Border Security
Additional Actions Needed to Eliminate Weaknesses in the Visa Revocation Process Gao ID: GAO-04-795 July 13, 2004The National Strategy for Homeland Security calls for preventing foreign terrorists from entering our country and using all legal means to identify; halt; and where appropriate, prosecute or bring immigration or other civil charges against terrorists in the United States. GAO reported in June 2003 that the visa revocation process needed to be strengthened as an antiterrorism tool and recommended that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), in conjunction with the Departments of State (State) and Justice, develop specific policies and procedures to ensure that appropriate agencies are notified of revocations based on terrorism grounds and take proper actions. GAO examined whether weaknesses in the visa revocation process identified in its June 2003 report were addressed.
GAO's analysis shows that the Departments of State and Homeland Security took some actions in the summer of 2003 to address weaknesses in the visa revocation process identified in its June 2003 report. However, GAO's review of visas revoked from October to December 2003, including a detailed review of a random sample of 35 cases, showed that weaknesses remained in the implementation of the revocation process, especially in the timely transmission of information among federal agencies. For example, delays existed in matching names of suspected terrorists with names of visa holders and in forwarding necessary information to State. In at least 3 of the 35 cases, it took State 6 months or more to revoke visas after receiving a recommendation to do so. In 3 cases, State took a week or longer after deciding to revoke visas to post a lookout or notify DHS. Without these notifications, DHS may not know to investigate those individuals who may be in the country. In 10 cases, DHS either failed to notify or took several months to notify immigration investigators that individuals with revoked visas may be in the country. It then took over 2 months for immigration investigators to request field investigations of these individuals. After GAO initiated its inquiry for this report in January 2004, additional actions were taken to improve the process, including revising procedures and reassessing the process. DHS and State believe these actions will help avoid the delays experienced in the past. In April and May, State revised its procedures and formalized its tracking system for visa revocation cases. In March, DHS developed new written procedures and acted to ensure that immigration investigators are aware of all individuals with revoked visas who may be in the country. State and DHS also took some steps to address legal and policy issues related to visa revocations. In April, the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), an interagency group organized under the FBI, identified the visa revocation process as a potential homeland security vulnerability and developed an informal process for TSC to handle visa revocation cases. However, weaknesses remain. For example, State's and DHS's procedures are not fully coordinated and lack performance standards, such as specific time frames, for completing each step of the process. Outstanding legal and policy issues continue to exist regarding the removal of individuals based solely on their visa revocation.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-04-795, Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Eliminate Weaknesses in the Visa Revocation Process
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Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging
Threats, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform,
House of Representatives:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
July 2004:
Border Security:
Additional Actions Needed to Eliminate Weaknesses in the Visa
Revocation Process:
GAO-04-795:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-04-795, a report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on
National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations,
Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
The National Strategy for Homeland Security calls for preventing
foreign terrorists from entering our country and using all legal means
to identify; halt; and where appropriate, prosecute or bring
immigration or other civil charges against terrorists in the United
States. GAO reported in June 2003 that the visa revocation process
needed to be strengthened as an antiterrorism tool and recommended that
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), in conjunction with the
Departments of State (State) and Justice, develop specific policies
and procedures to ensure that appropriate agencies are notified of
revocations based on terrorism grounds and take proper actions. GAO
examined whether weaknesses in the visa revocation process identified
in its June 2003 report were addressed.
What GAO Found:
GAO‘s analysis shows that the Departments of State and Homeland
Security took some actions in the summer of 2003 to address weaknesses
in the visa revocation process identified in its June 2003 report.
However, GAO‘s review of visas revoked from October to December 2003,
including a detailed review of a random sample of 35 cases, showed that
weaknesses remained in the implementation of the revocation process,
especially in the timely transmission of information among federal
agencies. For example:
* Delays existed in matching names of suspected terrorists with names
of visa holders and in forwarding necessary information to State. In
at least 3 of the 35 cases, it took State 6 months or more to revoke
visas after receiving a recommendation to do so.
* In 3 cases, State took a week or longer after deciding to revoke
visas to post a lookout or notify DHS. Without these notifications, DHS
may not know to investigate those individuals who may be in the
country.
* In 10 cases, DHS either failed to notify or took several months to
notify immigration investigators that individuals with revoked visas
may be in the country. It then took over 2 months for immigration
investigators to request field investigations of these individuals.
After GAO initiated its inquiry for this report in January 2004,
additional actions were taken to improve the process, including
revising procedures and reassessing the process. DHS and State believe
these actions will help avoid the delays experienced in the past. In
April and May, State revised its procedures and formalized its
tracking system for visa revocation cases. In March, DHS developed new
written procedures and acted to ensure that immigration investigators
are aware of all individuals with revoked visas who may be in the
country. State and DHS also took some steps to address legal and
policy issues related to visa revocations. In April, the Terrorist
Screening Center (TSC), an interagency group organized under the FBI,
identified the visa revocation process as a potential homeland security
vulnerability and developed an informal process for TSC to handle visa
revocation cases. However, weaknesses remain. For example, State‘s and
DHS‘s procedures are not fully coordinated and lack performance
standards, such as specific time frames, for completing each step of
the process. Outstanding legal and policy issues continue to exist
regarding the removal of individuals based solely on their visa
revocation.
Points of Delay Observed in the Visa Revocation Process:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
To improve the visa revocation process as an antiterrorism tool, GAO
recommends that the Secretaries of Homeland Security and State jointly
(1) develop a written governmentwide policy that clearly defines roles
and responsibilities and sets performance standards and (2) address
outstanding legal and policy issues in this area or provide Congress
with specific actions it could take to resolve them. DHS generally
concurred with the report and recommendations. State agreed to consult
with DHS regarding our recommendations.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-795.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Jess T. Ford at (202)
512-4128 or fordj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Initial Actions Taken to Address Weaknesses Were Inadequate:
Recent Actions Taken to Address Identified Weaknesses in the Visa
Revocation Process:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
GAO Comments:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State:
GAO Comments:
Figures:
Figure 1: The Visa Revocation Process in Effect from October through
December 2003:
Figure 2: Points of Delay in the Visa Revocation Process:
Figure 3: Inconsistencies among Agencies on Number of Visas Revoked
from October through December 2003:
Abbreviations:
CBP: U.S. Customs and Border Protection:
CLASS: Consular Lookout and Support System:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation:
IBIS: Interagency Border Inspection System:
ICE: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement:
NIIS: Nonimmigrant Information System:
TSC: Terrorist Screening Center:
United States General Accounting Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
July 13, 2004:
The Honorable Christopher Shays:
Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and
International Relations:
Committee on Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
Dear Mr. Chairman:
As stated in the President's National Strategy for Homeland
Security,[Footnote 1] the U.S. government has no more important mission
than protecting the homeland from future terrorist attacks. The
strategy calls for preventing the entry of foreign terrorists into our
country and using all legal means to identify; halt; and, where
appropriate, prosecute or initiate immigration or other proceedings
against terrorists in the United States. The U.S. homeland security
strategy, involving a variety of federal agencies, has multiple tools
for preventing potential terrorists from entering the country and
identifying potential terrorists that have already entered. The visa
revocation process is one such tool.
In June 2003 we reported[Footnote 2] that agencies lacked written
procedures to ensure that appropriate personnel are notified and take
specific actions when the Department of State (State) revokes
visas[Footnote 3] on terrorism grounds.[Footnote 4] As a result,
lookouts were not always posted, other agencies were not always
notified of visa revocations, and there were potential investigative
gaps on individuals with visas revoked based on terrorism concerns who
were in the United States.[Footnote 5] We recommended that the
Secretary of Homeland Security, in conjunction with the Secretary of
State and Attorney General, develop specific policies and procedures
for the interagency visa revocation process to ensure that revocation
notices and related information are transmitted to the appropriate
immigration and law enforcement agencies in a timely manner. We also
recommended that they develop a specific policy on actions that
immigration and law enforcement agencies should take to investigate and
locate individuals who remain in the United States after their visas
are revoked.
At your request, we examined whether weaknesses in the visa revocation
process identified in our June 2003 report were addressed. To
accomplish our objective, we obtained information on policies and
procedures put in place to improve the visa revocation process;
interviewed key State and Homeland Security officials responsible for
visa revocations; determined the steps taken to address policy and
legal issues regarding removal of individuals with revoked visas raised
in our June 2003 report; and analyzed data on all visas revoked on
terrorism grounds over a 3-month period,[Footnote 6] including detailed
information on a random sample of 35 cases selected from data provided
by the Department of State in February 2004. This sample is not
projectable because of data problems discussed in appendix I. We did
not review Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) activities to
investigate suspected terrorists. We conducted our evaluation in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Results in Brief:
State and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) took some actions
in the summer of 2003 to address the weaknesses identified in our June
2003 report. State issued new procedures for revoking visas and
notifying DHS and other agencies of the revocation, and U.S. Customs
and Border Protection (CBP), a component of DHS, developed a workflow
outline for determining if individuals with revoked visas are in the
country and, if so, notifying officials responsible for enforcing our
immigration laws. However, our analysis of visas revoked based on
terrorism concerns from October through December 2003 revealed that
weaknesses remained in the implementation of the visa revocation
process, especially relating to the timely transmission of information
among federal agencies. For instance, we found that backlogs or long
delays sometimes occurred in screening names in the U.S. government's
most complete database of potential terrorists (called TIPOFF) against
State's database of current visa holders, in transmitting
recommendations to revoke individual visas, and in revoking individual
visas after receiving a recommendation to do so. We also found that
agencies involved in the visa revocation process had conflicting
records of how many visas were revoked for terrorism concerns between
October and December 2003 and whether individuals who held these visas
may be in the country. In addition, officials from DHS's Customs and
Border Protection could not document that they consistently notified
immigration officials of the need to locate and investigate individuals
with revoked visas who were present in the United States. Additionally,
we found that U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), a
component of DHS, requested that field offices investigate individuals
with visas revoked on terrorism grounds who may be in the country more
than 2 months after receiving notification of the visa revocation. Our
review of visa revocations shows that DHS has located individuals in
the country whose visas were revoked because they may be suspected or
actual terrorists. ICE officials told us that some are still being
investigated, three have been arrested on immigration charges, and
others have been cleared. With respect to an alien already present in
the United States, the Department of State's current visa revocation
certificate makes revocation effective only upon the alien's departure.
Therefore, according to DHS, if ICE special agents locate an alien in
the United States for whom State has issued a revocation certificate
that states the revocation is effective upon his or her departure, ICE
would be unable to place the alien in removal proceedings based solely
on a visa revocation that had not yet taken place.[Footnote 7]
After we initiated our inquiry for this report in January 2004, State
and DHS took additional actions to address the weaknesses we identified
through our analysis. DHS and State believe these actions will avoid
delays experienced in the past. In April and May, State made
significant revisions to its procedures[Footnote 8] and formalized its
tracking system for visa revocation cases. Starting in March, CBP took
steps to ensure that ICE officials are aware of individuals whose visas
were revoked and who may be in the country. Also in March, ICE
developed written procedures instructing personnel to determine if
individuals with revoked visas are in the country and, if necessary,
investigate them. Finally, State and DHS began discussing how to
address the legal and policy issues regarding the removal of
individuals with revoked visas. In addition, the Terrorist Screening
Center (TSC), an interagency group organized under the FBI and
established in December 2003, recently took some steps to improve the
visa revocation process. In March 2004, TSC developed written standard
operating procedures related to the screening of intelligence
information and later began training additional staff to perform this
function. Although the recent actions are important steps to improve
the visa revocation process, additional measures are needed to further
improve the process. There is no governmentwide policy regarding visa
revocations, and the individual agencies' written policies and
procedures often do not contain performance standards such as time
frames for completing individual steps of the visa revocation process,
nor do they reflect a fully coordinated approach to implementing the
process. Further, State and DHS continue their discussions of the legal
and policy issues, with assistance from the Department of Justice.
In light of our past work and the weaknesses we identified through our
review, we are recommending that the Secretaries of Homeland Security
and State work jointly and with other appropriate agencies to develop a
written governmentwide policy that clearly defines the roles and
responsibilities and sets performance standards for the agencies
involved in the visa revocation process. We also recommend that DHS and
State address outstanding legal and policy issues or, by October 1,
2004, provide Congress with a list of specific actions that could help
resolve them. We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of
Homeland Security, State, and Justice for their comments. DHS generally
concurred with the report and recommendations. State said it would
consult with DHS regarding the recommendations, with a view to
addressing GAO's concerns. The Department of Justice did not provide
comments.
Background:
Our nation's border security process includes multiple mechanisms for
addressing potential terrorist threats to the United States. One of
these mechanisms is the visa revocation process. The visa revocation
process is a homeland security tool that can prevent potential
terrorists from entering the United States and can help immigration and
law enforcement officials identify and investigate potential terrorists
already in the country. The visa revocation process begins after
consular officers at the Department of State's overseas consular posts
adjudicate visa applications for foreign nationals who wish to
temporarily enter the United States for business, tourism, or other
reasons. After receiving a visa, foreign nationals travel to ports of
entry within the United States. At ports of entry, inspectors from
DHS's Customs and Border Protection determine whether the visa holder
is admitted to the United States and, if so, how long he or she may
remain in the country. Once foreign nationals have entered the United
States, DHS's Immigration and Customs Enforcement assumes
responsibility for enforcing our immigration laws, including ensuring
that foreign nationals are eligible to remain in the United States.
According to State officials, most visa revocations on terrorism
grounds begin with information from the TIPOFF database, the U.S.
government's primary terrorist watch list. The TIPOFF database includes
individuals the U.S. government suspects may have ties to terrorism.
Information in the TIPOFF database is provided by various federal
agencies including the FBI, State, and others. At the time of our
previous report, this information was managed by State's Bureau of
Intelligence and Research. In December 2003, TSC assumed responsibility
for this function. TSC was officially formed in December 2003 as a
result of a presidential directive designed to increase information
sharing across agencies and to facilitate better understanding between
the intelligence and investigation communities. As an interagency
organization under the administration of the FBI with representatives
from State, DHS, and other federal agencies, part of its role is to
work with federal agencies to provide access to the TIPOFF database.
Figure 1 depicts the visa revocation process in effect during the
October to December 2003 time period we analyzed for this report as
described in agency procedures and as explained to us by agency
officials.
Figure 1: The Visa Revocation Process in Effect from October through
December 2003:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
State uses information in TIPOFF to determine if visa holders may be
suspected or actual terrorists. When TSC adds individuals in TIPOFF to
the Department of State's Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS),
it provides a list of these names to Consular Affairs. State officials
told us that the entry of these names into CLASS and the Interagency
Border Inspection System (IBIS) should help prevent any of those
individuals from entering the United States because border inspectors
will be alerted to deny them entry. This lookout process does not
completely address the potential vulnerability posed by individuals
already in the country. Therefore, the visa revocation process is an
important tool to help identify individuals whom immigration and law
enforcement officials should locate and investigate. After TSC adds
names to CLASS and IBIS, Consular Affairs compares these names with its
database of all visa holders and sends an electronic spreadsheet back
to TSC containing probable or possible matches. TSC refines this list
by identifying direct matches and recommends that Consular Affairs
revoke these individuals' visas. It also sends Consular Affairs an
information package containing a summary of the derogatory information
that led TSC to the recommendation to revoke.
After determining that the revocation is appropriate, the Consular
Affairs officer posts a lookout in CLASS for the individual.[Footnote
9] According to State and DHS officials, this lookout is then
accessible in near real time to DHS inspectors at border ports of entry
through the IBIS database. CBP inspectors at ports of entry use IBIS to
check whether foreign nationals are inadmissible and should be denied
entry into the United States. When a person comes to the United States
by air or by sea, CBP inspectors are required to check that person's
name in IBIS before he or she is allowed to enter the country. After
posting the lookout, the Consular Affairs officer writes an internal
case file memo summarizing the derogatory information, creates a draft
revocation certificate and cable for management review, and forwards
these materials to the appropriate officials within State. Once these
officials clear and sign the revocation certificate, Consular Affairs
sends a cable instructing the overseas post that issued the visa to
contact the visa holder, physically cancel the visa, and report all
actions taken to State. State also notifies other federal agencies of
visa revocations. Specifically, Consular Affairs' Visa Office faxes a
copy of the revocation certificate to CBP. In addition, the Visa Office
sends a copy of the cable by email that includes the wording of the
revocation certificate to various other agencies, including CBP and
ICE.
Upon receiving the notification from State, CBP determines whether the
individual may have already legally entered the United States by
electronically searching immigration records. If CBP determines that
the individual may be in the country, it notifies ICE. ICE officials
also attempt to determine whether the individual may be in the country.
Once ICE determines that an individual with a visa revoked on national
security grounds may be in the United States, ICE employees query law
enforcement and open source information to attempt to locate the
individual. If they determine that the individual is in the country,
they conduct an additional investigation in law enforcement and
intelligence databases and forward the results of this preliminary
research to the appropriate Special Agent in Charge (field) office or
offices. The ICE Special Agent in Charge office then coordinates with
the FBI and conducts an investigation to locate the individual and
determine if the alien is in compliance with all terms of his or her
admission.[Footnote 10]
FBI's Role in Border Security:
While FBI investigators do not play a formal role in the visa
revocation process, they play a key role in the U.S. government's
overall border security efforts, including investigating suspected
terrorists in the United States. The FBI supports border security by
(1) working to deny entry into the United States of aliens associated
with, suspected of being engaged in, or supporting terrorist activity
and (2) aiding in supplying information to locate, detain, prosecute,
or deport any such aliens already present in the United States.
According to FBI officials, the TIPOFF database is central to the FBI's
efforts to track suspected terrorists in the United States. When names
of suspected terrorists are added to TIPOFF, this information may
originate from the FBI. When names are added to TIPOFF, the FBI may
forward investigative leads to the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task
Force, which in turn may relay information to one or more of the 84
Joint Terrorist Tracking Task Forces throughout the country for
investigation.
Initial Actions Taken to Address Weaknesses Were Inadequate:
Following our June 2003 report, State and DHS took some actions to
address weaknesses we identified in the visa revocation process, but
these actions did not adequately address all of the weaknesses we
found. State developed written procedures providing detailed
instructions for personnel to follow when revoking visas. DHS did not
develop an agencywide policy for visa revocations, but DHS's Customs
and Border Protection developed a workflow outline related to its role
in the visa revocation process. Our review of visas revoked from
October through December 2003 showed that despite State's and CBP's
initial actions, weaknesses persisted in the visa revocation process.
State Developed Initial Procedures in 2003, but DHS Did Not:
After our June 2003 report, State developed written standard operating
procedures for processing visa revocations. These procedures were
issued on July 7, 2003, and included written instructions for consular
officers to follow once they decide to revoke an individual's visa.
Specifically, they included directions for posting lookouts, preparing
and finalizing revocation certificates, and notifying appropriate State
personnel of the action taken. Additionally, these procedures provided
instructions for notifying both the overseas post that issued the visa
and Homeland Security officials. State published a less detailed
version of these procedures in its Foreign Affairs Manual on July 17,
2003, for use by consular officers.
DHS did not develop an intra-agency policy regarding responsibilities
for handling visa revocation cases. However, following our June 2003
report, DHS's Customs and Border Protection developed a workflow
outline showing the steps for determining whether individuals with
revoked visas may be in the United States and, if so, notifying ICE
immigration officials to take specific actions. These procedures were
designed to ensure that appropriate lookouts were recorded and that, in
cases in which the visa holder had entered the United States prior to
the visa revocation, all research information from CBP was immediately
relayed to DHS's Immigration and Customs Enforcement for investigation.
Review of Revocation Process Identified Several Weaknesses:
Our review of visas revoked based on terrorism concerns from October
through December 2003 indicated that, despite State's and CBP's initial
efforts, weaknesses remained in the visa revocation process. We found
that backlogs in cases to be screened, delays in forwarding the
appropriate intelligence to State, and delays in taking action to
revoke visas all created weaknesses in the visa revocation process.
(See fig. 2 for the points of delay we observed in our review of visas
revoked over a 3-month period.) We also found instances of delays in
State's notification to DHS. In addition, conflicting records of how
many individuals' visas were revoked for terrorism concerns during our
reporting period and which of these people may be in the United States
suggest a risk that agencies may have been prevented from taking
appropriate action in some cases. Further, we found that ICE was not
consistently or promptly notified after CBP determined that aliens with
revoked visas might be in the United States. We also found that ICE
officials were generally unaware of the basis for individual
revocations. Additionally, we found that ICE waited more than 2 months
to request that field offices investigate individuals with visas
revoked on terrorism grounds who may be in the country. Finally,
outstanding legal and policy issues continue to exist regarding the
removal of individuals based solely on their visa revocation.
Figure 2: Points of Delay in the Visa Revocation Process:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Delays Before Revoking Visas Posed Significant Risks:
Our review of all visas revoked on terrorism grounds from October
through December 2003 showed that delays occurred in identifying
individuals whose visas should be revoked. According to a State
official, in August and September 2003, there was a backlog of
approximately 5,000 names of suspected terrorists in TIPOFF that had
not been screened to identify any visa holders. Therefore, there was a
delay between identifying individuals who may be suspected terrorists
and determining whether they had a visa. This official explained that
the backlog developed in part because of a quadrupling in the amount of
counterterrorism intelligence gathered after September 11 without a
commensurate increase in staff allocated to screen this intelligence
information. She added that the backlog was cleared in December 2003
following the temporary assignment of additional staff from Consular
Affairs.
Our review of a sample of 35 visas revoked based on terrorism concerns
showed that delays occurred in transmitting recommendations to Consular
Affairs to revoke visas. To eliminate the backlog of names to be
checked, Consular Affairs temporarily assigned two full-time employees
to screen these intelligence data from TIPOFF. TSC officials told us
that terrorism intelligence should be screened to identify visa holders
as quickly as possible. A TSC contractor who typically performs this
duty said that TSC normally sends an average of no more than six
recommendations for visa revocation per day. However, according to a
TSC official, during the time that the Consular Affairs staff were
temporarily assigned to screen intelligence, these staff waited until
they had collected large quantities of recommendations and sent them to
Consular Affairs in large batches. As a result, about 260 visa
revocations on terrorism grounds during the 3-month period we examined
were processed on 2 days, November 25 and December 1. This delay
increased the risk that some of these individuals could have entered
the United States before State was able to post the appropriate
lookouts or revoke their visas.
State's Lookouts Were Not Always Timely:
Based on our review of a sample of visa revocations, the Department of
State did not always post lookouts in a timely manner. According to
State and DHS officials, posting this lookout is a key step in the
border security process because it is the primary mechanism for
notifying border inspectors that individuals' visas have been revoked
and should not be admitted to the United States. State's standard
operating procedures issued in July 2003 directed Consular Affairs
officials to post a lookout for an individual before the revocation is
finalized. Although State posted lookouts in all 35 visa revocations we
examined in detail, we found that in six instances, Consular Affairs
did not do so until after the revocation was finalized. In one case it
took 8 days after the revocation certificate was signed for Consular
Affairs to post the lookout.
Delays Occurred in Revoking Visas:
Our review of 35 visas revoked based on terrorism concerns also showed
that delays occurred in Consular Affairs' decisions to revoke visas
after receiving a recommendation to do so.[Footnote 11] State officials
told us that it should not take more than a week for them to complete
the visa revocation process after receiving a recommendation to revoke.
We attempted to determine how long it took Consular Affairs to revoke
visas after receiving a recommendation to do so for our sample of 35.
However, this information only existed for 6 of the 35 cases. In 3 of
these cases, Consular Affairs revoked the individuals' visas within 10
days of receiving the recommendation. However, in the other 3 cases,
Consular Affairs took much longer to act on the recommendation. For
example, in one instance, a Consular Affairs official told us that
State officials deliberated for more than 6 months before deciding to
revoke the individual's visa. According to this official, Consular
Affairs was deliberating whether the individual's connection to
terrorism was strong enough to warrant revoking his or her visa. In
another instance, more than 17 months elapsed between the
recommendation to revoke and the actual revocation.
State's Notifications to DHS Were Not Always Timely:
We also observed delays in the Department of State notification to DHS
of visa revocations. It is particularly important that these
notifications are timely when the alien whose visa is revoked may
already be in the United States so that DHS can locate and investigate
him or her. Of the 35 cases we reviewed in detail, CBP told us it
received notification from State the same day a revocation was
finalized in 9 cases; within 1 to 6 days in 23 cases; and in 7 days or
more in three cases.
Agencies Reported Conflicting Information on Visa Revocations:
State, CBP, and ICE each maintain separate records on visa revocations.
We found that for the October through December 2003 time period, each
agency reported different numbers of revocations based on terrorism
concerns. As shown in figure 3, State listed 338; ICE, 347; and CBP,
336. We found that only 320 names were on all three lists and that some
lists contained names that were not on either of the other lists.
Figure 3: Inconsistencies among Agencies on Number of Visas Revoked
from October through December 2003:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Instances where a name did not appear on all three lists show a
potential breakdown in the visa revocation process. We could not
determine why all of the names were not on all lists. However, we
determined that some of the names were not included because the
agencies disagreed over whether some of these individuals' visas were
revoked on terrorism grounds or when their visas were revoked, and
others were not included because we were provided incomplete
information. Regardless of the reason, this discrepancy is a cause for
concern because CBP and ICE may not have taken timely action to
determine if these individuals were in the country and, if so, to
locate and investigate them.
In our June 2003 report, we noted that State's Visa Office neither kept
a central log of visas it revoked on the basis of terrorism concerns,
nor did it monitor whether notifications were sent to other agencies.
In commenting on that report, State said the Visa Office had changed
its practices to keep a log of revocation cases and maintain all signed
certificates in a central file. However, in conducting this review,
Visa Office officials told us that State did not maintain a formal list
of all visas revoked. We also learned that State, CBP, and ICE did not
have a system in place to regularly reconcile their separate records of
visa revocations to ensure that each agency has consistent information.
CBP and ICE Disagreed on Which Individuals May Have Been in the
Country:
Our review of a sample of 35 visa revocations on terrorism grounds
shows that CBP[Footnote 12] and ICE records also conflicted regarding
whether certain individuals may have been in the country. In 3 of the
35 cases, CBP and ICE disagreed about whether an individual may have
been in the country at the time of visa revocation and whether they
might still be in the country. In two of the instances, CBP did not
believe the individual was in the country and, therefore, did not refer
the cases to ICE for investigation. However, ICE special agents
determined that both of these individuals were and still are in the
country--one is awaiting adjudication of a political asylum claim, and
the other has a pending application to become a lawful permanent
resident of the United States.
In another instance, CBP believed an individual was in the country when
his visa was revoked and subsequently notified ICE of the need to
locate and investigate him. However, because ICE did not use CBP's
notification, it performed its own search of immigration records based
on State's notification and concluded that the individual was not in
the country. Therefore, it did not investigate him. According to CBP
data, this individual has been in the country for more than a year.
These disagreements are due in part to the lack of clearly defined
responsibilities for each of the DHS components. Because of DHS's lack
of an agencywide written policy regarding visa revocations, its
component units' procedures are sometimes duplicative. For example,
CBP's written procedures require its personnel to determine if
individuals with revoked visas may be in the United States and notify
ICE of any such individuals. According to ICE officials, they conduct
their own record checks to determine if individuals with revoked visas
are in the country and rely primarily on notifications from State to
identify individuals on whom they need to conduct records checks.
An ICE official told us that CBP and ICE have different
responsibilities regarding visa revocations and, as a result, may have
different levels of sensitivity to information regarding whether
individuals with revoked visas may be in the country. CBP's primary
responsibility is to post lookouts to prevent individuals from entering
the country. ICE's primary responsibility is to prevent any national
security threats by enforcing immigration laws once individuals have
already entered the country. Therefore, ICE officials told us that they
initiate investigations of individuals out of an abundance of caution,
even if CBP may not believe the individual may be in the country. They
added that notifications from CBP merely supplement ICE's efforts to
determine if individuals may be in the country.
ICE May Not Have Been Informed of Aliens with Revoked Visas Who May Be
in the Country:
Once they receive notification of a visa revocation from State, DHS
personnel at CBP should notify ICE if they determine that the
individual whose visa was revoked may be in the country. CBP's workflow
outline states that CBP verifies that any lead information on
individuals whose visas are revoked and may be in the United States is
immediately provided to ICE for investigation. A CBP official confirmed
that, because these cases are highly urgent, they should be handled
immediately. However, CBP could not document that it had notified ICE
promptly, or in several cases, that it notified ICE at all. According
to CBP data on the 35 cases in our sample, 10 aliens may have been in
the United States at the time of their revocation. In 3 of these cases,
CBP records indicate that ICE was never notified that the alien might
be in the country. In the other 7 cases, CBP notified ICE but could not
document that the notification occurred until at least 3 months after
the revocation.
ICE Officials Are Generally Unaware of Basis for Individual
Revocations:
While ICE could readily identify which visa revocation cases were based
on terrorism concerns, agency officials stated that they often received
no derogatory information showing that individuals whose visas State
had revoked on terrorism concerns might pose a national security
threat. Because ICE personnel are responsible for fully investigating
every case in which the individual may be in the country, they expend
resources conducting investigations on individuals who they believe may
pose little or no threat to national security. According to ICE
officials, the growing number of visa revocation cases based on
terrorism concerns places a significant strain on their investigative
resources, and ICE was forced to pull agents off active investigations
of known national security threats to investigate visa revocation
cases.
As discussed earlier, State officials told us that the vast majority of
visas revoked for terrorism concerns are based on derogatory
information contained in TIPOFF. According to TSC, of the 35 cases we
examined in detail, 32 of the individuals whose visas were revoked
appeared in TIPOFF. However, in May 2004, ICE officials told us that
they were not aware that most of State's visa revocations on terrorism
grounds are based on information in TIPOFF. In June 2004, they informed
us that their records check located only 6 of the 35 individuals from
our sample in TIPOFF. Also in June, State officials told us they
recently began providing DHS with the TIPOFF record number for each
individual whose revocation was based on derogatory information in
TIPOFF.
ICE Initiated Field Investigations More Than 2 Months after Receiving
Notification of Visa Revocation:
Our review of 35 visa revocations on terrorism grounds from October
through December 2003 shows that ICE forwarded requests for field
offices to initiate investigations of individuals who may be in the
United States more than 2 months after receiving notification of the
visa revocation. ICE officials explained that requests sent to field
offices specify a date by which the field offices should complete their
investigations. These officials added that, in instances when the
individual is in TIPOFF and in the country, they take immediate action
to locate and investigate him or her. After receiving notification from
State, ICE determined that field offices should investigate 8 of the 35
cases we examined in detail. In all 8 of these cases, ICE waited more
than 2 months to initiate field investigations. In 2 cases, ICE
received notification from the Department of State of the visa
revocation in mid-October 2003 but did not send a request to field
offices to investigate these individuals until the end of February
2004. In the other 6 cases, ICE received notification from the
Department of State of the visa revocation in early December but again
did not send a request to field offices to investigate these
individuals until the end of February.
ICE officials told us that it might have taken longer than it usually
takes to initiate these investigations because of an increase in their
workload resulting from the raising of the nationwide terror threat
level to "code orange" (high) during the period of our review. On
December 21, 2003, DHS raised the terror threat level from "code
yellow" (elevated) to "code orange" for 19 days. In June, ICE officials
told us they were considering revising their policies to ensure that
all future investigations are initiated promptly.
DHS Investigated Individuals with Visas Revoked on Terrorism Grounds:
Separate from our sample of 35 visa revocations, we reviewed the more
than 300 visa revocations based on terrorism concerns from October
through December 2003. According to ICE records, ICE determined that 64
of these individuals needed to be investigated because they might have
been in the United States at the time of revocation. ICE indicated it
had initiated investigations on all 64 of these individuals and has
concluded a majority of these investigations. Data provided by ICE show
that these investigations resulted in confirming departure of some
aliens, clearing others, and arresting 3 on administrative immigration
charges.[Footnote 13] On June 8, 2004, ICE officials told us that they
have no specific derogatory information that would indicate that any of
the individuals remaining in the United States represent a threat to
national security. We also noted several cases where the visa
revocation process prevented individuals with visas revoked based on
terrorism concerns from entering the United States or helped remove
them from the United States.
Existing Law Does Not Expressly Provide for the Removal of Aliens Based
Solely on Visa Revocations:
Revocation of a visa is not explicitly a stated grounds for removal
under the Immigration and Nationality Act.[Footnote 14] State's visa
revocation certificate states that the revocation shall become
effective immediately on the date the certificate is signed unless the
alien is already in the United States, in which case the revocation
will become effective immediately upon the alien's departure from the
United States. Therefore, if ICE special agents locate an alien in the
United States for whom the Department of State has issued a revocation
certificate that states that the alien's visa is revoked effective upon
his or her departure, ICE would be unable to place the alien in removal
proceedings based solely on a visa revocation that had not yet taken
place. In light of the Department of State's current revocation
certificate, the issue whether, under the current statute and
regulations, DHS would have the authority to initiate removal
proceedings on the basis solely of a visa revocation has not been
litigated and remains unresolved legally. According to DHS officials,
if State changed the wording of the certificate to make the revocation
effective retroactively to the date of issuance of the visa, the
government would no longer be effectively barred from litigating the
issue. However, in June 2004 State and DHS officials told us that they
had reached an informal understanding that should the wording of the
revocation certificate be changed, it would not be changed in all
instances, but only on a case by case basis. In commenting on a draft
of this report, DHS stated that on a case by case basis DHS may ask
that State change its revocation certificate related to an admitted
alien to make the revocation effective retroactively to the date of
issuance of the visa, and State will consider such a request in
consultation with DHS and the Department of Justice.
Recent Actions Taken to Address Identified Weaknesses in the Visa
Revocation Process:
Since we initiated our inquiry in January 2004, State and DHS have
taken additional actions to address identified weaknesses in the
process. These included revisions to visa revocation procedures,
reviewing past revocations, and taking steps to address legal and
policy issues. In addition, in mid-April, TSC identified visa
revocations as a potential vulnerability that could compromise homeland
security and developed an informal process for coordinating actions and
sharing information relating to visa revocations. However, we
identified some weaknesses that still need to be addressed.
State Revised Its Procedures and Formalized Its System for Tracking
Cases:
In April and May 2004, State took several actions to improve its
performance in the visa revocation process, including revising its
procedures and formalizing its tracking of visa revocations. In the
course of responding to our inquiries, State's Visa Office discovered
that its standard operating procedures had not always been followed
correctly. In response, the Assistant Secretary of State for Consular
Affairs informed us on April 27, 2004, that in light of the importance
of visa revocation cases, the procedures were revised to provide more
explicit details for each step in the process. For example, the
procedures were revised to highlight the importance of posting a
lookout code into CLASS before the revocation certificate is signed.
Additionally, the Visa Office now requires its personnel performing
visa revocations to certify that they have completed all steps in the
process and to provide the date on which each step was completed. At
the end of the process, a designated supervisor must now review the
revocation file and certify that the standard operating procedures were
completed correctly. State revised these procedures again in late May
2004 to further clarify which federal agencies should receive
notification of the revocation. Finally, the Assistant Secretary for
Consular Affairs told us that the Visa Office planned to formalize its
previously informal system for tracking visa revocations to make it a
definitive reference point for information about all visa revocations.
CBP Reviewed Past Revocations to Provide Additional Information to ICE:
Officials from CBP took two steps following the initiation of our
review to ensure that appropriate action was taken on prior visa
revocations. On March 25, 2004, CBP officials sent notifications to ICE
regarding individuals with visas revoked from October through December
2003 who may be in the country. CBP officials told us that they sent
these notifications to ICE because, in responding to our inquiry, they
determined that they could not document previous notifications to ICE
of these individuals.
In May 2004, a CBP official informed us that CBP was performing a
review of all visa revocations in its lookout database to ensure that
all appropriate notifications had been sent to ICE. This review
identified 656 individuals with revoked visas who may be in the
country. CBP provided this information to ICE. We reviewed these data
and determined that 34 of these individuals' visas were revoked based
on terrorism concerns from October through December 2003.
ICE Assigned Staff to CBP and Developed Written Standard Operating
Procedures:
In January 2004, ICE assigned a special agent to CBP in order to assist
with information exchange and coordination of visa revocation issues.
According to DHS, if CBP determines that an individual whose visa was
revoked is in the country, ICE is notified immediately. Also, on March
1, 2004, ICE issued written standard operating procedures for all visa
revocation investigations. ICE officials acknowledged that prior to
March 2004, ICE did not have a policy that specifically addressed visa
revocations. However, ICE explained that it had procedures for handling
all investigative leads received, including visa revocations. ICE's
March 2004 procedures outline the steps that ICE officials should take
for cases where an individual has entered the United States and
subsequently has a visa revoked. These procedures begin with the
receipt of a visa revocation cable from State and include steps for
determining if individuals are in the country, conducting records
searches to determine where the individual may be, and forwarding
necessary information to field offices for further investigation.
State and DHS Took Steps to Address Legal and Policy Issues:
In February 2004, officials from DHS, which has overall responsibility
for visa policy, told us they were considering a regulation relating to
visa revocations that could allow the removal of individuals from the
United States because their visas have been revoked by State. In June
2004, DHS officials told us that they were still considering this
regulation and were coordinating with State and the Department of
Justice. Additionally, DHS was working with Justice to address
questions regarding DHS's authority to issue such a regulation. State
officials told us that making changes regarding removal of persons with
revoked visas would require both State and DHS to make legal and policy
decisions and establish a formal written agreement regarding
procedures.
TSC's Efforts to Improve the Visa Revocation Process:
Since its formation in December 2003, TSC has taken actions to clarify
its role, increase its capacity to handle visa revocation cases, and
analyze the visa revocation process as an antiterrorism tool.
Specifically, in March 2004, TSC developed written standard operating
procedures outlining the process for screening intelligence information
to identify visa holders who may be terrorists and for recommending
that Consular Affairs revoke these individuals' visas. TSC also
recently began training additional staff to screen terrorism
intelligence for matches with visa holders. Previously, the center had
one full-time staff member dedicated to performing this function.
TSC officials told us that, in mid-April 2004, TSC identified the visa
revocation process as a potential vulnerability to homeland security.
As a result, it developed a process for TSC to coordinate the sharing
of information on visa revocation cases. This process outlines
responsibilities for representatives from State, CBP, ICE, and the FBI
who are assigned to TSC. According to a TSC official, this process is
designed to coordinate the efforts of these representatives, without
relying on formal notifications transmitted among the agencies. When
new names are added to the TIPOFF database, all the agency
representatives receive this information at the same time. According to
TSC's new process, State personnel assigned to TSC determine if the
person has a valid visa; CBP personnel determine if the individual may
be in the country; and, if the individual is in the country, ICE and
FBI personnel determine if they have open investigations of the
individual. Because this process was developed after the October to
December 2003 time period, we did not assess its effectiveness.
In April 2004, TSC also initiated a review of pending visa revocation
cases based on terrorism concerns to determine whether any of the
individuals in question were in the United States and whether DHS and
FBI were aware of their presence and had open investigations on them. A
senior FBI official assigned to TSC told us that as of May 27, 2004,
this review was not complete, but that, in some instances, law
enforcement or immigration officials needed to open investigations on
some of these individuals.
Additional Actions Are Needed to Improve the Visa Revocation Process:
Despite the steps taken by State and DHS, additional actions are needed
to improve the visa revocation process. There is no governmentwide
policy outlining roles and responsibilities for the visa revocation
process, and State and DHS have not completed their discussions on
legal and policy issues related to removing individuals with revoked
visas from the United States. Although CBP and ICE have written
internal procedures related to their respective roles and
responsibilities in the visa revocation process, DHS has still not
developed an agencywide policy governing the process. As a result, CBP
and ICE take responsibility for performing some of the same tasks.
While CBP's workflow outline states that CBP is responsible for
determining if individuals with revoked visas are in the United States
and referring cases to ICE, ICE's standard operating procedures
indicate that ICE staff are also responsible for performing this
function. In some cases, State, CBP, and ICE are not familiar with what
the different agencies' policies and procedures expect of them. Because
agency officials do not always recognize what other agencies' written
policies expect of them, important information may not be passed from
one agency to the next, and efforts may be duplicated. Further, since
the agencies do not have a system in place for routinely reconciling
their visa revocation records, there is a heightened chance that
individuals with visas revoked for terrorism concerns and who are in
the country will not be investigated.
State's and DHS's written procedures also lack specific time frames for
completing individual steps in the process. For instance, State's
procedures dated May 20, 2004 lack guidance on how quickly Consular
Affairs officials should act on recommendations from TSC to revoke
individuals' visas. Further, they lack guidance on how quickly Consular
Affairs officials should notify the overseas post and other federal
agencies once the revocation certificate is signed. In addition, ICE's
written procedures do not specify a time frame for referring cases to
Special Agent in Charge offices. This general lack of time frames is
significant, given the extent of delays we observed in the visa
revocation process and the potential threat posed by the individuals
whose visas have been revoked.
State's and DHS's discussions of legal and policy issues regarding the
visa revocation process have not been completed. DHS officials told us
that the agencies continue to discuss possible mechanisms for
addressing these issues, including possibly changing the wording of
State's revocation certificate or studying the feasibility of drafting
a regulation to address these issues. According to State and DHS, the
complexity of these issues have required an extraordinary amount of
review and coordination with various interested government agencies. As
of June 2004, neither State nor DHS could provide a time line for
addressing these legal and policy issues.
Conclusions:
Our testing of the visa revocation process from October through
December 2003 identified several gaps in the process. Since then, DHS
and State have taken several actions to improve the process. DHS and
State believe that these actions will avoid the delays that were
experienced in the past. TSC's recent initiative to coordinate the
sharing of information on potential terrorists should also improve the
process. Nevertheless, some additional actions are needed to further
improve the process. A governmentwide commitment is necessary to
address the weaknesses in the implementation of the visa revocation
process so that it can be a more effective antiterrorism tool.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To strengthen and improve the visa revocation process as an
antiterrorism tool, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland
Security work jointly with the Secretary of State and other appropriate
agencies to take the following two actions:
* Develop a written governmentwide policy that clearly defines the
roles and responsibilities of the agencies involved in the visa
revocation process, including TSC. This policy should include
directions for sharing information and tracking visa revocation cases
throughout the interagency visa revocation process. It should
incorporate performance standards (e.g., time frames for completing
each step in the process) and periodic interagency assessments to
determine whether information is being shared among the agencies
involved and appropriate follow-up action is being taken and to
reconcile data differences if they occur; and:
* Address outstanding legal and policy issues regarding the status of
aliens with visas revoked on national security grounds who are in the
United States at the time of the revocation. If these issues cannot be
addressed, the Executive Branch should, by October 1, 2004, provide
Congress with a list of specific actions (including any potential
legislative changes) that could help resolve them.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Homeland
Security, State, and Justice for their comments.
The Department of Homeland Security said it generally concurred with
the report and its recommendations. DHS believes that our
identification of areas where improvements are needed will contribute
to ongoing efforts to strengthen the visa revocation process. DHS
emphasized that persons whose visas have been revoked for terrorism
concerns may not be terrorists and that revoking a visa is a
precautionary measure to preclude an alien from gaining admission to
the United States until more information is obtained to decide if the
person should be admitted to the United States.
The Department of State indicated that it believes that its handling of
the revocation process overall has been excellent and has improved over
time. State indicated it would consult with DHS regarding
implementation of our recommendations. State also provided additional
information on the visa revocation process and the procedures currently
in effect.
DHS and State also provided technical comments, which we have
incorporated where appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to other interested Members of
Congress. We are also sending copies to the Secretary of State,
Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Attorney General. We also will
make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report
will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://
www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report,
please contact me at (202) 512-4128. Key contributors to this report
were John Brummet, Jason Bair, Elizabeth Singer, Mary Moutsos, Janey
Cohen, and Etana Finkler.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Jess T. Ford:
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
[End of section]
Appendix I Scope and Methodology:
The scope of our work covered the interagency process for visas revoked
by the Department of State (State) headquarters on the basis of
terrorism concerns between October 1 and December 31, 2003. To assess
the policies and procedures governing the visa revocation process, we
obtained copies of written procedures from the Department of State and
the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). In
addition, we interviewed officials from State, DHS, the Terrorist
Screening Center (TSC), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
To assess the process for revoking visas on terrorism grounds, we
examined data and records provided by State's Visa Office on visa
revocations from October through December 2003. The Visa Office
provided us an initial list of such revocations in February 2004 and an
amended list in April 2004. We also obtained information from CBP and
ICE on the number of visas revoked on terrorism grounds during this
time period and compared these data with that provided by State's Visa
Office. We found that the total number of visa revocations differed
among these three data sources. We identified discrepancies and
discussed these with agency officials. In addition, we obtained copies
of the official revocation certificates for individuals whose visas
State revoked during that time. We determined that State made at least
338 visa revocations during this time period, but we also determined
that the data on visa revocations were not sufficiently reliable to
provide an exact count of the number of revocations. However, the data
were sufficiently reliable for purposes of this report.
We used the Visa Office's February 2004 list of 318 cases to draw a
random sample of 35 to review in detail. We cannot generalize from this
sample to the full universe of all cases because, after we had drawn
our sample, the Visa Office subsequently supplied us with an amended
list of 338 cases. For the individuals in our sample of 35, we obtained
printouts from State's Consular Consolidated Database, which provided
us with the individuals' names, biographic data such as dates and
places of birth, passport numbers, and visa information such as issuing
posts and types of visa. We also obtained a copy of the cable sent by
State headquarters to the post that issued the visa that was revoked.
This cable included a reference to the specific section of the
Immigration and Nationality Act that was used as the basis for the
revocation as well as a list of other agencies the cable was sent to.
The Visa Office also provided documentation of the lookouts it posted
in the Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS).
We met with officials from TSC and State's Visa Office to determine the
steps taken prior to finalizing visa revocations. TSC officials
provided copies of their written policies and procedures for dealing
with visa revocations and described the process it follows in such
cases. TSC officials also informed us whether individuals in our sample
of 35 visa revocations are in the TIPOFF database and, if so, when a
recommendation to revoke these visas was sent to State. To calculate
the length of time between the recommendation to revoke and the actual
revocation, we compared the information provided by TSC with the dates
on the revocation certificates provided by State.
To determine when State posted lookouts and notified other agencies of
visa revocations, we obtained information from the Visa Office. This
included printouts from the CLASS system showing when a lookout was
posted, who posted the lookout, and what lookout code was used. In
addition, we examined the revocation cables sent to other agencies. We
also obtained information from CBP and ICE regarding when they received
notification from State. We determined that the CLASS system was
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of showing when lookouts were
posted.
To determine if and when ICE officials were informed by CBP of
individuals with revoked visas who might be in the country, we obtained
documents from and spoke with officials from CBP. These officials
provided an electronic version of CBP's Visa Revocation Case Tracking
Spreadsheet for the period we examined. This spreadsheet contained
information on all visa revocations during the period, not just those
based on terrorism concerns. The spreadsheet included the names, dates
the notifications of the revocations were received, dates of the most
recent entry and exit from the United States, and the date on which CBP
informed ICE that the individual might be in the country.
We also compared State, CBP, and ICE records regarding the number and
names of individuals with visas revoked based on terrorism concerns
from October through December 2003. We obtained lists of all such cases
during the period from State and ICE. We then compared these lists to
one another and to CBP's Visa Revocation Case Tracking Spreadsheet.
To determine which individuals with revoked visas might be in the
country, we examined CBP's entry and exit data in its Visa Revocation
Case Tracking Spreadsheet. These data are based on information from the
Nonimmigrant Information System, which does not have complete entry and
exit data (e.g., it does not include departure information if aliens
fail to turn in the bottom portion of their I-94 form when they leave
the country). As such, we determined that these data are not
sufficiently reliable for the purpose of determining which individuals
with visas revoked on terrorism grounds are in the country. In
addition, because ICE officials told us they do not rely on CBP to
determine which individuals might be in the country, we obtained
additional entry and exit data from ICE for our sample of 35 cases. To
assess the reliability of the ICE data, we interviewed officials who
were knowledgeable about the data and compared it with CBP's data.
Where we found discrepancies, we discussed these cases with officials
from both CBP and ICE. We determined that the ICE data were
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of providing the ongoing results
of investigations of individuals that had been in the United States
with revoked visas; however, some investigations were still outstanding
and, in some cases, ICE officials were not completely certain whether
the individuals had actually departed the United States.
We obtained information on actions taken to locate and investigate
individuals in the United States with visas revoked based on terrorism
concerns. ICE officials provided us with summary data on all visa
revocations based on terrorism concerns during the period. In addition,
they provided detailed information on their efforts to locate and
investigate each of the 35 individuals in our sample. We also met with
officials from the FBI and the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force to
determine their activities regarding investigating individuals with
visas revoked based on terrorism concerns.
To determine the steps taken to improve the visa revocation process
since our June 2003 report, we met with State, DHS, FBI, and TSC
officials. From these officials we obtained copies of policies and
procedures developed since our previous report. We also obtained
information on changes in the visa revocation process since our prior
report. In addition, we met with State and DHS officials regarding the
steps taken to resolve outstanding legal issues regarding visa
revocations. These officials described the discussions they have had
regarding changing the wording of State's certificate of revocation and
DHS's regulations. DHS declined to provide us with a copy of a draft
regulation they had prepared, noting that it was the subject of ongoing
intra-and interagency discussions.
We were briefed by FBI officials regarding their efforts to investigate
suspected terrorists in the TIPOFF database. However, we did not review
these efforts.
We conducted our work from January through June 2004 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Washington, DC 20528:
June 17, 2004:
Jess T. Ford:
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
U.S. General Accounting Office:
441 G St., NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Ford:
RE: GAO 04-795: Additional Actions Needed to Eliminate Weaknesses in
the Visa Revocation Process (GAO Job Code 320248):
Thank you for the opportunity to review your draft report, "BORDER
SECURITY: Additional Actions Needed to Eliminate Weaknesses in the Visa
Revocation Process," GAO-04-795.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appreciates the work done in
this report to identify areas where the visa revocation process can be
enhanced to ensure the prevention, detection, prosecution, and/or the
initiation of immigration proceedings against aliens associated with or
suspected of being engaged in terrorist activity. DHS believes that the
General Accounting Office's (GAO's) identification of areas where
improvements are needed will contribute to ongoing efforts to
strengthen the visa revocation process. We generally concur with the
report and its recommendations and appreciate the discussion of
challenges and next steps. However, there are a number of areas within
the report that require our comments.
The draft report notes that in March 2004, DHS "developed new written
procedures and acted to ensure that immigration investigators [were]
aware of all individuals with revoked visas who may be in the country"
and "developed written procedures instructing personnel to determine if
individuals with revoked visas are in the country and, if necessary,
investigate them." This might lead the reader to mistakenly conclude
that such procedures were not in place before March 2004. In fact,
prior to March 2004, the National Security and Threat Protection Unit
(NSTP) within Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and the
former Immigration and Naturalization Service's National Security
Unit, operated under written standard operating procedures which
governed the investigative process for all investigative leads
received, including visa revocation investigations. Consequently, what
occurred in March 2004 was not the creation of written procedures
regarding visa revocation. Rather, what occurred in March 2004 was the
re-issuance of written procedures, procedures that NSTP revised and
updated, largely to reflect the agency's organizational enhancements.
The draft report seems to suggest that the individuals whose visas were
revoked were necessarily suspected or actual terrorists. However, as
previously stated by the Department of State (DOS) in June 2003, in
almost all cases revocations are prudential rather than based on a
definite finding that an alien is inadmissible for security reasons.
Unlike consular officers, the Secretary of State or the Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Visa Services as his designee may revoke a visa
on a prudential basis, without a finding of inadmissibility. A
prudential visa revocation thus constitutes a precautionary measure to
preclude an alien from gaining admission to the United States until his
or her visa eligibility can be reestablished, and its purpose is to
require another look at the applicants' admissibility and hence
eligibility for a visa. Thus, it is not accurate to suggest that
individuals whose visas were revoked were necessarily terrorists or
suspected terrorists; and in fact, after aggressive investigations of
the referenced individuals, and pursuit of investigative leads to field
offices with the highest precedence, DHS concluded that these
individuals should not be regarded as such.
At present, DOS' visa revocation certificate normally makes revocation
effective only upon the alien's departure (although DOS will make a
revocation effective immediately upon request in certain cases
involving aliens stopped at a port of entry). Therefore, if ICE
investigators locate an alien who has been admitted to the United
States, and who is the subject of a DOS certificate advising that the
alien's visa is revoked effective upon his or her departure, ICE is
unable to place the alien in removal proceedings predicated solely on a
visa revocation that has not yet taken place. As a practical matter,
however, DHS and DOS recently reached an informal understanding, which
they are in the process of formalizing, that on a case-by-case basis
DHS may ask that DOS change its revocation certificate relating to an
admitted alien to make the revocation effective retroactively to the
date of issuance of the visa, and DOS will consider such a request in
consultation with DHS and the Department of Justice (DOJ). Such a
retroactive revocation may allow DHS to remove the alien on the ground
that he or she entered without a valid visa. Additionally, DHS in
consultation with the DOS and DOJ is contemplating drafting a proposed
regulation to address this issue. While the problem appears facially
straightforward, it in fact involves very complex legal and policy
questions. In addition to the regulatory remedy, DHS is contemplating a
proposed statutory remedy to address the issue.
The report expresses concern about information sharing between
agencies. Acting upon recommendations made in the GAO's June 2003
report, ICE, CBP, and DOS established a protocol to receive visa
revocation cables electronically and directly from DOS. Current
procedures and personnel assignments ensure that both ICE and CBP are
receiving all visa revocation cables, and that cables received by
either agency are investigated thoroughly. Given that ICE directly
receives visa revocation data from DOS, the report perhaps places too
great a stress on CBP's role in conveying the same data to ICE. ICE's
coordination with CBP on visa revocation investigations is crucial to
ensuring operational continuity, but it remains secondary to ICE's
receipt of the actual visa revocation information from DOS. ICE did not
initiate this practice because of concerns about transmissions of data
from CBP, but did so in order to conform to GAO's recommendation in the
June 2003 report that DHS "develop specific policies and procedures for
the interagency visa revocation process to ensure that notification of
visa revocations for suspected terrorists and relevant supporting
information is transmitted from State to immigration and law
enforcement agencies, and their respective inspection and
investigation units, in a timely manner..."
The report also appears to express concern about whether ICE and CBP
agree whether some of the individuals with visas revoked may have been
in the country at the time of visa revocation, and whether they may
still be in the country. When ICE receives a visa revocation cable from
DOS or CBP, NSTP initiates a preliminary investigation to determine if
the subject of the revocation is present in the United States. During
this preliminary investigation, NSTP queries numerous law enforcement
and open source databases that may indicate if a person has ever
entered the United States, is present, was present, and whether the
individual has departed the United States. ICE and CBP use many of the
same systems to query whether an individual is present in the United
States, and numerous explanations exist as to why the agencies may have
achieved different results, not the least of which being the date their
investigation was initiated and the various databases queried.
Finally, the report gives the wrong impression in stating that "ICE's
written procedures do not specify a time frame for referring cases to
Special Agent in Charge offices." It is important to note that all visa
revocation investigations referred to Special Agent in Charge (SAC)
offices during the period covered in the 2004 draft report directed SAC
offices to forward an initial report to NSTP within 7 days and,
thereafter, a progress report every 30 days.
GAO Recommendations for Executive Action:
RECOMMENDATION 1:
Develop a written government wide policy that clearly defines the roles
and responsibilities of the agencies involved in the visa revocation
process, including the Terrorist Screening Center. This policy should
include directions for sharing information and tracking visa revocation
cases throughout the interagency visa revocation process. It should
incorporate performance standards (e.g., time frames for completing
each step in the process) and periodic interagency assessments to
determine whether information is being shared among the agencies
involved and appropriate follow-up action is being taken and to
reconcile data differences if they occur.
RESPONSE:
DHS agrees that the agencies involved in the visa revocation process
must have a full understanding of the procedures that must be followed
to ensure that data is accurately and timely transmitted, and that
investigations are initiated timely and pursued vigorously. DHS
believes that these objectives can be formalized by having each agency
in the process exchange letters which set forth standard operating
procedures explaining how information is shared, how cases are
tracked, and what deadlines are imposed, so that each agency is
conscious fully of its partners' procedures.
RECOMMENDATION 2:
Address outstanding legal issues regarding the visa revocation process,
especially those relating to the status of aliens with visas revoked on
national security grounds who are in the United States at the time of
revocation. If these issues cannot be addressed, the Executive Branch
should, by October 1, 2004, provide Congress with a list of specific
actions (including any potential legislative changes) that could help
resolve them.
RESPONSE:
DHS, in consultation and coordination with DOS and DOJ, currently is
considering a proposed regulation to allow removal of aliens whose
visas have been revoked. In addition to pursuing the regulatory remedy,
DHS is considering formulating a statutory remedy.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Anna F. Dixon,
Director, Bankcard Programs and GAOIOIG Liaison:
The following are GAO's comments on the Department of Homeland
Security's letter dated June 17, 2004.
GAO Comments:
1. We have revised the report to reflect the fact that, while ICE did
not have procedures specific to visa revocations prior to March 2004,
it had procedures that applied more generally to all investigative
leads.
2. Our report did not indicate that any of the individuals included in
our review were necessarily suspected or actual terrorists. The
Department of State revokes a person's visa as a precautionary measure
after it learns that person might be a suspected terrorist. The purpose
of this revocation is to obtain additional information from the person
to determine if they are the same person that is suspected to be a
terrorist by requiring them to return to the consulate that issued
their visa. In commenting on our draft report, State explained that all
of these revocations were based on information suggesting possible
terrorist activities or links.
3. Based on our analysis, we reported that ICE and CBP records
conflicted regarding whether specific individuals whose visas were
revoked on terrorism grounds were or may still be in the country. With
regard to one of these individuals, ICE concluded that the individual
was not in the country and therefore, it did not investigate him.
According to CBP data, this individual has been in the country for more
than a year. As a result of such discrepancies between agency records,
we are recommending that State and DHS conduct periodic interagency
assessments to determine whether information is being shared among the
agencies involved in the visa revocation process and appropriate
follow-up action is being taken and to reconcile data differences if
they occur.
4. We acknowledge that ICE requests sent to field offices specify a
date by which they should complete their investigations. However, our
statement refers to a lack of time frames for sending requests to field
offices, not to a lack of time frames for those field offices to
complete their investigations.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State:
Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.
United States Department of State:
Assistant Secretary and Chief Financial Officer:
Washington, D.C. 20520:
JUN 23 2004
Ms. Jacqueline Williams-Bridgers:
Managing Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
General Accounting Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001:
Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers:
We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "BORDER
SECURITY: Additional Actions Needed to Eliminate Weaknesses in the Visa
Revocation Process," GAO Job Code 320248.
The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.
If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact Paul
Doherty, Division Chief, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Visa Office at
(202) 663-1246.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Christopher B. Burnham:
cc: GAO - John Brummet
CA - Maura Harty
State/OIG - Mark Duda
State/H - Paul Kelly:
Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report BORDER
SECURITY:Additional Actions Needed to Eliminate Weaknesses in the Visa
Revocation Process (GAO-4-795, GAO Code 320248):
The Department of State appreciates the opportunity to review and
comment on the GAO draft report, "Border Security: Additional Actions
Needed to Eliminate Weaknesses in the Visa Revocation Process."
Since long before the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the State
Department has aggressively used its discretionary authority to revoke
visas issued to known or suspected terrorists. Section 221(i) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) grants the Secretary of State
visa revocation authority and the Department has used this authority to
revoke more than 1,250 visas since 9/11. All of these revocations were
based on information suggesting possible terrorist activities or links.
The use of the revocation authority is one element in a multi-layered,
interlocking system of border security measures. Its present value as a
counter-terrorist measure cannot be evaluated without reference to the
creation of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) and the
Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), which were built on and incorporated
the Department's Intelligence and Research Bureau (INR/TIPOFF) TIPOFF
program. The revocation process now supplements the terrorist
watchlisting work of TSC, which provides the vast majority of the
derogatory information on specific individuals that prompts the
Department of State to revoke a visa.
It is important to note that the standard procedures of TIPOFF and now
of TSC are to enter the subject's name in the Department's Consular
Lookout and Support System (CLASS) data base and the Department of
Homeland Security's IBIS data base PRIOR to determining whether the
subject has been issued a visa. Thus, the name is in both agencies'
lookout systems prior to the Department's receipt of any request for
revocation from TSC. These lookouts immediately put safeguards in place
that prevent further visa issuance or admission to the United States
and in effect provide "breathing room" for the revocation process to
proceed from the very first step. The Department's subsequent entry of
a revocation lookout serves to further inform the lookout users that a
visa that had been issued has been revoked, but is not essential to
ensure that the subject is not admitted to the United States.
In almost all cases the revocation has been prudential rather than
based on a definite finding that the alien is inadmissible. This is in
part because, at the time of revocation, we are unable to conclude with
certainty that the visa holder is the subject of the derogatory
information. Nevertheless, given the terrorism-related nature of the
information that may relate to the visa holder, we deem it prudent to
take the action to revoke the visa promptly after that information
becomes available and to rely on the visa application process to
resolve identity and other questions at a later time, should the visa
holder wish to reapply for a visa. If the holder of the revoked visa
reapplies for a visa at one of our embassies or consulates abroad, a
consular officer carefully screens his application at that time to
determine admissibility. The alien whose visa was revoked may well be
issued a new visa, if it is determined that the information that led to
the revocation does not pertain to the alien or that the alien is in
any event admissible.
The Visa Office (VO) of the Consular Affairs Bureau manages the visa
revocation process for the Department. Initially after 9/11, the
majority of requests to revoke visas came from INR/TIPOFF, which
managed the TIPOFF terrorist database. Since December 2003, requests
have come from TSC, INR/TIPOFF's successor. VO has also on occasion
received requests to revoke visas directly from other agencies, such as
FBI and DHS, especially when the agencies suspected imminent travel of
the individual. (VO also receives requests to revoke visas for reasons
unrelated to terrorist concerns; such revocations are not discussed
here.):
Before revoking a visa, the Department satisfies itself that there is
sufficient information available to indicate that the visa holder may
be ineligible for a visa under Section 212(a)(3) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA). The information on which the Department acts is
rarely sufficient to meet the standards required for a formal finding
of inadmissibility under the INA. VO instead reviews the derogatory
information carefully to ensure that there is some minimal nexus to
terrorist activities falling within the purview of the INA. When asked
to revoke a visa for terrorist-related reasons, we have nearly always
concluded that there were sufficient grounds to warrant revoking the
visa. There have been only a handful of cases in which we have
determined that the information was not sufficient to support a visa
revocation. However, regardless of the Department's decision, it is
made after a deliberative process involving the application of U.S.
law and not an automatic or ministerial response to a recommendation
from TSC. This is an important point that the draft report completely
ignores, suggesting at some points that any delay in revoking a visa
after receiving a request to do so is inherently a sign that the
process is not working. To the contrary, it generally is an indication
that the Department is carefully exercising the discretion given to
the Secretary of State.
The process of deliberation can take time, but in no way does it
compromise the security of our borders. The very first action that we
take is to place a revocation lookout ("VRVK") in CLASS that replicates
in real time to the DHS's IBIS lookout system. The action is taken by
close of business on the same day that VO receives the revocation
request. The lookout is thus available to DHS inspectors at all Ports
of Entry into the United States should the person whose visa has been
revoked seek to enter the country.
Furthermore, as noted above, before TSC sends us a request to revoke a
visa, they enter the individual into CLASS and IBIS. Therefore, even
before the case comes to the Department's attention, there is already
a lookout in DHS's computer system at the Port of Entry that would
require a port inspector to detain the individual should he seek to
enter the country.
The Department has worked closely with its partners in the revocation
process to make sure that the fact that a visa has been revoked is
disseminated to those in other agencies who may need to carry out
follow-up action. When we determine that a visa should be revoked, we
prepare a revocation certificate and a revocation cable to the embassy
or consulate where the visa was issued. The certificate is the official
document showing that the visa has been revoked. The cable to the post
contains the language of the revocation certificate and instructs the
consular officer to call the visa holder in so that the revoked visa
can be physically canceled.
The Deputy Assistant Secretary for Visa Services signs the revocation
certificate. VO then immediately sends the cable electronically to the
appropriate post as well as to FBI and to Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) within DHS. At the same time, VO emails the
revocation cable to the National Targeting Center (NTC) and to elements
of Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) and ICE within DHS. We also fax the
cable to the NTC. Through these means, by cable, email and fax, we
inform our partners in the revocation process in a timely manner of
each visa that is revoked. However, long before all of this
communication and coordination takes place, the revocation code has
already been entered into the lookout system and the traveler is not
able to enter the United States. As noted above, the lookout system
already has the TSC entry for a suspected or actual terrorist.
Internally, VO has a very clear Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for
visa revocations that has been continually updated over time as the
process has been refined and as DHS has clarified the mission and
operating practices of its new institutional structure. We have shared
the SOP with our revocation partners. VO has a designated revocation
officer, who reviews incoming requests to make sure they meet the
standard for prudential revocation, and a revocation assistant who
prepares all of the appropriate documents. We have internal
accountability built into the process as the revocation assistant must
complete a checklist of steps taken which is reviewed and verified by a
senior officer before the case can be closed.
Following the attacks of 9/11, VO was inundated with a large number of
requests to revoke visas from a number of agencies. In the haste to
respond to these requests, the VO staff concentrated on executing the
relevant documents to effect revocations as quickly as possible. After
the initial period of heavy revocation activity ended and we began to
receive requests on a steadier basis, we established a system of
revocation record keeping that is now truly excellent. Our database
systems have always been the single official electronic record of cases
revoked. We now also maintain a master spreadsheet that contains
information on all visas that have been revoked since 9/11, and we have
established a designated location for easy access to all of the
revocation case files.
The GAO report is at best a snapshot in time that reflects the
processing of only 35 cases out of the more than 300 that were revoked
during the three month period of the GAO study (October through
December 2003) and out of a total of more than 1,250 that have been
revoked since September 11, 2001. We consider that our handling of the
revocation process overall has been excellent and has improved over
time to where we believe there is no opportunity for error. Again, the
visa revocation process works in tandem with the watchlisting work of
TSC. The watchlist is the most effective measure to stop suspected or
actual terrorists since it is used by many federal agencies, not just
DHS port of entry inspectors and consular officers overseas. Visa
revocation is another measure in a multi-layered and interlocking
system of border security.
The report cites specific weaknesses in the revocation process during
the three-month period of the GAO study. One concerns the Department's
failure to revoke visas in a timely manner for 3 out of the study's
random sampling of 35 cases. As the report does not identify these
three cases, we can only speculate about what may have transpired. As
mentioned above, revoking visas on request is not a ministerial act,
but one that requires the careful exercise of discretion vested by law
in the Secretary of State. There have been a few cases in which the
Department decided not to revoke the visa as the derogatory information
was not sufficient to find the person ineligible under Section
212(a)(3) of the INA. In several of these cases, we later received a
renewed request to revoke the visa based on additional derogatory
information that we deemed sufficient to warrant revocation. The time
between the initial request to revoke and the actual revocation based
on the follow-up request may explain the apparent time lag in these
cases. However, the VRVK code should have been in the lookout system
during this period of deliberation in addition to the TSC entry, which
would have prevented the visa holders from entering the United States.
The report also states that in 3 out of the 35 cases, the Department
took a week or longer after deciding to revoke a visa to enter a
lookout in the CLASS system and to notify other agencies. Again, not
knowing the specific cases cited, it is difficult to comment on the
circumstances of what happened. VO's Revocation SOP is crystal clear
in directing those who carry out revocations to enter the VRVK lookout
as soon as the process has begun. The SOP states in underlined capital
letters, "IT IS CRITICAL THAT YOU ENTER THE VRVK HIT IN CLASS AT THIS
POINT IN THE PROCESS." The revocation preparer must show a printout of
the CLASS lookout to the VO supervisor to prove that the VRVK hit has
been entered immediately. This is done and verified in all cases. We
cannot comment on why, between October and December 2003, a revocation
preparer may have failed to enter the lookout immediately in a very
small number of cases or to alert other agencies in a similar fashion.
There could be a variety of explanations or it just may have been human
error. It is certainly not anything that can and does happen now.
The important point is that during the period of study the Department
of State added a revocation entry to the TSC lookout entry in CLASS
and IBIS in a timely manner in over 90% of the cases in question. It
appears that the other cases were the object of appropriate
deliberation regarding the nature of the derogatory information, and
whether the subject of the intelligence information was the same as the
visa holder, and other appropriate and relevant issues.
The report comments that the Department's SOP does not include
performance standards such as timeframes. The orientation on
revocations that VO personnel receive and the language of the SOP make
it clear that actions should be taken immediately and with no delay.
While we are confident that VO personnel understand clearly the need to
act as quickly as possible in processing revocations, we have added
further indicators to the SOP explicitly stating the need to act within
one business day. There will always be exceptions, however, such as
might arise if the Department were asked to revoke a visa held by a
diplomat, when further consideration of options and implications would
likely be required.
The report mentions that agencies had conflicting records of the number
of revocation cases during the three-month period of the study. The
numbers vary by very little (the illustration of superimposed circles
is highly misleading in this regard), and can probably be explained by
agencies using different methodologies to compile their statistics. For
example, we believe that there was some confusion among GAO, State, and
other agencies as to what the standard was for a case falling within
the three-month period. Some agencies used the date the VRVK hit was
entered into CLASS as the standard while others used the date the
revocation certificate was signed. Thus the universe of revokees may
well have been the same, with accounting differences making for
slightly different numbers. In any event, the important issue is not
matching precise numbers but that all of the cases were placed into the
lookout system to prevent the revokees from entering the country, which
was the case.
The report describes "unresolved legal issues" surrounding the visa
revocation process that prevent DHS from removing from the U.S.
individuals whose visas have been revoked. Further, the report suggests
that there are legal disputes between State and DHS. This is not the
case. Since State opened a dialog with DHS on the relevant legal and
policy issues in September 2003, both have worked cooperatively on
DHS's efforts to draft a regulation that would facilitate DHS in
appropriate cases removing from the United States an alien who has been
admitted but whose visa has been revoked. Both agencies also agree on
the potential legal issues raised by a regulatory approach; DHS has
consulted the Department of Justice on these issues with State's
support and is also contemplating formulating a statutory remedy.
In addition, DHS and State have an informal understanding, which they
are in the process of formalizing, for dealing with cases involving
significant security concerns that may arise. Specifically, on a case-
by-case basis, DHS may ask that State revoke a visa effective either
immediately, in certain port of entry cases, or retroactively to the
date of issuance of the visa, in certain cases of persons already
admitted to the United States. Such a retroactive revocation in an
appropriate case might allow DHS to initiate immigration proceedings
against an alien. State is prepared to take such revocation action in
an appropriate case after consultation with DHS and the Department of
Justice; State has already revoked a visa effective immediately in at
least one case arising at a port of entry, thereby allowing DHS to deny
entry because the alien did not have a valid visa. Thus we do not
understand the basis for GAO's assertions that there are legal
disagreements.
In this connection, the report is inaccurate insofar as it states, on
the bottom of page 29, that DOS stated that any action of this nature
must await promulgation of a new DHS regulation or a statutory
amendment. We believe GAO is mischaracterizing our statement that DOS
does not plan to make any across-the-board change in the standard
language in its certificate of revocation at this time; rather it will
address the need for different language in the certificate with DHS on
a case-by-case basis.
In conclusion, we take note of the report's two recommendations on
developing a written government-wide policy and resolving outstanding
issues. We will consult with DHS officials with a view to addressing
these concerns as best we can consistent with the fact that the
decision whether to revoke a visa is committed by law to the discretion
of the Secretary of State.
The following are GAO's comments on the Department of State's letter
dated June 23, 2004.
GAO Comments:
1. The posting of lookouts in CLASS and IBIS is an important tool for
preventing potential terrorists from entering the country. However,
posting these lookouts is not designed to track individuals who entered
the United States before the Department of State revokes their visas.
As such, the visa revocation process remains a useful tool for promptly
identifying, locating, and investigating individuals who may be in the
United States and may pose a threat to homeland security.
1. We acknowledge that the Department of State should appropriately
deliberate over visa revocation cases. However, State officials told us
that their involvement in the entire visa revocation process should
take no longer than one week. Given this standard, State's delay in
three cases of more than 6 months appears excessive.
1. This report includes a review of all 330+ visas revoked on terrorism
grounds from October through December 2003, including a detailed review
of a random sample of 35 cases. We chose to review this 3-month period
to allow some time for the agencies involved to implement our
recommendations for improving the visa revocation process contained in
our June 2003 report. In addition to this report, we previously
reviewed all 240 visas revoked on terrorism grounds from September 11,
2001 through December 31, 2002, and found similar weaknesses. As noted
earlier, posting CLASS and IBIS lookouts is not intended to track
individuals who entered the United States before the Department of
State revoked their visas. As such, the visa revocation process remains
a useful tool for promptly identifying, locating, and investigating
individuals who may be in the United States and may pose a threat.
1. In February 2004, we requested detailed information from State on 35
individuals whose visas State had revoked on terrorism grounds from
October through December 2003. In April, we received this information.
After reviewing the data, we discussed our preliminary findings with
the Managing Director of State's Office of Visa Services, including
delays in State's decisions to revoke three individuals' visas. The
same day, we provided State the names of these three individuals and
requested information on why these delays occurred. In May, a State
official provided an explanation of State's actions regarding these
individuals. However, we chose to exclude this information from our
report due to the sensitivity of the type of information involved.
1. In February 2004, we requested detailed information (including when
lookout codes were entered) for a random sample of 35 visa revocation
cases. In April 2004, the Assistant Secretary of State for Consular
Affairs informed us that in researching and gathering this information,
State discovered that, in some cases, the officer responsible for
handling revocations did not enter the revocation lookout code
immediately into CLASS before the revocation certificate was signed.
1. Based on information State provided during the course of our review,
we note that State revises its standard operating procedures for visa
revocations as necessary. After reviewing our draft report, State
provided us with a revised copy of its standard operating procedures
dated June 17, 2004, which included more explicit time frames. We
believe this is a good step toward implementing our recommendation.
2. In conducting this review, we requested a list of individuals whose
visas were revoked based on terrorism concerns from October through
December 2003 from State, CBP, and ICE. State asserts that the
conflicting records were probably due to different methodologies for
compiling various agencies' lists. We note that we observed multiple
instances where conflicting records could not be explained by differing
methodologies. For example, in some cases the agencies disagreed over
whether the individuals' visas were revoked based on terrorism grounds
and, in other cases, agencies did not initially provide names that they
later acknowledged should have been included in their lists.
Given these conflicting records and the possible threat to homeland
security, we are recommending that State and DHS conduct periodic
interagency assessments to determine whether information is being
shared among the agencies involved in the visa revocation process and
appropriate follow-up action is being taken and to reconcile data
differences if they occur.
3. We have updated our report to reflect the current status of State's
and DHS's discussions of legal and policy issues and have removed all
references to unresolved legal disagreements. We have added information
reflecting a recent informal understanding reached by State and DHS
that, on a case by case basis, DHS may ask that State revoke a visa
retroactively. However, we note that legal and policy issues regarding
the removal of individuals based solely on their visa revocations
continue to exist, and agency discussions on how to address these
issues have not been completed.
4. During the course of our review, State's and DHS's discussions
evolved regarding legal and policy issues relating to removing
individuals from the United States based on visa revocations. Based on
discussions with State and DHS officials, we have removed any implied
linkage between revising the visa revocation certificate and a
regulatory or statutory amendment.
FOOTNOTES
[1] Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland
Security (Washington, D.C.: July 2002).
[2] U.S. General Accounting Office, Border Security: New Policies and
Procedures Are Needed to Fill Gaps in the Visa Revocation Process,
GAO-03-798 (Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2003).
[3] In this report, we use the term "visa" to refer to nonimmigrant
visas only. The United States also grants visas to people who intend to
immigrate to the United States. A visa is a travel document that allows
a foreign visitor to present himself or herself at a port of entry for
admission to the United States.
[4] The Department of State revokes a person's visa as a precautionary
measure after it learns that person might be a suspected terrorist. The
purpose of this revocation is to obtain additional information from the
person to determine if they are the same person that is suspected to be
a terrorist by requiring them to return to the consulate that issued
their visa. According to State officials, this authority is an
important and useful tool for more closely scrutinizing the individual
as they reapply for a new visa. The Department of State also revokes
visas for reasons other than terrorism, such as alien smuggling, drug
trafficking, and misrepresentation. State officials told us that visas
revoked on terrorism grounds account for the vast majority of all visas
revoked on national security grounds.
[5] In this report, when we refer to individuals whose visas have been
revoked, we are referring to those individuals for whom the Department
of State has issued a visa revocation certificate. According to the
terms of the certificate, the revocation is effective immediately on
the date the certificate is signed unless the alien is already in the
United States in which case the revocation becomes effective
immediately upon the alien's departure from the United States.
[6] Our review covered only nonimmigrant visas that the Department of
State revoked on terrorism grounds from October 1, 2003, through
December 31, 2003.
[7] DHS could also attempt to remove these aliens based on the
derogatory information that led State to revoke the individual's visa.
[8] State told us that, in light of the evolving relationships between
State, DHS, and TSC, State revises its standard operating procedures as
necessary.
[9] The lookout entry--known by the acronym VRVK--is used for all visa
revocations, regardless of whether the reason for the revocation is
related to terrorism or other concerns.
[10] As we have previously reported, efforts to locate aliens once they
have entered the United States are often complicated by incomplete or
inaccurate information provided at the time of entry. For example, see
U.S. General Accounting Office, Overstay Tracking: A Key Component of
Homeland Security and a Layered Defense, GAO-04-82 (Washington, D.C.:
May 21, 2004). Additional information provided by aliens as a result of
US-VISIT may help ICE special agents locate individuals whose visas are
revoked after they enter the United States. US-VISIT is a
governmentwide program for collecting, maintaining, and sharing
information on certain foreign nationals who enter and exit the United
States.
[11] State officials told us that there was no homeland security
vulnerability during its deliberations because procedures call for
posting lookouts to alert border inspectors to stop these individuals.
[12] CBP's data come from the Nonimmigrant Information System (NIIS),
which does not have complete arrival and departure records for all non-
U.S. citizens. NIIS records arrivals and departures of foreign citizens
through the collection of I-94 forms. Some aliens are required to fill
out and turn in these forms to inspectors at air and seaports of entry,
as well as at land borders. (Canadians and U.S. permanent residents are
not required to fill out I-94 forms when they enter the United States).
NIIS does not have departure data for aliens if they fail to turn in
the bottom portion of their I-94 when they depart.
[13] ICE provided us a breakdown of results of the 64 investigations,
but we have not included these data because DHS classified them as law
enforcement sensitive.
[14] 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. An alien may be placed in removal
proceedings under a charge of inadmissibility based on terrorist
activities as defined in Section 212(a)(3)(B) of the INA. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(a)(2).
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