Border Security
Additional Actions Needed to Eliminate Weaknesses in the Visa Revocation Process
Gao ID: GAO-04-899T July 13, 2004
The National Strategy for Homeland Security calls for preventing foreign terrorists from entering our country and using all legal means to identify; halt; and where appropriate, prosecute or bring immigration or other civil charges against terrorists in the United States. GAO reported in June 2003 that the visa revocation process needed to be strengthened as an antiterrorism tool and recommended that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), in conjunction with the Departments of State (State) and Justice, develop specific policies and procedures to ensure that appropriate agencies are notified of revocations based on terrorism grounds and take proper actions. GAO examined whether weaknesses in the visa revocation process identified in our June 2003 report were addressed.
GAO's analysis shows that the Departments of State and Homeland Security took some actions in summer 2003 to address weaknesses in the visa revocation process that we identified in June 2003. However, GAO's review of visas revoked from October to December 2003, including a detailed review of a random sample of 35 cases, showed that weaknesses remained. Delays existed in matching names of suspected terrorists with names of visa holders and in forwarding necessary information to consular officials at State. In at least 3 of the 35 cases, it took State 6 months or longer to revoke visas after receiving a recommendation to do so. In 3 cases, State took a week or longer after deciding to revoke visas to post a lookout or notify DHS. Without these notifications, DHS may not know to investigate those individuals who may be in the country. In 10 cases, DHS either failed or took several months to notify immigration investigators that individuals with revoked visas may be in the country. It then took more than 2 months for immigration investigators to initiate field investigations of these individuals. After GAO initiated its inquiry for this report in January 2004, additional actions were taken to improve the process. DHS and State believe these actions will help avoid the delays experienced in the past. In April and May, State revised its procedures and formalized its tracking system for visa revocation cases. In March, DHS developed new written procedures and acted to ensure that immigration investigators were aware of all individuals with revoked visas who may be in the country. State and DHS also took some steps to address legal and policy issues related to visa revocations. Further, in April, the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), an interagency group organized under the Federal Bureau of Investigation, identified the visa revocation process as a potential homeland security vulnerability and developed an informal process for TSC to handle visa revocation cases. However, weaknesses remain. For example, State's and DHS's procedures are not fully coordinated and lack performance standards, such as specific time frames for completing each step of the process. Moreover, outstanding legal and policy issues continue to exist regarding removing individuals based solely on their visa revocation.
GAO-04-899T, Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Eliminate Weaknesses in the Visa Revocation Process
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and
International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of
Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT:
Tuesday, July 13, 2004:
Border Security:
Additional Actions Needed to Eliminate Weaknesses in the Visa
Revocation Process:
Statement of Jess T. Ford, Director, International Affairs and Trade:
GAO-04-899T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-04-899T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations,
Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives:
Why GAO Did This Study:
The National Strategy for Homeland Security calls for preventing
foreign terrorists from entering our country and using all legal means
to identify; halt; and where appropriate, prosecute or bring
immigration or other civil charges against terrorists in the United
States. GAO reported in June 2003 that the visa revocation process
needed to be strengthened as an antiterrorism tool and recommended that
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), in conjunction with the
Departments of State (State) and Justice, develop specific policies and
procedures to ensure that appropriate agencies are notified of
revocations based on terrorism grounds and take proper actions. GAO
examined whether weaknesses in the visa revocation process identified
in our June 2003 report were addressed.
What GAO Found:
GAO‘s analysis shows that the Departments of State and Homeland
Security took some actions in summer 2003 to address weaknesses in the
visa revocation process that we identified in June 2003. However, GAO‘s
review of visas revoked from October to December 2003, including a
detailed review of a random sample of 35 cases, showed that weaknesses
remained.
* Delays existed in matching names of suspected terrorists with names
of visa holders and in forwarding necessary information to consular
officials at State. In at least 3 of the 35 cases, it took State 6
months or longer to revoke visas after receiving a recommendation to do
so.
* In 3 cases, State took a week or longer after deciding to revoke
visas to post a lookout or notify DHS. Without these notifications,
DHS may not know to investigate those individuals who may be in the
country.
* In 10 cases, DHS either failed or took several months to notify
immigration investigators that individuals with revoked visas may be in
the country. It then took more than 2 months for immigration
investigators to initiate field investigations of these individuals.
After GAO initiated its inquiry for this report in January 2004,
additional actions were taken to improve the process. DHS and State
believe these actions will help avoid the delays experienced in the
past. In April and May, State revised its procedures and formalized
its tracking system for visa revocation cases. In March, DHS developed
new written procedures and acted to ensure that immigration
investigators were aware of all individuals with revoked visas who may
be in the country. State and DHS also took some steps to address legal
and policy issues related to visa revocations. Further, in April, the
Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), an interagency group organized under
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, identified the visa revocation
process as a potential homeland security vulnerability and developed an
informal process for TSC to handle visa revocation cases. However,
weaknesses remain. For example, State‘s and DHS‘s procedures are not
fully coordinated and lack performance standards, such as specific time
frames for completing each step of the process. Moreover, outstanding
legal and policy issues continue to exist regarding removing
individuals based solely on their visa revocation.
Points of Delay Observed in the Visa Revocation Process:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
To improve the visa revocation process as an antiterrorism tool, we
recommend that the Secretaries of Homeland Security and State jointly
(1) develop a written governmentwide policy that clearly defines
agencies‘ roles and responsibilities and sets performance standards and
(2) address outstanding legal and policy issues in this area or provide
Congress with specific actions it could take to resolve them. DHS
generally concurred with these recommendations. State agreed to
consult with DHS regarding our recommendations.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-899T.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click
on the link above. For more information, contact Jess T. Ford at
(202) 512-4128 or fordj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here to discuss the report[Footnote 1] we are
issuing today on the visa revocation process and the steps that the
Departments of State (State) and Homeland Security (DHS) and other
federal agencies have taken to improve the use of this process as an
antiterrorism tool. In June 2003 we reported[Footnote 2] that agencies
lacked written procedures to ensure that appropriate personnel are
notified and take specific actions when the Department of State revokes
visas[Footnote 3] on terrorism grounds.[Footnote 4] As a result,
lookouts were not always posted, other agencies were not always
notified of visa revocations, and there were potential investigative
gaps on individuals with visas revoked based on terrorism concerns who
were in the United States. We recommended that the Secretary of
Homeland Security, in conjunction with the Secretary of State and the
Attorney General, develop specific policies and procedures for the
interagency visa revocation process to ensure that information is
transmitted to the appropriate immigration and law enforcement agencies
in a timely manner. We also recommended that they develop a specific
policy on actions that immigration and law enforcement agencies should
take to investigate and locate individuals who remain in the United
States after their visas are revoked.
At your request, we examined whether weaknesses in the visa revocation
process identified in our June 2003 report were addressed. To
accomplish our objective, we obtained information on policies and
procedures put in place to improve the visa revocation process;
interviewed key State and DHS officials responsible for visa
revocations; determined the steps taken to resolve legal and policy
issues raised in our June 2003 report; and analyzed data on all visas
revoked on terrorism grounds over a 3-month period,[Footnote 5]
including detailed information on a random sample of 35 cases selected
from data provided by State in February 2004. We did not review
activities by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to investigate
suspected terrorists. This testimony is based on a published report
that was done in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.
Summary:
The Departments of State and Homeland Security took some actions in the
summer of 2003 to address the weaknesses identified in our June 2003
report. State and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), a component
of DHS, developed procedures outlining their respective processes for
handling visa revocations. However, our analysis of visas revoked based
on terrorism concerns from October through December 2003 revealed that
weaknesses remained in the implementation of the visa revocation
process, especially relating to the timely transmission of information
among federal agencies. For instance, we found that backlogs or long
delays sometimes occurred in:
* screening names of terrorists against State's database of current
visa holders,
* transmitting recommendations to revoke individual visas,
* revoking individual visas after receiving a recommendation to do so,
* posting appropriate lookouts used to alert border inspectors of the
revocation,
* notifying DHS of visa revocations, and:
* requesting that field offices investigate individuals with visas
revoked on terrorism grounds who may be in the country.
We also found that agencies involved in the visa revocation process had
conflicting records of how many visas were revoked for terrorism
concerns and whether individuals who held these visas may be in the
country. In addition, officials from DHS's Customs and Border
Protection could not document that they consistently notified
immigration officials of individuals with revoked visas who were
present in the United States. Our review of visa revocations shows that
DHS has located individuals in the country whose visas were revoked
because they may be suspected or actual terrorists. DHS officials told
us that some are still being investigated, three have been arrested on
immigration charges, and others have been cleared. With respect to an
alien already present in the United States, the Department of State's
current visa revocation certificate makes the revocation effective only
upon the alien's departure. Therefore, according to DHS officials, if
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) special agents locate an
alien for whom State has issued a revocation certificate that states
the revocation is effective upon his or her departure, ICE would be
unable to place the alien in removal proceedings based solely on a visa
revocation that had not yet taken place.[Footnote 6]
After we initiated our inquiry for this report in January 2004, State
and DHS took additional actions to address the weaknesses we identified
through our analysis. State and DHS believe these actions will avoid
delays experienced in the past. In April and May, State made
significant revisions to its procedures and formalized its tracking
system for visa revocation cases. Between January and May, DHS took
steps to develop additional written procedures, improve the sharing of
information on visa revocation cases, and ensure that immigration
investigators are aware of individuals whose visas were revoked and who
may be in the country. Finally, State and DHS began discussing how to
address the legal and policy issues regarding the removal of
individuals with revoked visas. In addition, the Terrorist Screening
Center (TSC), an interagency organization established under the FBI in
December 2003, recently took some steps to improve the visa revocation
process, including developing written standard operating procedures
related to the screening of intelligence information and training
additional staff to perform this function. We did not fully assess the
effectiveness of these actions because they were taken after the
October to December 2003 time period that we reviewed. Nonetheless,
additional measures are needed to further improve the process. The
written policies and procedures often neither contain performance
standards such as time frames for completing individual steps of the
visa revocation process, nor do they reflect a fully coordinated
approach to implementing the process. Further, State and DHS have not
concluded their discussion of legal and policy issues related to
removing individuals with revoked visas from the country.
In light of our past work and the weaknesses we identified through our
review, we are recommending that the Secretaries of Homeland Security
and State work jointly and with other appropriate agencies to develop a
written, governmentwide policy that clearly defines roles and
responsibilities and sets performance standards for the agencies
involved in the visa revocation process. We also recommend that DHS and
State address outstanding legal and policy issues related to removing
individuals with revoked visas from the country or, by October 1, 2004,
provide Congress with a list of specific actions that could help
resolve them.
Background:
Our nation's border security process involves multiple tools for
addressing potential terrorist threats to the United States. These
tools generally include (1) preventing potential terrorists from
entering the country and (2) identifying, locating, and investigating
potential terrorists already in the United States. One such tool is the
visa revocation process, which involves multiple federal agencies
including the Terrorist Screening Center and the Departments of State
and Homeland Security. The visa revocation process typically begins
with the development of derogatory information about individuals by
various federal agencies. This information is then forwarded to TSC,
which, along with State, identifies visa holders who may be suspected
or actual terrorists. State then posts lookouts regarding the
revocation for these individuals; revokes their visas; and notifies the
overseas post that issued the visa, DHS, and other agencies. Based on
the notification from State, DHS then determines if any of these
individuals may be in the country. If so, DHS attempts to locate,
investigate, and, as appropriate, remove them from the country.
Initial Actions Taken to Address Weaknesses Were Inadequate:
Mr. Chairman, following our June 2003 report, State and DHS's U.S.
Customs and Border Protection developed written policies outlining
their respective processes for handling visa revocations. However, our
analysis of subsequent visa revocations shows that weaknesses remained
in the implementation of the visa revocation process.
Delays Occurred at Many Steps in the Visa Revocation Process:
State's July 7, 2003, standard operating procedures outlined its
internal process for handling visa revocations, including posting
lookouts and notifying other agencies of the visa revocation. U.S.
Customs and Border Protection's procedures developed following our June
2003 report explained the process for determining whether an individual
with a revoked visa may be in the country and, if so, taking
appropriate steps to notify investigators. Despite these initial
efforts, our review of visas revoked on terrorism grounds from October
through December 2003 showed that weaknesses remained in the visa
revocation process, especially regarding timely transmission of
information among federal agencies. As shown in figure 1, we found
delays in agency efforts to:
* Identify individuals whose visas should be revoked. In August and
September 2003, there was a backlog of approximately 5,000 names of
suspected terrorists that had not been screened to identify any visa
holders.
* Transmit recommendations to consular officials to revoke certain
individuals' visas. Instead of sending the typical average of 2 to 6
recommendations to revoke per day, intelligence screeners waited until
they had large batches of nearly 100 recommendations or more before
sending them to consular officials at State.
* Post lookouts to alert border inspectors of visa revocations.
Although State's standard operating procedures directed Consular
Affairs officials to post lookouts regarding the revocation before
finalizing it, we found that in 6 of the 35 cases we examined in
detail, Consular Affairs did not do so until after the revocation was
finalized.
* Revoke individual visas. State officials told us it should take no
more than a week to revoke an individual's visa after receiving a
recommendation to do so. In 6 cases, we had sufficient information to
determine how long it took State to revoke a visa after receiving a
recommendation to do so. In 3 of these cases, it took State at least 6
months and, in one case, as long as 17 months to revoke the
individual's visa.
* Notify DHS of visa revocations. Of the 35 cases we reviewed in
detail, DHS received notification from State the same day a revocation
was finalized in 9 cases; in 1 to 6 days in 23 cases; and in 7 days or
longer in 3 cases. It is particularly important that these
notifications are timely when the alien may already be in the country
so that DHS can locate and investigate him or her.
* Investigate individuals with visas revoked on terrorism grounds who
may be in the country. After receiving notification from State, DHS's
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) determined that field
offices should investigate 8 of the 35 cases we examined in detail. In
all 8 of these cases, ICE waited more than 2 months to initiate field
investigations.
Figure 1: Points of Delay in the Visa Revocation Process:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Conflicting Data among Agencies:
We also found that for the October to December 2003 time period, State,
CBP, and ICE reported different numbers of revocations based on
terrorism concerns. As shown in figure 2, State listed 338; ICE, 347;
and CBP, 336. We found that only 320 names were on all three lists and
that some lists contained names that were not on either of the other
lists. Instances where a name did not appear on all three lists show a
potential breakdown in the visa revocation process and raise concern
because DHS may not have been able to take timely action to determine
if these individuals were in the country and, if so, to locate and
investigate them.
Figure 2: Inconsistencies among Agencies on Number of Visas Revoked
from October through December 2003:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Our detailed review of 35 visa revocations on terrorism grounds also
showed that CBP's[Footnote 7] and ICE's records conflicted on whether
certain individuals may have been in the country. In 3 of the 35 cases,
CBP and ICE disagreed about whether an individual might have been in
the country at the time of visa revocation and whether he or she might
still be in the country. In 2 of the cases, CBP did not believe the
individual was in the country and, therefore, did not refer the cases
to ICE for investigation. However, ICE special agents determined that
both of these individuals were and still are in the country--one is
awaiting adjudication of a political asylum claim, and the other has a
pending application to become a lawful permanent resident of the United
States.[Footnote 8] In another instance, CBP believed an individual was
in the country when his visa was revoked and subsequently notified ICE
of the need to locate and investigate him. However, ICE performed its
own search of immigration records based on State's notification and
concluded that the individual was not in the country. Therefore, it did
not investigate him. According to CBP data, this individual has been in
the country for more than a year.
Lapses in Notification, Provision of Derogatory Information:
We further found that although Customs and Border Protection officials
are supposed to immediately notify Immigration and Customs Enforcement
of individuals with revoked visas who may be in the country, CBP could
not document that it had notified ICE promptly or, in several cases,
that it notified ICE at all. According to CBP data on the 35 cases in
our sample, 10 aliens might have been in the United States at the time
of their revocation. In 3 of these cases, CBP records indicate that ICE
was never notified; in the other 7 cases, CBP notified ICE but could
not document that the notification occurred until at least 3 months
after the revocation.
In addition, Immigration and Customs Enforcement officials stated that
they often received no derogatory information showing that individuals
whose visas State had revoked on terrorism concerns may pose a national
security threat. Without this information, ICE may expend resources
conducting investigations on individuals who they believe may pose
little or no threat to national security. According to ICE officials,
the growing number of visa revocation cases based on terrorism concerns
places a significant strain on their investigative resources, forcing
ICE to pull agents off active investigations of known national security
threats to investigate visa revocation cases.
State officials told us that the vast majority of visa revocations on
terrorism grounds are based on derogatory information in the TIPOFF
database. However, in May 2004, ICE officials told us that they were
not aware that most of State's visa revocations on terrorism grounds
are based on information in TIPOFF. According to TSC, of the 35 cases
we examined in detail, 32 of the individuals appeared in TIPOFF. In
June 2004, ICE informed us that its records check located only 6 of the
35 individuals from our sample in TIPOFF. Also in June, State officials
told us they recently began providing the TIPOFF record number to DHS
for each individual whose revocation was based on derogatory
information in TIPOFF.
Majority of ICE Investigations Concluded, but Legal and Policy Issues
Regarding Removing Aliens Remain:
Separate from our detailed review of 35 visa revocation cases, we
obtained information on the more than 330 visa revocations on terrorism
grounds from October through December 2003. According to ICE records,
ICE identified 64 individuals whose visas were revoked on national
security grounds between October and December 2003 and may be in the
country, initiated investigations of all these individuals, and
concluded a majority of these investigations. Data provided by ICE show
that these investigations resulted in confirming departure of some
aliens, clearing others, and arresting 3 on administrative immigration
charges.[Footnote 9] On June 8, 2004, ICE investigators told us that
they have no specific derogatory information that would indicate that
any of the individuals remaining in the United States currently
represent a threat to national security. We also noted several cases
where the visa revocation process prevented individuals with visas
revoked based on terrorism concerns from entering the United States or
helped remove them from the United States.
While ICE has investigated individuals with visas revoked on terrorism
grounds, if ICE special agents told us that if they locate an alien in
the United States for whom State has issued a revocation certificate
using its current wording, ICE would be unable to remove the individual
based solely on the visa revocation. State's current visa revocation
certificate states that the revocation shall become effective
immediately on the date the certificate is signed unless the alien is
already in the United States, in which case the revocation will become
effective immediately upon the alien's departure.
Actions Have Been Taken Recently to Address Identified Weaknesses:
Since we initiated our inquiry in January 2004, State and DHS have
taken additional steps to address identified weaknesses in the visa
revocation process. These include revising procedures, reviewing past
visa revocation cases, and taking steps to address legal and policy
issues. In addition, in mid-April, TSC identified visa revocations as a
potential homeland security vulnerability and developed an informal
process for coordinating actions and sharing information on visa
revocations. However, we identified some weaknesses that still need to
be addressed.
State Revised Standard Operation Procedures and Formalized Its
Revocation Tracking System:
In the course of responding to our inquiries, State's Visa Office
discovered that its standard operating procedures had not always been
followed correctly. As a result, in April and May, State made
significant revisions to its procedures to provide more explicit
instructions for each step in the process.[Footnote 10] Also in April,
a State official told us that the Visa Office planned to formalize its
previously informal system for tracking visa revocations to make it a
definitive reference point for information about all visa revocations.
DHS Acted to Improve Policies and Information Sharing, Review Visa
Revocations, and Resolve Legal and Policy Issues:
DHS also took several actions following the initiation of our inquiry.
In January, ICE assigned a special agent to CBP to assist with
information exchange and coordination of visa revocation issues and in
March issued written standard operating procedures for visa revocation
investigations. In May, CBP reviewed all visa revocations in its
lookout database to ensure that all appropriate notifications had been
sent to ICE and sent additional notifications. This review identified
656 individuals with revoked visas who may be in the country. We
reviewed these data and determined that 34 of these individuals' visas
were revoked on terrorism grounds during the period of our review.
In February 2004, DHS officials also told us that they were considering
a regulation relating to visa revocations that could allow the removal
of individuals from the United States because their visas have been
revoked by State. In June 2004, DHS officials told us that they were
still considering this regulation and were coordinating with State and
the Department of Justice. Also in June 2004, DHS officials told us
that they had reached an informal understanding with State that, on a
case-by-case basis, DHS may ask that State change its revocation
certificate related to an admitted alien to make the revocation
effective retroactively to the date of issuance of the visa, and State
will consider such a request in consultation with DHS and the
Department of Justice. State and DHS further agreed that should the
wording of the revocation certificate be changed, it would not be
changed in all instances, but only on a case-by-case basis. According
to DHS officials, if State changed the wording of the certificate to
make the revocation effective retroactively to the date of issuance of
the visa, the government would no longer be effectively barred from
litigating the issue. Nonetheless, revocation of a visa is not
explicitly a stated grounds for removal under the Immigration and
Nationality Act.[Footnote 11] Moreover, the issue of whether, under
current statute and regulations, DHS would have the authority to
initiate removal proceedings solely on the basis of a visa revocation
has not been litigated and remains unresolved legally. As of June 2004,
DHS did not have any specific time frame for completing discussions
with State and other agencies regarding legal and policy issues
relating to visa revocations.
TSC Developed Procedures, Trained Additional Staff, and Assessed the
Visa Revocation Process:
Since its formation in December 2003, TSC has taken actions to clarify
its role, increase its capacity to handle visa revocation cases, and
analyze the visa revocation process as an antiterrorism tool.
Specifically, in March 2004, TSC developed written standard operating
procedures outlining the process for screening intelligence information
to identify visa holders who may be terrorists. TSC also recently began
training additional staff to screen terrorism intelligence for matches
with visa holders.[Footnote 12] TSC officials told us that, in mid-
April 2004, TSC identified the visa revocation process as a potential
vulnerability to homeland security. As a result, it developed a process
to enable the Center to coordinate the sharing of information on visa
revocation cases without relying on formal notifications transmitted
among the agencies.
Additional Actions Still Needed:
While steps have been taken to improve the visa revocation process,
which State and DHS believe will help avoid delays experienced in the
past, additional actions are needed to further improve it. There is no
governmentwide policy outlining roles and responsibilities for the visa
revocation process. Although CBP and ICE have written internal
procedures related to their respective roles and responsibilities in
the visa revocation process, DHS has still not developed an agencywide
policy governing the process. The written procedures also often lack
specific time frames for completing individual steps in the process.
For instance, State's procedures lack guidance on how quickly Consular
Affairs officials should act on recommendations from TSC to revoke
individuals' visas, and ICE's written procedures do not specify a time
frame for referring cases to field offices. In addition, State and DHS
have not concluded their discussions on legal and policy issues related
to removing individuals with revoked visas from the United States.
Mr. Chairman, in light of the weaknesses we identified in our most
recent review of the visa revocation process as an antiterrorism tool,
we are recommending that the Secretary of Homeland Security work
jointly with the Secretary of State and other appropriate agencies to
take the following two actions:
* Develop a written, governmentwide policy that clearly defines the
roles and responsibilities of the agencies involved in the visa
revocation process, including the Terrorist Screening Center. This
policy should include directions for sharing information and tracking
visa revocation cases throughout the interagency visa revocation
process. It should incorporate performance standards (e.g., time frames
for completing each step in the process) and periodic interagency
assessments to determine whether information is being shared among the
agencies involved, appropriate follow-up action is being taken, and
data differences, if they occur, are being reconciled; and:
* Address outstanding legal and policy issues regarding the status of
aliens with visas revoked on national security grounds who are in the
United States at the time of the revocation. If these issues cannot be
addressed, the executive branch should, by October 1, 2004, provide
Congress with a list of specific actions (including any potential
legislative changes) that could help resolve them.
In commenting on a draft of our report, the Department of Homeland
Security said it generally concurred with the report and its
recommendations. It added that our identification of areas where
improvements are needed will contribute to ongoing efforts to
strengthen the visa revocation process. The Department of State
indicated that it believes that its handling of the revocation process
overall has been excellent and has improved over time. State indicated
that it would consult with DHS regarding implementation of our
recommendations.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to
answer any questions you or other Members of the Subcommittee may have
at this time.
GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
For further information on this testimony, please call Jess Ford or
John Brummet at (202) 512-4128. Individuals making key contributions to
this testimony include Jason Bair, Elizabeth Singer, Mary Moutsos,
Janey Cohen, and Etana Finkler.
FOOTNOTES
[1] U.S. General Accounting Office, Border Security: Additional Actions
Needed to Eliminate Weaknesses in the Visa Revocation Process,
GAO-04-795 (Washington, D.C.: July 13, 2004).
[2] U.S. General Accounting Office, Border Security: New Policies and
Procedures Are Needed to Fill Gaps in the Visa Revocation Process,
GAO-03-798 (Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2003).
[3] In this testimony, we use the term "visa" to refer to nonimmigrant
visas only. The United States also grants visas to people who intend to
immigrate to the United States. A visa is a travel document that allows
a foreign visitor to present himself or herself at a port of entry for
admission to the United States.
[4] The Department of State revokes a person's visa as a precautionary
measure after it learns that person may be a suspected terrorist. The
purpose of this revocation is to obtain additional information from the
person to determine if the individual is the same person who is
suspected of being a terrorist by requiring him or her to return to the
consulate that issued the visa. According to State officials, this
authority is an important and useful tool for more closely scrutinizing
the individual as he or she reapplies for a new visa. State also
revokes visas for reasons other than terrorism, such as alien
smuggling, drug trafficking, and misrepresentation. State officials
told us that visas revoked on terrorism grounds account for the vast
majority of all visas revoked on national security grounds.
[5] Our review covered only nonimmigrant visas that State revoked on
terrorism grounds from October 1, 2003, through December 31, 2003. In
this testimony, when we refer to individuals whose visas have been
revoked, we are referring to those individuals for whom the Department
of State has issued a visa revocation certificate. According to the
terms of the certificate, the revocation is effective immediately on
the date the certificate is signed unless the alien is already in the
United States, in which case the revocation becomes effective
immediately upon the alien's departure from the United States.
[6] DHS could also attempt to remove these aliens based on the
derogatory information that led State to revoke the individual's visa.
[7] CBP's data come from the Nonimmigrant Information System (NIIS),
which does not have complete arrival and departure records for all non-
U.S. citizens. NIIS records arrivals and departures of foreign citizens
through the collection of I-94 forms. Some aliens are required to fill
out and turn in these forms to inspectors at air and sea ports of entry
as well as at land borders. (Canadians and U.S. permanent residents are
not required to fill out I-94 forms when they enter the United States.)
NIIS does not have departure data for aliens if they fail to turn in
the bottom portion of their I-94 when they depart.
[8] On June 8, 2004, ICE investigators told us that they have no
specific derogatory information that would indicate that any of the
individuals remaining in the United States currently represent a threat
to national security.
[9] ICE provided us a breakdown of results of the 64 investigations,
but we have not included these data because DHS classified them as law
enforcement sensitive.
[10] State officials told us that, in light of the evolving
relationships among the agencies involved in the visa revocation
process, they revise their procedures as necessary.
[11] 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.
[12] Previously, the center had one full-time staff member dedicated to
performing this function.
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