Federal Aircraft
Inaccurate Cost Data and Weaknesses in Fleet Management Planning Hamper Cost Effective Operations Gao ID: GAO-04-645 June 18, 2004Federal civilian agencies own and operate a fleet of aging aircraft, many of which may soon need to be replaced. Agencies manage their fleets with help from guidance and policies issued by the General Services Administration (GSA) and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Numerous audit reports have disclosed that agencies lacked accurate cost data and had acquired aircraft without adequate justification. GAO reviewed (1) the composition and costs of the federal aircraft fleet; (2) the systems and controls agencies use to ensure that they effectively and efficiently acquire and manage their aircraft fleets; and (3) the operations, maintenance, safety standards, and safety records for federal aircraft.
GAO could not accurately determine the number of government-owned aircraft and total costs of federal aircraft program operations, because it found that GSA's database was unreliable. Although the database showed federal agencies owned nearly 1,400 aircraft and that agencies reported spending over $700 million to operate and maintain federally-owned and contracted aircraft in fiscal year 2002, GAO found it understated the cost of federal aircraft operations by at least $568 million over the past 3 years. This is because some agencies did not report all the required information. GAO also found there was no requirement for the agencies to report other aircraft costs such as depreciation. The systems and controls GAO reviewed provide limited assurance that agencies are cost effectively acquiring and managing their aircraft fleets. All seven aircraft programs GAO examined failed to implement some key principles of fleet management planning, as outlined in GSA, OMB, and other federal guidance. GAO found that programs did not consistently prepare long-term fleet management plans to identify fleet requirements and aircraft that best meet those requirements. GAO also found that these programs rarely prepared OMB Circular A-76 studies to assess whether the private sector could provide aviation services at a lower cost, and often did not perform cost benefit analyses before acquiring aircraft. Finally, GAO found that programs did not use a full range of aviation metrics to measure and assess the effectiveness of their aircraft operations and rarely prepared OMB Circular A-126 studies to periodically assess the continuing need for their aircraft operations. GAO also found that OMB provides limited oversight over compliance with Circulars A-76 and A-126, leaving it up to each program to determine whether to complete the reviews. Although exempt from many federal safety requirements, federal aircraft programs GAO reviewed developed their own operations, maintenance, and safety standards to help ensure safe operations. However, the use of oversight to evaluate the safety of the programs and help identify potential issues before they become safety problems varied greatly. Two programs that GAO visited subjected themselves to reviews by Federal Aviation Administration inspectors and two others utilized GSA-sponsored safety teams to review their operations. Historically, these GSA-sponsored reviews have found that similar safety issues existed at several programs. These issues included having an insufficient number of instructors to conduct aviation training, lack of a formal general maintenance manual, lack of trained personnel to accomplish assigned missions, and flight crews not thoroughly planning flights. The remaining three programs relied on internal reviews of their operations. GAO also identified 183 accidents and incidents occurring in federally owned or contracted aircraft over the past 9 years that resulted in 91 fatalities. GAO found that most of these were caused by human factors such as pilot error and occurred in contracted aircraft.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-04-645, Federal Aircraft: Inaccurate Cost Data and Weaknesses in Fleet Management Planning Hamper Cost Effective Operations
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
June 2004:
FEDERAL AIRCRAFT:
Inaccurate Cost Data and Weaknesses in Fleet Management Planning Hamper
Cost Effective Operations:
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-645]
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-04-645, a report to congressional requesters
Why GAO Did This Study:
Federal civilian agencies own and operate a fleet of aging aircraft,
many of which may soon need to be replaced. Agencies manage their
fleets with help from guidance and policies issued by the General
Services Administration (GSA) and the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB). Numerous audit reports have disclosed that agencies lacked
accurate cost data and had acquired aircraft without adequate
justification. GAO reviewed (1) the composition and costs of the
federal aircraft fleet; (2) the systems and controls agencies use to
ensure that they effectively and efficiently acquire and manage their
aircraft fleets; and (3) the operations, maintenance, safety
standards, and safety records for federal aircraft.
What GAO Found:
GAO could not accurately determine the number of government-owned
aircraft and total costs of federal aircraft program operations,
because it found that GSA‘s database was unreliable. Although the
database showed federal agencies owned nearly 1,400 aircraft and that
agencies reported spending over $700 million to operate and maintain
federally-owned and contracted aircraft in fiscal year 2002, GAO found
it understated the cost of federal aircraft operations by at least $568
million over the past 3 years. This is because some agencies did not
report all the required information. GAO also found there was no
requirement for the agencies to report other aircraft costs such as
depreciation.
The systems and controls GAO reviewed provide limited assurance that
agencies are cost effectively acquiring and managing their aircraft
fleets. All seven aircraft programs GAO examined failed to implement
some key principles of fleet management planning, as outlined in GSA,
OMB, and other federal guidance. GAO found that programs did not
consistently prepare long-term fleet management plans to identify fleet
requirements and aircraft that best meet those requirements. GAO also
found that these programs rarely prepared OMB Circular A-76 studies to
assess whether the private sector could provide aviation services at a
lower cost, and often did not perform cost benefit analyses before
acquiring aircraft. Finally, GAO found that programs did not use a full
range of aviation metrics to measure and assess the effectiveness of
their aircraft operations and rarely prepared OMB Circular A-126
studies to periodically assess the continuing need for their aircraft
operations. GAO also found that OMB provides limited oversight over
compliance with Circulars A-76 and A-126, leaving it up to each program
to determine whether to complete the reviews.
Although exempt from many federal safety requirements, federal
aircraft programs GAO reviewed developed their own operations,
maintenance, and safety standards to help ensure safe operations.
However, the use of oversight to evaluate the safety of the programs
and help identify potential issues before they become safety problems
varied greatly. Two programs that GAO visited subjected themselves to
reviews by Federal Aviation Administration inspectors and two others
utilized GSA-sponsored safety teams to review their operations.
Historically, these GSA-sponsored reviews have found that similar
safety issues existed at several programs. These issues included having
an insufficient number of instructors to conduct aviation training,
lack of a formal general maintenance manual, lack of trained personnel
to accomplish assigned missions, and flight crews not thoroughly
planning flights. The remaining three programs relied on internal
reviews of their operations. GAO also identified 183 accidents and
incidents occurring in federally owned or contracted aircraft over the
past 9 years that resulted in 91 fatalities. GAO found that most of
these were caused by human factors such as pilot error and occurred in
contracted aircraft.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that GSA strengthen the accuracy and reliability of
data in the federal aircraft database, help programs develop more cost-
effective fleet management planning systems, and assist programs in
strengthening the safety oversight of their operations. GAO also
recommends that OMB review and clarify its guidance for cost
effectively acquiring and managing government aircraft. Departments of
Agriculture, Energy, Interior, Justice, Transportation, GSA and OMB
commented on a draft of this report; in general, they agreed with GAO‘s
findings and recommendations.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-645.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact JayEtta Hecker, at (202)
512-2834 or heckerj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Total Federal Aircraft Operating and Maintenance Costs Are Unknown
Because Existing Data Are Incomplete and Inaccurate:
Federal Aircraft Programs Lack Comprehensive Systems to Ensure Cost-
effective Acquisition and Fleet Management Decisions:
Federal Aircraft Programs Have Developed Operational and Safety
Standards, but Oversight Is Voluntary and Varied:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Federal Aircraft Fleet Information:
Appendix III: Review of FAIRS Internal Controls:
Appendix IV: Federal Aviation Administration, Flight Inspection
Program:
Appendix V: Department of Justice, Justice Prisoner and Alien
Transportation System:
Appendix VI: Department of Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service:
Appendix VII: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service Aircraft
Program:
Appendix VIII: Federal Aviation Administration, Hangar 6 Program:
Appendix IX: Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration:
Appendix X: Department of State, International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Program:
Appendix XI: Comments from the General Services Administration:
Appendix XII: Comments from the Department of Justice:
Appendix XIII: Comments from the Department of Agriculture:
Appendix XIV: Comments from the Department of the Interior:
Appendix XV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: FAIRS Data Problems for Major Aircraft Programs, Fiscal Years
2000 through 2002:
Table 2: Analysis of Internal Controls for the FAIRS System:
Table 3: Causes and Contributing Factors to the 183 Federal Aircraft
Accidents and Incidents, April 1995 - October 2003:
Table 4: Number of Aircraft Owned by Federal Agencies, Fiscal Years
2000-2002:
Table 5: Average Age of Federal Aircraft by Agency, Fiscal Year 2002
(in years):
Table 6: Total Flight Hours of Aircraft Owned by Federal Agencies,
Fiscal Years 2000-2002:
Table 7: Total Cost of Federal Aircraft Programs, Fleet Aircraft and
Commercial Aviation Services Fiscal Years 2000-2002:
Table 8: Cost of Federal Aircraft, Fiscal Years 2000-2002:
Table 9: Cost of Commercial Aviation Services, Fiscal Years 2000-2002:
Table 10: Analysis of Data Stewardship Controls:
Table 11: Analysis of Systems Controls:
Table 12: Cost and Utilization of Flight Inspection Aircraft, Fiscal
Years 2000-2002:
Table 13: Documentation Supporting Four Flight Inspection Aircraft
Acquisitions:
Table 14: Cost and Utilization JPATS Aircraft and Commercial Aviation
Services, Fiscal Years 2000-2002:
Table 15: Documentation Supporting Four JPATS Aircraft Acquisitions:
Table 16: Cost and Flight Hours FWS Aircraft and Commercial Aviation
Services, Fiscal Years 2000-2002:
Table 17: Documentation Supporting Four FWS Aircraft Acquisitions:
Table 18: Causes and Contributing Factors of U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service Aircraft Accidents:
Table 19: Cost and Flight Hours USDA Forest Service Aircraft and
Commercial Aviation Services, Fiscal Years 2000-2002:
Table 20: Documentation Supporting Four USDA Forest Service Aircraft
Acquisitions:
Table 21: Causes and Contributing Factors of USDA Forest Service
Aircraft Accidents:
Table 22: Cost and Utilization of Hangar 6 Aircraft, Fiscal Years 2000-
2002:
Table 23: Documentation Supporting Acquisition of Current and Recently
Disposed Hangar 6 Aircraft:
Table 24: Cost and Utilization of DEA Aircraft, Fiscal Years 2000-2002:
Table 25: Documentation Supporting 6 DEA Aircraft Acquisitions:
Table 26: Cost and Flight Hours INL/A Aircraft, Fiscal Years 2000-2002:
Table 27: Documentation Supporting Four Recent INL/A Aircraft
Acquisitions:
Table 28: Causes and Contributing Factors of the Bureau of
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Aircraft Accidents:
Figures:
Figure 1: Aviation Fleet Management Planning Process:
Figure 2: Implementation of Key Fleet Management Planning Principles:
Figure 3: Federal Fatal and Nonfatal Accidents and Incidents, April
1995 - October 2003:
Figure 4: Classification of Accidents and Incidents by Mission April
1995 - October 2003:
Figure 5: Classification of Accidents and Incidents by Aircraft Owner:
Figure 6: Types of Aircraft Owned by Federal Agencies, Fiscal Year
2002:
Figure 7: Age of Federal Aircraft in Fiscal Year 2002:
Figure 8: Hierarchy of Criteria Used to Review Controls over GSA's
FAIRS
System:
Figure 9: U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Aircraft Accidents, April 1995
- October 2003:
Figure 10: USDA Forest Service Aircraft Accidents, April 1995 - October
2003:
Figure 11: Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs Accidents, April 1995 - October 2003:
Abbreviations:
AMD: Aviation Management Directorate:
ARMS: Aviation Resource Management Survey:
ARO: Aviation Resident Offices:
AVN: Aviation Systems Standards:
BICE: Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement:
BOP: Bureau of Prisons:
CAS: Commercial Aviation Services:
DEA: Drug Enforcement Administration:
DOE: Department of Energy:
DOI: Department of the Interior:
DOJ: Department of Justice:
DOS: Department of State:
DOT: Department of Transportation:
FAA: Federal Aviation Administration:
FAIRS: Federal Aviation Interactive Reporting System:
FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation:
FWS: U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service:
GSA: General Services Administration:
ICAP: Interagency Committee for Aviation Policy:
INL/A: Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
Office of Aviation:
IPT: Integrated Product Team:
JPATS: Justice Prisoner and Alien Transportation System:
JRC: Joint Resources Council:
MOA: memorandum of agreement:
NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration:
NTSB: National Transportation Safety Board:
OA: Aviation Division:
OMB: Office of Management and Budget:
USDA: United States Department of Agriculture:
Letter June 18, 2004:
The Honorable Susan M. Collins, Chairwoman:
Committee on Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Russell D. Feingold:
United States Senate:
Federal civilian agencies own and operate a fleet of aging aircraft,
many of which are well past the age when aircraft become increasingly
unreliable, more costly to operate and maintain, and potentially
unsafe. These agencies' programs have historically reported spending
several hundred million dollars each year on government-owned and
leased or contracted aircraft obtained from the private sector to
perform important and sometimes dangerous missions, such as aerial
firefighting, illicit drug eradication, and wildlife control. Since
1977, numerous audit reports and studies have repeatedly disclosed that
the programs lacked accurate information on aircraft costs,
inappropriately used aircraft for nonmission activities, and spent
millions of dollars acquiring aircraft without adequate justification.
Additionally, studies have disclosed that federal government aircraft
operations are exempted from many of the safety regulations applicable
to commercial aircraft and that these operations are not subject to
most aspects of Federal Aviation Administration oversight. The safety
of federal government aircraft operations drew national attention in
the summer of 2002 when the wings of two aircraft under contract to the
U.S. Department of Agriculture's Forest Service fell off in midflight,
causing both aircraft to crash and kill a total of five crewmembers.
You asked us to assess the oversight and management of federal
agencies' aircraft programs by providing information on (1) the
composition of the federal aircraft fleet and how much it costs to
operate and maintain; (2) the extent to which federal agencies have
systems and controls in place to ensure that they are effectively and
efficiently acquiring and managing their aircraft fleets; and (3) the
operations, maintenance, safety standards, and safety records for the
federal aircraft fleet. In conducting this review, we analyzed fleet
data that the General Services Administration (GSA) centrally collects
and maintains for both federal civilian aircraft and for aircraft and
related services supplied by the private sector.[Footnote 1] We also
assessed the internal controls and reliability of this data to
determine whether they contain accurate information about the fleet of
aircraft and the costs to operate and maintain it. We found information
in the database was not sufficiently complete and accurate to determine
the composition and cost of federal aircraft programs, however, we used
the information to provide descriptive information and summary
statistics to show the relative magnitude of the federal programs.
To obtain information on the systems and controls for acquiring and
managing aircraft fleets, we selected seven programs in five agencies
for review. According to GSA's data at the time we began our review:
these agencies owned over 70 percent of federal civilian aircraft used
for federal missions and accounted for over 85 percent of federal
aircraft program costs. For each of the seven aircraft programs we
selected we reviewed the systems and controls they were currently using
to help ensure they acquire and manage their aircraft cost effectively
and operate and maintain their aircraft safely. The seven programs were
the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Forest Service (USDA Forest
Service), the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) in the Department of
the Interior (DOI), the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the
Justice Prisoner and Alien Transportation System (JPATS) in the
Department of Justice (DOJ), the Bureau for International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement Affairs Office of Aviation (INL/A) in the Department of
State (DOS), and the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) Flight
Inspection and Washington Flight Program (Hangar 6) in the Department
of Transportation (DOT). The seven programs we selected were some that
had the greatest number of aircraft, historically incurred the most
costs, or covered a wide variety of aviation missions. We selected four
to six aircraft in each program and asked program officials to provide
documentation to support their acquisition decisions. In judgmentally
selecting these aircraft we considered such factors as whether the
aircraft were airplanes or helicopters, the make and model of the
aircraft, and the date the program acquired the aircraft. We also
reviewed and analyzed data on accidents that occurred between April
1995 through October 2003 contained in the National Transportation
Safety Board's (NTSB) aviation accident database. Based on interviews
with NTSB officials and testing of the data, we determined that the
data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. More
information on our scope and methodology is contained in appendix I. We
conducted our work from February 2003 through May 2004 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Results in Brief:
We were unable to accurately determine the composition and costs of the
federal aircraft fleet because we found the governmentwide aircraft
database maintained by GSA to be unreliable because it was incomplete
and inaccurate. According to this database, the federal fleet consisted
of about 1,400 aircraft, and federal programs reported spending about
$290 million in fiscal year 2002 in operations and maintenance costs
for their fleet aircraft. It also showed that programs reported
spending an additional $416 million on aviation services such as
aircraft contracted from the private sector. However, on the basis of
our review of the database and more detailed reviews of select aircraft
programs, we estimated that, at a minimum, the database likely
understates total program costs by at least $568 million over the
period 2000 through 2002, or an average of about $190 million per year.
The database understates the cost of the federal aircraft fleet because
some programs did not report all the required costs. For example, we
identified instances where programs had not reported any costs for
their aircraft and did not report costs for fuel or pilot salaries. We
also found four federally owned aircraft that were not included in the
database. In addition, we identified additional costs that programs are
not required to report that we believe would make the cost data more
complete and accurate. For example, requiring programs to report
depreciation, self-insurance, and financing costs would provide a more
complete view of the costs associated with operating the federal
aircraft fleet. Further, we determined that a number of internal
controls on the database system were missing, and other controls did
not always function effectively, which may have allowed invalid data to
be recorded.
Systems and controls for the federal aircraft programs we reviewed
provide limited assurance that agencies are cost effectively acquiring
and managing their aircraft fleets. We found that programs we reviewed
did not consistently implement federal fleet management guidance to (1)
determine program mission and flight hour requirements and the number
and type of aircraft needed over the long term, (2) ensure that they
acquired the appropriate aircraft at the least possible cost, and (3)
track key aviation information regarding aircraft performance, such as
whether an aircraft is available when needed. We found that only two of
the seven programs we reviewed had identified their long-term aviation
requirements and determined the most effective mix of aircraft to meet
these needs. In addition, although the programs we reviewed generally
had processes in place for making decisions on acquiring aircraft, they
did not always use the available tools to assist them in making their
decisions. For example, under certain circumstances, the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB), pursuant to OMB Circular A-76, requires
programs to conduct an analysis to determine if the private sector
could provide the services at a lower cost. However, we found that
programs conducted this analysis for only 3 of the 28 aircraft we
examined. In general, program officials said they did not do so because
they consider their operations to be inherently governmental in nature
and not subject to that requirement. OMB staff stated they do not
independently validate these decisions and allow aircraft program
managers to determine when they should complete A-76 reviews. In
addition, cost benefit analyses, which are useful in helping to
determine the most cost-effective aircraft model to acquire were not
regularly conducted. Although each of the programs we reviewed tracked
aspects of aircraft performance, such as whether their aircraft are
available when needed, the information tracked did not include a full
range of statistical information to assess their aircrafts'
performance. Additionally, six of the seven programs did not prepare
periodic OMB Circular A-126 reviews of the continuing needs of their
fleets. Similar to the A-76 required reviews, OMB staff stated they do
not ensure that programs complete these reviews; rather, they leave it
up to each program to determine whether or not they are needed.
The seven programs we reviewed required their aircraft operations to
comply, at a minimum, with the FAA basic rules governing all civil
flight operations and developed operations, maintenance, and safety
standards specific to their aircraft programs to help ensure safe
operations. These standards address, for example, operational issues
associated with pilot qualifications and training requirements; the
need for a maintenance inspection program and a means of tracking
maintenance actions; and the need for safety guidelines and minimum
flight crew requirements. In addition, some of the programs developed
standards significantly above the minimum applicable FAA requirements
and required compliance with portions of the more restrictive FAA civil
aircraft regulations. One area where we found considerable differences
among the programs was in the use of oversight. For example, the two
FAA programs we reviewed were subjected to the same level of inspection
that FAA requires of civil operations. Two other programs subjected
themselves to external oversight of their operations by the GSA-
sponsored Interagency Committee on Aviation Policy, and the remaining
three programs subjected themselves to internal reviews. Although
programs have taken these steps to mitigate the risks of their
dangerous missions, the operations have resulted in some accidents or
incidents.[Footnote 2] Our review of safety data for all federal
programs found 183 accidents and incidents involving federally owned,
operated, or contracted aircraft between April 1995 and October 2003
that resulted in 91 fatalities. Our review of accident reports for
these accidents found that most accidents (1) were caused by human
factors such as pilot error, (2) occurred during dangerous missions
such as fire suppression and complex training maneuvers, and (3)
occurred in contracted aircraft.
This report includes recommendations to the Administrator, General
Services Administration, and the Director, Office of Management and
Budget, to strengthen the accuracy and completeness of data in the
federal aircraft database, to help agencies improve fleet management
and aircraft acquisition decisions, and to help agencies strengthen the
safety oversight of their operations. We received written and oral
comments on a draft of this report from the Departments of Agriculture,
Energy, Interior, Justice, and Transportation, and the General Services
Administration and the Office of Management and Budget; in general the
agencies concurred with our findings and recommendations.
Background:
Federal civilian agencies have aircraft programs that utilize a wide
variety of aircraft, ranging from helicopters to large jet airliners to
accomplish their missions. These programs use aircraft that they own
and aircraft they obtain from the private sector through commercial
aviation service contracts to perform activities such as aerial
firefighting, illicit drug eradication, and passenger transportation.
The individual agencies and their programs are responsible and
accountable for aircraft acquisition, management, use, cost accounting,
and safety. Although the agencies and programs have independent
responsibility and accountability for managing their programs, OMB and
GSA provide guidance and regulations for the agencies to follow.
OMB has issued two circulars that directly affect the management of
agency aircraft programs. Circular A-126 provides the basic guidance
for management of aircraft programs and for travel on government
aircraft.[Footnote 3] The purpose of Circular A-126 is to minimize cost
and improve the management and use of government aviation resources.
The circular prescribes policies for acquiring, managing, using,
accounting for the costs of, and disposing of aircraft. According to
the circular, agencies should not have more aircraft than they need to
fulfill their mission, and they should periodically review the cost
effectiveness of their entire fleet of owned aircraft. The circular
also instructs agencies to comply with Circular A-76 before purchasing,
leasing, or otherwise acquiring aircraft. Circular A-76 establishes
policy for the competition of commercial activities, including the use
of aircraft.[Footnote 4] The circular provides guidance for use in
preparing cost comparisons involving the provision of aircraft or
aviation support services with agency-owned resources or through the
private sector. The purpose of the comparison is to ensure that
aviation services cannot be obtained from the private sector more cost
effectively. It also states that agencies should consider that,
although an activity may be inherently governmental, the tools needed
to perform the activity are not necessarily inherently governmental.
OMB Circular A-126 also sets out responsibilities for GSA regarding
aircraft management. Under the circular, GSA:
* maintains an office to coordinate policy for federal aircraft
management;
* develops generic federal aircraft information system standards;
* identifies ways to acquire, manage, and dispose of aircraft in a
cost-effective manner;
* assists agencies in establishing systems to comply with cost
accounting and cost analyses requirements; and:
* reviews agencies' internal policies for compliance with OMB guidance.
In implementing the circular, GSA employs a small group of individuals
to help it establish governmentwide policy on the operation of aircraft
by the federal government--including policies for managing the
acquisition, use, and disposal of aircraft that the agencies own or
hire. GSA publishes its regulatory policies in the Code of Federal
Regulations (C.F.R.).[Footnote 5] GSA also established the Interagency
Committee for Aviation Policy (ICAP) as a working group to advise it in
developing or changing aircraft policies and information requirements.
Under GSA's direction, ICAP has established several subcommittees,
comprising representatives from the various aircraft programs, which
work on regulatory, data management, aircraft acquisition, and safety
issues. GSA, in conjunction with ICAP, also publishes a number of other
guides and manuals to help agencies manage the acquisition, use, and
disposal of their aircraft. These publications include the U.S.
Government Aircraft Cost Accounting Guide, which contains information
on how agencies should account for aircraft costs; the Fleet
Modernization Planning Guide, which aids programs in developing cost-
effective fleet replacement plans; and the Safety Standards Guidelines
for Federal Flight Programs, which agencies can use to help create
their own agency-specific safety standards and operations and
maintenance manuals.
In addition to establishing governmentwide aircraft policy, OMB
Circular A-126 requires GSA to maintain a system to track aircraft cost
and usage data. GSA deployed the Federal Aviation Interactive Reporting
System (FAIRS) in April 2000 in an attempt to improve upon the
shortcomings of a previous data system. The FAIRS system replaced the
Federal Aviation Management Information System that was antiquated and
had limited data collection and analysis capabilities. All civilian
federal agencies that own or hire aircraft must report data into the
FAIRS system. FAIRS is an Internet-based system that is accessed
through a secure Web site. Each individual agency is responsible for
entering the data into FAIRS, and GSA is responsible for developing,
operating, and maintaining the computer-based system itself. GSA uses
the data contained in the FAIRS system to prepare its annual report on
the status of federal government aircraft, which includes information
on the costs and use of the aircraft fleet. The most recent report for
the period of this study details fiscal year 2002 operations.[Footnote
6]
When federal agencies use aircraft to carry out their missions, the
aircraft are generally flown as "public use" aircraft and are exempted
from many FAA regulatory requirements that are applicable to "civil
use" aircraft. Although all aircraft operations must follow applicable
sections of 14 C.F.R. Part 91, which sets out basic rules governing all
flight operations, public aircraft operators do not have to comply with
FAA safety regulations, including maintenance rules and pilot
certification standards. Therefore, the federal agencies have sole
responsibility for providing the safety oversight of those operations.
The definition of what constitutes a public use operation has been
modified over the years, but public use operations include, but are not
limited to, law enforcement, firefighting, search and rescue,
biological or geological resource management, and aeronautical
research. When agencies use aircraft for nonmission purposes such as
passenger transportation, they are no longer considered to be public
use and FAA subjects the federal aircraft programs to the same
operations, maintenance, and safety standards as those that apply to
civil operators.
Total Federal Aircraft Operating and Maintenance Costs Are Unknown
Because Existing Data Are Incomplete and Inaccurate:
We were unable to accurately determine the composition and costs of the
federal aircraft fleet because there is no reliable central source of
this information. Although GSA maintains a governmentwide aircraft
database, we found this information to be incomplete and inaccurate.
GSA's FAIRS system showed that in fiscal year 2002, the federal
government owned about 1,400 aircraft and, including the cost of
aviation services obtained through the private sector, reported
spending about $706 million to operate and maintain federal aircraft
programs.[Footnote 7] However, according to the results of our
analysis, GSA's management controls do not provide reasonable assurance
that the FAIRS system provides an accurate accounting of the
composition and cost of the federal aircraft fleet, which calls into
question the information published in GSA's annual report. Our review
of the FAIRS data showed that the data are incomplete and inaccurate
because several agencies did not accurately report all of the costs
captured by FAIRS and did not report all aircraft to FAIRS. As a result
of these shortcomings, we found that GSA's annual reports on the cost
of federal aircraft programs likely understate total program costs by
at least $568.7 million over the period fiscal year 2000 through fiscal
year 2002, or an average of about $190 million per year. In addition,
agencies are not required to report some costs, such as depreciation
and financing costs, which further understates total aircraft program
costs, and some of the data reliability controls directed at ensuring
that the FAIRS data are sound were not working as designed.
Agencies Reported Incomplete or Inaccurate Information:
On the basis of our analysis of the data contained within the FAIRS
system and information obtained from the seven programs we reviewed, we
found that agencies reported incomplete or inaccurate information.
Reasons they did not report certain information included not
understanding the FAIRS reporting requirements, finding no compelling
reason to report, and agency mistakes resulting in some missing
information. Table 1 summarizes the results of our analysis of the data
contained within the FAIRS system.
Table 1: FAIRS Data Problems for Major Aircraft Programs, Fiscal Years
2000 through 2002:
Dollars in millions.
Department of Agriculture (USDA Forest Service): Problems identified/
status: Forest Service-provided data exceeds FAIRS data for fiscal
years (FY) 2000 - 2002. FAIRS aircraft program costs understated;
2000: $16.5;
2001: $30.3;
2002: $39.4.
Department of Agriculture (USDA Forest Service): Problems identified/
status: USDA Forest Service overstated Commercial Aviation Services
(CAS) hours by about 4,000. However, cost data did not change so there
was no impact on total program costs;
2000: None;
2001: None;
2002: None.
Department of Justice: Problems identified/status: JPATS costs
understated. JPATS reported $52.8 million in FY 2000, $67.4 million in
FY 2001, and $49.5 million in FY 2002 to FAIRS. JPATS officials stated
that the agency's program costs were $78.4 million in FY 2000, $78.0
million in FY 2001, and $72.4 million in FY 2002. Aircraft program
costs understated;
2000: $25.6;
2001: $10.6;
2002: $22.9.
Department of Justice: Problems identified/status: DEA did not report
costs or hours associated with aircraft leased through a private
contractor. Aircraft were flown by DEA pilots. DEA officials estimated
that the program spent about $2 million per year for the use of these
aircraft. Aircraft program costs understated;
2000: $2.0;
2001: $2.0;
2002: $2.0.
Department of Justice: Problems identified/status: Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) did not report for certain aircraft. Impact on
total program costs unknown. All aircraft conduct sensitive missions
and FAIRS data is restricted to FBI use only. Total aircraft program
costs understated;
2000: Unknown;
2001: Unknown;
2002: Unknown.
Department of the Interior: Problems identified/status: Three DOI
aircraft not included in inventory. DOI officials stated that they do
not include the three aircraft because they perform undercover
operations. DOI continues to exclude the aircraft from FAIRS. Aircraft
program costs understated;
2000: $0.1;
2001: $0.1;
2002: $0.1.
Department of the Interior: Problems identified/status: DOI does not
report cost of pilots when they perform a dual role on the flight
(e.g., serve as a biologist in addition to piloting the aircraft).
Total aircraft program costs understated;
2000: Unknown;
2001: Unknown;
2002: Unknown.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration: Problems identified/
status: One National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
Gulfstream aircraft not reported in inventory. Aircraft recently added
to fleet inventory. FAA operates aircraft and is required to report
cost and hour data. Federal aircraft fleet understated by one aircraft;
2000: None;
2001: None;
2002: None.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration: Problems identified/
status: No cost data reported for FY 2002. In FYs 2000 and 2001 NASA
reported between $75.5 million and $79.3 million respectively. GSA
officials working with NASA to comply with FAIRS reporting
requirements. Aircraft program costs understated by an estimated $75 to
$80 million in FY 2002;
2000: None;
2001: None;
2002: $75.0.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration: Problems identified/
status: Many reported costs averaged across aircraft. Analysis of NASA
aircraft and complete FAIRS inventory by cost category not meaningful.
No impact on total program costs;
2000: None;
2001: None;
2002: None.
National Science Foundation: Problems identified/status: FAIRS
reporting for FYs 2001 and 2002 are incomplete. Agency reported
inconsistent data across years. Aircraft program costs understated for
FYs 2001 and 2002;
2000: Unknown;
2001: Unknown;
2002: Unknown.
National Science Foundation: Problems identified/status: Crew costs
not reported (aircraft flown by military crews.) Total aircraft
program costs understated;
2000: Unknown;
2001: Unknown;
2002: Unknown.
Department of State: Problems identified/status: No cost data reported
for FY 2001;
FY 2002 data understated. In FYs 2000 and 2002, agency reported $20.7
million and $91.7 million respectively. Agency officials estimated that
program costs were $150 to $180 million per year. Aircraft program
costs understated by between $58 and $150 million per year;
2000: $129.3;
2001: $150.0;
2002: $58.3.
Department of State: Problems identified/status: Cost data for FYs
2000 and 2002 inconsistently reported. Results in unreliable cost
category analysis. No impact on total program cost;
2000: None;
2001: None;
2002: None.
Department of State: Problems identified/status: Numerous costs not
reported to FAIRS. Costs of fuel, chemicals, salaries, and overhead are
not reported. Agency officials stated that only costs directly
associated with aircraft are reported. Total aircraft program costs
understated (impact captured above.);
2000: Unknown;
2001: Unknown;
2002: Unknown.
Department of Transportation: Problems identified/status: FAA did not
report cost or hours for NASA Gulfstream aircraft. (The aircraft had
been missing from the inventory, and was recently added.) GSA officials
stated that FAA would report costs and hours for FY 2003. Aircraft
program costs understated;
2000: $1.5;
2001: $1.5;
2002: $1.5.
Overall FAIRS data: Problems identified/status: Number of aircraft
understated. GSA and program officials compared FAIRS inventory
information to agency data and discovered 65 aircraft that should have
been included in FAIRS. Many of the aircraft identified were classified
as nonoperational. Magnitude of impact on cost and hour data unknown,
but likely understated;
2000: Unknown;
2001: Unknown;
2002: Unknown.
Minimum total estimated understatement[A];
2000: $175.0;
2001: $194.5;
2002: $199.2.
FAIRS reported costs;
2000: $661.5;
2001: $613.1;
2002: $705.6.
Minimum percentage understated;
2000: 26%;
2001: 32%;
2002: 28%.
Source: GAO analysis of FAIRS data.
[A] Our analysis showed that this amount represents the minimum amount
that FAIRS data are understated.
[End of table]
In addition to our findings of incomplete or inaccurate information
being reported, in January 2004, GSA and the agencies reviewed the
aircraft contained in the FAIRS database and found that numerous
aircraft were missing from the database. According to GSA, agencies
found that a number of aircraft were assigned erroneously within and
among agencies and that a number of aircraft, particularly
nonoperational aircraft, were not recorded in FAIRS. According to
preliminary fiscal year 2003 data, GSA and the agencies discovered an
additional 65 aircraft that were not included in the FAIRS inventory
(not including the three DOI aircraft that remain missing from the
inventory.)
Agencies Are Not Required to Report Some Important Costs:
Our review of the FAIRS data requirements for aircraft programs found
that the system does not capture several cost elements that directly
relate to the costs of operating aircraft programs. OMB Circulars A-126
and A-76 and GSA's cost accounting guidelines recognize costs such as
depreciation, self-insurance, and financing costs as important costs of
acquiring and operating aircraft and require programs to include them
when preparing various cost analyses. However, FAIRS has made no
provision that programs identify and report these costs because GSA
designed FAIRS to capture only the day-to-day costs associated with
operating aircraft.
The impact of not capturing these costs can potentially represent a
significant annual expense that is not included in GSA's annual report
on the aircraft program costs. For example, generally accepted
accounting principles recognize depreciation as a "cost of doing
business"--a way to recoup the value of an asset as it is consumed. In
this way, the organization can capitalize the lost value of an asset in
planning its future replacement. Given the age and diverse nature of
the federal aircraft fleet, it is not possible to determine the total
amount of annual depreciation that would be reported to FAIRS. However,
given the size and value of the fleet, it could represent a significant
annual expense. For example, in 2002, a contractor estimated that it
could cost JPATS about $117 million to purchase a fleet of seven used
large transport aircraft. The depreciation expense of this fleet could
total several million dollars per year over the anticipated 10 years
that JPATS plans to use these aircraft.
We also found that GSA's cost accounting guidelines do not require that
agencies report the costs associated with self-insurance. Aviation
activity involves risks and potential casualty losses and liability
claims. These risks are normally covered in the private sector through
the purchase of an insurance policy. The government is self-insuring;
the Treasury's general fund is charged for losses and liability claims.
Circular A-76 requires agencies to include a self-insurance cost when
performing A-76 calculations. Finally, the costs associated with
financing are not captured. For the purpose of capturing finance costs,
OMB instructs agencies to use the borrowing rate announced by the
Department of the Treasury for bonds or notes whose maturities
correspond to the useful life of the asset.
FAIRS Data Reliability Controls Could Be Improved:
In developing the FAIRS system, GSA implemented a number of data
reliability controls and issued guidance designed to help ensure that
FAIRS data are complete and accurate. Some of these controls are
specific controls built into the FAIRS system. Others relate to GSA's
role as a "central data steward"--a central agency that collects and
reports aircraft program data. GSA has a responsibility to provide the
most accurate information possible. We tested a number of the controls
that GSA employs and found some to be effective or partially effective
and some ineffective or missing. Table 2 summarizes our review of both
existing and missing internal controls that apply to the FAIRS system
and GSA's responsibility as a data steward.
Table 2: Analysis of Internal Controls for the FAIRS System:
FAIRS systems controls: Effective controls: Only agency-authorized and
GSA-trained persons can access FAIRS;
Partially effective controls: Triggers prevent improper entry, review,
correction, or approval of aircraft inventory, cost, and use data;
Ineffective controls: Only the FAIRS administrator should be able to
change approved inventory data;
Missing controls: FAIRS should not allow a reviewer to enter new
aircraft inventory or cost and use data.
FAIRS systems controls: Effective controls: Triggers allow only an
agency-authorized user to enter new or correct disapproved data;
Ineffective controls: Only agency-authorized reviewer should be able to
mark CAS cost and use data as approved;
Missing controls: FAIRS should not allow negative aircraft cost and
use data to be accepted.
FAIRS systems controls: Effective controls: Triggers allow only records
without errors on aircraft cost and use data to be uploaded via batch
processing;
Ineffective controls: Approved CAS cost and use data should only be
changed with the assistance of the FAIRS administrator;
Missing controls: Users should not be able to enter a disposal date
that is prior to the acquisition date for an aircraft.
FAIRS systems controls: Effective controls: Only agency-authorized
reviewer can review and mark aircraft cost and use data as approved;
Missing controls: Use data entered should not be greater than the
maximum number of hours available for the reporting period.
FAIRS systems controls: Effective controls: Approved federal aircraft
cost and use data can only be changed with the assistance of the FAIRS
administrator.
FAIRS systems controls: Effective controls: Status automatically
changes to awaiting review or system accepted, not reviewed after
specific time frames.
FAIRS systems controls: Effective controls: Control access to report
and data in FAIRS and make corrections as proposed by agencies.
Data stewardship controls: Effective controls: Provide agencies with
guidance on data requirements including the Cost Accounting Guide and
the FAIRS Users Manual;
Partially effective controls: Provide technical assistance to agencies
in establishing their cost accounting systems;
Missing controls: GSA should foster the concept of full costing for
agencies' cost accounting systems.
Data stewardship controls: Effective controls: Provide draft of annual
report to agencies for comment and proposed changes;
Partially effective controls: Require agencies to use prescribed data
elements for reporting aircraft cost data;
Missing controls: GSA should check agencies' cost accounting systems
for compliance with the Cost Accounting Guide.
Data stewardship controls: Partially effective controls: Verify that
aircraft cost and use data collected from agencies are in compliance
with reporting requirements;
Missing controls: GSA should routinely check data agencies report to
FAIRS for completeness and accuracy.
Data stewardship controls: Partially effective controls: Establish
data entry and approval procedures and edit checks to promote validity
and reliability of data;
Missing controls: GSA should ensure periodic audit coverage by the
Office of Inspector General or internal auditors to promote quality of
aircraft data.
Data stewardship controls: Partially effective controls: Systematically
perform analytical reviews of cost and use data reported to FAIRS;
Missing controls: GSA should ensure that changes to prior periods and
annual report are disclosed in subsequent reports.
Sources: GAO analysis of FAIRS internal controls and GSA aircraft
program guidance.
[End of table]
Appendix III contains additional information on the criteria we used to
analyze GSA's controls over data reliability and the results of that
analysis.
Our review found that the system effectively ensured that only agency-
designated personnel had access to the agency's data. Alternatively, we
found that the control designed to ensure that each aircraft entered
has a unique inventory code assigned to it that allows each aircraft in
the database to be differentiated was not functioning properly at the
time of our test. The control is designed to ensure that once entered
and approved, the data cannot be changed without the use of approved
approaches. During our tests we created a new aircraft record, approved
the data, and were able to change the information. GSA officials stated
that they have taken steps to correct the malfunctioning controls and
have a continuing agreement with Computer Sciences Corporation, the
FAIRS contractor to establish additional controls for the FAIRS system.
Our review also found that although the internal controls currently
available in the system are fairly robust, a number of the controls
were missing, and other controls did not always function effectively.
As a result, the controls as a whole could not ensure that the data
contained in the system are complete and accurate. For example, we
found that GSA did not routinely audit the agency-generated data to
help ensure that all aircraft and related costs and flight hours that
should be reported to FAIRS were included. In addition, we found that
GSA does not check agencies' compliance with the Cost Accounting Guide
or conduct oversight of agencies' cost accounting systems to compare
the data in these systems with the data reported to FAIRS. Some
agencies ask GSA for advice on policies and the operation of their cost
accounting systems, and GSA provides the assistance when requested. A
GSA official stated that the agency has the responsibility to develop
policies and provide consultation to agencies that report to FAIRS, but
it lacks the resources necessary to ensure that the agencies completely
and accurately report. The official added that he would prefer
additional resources to oversee the agencies reporting information into
FAIRS but also said that it would be more effective for the agencies to
routinely audit the aircraft and related cost and use data that they
report.
GSA is responsible for collecting information on the federal
government's use of aircraft and issues an annual report that provides
information on the composition of the federal fleet and the costs that
agencies incur in conducting aircraft operations. GSA helps agencies to
identify, compile, analyze, and report aircraft program data but does
not have systematic oversight of the agencies' cost accounting systems-
-the primary source for the cost data that GSA collects. As the central
agency that collects and reports aircraft program data, GSA has a
responsibility to provide the most accurate information possible. The
Joint Financial Management Improvement Program's Framework for Federal
Financial Management Systems identifies GSA as a "central data steward"
with responsibility to ensure that the data used to support
governmentwide managerial functions and reporting are complete and
accurate. Specifically, the document states that although the
information is dependent on the integrity of data provided by program
agencies, GSA must still perform adequate verification to ensure that
data collected comply with reporting standards.
In 2002, GSA hired Conklin and deDecker Associates, an aviation
information services consultant, to analyze FAIRS cost data to
determine, among other things, the extent to which the data could be
used for detailed cost analyses and developing aviation performance
measures. The contractor's preliminary study found that missing and
inconsistent FAIRS data, combined with the ways in which different
agencies report data into FAIRS, made it impossible to draw useful
conclusions. The study also found that the FAIRS reporting requirements
were vague and allowed agencies to report inconsistent or incomplete
data. The contractor provided several recommendations on how the
quality of the data could be improved and GSA has awarded a contract to
Computer Sciences Corporation to enhance and modify FAIRS with many of
the recommendations identified in the performance measures study. These
enhancements include requiring four mandatory cost categories (crew,
fuel, maintenance, and overhead); the adding of two aircraft
utilization measures; and clarifying the definitions of several cost
elements. GSA and ICAP recognized that the FAIRS system would change
over time and adopted a process to address potential enhancements to
the system. They meet periodically to review and prioritize
improvements and, after enhancements have been approved, GSA plans to
make the improvements to the FAIRS system as funding permits.
Federal Aircraft Programs Lack Comprehensive Systems to Ensure Cost-
effective Acquisition and Fleet Management Decisions:
A comprehensive aircraft fleet management planning process can help
federal aircraft programs ensure that they acquire, manage, and
modernize their aircraft in a cost-effective manner. This process is
based on determining a program's long-term fleet requirements,
acquiring the most cost-effective fleet of aircraft, and continually
assessing the fleet's ability to meet a program's mission requirements.
Our review of seven programs found that none of them had fully
implemented such a systematic process to ensure cost effective fleet
management decisions. However, some had sporadically taken measures,
such as developing a fleetwide replacement plan, preparing cost benefit
analyses on some aircraft, and implementing some statistics to assess
their fleet's performance. In addition, officials from some of the
programs said that their ability to make cost-effective acquisition
decisions is constrained by budget scoring rules presented in OMB
Circular A-11, because it can limit their method of acquiring aircraft
to either purchasing them outright or entering into more costly short-
term operating leases.
Federal Guidance Outlines Three Key Fleet Management Planning
Principles:
According to federal guidance, sound fleet management decisions should
be based on a comprehensive process that relies on three key
principles: (1) assessing a program's long-term fleet requirements, (2)
acquiring the most cost-effective fleet of aircraft to meet those
requirements, and (3) continually assessing fleet performance to
determine if needs are being effectively met. These overarching
principles are detailed in guidance that GSA, OMB, and the Department
of Energy (DOE) have made available to federal aircraft programs.
Specifically, GSA has developed a fleet modernization planning guide
and associated workshops, which outlines key aspects of sound fleet
planning. This guidance stresses the need for aircraft programs to
determine mission requirements, identify aircraft alternatives,
perform financial analyses of alternatives, and select the most cost-
effective mix of fleet aircraft. OMB Circulars A-76 and A-126 highlight
the need to make cost-effective aircraft acquisition decisions, and
Circular A-126 requires programs to periodically assess the cost-
effectiveness of their fleets. In addition, the DOE's aircraft program
has developed a comprehensive aviation performance management program,
which outlines nearly 40 statistical measures or metrics that aviation
officials can use to continually assess their fleet's operating,
maintenance, supply, crew, mission equipment, safety, and cost
performance. Through ICAP, DOE has made the details of their program
available to other programs.
Figure 1 displays the fleet management planning process, showing that
it is a continuous cycle of planning and analyses.
Figure 1: Aviation Fleet Management Planning Process:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The first phase of the fleet management planning process begins when
aircraft program managers do a strategic assessment of long-term fleet
requirements. According to GSA's guidance, this is the foundation of
fleet management, because it identifies future workload requirements
that serve as the basis for aircraft needs. The assessment process
includes specific analyses, such as an assessment of the number of
flight hours needed to meet mission requirements over a minimum of a 5-
year period and the capability of existing aircraft to cost effectively
meet those requirements. The guidance recommends that, if shortfalls in
the current fleet of aircraft are identified, managers should determine
the optimal mix of aircraft to meet anticipated flight hour and mission
requirements and develop a proposed fleet acquisition or replacement
plan to achieve the desired mix of aircraft. This plan could include an
anticipated schedule and time frames for disposing of inadequate
aircraft and procuring replacements.
According to GSA's guidance, after identifying potential aircraft and
developing a proposed fleet replacement plan, aviation managers should
develop a series of analyses to identify and acquire the most cost-
effective aircraft to meet mission needs. These analyses include
preparing A-76 studies to determine whether the aviation operations
should be performed by the government or contracted to the private
sector and life cycle cost analyses to ensure that the most cost-
effective aircraft are procured. A life cycle cost analysis provides
managers with important information concerning the total cost of an
aircraft over its full life. It takes into account not only the costs
of acquiring aircraft, but also the cost of operating and maintaining
them over their useful life. Such information and analyses are crucial
to making sound acquisition decisions. Once analyses are completed,
aviation managers should obtain senior management approval and then
acquire needed aircraft or commercial aviation services.
The final phase of the fleet management process centers on assessing
the performance of the aircraft fleet in meeting mission needs. To
accomplish this, managers should develop a set of aviation performance
measures and a process to routinely review and analyze these measures
to gauge their fleet's performance. These measures include statistics
to assess the reliability of the aircraft fleet, determine whether
costs are too high, and determine whether there are systematic
maintenance issues that require attention. Managers should also
periodically conduct an OMB Circular A-126 review of the cost
effectiveness of their entire fleet. Finally, managers should
incorporate the results of their performance metrics analyses and their
periodic Circular A-126 reviews into their long-term fleet planning
process and make adjustments to their fleets as needed.
Programs Made Limited Use of Key Principles in Fleet Management
Planning:
Of the seven programs we reviewed, we found no program fully
implementing all of the key aspects of fleet management planning. We
found only two of the seven programs had performed long-term, strategic
reviews of their mission requirements and optimal fleet mix. Rather,
most of the programs we reviewed engaged in a limited form of long-term
planning. In addition, we found none of the seven programs were
regularly completing Circular A-76 studies to determine whether their
aircraft should be owned or operated by the federal government or a
contractor. The programs could provide cost-benefit reviews only about
one-third of the time documenting the aircraft they selected was the
most cost-effective aircraft to perform the needed tasks. Similarly, we
found that none of the seven programs in our review had developed a
comprehensive system that included a full-range of aviation statistics
to track the effectiveness of their aircraft, and only one that
evaluates the continuing need for their aircraft under OMB Circular A-
126.
Figure 2 displays our assessment of whether the programs we reviewed
had implemented the key concepts of fleet management planning when
acquiring and managing their aircraft fleets. In general, we found that
FAA's Flight Inspection, DOJ's JPATS, USDA Forest Service, and FWS
programs had implemented many of the key concepts of fleet management
planning when acquiring and managing their fleets. In contrast, FAA's
Hangar 6, DEA, and DOS's INL/A programs made less frequent use of these
key concepts when acquiring and managing their fleets. Summaries of how
the agencies we reviewed implemented the key principles of fleet
management planning follow the chart. Detailed information on the
programs we reviewed can be found in appendixes IV through X.
Figure 2: Implementation of Key Fleet Management Planning Principles:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Most Programs Made Limited Use of Long-term Strategic Planning:
Overall, federal aircraft programs we reviewed generally engaged in
limited long-term strategic planning for the purpose of assessing and
determining their fleet requirements. For example, only two of the
seven programs we reviewed had produced a comprehensive long-term plan
that identified future mission requirements and a recommended mix of
aircraft to meet those requirements. In 2002, FAA's Flight Inspection
program issued a study that evaluated the program's future workload;
how many flight hours it would take to meet that workload; and what the
optimal, most cost-effective mix of aircraft would be to perform the
program's mission. The study resulted in a recommendation to replace
much of the current fleet with smaller, more efficient aircraft. FAA
officials stated that they hope to implement these recommendations, if
funding is available. Similarly, in 1997 DOJ's JPATS program completed
a comprehensive strategic plan estimating how many and what type of
prisoners the program would need to transport over a 5-year period, the
program's resources needed to perform this task, and what mix of
aircraft would be best-suited for the program's future needs. This
study also resulted in a recommendation to replace many current JPATS
aircraft with more efficient aircraft. DOJ officials stated that they
have been trying to implement these recommendations but have been
delayed due to budgetary and contracting concerns. Although these two
programs have recently produced long-term strategic plans for the
aircraft fleet, neither has a mechanism in place to regularly produce
such plans.
Three of the other programs we reviewed had recently produced some
long-term fleet plans, but nothing as comprehensive as the Flight
Inspection or JPATS programs. For example, although the FWS has not
produced a long-term strategic fleet plan for its entire fleet of 57
aircraft, in 2003 it produced a long-term assessment and fleet
replacement plan for the portion of its fleet of aircraft used to
survey migratory bird routes. This plan recommended replacing nine
outdated aircraft by purchasing nine new aircraft beginning in 2005.
Also, in the Conference Report (H.R. Conf. Rep. 108-10) for the
Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003 (P.L. 108-7), the
conferees directed that DEA produce a 5-year strategic plan for its
aircraft program. The plan includes some recommendations on replacing
portions of its fleet, including its aging OH-6 helicopters, but did
not include a detailed analysis of how many flight hours would be
required of its fleet and what mix of aircraft would be best suited to
DEA's mission. Finally, the USDA Forest Service completed two
replacement studies for its fleet of Beech Baron planes that direct
other aircraft fighting forest fires but USDA Forest Service officials
indicated they have not done such a study for the USDA Forest Service's
entire fleet of aircraft.
The remaining two programs we reviewed (DOS-INL/A and FAA's Hangar 6)
did not engage in long-term planning that estimated the future, long-
term mission requirements for their programs and what mix of aircraft
was best suited for these requirements. These programs had general
ideas about the future mission requirements of their programs and when
particular aircraft in their fleets would need to be replaced. However,
these programs had not performed a comprehensive, fleetwide analysis of
these issues and had not studied the optimal fleet mix for their future
requirements.
During the course of our review, GSA identified DOE as an example of a
federal aircraft program that had successfully implemented the key
principles of fleet management. For example, DOE officials stated they
implemented a comprehensive long-term planning process in which DOE
strategically assesses its aircraft program's long-term fleet
requirements. In 2001, DOE published the results of their planning
process. According to DOE officials, this document, the Comprehensive
Aviation Program Study, recommended selling five aircraft and acquiring
two others. DOE plans to perform this type of study every 5 years and
update the study on an ongoing basis in the interim.
Programs Use Differing Methods for Justifying and Making Cost-effective
Aircraft Acquisition Decisions:
Each of the seven aircraft programs we reviewed used different methods
to justify their needs to acquire aircraft and used different amounts
of documentation to ensure the most cost-effective aircraft was
acquired--an important principle of comprehensive fleet management.
These processes range from programs that require formal cost-benefit
analyses and review by officials outside the aircraft program before
acquiring an aircraft to those that have an informal process in which
aircraft are acquired as needed with only limited analysis required.
For example, FAA's Flight Inspection program uses a process that all
FAA programs are subject to when they acquire capital assets. Under
this process, the acquiring program prepares an analysis documenting
the need for the aircraft and recommending the most cost-effective
aircraft to acquire. After that, an outside group, independent of the
acquiring program, reviews this documentation to determine if the
acquisition is justified. Conversely, the DOS's INL/A program uses no
set criteria or documentation to approve an aircraft acquisition and
there is no outside, independent review of their decisions.
To gain a better understanding of how the programs we reviewed
justified and documented their aircraft acquisitions, we asked program
officials to provide us documentation on 28 of the aircraft they
acquired.[Footnote 8] These aircraft had a combined initial acquisition
value of over $129 million.[Footnote 9] Specifically, we asked program
officials to provide A-76 reviews for the aircraft we selected. OMB
Circular A-76 requires federal programs to perform an analysis of
whether or not an aircraft they are acquiring should be owned and/or
operated by the federal government or contracted out to a private
entity. The circular also requires that programs provide the results of
this review to GSA and OMB. The overarching principles of fleet
management planning and modernization would also indicate that programs
should complete a cost-benefit analysis before acquiring any aircraft.
We found that programs had completed A-76 reviews for only 3 of the 28
aircraft whose documentation we reviewed. Only the Fish and Wildlife
Service (once) and the USDA Forest Service (twice) had completed an
A-76. In all other cases, programs stated that the aircraft we had
selected were considered by agency officials to be exempt from OMB
Circular A-76 requirements because the aircraft performed inherently
governmental missions, were replacements for existing aircraft, or had
been mandated by Congress.
However, Circular A-76 explicitly states that programs should file A-76
reviews in most instances because, although the mission of the program
may be inherently governmental, the aircraft does not necessarily have
to be government owned or operated. In addition, we found that some of
these programs had hired contractors to perform the same aviation
functions for them, which contradicted their views that the missions
were inherently governmental, and thus needed to be completed by
government employees using government-owned aircraft. Furthermore,
Circulars A-76 and A-126 require programs to meet its requirements
whenever they acquire an aircraft and does not make a distinction as to
whether the aircraft is a replacement of an existing aircraft or an
addition to the fleet. GAO and several Offices of Inspectors General
have repeatedly found aircraft programs that do not complete A-76
reviews before acquiring their aircraft.[Footnote 10] Despite the
circular's requirements, OMB staff stated that they do not verify the
material in A-76 studies that programs submit nor do they ensure that
such studies are completed. Also, OMB staff stated that they rely on
program officials to determine whether they need to prepare A-76
reviews or decide the requirements do not apply to their programs
because their operations are inherently governmental.[Footnote 11] As
we have previously reported, OMB does not view its role as requiring
agencies to undertake A-76 cost comparisons, and it has not
consistently worked with agencies to ensure that provisions of A-76 are
being effectively implemented.[Footnote 12] In addition, we reported
that A-76 has not appeared to be a high priority within OMB or civilian
agencies and, as a result, little effort has been taken to use the A-76
process.
In addition to A-76 reviews, another way federal aircraft programs can
help ensure that they acquire the most cost-effective aircraft to meet
their needs is to perform a cost-benefit analysis that includes a life
cycle cost analysis on any aircraft a program is considering acquiring.
GAO and several agencies' Offices of Inspectors General have
recommended that programs perform these cost-benefit analyses prior to
acquiring aircraft. Despite this, we found that, in general, programs
had performed such analyses for only one-third of the programs'
aircraft we selected and that five of the seven programs we reviewed
had added at least one aircraft without performing such a study. FAA's
Flight Inspection program and the USDA Forest Service were the most
consistent as far as preparing such studies. In contrast, the remaining
programs had either performed such analyses in only some instances, or,
as was the case with DOS's INL/A operation and DEA, they did not
document or could not locate their analyses.
Programs Did Not Have Comprehensive Systems for Assessing Fleet
Performance:
We found that programs were implementing the final key principle of
fleet management--assessing fleet performance--to varying degrees.
Overall, we found that none of the seven programs we reviewed had
established a wide range of statistical goals or targets that were
routinely tracked to judge the effectiveness of their aircraft. These
statistics could include data on whether a particular part on an
aircraft has failed several times, how frequently pilots are flying
aircraft, or how long it takes to repair a particular malfunction. Five
of the seven programs we reviewed tracked some statistics but did not
include a full range that focused on all aspects of their aircraft
programs. Generally, these programs focused on performance indicators
measuring how often an aircraft was disabled and unable to fulfill its
mission. The remaining two programs--FAA's Hangar 6 and the FWS--do not
routinely track any performance indicators on their aircraft. In
contrast to these programs, DOE has implemented a comprehensive
performance management system that tracks nearly 40 performance
indicators. The Director of DOE's Office of Aviation Management stated
that DOE aviation staff frequently review these indicators and would be
able to discover issues that they otherwise might not. For instance,
DOE staff would be able to identify if delivery of certain parts was
consistently slow, keeping their aircraft grounded longer than they
needed to be. They would then be able to make changes to address the
problem.
Having a system of performance measures in place can also help a
program fulfill the requirements of another OMB circular designed to
assist programs in assessing their operations. OMB Circular A-126
requires continuing needs analyses in which programs periodically
assess the cost-effectiveness of their operations and determine whether
their aircraft are still necessary. However, we found that six of the
seven programs we reviewed were not performing these continuing needs
analyses, stating that they were exempt from the requirements or did
not know about them. Only the FWS had completed an A-126 review. Much
like A-76 reviews, OMB staff stated they do not verify the information
in A-126 reviews nor ensure that agencies complete the reviews as the
circular directs.
Budget Scoring Rules May Cause Agencies to Select Costly Shorter-term
Leases, Which Can Potentially Increase Long-term Acquisition Costs:
With the average age of the federal aircraft fleet exceeding 25 years
and nearly 45 percent being older than 30 years, many federal aircraft
programs may soon need to spend millions of dollars acquiring new or
replacement aircraft. As program managers proceed through this process,
they will be faced with the decision of whether to (1) purchase the
aircraft outright; (2) use a lease-purchase arrangement in which
programs make payments for a period of years, at the end of which they
would own the aircraft; or (3) use short-or longer-term operating
leases.[Footnote 13] During the course of our review, officials from
some aircraft programs indicated that, when budgetary constraints
precluded the purchase of aircraft, they have attempted to use lease-
purchase or long-term lease options. However, they said that federal
budget scoring guidelines as presented in OMB Circular A-11 have
effectively precluded these options.[Footnote 14] As a result,
programs are left with either continuing to use their existing fleet
or entering into short-term operating leases, which increase the cost
of their acquisitions by millions of dollars.
To effectively allocate resources, Congress needs to know and vote on
the full cost of any program it approves at the time a funding decision
is made. Thus, scorekeeping rules require that budget authority for the
cost of purchasing an asset--whether it be outright federal purchase or
lease-purchase--be recorded in the budget when it can be controlled,
that is, up front so that decision makers have the information needed
and an incentive to take the full cost of their decisions into account.
Under budget scoring rules, if a program uses a lease-purchase, it must
have budget authority in an amount equal to the present value of the
total lease payments for the asset. Scoring the full costs up-front
permits Congress to compare a lease-purchase with an outright purchase.
However, this scoring results in pressures to use operating leases,
because if a program uses an operating lease, it needs up-front budget
authority to cover only the first year lease payments plus any
cancellation costs. Therefore, a program could spread the budgetary
impact of acquiring the use of an asset over a number of years using an
operating lease.
As we have reported in the past, purchasing assets is typically the
least costly option, followed by the lease-purchase option, which is
more expensive than purchasing assets, but less costly than using
short-term operating leases.[Footnote 15] While short-term operating
leases are more costly over time compared with other options, they add
much less to a single year's total appropriation, making them a more
attractive option from an agency's perspective, particularly when it
believes that funds for ownership would not be made available. With
regard to acquiring aircraft, a GSA consultant's 2003 study showed the
cost impact of these different acquisition methods.[Footnote 16]
According to the study, the net cost of acquiring a $10 million
aircraft, after subtracting the residual value of the aircraft after 10
years, would be about $3.5 million. This same aircraft would have a
10-year net cost of about $5.5 million if acquired though a 5-year
lease-purchase, $9.6 million by using a 10-year operating lease, and
$18 million by using a series of ten 1-year operating leases.[Footnote
17]
Officials at several programs we visited stated that if they had
sufficient budget authority they would not need to finance aircraft,
and their first choice would be to purchase aircraft, because it costs
less in the long run. As a result, officials indicated that if funding
is not available for purchasing an aircraft, their options are limited
to using more costly shorter-term leases that can meet the operating
lease definition spelled out in Circular A-11 or continue to fund the
operation and maintenance of older, less reliable aircraft until
funding becomes available to acquire new ones. For example, in 2003 FAA
Hanger 6 decided they needed two replacement aircraft. Since funding
was not available to purchase these aircraft they entered into two 1-
year leases, with four 1-year renewable options. A study for FAA's
Hanger 6 program estimated that the net cost of purchasing the two
aircraft would be about $7.7 million, after subtracting the residual
value of the aircraft after 10 years. If they were to acquire these
aircraft though lease-purchase they estimated the net cost of about
$10.7 million.[Footnote 18] The study estimated the cost of acquiring
these aircraft through operating leases over the 10-year period to be
about $21.3 million--$13.6 million and $10.6 million more than the
outright purchase and lease-purchase options, respectively. JPATS is
also in the process of acquiring replacement aircraft. A study
examining the cost of acquiring seven large transport aircraft
estimated that it could cost about $117 million to purchase the
aircraft, about $137 million to use lease-purchase, about $183 million
for a 7-year lease, and $208 million for seven 1-year leases.[Footnote
19]
OMB staff told us that purchasing an aircraft is more cost effective
than various lease options because a program can avoid financing costs,
so programs should purchase aircraft, rather than finance them. They
indicated that if the aircraft acquisition is a high enough priority,
program officials should work through the budget process to obtain the
funding needed to acquire it.
Decision makers have struggled with this matter since the scoring rules
were established and the tendency for agencies to choose operating
leases instead of ownership became apparent. We have suggested the
alternative of up-front scoring of those leases that are perceived by
all sides as long-term federal commitments so that all options are
treated equally.[Footnote 20] Although this could be viable, there
would be implementation challenges if this were pursed, including the
need to evaluate the validity of agencies' requirements. Another
option, which was recommended in 1999 and discussed by GAO, would be
for agencies to establish capital acquisition funds to pursue ownership
where it is advantageous, from an economic perspective.[Footnote 21]
Finding a solution for this problem has been difficult; leasing to meet
long-term needs results in excessive costs to taxpayers and does not
reflect a sensible approach to capital asset management.
Federal Aircraft Programs Have Developed Operational and Safety
Standards, but Oversight Is Voluntary and Varied:
The federal aircraft programs included in our review had developed
operations, maintenance, and safety standards specific to their
programs even though their public use operations are exempted from many
regulatory requirements that apply to "civil use" aircraft. The
programs required their aircraft operations to comply, at a minimum,
with FAA's basic rules governing all civil flight operations, and some
of the programs required their aircraft operations to develop standards
beyond the basic rules and comply with more restrictive FAA aircraft
regulations. Although federal aircraft programs had developed various
standards without being required to do so, the use of oversight to help
ensure the safety, effectiveness, and efficiency of the programs varied
greatly. We found that each agency is responsible for managing its
aircraft programs, writing standards based on the ICAP safety standards
guidelines, and instituting an oversight process. Although the federal
agencies have taken steps to mitigate the risks of their dangerous
missions, it is not possible to eliminate the risk and, as a result,
the operations have resulted in some accidents. Our review of accident
data for all federal programs found 183 accidents and incidents from
April 1995 through October 2003. Most of these accidents occurred
during dangerous missions, such as fire suppression and complex
training maneuvers, and were generally the result of pilot error.
Federal Aircraft Programs Have Developed Standards That Exceed Federal
Requirements:
Federal aircraft programs operate and maintain aircraft that are
engaged in some of the most dangerous types of flight possible. For
example, USDA Forest Service pilots often fly 150 feet above ground
level at roughly 175 miles per hour when dropping fire retardant in an
effort to suppress forest fires. Despite the inherently dangerous
nature of some of their missions, federal aircraft are exempt from most
safety requirements that apply to civil and commercial aircraft, with
the exception of the airspace rules referred to in certain sections of
C.F.R., Part 91, that all aircraft operators must follow.[Footnote 22]
For example, operators of public aircraft are not required to have an
FAA pilot or medical certificate ensuring they are able and medically
fit to operate aircraft; pilots who fly civil aircraft must have these
minimum credentials.
Recognizing that the inherently dangerous nature of their missions
require a focus on safety, each aircraft program we reviewed had
voluntarily developed systems specific to their programs to help ensure
safety. These systems set a level of standards to address the
operational, maintenance, and safety issues associated with operating
the aircraft programs. The operations standards generally covered
program policies and procedures, pilot qualifications, and crew
training and proficiency requirements. The maintenance standards
provided procedures for maintaining the programs' aircraft, which
included maintenance management responsibilities, personnel
qualifications, maintenance and inspection procedures, and a means of
tracking maintenance actions. Finally, the safety standards established
guidelines for the protection and preservation of personnel and
property against injury and loss. They covered items such as aircraft
accident investigation and reporting requirements, mission risk
assessment processes, mission safety guidelines, and program safety
review requirements.
Each of the programs that we reviewed developed specific operations,
maintenance, and safety standards governing a wide variety of aircraft
operations. Because of the differences in the missions, the standards
for each aircraft program were developed specific to the program's
mission. Based on our review of these standards, and discussions with
program officials, we found that the standards federal aircraft
programs had developed exceeded the requirements for public use
operations. Each of the programs we reviewed also voluntarily adopted
ICAP's Safety Standards Guidelines for Federal Flight Programs. The
standards outline five major components of an effective aviation safety
system--management/administration, operations, maintenance, training,
and safety.
In addition, we found some of the programs developed standards
significantly above the basic operating rules set out in 14 C.F.R. Part
91 and required compliance with the more restrictive FAA aircraft
regulations, 14 C.F.R. Part 135.[Footnote 23] For example, FAA made a
policy decision to comply with Part 135 regulations prescribed for
civil operations. Still, two of the federal aircraft programs developed
requirements to operate above the requirements of Part 91 but do not
comply with all of the higher standards of Part 135 and 14 C.F.R. Part
121.[Footnote 24] To illustrate, JPATS officials said their operations
and safety standards attempt to mirror those in Part 121 relating to
air carrier operations but cannot meet all of the standards of Part
121 because of the associated costs of maintaining maintenance and
parts facilities at each location their aircraft visit. Thus, JPATS
met some of the Part 121 standards, such as pilot qualifications and
training requirements, but its maintenance is conducted at the less
restrictive Part 91 level.
Agencies Use Differing Approaches to Aircraft Program Oversight:
FAA is generally considered the federal government's expert for
overseeing and regulating aircraft safety, operations, and maintenance.
In the interest of public safety, FAA regulates civil aircraft
requiring that operators, pilots, crew, and maintenance personnel
comply with general standards and procedures. In addition, FAA's flight
inspectors examine the operations, maintenance, and airworthiness of
commercial aircraft. As a result of these inspections, aircraft can be
grounded until corrective actions are taken to address the inspector's
findings. However, FAA's responsibilities for flight safety do not
reach to the aircraft used for public use operations by federal
agencies.[Footnote 25]
Because there are no regulatory requirements for oversight of federal
aircraft programs, it is left to each program to determine the best
oversight process for making certain that it is complying with its
policies and safety standards. An oversight process can help ensure
that each federal aircraft program continues to operate as safely as
possible. We found that some programs chose to undergo external
oversight voluntarily, while others relied on self-enforcement. For
example, the two FAA programs, Hangar 6 and Flight Inspection, both
undergo safety reviews from FAA's Flight Standards Service staff.
Flight Standards is the organization within FAA that has oversight
responsibilities for all civil aviation operations. FAA officials
stated that the Flight Standards Service subjects FAA's aircraft
programs to the same level of scrutiny and inspection that it gives the
commercial industry.
Two programs we reviewed, JPATS and INL/A had established program
requirements that require them to undergo GSA's Aviation Resource
Management Survey (ARMS) reviews. JPATS has a requirement to complete
an ARMS review every 4 years, and DOS's INL/A has an ARMS review
requirement for each of its site locations on a periodic basis. An ARMS
review, coordinated through ICAP, is an evaluative process for safety
and accident prevention used for discovering deficiencies in federal
aircraft programs in the areas of operations, training, and facilities.
The criteria used in the ARMS reviews are derived from the ICAP Safety
Standards Guidelines. In implementing a review to assess a program's
operations, ICAP forms a safety team that generally includes FAA
personnel to ensure the team has adequate safety expertise. Between
1991 and 2002, ICAP completed 22 ARMS reviews. Although the evaluative
results of program-specific ARMS reviews are not publicly available,
GSA performed a trend analysis of the 10 ARMS reviews completed between
1997 and 2002 found many of the same safety issues existed at several
programs. These issues included having an insufficient number of
instructors to conduct aviation training, not having a formal general
maintenance manual, lack of trained personnel to accomplish assigned
missions, and flight crews not thoroughly planning flights.
In contrast, the USDA Forest Service, DEA, and FWS subject themselves
to internal reviews of their operations. Each FWS region undergoes a
program review performed by the Department of the Interior's National
Business Center-Aviation Management Directorate (AMD) every 5 years.
This review involves a broad examination of FWS' aircraft program
administration, training, operations, and safety systems in each
region. FWS officials said the AMD program review is considered an
external oversight process, and they believe AMD's inspections and 5-
year reviews are sufficient. The USDA Forest Service and DEA elected to
undergo program reviews that are initiated and performed internally.
DEA officials stated that their internal safety and training reviews
are conducted using guidelines established by outside agencies. In
addition, DEA plans to undergo an ARMS review in the next year and an
internal DEA Office of Inspections review in July 2004.
Although the programs are responsible for the oversight of their public
use operations, we found that some confusion exists over what party is
responsible for ensuring that contractors are meeting operations,
maintenance, and safety requirements. Government regulations require
that when federal aircraft programs enter into contractual agreements
with commercial operators to fulfill their missions, they include
operational, maintenance, and safety requirements in the agreements.
For example, 2 years ago two USDA Forest Service contracted aircraft
crashed after their wings came detached during flight. The USDA Forest
Service had included maintenance requirements in its contracts for the
air tankers that required compliance with Part 135 maintenance
standards. USDA Forest Service officials said they believed that
because they had required Part 135 compliance, it was FAA's
responsibility to ensure that the contractors were meeting those
maintenance requirements. However, FAA officials stated that when
federal aircraft programs use contracted aircraft to fulfill a public
use mission, it is the responsibility of the agencies to monitor the
contractors. Consequently, neither the USDA Forest Service nor FAA were
ensuring that the contractors were meeting the maintenance and safety
standards set forth in the contracts.
A blue ribbon panel formed after the accidents concluded that until new
contracting processes are implemented and backed by FAA's participation
and oversight, this situation would likely continue. FAA officials told
us that they would consider providing safety inspections to federal
agencies on a reimbursable, resource-available basis if an agency
requested this service. In addition, NTSB investigated these accidents
and found that oversight of aircraft used in firefighting operations
was not adequate to ensure safe operations. On April 23, 2004, NTSB
issued a letter to the Departments of Agriculture and Interior--federal
agencies that routinely conduct firefighting operations--and FAA that
concluded the firefighting agencies must ensure the continuing
airworthiness of firefighting aircraft and monitor the adequacy of
maintenance programs used for these aircraft.[Footnote 26] NTSB made a
number of recommendations to these agencies to ensure the continued
airworthiness of aircraft used in firefighting operations. Subsequent
to this letter, USDA Forest Service and DOI determined they do not have
in-house expertise to certify the airworthiness of these aircraft and,
therefore, decided to ground the planes and cancel all existing
contracts for air tanker services.
Federal Aircraft Programs Are Required to Report Accidents and
Incidents:
Federal aircraft programs are required to report to the NTSB when
accidents or incidents occur.[Footnote 27] Since 1995, NTSB has had
authority to investigate and determine probable cause of all federal
aircraft accidents or incidents.[Footnote 28] We identified 183
accidents and incidents occurring from April 1995 through October 2003
involving federally owned and contracted aircraft that resulted in 91
fatalities. Figure 3 shows the number of fatal and nonfatal accidents
and incidents reported to NTSB during the period April 1995 through
October 2003.[Footnote 29]
Figure 3: Federal Fatal and Nonfatal Accidents and Incidents, April
1995 - October 2003:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
We found three primary categories of causes of federal aircraft
accidents and incidents identified by NTSB: (1) human factors,
including pilots, maintenance staff, flight crews, and management; (2)
environmental factors, including light conditions, terrain, objects,
and weather; and (3) mechanical malfunction, including structure and
systems failure, fuel exhaustion, and engine failure. In addition to
the primary causes, NTSB often finds other contributing factors that
may have lead to an accident or incident. Table 3 identifies the
primary cause and contributing factors that NTSB determined for the
federal aircraft accidents and incidents.
Table 3: Causes and Contributing Factors to the 183 Federal Aircraft
Accidents and Incidents, April 1995 - October 2003:
Human: Pilot;
Primary cause: 103;
Contributing factor: 3;
Total: 106;
Percentage of accidents: 58%.
Human: Maintenance;
Primary cause: 6;
Contributing factor: 7;
Total: 13;
Percentage of accidents: 7%.
Human: Crew;
Primary cause: 2;
Contributing factor: 7;
Total: 9;
Percentage of accidents: 5%.
Human: Management;
Primary cause: 0;
Contributing factor: 9;
Total: 9;
Percentage of accidents: 5%.
Human: Other;
Primary cause: 2;
Contributing factor: 3;
Total: 5;
Percentage of accidents: 3%.
Human: Subtotal;
Primary cause: 113;
Contributing factor: 29;
Total: 142;
Percentage of accidents: 78%.
Environment: Light conditions;
Primary cause: 0;
Contributing factor: 6;
Total: 6;
Percentage of accidents: 3%.
Environment: Terrain;
Primary cause: 1;
Contributing factor: 19;
Total: 20;
Percentage of accidents: 11%.
Environment: Object;
Primary cause: 3;
Contributing factor: 12;
Total: 15;
Percentage of accidents: 8%.
Environment: Weather;
Primary cause: 2;
Contributing factor: 35;
Total: 37;
Percentage of accidents: 20%.
Environment: Subtotal;
Primary cause: 6;
Contributing factor: 72;
Total: 78;
Percentage of accidents: 43%.
Mechanical: Structure and systems;
Primary cause: 14;
Contributing factor: 8;
Total: 22;
Percentage of accidents: 12%.
Mechanical: Fuel;
Primary cause: 4;
Contributing factor: 5;
Total: 9;
Percentage of accidents: 5%.
Mechanical: Engine;
Primary cause: 10;
Contributing factor: 11;
Total: 21;
Percentage of accidents: 11%.
Mechanical: Subtotal;
Primary cause: 28;
Contributing factor: 24;
Total: 52;
Percentage of accidents: 28%.
Unknown: Cause not identified;
Primary cause: 4;
Contributing factor: 0;
Total: 4;
Percentage of accidents: 2%.
Unknown: Ongoing investigation;
Primary cause: 32;
Contributing factor: 0;
Total: 32;
Percentage of accidents: 18%.
Subtotal;
Primary cause: 36;
Contributing factor: 0;
Total: 36;
Percentage of accidents: 20%.
Source: GAO analysis of NTSB accident data.
Note: Contributing factor columns may not equal to the total number of
accidents and incidents because a single accident or incident could
have none or multiple contributing factors. In addition, percent
columns do not add to 100 because a single accident could have more
than one category of causes or contributing factors.
[End of table]
The table shows that human factors caused or contributed to 142, or 78
percent, of all federal aircraft accidents and incidents. Pilot error
was the most frequently cited primary cause, contributing to 58 percent
of all federal aircraft accidents and incidents we reviewed. Our review
of safety reports and discussions with agency officials confirmed that
pilot and crew error have historically been a safety challenge.
Examples of pilot error included operating at inadequate speeds, not
following procedures, and lack of experience. There also appeared to be
a link between pilot error and environmental factors and mechanical
failure. For example, more than half of the 103 accidents and incidents
caused by pilot error were due to the pilots' actions during adverse
weather conditions; while in close proximity to objects and terrain,
such as power lines and trees; or during mechanical breakdown.
We also found that the number of accidents and incidents varied by the
nature of the mission. For example, 98 of the 183 accidents and
incidents, or 54 percent, occurred during firefighting missions, law
enforcement, and training operations (see fig. 4). These missions
involve such activities as abrupt and sharp turns; low-level
maneuvering; excessively slow or fast speeds; and landings on water and
ice-covered runways and lakes.
Figure 4: Classification of Accidents and Incidents by Mission April
1995 - October 2003:
[See PDF for image]
Note: Repositioning involves moving an aircraft from one location to
another for future use.
[End of figure]
We also found that a higher proportion of federal aircraft accidents
and incidents occurred during the flight of the mission, compared with
approach and landings, when most of the commercial aircraft accidents
occur. Overall, about 34 percent of the 183 accidents and incidents
occurred during the maneuvering phase of the mission, such as dropping
fire retardants, capturing animals, enforcing drug laws, and crop
dusting. For example, 12 of the 17 or 71 percent of predator control
accidents and incidents occurred during the maneuvering phase of
flight.[Footnote 30] Predator control missions require pilots to turn
at sharp angles and fly at aggressively fast speeds to chase and
capture a predator in close proximity to trees and other terrain.
Finally, we found that about half of the 183 accidents and incidents
occurred in privately owned aircraft that were under government
contract. We reviewed the data to determine whether the accidents or
incidents occurred more frequently with aircraft owned and operated by
the federal government or with commercial aviation services obtained
from the private sector. Although we were not able to determine
ownership in all 183 accidents and incidents, we were able to identify
95 accidents and incidents (or 51 percent) that occurred in privately
owned aircraft (see fig. 5).
Figure 5: Classification of Accidents and Incidents by Aircraft Owner:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
In reviewing the NTSB data we found that privately owned aircraft under
government contract completed a majority of the search and rescue,
firefighting, crop protection, predator control, and passenger/cargo
missions. For example, according to our analysis, 79 percent of the 44
USDA Forest Service accidents and incidents during the timeframe
occurred in privately owned aircraft. According to a USDA Forest
Service official, the safety of contracted aircraft has been a
longstanding issue, because the contracting process assumed that FAA's
certification ensured the aircraft's safety. In contrast, the owners of
the aircraft were responsible for maintaining their own safety. Two
highly publicized accidents that occurred during firefighting
highlighted safety issues associated with the government's use of
contractor-supplied aircraft. According to a study commissioned by the
USDA Forest Service and the U.S. Bureau of Land Management following
these accidents, the contracting process for acquiring the services of
privately owned aircraft is limited, because it does not require
contractors to operate their aircraft in accordance with maintenance
and inspection schedules tailored to the conditions of
firefighting.[Footnote 31]
Conclusions:
In order to cost effectively manage federal aircraft programs, managers
need accurate and complete cost data and a systematic process for
determining aircraft fleet requirements and the best mix of aircraft to
meet those requirements. Developing accurate cost and usage data is a
critical first step to conducting meaningful assessments of federal
aircraft programs. Since 1992, OMB Circular A-126 has directed GSA to
operate a governmentwide aircraft management information system to
collect, analyze, and report on the aircraft that programs own or hire
and the usage of those aircraft. GSA has developed the FAIRS system to
fulfill its requirements under the circular. FAIRS was designed to
correct many of the problems inherent in the system it replaced.
However, FAIRS data is insufficient for conducting detailed analyses or
drawing useful conclusions on the condition and performance of federal
aircraft operations because it does not capture the full costs
associated with acquiring, operating, and maintaining federal aircraft.
Existing FAIRS reporting guidance is vague and allows programs latitude
in what cost elements to report. Also, the system provides no mechanism
to ensure programs adhere to reporting requirements. This results in
some programs excluding specific items, such as pilot salaries and fuel
costs; and other programs excluding the entire costs of their aircraft
programs--items totaling hundreds of millions of dollars. In addition,
the design of the FAIRS system itself excludes important aircraft
program costs such as those associated with acquiring and financing
aircraft. By excluding the cost of acquiring aircraft, this system does
not capture a significant portion of aircraft program costs. Further,
the FAIRS system lacks sufficient internal controls to maintain data
integrity. We found that some controls over the entry, review, and
approval of FAIRS data were ineffective.
Developing accurate and reliable cost data for federal aircraft
programs is only one part of a system to ensure cost-effective
management and use of aircraft. Federal aircraft programs are, or soon
will be, facing decisions about what to do with their aging fleets. A
substantial portion of the federally owned aircraft fleet is
approaching or past the age when aircraft become increasingly
unreliable and more costly to operate; thus, programs will be faced
with spending considerable sums on modernizing and upgrading their old,
inefficient fleets. Federal aircraft programs will need to make cost-
effective decisions on how best to modernize their fleets in order to
stretch their available funding as far as possible and in accordance
with applicable budget scoring rules. However, some agencies have not
developed adequate systems to acquire and manage their aircraft fleets
in the most cost-effective manner. Programs have continued to spend
millions of dollars acquiring aircraft without completing required OMB
reviews or consistently performing cost benefit analyses. Officials
from many of these programs believe that they are exempt from meeting
OMB requirements to assess the cost effectiveness of their aircraft
acquisitions and operations, despite repeated studies calling for them
to complete such reviews. OMB provides limited oversight of the
applicable circulars and leaves it up to the programs' discretion to
determine whether and when to complete required reviews. In addition,
programs lack comprehensive performance management systems that could
help them prioritize those aircraft in greatest need of replacement. In
meeting these future needs, a wide range of guidance and analytical
tools is available to these programs, including OMB circulars, GSA
fleet management guidance, and lessons learned from other programs such
as FAA and DOE. By utilizing these available tools, program managers
can begin developing comprehensive fleet management planning processes,
which will help them identify needed replacements and provide added
assurance that their replacement decisions are the most cost effective
for the government.
In addition, each of the programs we reviewed subjected themselves to
varying levels of safety and accident prevention oversight. FAA's two
programs are examined by the same organization that inspects civil
aviation operations, and two other programs have had aspects of their
operations reviewed through use of GSA's ICAP Aviation Resource
Management Surveys. Historically, these GSA-sponsored reviews have
found that many of the same safety issues existed at several programs.
The three other programs have relied on internal reviews of their
operations. While it was beyond the scope of our review to evaluate the
adequacy of these varying approaches to oversight, a comprehensive
oversight system can play a key role in identifying potential issues
before they become safety problems.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
In order to improve the completeness and accuracy of the FAIRS database
so that it captures all aircraft program costs and is useful for
conducting detailed analyses of the condition and performance of the
federal aircraft fleet, we are making the following three
recommendations to the Administrator of GSA:
* Clarify existing FAIRS guidance to agencies to identify those cost
elements that all aircraft programs should report to the FAIRS system,
make the reporting of those elements mandatory, and develop a mechanism
to ensure that agencies comply with reporting requirements.
* Expand existing FAIRS guidance to require that programs report
additional aviation costs associated with acquiring aircraft, not
currently required, which would provide more complete and accurate data
on the composition and cost of the federal aircraft fleet and, thus,
enhance GSA's annual report on federal aircraft operations. At a
minimum, agencies should be required to report acquisition, financing,
and self-insurance costs.
* Conduct periodic testing of the FAIRS database to ensure that
existing systems controls are working as designed and work with ICAP to
identify, develop, and implement additional controls as necessary.
In order to ensure that federal aircraft programs have the capability
to make sound fleet management decisions, we are making the following
recommendation to the Administrator of GSA:
* Direct the Interagency Committee on Aviation Policy to work with its
members to develop a model fleet management planning process. At a
minimum, this process should include guidance to help agencies
strategically assess long-term fleet requirements, acquire the most
cost-effective aircraft to meet those requirements, and continually
assess fleet performance.
Given the wide variety of oversight provided these programs and the
important role oversight can play in helping enhance safety, we are
making the following recommendation to the Administrator of GSA:
* Direct the Interagency Committee on Aviation Policy to examine the
oversight being provided to federal aircraft programs and provide
additional guidance, as necessary, on areas where enhanced oversight
could improve the safety of federal aircraft operations.
In order to help ensure that federal aircraft programs are being
managed in the most cost effective manner, we are making the following
recommendation to the Director, OMB:
* Review current guidance relating to the acquisition and management of
federal aircraft, including those associated with OMB Circulars A-76
and A-126, and develop additional guidance, as necessary, for agencies
and OMB to achieve greater consistency in the management of federal
aircraft programs.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We received written comments on a draft of this report from GSA, DOJ,
USDA, and DOI. We received oral comments from DOE and OMB. We received
comments via e-mail from DOT. NTSB and DOS did not provide comments on
the report.
The General Services Administration generally agreed with the findings
and noted that improvements are needed in the management of federal
aircraft programs across the board but did not indicate whether they
agreed or disagreed with the specific recommendations. In addition, GSA
offered several observations on our report. First, GSA commented that
the draft report's title obscures the audit's scope, findings, and
recommendations and suggested we revise the title to Federal Aviation:
Further Improvements Needed in Acquisition, Cost Accounting,
Performance Measurement and Oversight. We did not make this suggested
change for several reasons. In our opinion, the term "aviation"
encompasses factors beyond aircraft, such as air traffic control
systems and the National Airspace; therefore, we do not believe it
accurately portrays that this report is about aircraft operated by the
federal government. In addition, the term "Federal Aviation" could
imply that this report is about FAA, when it encompasses many federal
agencies. Finally, we believe that the remainder of the report's title
accurately reflects the report's key findings and recommendations.
Second, GSA agreed that FAIRS cost data is too understated at this
point to draw concrete conclusions about cost effectiveness and
stressed that the quality of the data is improving each year. It also
stated that aircraft inventory and flight hour data are more accurate
and useful. We recognize that FAIRS is an enhancement over the prior
system and that GSA has worked to improve the data it contains. We
believe that our recommendation to improve the FAIRS system and its
controls will further aid GSA's efforts. With regard to the inventory
and flight hour data, we agree with GSA's assessment that it is more
accurate and useful than the cost data contained in the system. Third,
GSA commented that there were inconsistencies in the report's
presentation of accident and incident data. We agree with GSA's comment
and have revised the report to clarify the accident and incident data.
Finally, GSA commented that the draft report correctly highlights that
many parties are responsible for effectively implementing and managing
federal aircraft programs including GSA, OMB, other agencies, and
Congress. However, GSA opposes interfering in other agencies' internal
management controls for which the agencies are accountable. We agree
that no one party bears responsibility for effective federal aircraft
programs; therefore, some of our recommendations are directed at the
ICAP where all responsible parties can work together to improve the
management and use of federal aircraft. GSA also provided several
technical comments that we have incorporated where appropriate. GSA's
written comments are reproduced in appendix XI.
The Department of Justice generally agreed with much of the report, but
expressed concerns regarding the implications of some statements
contained in the report. First, the department stressed that DEA's
long-term planning examined only a portion of its fleet because it did
not have the financial resources or ability to identify specific
milestones for its aircraft in that time frame. Also, it stated that
the nature of DEA's mission was constantly changing, which makes it
impossible to know how many flight hours its aircraft will need to
perform. Instead, DEA focused its 5-year strategic plan on what could
realistically be accomplished within a 5-year period. While we
recognize that all government agencies have limited funding and
changing mission requirements, we believe that preparing a strategic
assessment of mission and fleet requirements is the foundation of
effective fleet management because such analysis can identify future
workload requirements, which define aircraft needs. We further believe
that having such a plan allows agencies to respond proactively to
existing and future needs and meet them as funding becomes available.
We encourage DEA to emulate the best practices of programs that have
prepared such a strategic assessment, such as FAA Flight Inspection and
DOJ's JPATS programs. Second, the department commented that it believes
that DEA's aircraft program is exempt from OMB Circular A-76 reviews
because the majority of its missions are inherently governmental and
require the use of law enforcement officers or other specialized DEA
employees. As we point out in this report, GAO has observed a long
history of noncompliance with OMB Circular A-76 and DEA, in particular,
has previously indicated its aviation function is exempt from OMB
Circular A-76 requirements because of the nature of its missions.
Specifically, in our 1983 report on federal civilian aircraft programs,
DEA stated that it is not realistic to expect drug law enforcement
aircraft services to be provided by the private sector. Its rationale
was that law enforcement needs are specialized and need to be available
on demand. At that time, we agreed with DEA that law enforcement is a
specialized area, but our position was, and remains, that all agencies
must comply with OMB Circular A-76 in determining whether aircraft can
be provided by the private sector. Also, DEA's argument is incongruous
with INL/A's routine use of a contractor to fly aircraft used in drug
eradication, interdiction, and surveillance missions. The department's
long-standing noncompliance with OMB Circular A-76 is an example of why
we have recommended OMB review its guidance and make necessary
clarifications on this matter. Finally, the department further
clarified DEA's internal safety review process and provided additional
information regarding planned external safety reviews of DEA's aviation
operations. We have incorporated this information in the body of this
report. The department also provided technical comments that we have
incorporated where appropriate. The department's written comments are
reproduced in appendix XII.
The Department of Agriculture agreed with virtually all of the comments
that specifically identified a USDA Forest Service need for improvement
and indicated that, in most cases, it believed it had complied with the
requirements of OMB Circulars A-76 and A-126 but realized it could
improve in the areas outlined in the draft report. The department
agreed with GAO's concerns about GSA's FAIRS database and believed the
draft report provided an accurate assessment of USDA Forest Service
aviation cost data. Finally, it welcomed the suggested improvements to
FAIRS and would like to be an active participant in making improvements
to the FAIRS database. The department's written comments are reproduced
in appendix XIII.
The Department of the Interior generally agreed with the findings and
recommendations contained in the report but offered clarifying comments
to information that pertains to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.
First, FWS expressed concerns regarding our finding that inaccurate
aviation cost data hampers the cost-effective operation of federally
owned aircraft because GAO based its assessment on data contained in
the FAIRS system rather than agency-specific data. FWS indicated it
does not use the information in GSA's database and, as a result, the
shortcomings of the FAIRS cost data do not impact the agency's ability
to cost effectively manage its aircraft fleet. While we recognize that
FWS does not utilize FAIRS data to manage its aircraft fleet, our
findings are based on the extent to which agencies used a comprehensive
system of key fleet management principles that include an analysis of
aircraft program cost data, as well as numerous other factors such as
long-term planning, cost-benefit analysis, and performance management
data. Second, while FWS agreed that it does not routinely track any
performance indicators, both FWS and DOI commented that reports are
available that track the daily utilization of individual aircraft that
could be used to monitor trends in utilization. As this report points
out, having information available on the utilization of aircraft can
provide valuable data on the performance of aircraft--data that can
support analytically-based fleet management decisions. As such,
utilizing these reports can only serve to aid the department and FWS in
managing its aircraft program. The department also provided technical
comments that we have incorporated where appropriate. The department's
written comments are reproduced in appendix XIV.
OMB representatives agreed with the facts, conclusions, and
recommendations of the report. With regard to the recommendation
directed to OMB, its staff suggested that we slightly modify our
original recommendation that it develop new guidance to one that
recommends they review existing guidance and identify any actions
needed to help ensure more consistency in the management of federal
aircraft programs. We agreed and have modified the recommendation to
OMB. OMB also provided technical comments that we incorporated where
appropriate.
The Department of Transportation provided technical comments, which we
incorporated where appropriate.
Officials from the Department of Energy agreed with the findings,
conclusions, and recommendations in the report and provided comments on
a few issues. First, the officials agreed with GAO's presentation of
the impact that OMB Circular A-11 has and will continue to have on
programs' ability to modernize their aging aircraft fleets. The
officials also stated that this issue merits further scrutiny from OMB
because of the potential to add sizable unnecessary costs to aircraft
programs. We agree that this issue is important and believe our
discussion adequately describes the challenges facing aircraft programs
as they attempt to modernize their fleets. Secondly, these officials
wanted to highlight the fact that internal safety reviews can be an
adequate mechanism for ensuring program safety if the review is
performed by qualified staff with the requisite safety and technical
expertise to oversee aviation operations. Although not cited in this
report, they believe DOE's own internal program could be a model for
other agencies to follow. Finally, DOE officials suggested that GAO
recognize that FAIRS is an improvement over the previous federal
aircraft database and has the ability to be an effective management
tool if agencies would consistently follow reporting requirements and
utilize the data in decision making. We agree that FAIRS has the
potential to assist agencies in cost effectively managing their
aircraft operations.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report
to congressional committees with responsibilities for the activities
discussed in this report; to the Secretaries of the agencies we
reviewed; and to the Administrators of the bureaus and offices we
reviewed. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In
addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site
at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions regarding the contents of this
report, please contact me at (202) 512-2834 or [Hyperlink,
heckerj@gao.gov]. Individuals making key contributions to this report
are listed in appendix XV.
Signed by:
JayEtta Z. Hecker:
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues:
[End of section]
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To provide information on the composition of the federal fleet and how
much it costs to operate and maintain, we examined both the General
Services Administration's (GSA) Federal Aviation Interactive Reporting
System (FAIRS) computer system and its underlying data to attempt to
determine the reliability of the information that the system provides.
We analyzed GSA's FAIRS data reporting requirements, the computer-based
system's internal controls, and the data that agencies reported into
the system. Where possible, we compared the data that the agencies
reported with that from their internal cost accounting systems. We
conducted interviews with GSA officials responsible for operating and
maintaining the FAIRS system and agency officials responsible for
reporting the data and ensuring its accuracy. In addition, we
interviewed an industry expert who specializes in aircraft program cost
accounting. For this report, we are using FAIRS data for fiscal years
2000 through 2002. Although agencies were required to submit their
fiscal year 2003 FAIRS data by December 31, 2003, GSA had not finalized
the data by the time we completed our analysis.
As part of our effort to examine GSA's FAIRS systems, we reviewed the
extent and quality of controls over federal aircraft data. In doing so,
we sought to determine whether (1) GSA had management controls in place
to provide reasonable assurance that the FAIRS data included in its
report were valid and reliable and (2) FAIRS data were sufficiently
reliable for our intended use. We identified and evaluated GSA's
management controls over the processes to collect, analyze, and report
costs, use, and numbers of government aircraft. We did not audit the
data that agencies submit to FAIRS, nor did we audit the data produced
by FAIRS or the information included by GSA in its annual reports. We
conducted background research and site visits; interviewed GSA
officials, and collected and reviewed documentation on GSA and FAIRS to
gain an understanding of GSA's operations and FAIRS processes, its
inherent and control risk factors, and existing management controls. We
documented our understanding of the processing of aircraft inventory,
cost, and use data in FAIRS and the identified internal controls in a
process flowchart. For each relevant process identified, we assessed
the overall effectiveness of existing controls by conducting a walk-
through of the system and performing control testing--physical
observation of how controls actually operated. Further, we evaluated
the results of our analyses and testing to conclude whether GSA
management controls provide reasonable assurance that the FAIRS data
included in GSA's annual report are valid and reliable. We found
information in the database was not sufficiently reliable to accurately
determine the composition and cost of federal aircraft programs,
however, we used the information to provide descriptive and summary
statistics. As a result, we developed recommendations for improving or
establishing management controls to help assure FAIRS data quality.
To determine the extent to which federal programs have systems and
controls in place to ensure that they are effectively and efficiently
acquiring and managing their aircraft fleets, we identified key
principles of aircraft fleet management/modernization planning and
assessed the extent to which the programs had implemented these
principles. In doing so, we reviewed the systems and controls that
seven specific aircraft programs in five agencies were currently using
to help ensure they acquire and manage their aircraft cost effectively
and operate and maintain their aircraft safely. The seven programs were
the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Forest Service, the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service in the Department of the Interior, the Drug
Enforcement Administration and the Justice Prisoner and Alien
Transportation System in the Department of Justice, the Bureau for
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Office of Aviation
in the Department of State, and the Federal Aviation Administration's
Flight Inspection and Washington Flight Program in the Department of
Transportation. We selected these five agencies because, according to
GSA's data at the time we began our review; they owned over 70 percent
of federal civilian aircraft and accounted for over 85 percent of
federal aircraft program costs. Also, the seven programs we selected
were some that had the greatest number of aircraft, historically
incurred the most costs, or covered a wide variety of aviation missions
(for detailed information on the seven programs, see appendixes IV
through X.)
As a part of our review of these programs, we interviewed officials
knowledgeable in fleet management at GSA, the various programs we
reviewed, and GSA's primary aviation consultant, and we reviewed and
analyzed the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), GSA, and Department
of Energy (DOE) guidance on cost effectively acquiring and managing
federal government aircraft. Based on the results of our interviews and
our analysis of these documents, we identified key principles of a
sound fleet management planning process, which we discussed with GSA
officials and GSA's primary aviation consultant. In addition, we
compared the systems and controls in place at each of the seven
programs we reviewed with the key fleet management principles outlined
in the available guidance. In doing so, we interviewed officials to
determine whether they had strategically assessed and identified the
optimal mix of aircraft to meet their programs' long-term mission
needs. We also identified the internal review and approval processes
for justifying aircraft acquisitions at each of the seven programs. We
also selected a nonprobabilistic sample of four to six aircraft in each
program and asked program officials to provide documentation to support
their acquisition decisions. The criteria for which we based our
selection of the 32 aircraft consisted of factors such as whether the
aircraft were airplanes or helicopters, the make and model of the
aircraft, and the date the program acquired the aircraft. Finally, we
interviewed officials at each of the programs to determine whether they
had implemented a comprehensive aviation performance management system.
During the course of our review, officials at some of the programs
expressed concerns about the impact of OMB Circular A-11 on their
abilities to cost effectively modernize their aircraft fleets. To learn
more about the impact of this circular, we held discussions with OMB
staff and reviewed a study prepared by GSA's consultant on this topic.
We also reviewed the operations, maintenance, safety standards, and
safety records for the federal fleet. To determine what systems federal
aircraft programs use to ensure safe operations, maintenance, and
safety standards, we interviewed GSA officials and representatives from
each of the selected aircraft programs. Further, we obtained
documentation from the selected aircraft programs and performed site
observations regarding the standards they use for their operations,
maintenance, and safety programs. We also subjectively selected
aircraft from the selected aircraft programs for detailed review and
completed data collection instruments pertaining to maintenance and
inspections of the aircraft. For each aircraft selected, we reviewed
available maintenance and inspection records, and discussed the pilots'
qualification requirements to operate the aircraft with program
officials. We also interviewed officials from the Aerial Firefighting
Industry Association, the Flight Safety Foundation, and the Helicopter
Association International to obtain information on safety within
federal, civil, and commercial aviation operations. However, we did not
test for compliance with each programs' standards as it relates to
their operations, maintenance, and safety programs. We also analyzed
GSA, Congressional Research Service, and congressional committee
reports on safety standards for federal aircraft programs.
To examine the safety record of federal agencies we developed a
database of aviation accidents and incidents, which occurred from April
1995 through October 2003, based on an analysis of the National
Transportation Safety Board's (NTSB) Aviation Accident Database. To
ensure that the NTSB's database was complete and up-to-date, we
conducted literature searches to identify federal aviation accidents,
we collected accident data from the agencies that participate in the
Interagency Committee for Aviation Policy, and included accidents that
NTSB identified for its public aircraft accident study. Where possible,
we developed information on the agency involved, the type of mission,
type of aircraft, accident severity, and flight operation among others.
We identified summary data on these elements and, where possible,
sought to identify trends in the data. We confirmed our analysis
methodology with officials from NSTB. Based on interviews with NTSB
officials and testing of the data, we determined that the data were
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Federal Aircraft Fleet Information:
To determine the composition of the federal aircraft fleet and how much
it costs to operate and maintain, we examined data that the agencies
reported into the Federal Aviation Interactive Reporting System
(FAIRS). We reviewed data for fiscal years 2000-2003, however, fiscal
year 2003 was not complete enough to include in our analysis.
Therefore, this section provides information for fiscal years 2000--
2002.[Footnote 32] Our review found four aircraft that should have been
listed in the database but were not. This represented an understatement
of about 0.3 percent. In addition, our review found discrepancies
between the flight hours that agencies reported to FAIRS and the
information we obtained directly from the seven flight programs we
reviewed. Our review of the cost information in the database found it
to be incomplete and inaccurate. We found that the cost data
significantly understates the true cost of federal aircraft programs.
Therefore, while FAIRS is the only comprehensive source of data on the
federal government's use of aircraft, care should be taken in drawing
conclusions based on the information. We are reporting the data in the
following tables and figures for information purposes only.
Composition of the Federal Aircraft Fleet:
Eleven federal agencies owned aircraft during fiscal years 2000-2002.
In addition, the Department of Agriculture and the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration own a number of aircraft that are loaned to
nonfederal entities.[Footnote 33] Table 4 contains detailed information
on the composition of the federal fleet.
Table 4: Number of Aircraft Owned by Federal Agencies, Fiscal Years
2000-2002:
Agency: Department of Agriculture;
2000: 89;
2001: 93;
2002: 77.
Agency: Department of Commerce;
2000: 14;
2001: 14;
2002: 13.
Agency: Department of Energy;
2000: 31;
2001: 30;
2002: 24.
Agency: Department of Justice;
2000: 331;
2001: 347;
2002: 348.
Agency: Department of State;
2000: 163;
2001: 158;
2002: 204.
Agency: Department of the Interior;
2000: 94;
2001: 98;
2002: 94.
Agency: Department of the Treasury;
2000: 131;
2001: 137;
2002: 137.
Agency: Department of Transportation;
2000: 52;
2001: 52;
2002: 52.
Agency: National Aeronautics and Space Administration;
2000: 107;
2001: 108;
2002: 108.
Agency: National Science Foundation;
2000: 14;
2001: 14;
2002: 13.
Agency: Tennessee Valley Authority;
2000: 9;
2001: 9;
2002: 9.
Agency: Subtotal;
2000: 1,035;
2001: 1,060;
2002: 1,079.
Agency: Loaned to the states;
2000: 236;
2001: 235;
2002: 289.
Total;
2000: 1,271;
2001: 1,295;
2002: 1,368.
Source: FY2000-2002 FAIRS reports.
Note: Several aircraft programs were transferred to the Department of
Homeland Security. The Department of Homeland Security began reporting
to FAIRS in fiscal year 2003.
[End of table]
According to FAIRS, in fiscal year 2002, the federal aircraft fleet was
composed of 236 different makes and models of aircraft produced by 45
different manufacturers. The fleet is composed of aircraft that are
classified as either airplanes or helicopters.[Footnote 34] Figure 6
shows the types of aircraft in the federal fleet in fiscal year 2002.
Figure 6: Types of Aircraft Owned by Federal Agencies, Fiscal Year
2002:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The federal aircraft fleet contains generally older aircraft--nearly 45
percent are 30 years or older. In fiscal year 2002, the average age of
aircraft in the fleet was 26 years old. Figure 7 shows the age of
federal aircraft grouped in 10-year increments.
Figure 7: Age of Federal Aircraft in Fiscal Year 2002:
[See PDF for image]
Note: Includes aircraft on loan to the states.
[End of figure]
The Department of Agriculture and the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration had the oldest aircraft--an average of 32 years in
fiscal year 2002. Table 5 shows the average age of aircraft in the
federal fleet during fiscal year 2002.
Table 5: Average Age of Federal Aircraft by Agency, Fiscal Year 2002
(in years):
Agency: Department of Agriculture;
2002: 32.
Agency: National Aeronautics and Space Administration;
2002: 32.
Agency: National Science Foundation;
2002: 28.
Agency: Department of Justice;
2002: 25.
Agency: Department of State;
2002: 24.
Agency: Department of the Interior;
2002: 20.
Agency: Department of the Treasury;
2002: 20.
Agency: Department of Commerce;
2002: 19.
Agency: Department of Transportation;
2002: 18.
Agency: Department of Energy;
2002: 17.
Agency: Tennessee Valley Authority;
2002: 16.
[End of table]
Source: FY 2002 FAIRS report.
Note: Includes aircraft on loan to the states.
Federal Aircraft Utilization:
To determine the extent to which federal aircraft are utilized, we
examined the flight hours reported to the FAIRS system. FAIRS does not
collect or maintain information on the usage of aircraft that are
loaned to the states. For the purposes of FAIRS, agencies track the
amount of time that an aircraft is airborne. Table 6 contains
information on aircraft utilization.
Table 6: Total Flight Hours of Aircraft Owned by Federal Agencies,
Fiscal Years 2000-2002:
Agency: Department of Agriculture;
2000: 26,337;
2001: 24,897;
2002: 26,756.
Agency: Department of Commerce;
2000: 2,869;
2001: 3,002;
2002: 3,800.
Agency: Department of Energy;
2000: 8,090;
2001: 8,286;
2002: 9,057.
Agency: Department of Justice;
2000: 101,387;
2001: 82,887;
2002: 107,373.
Agency: Department of State;
2000: 19,818;
2001: 29,149;
2002: 32,294.
Agency: Department of the Interior;
2000: 21,805;
2001: 17,792;
2002: 19,486.
Agency: Department of the Treasury;
2000: 38,223;
2001: 30,021;
2002: 44,907.
Agency: Department of Transportation;
2000: 15,253;
2001: 19,824;
2002: 23,582.
Agency: National Aeronautics and Space Administration;
2000: 20,024;
2001: 19,592;
2002: 15,545.
Agency: National Science Foundation;
2000: 933;
2001: 4;
2002: 731.
Agency: Tennessee Valley Authority;
2000: 3,274;
2001: 3,133;
2002: 2,874.
Agency: Total;
2000: 258,013;
2001: 238,587;
2002: 286,405.
[End of table]
Source: FY 2000-2002 FAIRS reports.
Aircraft Program Costs:
In attempting to determine the cost of federal aircraft programs, we
analyzed aircraft program costs contained in the FAIRS system. Table 7
shows the total costs that agencies reported to FAIRS for fiscal years
2000 through 2002.
Table 7: Total Cost of Federal Aircraft Programs, Fleet Aircraft and
Commercial Aviation Services Fiscal Years 2000-2002:
Dollars in millions.
Agency: Department of Agriculture;
2000: $230.1;
2001: $182.0;
2002: $280.0.
Agency: Department of Commerce;
2000: 6.5;
2001: 6.1;
2002: 8.6.
Agency: Department of Energy;
2000: 21.7;
2001: 21.8;
2002: 33.6.
Agency: Environmental Protection Agency[A];
2000: 0.4;
2001: 0.2;
2002: 0.3.
Agency: Federal Emergency Management Agency[A];
2000: 0.0;
2001: 0.0;
2002: < 0.1.
Agency: Department of Health and Human Services[A];
2000: 2.4;
2001: 1.4;
2002: 0.9.
Agency: Dept. of Housing and Urban Development[A];
2000: < 0.1;
2001: 0.0;
2002: 0.0.
Agency: Department of Justice;
2000: 80.8;
2001: 124.6;
2002: 83.8.
Agency: Department of State;
2000: 20.7;
2001: 33.7;
2002: 91.7.
Agency: Department of the Interior;
2000: 80.1;
2001: 78.1;
2002: 96.2.
Agency: Department of the Treasury;
2000: 41.9;
2001: 29.9;
2002: 50.1.
Agency: Department of Transportation;
2000: 76.0;
2001: 47.4;
2002: 49.1.
Agency: National Aeronautics and Space Administration;
2000: 75.5;
2001: 79.3;
2002: Not reported.
Agency: National Science Foundation;
2000: 21.7;
2001: 6.0;
2002: 8.3[B].
Agency: National Transportation Safety Board[A];
2000: < 0.1;
2001: 0.0;
2002: 0.0.
Agency: Tennessee Valley Authority;
2000: 3.4;
2001: 2.7;
2002: 2.8.
Agency: U.S. Arctic Research Commission[A];
2000: 0.0;
2001: < 0.1;
2002: 0.0.
Total[C];
2000: $661.5;
2001: $613.1;
2002: $705.6.
Source: FY 2000-2002 FAIRS reports.
[A] Several agencies do not own aircraft and use commercial aviation
services exclusively.
[B] The National Science Foundation did not report costs for the
Office of Polar Programs.
[C] Totals may not add due to rounding.
[End of table]
Table 8 shows the costs that agencies reported to FAIRS for fleet
aircraft during fiscal years 2000 through 2002.
Table 8: Cost of Federal Aircraft, Fiscal Years 2000-2002:
Dollars in millions.
Department of Agriculture;
2000: $8.3;
2001: $2.3;
2002: $11.2.
Department of Commerce;
2000: 6.4;
2001: 5.7;
2002: 8.0.
Department of Energy;
2000: 19.6;
2001: 20.3;
2002: 21.5.
Department of Justice;
2000: 57.9;
2001: 76.0;
2002: 53.2.
Department of State;
2000: 20.7;
2001: 33.7;
2002: 91.7.
Department of the Interior;
2000: 6.4;
2001: 6.3;
2002: 5.6.
Department of the Treasury;
2000: 41.7;
2001: 29.8;
2002: 50.1.
Department of Transportation;
2000: 70.4;
2001: 40.6;
2002: 43.7.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration;
2000: 75.5;
2001: 76.2;
2002: Not reported.
National Science Foundation;
2000: 2.9;
2001: < 0.1;
2002: 2.3[A].
Tennessee Valley Authority;
2000: 3.1;
2001: 2.5;
2002: 2.8.
Total[B];
2000: $312.9;
2001: $293.5;
2002: $289.9.
Source: FY 2000-2002 FAIRS reports.
[A] The National Science Foundation did not report costs for the Office
of Polar Programs.
[B] Totals may not add due to rounding.
[End of table]
Agencies sometimes acquire commercial aviation services from the
private sector. Some agencies that do not own their own aircraft still
use aircraft and are required to report those costs to FAIRS.
Therefore, the number of agencies reporting commercial aviation
services costs is greater than the number of agencies in table 8.
Table 9 shows the costs that agencies reported to FAIRS for commercial
aviation services during fiscal years 2000 through 2002.
Table 9: Cost of Commercial Aviation Services, Fiscal Years 2000-2002:
Dollars in millions.
Department of Agriculture;
2000: $221.8;
2001: $179.7;
2002: $268.9.
Department of Commerce;
2000: < 0.1;
2001: 0.4;
2002: 0.5.
Department of Energy;
2000: 2.1;
2001: 1.4;
2002: 12.2.
Environmental Protection Agency[A];
2000: 0.4;
2001: 0.2;
2002: 0.3.
Federal Emergency Management Agency[A];
2000: 0.0;
2001: 0.0;
2002: < 0.1.
Department of Health and Human Services[A];
2000: 2.4;
2001: 1.4;
2002: 0.9.
Dept. of Housing and Urban Development[A];
2000: < 0.1;
2001: 0.0;
2002: 0.0.
Department of Justice;
2000: 23.0;
2001: 48.6;
2002: 30.7.
Department of State;
2000: 0.0;
2001: 0.0;
2002: 0.0.
Department of the Interior;
2000: 73.7;
2001: 71.7;
2002: 90.6.
Department of the Treasury;
2000: 0.1;
2001: < 0.1;
2002: 0.0.
Department of Transportation;
2000: 5.6;
2001: 6.7;
2002: 5.4.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration;
2000: 0.0;
2001: 3.1;
2002: 0.0.
National Science Foundation;
2000: 18.8;
2001: 6.0;
2002: 6.0[B].
National Transportation Safety Board[A];
2000: < 0.1;
2001: 0.0;
2002: 0.0.
Tennessee Valley Authority;
2000: 0.3;
2001: 0.2;
2002: < 0.1.
U.S. Arctic Research Commission[A];
2000: 0.0;
2001: < 0.1;
2002: 0.0.
Total[C];
2000: $348.3;
2001: $319.6;
2002: $415.6.
Source: FY 2000-2002 FAIRS reports.
[A] These agencies do not own aircraft and use commercial aviation
services exclusively.
[B] The National Science Foundation did not report costs for the
Office of Polar Programs.
[C] Totals may not add due to rounding.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Review of FAIRS Internal Controls:
The General Services Administration (GSA) developed the Federal
Aviation Interactive Reporting System (FAIRS) to fulfill its
responsibilities for maintaining a management information system to
collect, analyze, and report information on the inventory, cost, and
usage of government aircraft. In order ensure the system contains
accurate and complete information, GSA must have effective controls
over the system and data it contains. Our review found, that overall,
GSA's internal control system did not have sufficient, effective
control procedures in place to provide reasonable assurance that the
FAIRS data included in the annual GSA report are valid and reliable. We
found data stewardship controls and systems controls over validity and
reliability of data ranging in effectiveness from in-place-and-working-
as-expected to in-place-but-not-working (ineffective).[Footnote 35]
More importantly, we identified specific control procedures that should
be in place but did not exist. Any management controls that are
partially effective, ineffective, or nonexistent increase the risk for
nonvalid, incomplete, or inaccurate data entering the system.
Requirements for GSA to Maintain Effective Control over the FAIRS
System:
As a governmentwide operational data steward for central agency data,
GSA should comply with requirements that are applicable to federal
agencies that manage governmentwide programs and to central data
stewards' information systems, such as FAIRS. Furthermore, federal
agencies that use aircraft to accomplish their missions and GSA, as
management coordinator for federal aircraft, should also comply with
requirements in federal regulations and authoritative guidance
specifically crafted both for the management and operations of federal
agencies' aircraft programs and for the implementation and use of cost
accounting and information systems. These requirements are spelled out
in numerous documents such as Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
circulars, financial accounting standards, government internal control
and auditing standards, and FAIRS manuals. Figure 8 outlines the
framework of criteria applicable to GSA's management of the FAIRS
system.
Figure 8: Hierarchy of Criteria Used to Review Controls over GSA's
FAIRS System:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
As the figure shows, GSA must follow numerous requirements in
administering the FAIRS system. The controls needed to meet these
requirements and thereby ensure validity and reliability of data in the
FAIRS system can be grouped into two main categories. The first
category is data stewardship controls, which are procedures that a
central agency needs to institute to ensure that agencies capture and
report valid and reliable data. They include items such as procedures
to ensure that all agencies comply with data reporting requirements and
tests to ensure that reported data is accurate. The second category is
system controls, which are controls over FAIRS to ensure proper
operation of the system and accurate data processing. These include
items such as mechanisms to ensure that the system does not accept
invalid data entries.
GSA Needs More Effective Data Stewardship Controls:
To meet its data stewardship responsibilities, GSA should have certain
procedures in place to ensure that the aircraft inventory, cost, and
use data that agencies generate and report to FAIRS are valid and
reliable. Our review found that GSA had a range of data stewardship
controls in place, but that many of them were only partially effective.
For example, GSA does not ensure that all agencies report their costs
in compliance with reporting requirements. GSA officials stated that
they work with agencies to help them understand the cost reporting
requirements and urge them to comply. However, we found one agency
lumped all of their costs under one cost element, instead of breaking
out its costs among multiple cost elements as required by the Cost
Accounting Guide. As a result, cost data reported by this agency did
not contain detail needed for accurate compilation and analyses in
FAIRS.
We also found that GSA had not implemented several other data
stewardship controls. For example, GSA does not review the agencies'
cost accounting systems or require that agencies' auditors review those
systems for compliance with GSA's Cost Accounting Guide. Also, GSA does
not routinely test agencies' data for completeness and accuracy. While
GSA confirms FAIRS data with agency officials prior to releasing its
annual report, GSA does not compare FAIRS data with agencies'
information systems. Further, agencies routinely make changes to
existing FAIRS data after GSA's annual report is issued. GSA, however,
does not disclose the changes that agencies made in subsequent annual
reports. Table 10 displays our analysis and evaluation of data
stewardship controls by effectiveness of the controls.
Table 10: Analysis of Data Stewardship Controls:
Effective (control in place and working): Provide agencies with
guidance on data requirements including the Cost Accounting Guide and
the FAIRS Users Manual;
Partially effective (control in place, but only working to a certain
extent): Provide technical assistance to agencies in establishing their
cost accounting systems;
Ineffective (control in place, but not working): None;
Missing (control not in place): GSA should foster full costing for
agencies cost accounting systems.
Effective (control in place and working): Provide draft of annual
report to agencies for comment and proposed changes;
Partially effective (control in place, but only working to a certain
extent): Require agencies to use prescribed data elements for reporting
aircraft cost data;
Missing (control not in place): GSA should check accounting systems
for compliance with the Cost Accounting Guide.
Partially effective (control in place, but only working to a certain
extent): Verify that aircraft cost and use data collected from agencies
are in compliance with reporting requirements;
Missing (control not in place): GSA should routinely check data that
agencies report to FAIRS for completeness and accuracy.
Partially effective (control in place, but only working to a certain
extent): Establish data entry/approval procedures and edit checks to
promote validity and reliability of data;
Missing (control not in place): Changes to prior annual reports should
be disclosed in subsequent annual reports.
Partially effective (control in place, but only working to a certain
extent): Systematically perform analytical reviews of cost and use data
reported to FAIRS.
Source: GAO analysis GSA's data stewardship controls.
[End of table]
GSA Lacks Effective FAIRS Systems Controls:
GSA has incorporated numerous system controls in FAIRS to help maintain
data integrity once the aircraft inventory, cost, and use data are
input into the system and even after the issuance of the annual report.
However, we found that some of the controls in place were not effective
and other control procedures that should exist were missing or not in
place. For example, certain controls over who should review, correct,
and approve data were ineffective. Further, we found controls to
prevent input of negative values for aircraft costs and hours do not
exist. Table 11 depicts our analysis of systems controls by
effectiveness of controls.
Table 11: Analysis of Systems Controls:
Effective (control in place and working): Only agency-authorized and
GSA-trained persons can access FAIRS;
Partially effective (control in place, but only working to a certain
extent): Triggers prevent improper entry, review, correction, or
approval of aircraft inventory, cost and use data;
Ineffective (control in place, but not working): Only the FAIRS
administrator should be able to change approved inventory;
Missing (control not in place): FAIRS should not allow reviewer to
enter new aircraft inventory or cost and use data.
Effective (control in place and working): Triggers allow only an
agency-authorized user to enter new, or correct disapproved data;
Ineffective (control in place, but not working): Only agency-authorized
reviewer should be able to mark and use data as approved;
Missing (control not in place): FAIRS should not allow negative
aircraft cost and use data to be accepted.
Effective (control in place and working): Triggers allow only records
without errors on aircraft cost and use data to be uploaded via batch
processing;
Ineffective (control in place, but not working): Approved CAS cost and
use data should only be changed with the assistance of the FAIRS
administrator;
Missing (control not in place): Disposal date entered should not be
prior to the acquisition date.
Effective (control in place and working): Only agency-authorized
reviewer can review and mark aircraft cost and use data as approved;
Missing (control not in place): Use data entered should not be greater
than the maximum number of hours available for the reporting period.
Effective (control in place and working): Approved federal aircraft
cost and use data can only be changed with the assistance of the FAIRS
administrator.
Effective (control in place and working): Status automatically changes
to awaiting review or system accepted, not reviewed after specific time
frames.
Effective (control in place and working): Control access to report and
data in FAIRS and make corrections as proposed by agencies.
Source: GAO analysis of GSA's system controls.
[End of table]
Policy Issues Affecting GSA's Controls over FAIRS Data:
GSA officials expressed concerns about a variety of issues affecting
their ability to implement controls to ensure that agencies report
complete and accurate information to FAIRS. This included the validity
and reliability of data generated and reported by the agencies and in
FAIRS, their data sources and related cost accounting systems, GSA
management resources, aircraft management policies, regulations and
authoritative guidance, and advisory oversight. Specifically, because
the U.S. Government Aircraft Cost Accounting Guide does not require
that agencies report depreciation, self-insurance cost, or finance
costs to FAIRS, agencies do not include them in the costs they report
to FAIRS and, therefore, the costs of federal aircraft programs GSA
includes in its annual report do not reflect full costing. GSA
officials told us that they are concerned that problems with cost
accounting throughout the government make it difficult to determine the
full costs associated with federal aircraft programs.
GSA officials brought up two examples of deficiencies by aircraft
program managers that adversely affect data reliability in FAIRS: (1)
some agencies do not have cost accounting systems that capture aviation
costs by the same categories or in the same detail as FAIRS and (2)
some agencies do not collect aircraft costs quarterly. Furthermore, GSA
officials expressed concern about the incomplete and inaccurate nature
of the federal aircraft cost data in FAIRS. At the same time, one
official acknowledged that GSA shared a responsibility for the
agencies' data quality, but he said GSA had very limited resources to
exert program oversight. The officials also supported changes to
policies and authoritative guidance for increased resources to meet
oversight requirements.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Federal Aviation Administration, Flight Inspection
Program:
Program Description:
The Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) Flight Inspection Program
is one of six FAA flight programs, each of which utilizes government-
owned aircraft and or commercial aviation services to fulfill its
mission. The Flight Inspection Program's mission is to help ensure the
integrity of airspace systems in the U.S. and abroad through inspection
and testing of navigational aids and flight procedures at public,
private, and military facilities. The Flight Inspection Program
accomplishes this through airborne inspection and testing of ground-
based equipment, satellite, and electronic signals in space that pilots
used to safely navigate their aircraft. This mission requires that FAA
operate aircraft with special communication and navigation devices that
allow it to perform required inspections.
The Flight Inspection Program is headquartered in Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma, where FAA centrally manages flight operations and aircraft
maintenance. FAA also maintains an aircraft hangar and maintenance and
repair facilities in Oklahoma City. The program has six domestic flight
inspection field offices located throughout the country from which FAA
aircraft are dispatched to inspect and test the U.S. airspace
system.[Footnote 36] The domestic flight inspection function includes
inspection of U.S. military facilities and is governed by a memorandum
of agreement (MOA) with the Air Force. Under the MOA, the Air Force
provides FAA with staffing to support military contingency flight
inspection missions. The program also has an international flight
inspection field office located in Oklahoma City from which FAA
aircraft conduct missions outside of the United States. These
international missions include inspection of U.S. military facilities
overseas, which are also governed by the MOA, as well as inspection of
foreign airspace systems for countries that agree to reimburse FAA.
Aircraft Fleet and Operating Statistics:
The Flight Inspection Program currently operates a fleet of 30
government-owned airplanes; composed of four different makes and
models. The average age of these aircraft is about 14 years. The
program does not contract for commercial aviation services. Table 12
below shows that according to data in the FAIRS database, the overall
cost of and utilization of the Flight Inspection Program fleet aircraft
has increased since fiscal year 2000, reflecting the increased workload
of the program.
Table 12: Cost and Utilization of Flight Inspection Aircraft, Fiscal
Years 2000-2002:
Fiscal years: 2000;
Costs: $26,142,084;
Flight hours: 11,617.
Fiscal years: 2001;
Costs: $30,850,449;
Flight hours: 14,030.
Fiscal years: 2002;
Costs: $29,749,417;
Flight hours: 15,014.
Total;
Costs: $86,741,950;
Flight hours: 40,661.
Source: GAO's analyses of FAIRS database.
[End of table]
Aircraft Planning Process:
Fleet management planning in the Flight Inspection Program comprises a
mix of short-and long-range planning to help ensure the program has a
cost-effective mix of aviation resources to achieve its mission. FAA
officials indicated that flight operations managers perform short-range
planning on a continual basis by assessing workload requirements and
assigning available aircraft to meet those requirements. Managers try
to ensure that they have the optimal mix of fleet aircraft spread
around the country. Short-range fleet planning also requires managers
to coordinate with the Air Force to ensure that sufficient aircraft are
available to meet military needs under the MOA. Managers perform long-
range planning, and such planning is designed to ensure the program has
the most cost-effective mix of aircraft to meet its long-term mission
requirements. Program officials completed the most recent long-range
plan in July 2002.
Aircraft Acquisition Process:
In 1999 FAA created the Aircraft Fleet Modernization Integrated Product
Team (IPT) to help ensure that aircraft acquisition decisions are
justified and based on defined mission requirements. Therefore, when
Flight Inspection Program managers determine they need to acquire an
aircraft, they begin the aircraft acquisition process by providing the
IPT with a mission needs justification for acquiring the aircraft.
Working with Flight Inspection Program managers, the IPT will prepare a
requirements document that provides initial justification for acquiring
an aircraft. Once the requirements document is approved by FAA's
Associate Administrator for Air Traffic Services, IPT officials
indicated they begin assessing the life cycle costs of different
options, such as purchasing or leasing new aircraft or rehabilitating
existing aircraft. Staff from FAA's finance office then independently
reviews the life cycle cost analyses and, if it concurs that the
assumptions underlying the aircraft requirements are justified, it
forwards a procurement request to FAA's Joint Resources Council (JRC).
This is a headquarters group of Associate Administrators that controls
the funding for major capital projects. If this council authorizes
funding, the FAA Administrator must make a final approval, and then the
procurement process can begin.
To gain a better understanding of how the Flight Inspection Program has
traditionally justified their aircraft acquisitions and the type of
documentation used to support aircraft acquisition decisions, we asked
program officials to provide documentation on four aircraft that they
acquired. Since the Flight Inspection Program had not identified a need
for new aircraft for a number of years, justifications for all four of
the aircraft pre-dated FAA's creation of the IPT and its review
process. Results from our review of these four aircraft are summarized
in table 13.
Table 13: Documentation Supporting Four Flight Inspection Aircraft
Acquisitions:
Aircraft (type): Learjet 60;
(airplane);
Acquisition date: January 5, 1996;
Purchase price: $19,035,000;
Justification: Aircraft needed to improve cost, reliability, and range
over existing aircraft;
A-76 study completed: No;
Cost benefit analysis provided: Yes.
Aircraft (type): Beechcraft B300 (airplane);
Acquisition date: October 21, 1988;
Purchase price: [A];
Justification: [A];
A-76 study completed: No;
Cost benefit analysis provided: No[A].
Aircraft (type): Challenger CL-600 (airplane);
Acquisition date: August 8, 1997;
Purchase price: $30,112,000;
Justification: Aircraft needed to improve cost, reliability, and range
over existing aircraft;
A-76 study completed: No;
Cost benefit analysis provided: Yes.
Aircraft (type): British Aerospace BAe-800A (airplane);
Acquisition date: October 1, 1991;
Purchase price: $0;
Justification: Obtained from U.S. Air Force to perform military flight
inspection;
A- 76 study completed: N/A;
Cost benefit analysis provided: N/A.
Source: GAO's analysis of GSA and FAA data.
[A] The program officials were unable to provide this information
because they said records had been destroyed due to the length of time
since the aircraft was purchased.
[End of table]
During our review, we learned that one of these aircraft was originally
obtained by the U.S. Air Force and transferred at no cost to FAA, so we
determined that our questions did not apply to that specific aircraft
acquisition. As the table shows, the program officials were able to
provide limited documentation supporting their justification for
acquiring the remaining three aircraft. Specifically, program officials
did not complete any A-76 studies, but they did complete cost benefit
analyses for two of these three aircraft. Regarding completing A-76
studies, in commenting on a draft of this report, FAA officials
stressed that they determined they were exempt from completing reviews
for these aircraft and that officials followed applicable agency policy
in effect at the time they acquired these aircraft.
Aviation Metrics and Performance Management:
Program managers track a number of aviation metrics to monitor the
operation and maintenance of their aircraft. To help ensure that
aircraft are available to accomplish their missions, the Flight
Inspection Program's Maintenance and Engineering Division has
implemented a fleet reliability program. According to FAA officials,
this program not only judges the effectiveness of flight inspection
aircraft, it is designed to improve effectiveness and reliability by
making appropriate adjustments to the maintenance program based on
fleet performance. FAA officials said the program has the following
five objectives:
* ensure safety and reliability levels of the aircraft and its
equipment,
* restore safety levels when a safety weakness is detected or has
occurred,
* obtain information necessary to improve the reliability of parts and
appliances,
* allow aircraft systems and components/parts to dictate the
appropriate maintenance process and intervals, and:
* provide economic criteria to reduce maintenance costs and increase
aircraft availability.
Under this program, flight inspection officials indicated that
maintenance staff established three key performance measures and
associated performance goals and a system to track their ability to
meet these goals. The three measures are dispatch reliability,
scheduled completion rate, and aircraft availability. Dispatch
reliability is the percentage of scheduled flights that depart within
30 minutes of scheduled departure times. The program's goals are 95
percent for domestic flights and 90 percent for international flights.
Schedule completion rate is the percentage of scheduled flights
completed without a mechanical cancellation. The program's goals are 95
percent for domestic flights and 90 percent for international flights.
Aircraft availability is the total number of aircraft that are
currently available to meet mission requirements. The program's goal is
to have 22 of the 30 fleet aircraft available for use at any time.
Maintenance staff produces a quarterly report comparing actual fleet
performance with these goals. Program managers indicated that they
track other operational statistics such as total flight hours, average
daily flight hours, and cost per flight hour for each aircraft, and
these measures can help determine if other Flight Inspection goals have
been met, such as reducing the amount of en route time. In terms of
assessing the cost-effectiveness of aircraft, Flight Inspection
officials indicated that they have not periodically reviewed the cost-
effectiveness of their entire fleet of aircraft to comply with OMB
Circular A-126.
Safety Statistics:
The Flight Inspection Program has not had any National Transportation
Safety Board reportable accidents or incidents since 1995.
[End of section]
Appendix V: Department of Justice, Justice Prisoner and Alien
Transportation System:
Program Description:
In 1995, the air fleets of the U.S. Marshals Service and the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) merged to create the
Justice Prisoner and Alien Transportation System (JPATS). Operated by
the U.S. Marshals Service, JPATS supports the federal judiciary by
scheduling and transporting thousands of prisoners and criminal and
administrative aliens each year to courts, hearings, and detention
facilities around the country. JPATS also provides regular
international flights for the removal of deportable aliens. JPATS'
primary customers are the U.S. Marshals Service, the Bureau of Prisons
(BOP), and the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (BICE);
but military and other civilian law enforcement agencies, including
state agencies, also use JPATS to transport their prisoners.
JPATS transports prisoners and aliens for its customers on a cost-
reimbursable basis; charging each customer a portion of its total fixed
and variable costs based on the number of persons it transports for
each customer on a given aircraft. JPATS accomplishes nearly all its
air movements with aircraft that the U.S. Marshals Service owns or
leases, including Boeing 727s, McDonnell Douglas 82s, and several
smaller jets. JPATS is headquartered in Kansas City, Missouri, where a
scheduling center and business management office are maintained. The
seat of the air operations is located in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, with
operational hubs in Mesa, Arizona; Alexandria, Louisiana; Anchorage,
Alaska; and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
Aircraft Fleet and Operating Statistics:
JPATS currently has a fleet of 10 government-owned aircraft, 4 of which
it uses to conduct flight operations, and 6 of which JPATS is
attempting to dispose of through sale. The 4 aircraft comprise three
different makes and models. The average age of all 10 aircraft is 28.5
years, and the average age of the 4 aircraft in use is 20.75 years.
Table 14 shows that according to data in the FAIRS database, the total
cost of JPATS' fleet aircraft fluctuated during the period, while total
flight hours declined. Also, JPATS' use of commercial aviation services
has increased during the period. Fluctuations in the total cost data on
fleet aircraft are partially attributable to JPATS taking out of
service some large aircraft and relying more on commercial aviation
services.
Table 14: Cost and Utilization JPATS Aircraft and Commercial Aviation
Services, Fiscal Years 2000-2002:
Fiscal years: 2000;
JPATS owned aircraft: Costs: $29,809,437;
JPATS owned aircraft: Flight hours: 6,109;
Commercial aviation services: Costs: $22,957,056;
Commercial aviation services: Flight hours: 5,988;
Total JPATS program: Costs: $52,766,493;
Total JPATS program: Flight hours: 12,097.
Fiscal years: 2001;
JPATS owned aircraft: Costs: $41,733,772;
JPATS owned aircraft: Flight hours: 5,449;
Commercial aviation services: Costs: $25,699,656;
Commercial aviation services: Flight hours: 6,010;
Total JPATS program: Costs: $67,433,428;
Total JPATS program: Flight hours: 11,459.
Fiscal years: 2002;
JPATS owned aircraft: Costs: $18,892,169;
JPATS owned aircraft: Flight hours: 4,630;
Commercial aviation services: Costs: $30,585,593;
Commercial aviation services: Flight hours: 6,805;
Total JPATS program: Costs: $49,477,762;
Total JPATS program: Flight hours: 11,435.
Fiscal years: Total;
JPATS owned aircraft: Costs: $90,435,378;
JPATS owned aircraft: Flight hours: 16,188;
Commercial aviation services: Costs: $79,242,305;
Commercial aviation services: Flight hours: 18,803;
Total JPATS program: Costs: $169,677,683;
Total JPATS program: Flight hours: 34,991.
Source: GAO analysis of FAIRS database.
[End of table]
Aircraft Planning Process:
Fleet management planning at JPATS focuses on a mix of short and long-
range planning, and is designed to help ensure that JPATS has a cost-
effective mix of aviation resources to meet its customers'
requirements. According to JPATS officials, short-range fleet planning
is performed on an annual basis and is tied to the annual budget
process. In developing short-range plans, JPATS and its three primary
customers--BOP, U.S. Marshals, and BICE--determine the projected
workload for an upcoming year, and determine whether the current mix of
aircraft is adequate to cost effectively meet anticipated requirements.
Based on anticipated budget amounts, the organizations agree on a final
mix of aircraft and on a final expected number of prisoner and alien
movements. According to JPATS officials, long-range fleet planning is
done on a periodic, as needed basis, and helps JPATS ensure they have
most appropriate aircraft to meet their long-term mission requirements.
JPATS completed its most recent long-range fleet plan in 1997.
Aircraft Acquisition Process:
JPATS officials indicated that their current process for justifying
aircraft acquisitions was put into place about three years ago. This
process begins when managers from a variety of JPATS offices, including
business, operations, and security, along with managers from JPATS
major customers, identify a need for additional aircraft. At this time,
JPATS will prepare technical specifications of potential new aircraft
and either contract for independent analyses or conduct in-house
studies to determine the type and quantity of aircraft to acquire and
whether to purchase or lease specific aircraft. During this time, JPATS
conducts many meetings, process reviews, and cost-benefit and
alternative analyses, according to JPATS officials. This typically
would include preparing a life cycle costing of various aircraft
acquisition options, but officials indicated that there is no specific
requirement about the level of analyses needed to justify acquisition
decisions. Once JPATS reaches a conclusion about a specific option, it
forwards its recommendation to the JPATS Executive Committee for review
and approval. The committee is JPATS' board of directors, is chaired by
the Assistant Attorney General, and includes senior managers from the
U.S. Marshals Service, the BOP, BICE, and the Office of Detention
Trustee. If the committee approves the aircraft acquisition, and
funding is available, JPATS can acquire the aircraft.
To gain a better understanding of how JPATS has traditionally justified
aircraft acquisitions, including the type of documentation used to
support aircraft acquisition decisions, we asked JPATS officials to
provide documentation on four aircraft that it acquired. Results from
our review of these four aircraft are summarized in table 15.
Table 15: Documentation Supporting Four JPATS Aircraft Acquisitions:
Aircraft (type): Airplane 1;
Acquisition date: May 11, 2000;
Purchase price: $971,000;
Justification: Obtained to temporarily backfill for retired Sabreliner
while waiting for Hawker funding;
A-76 study completed: No;
Cost benefit analysis provided: No[A].
Aircraft (type): Airplane 2;
Acquisition date: November 19, 1996;
Purchase price: $4,268,000;
Justification: Needed a larger aircraft to meet customer needs after
JPATS formed;
A-76 study completed: No;
Cost benefit analysis provided: No[A].
Aircraft (type): Airplane 3;
Acquisition date: December 3, 2001;
Purchase price: $8,000,000;
Justification: Obtained as a long- term replacement for Sabreliner;
A-76 study completed: No;
Cost benefit analysis provided: Yes.
Aircraft (type): Airplane 4;
Acquisition date: April 19, 1995;
Purchase price: $1,994,950;
Justification: Enabled U.S. Marshals Service (prior to JPATS) to use
owned aircraft rather than charter for missions;
A-76 study completed: No;
Cost benefit analysis provided: No.
Source: GAO analysis of JPATS documentation and interviews.
Note: Information on aircraft type is not included because DOJ
considers it to be sensitive law enforcement information.
[A] JPATS officials stated they completed cost-benefit studies for
these aircraft but could not find them.
[End of table]
As the table shows, JPATS officials were able to provide only limited
documentation supporting their justification for acquiring these
aircraft. Specifically, JPATS did not complete any A-76 studies and
could provide a cost benefit review for only one of the four aircraft.
It should be noted that for several, more recent planned acquisitions,
JPATS has completed detailed cost-benefit analyses, which they believe
is happening more consistently since they implemented the Executive
Committee approval process in 1999.
Aviation Metrics and Performance Management:
JPATS officials indicated that they rely on eight performance metrics
to monitor and assess their program. These metrics are composed of a
combination of cost and performance metrics that JPATS routinely track
and generally report on an annual, biannual, or monthly basis. These
metrics include cost per flight hour, aircraft availability, and total
flight hours per aircraft. Officials indicated that these metrics
provide data to help managers assess the performance of each aircraft.
JPATS officials stated that these metrics are used internally to assess
the program, and are provided to each major customer so they can
perform their own analyses of the program. In addition, JPATS officials
indicated that they prepare a monthly report of operations, which
includes a monthly income statement, and that such data is used to
track cost performance and compare it with budgets. These reports are
also shared with JPATS' major customers, and the information is used to
make any changes in rates that JPATS charges. Officials indicated that,
due to their ongoing analyses, they do not believe it is necessary to
perform periodic assessments of their fleet to comply with OMB Circular
A-126.
Safety Statistics:
From April 1995 through October 2003, JPATS experienced one nonfatal,
noninjury accident and one noninjury incident, both of which occurred
during 2000. The accident occurred while landing during a training
mission, and the incident occurred while transporting 86 federal
prisoners. According to National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
aircraft accident data, the accident was a result of the pilot's
improper remedial action and his failure to maintain directional
control of the airplane during landing. The incident occurred as a
result of a material failure of a wing flap section due to inadequate
maintenance according to results of a NTSB investigation.
[End of section]
Appendix VI: Department of Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service:
Program Description:
The Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS') mission is working with others to
conserve, protect, and enhance fish, wildlife, plants and their
habitats for the continuing benefit of the American people. To help
accomplish this mission, FWS uses aircraft to conduct a variety of
activities, including wildlife surveys, aerial photography, radio
telemetry, fire reconnaissance, and law enforcement. Aircraft are used
to support the Refuge, Migratory Bird Management, Fisheries and Habitat
Conservation, Endangered Species, and Law Enforcement programs. The FWS
aircraft program is headquartered in Albuquerque, New Mexico, and is
directed by a National Aviation Manager. The program has seven Regional
Aviation Managers spread throughout Alaska and the Lower 48 States who
manage aircraft operations in their regions. As part of the Department
of Interior (DOI), the FWS program falls under the policies and
oversight of DOI's National Business Center-Aircraft Management
Directorate (AMD). As a centralized aviation management oversight and
support office for all DOI aviation activities, AMD establishes policy,
oversees aviation safety, provides contract services, and maintains
accounting and financial information for all aircraft use within
DOI.[Footnote 37]
Aircraft Fleet and Operating Statistics:
The FWS currently operates a fleet of 57 government-owned aircraft, 36
that are located in Alaska and 21 in the Lower 48 States. Of these
aircraft, 56 are airplanes, and one is a helicopter, and the average
age of 54 of these aircraft is about 22 years.[Footnote 38] Table 16
shows that according to data in the FAIRS database, the overall cost of
these fleet aircraft has declined slightly since fiscal year 2000,
while utilization has fluctuated. FWS' cost and utilization of
commercial aviation services also fluctuated over the period.
Table 16: Cost and Flight Hours FWS Aircraft and Commercial Aviation
Services, Fiscal Years 2000-2002:
Fiscal years: 2000;
FWS owned aircraft: Costs: $2,626,980;
FWS owned aircraft: Flight hours: 10,936;
Commercial aviation services: Costs: $3,836,388;
Commercial aviation services: Flight hours: 8,928;
Total FWS program: Costs: $6,463,368;
Total FWS program: Flight hours: 19,864.
Fiscal years: 2001;
FWS owned aircraft: Costs: $2,532,318;
FWS owned aircraft: Flight hours: 9,610;
Commercial aviation services: Costs: $3,407,924;
Commercial aviation services: Flight hours: 5,811;
Total FWS program: Costs: $5,940,242;
Total FWS program: Flight hours: 15,421.
Fiscal years: 2002;
FWS owned aircraft: Costs: $2,467,529;
FWS owned aircraft: Flight hours: 11,579;
Commercial aviation services: Costs: $4,078,422;
Commercial aviation services: Flight hours: 6,037;
Total FWS program: Costs: $6,545,951;
Total FWS program: Flight hours: 17,616.
Fiscal years: Total;
FWS owned aircraft: Costs: $7,626,827;
FWS owned aircraft: Flight hours: 32,125;
Commercial aviation services: Costs: $11,322,734;
Commercial aviation services: Flight hours: 20,776;
Total FWS program: Costs: $18,949,561;
Total FWS program: Flight hours: 52,901.
Source: GAO analysis of FAIRS database.
Note: FWS officials stated that the FAIRS database was a subset of the
data AMD maintained and that, therefore, was not the most accurate
source of the use and cost of FWS aircraft. Also, there are three FWS
aircraft used for undercover operations that are not listed in FAIRS
and, therefore, not included in the table.
[End of table]
Aircraft Planning Process:
Fleet management planning at FWS focuses on a mix of mid-to-long-range
planning and is designed to help ensure that FWS has a cost-effective
mix of aviation resources to achieve its mission. With respect to
midrange planning, FWS, along with the other bureaus and AMD staff,
develop a 5-year fleet replacement plan at an annual meeting of
aviation managers. The plans outlines which specific aircraft the
bureaus would like to replace for each of the next 5 years. According
to the FWS National Aviation Manager, aircraft chosen for replacement
are typically older aircraft or aircraft that have accumulated a
significant amount of flight hours. The plan is updated each year and
adjusted as aircraft are disposed or refurbished and as funding for
replacement aircraft becomes available. In addition to this ongoing
midrange planning, FWS also undertakes some long-range fleet planning.
The manager said that, while FWS has not prepared a strategic
assessment of its entire fleet, it has performed long-range assessments
as fleet needs warrant. For example, FWS recently developed a long-term
plan for replacing its entire fleet of nine migratory bird amphibious
survey aircraft.
Aircraft Acquisition Process:
The FWS Program Managers, National Aviation Manager, and Regional
Aviation Managers are responsible for determining whether FWS needs to
acquire additional aircraft. These managers can identify aircraft that
need to be replaced either through the 5-year replacement planning
process or by identifying additional aircraft that are needed to meet
mission requirements. FWS can acquire aircraft or aviation services
through purchase, lease, or through contracting for commercial aviation
services. With respect to purchasing or leasing new aircraft, once a
need is identified, FWS managers are responsible for preparing an A-76
analysis to determine whether it is more cost-effective to purchase the
aircraft and operate it with government pilots or to use some other
combination of acquisition methods. This could include leasing an
aircraft and operating it with government pilots or contracting out the
entire operation. The National Aviation Manager said there was no
specific requirement to conduct a life cycle cost analysis of different
options. Once completed, the study would be sent to AMD for review. The
AMD review focuses on whether the studies have been done correctly and
whether the assumptions are accurate and sufficient to justify the
aircraft acquisition. After the study is finalized, AMD will begin a
competitive bid contracting process and ultimately select the best
value option.
To gain a better understanding of how FWS has traditionally justified
their aircraft acquisitions and the type of documentation used to
support aircraft acquisition decisions, we asked the FWS National
Aviation Manager to provide documentation on four aircraft that FWS
acquired for the Lower 48 States. Results from our review of these four
aircraft are summarized in table 17.
Table 17: Documentation Supporting Four FWS Aircraft Acquisitions:
Aircraft (type): Bell 206B;
(helicopter);
Acquisition date: April 10, 2001;
Purchase price: $661,319;
Justification: Replaced aircraft that crashed;
needed for waterfowl law enforcement;
A-76 study completed: Yes;
Cost benefit analysis provided: Yes.
Aircraft (type): Cessna 206G (airplane);
Acquisition date: August 29, 2000;
Purchase price: $199,900;
Justification: Replaced aircraft that was damaged;
needed for migratory bird management program;
A-76 study completed: No[A];
Cost benefit analysis provided: No[A].
Aircraft (type): Aircraft 3[B] (airplane);
Acquisition date: April 4, 1990;
Purchase price: $81,358;
Justification: Replaced aging Cessna 206 aircraft used for law
enforcement;
A-76 study completed: No[C];
Cost benefit analysis provided: No.
Aircraft (type): Partenavia P68 (airplane);
Acquisition date: April 19, 2002;
Purchase price: $617,723;
Justification: Replaced existing Cessna 185 single engine aircraft with
twin-engine aircraft to increase mission effectiveness;
A-76 study completed: No[D];
Cost benefit analysis provided: No[D].
Source: GAO analysis of FWS documentation and interviews.
[A] FWS officials stated that since this aircraft replaced one that had
undergone justification and cost benefit analysis, and because studies
had been completed for similar aircraft, documentation was not required
for this replacement aircraft.
[B] Information on aircraft type is not included because DOI considers
it to be sensitive law enforcement information.
[C] Program officials believe this aircraft was exempt from the A-76
process because it is used for law enforcement operations.
[D] FWS officials stated that an A-76 justification and cost benefit
analysis were performed for the initial aircraft purchased in this
program, but not this particular aircraft.
[End of table]
As the table shows, the National Aviation Manager provided
documentation on one A-76 study and a cost benefit analyses for one of
the four aircraft. The other aircraft acquisitions were primarily
justified based on A-76 studies from the older aircraft these newer
ones were replacing or on A-76 and cost benefit analyses for other
similar aircraft that FWS had acquired.
Aviation Metrics and Performance Management:
According to the National Aviation Manager, FWS does not have an
aviation metric performance management system. As the national manager,
he does not routinely measure and track metrics such as aircraft
dispatch reliability and aircraft availability. The manager stated that
FWS maintenance personnel periodically monitor aircraft utilization
data and will spot any issues such as increased maintenance problems.
In commenting on a draft of this report, AMD indicated it has a report
available that tracks the daily utilization, by aircraft, which could
be used to monitor trends in utilization, or monitor how frequently an
aircraft is flying. In addition, AMD stated that it has reporting tools
which identify by aircraft, by month, by day, the number of hours the
aircraft has been utilized, but does not currently track the aircraft's
daily operational status. Operational status had been tracked in the
past, through the daily availability charged to the aircraft, but was
replaced with a monthly availability charge to reduce the paperwork and
reconciliation burden that was identified in the field as resources
have declined. Tracking the daily operational status is something that
had been and can be done, but it takes a tremendous commitment of
resources and time by the user agencies in the field that are also
tasked with completing their mission, with fewer people. Further, every
5 years, AMD contracts for a review of the cost effectiveness of all
the bureaus' fleet aircraft, to comply with OMB Circular A-126. FWS
aircraft are part of this review, which helps AMD and its bureaus
identify any aircraft that are too expensive to operate.
Safety Statistics:
Between April 1995 and October 2003, FWS had 13 accidents, 2 of which
were fatal, and resulted in 3 fatalities. Figure 9 illustrates the
number of both fatal and nonfatal accidents by year.
Figure 9: U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Aircraft Accidents, April 1995
- October 2003:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
FWS accidents occurred more often during the landing phase of flight
and on a variety of missions, including research and development,
predator control, training, and passenger transportation missions.
According to National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) aircraft
accident data, the most common causes of FWS accidents were personnel
related. NTSB attributed the cause of 9 out of the 13 accidents to
pilot error. Environmental related factors such as strong winds and icy
terrain were the leading contributing factors. Table 18 summarizes the
number of accidents that NTSB attributed to personnel, environment, and
mechanical factors by primary cause and other contributing factors.
Table 18: Causes and Contributing Factors of U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service Aircraft Accidents:
Personnel factors; Primary cause: 9.
Environment factors; Contributing factor: 11.
Mechanical factors; Primary cause: 2.
Not determined; Primary cause: 2.
Source: GAO analysis of NTSB aircraft accident data.
Note: Contributing factor columns may not equal the total number of
accidents because a single accident may have none or multiple
contributing factors.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix VII: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service Aircraft
Program:
Program Description:
The mission of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Forest Service
is to sustain the health, diversity, and productivity of the nation's
forests and grasslands to meet the needs of present and future
generations. USDA Forest Service aircraft, either owned or contracted,
are mostly used to fight forest fires through reconnaissance and
photography, transporting personnel and materials to fight fires, and
dropping retardant and water directly on fires. USDA Forest Service
also utilizes their aircraft for such missions as law enforcement,
forest health monitoring, and range management. USDA Forest Service
also provides firefighting training to other federal, state, and local
agencies, and contractors.
The USDA Forest Service aircraft program operates within the Department
of Agriculture and has its operational headquarters in Boise, Idaho,
and its administrative headquarters are in Washington, D.C., where the
Director of Fire/Aviation Management is located. The program is divided
into nine regions. In each region, a Regional Aviation Officer manages
the Fire and Aviation Management program of that region. According to
USDA Forest Service officials, their aircraft program is the largest
nonmilitary governmental aircraft program in the world, and their
aircraft program spent approximately $207 million in fiscal year 2000
on aviation services. This number can vary a great deal depending on
the severity of the fire season. In fiscal year 2000, about 97 percent
of total program spending went to private operators that the USDA
Forest Service contracts with to fight fires and perform other
logistical support. The remaining 3 percent was spent on USDA Forest
Service-owned aircraft. Contractors are responsible for providing
maintenance for their own aircraft. USDA Forest Service contracts out
maintenance services for its owned aircraft to maintenance providers
located near where the individual aircraft are stationed.
Aircraft Fleet and Operating Statistics:
The USDA Forest Service owns and operates a fleet of 44 operational
aircraft, mostly located throughout the Western United States. Of these
aircraft, 42 are airplanes and 2 are helicopters. The average age of
these aircraft is approximately 27 years. There is wide variation in
the age of USDA Forest Service aircraft, with the oldest being a 1944
DC-3 used to drop firefighters into areas surrounding the fires, and
the newest, a 2000 Cessna used for aerial photography. In addition to
these aircraft, in 2003 USDA Forest Service took possession of 25 Cobra
helicopters that the U.S. Army gave to them. These aircraft are being
used for spare parts and only one is operational. The nonoperational
Cobras are not included in the aircraft statistics listed here.
According to data in the FAIRS database, the cost and utilization of
USDA Forest Service fleet aircraft and commercial aviation services
have fluctuated over the past 3 years. Costs and utilization of both
fleet aircraft and commercial aviation services were significantly
higher in fiscal years 2000 and 2002 than in fiscal year 2001.
According to USDA Forest Service officials, this was primarily due to
increased mission requirements resulting from the severe fire seasons
those years. USDA Forest Service officials also indicated that costs
rose in fiscal year 2002 due to increases in the costs of fuel and fire
retardant. Table 19 shows the cost and utilization of program aircraft
and commercial aviation services for fiscal years 2000-2002.
Table 19: Cost and Flight Hours USDA Forest Service Aircraft and
Commercial Aviation Services, Fiscal Years 2000-2002:
Fiscal years: 2000;
USDA Forest Service owned aircraft: Costs: $6,240,844;
USDA Forest Service owned aircraft: Flight hours: 12,967;
Commercial aviation services: Costs: $219,131,950;
Commercial aviation services: Flight hours: 102,910;
Total USDA Forest Service program: Costs: $225,372,794;
Total USDA Forest Service program: Flight hours: 115,877.
Fiscal years: 2001;
USDA Forest Service owned aircraft: Costs: $4,747,609;
USDA Forest Service owned aircraft: Flight hours: 10,503;
Commercial aviation services: Costs: $176,140,267;
Commercial aviation services: Flight hours: 78,240;
Total USDA Forest Service program: Costs: $180,887,876;
Total USDA Forest Service program: Flight hours: 88,743.
Fiscal years: 2002;
USDA Forest Service owned aircraft: Costs: $8,395,422;
USDA Forest Service owned aircraft: Flight hours: 12,920;
Commercial aviation services: Costs: $264,483,933;
Commercial aviation services: Flight hours: 102,385;
Total USDA Forest Service program: Costs: $272,879,355;
Total USDA Forest Service program: Flight hours: 115,305.
Fiscal years: Total;
USDA Forest Service owned aircraft: Costs: $19,383,875;
USDA Forest Service owned aircraft: Flight hours: 36,390;
Commercial aviation services: Costs: $659,756,150;
Commercial aviation services: Flight hours: 283,535;
Total USDA Forest Service program: Costs: $679,140,025;
Total USDA Forest Service program: Flight hours: 319,925.
Source: GAO analysis of FAIRS database.
[End of table]
Aircraft Planning Process:
Fleet management planning at USDA Forest Service is mainly focused on
the contracted commercial aviation aspect of their operations. This
planning is mainly used to decide how to allocate their contracts
during the following fire season. Each winter, the staff at each USDA
Forest Service regional office study the past fire season in their
area, look at long-term weather patterns, and use computer modeling to
estimate how severe the upcoming fire season will be in their region.
They then submit a budget request to the aircraft program headquarters.
The headquarters staff reviews all the regions' budget requests and
allocates an amount to each region based on funding availability. The
same process holds true for USDA Forest Service-owned aircraft. If USDA
Forest Service regional staff discovers a need to replace or
rehabilitate an aircraft, the regional staff notifies headquarters and,
if funding is available, or if Congress authorizes special funding, a
replacement or rehabilitation can go forward. However, according to the
USDA Forest Service Operations Manager, it is likely that the USDA
Forest Service will replace its owned aircraft with leased aircraft
when they need to be replaced, at least for the next few years because
funding for buying new aircraft is not expected.
Prior to 2003, the USDA Forest Service did not engage in long-term
strategic planning for its aircraft program. However, due to accidents
in the 2002 fire season, the bureau decided to begin looking more
critically at its aviation operation. One result of this critical
evaluation was a 5-year strategic plan that includes sections on
safety, security, training, quality assurance, aircraft fleet, and cost
effectiveness. The plan will be updated annually to adjust for changing
conditions.
Aircraft Acquisition Process:
With respect to purchasing or leasing new aircraft, once a need is
identified, USDA Forest Service regional managers are responsible for
preparing an A-76 analysis to determine whether it is more cost-
effective to purchase the aircraft and operate it with government
pilots or to use some other combination of acquisition methods. Once
completed, the study is sent to USDA Forest Service headquarters for
review and approval. If headquarters approves funding, USDA Forest
Service regional staff will solicit bids. USDA Forest Service does not
perform A-76 reviews when they solicit commercial aviation services.
To gain a better understanding of how the acquisition process works,
and the type of documentation used to support aircraft acquisition
decisions, we asked USDA Forest Service staff to provide documentation
on four aircraft that they acquired relatively recently. Results from
our review of these four aircraft are summarized in table 20.
Table 20: Documentation Supporting Four USDA Forest Service Aircraft
Acquisitions:
Aircraft (type): Cessna C550; (airplane);
Acquisition date: June 8, 2001;
Purchase price: $5,184,000;
Justification: Determined need for infrared scanning;
A-76 study completed: Yes;
Cost benefit analysis provided: Yes.
Aircraft (type): Beechcraft E90; (airplane);
Acquisition date: January 28, 1995;
Purchase price: $576,870;
Justification: Determined need for lead plane in firefighting;
A-76 study completed: No;
Cost benefit analysis provided: No.
Aircraft (type): Beechcraft A100 (airplane);
Acquisition date: April 13, 1993;
Purchase price: $0;
Justification: Replaced older aircraft;
A-76 study completed: Yes;
Cost benefit analysis provided: Yes.
Aircraft (type): Bell; 206A (helicopter);
Acquisition date: July 20, 1988;
Purchase price: $0;
Justification: Determined need for training helicopter;
A-76 study completed: No[A];
Cost benefit analysis provided: No.
Source: GAO analysis of USDA Forest Service documentation and
interviews.
[A] Forest Service officials stated they completed an A-76 review for
this aircraft but could not locate it.
[End of table]
As the table shows, the USDA Forest Service operations manager was able
to provide detailed documentation supporting its justification for
acquiring two of the four aircraft selected. For these two aircraft,
USDA Forest Service officials provided an A-76 study and extensive
studies documenting the need for these aircraft and evaluating the
costs and benefits of acquiring different models of aircraft. For the
Bell helicopter, the operations manager could not provide documentation
from the time the helicopter was acquired. However, he provided a cost-
benefit analysis completed a few years after the aircraft was acquired
justifying the continued operation of the aircraft. Each analysis
performed for each of these three aircraft included a discussion of the
life cycle costs different options would incur. For the remaining
aircraft, the Beechcraft E90, the operations manager stated that the
task it performed was mandated by federal law, so USDA Forest Service
staff did not feel an A-76 review or cost benefit analysis was
warranted in that case.
Aviation Metrics and Performance Management:
According to the USDA Forest Service operations manager, the USDA
Forest Service tracks a limited number of statistics documenting the
performance of aircraft they own. The metrics they track include cost
per flight hour, fuel usage and costs, and time down for maintenance.
Regional staff review these statistics, usually once a year, to
evaluate how their aircraft are performing and to spot potential
maintenance or operational problems early. For certain aircraft, such
as those used for training, these statistics are reviewed on a more
regular basis, as the information on costs is needed to set the rates
charged to other agencies that may use the aircraft. These reports are
also used when determining whether or not it is time to replace USDA
Forest Service existing aircraft. In terms of assessing the cost-
effectiveness of aircraft, USDA Forest Service officials indicated that
they have not periodically reviewed the cost-effectiveness of their
entire fleet of aircraft to comply with OMB Circular A-126.
Safety Statistics:
From April 1995 through October 2003, the USDA Forest Service has had
44 accidents with 11 resulting in 20 fatalities. Figure 10 shows the
number aircraft accidents by year and indicates that 1996, 2001, and
2002 had the highest number of accidents. According to both a USDA
Forest Service official and the Blue Ribbon Panel Report, the high
number of accidents in 2000 through 2002 likely reflects that these
years also had severe fire seasons.
Figure 10: USDA Forest Service Aircraft Accidents, April 1995 - October
2003:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Most of the accidents occurred during the maneuvering phase of
difficult firefighting missions such as retardant drops and external
load operations. Retardant drops involve dropping a chemical agent
along the perimeters of a fire to keep it contained. External load
operations require helicopters to fill a water bucket while hovering
above a water source to aid suppressing the fire.
According to National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) accident data,
the most common causes of USDA Forest Service accidents were personnel
related. NTSB attributed the cause of 24 out of the 44 accidents to
pilot error or crew error, and the cause of one accident to an
inadequate maintenance inspection. Table 21 summarizes the causes of
USDA Forest Service accidents, as determined by NTSB.
Table 21: Causes and Contributing Factors of USDA Forest Service
Aircraft Accidents:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of NTSB aircraft accident data.
Note: Contributing factor columns may not equal the total number of
accidents because a single accident may have none or multiple
contributing factors.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix VIII: Federal Aviation Administration, Hangar 6 Program:
Program Description:
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) maintains an executive
transportation function out of Hangar 6 at Washington Reagan National
Airport near Washington, D.C. According to FAA officials, this service,
commonly referred to as Hangar 6, utilizes four aircraft to transport
passengers and cargo to locations throughout the world for which
commercial service is either unavailable or not cost effective. Such
missions include transporting staff of other agencies when Hangar 6
aircraft are available to do so. Also, Hangar 6 transports National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) "go team" members to crash sites and
flies FAA staff to special events when commercial service would be too
time consuming. Furthermore, because commercial airlines cannot
transport explosive materials, Hangar 6 transports explosives used in
the Transportation Security Administration's canine training program.
In addition, FAA headquarters personnel also use Hangar 6 aircraft to
ensure that they have enough hours of flight time for their pilot
certificate to stay current, and Hangar 6 aircraft are available to
assist in emergencies, such as in transporting air marshals to guard
flights after September 11, 2001. Hangar 6 employs 10 pilots and 8
maintenance workers. Hangar 6 officials stated that they need 12 pilots
to fully utilize their aircraft and that the planes are not fully
utilized because of a lack of qualified pilots.
FAA leases two aircraft at Hangar 6 from the Cessna Finance
Corporation. This company provides heavy maintenance for these
aircraft. Of the remaining two aircraft at Hangar 6, one is owned by
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), which loans
the plane to FAA, and FAA owns the fourth aircraft outright. FAA
contracts out the heavy maintenance on these two aircraft on a set
maintenance schedule.
Hangar 6 receives its funding through several sources. First, it
receives an annual appropriation from Congress that has averaged
approximately $5.6 million over the past 3 years. This includes about
$1,080,000 it receives from NASA annually to defray the operational
cost of the NASA aircraft FAA operates. In addition, other agencies
that use Hangar 6 aircraft to transport their staff pay Hangar 6 about
$1 million per year.
Aircraft Fleet and Operating Statistics:
As stated above, Hangar 6 operates a fleet of four airplanes composed
of three separate makes and models for its missions. With the exception
of the aircraft on loan from NASA, Hangar 6 acquired all of its current
aircraft when new. The average age of Hangar 6's aircraft is about 10
years, although two of their four aircraft entered service in 2003.
According to Hangar 6 data entered into the FAIRS database, the overall
cost and utilization of aircraft has remained relatively stable since
fiscal year 2000. Table 22 shows the cost and utilization of program
aircraft for fiscal years 2000-2002.
Table 22: Cost and Utilization of Hangar 6 Aircraft, Fiscal Years 2000-
2002:
Fiscal years: 2000;
Hangar 6 operated aircraft[A]: Costs: $3,814,127;
Hangar 6 operated aircraft[A]: Flight hours: 1,323.
Fiscal years: 2001;
Hangar 6 operated aircraft[A]: Costs: $3,623,100;
Hangar 6 operated aircraft[A]: Flight hours: 1,318.
Fiscal years: 2002;
Hangar 6 operated aircraft[A]: Costs: $4,386,898;
Hangar 6 operated aircraft[A]: Flight hours: 1,366.
Fiscal years: Total;
Hangar 6 operated aircraft[A]: Costs: $11,824,125;
Hangar 6 operated aircraft[A]: Flight hours: 4,007.
Source: GAO analysis of FAIRS database.
[A] Hangar 6 has not reported any cost or flight hours data for the
NASA-owned G-III.
[End of table]
Aircraft Planning Process:
Hangar 6 is part of FAA's Aviation Systems Standards (AVN) group.
Hangar 6 officials stated that their long-term strategic planning is
incorporated into AVN's long-term strategic planning process. However,
in the most recent AVN strategic plan, there is no mention of Hangar 6.
The 1988 AVN strategic plan was the most recent one FAA provided us
mentioning Hangar 6. Hangar 6 officials stated that since their
operation is so small, they are able to spot future needs early and
without a formal long-term planning process.
Hangar 6 engages in some short-term fleet planning. For example, Hangar
6 officials stated that they discuss the capital needs of their program
each year at the AVN strategic planning meeting. Also, when Hangar 6
staff identifies an upcoming need to acquire an aircraft, they can
perform studies to determine how best to fill their needs. FAA may
perform these studies or they can hire outside consultants to do the
studies. For example, when two Hangar 6 aircraft were reaching the end
of their lease, Hangar 6 officials performed a market survey, which
asked potential customers how much they would use Hangar 6 aircraft
under various scenarios. Based on the results of the survey, they hired
Conklin and de Decker Associates to determine what aircraft best met
the needs of their customers and to perform a cost-benefit analysis of
these options.
Aircraft Acquisition Process:
When Hangar 6 officials determine a need exists to acquire a new
aircraft, they must identify a potential funding source. Unless Hangar
6 was to receive a special congressional appropriation, they would have
to use their existing program funds to pay for the aircraft. If the
funds come out of Hangar 6's Facilities and Equipment funds (as funding
for FAA capital assets usually does), according to FAA rules, Hangar 6
must submit their proposal to the Integrated Product Team (IPT) for
review, just as the Flight Inspection program does, as was discussed
earlier. However, Hangar 6 officials stated that they have not used
Facilities and Equipment funding to acquire aircraft.
However, if Hangar 6 uses operating funds to acquire an aircraft,
officials stated they are exempt from the Investment Analysis process
to determine the best option to meet their needs. In this instance,
they only need to obtain the approval of the directors of the Aviation
Systems Standards Division and the FAA Administrator. Also, there is no
requirement to evaluate the life cycle cost of aircraft acquisition
options and no IPT review is required when using operating funds to
acquire an aircraft. One FAA manager admitted that this represented a
loophole in the acquisition process.
To gain a better understanding of how Hangar 6 traditionally justified
their aircraft acquisitions and the type of documentation used to
support aircraft acquisition decisions, we asked officials to provide
documentation on 6 aircraft that Hangar 6 either currently operates or
recently returned to the lessee. Results from our review of these
aircraft are summarized in table 23.
Table 23: Documentation Supporting Acquisition of Current and Recently
Disposed Hangar 6 Aircraft:
Aircraft (type): Gulfstream G-IV;
Acquisition date: May 25, 1989;
Purchase or lease price: Unknown;
Justification: Aircraft purchased through congressional mandate;
A-76 study completed: No;
Cost benefit analysis provided: No.
Aircraft (type): Gulfstream G-III;
Acquisition date: September 26, 2002;
Purchase or lease price: Unknown[A];
Justification: Unknown[A];
A-76 study completed: Unknown[A];
Cost benefit analysis provided: No[A].
Aircraft (type): Lear Jet 45;
Acquisition date: August 6, 1992;
Purchase or lease price: $7.86 million lease over 10 years;
Justification: Accident investigations and support of other agencies'
operations;
A-76 study completed: No;
Cost benefit analysis provided: No[B].
Aircraft (type): Cessna Citation 560 XL;
Acquisition date: March 2003;
Purchase or lease price: $11 million lease over 10 years;
Justification: To replace aircraft for which lease were expiring;
A-76 study completed: No;
Cost benefit analysis provided: Yes.
Aircraft (type): Cessna Citation 560 XL;
Acquisition date: March 2003;
Purchase or lease price: $11 million lease over 10 years;
Justification: To replace aircraft for which lease was expiring;
A-76 study completed: No;
Cost benefit analysis provided: Yes.
Aircraft (type): Cessna Citation 560;
Acquisition date: June 1, 1992;
Purchase or lease price: $8.4 million lease over 10 years;
Justification: Accident investigations;
A-76 study completed: No;
Cost benefit analysis provided: No[B].
Sources: GAO analysis of GSA data and interviews with FAA.
[A] NASA owns the Gulfstream G-III that Hangar 6 operates. FAA had no
documents relating to the purchase of this aircraft.
[B] FAA stated that they completed cost-benefit analyses for these
aircraft but disposed of the records.
[End of table]
As the table shows, Hangar 6 officials provided some documentation
showing the justification for acquiring the current and recent aircraft
but no A-76 analyses for the aircraft. Also, they provided cost-benefit
analyses on their most recent acquisitions, which included a life cycle
cost analysis. Hangar 6 does not have any documentation on the NASA-
owned aircraft they operate because NASA originally purchased the
aircraft and retains the acquisition documentation for it.
Nevertheless, Hangar 6 officials stated that they did not perform an
analysis of the operational or financial impact acquiring this aircraft
would have on their operations.
Aviation Metrics and Performance Management:
Hangar 6 has no specific measures or metrics that they use to
periodically measure the performance of their aircraft. Hangar 6 staff
annually reviews statistics for its aircraft, such as aircraft
downtime, maintenance costs, and total flight hours, in order to adjust
aircraft utilization levels. Hangar 6 staff stated that their program
is small enough that all staff maintains an intimate knowledge of all
of Hangar 6's aircraft, so a formalized system is unnecessary. Also,
Hangar 6 officials stated that they would use an aircraft's past
history when deciding on what is the best aircraft for them to acquire.
In terms of assessing the cost-effectiveness of aircraft, Hangar 6
officials indicated that they have not periodically reviewed the cost-
effectiveness of their entire fleet of aircraft to comply with OMB
Circular A-126.
Safety Statistics:
The Hangar 6 operation did not have any accidents reportable to the
National Transportation Safety Board from April 1995 through October
2003.
[End of section]
Appendix IX: Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration:
Program Description:
The Drug Enforcement Administration's (DEA) Aviation Division (OA)
provides support to DEA's operational and intelligence elements within
the rest of DEA in order to detect, locate, identify, and assess
illicit narcotics-related trafficking activities; to dismantle drug
trafficking organizations and cartels in the United States and foreign
countries; and to assist other federal, state, and local law
enforcement agencies involved in the deterrence of illicit narcotics-
related activities. Also, DEA assists foreign governments with
operational and logistical drug enforcement activities.
OA's Office of Aviation Operations is headquartered out of a secured
facility on the grounds of Alliance Airport in Ft. Worth, Texas.
Alliance Airport has three runways, one of which is over 7,000 feet
long and can handle the largest jets in operation today. DEA also
maintains 37 other aviation locations throughout the world. These
include 30 domestic and 7 overseas locations, such as Miami; Seattle;
Ft. Worth; Bogotá, Colombia; and Lima, Peru. Minor maintenance is
performed at the aircraft's location, but DEA contracts with Vertex-L3
Aerospace to perform heavy maintenance on their aircraft at Alliance
Airport in Ft. Worth.
A DEA Special Agent in Charge is assigned to administer OA. Also, DEA
has four Aviation Resident Offices (ARO) within the United States that
oversee the major metropolitan areas of Houston (South Central ARO),
Los Angeles (Western ARO), Miami (Southeastern ARO), and Newark/New
York (Northeastern ARO). Other areas are managed by Area Supervisors
who are based at the Office of Aviation Operations, with the exception
of the Southeastern Aviation Group whose Area Supervisor is based at
the Southeastern ARO. Additionally, the Aviation Intelligence Group and
the Operational Support Group, which are based at the Office of
Aviation Operations, provide air intelligence and aviation support to
all domestic field divisions through the use of specialized aircraft.
OA receives funding directly through budgetary appropriations to DEA.
Aircraft Fleet and Operating Statistics:
DEA's fleet consists of 107 aircraft, including 50 single engine and 14
twin-engine turboprop fixed wing airplanes, 29 single engine and 12
twin-engine helicopters, and two twin-engine jets. DEA acquired 20 of
these aircraft through seizure. Of the 107 aircraft, 6 are leased and 5
are unserviceable and are being kept for parts. DEA's aircraft have an
average age of 19.65 years.
According to the Federal Aviation Interactive Reporting System (FAIRS)
database, both the cost and hours flown for DEA's aircraft have
remained relatively steady since fiscal year 2000 (see table 24).
Table 24: Cost and Utilization of DEA Aircraft, Fiscal Years 2000-2002:
Fiscal years: 2000;
Costs: $14,465,542;
Flight hours: 22,898.
Fiscal years: 2001;
Costs: $15,842,357;
Flight hours: 22,957.
Fiscal years: 2002;
Costs: $14,453,567;
Flight hours: 23,633.
Total;
Costs: $44,761,466;
Flight hours: 69,488.
Source: GAO analysis of FAIRS database.
[End of table]
Aircraft Planning Process:
Currently, DEA has contracted with Conklin and deDecker Associates to
perform a long-term strategic plan to evaluate the performance and
composition of its aircraft fleet. Also, in the Conference Report (H.R.
Conf. Rep. 108-10) for the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003
(P.L. 108-7), the conferees directed that DEA complete a 5-year master
plan for its aircraft fleet. This plan evaluated the utilization of the
current fleet and reviewed potential replacement scenarios. The plan
states that most DEA aircraft have a useful life of no more than 25
years. Therefore, many portions of DEA's fleet will need to be replaced
or rehabilitated in the next several years. DEA officials, however,
stated implementing such plans is often difficult because of budgetary
levels or new mission requirements; therefore, when doing strategic
planning, they focus on shorter time frames than other organizations
might.
DEA's officials stated that OA is an organization that must respond to
the needs of DEA field elements. According to the Aviation Division's
Assistant Special Agent in Charge, because of this, they respond to
needs regardless of cost, much like a fire department, although they
use competitive bids and other cost saving procedures to try to keep
costs down.
Aircraft Acquisition Process:
Once funding for aircraft assets is approved, DEA's Aviation Division
compiles a "One-Year Advance Procurement Plan" that includes a
discussion of the need to be filled. OA then prepares a Statement of
Work identifying the DEA needs to be filled and requests bids from
private companies for aircraft to fill these needs. A technical
evaluation panel then is created to determine the best aircraft to fill
the need. Cost is considered in this evaluation but is not necessarily
the determining factor. Occasionally, Congress will mandate that DEA
purchase a particular type of aircraft and include funds to do so. This
bypasses the normal budget process.
To gain a better understanding of the traditional acquisition process
for DEA aircraft, and the type of documentation used to support
acquisition decisions, we asked DEA to provide documentation on several
of their aircraft. Results from this request are summarized in table
25.
Table 25: Documentation Supporting 6 DEA Aircraft Acquisitions:
Aircraft (type)[A]: Helicopter 1;
Acquisition date: August 16, 1993;
Purchase price: $159,398;
Justification: Need for surveillance aircraft; affordable;
A-76 completed: No;
Cost benefit analysis provided: No[B].
Aircraft (type)[A]: Airplane 1;
Acquisition date: October 11, 2001;
Purchase price: $3,304,760;
Justification: Need for cargo and passenger transportation;
A-76 completed: No;
Cost benefit analysis provided: No[B].
Aircraft (type)[A]: Airplane 2;
Acquisition date: February 13, 2002;
Purchase price: $8,600,000;
Justification: Need for passenger transportation;
A-76 completed: No;
Cost benefit analysis provided: No[B].
Aircraft (type)[A]: Airplane 3;
Acquisition date: April 25, 2002;
Purchase price: $379,575;
Justification: Need for surveillance aircraft;
A-76 completed: No;
Cost benefit analysis provided: No[B].
Aircraft (type)[A]: Airplane 4;
Acquisition date: December 20, 1999;
Purchase price: $4,458,749;
Justification: Need for twin- engine aircraft;
A-76 completed: No;
Cost benefit analysis provided: No[B].
Aircraft (type)[A]: Helicopter 2;
Acquisition date: October 15, 2001;
Purchase price: $1,606,374;
Justification: Need for surveillance aircraft;
A-76 completed: No;
Cost benefit analysis provided: No[B].
Source: GAO analysis of DEA documents and interviews.
[A] Information on aircraft type is not included because DOJ considers
it to be sensitive law enforcement information.
[B] According to DEA, cost-benefit analyses for these aircraft were
performed, but not written down or recorded.
[End of table]
As table 25 shows, DEA was able to provide detailed information about
the acquisition date and purchase price for the selected aircraft, but
not the other information we requested. DEA does not complete any
analyses to comply with Circulars A-76 and A-126. DEA officials stated
that they are "mission exempt" from these requirements since they are a
law-enforcement agency. Therefore, no analysis is completed of whether
or not an aircraft would be more cost-effective if a private contractor
operated it for DEA, and there is no requirement to perform an analysis
of an aircraft's life cycle costs prior to acquiring it. However,
periodically, DEA will hire a consultant to perform a cost-benefit
analysis of a portion of their fleet. For instance, in 1996 DEA hired
Conklin and de Decker Associates to analyze the cost-effectiveness of
their turboprop fleet. This is similar to an A-126 review. DEA staff
determine their needs on an ongoing basis, and the justification and
cost-benefit calculations for individual aircraft are not recorded
formally. DEA officials provided no studies or documents that assess
the projected costs over the life of an aircraft versus those of a
similar model (also known as life cycle cost analysis).
Aviation Metrics and Performance Management:
DEA's contractor, Vertex L-3 Aerospace, tracks certain aspects of DEA
aircraft performance in a detailed fashion. They collect information on
such statistics as operational readiness, cost per flight hour, and
total maintenance costs. They track these statistics for each model of
aircraft and produce quarterly spreadsheets showing the trends for each
aircraft and each model. These spreadsheets are provided to several DEA
staff members with responsibility for various areas of the aviation
operation. These staff members meet quarterly to evaluate the
contractor's performance and decide upon any incentive payments for
good performance.
Also, other DEA staff members are charged with reviewing these
statistics and determining if action needs to be taken regarding
specific aircraft, such as additional unscheduled maintenance,
contacting the manufacturer, or taking the aircraft out of service
because of a safety issue. These staff members have input when DEA is
deciding on what aircraft are best suited to fill its future needs so
that past trends can be taken into account. When new aircraft are being
acquired, the technical evaluation panel looks at the past performance
of aircraft already in the DEA fleet to see if similar aircraft should
be acquired or avoided.
Safety Statistics:
From April 1995 through October 2003, the DEA had three accidents and
one incident. The accidents occurred in 1998 and 2001, and the incident
occurred in 2002. In the 1998 occurrence, a DEA helicopter descended
into the ground during a training mission, and this resulted in one
fatality. According to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
aircraft accident data, this accident was a result of the instructor
pilot's failure to control the helicopter during a demonstrated
autorotation. Contributing to the accident were the lack of Instructor
Pilot Standardization Procedures and Specific Flight Demonstration
Procedures. According to DEA, they have addressed these deficiencies
and altered flight procedures accordingly by restricting procedures for
aircraft operation both in training and on missions. Both 2001
accidents occurred while on law enforcement missions, and were both due
to mechanical failure. The 2002 incident took place during a
positioning flight, and NTSB is still investigating the cause.
[End of section]
Appendix X: Department of State, International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Program:
Program Description:
The State Department's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs Office of Aviation (INL/A) is responsible for
assisting host nations eradicate illicit drug crops and detect,
monitor, and interdict drug trafficking operations. The crops INL/A
seeks to eradicate include marijuana, coca, and opium poppy. To
accomplish these missions, INL/A uses helicopters and airplanes in
South America and Pakistan. Through its contract with DynCorp, INL/A
undertakes aerial eradication of illicit drug crops in Colombia,
supports manual eradication of drug crops in Peru and Bolivia, and
provides border security in Pakistan. The operations in Colombia are
often times in hostile environments, which can place aircraft and
personnel under small arms fire. The programs aviation operations are
headquartered and managed at Patrick Air Force Base located in Florida.
As the aircraft program's contractor, DynCorp performs major
maintenance and initial pilot training at Patrick Air Force Base and
flies and maintains U.S. aircraft and trains foreign personnel at
various locations in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru. Training for some of
the spray aircraft is also conducted at Kirtland Air Force Base in New
Mexico. This training helps simulate the mountainous environments of
Colombia.
Aircraft Fleet and Operating Statistics:
According to INL/A officials, the program has 154 operational aircraft,
consisting of 33 airplanes and 121 helicopters. These aircraft are
composed of 10 major makes and models, and the average age of all INL/
A aircraft, including nonoperational aircraft, is about 26 years. Many
of these aircraft were previously in military service, and over 110 of
these aircraft were acquired since January 2002 as funding for this
program increased dramatically in support of Plan Colombia.[Footnote
39] Table 26 shows that, according to data INL/A entered into the FAIRS
database, the overall cost and utilization of fleet aircraft also has
significantly increased since fiscal year 2000.
Table 26: Cost and Flight Hours INL/A Aircraft, Fiscal Years 2000-2002:
Fiscal years: 2000;
INL/A owned aircraft: Costs[A]: $20,724,587;
INL/A owned aircraft: Flight hours: 19,820.
Fiscal years: 2001;
INL/A owned aircraft: Costs[A]: $33,696,589;
INL/A owned aircraft: Flight hours: 20,824.
Fiscal years: 2002;
INL/A owned aircraft: Costs[A]: $91,672,382;
INL/A owned aircraft: Flight hours: 32,306.
Total;
INL/A owned aircraft: Costs[A]: $146,093,588;
INL/A owned aircraft: Flight hours: 72,950.
Source: GAO analysis of FAIRS database.
Note: INL/A reported total commercial aviation services costs and
flight hours of $880 and 1 flight hour respectively during this period.
[A] An INL/A official stated that total program costs were probably
close to $200 million annually, but that an exact figure could not be
determined due to the complex nature of the program's financial
transactions involving foreign governments and embassies.
[End of table]
Aircraft Planning Process:
Fleetwide planning for INL/A aircraft is primarily short-term in nature
and revolves around identifying aircraft capability to meet current and
next-year mission requirements. Officials at Patrick Air Force Base
indicated that this short-term focus is due to the nature of the
program's mission requirements, which are greatly affected by broader
international drug control priorities. Officials indicated that INL/A
has never undertaken any long-term strategic assessment to determine
potential mission requirements and the optimal mix of aircraft to meet
such requirements. As such, officials could not provide a long-term
fleet management plan that identified anticipated aircraft
requirements, and strategies for ensuring the program had the most
cost-effective mix of aircraft. Officials indicated that they intend to
prepare a long-term plan in the near future.
Aircraft Acquisition Process:
INL/A officials stated that program managers in the field are
responsible for identifying any shortfalls in aircraft capabilities and
whether additional aircraft are needed. If new aircraft requirements
are identified, field managers and the Chief of Operations at Patrick
Air Force Base develop a justification. The justification must be
reviewed and approved by the Program Director at Patrick Air Force Base
and then by the Department's Assistant Secretary responsible for the
INL/A. Once all approvals and funding are obtained, contracting
officials in Washington, D.C., proceed with a procurement. A program
manager in Washington, D.C., indicated that this was somewhat of an
informal process; there were no set criteria for the type and extent of
documentation required to develop a justification and obtain final
approval. Typically, once a need is identified, the Chief of Operations
tasks DynCorp to prepare a study and come up with a recommendation on a
specific aircraft to purchase. The Chief of Operations then
incorporates this into a power point presentation, which he uses to
obtain funding approval from officials in either Washington, D.C., or
an embassy.
To gain a better understanding of how INL/A has traditionally justified
its aircraft acquisitions and the type of documentation used to support
aircraft acquisition decisions, we asked officials to provide
documentation on four aircraft that INL/A recently acquired. Results
from our review of these four aircraft are summarized in table 27.
Table 27: Documentation Supporting Four Recent INL/A Aircraft
Acquisitions:
Aircraft (type): Cessna 208B; (airplane);
Acquisition date: May 13, 2002;
Purchase price: $1,200,000;
Justification: Needed for increasing training missions, replaces
existing C212;
A-76 study completed: No;
Cost benefit analysis provided: No.
Aircraft (type): Air Tractor 802 (airplane);
Acquisition date: January 24, 2002;
Purchase price: [A];
Justification: Congress mandated increased crop spraying under Plan
Colombia;
A-76 study completed: No;
Cost benefit analysis provided: No.
Aircraft (type): Sikorsky UH-60; (helicopter);
Acquisition date: July 1, 2002;
Purchase price: [A];
Justification: Directed by Congress under Plan Colombia;
A-76 study completed: N/A;
Cost benefit analysis provided: N/A.
Aircraft (type): Bell UH-1H II (helicopter);
Acquisition date: June 1, 2002;
Purchase price: [A];
Justification: Directed by Congress under Plan Colombia;
A-76 study completed: N/A;
Cost benefit analysis provided: N/A.
Source: GAO analysis of INL/A documentation and interviews.
[A] INL/A officials did not provide us with requested information on
the purchase price.
[End of table]
During our review, we learned that one of these aircraft was recently
acquired by the U.S. military and provided to INL/A under Plan
Colombia, and Congress mandated INL/A acquire another of these
aircraft. Therefore, we determined that our questions did not apply to
these specific aircraft acquisitions. As the table shows, INL/A was
able to provide only limited documentation supporting its aircraft
acquisition decisions for the remaining two aircraft. Specifically,
INL/A could not provide any OMB Circular A-76 cost comparison studies.
Further, INL/A officials could not provide any detailed study or cost
benefit analyses supporting these acquisitions. While they indicated
they had prepared Power Point presentations to obtain funding approval,
they could not locate or provide these documents.
Aviation Metrics and Performance Management:
As part of its contract with DynCorp, INL/A officials indicated they
have established operational readiness requirements for its aircraft.
This requirement is designed to ensure that DynCorp keeps the aircraft
mission capable and a flies them a sufficient number of hours to
achieve its mission. To help evaluate DynCorp's performance, INL/A
maintains an information system which tracks, on a monthly basis,
operational readiness for each group of aircraft at each location. An
official indicated the operational readiness is the primary aviation
metric that it used to help manage its operations, and help spot if
aircraft are having problems in meeting mission requirements. In terms
of assessing the cost effectiveness of aircraft, INL/A officials
indicated that they have not periodically reviewed the cost-
effectiveness of their entire fleet of aircraft to comply with OMB
Circular A-126.
Safety Statistics:
From April 1995 through October 2003, INL/A had five accidents with
three resulting in a total of three fatalities. Figure 11 shows the
number of both fatal and nonfatal accidents from 1995 to 2003.
Figure 11: Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs Accidents, April 1995 - October 2003:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The accidents occurred during crop eradication, training, and
maintenance ferry missions at various phases of flight including the
maneuvering, descent, cruise, and climb phases.
According to National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) aircraft
accident data, the causes of the accidents varied. Pilot error
contributed to three accidents. In two cases, NTSB does not list the
cause. NTSB did not list the cause of the 2001 fatal accident because
the pilot and the plane are missing. Another fatal accident occurred
during a crop eradication flight in Colombia. NTSB does not list a
final cause for this accident because the Government of Colombia has
primary authority to conduct this accident investigation. Table 28
summarizes the number of accidents that NTSB attributed to personnel,
environment, and mechanical factors by primary cause and other
contributing factors.
Table 28: Causes and Contributing Factors of the Bureau of
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Aircraft Accidents:
Personnel factors; Primary cause: 2; Contributing factor[A]: 1.
Environment factors; None.
Mechanical factors; Primary cause: 1.
Not determined; Primary cause: 2.
Source: GAO analysis of NTSB aircraft accident data.
[A] Contributing factors columns may not equal to the total number of
accidents, because a single accident could have none or multiple
contributing factors.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix XI: Comments from the General Services Administration:
GSA:
GSA Office of Governmentwide Policy:
MAY 14 2004:
Ms. JayEtta Z. Hecker:
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues:
General Accounting Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. Hecker:
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the draft General
Accounting Office (GAO) Publication GAO-04-645, "Federal Aircraft:
Inaccurate Cost Data and Weaknesses in Fleet Management Planning Hamper
Cost Effective Operations." Our markup is enclosed. Following are some
general comments.
The draft report's title obscures the audit's scope, findings, and
recommendations. We suggest a clearer title such as "Federal Aviation:
Further Improvements Needed in Acquisition, Cost Accounting,
Performance Measurement, and Oversight". As defined by regulation,
Federal aircraft are those aircraft that the Federal Government owns.
Therefore, your title inadvertently excludes the many aircraft the
Federal Government leases, contracts, charters, and rents. Our data,
though not entirely complete, reveals that about 50% of annual
operating costs is spent on these commercial aircraft. Additionally,
about 50% of annual operating costs attributed to Federally-owned
aircraft is spent in the commercial sector for aircrews, maintenance,
fuel, facilities, and other products and services. As your draft report
shows, improvements are needed across the board.
Regarding the Federal Aviation Interactive Reporting System (FAIRS), we
agree that the cost data is too understated at this point to draw
concrete conclusions about cost effectiveness. However, we have seen
incremental improvements each year largely as a result of our data
stewardship actions like training, technical assistance, and data
reconciliation. In fact, our 2003 cost data is very close to the
estimates in your draft report. Our 2004 cost data should be even
better, as we have recently made improvements to FAIRS including
additional internal controls and mandatory cost elements. We are
confident that the inventory and flight hour data are more accurate and
useful. For example, the inventory data persuasively shows that we have
an aging fleet badly in need of modernization. Our flight hour data
convincingly shows that the aircraft support law enforcement, fire
fighting, resources management, scientific research, humanitarian
assistance, and many other vital missions.
In the safety area, we are pleased that you found that all the agencies
examined produced evidence of strong programs, even though their
oversight processes varied. We also note that in several places in the
draft report you refer to "183 accidents" from 1995 to 2003, and in
several others you refer to "183 accidents and incidents" over the same
period. As you know, the criteria for accidents are much different from
the criteria for incidents, and the causal factors and other
conclusions can also be quite different. We ask that you clarify this.
Finally, the draft report correctly highlights the "gap" between
Federal aviation policies and operations - namely enforcement.
Enforcement is a responsibility at all levels of Federal aviation
including General Services Administration, agencies that operate
aircraft, OMB, and pertinent congressional oversight committees. We
look forward to working with all responsible parties involved to help
"close the gap". However, we oppose interfering in other agencies
internal management controls for which they are accountable. Our
specific steps will, of course, be included in action plans generated
as the audit process unfolds.
If you have questions or need further information, please contact Mr.
Peter Zuidema, Director, Aircraft Management Policy, (202) 219-1377, or
peter.zuidema@gsa.gov.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
G. Martin Wagner:
Associate Administrator:
Enclosure:
[End of section]
Appendix XII: Comments from the Department of Justice:
U.S. Department of Justice:
Washington, D.C. 20530:
May 20, 2004:
JayEtta Z. Hecker:
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues:
General Accounting Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. Hecker:
On April 26, 2004, the General Accounting Office (GAO) provided the
Department of Justice (DOJ) a copy of its draft report entitled Federal
Aircraft: Inaccurate Cost Data and Weaknesses in Fleet Management
Planning Hamper Cost Effective Operations (GAO-04-645/540051) with a
request for comments. We appreciate the opportunity to review the draft
report. While the Department agrees with much of the report, we are
concerned by the implications of several statements contained therein.
The following formal comments will clarify such information and we
request that they be incorporated into the final report.
First on page 22 of the report, the GAO states that "in 2003, Congress
mandated that DEA produce a 5-year strategic plan for its aircraft
program. The plan included some recommendations on replacing portions
of its fleet, including its aging OH-6 helicopters, but did not include
a detailed analysis of how many flight hours would be required of its
fleet and what mix of aircraft would be best suited to DEA's mission."
In its 5-Year Plan for Aviation Support (FY 2003 to FY 2008) DEA's
recommendation focused on replacement and modernization of the portion
of its fleet that could reasonably be accomplished by FY 2008. DEA does
not have the aircraft replacement base resources for a complete
turnover of the fleet to an ideal mix of aircraft within five years, or
the luxury of scheduling a date certain for the replacement of each of
its aircraft. Instead, DEA chose to focus on planning for what could
realistically be accomplished within a five-year period. The report
responded to a Congressional Reporting Requirement in which the five-
year period was the parameter specified by the House Commerce, Justice,
State and the Judiciary Appropriations Subcommittee.
Additionally, it should be noted that DEA's changing focus makes it
impractical to attempt to estimate flight hours per year. As the
Aviation Division responds to the needs of DEA's field divisions,
flight hours as well as the types of missions performed vary. The
Aviation Division's operational funds are applied to different aircraft
based upon the fluctuating needs of DEA. For this reason, the program
is funded as a collective operation requiring managers to apportion
resources to meet changing priorities.
On page 24 of the report, the GAO noted that "Circular A-76 explicitly
states that programs should file A-76 reviews in most instances because
although the mission of the program may be inherently governmental, the
aircraft does not necessarily have to be government owned or operated.
In addition, we found that some of these programs had hired contractors
to perform the same aviation functions for them, which contradicted
their views that the missions were inherently governmental, and thus
needed to be completed by government employees using government owned
aircraft."
The Department believes that the Aviation Division is exempt from A-76
reviews due to the nature of the work being performed by DEA. While
there are instances where contract employees are utilized for missions
that could possibly be performed by a commercial entity, these
instances are exceptions to the norm and would not justify an aircraft
used only for commercial purposes. The majority of missions performed
by the Aviation Division are inherently governmental and require the
use of law enforcement officers or other specialized DEA employees.
These missions include but are not limited to surveillance missions,
undercover use of aircraft, and prisoner transportation. The process of
determining the cost for this type of mission commercially is
irrelevant because it simply cannot be accomplished by civilian
personnel.
Finally on page 34, the GAO reports that "the USDA Forest Service, DEA,
and FWS subject themselves to internal reviews of their operations...
The USDA Forest Service and DEA elected to undergo program reviews that
are initiated and performed internally."
It is extremely important to note that DEA's internal reviews in the
areas of safety and training use guidelines established by outside
agencies. The reviews are not arbitrarily defined nor are they
conducted solely upon DEA guidelines. Additionally, the Aviation
Division plans to undergo an ARMS (Aviation Resources Management
Survey) review in the next year and will undergo an internal DEA Office
of Inspections review in July 2004, in part, utilizing ARMS guidelines
and checklists.
We hope these comments will be beneficial in preparing your final
report. If you have any questions concerning the Department's comments
in this matter, please feel free to contact Vickie L. Sloan, Director,
Audit Liaison Office, Justice Management Division on (202) 514-0469.
Sincerely,
Signed for:
Paul R. Corts:
Assistant Attorney General for Administration:
[End of section]
Appendix XIII: Comments from the Department of Agriculture:
United States Department of Agriculture:
Forest Service:
Washington Office:
14th & Independence SW
P.O. Box 96090
Washington, DC 20090-6090:
File Code: 5700:
Date: MAY 21 2004:
Ms. JayEtta Z. Hecker:
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues:
General Accounting Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. Hecker:
Thank you for the opportunity to review the draft report on federal
aircraft GAO-04-645, "Inaccurate Cost Data and Weaknesses in Fleet
Management Planning Hampering Cost Effective Operations."
We are continually attempting to improve the systems, which assist us
in cost effective operations and believe the report assists us in
accomplishing those goals. The following comments on the draft report
are consolidated from those received from within the Forest Service.
We agree with virtually all of the comments that specifically identify
a Forest Service need for improvement. We believe that in most cases we
have complied with OMB Circular A-76 and A-126 but realize we can
improve in the areas outlined in the draft report.
We share GAO's concerns about the Federal Aviation Interactive
Reporting System (FAIRS). We believe it is a good starting point toward
improved reporting. However, it is our opinion that the FAIRS is
difficult to use and could be designed more efficiently. For example,
FAIRS currently captures over one hundred cost elements, making it
cumbersome and unwieldy.
In conclusion, we believe the GAO draft report on federal aviation has
provided an accurate assessment of Forest Service cost data. We welcome
the suggested improvements to FAIRS and would like to be an active
participant in any future updates.
Contact Larry Brosnan at 202-205-1497 with any further questions.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
DALE N. BOSWORTH:
Chief:
[End of section]
Appendix XIV: Comments from the Department of the Interior:
United States Department of the Interior:
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
Washington, D.C. 20240:
MAY 21 2004:
Ms. JayEtta Z. Hecker:
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues:
U.S. General Accounting Office:
441 G Street, N.W.:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Ms. Hecker:
Thank you for providing the Department of the Interior the opportunity
to review and comment on the draft U.S. General Accounting Office
report entitled, "Federal Aircraft: Inaccurate Cost Data and Weaknesses
in Fleet Management Planning Hamper Cost Effective Operations," (GAO-
04-645) dated April 26, 2004. In general, we agree with the findings
that pertain to the Department, except as indicated in the enclosure.
Although the recommendations are not directed to the Department, we
generally agree with them.
The enclosure provides comments from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
and the National Business Center. We hope our comments will assist you
in preparing the final report.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Paul Hoff
For the Assistant Secretary for Fish and Wildlife and Parks:
Enclosure:
[End of section]
Appendix XV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
JayEtta Z. Hecker (202) 512-2834 Gerald L. Dillingham (202) 512-2834
Glen Trochelman (312) 220-7729:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to those individuals named above, Kimberly Berry, Vashun
Cole, Michael LaForge, David Lehrer, David Lichtenfeld, Miguel Lujan,
and Ray Sendejas made key contributions to this report.
(540051):
FOOTNOTES
[1] GSA does not collect or maintain information on Armed Forces,
Executive Office of the President, or U.S. intelligence-gathering
aircraft programs and, thus, these programs are not part of our review.
[2] An accident is an occurrence associated with the operation of an
aircraft in which any person suffers death or serious injury, or in
which the aircraft receives substantial damage. An incident is an
occurrence other than an accident, which affects or could affect the
safety of operations.
[3] OMB Circular A-126, "Improving the Management and Use of Government
Aircraft," May 1992.
[4] OMB Circular A-76, "Performance of Commercial Activities," May
2003.
[5] 41 C.F.R. Pt. 102-33, (2003).
[6] General Services Administration, Report on the Status of Federal
Government Aircraft, Fiscal Year 2002, Aircraft Management Policy
Division, undated.
[7] Appendix II summarizes federal fleet information from the GSA FAIRS
system.
[8] We initially selected 32 aircraft for our review, but because
agencies had acquired 4 of these aircraft at the direction of Congress,
or through an interagency transfer, we excluded them from our review.
Therefore, we reviewed the documentation of 28 aircraft.
[9] Program officials could not provide the acquisition price for six
of the aircraft we reviewed.
[10] U.S. General Accounting Office, Improvements Are Needed in
Managing Aircraft Used by Federal Civilian Agencies, LCD-77-430
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 22, 1977); U.S. General Accounting Office,
Federal Civilian Agencies Can Better Manage Their Aircraft and Related
Services, GAO/PLRD (Washington, D.C.: June 24, 1983); President's
Council on Integrity and Efficiency Combined Report on the Federal
Civilian Agencies' Aircraft Management Programs, December 16, 1996.
This study summarized the reports of 20 Offices of Inspectors General
that were completed between 1994 and 1996.
[11] OMB staff stated that they do require federal agencies to submit a
list of activities they perform that are not inherently governmental,
as required by the Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act of 1998 (P.
L. 105-270) so that private contractors are aware of activities on
which they could potentially bid.
[12] U.S. General Accounting Office, OMB Circular A-76: Oversight and
Implementation Issues, GAO/T-GGD-98-146 (Washington, D.C.: June 4,
1998).
[13] An operating lease gives the federal government the use of an
asset for a specified period of time, but the ownership of the asset
does not change. OMB Circular A-11 identifies six criteria that a lease
must meet to be considered an operating lease. The circular defines a
lease-purchase as a type of lease in which ownership of the asset is
transferred to the government at or shortly after the end of the lease
term. It defines a capital lease as any lease other than a lease-
purchase that does not meet the criteria of an operating lease.
[14] Scorekeeping guidelines as agreed upon and used by the House and
Senate Budget Committees, the Congressional Budget Office, and OMB
measure the effects of legislation on the deficit. They are presented
in OMB Circular A-11.
[15] U.S. General Accounting Office, Performance and Accountability
Series, High-Risk Series: Federal Real Property, GAO-03-122
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 1, 2003).
[16] "Impact of the FAR and OMB Circular A-11 on Lease vs. Lease-to-
purchase Decisions," Conklin and deDecker Associates, (July 9, 2003).
[17] The net cost of the purchase and lease-purchase options includes
the residual value of the aircraft, estimated to be $6.5 million at the
end of 10 years.
[18] The net cost of the purchase and lease-purchase options includes
the residual value of the aircraft, estimated to be $12.4 million at
the end of 10 years.
[19] The study did not include a calculation of any aircraft residual
values for the purchase or lease-purchase options.
[20] U.S. General Accounting Office, Public Buildings: Budget
Scorekeeping Prompts Difficult Decisions, GAO/T-AIMD-GGD-94-43
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 28, 1993).
[21] U.S. General Accounting Office, Accrual Budgeting: Experiences of
Other Nations and Implications for the United States, GAO/AIMD-00-57
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 18, 2000).
[22] 14 C.F.R. pt. 91 prescribes air traffic and general operating
rules governing flight operations.
[23] 14 C.F.R. pt. 135 prescribes rules specifically governing certain
commuter, on-demand (air taxi), and charter flight operations.
[24] 14 C.F.R. pt. 119 prescribes rules specifically governing
scheduled air carrier common carriage or commercial charter service
operations using large aircraft--aircraft capable of carrying more than
20 passengers or a maximum payload of 6,000 pounds or more. 14 C.F.R.
pt. 121 prescribes rules governing the domestic, flag, and supplemental
operations of (pt. 119) scheduled air carrier common carriage or
commercial large aircraft charter service operators.
[25] When agencies operate aircraft for purposes that are not defined
as public use operations, such as passenger transportation, those
operations are subject to the FAA regulations applicable to civil
aircraft operations.
[26] National Transportation Safety Board: Safety Recommendation (A-04-
29 through A-04-33), April 23, 2004.
[27] NTSB defines aircraft "Accidents" as an occurrence associated with
the operation of an aircraft in which any person suffers death or
serious injury or in which the aircraft receives substantial damage. An
"Incident" is an occurrence other than an accident, associated with the
operation of an aircraft, which affects or could affect the safety of
operations.
[28] The Independent Safety Board Act Amendments of 1994 (P.L. 103-411)
gave NTSB jurisdiction to investigate all accidents involving public
aircraft, except those operated by the Armed Forces or by a U.S.
intelligence agency.
[29] It is customary to cite accident rates--for example, accidents per
100,000 flight hours--however, because there is a lack of accurate
federal public use flight hours, we did not compute accident rates.
[30] Predator control refers to the operation of an aircraft for
control of predators such as coyotes by capture and/or eradication.
[31] Blue Ribbon Panel, Federal Aerial Firefighting: Assessing Safety
and Effectiveness (December 2002).
[32] FAIRS data frequently change as program officials input and edit
data on an as needed basis. The data presented in this section are from
the General Service Administration's (GSA) published reports unless
otherwise indicated.
[33] Although the federal government owns the aircraft that are loaned
to the states, it does not operate the aircraft. Therefore, while the
loaned aircraft are included in the inventory, they are not included in
utilization or cost analyses.
[34] There is currently one glider in the fleet that is nonoperational.
GSA classifies this aircraft as a piston engine aircraft.
[35] The Joint Financial Management Improvement Program's Framework for
Federal Financial Management Systems defines a "central data steward"
as having the responsibility to assure that data used to support
government wide functions and reporting are complete and accurate.
[36] Domestic flight inspection field offices are located in Atlantic
City, Atlanta, Battle Creek, Oklahoma City, Sacramento, and Anchorage.
[37] Eight bureaus in DOI have aircraft programs. The bureaus are the
Bureau of Land Management, FWS, National Park Service, Minerals
Management Service, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Bureau of Reclamation,
U.S. Geological Survey, and Office of Surface Mining.
[38] AMD does not report data to FAIRS on three aircraft because they
perform undercover operations, thus we had data on only 54 of the 57
aircraft.
[39] In July 2000, the United States agreed to provide about $860
million for fiscal years 2000 to 2001 to support Plan Colombia, the
Colombian government's $7.5 billion, 6-year counter narcotics plan.
This amount was in addition to previously programmed U.S. assistance of
over $300 million for the same period and almost doubled U.S. counter
narcotics assistance to Colombia compared with fiscal year 1999 levels.
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