defense and Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations for Recovery from and Response to Terrorist
Attacks on the United States Act, 2002:
[D] Public Law 107-206, 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act for
Further Recovery From and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United
States:
[E] Public Law 108-7, Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003, and
for Other Purposes:
[F] Public Law 108-11, Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations
Act 2003.
[End of figure]
Because of the delays in funding during the 17-month period following
the signing of the Bonn Agreement, USAID had to cancel projects,
reallocate funding from some projects in order to keep other projects
operating, and delay the implementation of 5 of its 7 major
reconstruction contracts until spring and summer of 2003. According to
USAID officials responsible for the management of USAID's assistance to
Afghanistan in fiscal years 2002-2003, if funding had been provided
sooner and in greater amounts, major contracts could have been awarded
sooner, a greater number of projects could have been implemented over
the 2-year period, and more results could have been achieved.
Rate of International Donor Funding Was Also Slow:
The funding provided by the United States in fiscal years 2002-2003 was
part of the larger international reconstruction effort in Afghanistan.
The Afghan government estimated that Afghanistan needs $30 billion over
the 5-year period 2004-2008 for what it defines as high-priority
reconstruction efforts. According to the Center on International
Cooperation, as of May 2003, $947 million of the international
disbursements had been used to begin reconstruction projects. Despite
Afghanistan's stated need and the importance that the United States and
the international community assigned to the reconstruction effort,
Afghanistan received significantly less international assistance over
fiscal years 2002-2003 than was provided during the first 2 years of
other recent postconflict, complex emergencies over a similar time
period. According to analyses by the International Monetary Fund, RAND
Corporation, and others, Afghanistan received about $67 in annual per
capita assistance in 2002 and 2003; by contrast, the annual per capita
aid provided during the first 2 years in other recent postconflict
settings was greater. For example, annual per capita assistance was
$256 in East Timor (1999-2001) and $249 in Bosnia (1995-1997). At the
October 19, 2003, meeting of the Consultative Group Standing Committee,
the Afghan government warned the international community that the
reconstruction effort might fail and that success would occur only if
the rate of international obligations were increased and national
reconstruction projects were fully funded.
Accelerating Success Initiative Designed to Increase Funding for
Reconstruction:
The U.S. government announced in September 2003 a new initiative called
"Accelerating Success," to increase funding and expedite the
reconstruction efforts, particularly regarding infrastructure,
democratization and human rights, and security. The initiative was
designed to be implemented in the 9-months leading up to the
presidential elections planned for June 2004.[Footnote 56] The U.S.
government plans to provide $1.76 billion[Footnote 57] for the
acceleration effort. Approximately $1 billion of that amount would
provide funding for elections, major and secondary road construction,
health and education programs, economic and budget support to the
Afghan government, senior advisers and technical experts, and private
sector initiatives. The remaining $700 million would be targeted toward
building the Afghan National Army, training and equipping the police
force, expanding the counternarcotics program, and establishing rule of
law.[Footnote 58] Funding for the initiative was appropriated in
November 2003; however, USAID did not receive the money until January/
February 2004, leaving only 7 months to complete visible reconstruction
projects before the September election. Moreover, the need to evaluate
projects quickly will increase under the initiative, but no additional
funds have been included for this purpose.
In April 2003, prior to the "Accelerating Success" initiative, at the
request of President Karzai, the United States decided to complete the
first layer of pavement of the Kabul-Kandahar road by December 2003
instead of December 2005. Under the original plan, the estimated cost
to bring the road up to international standards was $113 million; the
United States pledged $80 million, while Saudi Arabia and Japan each
pledged an additional $50 million. In shortening the timeline by 2
years, the United States assumed responsibility for 389 kilometers of
the 482-kilometer distance.[Footnote 59] (See fig. 21.) Consequently,
the United States hired several more subcontractors, increased the
labor and security forces, imported additional equipment, and tapped
the world market of asphalt. The first layer of pavement was completed
about 17 months after the contract was signed, and the road opened on
December 16, 2003. By the time in 2004 that contractors lay the final
layers of asphalt, repair the road's bridges, and construct the
culverts, USAID projects that the road's total cost to the United
States will be $270 million, more than double the original cost
estimate, due to accelerating the project.
Figure 21: Division of Responsibility for Repairing the 482-kilometer
Kabul-Kandahar Highway:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Conclusions:
After 23 years of war, the reconstruction needs of Afghanistan are
immense. Since the fall of the Taliban regime in October 2001, the
United States has viewed the establishment of a stable, democratic
Afghanistan as essential to U.S. national security. The United States,
in cooperation with the international community, is attempting to
rebuild Afghanistan and help the country become a stable and
functioning democracy. U.S.-led efforts in fiscal years 2002-2003
helped avert a humanitarian crisis; however, conditions in Afghanistan,
such as the deteriorating security situation, the relative weakness of
the central government, and the increase in opium production,
complicate the longer-term reconstruction process and threaten its
ultimate success. In addition, despite a consensus that reconstruction
assistance is essential to achieving the U.S. goal in Afghanistan, most
funding for reconstruction in fiscal years 2002-2003 was not allocated
until 17 months after the signing of the Bonn Agreement. This delay, as
well as a lack of staff and equipment, further hindered U.S. efforts.
Consequently, overall progress towards Afghanistan's reconstruction
goals by the end of fiscal year 2003 was limited.
The President's broad strategy published in February 2003 and reported
on semiannually states that success in Afghanistan demands that the
U.S. government follow a coherent, consistent, and closely coordinated
strategy. However, for most of fiscal years 2002-2003, the United
States lacked such a strategy. In addition, USAID, which provided the
majority of U.S. assistance to Afghanistan, lacked a complete
operational strategy to guide its nonsecurity-related efforts, making
it difficult for the agency to integrate projects, focus available
resources, and be held accountable for achieving measurable results.
The need for such a strategy has become more vital given that, between
August 2002 and July 2003, USAID awarded seven major multiyear
reconstruction contracts worth hundreds of millions of dollars.
Further, most of the U.S. agencies providing assistance to Afghanistan
did not have readily available comprehensive financial data on their
efforts, limiting the ability of individuals and institutions charged
with coordinating and overseeing the assistance to execute these
responsibilities.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
We recommend that the Administrator of USAID revise its strategy for
the agency's assistance program in Afghanistan. The revised strategy
should, among other things, (1) contain measurable goals, specific time
frames, and resource levels; (2) delineate responsibilities; (3)
identify external factors that could significantly affect the
achievement of its goals; and (4) include a schedule for program
evaluations that assess progress against the strategy's goals.
In addition, to improve oversight of U.S. assistance to Afghanistan, we
are making two recommendations to the Secretary of State. We recommend
that the Secretary of State direct the Coordinator for U.S. Assistance
to Afghanistan to (1) produce an annual consolidated budget report for
all assistance to Afghanistan and (2) semiannually report obligations
and expenditures for the assistance provided, delineated by relevant
U.S. agencies and the bureaus and offices within each agency
semiannually.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of State and
Defense and to the U.S. Agency for International Development. State's
and USAID's written comments are presented in appendixes VI and VII,
respectively. State and USAID generally concurred with much of the
information presented on the situation in Afghanistan for the period
covered by our review. State emphasized that despite security and other
challenges, significant progress had been made, not only with respect
to humanitarian and short-term assistance, but also in advancing long-
term security, reconstruction, and governance objectives. USAID stated
that the report presented a fair picture of the situation in
Afghanistan at the end of fiscal year 2003, when USAID's large
reconstruction efforts were just beginning. Both agencies included in
their response additional information on more recent activities taken
and progress made. The Department of Defense did not provide official
written comments, but provided technical comments, as did USAID, that
we have incorporated where appropriate.
In response to our recommendation that USAID revise its operational
strategy for Afghanistan to include details such as measurable goals,
timeframes, and required resources, USAID said that its less
comprehensive interim strategy was appropriate given the situation in
Afghanistan during the early phases of the ongoing efforts. While we
recognize in the report that the strategy was an interim strategy, the
need for a more complete strategy is vital due to the large increase in
USAID assistance funding for Afghanistan. USAID said that it is
committed to developing a standard strategic plan for Afghanistan
during 2004, which would be consistent with our recommendation. The
Department of State disagreed with our finding that the United States
lacks a complete and integrated assistance strategy, citing its
December 15, 2003 report to Congress, titled Fiscal Year 2004 Strategic
and Financial Plan for Reconstruction and Related Activities in
Afghanistan. In the plan, State noted that the United States is
pursuing a three-fold strategy in Afghanistan, focusing on security,
reconstruction, and governance. We found that most of the strategies
that were published in fiscal years 2002 and 2003 lacked details on
funding and other resources, measurable goals, timeframes, as well as a
means to measure progress. However, in the report, we also cite State's
June 2003 Mission Performance Plan as meeting many of the requirements
for a government-wide operational strategy. Although the fiscal year
2004 plan cited by State in its comments includes more details on the
U.S. assistance budget for Afghanistan, like some of the previously
published strategies, it lacks operational details, including time
frames, measurable goals, and a means to measure progress toward those
goals.
In response to our recommendation that State produce an annual
consolidated budget for all U.S. assistance to Afghanistan and report
to Congress semiannually on obligations and expenditures, State
emphasized that policymakers are provided with information on U.S.
obligations weekly, and that close interagency collaboration occurs
regarding all funding issues. In addition, State said that it already
keeps Congress regularly informed through staff briefings, hearings,
and mandated reports. We disagree. As we reported, complete and readily
accessible obligation and expenditure data were not available, and
consequently, it is difficult for the Coordinator to determine the
extent to which U.S. assistance dollars are being used to achieve
measurable results in Afghanistan. Moreover, we found that government-
wide expenditure data on U.S. assistance to Afghanistan is not
collected, obligation data is collected on an ad hoc basis, and that
the Coordinator's office experienced difficulty in consistently
collecting complete and accurate obligation data from U.S. government
agencies. Further reporting obligation data alone is insufficient.
Obligation data measures the extent to which contracts have been
awarded, orders placed, and similar transactions, not the extent to
which money actually has been spent on the ground on visible projects.
Consequently, reporting obligations alone does not provide an accurate
portrayal of the progress of the assistance effort. For example, as our
report shows, although $647 million was obligated for reconstruction
projects in fiscal 2002 and 2003, less than a third of the total, or
$214 million was actually spent. Regular reporting of both obligations
and expenditures for U.S. assistance to Afghanistan would provide the
Coordinator and Congress a more complete picture of what funds actually
have been spent on visible projects.
We are sending copies of this report to other interested congressional
committees. We are also sending copies to the Administrator of USAID,
the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense. We also will make
copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will
be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-3149. Other GAO contacts and staff
acknowledgements are listed in appendix VIII.
Signed by:
David Gootnick, Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
[End of section]
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Section 106 of the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 directs GAO
to monitor U.S. humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to
Afghanistan. To meet the requirements of the directive and provide
Congress with a comprehensive accounting of U.S. assistance to
Afghanistan for fiscal years 2002-2003, we (1) analyzed U.S.
obligations and expenditures; (2) identified the results of assistance
projects through September 30, 2003; (3) evaluated U.S. and
international assistance coordination mechanisms and the U.S.
assistance strategy; and (4) examined the major obstacles that affected
the achievement of U.S. policy goals and the reconstruction effort.
We collected data on fiscal years 2002 and 2003 obligations and
expenditures from the U.S. departments and agencies responsible for
implementing U.S. government-funded projects in Afghanistan. These
include U.S. Departments of Agriculture, Defense, Health and Human
Services, State, and Treasury; the U.S. Trade and Development Agency;
and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Because
there is no single repository of financial information for all U.S.
assistance in Afghanistan, we contacted each agency directly. In
addition, because the Department of State does not have a consolidated
financial reporting mechanism for programs in Afghanistan, we contacted
each bureau and office separately--including the Bureaus of Population,
Refugees, and Migration, and International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement; and the Offices of International Information Programs,
Humanitarian Demining Programs, and Trafficking in Persons.
To determine which funds were applied to humanitarian and quick-impact
projects and which were applied to longer-term reconstruction funding,
we requested the agencies to designate their funding accordingly. In
the case of USAID, we relied on the stated mission of the responsible
funding bureau to make the determination. For example, the missions of
the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and Office of Transition
Initiatives include addressing emergency situations and implementing
quick-impact projects, respectively.
Since USAID did not provide separate financial management records for
fiscal years 2002 and 2003, we, in consultation with USAID, sorted the
obligation and expenditure data by year to arrive at the fiscal year
breakdowns that appear in this report. The Department of Defense was
unable to disaggregate PRT project data by fiscal year. The fiscal 2002
obligations and expenditures in the report include only funds spent on
humanitarian daily rations, while the fiscal 2003 figures include all
PRT funds in 2002 and 2003.
To delineate how funding and projects were distributed by province, we
combined information from both USAID and the Department of Defense.
USAID provided the information from a programmatic, rather than a
financial database, as the financial database did not include data by
location. Because the programmatic database had been updated only to
September 17, 2003, the numbers used for figure 5 are less than the
total obligations reported as of September 30, 2003. However, according
to USAID, it can be assumed that the proportion of assistance by
province did not change during that time lag. Also as a result of the
data being drawn from a programmatic database, we are unable to show
expenditures by province, because the database tracks only obligations.
To assess the reliability of the obligations and expenditures data from
U.S. agencies providing assistance to Afghanistan, we (1) interviewed
officials at the Departments of Defense, State, and USAID regarding
their methods of gathering, managing, and using data; (2) reviewed
USAID's financial audit statement; and (3) compared the data we
gathered with USAID's Congressional Budget Justifications and the
Department of State's 150 account documentation, as well as with the
government-wide Afghanistan assistance compilation done by the
Department of State's Resource Management bureau. A Department of State
official stated that the data State compiled are not completely
accurate, due in part to the lack of a requirement for all agencies to
report to one central office on a regular basis, which results in
variation in the frequency of reporting by individual agencies and
differences in how agencies track data. However, the Department of
State relies on these data for decision-making purposes and to track
how quickly money for Afghanistan is being used. Based on our
assessment, we conclude that the data are sufficiently reliable for the
purposes of showing, in gross numbers, the level of nonsecurity-related
assistance that the U.S. government provided to Afghanistan in fiscal
years 2002 and 2003.
To assess the reliability of the data on the pledges and disbursements
made by international donors, we (1) interviewed the official at the
Department of State who is responsible for compiling these data based
on information provided by the Government of Afghanistan and (2)
performed some basic reasonableness checks of the data against other
sources of information. We determined that the data are sufficiently
reliable for the purpose of making a broad comparison of the United
States' contributions to those of other major donors and the combined
total for all other donors. However, we also noted several limitations
in the data, notably the fact that the data are largely self-reported
by donor nations to the Afghan government and are affected by
differences in exchange rates. In addition, donors both over-and under-
report due to varying definitions of disbursement. Furthermore, the
data on larger donors are considered more reliable than the data on
smaller donors, according to the Department of State. Due to these
limitations, and the fact that we could not contact each of the donors,
we were unable to determine the reliability of the precise dollars
amounts pledged and disbursed by every donor. Nevertheless, because
these are the only available data and are used by the Department of
State, we present the dollar amounts reported to have been pledged and
disbursed by each donor in appendix V.
To examine the results of assistance projects through September 30,
2003, we collected and analyzed information from the Departments of
State and Defense, and USAID in Washington, D.C., which outlined policy
goals, basic strategies, program objectives, and monitoring efforts. We
also collected and analyzed pertinent reports and testimony these
agencies presented to Congress. In October 2003, we traveled to
Afghanistan to examine the implementation of USAID and the Department
of Defense's assistance-related operations. While in country, we spent
13 days in the capital city, Kabul, interviewing officials from the
Afghan Ministries of Finance, Health, Agriculture, and Rural
Rehabilitation and Development; the Afghan commissions on Human Rights
and the Judicial Reform; the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan; the
UN Development Program (UNDP); and the U.S. Departments of State and
Defense and USAID. We also met with most of USAID's primary
implementing partners (including the Louis Berger Group, Creative
Associates, Management Sciences for Health, and Bearing Point) as well
as nongovernmental organizations not funded by the United States, such
as the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit and the Danish
Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees. In Kabul, we inspected
Afghanistan's new banking system, customs house, and the rehabilitation
of the Rabia Balkhi Women's Hospital. We also spent a total of 7 days
in the Bamian, Kunduz, and Hirat provinces, where we inspected U.S.-
funded projects, implemented primarily by either the OTI or the
Department of Defense's PRTs. While in the provinces, we met with an
Afghan shura (community council), teachers, and other community members
involved in, or affected by, U.S. reconstruction projects. Constraints
placed on our movement within Afghanistan by the U.S. Embassy due to
security concerns limited the number of project sites we could visit.
To analyze the assistance coordination mechanisms developed by the U.S.
government and the international community, we met with Department of
State staff responsible for assistance coordination and staff from
USAID, and the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Health
and Human Services, Labor, Treasury, and State involved in the
provision of assistance, to obtain their views on coordination. In
addition, we reviewed the U.S. National Security Strategy, the
Department of State/USAID consolidated strategic plan for 2004-2009,
the President's Security Strategy for Afghanistan, the U.S. Embassy
Kabul Mission Performance Plan, and USAID's strategy and action plan
for Afghanistan. Using the criteria contained in the U.S. Government
Performance and Results Act and USAID Automated Directives System, we
examined USAID strategies to determine whether they contained the basic
elements of an operational strategy articulated in the act and in
agency guidance. Our analysis of international coordination mechanisms
included a review of UN and Afghan government documents, including the
Afghan National Development Framework and Budget, pertaining to the
international coordination mechanisms utilized in Afghanistan in fiscal
years 2002-2003. In addition, we met with officials from the Afghan
Ministries of Agriculture, Finance, Health, and Rural Rehabilitation
and Development to obtain their views on the evolution and status of
the consultative group mechanism.
To analyze the obstacles that affected the implementation of U.S.
reconstruction assistance, we examined analyses of common obstacles
found in postconflict environments produced by the Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, the Center for Strategic and International
Studies, the World Bank, Stanford University, and the RAND Corporation.
We also reviewed as previous GAO work on the subject. We then compared
those obstacles with the conditions present in Afghanistan in fiscal
years 2002-2003. In addition, we reviewed reports produced by the
Departments of Defense and State, the UN, the International Crisis
Group, Human Rights Watch, the Bonn International Center for
Conversion, as well as a U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime report on opium
production in Afghanistan. To analyze other obstacles, including the
lack of staff, equipment, and funding, we spoke with officials from the
Department of Defense and USAID. In addition, we examined appropriation
legislation, USAID's Congressional Budget Justifications, and the
Inspector General's risk assessment of major activities managed by
USAID/Afghanistan. Finally, we visited the USAID mission in Kabul,
Afghanistan, and PRTs in Bamian, Kunduz, and Hirat, Afghanistan.
We conducted our review from August 2003-April 2004 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Summary of the Key Provisions of the Bonn Agreement:
After coalition forces ousted the Taliban government, the United
Nations (U.N.) convened four Afghan groups to establish a blueprint for
a power-sharing, interim government;[Footnote 60] the Taliban were not
included in these talks. The resulting document, officially entitled
the "Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the
Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions," commonly
called the Bonn Agreement or the Bonn Accord, was signed in Bonn,
Germany on December 5, 2001.
I. General provisions:
* Establish an Interim Authority by December 22, 2001.
* Establish the composition, functions, and governing procedures for
the interim administration.
* Convene an emergency loya jirga,[Footnote 61] or grand council,
within 6 months of December 22, 2001 to decide on the Transitional
Authority, which will govern until the Afghan population elects a
representative government.
* Decide on a Transitional Authority by the emergency loya jirga until
such time as a fully representative government can be elected through
free and fair elections within 2 years of the convening of the
emergency loya jirga.
* Hold constitutional loya jirga to establish a new constitution within
18 months of December 22, 2001.
II. Legal framework and judicial system:
* The 1964 constitution and existing laws and regulations should be
applied until the new constitution is written, excepting:
* where provisions of 1964 constitution are inconsistent with the Bonn
Agreement, or relate to the monarchy or constitutional, executive, and
legislative bodies:
* where existing laws and regulations are inconsistent with the Bonn
Agreement, Afghanistan's international legal obligations, or the 1964
constitution.
* The interim authority shall have power to amend existing laws and
regulations.
* Afghanistan shall have independent judicial power vested in a Supreme
Court and other courts established by the Interim Administration. A
Judicial Commission established by the Administration shall rebuild the
justice system in accordance with Islamic principles, international
standards, the rule of law, and Afghan legal traditions.
III. Interim Administration:
* Composition: A chairman will preside over the cabinet-style interim
government, which includes five vice chairmen and 24 other members.
* Procedures: Decisions will be made by consensus, or by majority vote
where necessary, as long as 22 members are present. If the vote is
split equally, the chairman holds the deciding vote.
* Functions: The Interim Authority shall conduct the day-to-day affairs
of state. Among other things, it may, with the assistance of the UN,
establish a single national currency and a central bank, a Civil
Service Commission, a Human Rights Commission, and any other commission
to review matters not covered in the agreement.
IV. The Special Independent Commission for the Convening of the
Emergency Loya Jirga:
* A 21-member, special, independent commission will be established to
convene an emergency loya jirga within 6 months of the establishment of
the Interim Authority. The emergency loya jirga will decide on a
transitional authority to lead Afghanistan until a fully representative
government is elected within 2 years of the convening of the loya
jirga.
V. Final provisions:
* Upon official transfer of power, all mujahidin, Afghan armed forces,
and armed groups shall come under the command and control of the
Interim Authority.
* The Interim Authority and emergency Loya Jirga shall act in
accordance with basic human rights and international humanitarian law.
* The Interim Authority shall cooperate in the fight against terrorism,
drugs, and organized crime.
* The Interim Authority and Special Independent Commission for the
convening of the emergency Loya Jirga shall ensure the participation of
women and the equitable representation of all ethnic and religious
communities in the Interim Authority and emergency Loya Jirga.
* The Interim Authority shall adhere to Security Council resolution
1378.
* The Interim Authority shall elaborate on rules of procedure for the
government as appropriate with UN guidance.
Annexes: I. International Security Force II. Role of the United Nations
during the Interim Period III. Request to the United Nations by the
Participants at the UN talks on Afghanistan IV. Composition of the
Interim Administration:
[End of section]
Appendix III: Summary of the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002:
Name: Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002, P.L. 107-327:
Date: December 4, 2002:
Major titles:
I. Economic and Democratic Development Assistance for Afghanistan:
II. Military Assistance for Afghanistan and Certain other Foreign
Countries and International Organizations:
III. Miscellaneous provisions:
Purposes:
* Assure U.S. security.
* Address humanitarian crisis.
* Fight illicit narcotics.
* Promote a broad-based, multi-ethnic, gender-sensitive, and fully
representative government.
* Support Afghan government's projects.
* Foster civil society.
* Support reconstruction (create jobs, clear landmines, rebuild the
agriculture, health care and educational sectors).
* Provide resources to the Ministry for Women's Affairs.
* Foster a pluralistic society that respects religious freedom.
Major types of assistance authorized:
* Urgent humanitarian needs:
* Repatriation and resettlement of refugees and IDPs:
* Counternarcotics efforts:
* Reestablishment of food security, rehabilitation of the agriculture
sector, improvement in health conditions and the reconstruction of
basic infrastructure:
* Reestablishment of Afghanistan as a viable nation-state:
* Market economy:
* Assistance to women and girls:
Table 2: Total assistance authorized: $3.3 billion between FY 2003 and
2006:
Dollars in millions.
Development Assistance;
Fiscal year: 2003: 425;
Fiscal year: 2004: 425[A];
Fiscal year: 2005: 425;
Fiscal year: 2006: 425;
Total over 4 fiscal years: 1,700.
Enterprise fund;
Fiscal year: 2003: 300;
Fiscal year: 2004: 0;
Fiscal year: 2005: 0;
Fiscal year: 2006: 0;
Total over 4 fiscal years: 300.
Security assistance;
Fiscal year: 2003: 300[B];
Fiscal year: 2004: 0;
Fiscal year: 2005: 0;
Fiscal year: 2006: 0;
Total over 4 fiscal years: 300.
ISAF;
Fiscal year: 2003: 500;
Fiscal year: 2004: 500;
Fiscal year: 2005: 0;
Fiscal year: 2006: 0;
Total over 4 fiscal years: 1,000.
Total (per FY);
Fiscal year: 2003: 1,525;
Fiscal year: 2004: 925;
Fiscal year: 2005: 425;
Fiscal year: 2006: 425;
Total over 4 fiscal years: 3,300.
Source: GAO analysis of data contained in the Afghanistan Freedom
Support Act of 2002.
Note: Rough Breakdown of Authorizations by Fiscal Year:
[A] P.L. 108-106 Sec. 2214 increased the FY 04 allocation to $1.825
billion.
[B] P.L. 108-106 Sec. 2206 amends this amount to $450 million.
Table 3: Earmarks: $170 million development assistance of $425 million
total between FY 2003 and 2006:
Dollars in millions.
UNDCP[A];
Fiscal year: 2003: 15;
Fiscal year: 2004: 15;
Fiscal year: 2005: 15;
Fiscal year: 2006: 15;
Total over 4 fiscal years: 60.
Loya Jirga;
Fiscal year: 2003: 10;
Fiscal year: 2004: 10;
Fiscal year: 2005: 10;
Fiscal year: 2006: 0;
Total over 4 fiscal years: 30.
Women's Ministry;
Fiscal year: 2003: 15;
Fiscal year: 2004: 15;
Fiscal year: 2005: 15;
Fiscal year: 2006: 15;
Total over 4 fiscal years: 60.
NHRC[B];
Fiscal year: 2003: 5;
Fiscal year: 2004: 5;
Fiscal year: 2005: 5;
Fiscal year: 2006: 5;
Total over 4 fiscal years: 20.
Total;
Fiscal year: 2003: 45;
Fiscal year: 2004: 45;
Fiscal year: 2005: 45;
Fiscal year: 2006: 35;
Total over 4 fiscal years: 170.
Source: GAO analysis of data contained in the Afghanistan Freedom
Support Act of 2002.
Note: Rough breakdown of earmarks for FY 2003-2006. Up to 7% of each
earmark is allowed for federal agency administration costs. In this
case, that would be $12 million.
[A] U.N. Drug Control Program.
[B] National Human Rights Commission (renamed Afghan Independent Human
Rights Commission).
[End of table]
Coordination:
Designate a coordinator within the Department of State to:
* Design an overall strategy to advance U.S. interests in Afghanistan;
* Ensure coordination among U.S. agencies;
* Pursue coordination with other countries;
* Ensure proper management, implementation, and oversight of
assistance; and,
* Resolve disputes among U.S. agencies with respect to Afghan
assistance.
Strategies and Reports:
Table 4: Required strategies and reports to be submitted to the House
Committee on International Relations, Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, and both Appropriations committees:
Section 206: Promoting secure delivery of humanitarian and other
assistance in Afghanistan: c(1)(A) Security strategy, Immediate and
long-term needs (updating strategies required by P.L. 107-206)[A];
Schedule: 60 days after enactment of act;
Approximate deadlines: Section 206: Feb. 2003.
Section 206: Promoting secure delivery of humanitarian and other
assistance in Afghanistan: c(1)(B) Description of progress towards
poppy eradication;
Schedule: 60 days after enactment of act;
Approximate deadlines: Section 206: Feb. 2003.
Section 206: Promoting secure delivery of humanitarian and other
assistance in Afghanistan: c(2) Security strategy implementation
reports;
Schedule: Every 6 months through 1/07;
Approximate deadlines: June and Dec. 2003-2007.
Section 303: Donor contributions to Afghanistan: c(1) Initial report
(strategy and progress);
Schedule: 60 days after enactment;
Approximate deadlines: Feb. 2003.
Section 303: Donor contributions to Afghanistan: Contributions status;
Schedule: 90 days thereafter every 180 days through 12/31/04;
Approximate deadlines: 4/03, 10/ 03, 4/04, 10/04.
Source: GAO analysis of data contained in the Afghanistan Freedom
Support Act of 2002.
[A] P.L. 107-206 2002 (Supplemental Appropriations Act for Further
Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States
(required separate strategies for immediate security needs and long-
term security needs.
[End of table]
Sunset:
Authority expires after September 30, 2006.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Fiscal Years 2002-2003 Obligations and Expenditures for
Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance by U.S. Agencies:
Dollars in millions.
Agency: U.S. Agency for International Development;
Fiscal year 2002: Obligations: 436.34;
Fiscal year 2002: Expenditures: 379.59;
Fiscal year 2003: Obligations: 505.64;
Fiscal year 2003: Expenditures: 128.31.
Agency: Department of State: Bureau for Population, Refugees, and
Migration;
Fiscal year 2002: Obligations: 145.85;
Fiscal year 2002: Expenditures: 142.33;
Fiscal year 2003: Obligations: 87.70;
Fiscal year 2003: Expenditures: 72.79.
Agency: Department of State: International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement;
Fiscal year 2002: Obligations: 33.59;
Fiscal year 2002: Expenditures: 20.86;
Fiscal year 2003: Obligations: 0[A];
Fiscal year 2003: Expenditures: 0.
Agency: Department of State: Other State;
Fiscal year 2002: Obligations: 11.00;
Fiscal year 2002: Expenditures: 11.00;
Fiscal year 2003: Obligations: 8.68;
Fiscal year 2003: Expenditures: 6.66.
Agency: Department of Defense;
Fiscal year 2002: Obligations: 50.90;
Fiscal year 2002: Expenditures: 50.90;
Fiscal year 2003: Obligations: 20.27;
Fiscal year 2003: Expenditures: 13.58.
Agency: Department of Health and Human Services;
Fiscal year 2002: Obligations: 2.74;
Fiscal year 2002: Expenditures: 2.74;
Fiscal year 2003: Obligations: 5.61;
Fiscal year 2003: Expenditures: 5.61.
Agency: Department of Agriculture;
Fiscal year 2002: Obligations: 40.31;
Fiscal year 2002: Expenditures: 27.67;
Fiscal year 2003: Obligations: 29.36;
Fiscal year 2003: Expenditures: 10.85.
Agency: Department of Labor;
Fiscal year 2002: Obligations: 6.30;
Fiscal year 2002: Expenditures: 0;
Fiscal year 2003: Obligations: 0;
Fiscal year 2003: Expenditures: 0.57.
Agency: U.S. Trade and Development Agency;
Fiscal year 2002: Obligations: 0.35;
Fiscal year 2002: Expenditures: 0.35;
Fiscal year 2003: Obligations: 3.17;
Fiscal year 2003: Expenditures: 1.59.
Agency: Department of Treasury;
Fiscal year 2002: Obligations: 0.55;
Fiscal year 2002: Expenditures: 0.46;
Fiscal year 2003: Obligations: 1.12;
Fiscal year 2003: Expenditures: 0.64.
Agency: Broadcasting Board of Governors;
Fiscal year 2002: Obligations: 28.51;
Fiscal year 2002: Expenditures: 14.09;
Fiscal year 2003: Obligations: 7.40;
Fiscal year 2003: Expenditures: 6.67.
Agency: Overseas Private Investment Corporation;
Fiscal year 2002: Obligations: 0;
Fiscal year 2002: Expenditures: 0;
Fiscal year 2003: Obligations: 3.02;
Fiscal year 2003: Expenditures: 3.02.
Agency: Total;
Fiscal year 2002: Obligations: 756.44;
Fiscal year 2002: Expenditures: 649.99;
Fiscal year 2003: Obligations: 671.97;
Fiscal year 2003: Expenditures: 250.29.
Source: GAO analysis of U.S. agency data.
[A] INL neither received nor requested funding for fiscal 2003.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix V: Major Donors' Reported Pledges and Disbursements for
Assistance to Afghanistan for Fiscal Years 2002-2003:
Dollars in millions.
United States;
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 3300;
Total disbursed since 2001: 1428.
Japan;
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 500;
Total disbursed since 2001: 448.
European Commission;
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 1245;
Total disbursed since 2001: 386.
United Kingdom;
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 331;
Total disbursed since 2001: 190.
Germany;
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 379;
Total disbursed since 2001: 171.
Canada;
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 273;
Total disbursed since 2001: 129.
Netherlands;
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 162;
Total disbursed since 2001: 103.
World Bank;
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 600;
Total disbursed since 2001: 89.
Saudi Arabia;
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 220;
Total disbursed since 2001: 78.
Spain;
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 148;
Total disbursed since 2001: 77.
Italy;
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 99;
Total disbursed since 2001: 70.
United Arab Emirates;
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 70;
Total disbursed since 2001: 70.
India;
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 310;
Total disbursed since 2001: 69.
Norway;
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 93;
Total disbursed since 2001: 63.
Sweden;
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 142;
Total disbursed since 2001: 45.
Denmark;
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 106;
Total disbursed since 2001: 45.
Iran;
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 500;
Total disbursed since 2001: 33.
China;
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 152;
Total disbursed since 2001: 30.
France;
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 62;
Total disbursed since 2001: 30.
Kuwait;
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 45;
Total disbursed since 2001: 20.
Qatar;
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 20;
Total disbursed since 2001: 20.
Australia;
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 20;
Total disbursed since 2001: 20.
Pakistan;
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 100;
Total disbursed since 2001: 18.
Finland;
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 32;
Total disbursed since 2001: 13.
Belgium;
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 34;
Total disbursed since 2001: 12.
Asian Development Bank;
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 610;
Total disbursed since 2001: 11.
Austria;
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 12;
Total disbursed since 2001: 11.
South Korea;
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 45;
Total disbursed since 2001: 10.
Ireland;
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 12;
Total disbursed since 2001: 10.
Switzerland;
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 25;
Total disbursed since 2001: 9.
Luxembourg;
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 5;
Total disbursed since 2001: 4.
Turkey;
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 15;
Total disbursed since 2001: 3.
Greece;
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 5;
Total disbursed since 2001: 2.
Portugal;
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 5;
Total disbursed since 2001: 2.
Russia[B];
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 60;
Total disbursed since 2001: 0.
Oman;
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 6;
Total disbursed since 2001: 0.
Total;
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 9,743;
Total disbursed since 2001: 3,719.
Sources: Department of State, Asian Development Bank:
Notes: Figures cited relate to humanitarian and reconstruction
donations only; military donor contributions are not included.
GAO was not able to determine the reliability of the specific dollar
figures in this table. While we determined that the data are
sufficiently reliable for broadly comparing U.S. contributions to those
of major donors, we noted several limitations, namely (a) that they are
affected by differences in exchange rates, (b) donors both over-and
under-report due to varying definitions of disbursement, and (c) the
data on larger donors are considered more reliable than the data on
smaller donors.
[A] Pledges are inclusive from 2001-2003 and have a disbursement range
of 1-6 years depending on donor.
[B] Russian assistance has been primarily in-kind donations.:
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of State:
United States Department of State:
Assistant Secretary and Chief Financial Officer:
Washington, D.C. 20520
MAY 21 2004:
Ms. Jacqueline Williams-Bridgers
Managing Director:
International Affairs and Trade
General Accounting Office
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001:
Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers:
We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "AFGHANISTAN
RECONSTRUCTION: Deteriorating Security and Limited Resources Have
Impeded Progress; Improvements in U.S. Strategy Needed," GAO Job Code
320210.
The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.
If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact Tim
Wilder, Deputy Director, Bureau of South Asian Affairs, at
(202) 647-5267.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Christopher B. Burnham:
cc: GAO - Dave Bruno
SA - William Taylor
State/OIG - Mark Duda
State/H - Paul Kelly:
Department of State Comments on the GAO Draft Report Afghanistan
Reconstruction: Deteriorating Security and Limited Resources Have
Impeded Progress; Improvements in U.S. Strategy Needed (GAO Job Code
320210):
The Department has reviewed the draft report regarding obstacles to
progress in Afghanistan. While we concur with much that is in the
report, we would emphasize that despite security and other challenges,
significant progress has been made not only with respect to
humanitarian and short-term assistance but also in advancing long-term
security, reconstruction and governance objectives. Notably, the Afghan
National Army has reached an operational strength of over 8,000
soldiers and continues to grow steadily in capacity, recently deploying
to provincial centers. It is being joined by a rapidly growing police
force that now numbers over 6,000 and will number 20,000 this summer.
Reconstruction progress has not been limited to the Kabul-Kandahar-
Herat road, but -as the report acknowledges -includes the construction
of over 200 schools, rehabilitation of over 163 health facilities and
rehabilitation of over 7000 rural irrigation structures. These are not
minor achievements, and they are joined by many more (also referenced
in the report). Most remarkable, given Afghanistan's tortured political
history, has been the progress toward democratic governance --with a
constitution ratified in January and over 2.3 million voters registered
to participate, to date, in elections scheduled for September 2004.
The Department takes issue with the report's assertion that the United
States lacks a complete and integrated assistance strategy. On December
15, 2003 the Department submitted to Congress its report on the "FY
2004 Strategic and Financial Plan for Reconstruction and Related
Activities in Afghanistan." The Department's Report explains that:
"In concert with Afghan leaders and international partners, the United
States is pursuing a three fold, integrated strategy in Afghanistan,
focusing on security, reconstruction and governance. Pursued in
parallel, these three elements are mutually reinforcing and promise to
create a virtuous cycle as (1) improved security creates conditions for
accelerated reconstruction and stronger government, (2) reconstruction
boosts stability and confidence in the government by delivering
benefits to citizens and (3) as the growth of constitutional,
democratic and effective government discredits those who would return
Afghanistan to the anarchy and violence of the past."
This three-fold strategy has long underpinned U.S. assistance to
Afghanistan and is bearing fruit, as attested by progress already
noted.
The GAO report recommends that the Department of State produce (1) an
annual consolidated budget report and (2) semiannual reports to
Congress on obligations and expenditures for U.S. Assistance to
Afghanistan. These recommendations appear to be related to the judgment
that the "U.S. coordinator for assistance to Afghanistan, as well as
others responsible for the coordination of U.S. assistance, lacked
complete and accurate financial data in fiscal years 2002-2003." If so,
we would emphasize that there is close inter-agency collaboration on
all funding issues and the Coordinator and other policy makers are
provided with a chart that tracks all U.S. obligations and available
resources on a week-to-week basis - a chart that is available to
Congress on request. Progress toward specific sectoral objectives is
also carefully tracked on a month-to-month basis. The report notes the
weekly meetings of Department Deputies to review progress and set
priorities relating to Afghanistan. It neglects to mention the daily
meetings of the Afghanistan Interagency Operations Group (AIOG), which
has led to virtually seamless working-level coordination among DoD,
State, Treasury, USAID, the NSC, OMB and other agencies on the full
range of policy and programming issues, including funding. Congress is
also kept regularly informed, at the staff level, at hearings and
through numerous congressionally mandated reports, including the report
cited above.
[End of section]
Appendix VII: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International
Development:
USAID:
U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT:
MAY 19 2004:
Mr. David Gootnick, Director
International Affairs and Trade
General Accounting Office
441 G Street, NW Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Gootnick:
USAID welcomes the opportunity to respond to the audit report on
Afghanistan Reconstruction. On balance, we think the audit report
presents a fair picture of the situation in Afghanistan at the end of
fiscal year 2003 when
USAID's large reconstruction efforts were just getting underway. This
letter will bring you up to date on the progress made since then. My
comments will follow the order of the presentation in the report.
To begin, USAID is very proud that its early humanitarian assistance
averted a famine in Afghanistan in the winter of 2002-3. This enormous
effort saved countless lives and earned the United States tremendous
good will.
We have taken measures to address the shortcomings noted in the report.
For example:
* USAID now requires standard signage on all our projects that gives
credit to the Governments of the United States and Afghanistan. A
reproduction of the standard signage is attached hereto.
* USAID has signed agreements with five additional implementing
organizations to speed up progress constructing and rehabilitating
schools and clinics.
* One hundred percent of FY 2003 funds and nearly 70% of FY 2004 funds
are now obligated. Obligation figures are updated monthly for the
Afghanistan Interagency Operations Group chaired by the State
Department's Coordinator for U.S. assistance to Afghanistan and the
NSC in order to provide timely financial management information to aid
interagency decision making.
* USAID staff in Afghanistan has grown from the 39 reported in the
audit to 59 today (including six assigned to PRTs around the country).
Office and living space also expanded when USAID was allotted space at
Camp Phoenix, a U.S. military facility approximately 13 kilometers from
the Embassy compound. Next month, USAID and other agencies are
scheduled to move into new temporary facilities across the street from
the Embassy compound. Between Camp Phoenix and the new compound across
from the Embassy, office and living space no longer limit the size of
our staff recruitment in Afghanistan.
We can also update you on the significant progress of the major
projects identified in the report.
* The second layer of paving on the Kabul-Kandahar highway will be
complete on schedule, in October 2004. On the Kandahar-Herat portion,
the highway contractor is now working on 100 kilometers and several
bridges in Farah and Herat provinces. USAID is on schedule to finish
its portion of the Kandahar-Herat highway (approximately 329 kms) by
the end of 2005. Contractors are also grading and paving almost 500
kilometers of secondary roads, primarily in the south and southeast, to
connect provincial capitals and large towns to the new highway.
* Our health contractor has made grants to NGOs to operate clinics that
will provide service to 4.8 million Afghans; trained, since September
2003, 1,384 health workers (including 578 community health workers and
midwives-a key staffing constraint in addressing maternal mortality),
and started construction on 72 health centers. Another program is now
underway to train 5,500 women in literacy as a first step towards their
training as Community Health Workers; a second program will more than
double the number of trained midwives in Afghanistan.
* Our agricultural contractors have initiated irrigation projects to
improve irrigation on 301,000 hectares-half of which are now complete.
Approximately 350,000 livestock have been vaccinated or treated; a
microfinance program has disbursed 675 loans and trained 850 loan
officers; and 137,000 farmers are now served by 350 new extension
agents. Three agricultural market centers have been constructed; work
is underway on an additional 65, and a total of 100 will be complete
this summer. Thanks to USAID's support in the customs sector, the
Afghan government surpassed its target for domestic revenue collection
for the Afghan fiscal:
* year ended March 20, 2004, collecting 10,090,500,000 Afghanis ($201M).
Our education contractor has greatly expanded the Accelerated Learning
program for the 2004 school year: over 137,000 students are enrolled in
17 provinces now-67% of the last group of enrollees were girls. 4,800
teachers were trained in the past year and thousands more are listening
regularly to the radio-based teacher training program, now being
broadcast in six provinces through local radio stations, and nationwide
by way of a national broadcaster. Nearly 17 million textbooks are being
provided in 2004.
* In the justice sector, USAID has renovated 2 courthouses and work is
underway on 6 more. We have trained 120 potential judges and 183 court
staff.
* USAID supports the UN effort for the September 2004 Presidential and
parliamentary elections through civic education, political party
development, and elections registration and operational support. In the
last two weeks of April, 1,100 civic education workshops were held in
five provinces, with nearly 30,000 participants (of whom 31 % were
women). A second effort trained 43,000 people (36% women) to explain
the upcoming elections to their neighbors.
Finally, the report faults USAID for not preparing a strategic plan for
its program in Afghanistan. As the report notes, we did prepare a
strategy for Afghanistan early on, in July 2002, and we supplement it
with project planning documents that include interim goals, indicators
and specific results. The results for the most visible projects are
tracked biweekly by the Deputies' Committee meeting chaired by the
Deputy National Security Advisor at the White House. We think this
level of planning and oversight is appropriate for the situation in
Afghanistan and complies with agency directives on strategic planning.
(The agency directives distinguish between "standard" and "interim"
strategic plans. Countries in transition or experiencing high
uncertainty because of drastic political, military, and/or economic
events-like Afghanistan-are to prepare less comprehensive "interim"
strategies.) The time and resources it would take to prepare the
analyses required for a standard strategic plan was better spent
directing the multitude of ongoing projects, so there was no "back
sliding" on Afghanistan's progress. We are committed to developing a
standard strategic plan for Afghanistan during 2004 now that our
staffing in-country has reached adequate levels and a more permanent
government has been established in Afghanistan.
In summary, USAID has made great progress since the end of FY 2003.
Long term projects are showing impressive results and in-country
staffing is growing steadily. This summer will be the busiest yet, in
the lead up to the Presidential and Parliamentary elections. We are
very proud of our contributions to date and look forward to sharing
many more accomplishments with you in the coming months.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
John Marshall:
Assistant Administrator Bureau for Management:
Enclosure: Photo of standard USAID/Afghanistan project signage.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
[End of section]
[End of section]
Appendix VIII: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
David Gootnick (202) 512-3149 John Hutton (202) 512-7773 David Bruno
(202) 512-7280:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to those named above, Miriam A. Carroll, Martin de
Alteriis, Ernie Jackson, Reid Lowe, and Christina Werth made key
contributions to this report.
(320210):
FOOTNOTES
[1] Title I of P.L. 107-327 pertains to humanitarian and development
assistance; Title II, to security assistance; and Title III, to
miscellaneous provisions. As mandated by the act, this report focuses
on Title I-related assistance. For the purposes of this report,
humanitarian assistance refers to the provision of emergency assistance
that meets people's needs for adequate water, sanitation, nutrition,
food, shelter, and health care. Quick impact projects refer to short-
term assistance that helps transition Afghanistan from the humanitarian
to development assistance--longer-term reconstruction projects.
[2] The U.S. fiscal year covers the 12-month period October 1 through
September 30. In this report, "international community" is defined as
the collective grouping of bilateral, multilateral, and international
assistance agencies and nongovernmental organizations.
[3] This report refers to the Afghan Interim Authority and the
Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan as the government of
Afghanistan.
[4] President Karzai announced in March 2004 that the elections would
be postponed until September 2004.
[5] USAID is the principal U.S. agency that provides foreign assistance
to countries recovering from disaster, escaping poverty, and engaging
in democratic reforms.
[6] The Bureau for Asia and the Near East is one of four USAID
geographic bureaus that are responsible for activities in the countries
within the geographic region. The USAID mission in Kabul, Afghanistan,
falls under the jurisdiction of the bureau. The Bureau for Democracy,
Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance's mission is to save lives,
alleviate suffering, support democracy, and promote opportunities for
people adversely affected by poverty, conflict, natural disasters, and
a breakdown of good governance. OTI provides short-term assistance to
pre-and posttransition countries experiencing significant political
change or facing critical threats to stability and democratic reform.
[7] See appendix IV for a list of the agencies and their assistance
funding.
[8] For the purposes of this report, obligations are defined as amounts
of orders placed, contracts awarded, services received, and similar
transactions during a given period that will require payments during
the same or a future period.
[9] According to State officials,the Department of State does not track
international obligations and expenditures and defines disbursements as
monies that have moved beyond pledges. In this report, we consider an
international disbursement as including both obligations and
expenditures. See appendix V for detailed information on international
pledges and disbursements.
[10] For the purposes of this report, expenditures are defined as the
issuance of checks, disbursement of cash, or electronic transfer of
funds made to liquidate a federal obligation.
[11] USAID obligation data is from an agency database as of Sept. 17,
2003. The agency's database does not include the additional $150
million that were obligated in the last 13 days of fiscal year 2003.
According to USAID, the share of funding per province would have
remained relatively constant over the 13 days. The Department of
Defense obligations are as of December 2003. Defense officials stated
they could not break out the funds by fiscal year.
[12] Afghanistan has 32 provinces. Only 1 province, Nuristan, received
no assistance at the provincial level, although it may have benefited
from national programs.
[13] The Center on International Cooperation is a nongovernmental
organization that seeks to inform public debate by examining
international justice, humanitarian assistance, and postconflict
peace-building.
[14] Title II of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act
of 1954 as amended (P.L. 480) authorizes USAID to donate agricultural
commodities to meet international emergency relief requirements and
carry out nonemergency feeding programs overseas. The U.S. Department
of Agriculture provides surplus commodities to countries under section
416(b) of the Agricultural Act of 1949. U.S. contributions consist of
in-kind donations of commodities such as white wheat and cash donations
to cover the cost of transporting the commodities from the United
States to Afghanistan.
[15] Between October and December 2001, the Department of Defense also
dropped 2,489,880 humanitarian daily rations, each of which contained a
complete set of meals for one day for one person, totaling
approximately 2,200 calories. The Department of Defense stated the
total cost of the ration effort to be $50,897,769.
[16] For additional information on U.S. food and agriculture assistance
to Afghanistan in fiscal years 2002--2003, see U.S. General Accounting
Office, Foreign Assistance: Lack of Strategic Focus and Obstacles to
Agricultural Recovery Threaten Afghanistan's Stability, GAO-03-607
(Washington, D.C.: June 2003).
[17] OTI works to strengthen the Afghan government's capacity to govern
effectively and accountably; expand citizen and community participation
in decision making; support voices of moderation and peace; and
increase the availability and quality of public information.
[18] In each PRT, a military civil affairs team is responsible for
implementing aid projects.
[19] Policy Brief: Provincial Reconstruction Teams and the Security
Situation in Afghanistan (Kabul: July 24, 2003.) Agency Coordinating
Body for Afghan Relief is a nongovernmental organization coordinating
body in Afghanistan with a membership of 68 international and Afghan
nongovernmental organizations.
[20] Originally, USAID planned to conduct projects in four sectors:
agriculture, education, health, and democracy. However, its priorities
changed over time; the first long-term projects were implemented in the
infrastructure and economic governance sectors.
[21] The first phase of the Kabul-Kandahar highway was inaugurated on
Dec. 16, 2003.
[22] The total length of the highway is 482 kilometers. The Japanese
aid agency repaired an additional 50 kilometers leading into Kandahar.
The remaining 43 kilometers had been repaired under the Taliban.
[23] USAID's teacher training program has two facets: (1) a "master
trainer" seminar for educators, who in turn are expected to educate
other teachers in their vicinity with the new teaching methods, and (2)
a distance-learning curriculum in which teacher classes are broadcast
over the radio. The distance-learning radio shows began broadcasting in
August 2003.
[24] Afghanistan's Minister of Agriculture estimated that the country
needed about 500,000 metric tons of fertilizer for the 2002-2003 crop
year.
[25] Italy is the lead nation for judicial sector reconstruction.
[26] The Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 authorized $15 million
to be appropriated for programs to assist Afghan women and girls.
[27] Under the Taliban regime, girls were not allowed to attend school.
Consequently, many girls are older than the average age for their
education level. The accelerated learning program attempts to bring
them up to speed and reintegrate the girls into regular classroom
settings.
[28] In 2003, USAID and the Department of State began placing staff in
PRTs in part to improve coordination and assist in project selection.
[29] In previous analyses of postconflict assistance efforts, we found
that a strategy that both looks beyond a country's immediate situation
and operationalizes ongoing efforts is essential for effectively
implementing an assistance program. From 1994 to 2004, We have done
extensive work assessing postconflict assistance. Our report, Foreign
Assistance: Observations on Postconflict Assistance in Bosnia, Kosovo,
and Afghanistan, GAO-03-980T (Washington, D.C.: July 18, 2003),
summarizes the broad issues identified and contains a bibliography of
selected postconflict-related reports.
[30] The National Security Strategy, published in September 2002,
broadly presents the United States' core national security objectives
and includes foreign assistance as one of a wide range of initiatives
to achieve these objectives. The latest consolidated Department of
State/USAID strategic plan, published in August 2003, supports the
National Security Strategy, presents worldwide priorities for both
organizations, and includes four broad objectives for Afghanistan.
Country-specific strategies are intended to support the broader goals
contained in the National Security Strategy and Department of State/
USAID strategic plan.
[31] See Afghanistan Freedom Support Act, Title II, Section
206(c)(1)(A). The act also requires that the President semiannually
submit to the congressional committees cited in the act a status report
on the implementation of the strategy.
[32] A mission performance plan is an authoritative, integrated
interagency country strategy document, prepared by the U.S. embassy
country team. Despite the agriculture sector's importance to
Afghanistan's recovery and one of the major sectors targeted by USAID,
the performance plan completed in June 2003 does not address
rehabilitation of Afghanistan's agriculture sector.
[33] All of these components are required in USAID's standard strategic
plans. USAID directives allow the use of interim strategic plans in
countries experiencing high uncertainty because of drastic political,
military, and/or economic events. According to USAID directives, a
strategy should be developed prior to the implementation of assistance
activities. Waivers are available for countries with special foreign
policy interest, are valid for 1 year, and can be renewed annually. See
USAID Guidelines for Strategic Plans (Washington, D.C.: February 1995);
USAID Functional Series 200-Programming Policy Automated Directives
System 201-Planning (Washington, D.C.: January 2003).
[34] Section 201.3.4.5 of the USAID Automated Directives System
provides that in special foreign policy situations where activities
must be initiated prior to completion and approval of a strategic plan,
a temporary 1-year exemption may be issued.
[35] U.S. General Accounting Office, GAO Internal Control: Standards
for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999).
[36] In December 2003, the Department of State began collecting
obligation data from U.S. agencies providing assistance to Afghanistan.
However, Department of State officials acknowledged that the obligation
tracking efforts do not include all U.S. government agencies and are
not updated on a regularly scheduled basis. In addition, the agency
tracks only obligation, not expenditure, data.
[37] According to the UN, assistance coordination refers to a recipient
government's integration of donor assistance into national development
goals and strategies.
[38] United Nations, Immediate and Transitional Assistance Program for
the Afghan People (January 17, 2002).
[39] Consultative group is a World Bank term used to describe a process
of consultations between the government of a recipient developing
nation and the international community. Typically, the process involves
monthly group meetings in country on sectoral or thematic issues. Such
working groups bring together interested parties, including ministry
representatives, donors, nongovernmental organizations, and UN
agencies, to discuss strategic planning and improve coordination.
[40] Additional U.S. efforts to coordinate its assistance with that of
the international community and the Afghan government included the
biweekly humanitarian assistance conference call among relevant Afghan
government, U.S., and international organizations providing
humanitarian assistance and the Department of Defense's Civil Military
Coordination cell located in Kabul. The cell's role is to coordinate
PRT assistance efforts with the Afghan government.
[41] According to the World Bank, of the 52 countries that have
experienced civil conflict since 1960, 44 percent relapsed into
violence within 5 years.
[42] U.S. General Accounting Office, Foreign Assistance: Observations
on Postconflict Assistance in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, GAO-03-
980T (Washington, D.C.: July 18, 2003).
[43] As of July 2003, the International Security Assistance Force
reported having approximately 4,600 troops located in Kabul. These
troops provide security only for the city of Kabul and the immediate
vicinity. The bombing killed 4 soldiers and wounded 29 others.
[44] The Japanese government leads demobilization efforts.
[45] In 2001, the United States estimated that the Taliban collected at
least $40 million in taxes on opium.
[46] Revenue to farmers was estimated at $1.2 billion, while revenue to
traffickers was estimated to be $1.3 billion. Total income from opium
cultivation and trafficking accounted for approximately 40-60 percent
of Afghanistan's gross domestic product and is roughly equal to the
value of Afghanistan's legitimate trade.
[47] Department of State International Narcotics Control Strategy
Report-2003 (Washington, D.C.: March 2004).
[48] On January 17, 2002, the President of Afghanistan issued a decree
stating that the existence of an opium-based economy was a matter of
national security and should be fought by all means. In October 2002,
the Afghan government instituted a Counter-Narcotics Directorate within
its National Security Council to coordinate counternarcotics efforts.
In May 2003, the President of Afghanistan signed a national
counternarcotics strategy.
[49] The United Kingdom is the lead nation for counternarcotics efforts
in Afghanistan. U.S. efforts included several alternative development/
crops projects, including a program intended to restore cotton
production in Helmand province, the traditional center of opium
production in Afghanistan.
[50] U.S. Agency for International Development, Risk Assessment of
Major Activities Managed by USAID/Afghanistan, 5-306-03-001-S (Manila:
USAID, 2003).
[51] U.S. General Accounting Office, Foreign Assistance: Strategic
Workforce Planning Can Help Address Current and Future Challenges, GAO-
03-946 (Washington, D.C.; Aug. 22, 2003).
[52] USAID considers monitoring of its assistance effort critical for
measuring the achievement of program outputs and results.
[53] IOM was established in 1951 as an intergovernmental organization
to resettle European displaced persons, refugees, and migrants. Today
it engages in a variety of migration management activities throughout
the world.
[54] The distance between Hirat and Chaghcharan is approximately 200
miles.
[55] To expedite its program in Afghanistan, USAID obtained waivers
that authorized, among other things, other than fully competitive
procedures for awarding grants and cooperative agreements, and for the
procurement of goods and services. According to USAID documents, these
waivers allowed USAID to award its contracts for infrastructure
reconstruction and economic governance within 5 and 6 weeks,
respectively.
[56] In late March 2003, President Karzai announced that the election
would be postponed until September 2004.
[57] The "Accelerating Success" program provides an extra $1.63
billion, in addition to the regular fiscal 2004 request, and $135
million in drawdown authority provided in the Afghanistan Freedom
Support Act.
[58] The international community at a conference in Dubai pledged
approximately $125 million in new money in late 2003. Consequently, the
United States encouraged other donors to accelerate the rate at which
they give their initial pledges so that the impact of reconstruction
can be felt before Afghanistan's 2004 elections.
[59] Japan assumed responsibility for the remaining 50 kilometers
leading into Kandahar. The remaining 43 kilometers had been repaired
during the Taliban rule.
[60] Afghanistan comprises both settled and nomadic populations,
multiple religious and ethnic groups, and refugees. A new
representative government would need to incorporate all of these
groups.
[61] A loya jirga is a traditional grand assembly of elders, which has
been used in Afghanistan for centuries.
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