Drug Control
U.S. Nonmilitary Assistance to Colombia Is Beginning to Show Intended Results, but Programs Are Not Readily Sustainable Gao ID: GAO-04-726 July 2, 2004Since 2000, the U.S. government has provided a total of $3.3 billion to Colombia, making it the fifth largest recipient of U.S. assistance. Part of this funding has gone toward nonmilitary assistance to Colombia, including programs to (1) promote legitimate economic alternatives to coca and opium poppy; (2) assist Colombia's vulnerable groups, particularly internally displaced persons; and (3) strengthen the country's democratic, legal, and security institutional capabilities. GAO examined these programs' objectives, reported accomplishments, and identified the factors, if any, that limit project implementation and sustainability. We also examined the challenges faced by Colombia and the United States in continuing to support these programs.
Although U.S. nonmilitary assistance programs have begun to produce some results, individual projects reach a relatively small number of beneficiaries, face implementation challenges, and may not be sustainable. For example, projects designed to promote legitimate economic alternatives to illicit crop cultivation have helped about 33,400 families. However, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) estimated in 2000 and 2001 that as many as 136,600 families needed assistance, and these projects face implementation obstacles, such as difficulty marketing licit products and operating in conflictive areas. U.S. assistance to Colombia's vulnerable groups has provided support to many internally displaced persons, but these program beneficiaries do not receive all of the assistance they need, and there is no systematic way for beneficiaries to transition from emergency aid to longer-term development assistance. The U.S. government has made some progress toward facilitating democratic reform in Colombia, but projects face certain obstacles, such as limited funding and security constraints. Despite the progress made by the three nonmilitary assistance programs, Colombia and the United States continue to face long-standing management and financial challenges. The Colombian government's ability to contribute funds for nonmilitary assistance programs is limited by a number of domestic and foreign factors, and Colombia's longstanding conflict poses additional challenges to implementing and sustaining nonmilitary assistance efforts. The U.S. government has not maximized the mutual benefits of its nonmilitary assistance programs and has not established a mechanism for vulnerable groups to transition from emergency aid to longer-term assistance. Furthermore, the Departments of State and Justice and USAID have not established timelines for achieving their stated objectives, nor have State and USAID developed a strategy to turn programs over to the Colombian government or to the private sector.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-04-726, Drug Control: U.S. Nonmilitary Assistance to Colombia Is Beginning to Show Intended Results, but Programs Are Not Readily Sustainable
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Report to the Honorable Charles E. Grassley, Chairman, Caucus on
International Narcotics Control, U.S. Senate:
July 2004:
DRUG CONTROL:
U.S. Nonmilitary Assistance to Colombia Is Beginning to Show Intended
Results, but Programs Are Not Readily Sustainable:
GAO-04-726:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-04-726, a report to the Honorable Charles E.
Grassley, Chairman, Caucus on International Narcotics Control, U.S.
Senate:
Why GAO Did This Study:
Since 2000, the U.S. government has provided a total of $3.3 billion to
Colombia, making it the fifth largest recipient of U.S. assistance.
Part of this funding has gone toward nonmilitary assistance to
Colombia, including programs to (1) promote legitimate economic
alternatives to coca and opium poppy; (2) assist Colombia‘s vulnerable
groups, particularly internally displaced persons; and (3) strengthen
the country‘s democratic, legal, and security institutional
capabilities. GAO examined these programs‘ objectives, reported
accomplishments, and identified the factors, if any, that limit project
implementation and sustainability. We also examined the challenges
faced by Colombia and the United States in continuing to support these
programs.
What GAO Found:
Although U.S. nonmilitary assistance programs have begun to produce
some results, individual projects reach a relatively small number of
beneficiaries, face implementation challenges, and may not be
sustainable. For example:
* Projects designed to promote legitimate economic alternatives to
illicit crop cultivation have helped about 33,400 families. However,
the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) estimated in
2000 and 2001 that as many as 136,600 families needed assistance, and
these projects face implementation obstacles, such as difficulty
marketing licit products and operating in conflictive areas.
* U.S. assistance to Colombia‘s vulnerable groups has provided support
to many internally displaced persons, but these program beneficiaries
do not receive all of the assistance they need, and there is no
systematic way for beneficiaries to transition from emergency aid to
longer-term development assistance.
* The U.S. government has made some progress toward facilitating
democratic reform in Colombia, but projects face certain obstacles,
such as limited funding and security constraints.
Despite the progress made by the three nonmilitary assistance programs,
Colombia and the United States continue to face long-standing
management and financial challenges. The Colombian government‘s ability
to contribute funds for nonmilitary assistance programs is limited by
a number of domestic and foreign factors, and Colombia‘s longstanding
conflict poses additional challenges to implementing and sustaining
nonmilitary assistance efforts. The U.S. government has not maximized
the mutual benefits of its nonmilitary assistance programs and has not
established a mechanism for vulnerable groups to transition from
emergency aid to longer-term assistance. Furthermore, the Departments
of State and Justice and USAID have not established timelines for
achieving their stated objectives, nor have State and USAID developed a
strategy to turn programs over to the Colombian government or to the
private sector.
U.S. Nonmilitary Assistance to Colombia Programmed in Fiscal Years
2000-2004 (dollars in millions):
[See PDF for image]
Sources: State, Justice, and USAID.
Note: State‘s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
did not provide complete funding data.
[End of table]
What GAO Recommends:
We recommend that the Secretary of State, in consultation with the
Attorney General and the Administrator, USAID, develop a detailed plan
for improving systematic coordination among the three nonmilitary
assistance programs in Colombia. This plan should include a timeline
for achieving stated objectives, future funding requirements, and a
strategy for sustaining the results achieved. In commenting on this
report, State, Justice, and USAID generally found the report helpful.
State and USAID noted that they are exploring ways to improve
coordination.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-726.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Jess Ford at (202)
512-4128 or FordJ@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Nonmilitary Assistance Programs Have Begun to Show Intended Results,
but Progress May Not Be Sustainable:
Management and Financial Challenges Continue to Complicate Project
Implementation:
Conclusions:
Recommendation for Executive Action:
Agency Comments:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of State:
GAO Comments:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Justice:
GAO Comments:
Appendix IV: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International
Development:
Tables:
Table 1: Amount of U.S. Assistance Appropriated to Colombia, Fiscal
Years 2000-2004:
Table 2: U.S. Nonmilitary Assistance to Colombia Programmed, Obligated,
and Expended in Fiscal Years 2000-2004:
Table 3: Alternative Development Goals and Accomplishments, Fiscal
Years 2000-2005:
Figure:
Figure 1: Coca-and Poppy-Growing Areas in Colombia, 2003:
Abbreviations:
USAID: U.S. Agency for International Development:
GAO: U.S. General Accounting Office:
Letter July 2, 2004:
The Honorable Charles E. Grassley:
Chairman, Caucus on International Narcotics Control:
United States Senate:
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Since the early 1970s, the United States has supported Colombia's
efforts to reduce drug trafficking activities and stem the flow of
illegal drugs, principally cocaine and heroin, entering the United
States.[Footnote 1] Recognizing the severity of illicit drug activities
and the links between drug trafficking, illicit crop cultivation, and
the violence affecting Colombia, the Colombian government announced a
$7.5 billion plan in October 1999, known as Plan Colombia. This plan,
among other things, proposed to reduce the cultivation, processing, and
distribution of illegal narcotics by 50 percent over 6 years.[Footnote
2] To assist Colombia's efforts, the United States substantially
increased funding and material support to Colombia in 2000.[Footnote 3]
During fiscal years 2000 through 2004, the United States provided a
total of $3.3 billion, making Colombia the fifth largest recipient of
U.S. assistance since fiscal year 2002. For fiscal year 2005, the
administration has requested a total of $571 million for Colombia.
A key component of U.S. strategy has involved providing nonmilitary
assistance for programs to (1) promote legitimate economic alternatives
to the cultivation of coca and opium poppy; (2) assist Colombia's
vulnerable groups, particularly internally displaced persons; and (3)
strengthen the country's democratic, legal, and security institutional
capabilities. This assistance is provided through the Department of
State (State), the Department of Justice (Justice), and the U.S. Agency
for International Development (USAID). As of December 31, 2003, State,
Justice, and USAID had programmed approximately $566 million for fiscal
years 2000 through 2004 for nonmilitary assistance programs to
Colombia. For fiscal year 2005, the administration has requested an
additional $150 million for these programs.
In response to your request, we examined (1) the three U.S. nonmilitary
assistance programs' objectives, reported accomplishments, and the
factors, if any, limiting project implementation and sustainability and
(2) the challenges faced by Colombia and the United States in
continuing to support these programs.
To address these objectives, we analyzed program and project
information from State, Justice, and USAID and their implementing
partners both in Washington, D.C., and in Colombia. We also met with
representatives of several independent organizations with specialized
knowledge about the nonmilitary programs in Colombia. We traveled to
Colombia in January 2004. While there, we met with cognizant officials
of the U.S. Embassy and the government of Colombia. We reviewed how the
data provided to us were compiled and determined that they are
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. Finally, we met
with local nongovernmental organizations and project beneficiaries and
observed projects in Bogotá and Soacha (near Bogotá), Medellín, and
Puerto Asís and Villa Garzón in Putumayo. We performed our work from
August 2003 through June 2004 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards. (See app. I for a more complete
discussion of our scope and methodology.)
Results in Brief:
U.S. nonmilitary assistance programs have begun to produce some of the
results envisioned under Plan Colombia. However, individual projects
reach a relatively small number of beneficiaries, face implementation
challenges, and may not be sustainable.
* Alternative development provides legitimate economic alternatives to
illicit crop production. According to USAID, during 2000 through
December 2003, the alternative development program led to the voluntary
eradication of almost 22,000 hectares[Footnote 4] of illicit crops,
established 647 small infrastructure projects in rural areas, supported
the cultivation of nearly 44,000 licit hectares, and helped about
33,400 families. However, USAID once estimated that as many as 136,600
families need assistance, and alternative development projects face
implementation obstacles, such as difficulty marketing licit products
and operating in conflictive areas. For example, a specialty coffee
project has been able to market only a very limited amount of its
product because of the requirement to meet specialty coffee industry
standards--a process that can take 1 to 5 years due, in part, to the
need to renovate coffee farms and implement more stringent quality
control procedures. Moreover, according to the contractor, prior to
February 2004, security concerns had prevented U.S. buyers from
traveling to Colombia's coffee-growing regions to evaluate the product.
* U.S. assistance to Colombia's vulnerable groups, particularly
internally displaced persons, encompasses both emergency humanitarian
aid and mid-to long-term development assistance. State is responsible
for providing emergency aid in Colombia and to refugees in neighboring
countries, but State does not have a strategy incorporating objectives
and performance goals, does not routinely track the number of
individuals assisted, and does not have any systematic way for its
beneficiaries to transition to longer-term aid from USAID. USAID
reports that its program, among other accomplishments, has assisted
more than 1.4 million individuals and reintegrated 1,375 former child
soldiers. However, program beneficiaries do not receive all of the
assistance they need, and USAID does not keep track of its
beneficiaries after they have received assistance to determine whether
they have assimilated into society.
* U.S. assistance for democracy and rule of law reform is designed to
facilitate democratic reform in Colombia by promoting a more
responsive, participatory, and accountable democracy; enhancing state
presence and public security; and strengthening the country's justice
sector. State, Justice, and USAID report that they have made progress
toward each objective. However, projects often encounter obstacles,
such as limited funding and security constraints, that limit their
ability to achieve overall program objectives. For example, to enhance
Colombian state presence, State helped organize, train, and equip more
than 16,500 police officers. While this allowed the Colombian National
Police to move into areas of the country that previously did not have a
state presence, some police units cannot safely leave town limits, and
some mobile squadrons have limited patrolling capability.
Although the U.S. nonmilitary assistance programs are beginning to
achieve some of the results envisioned in 2000, Colombia and the United
States must continue to address long-standing management and financial
challenges. Specifically, USAID has not yet maximized the mutual
benefits of its programs for alternative development, vulnerable
groups, and democracy, and State and USAID have not coordinated their
assistance programs to internally displaced persons to help those who
need to transition from State's emergency assistance program to USAID's
longer-term assistance. Moreover, with the exception of the program to
enhance state presence and public security, State, Justice, and USAID
have not established timelines for achieving their stated objectives,
nor have State and USAID developed an overall strategy for turning
programs over to the Colombian government or to the private sector. In
addition, funding constraints adversely affect all three areas of
nonmilitary assistance and complicate sustainability efforts. Finally,
Colombia faces continuing challenges associated with its political and
economic instability, which has been fostered by more than 40 years of
civil war and human rights abuses.
We are recommending that the Secretary of State, in consultation with
the Attorney General and the Administrator, USAID, develop a detailed
plan for improving systematic coordination among the three nonmilitary
assistance programs and between State and USAID for assistance to
internally displaced persons. The plan should include a timeline for
achieving the stated objectives, an estimate of future funding
requirements, and a strategy for sustaining the results achieved.
Background:
Colombia is the source of 90 percent of the cocaine and 40 percent of
the heroin entering the United States. To assist the Colombian
government in its efforts to implement Plan Colombia and reduce the
cultivation and trafficking of illegal drugs, the United States has
pursued a strategy emphasizing interdiction, aerial eradication and
alternative development.[Footnote 5] The strategy has resulted in a 33
percent reduction in the amount of coca cultivated in Colombia over
the last 2 years[Footnote 6]--from 169,800 hectares in 2001 to 113,850
hectares in 2003--and a 10 percent reduction in the amount of opium
poppy cultivated over the last year. However, according to Drug
Enforcement Administration officials and documents, cocaine prices
nationwide have remained relatively stable--indicating that cocaine is
still readily available--and Colombia dominates the market for heroin
in the northeastern United States.
Despite improvements in Colombia's security situation in 2003--for
example, the murder rate declined 20 percent that year--insurgent and
paramilitary groups still control large parts of the countryside.
According to State Department officials, the insurgents exercise some
degree of control in up to 40 percent of Colombia's territory east and
south of the Andes--which, as illustrated in figure 1, includes the
primary coca-growing regions of Colombia. These groups, which include
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, the National Liberation
Army, and paramilitary forces such as the United Self Defense Forces of
Colombia, are involved in every facet of narcotics trafficking and are
on the State Department's list of terrorist organizations. Recognizing
that the insurgents and illicit drug activities are inextricably
linked, the Congress provided "expanded authority" in 2002 for the use
of U.S. assistance to Colombia. This authority enables the government
of Colombia to use U.S.-provided equipment to fight groups designated
as terrorist organizations as well as to fight drug trafficking.
Figure 1: Coca-and Poppy-Growing Areas in Colombia, 2003:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Beginning in fiscal year 2000, the United States substantially
increased counternarcotics assistance to Colombia. For fiscal years
2000 through 2004, the United States provided a total of approximately
$3.3 billion, making Colombia the fifth largest recipient of U.S.
assistance since fiscal year 2002.[Footnote 7] (See table 1.) Most of
this funding was provided through the Andean Counterdrug Initiative, an
appropriation provided annually that supports counternarcotics
programs throughout the Andean region.[Footnote 8] Much of this
assistance was provided to the Colombian Army to conduct interdiction
missions and to the Colombian National Police to conduct the aerial
eradication of coca and poppy.[Footnote 9] For fiscal year 2005, the
administration has proposed an additional $571 million for assistance
to Colombia.
Table 1: Amount of U.S. Assistance Appropriated to Colombia, Fiscal
Years 2000-2004:
Dollars in millions:
Agency: State[C];
Fiscal years: 2000[A]: $774.9;
Fiscal years: 2001: $48.0;
Fiscal years: 2002: $275.4;
Fiscal years: 2003[B]: $516.6;
Fiscal years: 2004: $495.8;
Total: $2,110.7.
Agency: USAID[D];
Fiscal years: 2000[A]: $123.5;
Fiscal years: 2001: $0;
Fiscal years: 2002: 104.5;
Fiscal years: 2003[B]: $122.2;
Fiscal years: 2004: $122.2;
Total: $472.4.
Agency: Defense;
Fiscal years: 2000[A]: $128.5;
Fiscal years: 2001: $190.2;
Fiscal years: 2002: 119.1;
Fiscal years: 2003[B]: $165.0;
Fiscal years: 2004: $122.0;
Total: $724.8.
Total;
Fiscal years: 2000[A]: $1,026.9;
Fiscal years: 2001: $238.2;
Fiscal years: 2002: $499.0;
Fiscal years: 2003[B]: $803.8;
Fiscal years: 2004: $740.0;
Total: $3,307.9.
Sources: The Departments of State and Justice, USAID, and Congressional
Research Service (data); GAO (presentation).
[A] Includes funds appropriated for Plan Colombia through the Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2000 (Division B of Public Law 106-
246).
[B] Includes $93 million in Foreign Military Financing funds
appropriated in the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Appropriations Act, 2003 (Division E, title III of P.L. 108-7); $34
million appropriated to State and $34 million appropriated to Defense
in the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 108-11);
and $37.1 million for Foreign Military Financing allotted from fiscal
year 2003 supplemental appropriations.
[C] Includes $88 million in funding transferred by State to Justice for
its rule of law programs.
[D] In fiscal years 2000 through 2003, State transferred $375 million
to USAID for alternative development, democracy and rule of law, and
internally displaced persons programs. In fiscal year 2004, the
Congress directly appropriated money for these programs to USAID.
[End of table]
U.S.-provided nonmilitary assistance to Colombia indirectly assists in
reducing narcotics cultivation and trafficking by providing
alternatives to cultivating illicit crops, assisting vulnerable groups,
and supporting democracy and rule of law reforms. As shown in table 2,
for fiscal years 2000 through 2004, the United States has programmed
about $566 million for nonmilitary assistance to Colombia, which
represents about 17 percent of the total U.S. assistance to Colombia
during the period. State, Justice, and USAID have obligated about $575
million and expended about $310 million of these funds. Most of the
funding--about $210 million--has been programmed for democracy, rule of
law, and enhancement of state presence programs. The administration has
requested an additional $150 million for nonmilitary programs in fiscal
year 2005.
Table 2: U.S. Nonmilitary Assistance to Colombia Programmed, Obligated,
and Expended in Fiscal Years 2000-2004:
Dollars in millions:
Fiscal years: 2000:
Program: Alternative development: Programmed: $43;
Program: Alternative development: Obligated: $43;
Program: Alternative development: Expended: $0.
Fiscal years: 2001:
Program: Alternative development: Programmed: $0;
Program: Alternative development: Obligated: $0;
Program: Alternative development: Expended: $40.
Fiscal years: 2002:
Program: Alternative development: Programmed: $52;
Program: Alternative development: Obligated: $52;
Program: Alternative development: Expended: $39.
Fiscal years: 2003:
Program: Alternative development: Programmed: $56;
Program: Alternative development: Obligated: $56;
Program: Alternative development: Expended: $5.
Fiscal years: 2004: (through 12/31/ 03):
Program: Alternative development: Programmed: $56;
Program: Alternative development: Obligated: $54;
Program: Alternative development: Expended: $0.
Total:
Program: Alternative development: Programmed: $207;
Program: Alternative development: Obligated: $205;
Program: Alternative development: Expended: $84.
Fiscal years: 2000:
Program: Vulnerable groups[A]: Programmed: $30;
Program: Vulnerable groups[A]: Obligated: $31;
Program: Vulnerable groups[A]: Expended: $1.
Fiscal years: 2001:
Program: Vulnerable groups[A]: Programmed: $0;
Program: Vulnerable groups[A]: Obligated: $10;
Program: Vulnerable groups[A]: Expended: $36.
Fiscal years: 2002:
Program: Vulnerable groups[A]: Programmed: $24;
Program: Vulnerable groups[A]: Obligated: $32;
Program: Vulnerable groups[A]: Expended: $26.
Fiscal years: 2003:
Program: Vulnerable groups[A]: Programmed: $57;
Program: Vulnerable groups[A]: Obligated: $57;
Program: Vulnerable groups[A]: Expended: $23.
Fiscal years: 2004: (through 12/31/03):
Program: Vulnerable groups[A]: Programmed: $38;
Program: Vulnerable groups[A]: Obligated: $46;
Program: Vulnerable groups[A]: Expended: $21.
Total:
Program: Vulnerable groups[A]: Programmed: $149;
Program: Vulnerable groups[A]: Obligated: $176;
Program: Vulnerable groups[A]: Expended: $107.
Fiscal years: 2000:
Program: Democracy/Rule of law[A]: Programmed: $51;
Program: Democracy/Rule of law[A]: Obligated: $51;
Program: Democracy/Rule of law[A]: Expended: $0.
Fiscal years: 2001:
Program: Democracy/Rule of law[A]: Programmed: $88;
Program: Democracy/Rule of law[A]: Obligated: $14;
Program: Democracy/Rule of law[A]: Expended: $54.
Fiscal years: 2002:
Program: Democracy/Rule of law[A]: Programmed: $28;
Program: Democracy/Rule of law[A]: Obligated: $67;
Program: Democracy/Rule of law[A]: Expended: $32.
Fiscal years: 2003:
Program: Democracy/Rule of law[A]: Programmed: $19;
Program: Democracy/Rule of law[A]: Obligated: $39;
Program: Democracy/Rule of law[A]: Expended: $31.
Fiscal years: 2004: (through 12/31/03):
Program: Democracy/Rule of law[A]: Programmed: $24;
Program: Democracy/Rule of law[A]: Obligated: $23;
Program: Democracy/Rule of law[A]: Expended: $2.
Total:
Program: Democracy/Rule of law[A]: Programmed: $210;
Program: Democracy/Rule of law[A]: Obligated: $194;
Program: Democracy/Rule of law[A]: Expended: $119.
Fiscal years: 2000:
Total: Programmed: $124;
Total: Obligated: $125;
Total: Expended: $1.
Fiscal years: 2001:
Total: Programmed: $88;
Total: Obligated: $24;
Total: Expended: $130.
Fiscal years: 2002:
Total: Programmed: $104;
Total: Obligated: $151;
Total: Expended: $97.
Fiscal years: 2003:
Total: Programmed: $113;
Total: Obligated: $152;
Total: Expended: $59.
Fiscal years: 2004: (through 12/31/03):
Total: Programmed: $118;
Total: Obligated: $123;
Total: Expended: $23.
Total:
Total: Programmed: $566;
Total: Obligated: $575;
Total: Expended: $310.
Sources: The Departments of State and Justice and USAID (data); GAO
(presentation).
[A] State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs did not provide complete funding data. As a result, the table
may not reflect what was actually programmed, obligated, and expended
for the programs it supports.
[End of table]
Our past reports have addressed each of these nonmilitary programs. In
February 2002, we reported that USAID faced serious obstacles to
developing alternatives to cultivating illicit crops in Colombia, among
them the Colombian government's lack of control over many coca-growing
areas.[Footnote 10] In August 2001, we reported that international
organizations generally met the emergency food and shelter needs of
internally displaced persons in Colombia, but were less effective in
meeting their longer-term needs, and that the U.S. government lacked an
overall policy to coordinate its efforts for dealing with the
displaced.[Footnote 11] In March 2003, we reported that U.S. democracy
programs in six countries, including Colombia, had a limited effect as
a result of various factors, and questions remained regarding the
sustainability of the gains made with U.S. assistance.[Footnote 12]
Nonmilitary Assistance Programs Have Begun to Show Intended Results,
but Progress May Not Be Sustainable:
A key component of U.S. counternarcotics strategy in Colombia has
involved providing nonmilitary assistance for programs to promote
legitimate economic alternatives to the cultivation of coca and opium
poppy; assist Colombia's vulnerable groups, particularly internally
displaced persons; and strengthen the country's democratic, legal, and
security institutional capabilities. Each of the three U.S. nonmilitary
assistance programs has begun to produce results envisioned in 2000
when U.S. funding for Plan Colombia was approved. However, each program
has limitations.
* Alternative development projects often benefit only a few people or
families; have difficulty marketing products; and, without additional
sources of funding, likely cannot be sustained.
* The assistance for vulnerable groups program cannot address all the
needs identified because of limited resources, and the number of
individuals displaced and needing assistance is increasing.
* U.S. assistance for democracy and rule of law is a long-standing
program, but progress has been limited because the government does not
control large parts of the country, and many projects are small scale
and have insufficient numbers of trained personnel and equipment.
Alternative Development Has Made Progress, but Projects Are Limited in
Scope:
USAID oversees and implements the alternative development program.
According to the agency's strategy, the objective of the alternative
development program is to provide economic and social alternatives to
illicit crop production through short-and long-term projects involving
crop substitution, infrastructure development, and income generation
projects in rural parts of the country, as well as in secondary cities
affected by illicit crop cultivation. The alternative development
program has had some success promoting economic and social alternatives
to illicit crop production, but individual projects are relatively
localized and small in scale.
USAID's original alternative development strategy from 2000 focused
primarily on encouraging farmers to manually eradicate illicit crops,
and those who did received assistance in licit, short-term, income-
producing opportunities. This assistance was intended to complement the
eradication and interdiction components of Colombia's effort to
eliminate coca cultivation in southern Colombia. USAID primarily
supported initiatives in the departments of Caquetá and Putumayo,
where, at the time, much of Colombia's coca was cultivated.[Footnote
13] USAID (and its implementing partners) found it difficult to
implement projects in the largely undeveloped south, where the
Colombian government exercised minimal control. In addition, poor soil
made growing licit crops a challenge, and farmers found it more
lucrative to continue growing coca. Furthermore, the USAID/Colombia
mission estimated that implementing such a comprehensive alternative
development program could involve assisting as many as 136,600 families
and cost up to $4 billion over 3 years.
As a result, USAID revised its approach in February 2002 to support
long-term income-generating activities, focus more attention and
resources outside southern Colombia, and encourage private sector
participation. The agency's revised strategy is to promote and leverage
significant private sector investment in longer-term, economically
viable agro-business and forestry initiatives, as well as linkages to
small-and medium-sized enterprises. Unlike the initial alternative
development efforts, the program is no longer based on an explicit
mandate to assist illicit crop growers whose crops had been eradicated
or who agreed to manually eradicate their illegal crops. Some current
program participants were not directly involved in cultivating coca or
poppy.
USAID has alternative development projects in 25 of Colombia's 32
departments. To assess its progress, USAID uses four measures: the
number of hectares of illicit crops eradicated, the number of hectares
of licit crops cultivated, the number of families benefited, and the
number of small infrastructure projects established. Table 3
illustrates USAID's reported accomplishments.
Table 3: Alternative Development Goals and Accomplishments, Fiscal
Years 2000-2005:
Agency performance indicators: Hectares of illicit crops eradicated[A];
Accomplished as of December 31, 2003: 21,838;
Program targets through 2005: 20,000;
Percentage of target accomplished: 109%.
Agency performance indicators: Hectares of licit crops cultivated;
Accomplished as of December 31, 2003: 43,951;
Program targets through 2005: 65,042;
Percentage of target accomplished: 68%.
Agency performance indicators: Families benefited;
Accomplished as of December 31, 2003: 33,399;
Program targets through 2005: 80,000;
Percentage of target accomplished: 42%.
Agency performance indicators: Small infrastructure projects;
Accomplished as of December 31, 2003: 647;
Program targets through 2005: 610;
Percentage of target accomplished: 106%.
Sources: USAID (data); GAO (presentation).
[A] USAID's original target was 30,000 hectares. USAID officials stated
that they lowered the goal because of the program's shift in emphasis
from crop substitution to more indirect forms of alternative
development, such as the creation of jobs in secondary cities.
[End of table]
Based on these four measures, the alternative development program has
started to produce results. However, USAID officials acknowledge that
these indicators do not measure the agency's progress in reaching its
primary objective of promoting economic and social alternatives to
illicit crop production.[Footnote 14] Individual alternative
development projects may employ only a small number of people for a
short period of time or benefit a relatively small number of families.
Without broader participation and financial support, such projects may
not be sustainable if U.S. support is reduced. Furthermore, as we
reported in 2002, the lack of security in the project areas continues
to seriously hamper the Colombian government's ability to develop
infrastructure where illicit crop cultivation takes place, establish
viable and reliable markets for licit products, and attract the private
investment needed for long-term, income-generating
development.[Footnote 15] For example:
* In 2002, a contractor received about $1.4 million from USAID to build
a water treatment plant in Villa Garzón in the department of Putumayo.
The plant is designed to provide clean water for the town and to create
employment opportunities for local residents. Construction began in
December 2002, and when we visited the site in January 2004, it was
nearing completion. Although the project provided jobs for some local
residents, these jobs will end shortly.
* Another contractor received funding for a hearts of palm canning
plant in Puerto Asís, Putumayo, which is intended to provide long-term
employment opportunities for the workers and income to farmers who grow
palm fronds. The United Nations Drug Control Program built the plant
with the government of Colombia in the late 1990s, but it was dormant
for several years. USAID took over the plant in 2002. When we visited
the site in January 2004, it was operating at 30 percent
capacity.[Footnote 16] Although the plant had secured a buyer for its
product, USAID support will end in September 2004, and the plant
manager told us he did not know if the plant could maintain or increase
its operating capacity when U.S. funding stops.
* The same contractor overseeing the hearts of palm plant also receives
USAID funding to operate a woodworking center in Puerto Asís, where
program participants make furniture parts. According to the project's
annual work plan, the woodworking center will directly employ 25
people. The contractor plans to sell the furniture parts for assembly
elsewhere, targeting the North American market. However, when we toured
the center, we learned that the contractor has not been able to market
the wood products outside Putumayo because when the products are
shipped to less humid regions, the wood cracks.[Footnote 17]
* An alternative development project outside Putumayo is designed to
encourage families to cultivate specialty coffee rather than coca or
opium poppy. To participate, farmers must commit to eradicate or not
enter into illicit crop cultivation. However, the contractor has been
able to market only a very limited amount of the product because before
a specialty coffee can be marketed, measures must be taken to ensure
that the coffee meets industry standards--a process that can take 1 to
5 years due, in part, to the need to renovate coffee farms and
implement more stringent quality control procedures. Moreover,
according to the contractor, before February 2004, security concerns
prevented U.S. buyers from traveling to Colombia's coffee-growing
regions to evaluate the product.
As we reported in February 2002, alternative development progress in
Bolivia and Peru took 20 years of sustained U.S. assistance, and the
host government agencies involved in the efforts continued to be
heavily dependent on U.S. support.[Footnote 18] The situation in
Colombia is similar. As noted earlier, the USAID/Colombia mission once
estimated that a comprehensive alternative development program could
involve assisting as many as 136,600 families and cost up to $4 billion
over 3 years. The agency has requested about $56 million for the
program in fiscal year 2005, and for fiscal years 2006 through 2008,
USAID planning documents call for a total of $234 million. In addition,
according to USAID officials, recent funding and personnel cuts have
hurt the Colombian alternative development agency's ability to support
the USAID program.
Vulnerable Groups Program Has Aided Numerous Disadvantaged Persons, but
Assistance Is Limited:
State and USAID implement programs to assist Colombia's vulnerable
groups--particularly its displaced population. Internally displaced
persons--those forced to flee their homes because of armed conflict and
persecution but who remain within their own country--are among the
most at-risk, vulnerable populations in the world.[Footnote 19] They
are unlikely to have adequate shelter, health care, and the ability to
earn a livelihood. By many estimates, Colombia has one of the world's
largest internally displaced populations. The U.S. vulnerable groups
program has provided assistance to many internally displaced persons
and others, but program beneficiaries may not receive all of the
services they need, and State and USAID do not track individuals after
they receive assistance.[Footnote 20]
State's Emergency Assistance:
In fiscal year 2003, State provided about $19 million[Footnote 21] to
seven organizations for assisting Colombia's internally displaced
persons--generally for a 3-month period immediately following initial
displacement. This emergency assistance included protection, shelter,
medical assistance, and food and assistance targeted specifically to
help displaced children. State also provided some emergency
humanitarian assistance to Colombian refugees living in neighboring
countries, primarily Ecuador. However, State does not have any written
strategy outlining the objectives and performance goals of its
vulnerable groups program. Furthermore, State does not routinely track
the number of people its program supports. After several requests by
us, State officials said the program assisted 763,000 internally
displaced persons in 2003. State officials did not provide comparable
figures for fiscal years 2000 through 2002.
State does not have a mechanism to "hand off" its program beneficiaries
to USAID's longer-term assistance program after they have received the
emergency aid. Although USAID's annual report for fiscal year 2003
states that USAID helped internally displaced persons gain access to
basic services after short-term emergency relief provided by State had
expired, this has not happened in any systematic way.
USAID's Longer-Term Assistance:
During fiscal year 2003, USAID provided about $38.2 million to seven
nongovernmental and international organizations for mid-to long-term
development assistance to Colombia's vulnerable groups. The agency
reported that as of December 2003, its program had helped more than 1.4
million individuals. Following are examples of USAID's projects that
assist vulnerable persons.
* One grantee received $5.1 million from USAID to alleviate child
hunger and improve the health and well-being of displaced families. The
project's two primary activities are a school feeding program and a
health education project for mothers. While these services address a
significant need, a relatively small number of beneficiaries will
receive them. Children and adolescents account for half (at least 1
million persons) of Colombia's displaced population. According to
agency documents, 113,000 displaced school children will benefit from
this program.
* Another USAID project in Soacha (just outside Bogotá) is designed to
address the health and education needs of displaced Afro-Colombian
children and their families. An assistance center provides day care to
children in the community, trains youth in life-and job-related skills,
and provides information to mothers about childcare and nutrition.
Colombia has at least 279,000 Afro-Colombian internally displaced
persons; this project will provide services to 120 Afro-Colombian
children and their families, 100 adolescents and their families, 210
fathers, and 50 lactating mothers and their families.
* Another USAID grantee received $16.7 million to, among other things,
provide microenterprise loans (averaging $1,000) and home improvement
loans (averaging $2,000) to internally displaced persons. However,
grantee officials stated that they have had minimal success with both
types of loans. Internally displaced persons often move to new
locations with little notice or lack the financial knowledge to manage
a loan. For these reasons, the grantee has decided to limit the number
of loans it awards.
USAID's program to rehabilitate and reintegrate excombatant children
into Colombian society provides specialized, individualized care,
including medical attention and psychosocial counseling. Some receive
formal education; others receive vocational or agricultural training.
When they reach age 18 or are reunited with their families, the
children are supported through regional reference centers that provide
continued assistance through a network of social service providers.
Types of assistance provided include employment assistance, legal aid,
and general services available through Colombia's social service
system. USAID reports that it has assisted 1,375 former child
combatants, or roughly 13 to 23 percent of Colombia's total child
soldier population. About 450 to 500 children currently receive
assistance through USAID's rehabilitation and reintegration program.
The rehabilitation center we visited had 30 former child soldiers
enrolled. Program participants were taking traditional classes and
learning useful skills through more unconventional projects. Some
students were learning how to make household cleaning products and were
communicating with a local company about marketing the products to the
local community. However, the program may face difficulty reintegrating
its beneficiaries into society. Several students we met with expressed
concern about what will happen when they leave the center. One student
stated that he wanted to stay and become a teacher, rather than
leave.[Footnote 22]
Although USAID reports that it has provided at least some assistance to
more than half of Colombia's estimated 2.5 million internally displaced
persons, this does not mean that the individuals received all or even
most of the services they needed. This is because most USAID grantees
specialize in one or two areas of assistance and operate in different
locations. Of the 27 departments in Colombia with vulnerable groups
projects, more than half had just one or two grantees providing
assistance. In addition, although USAID's most recent annual report
(January 2004) identifies "durable solutions" for program beneficiaries
as one of its performance goals, USAID officials acknowledged that they
have no way to track program beneficiaries once they have received
assistance through one of the agency's projects to determine whether
they have been assimilated back into society or still need additional
assistance.
State and USAID programs to assist Colombia's vulnerable groups are
achieving some of the intended results, but U.S. assistance cannot
address all the identified needs. One organization estimates that
providing a basic package of services to all of Colombia's internally
displaced persons would cost approximately $1 billion. However, U.S.
government expenditures for assistance to vulnerable groups have
declined each year since fiscal year 2001--from $36 million in fiscal
year 2001 to $21 million in fiscal year 2004. Nevertheless, the Office
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimates that in
Colombia, 900 to 1,000 individuals are newly displaced everyday. In
addition, USAID anticipates the demobilization of 30,000 insurgents and
paramilitaries over a 5-year period. USAID estimates that the complete
demobilization of all illegal armed groups in Colombia could cost
between $254 million and $298 million.
Democracy and Rule of Law Programs Are Long-standing, but Progress Is
Limited:
USAID, State, and Justice provide support and oversight for the
democracy and rule of law programs. In the 1980s, the United States
began to help Colombia and other Latin American countries improve their
judicial systems as a way to counter political instability and support
democratic principles and institutions. According to planning documents
from the three agencies, the objectives are to promote a more
responsive, participatory, and accountable democracy; enhance state
presence; and strengthen Colombia's justice sector. Democracy and rule
of law programs are intended to increase the Colombian government's
control over its territory and thereby help prevent the cultivation of
illicit crops in those areas. In addition, a strengthened justice
sector would help enforcement of Colombian laws that make cultivation
of coca and opium poppy illegal and afford greater protections to
vulnerable populations.
The United States has achieved some results in reaching its three main
objectives in the area of democracy and rule of law reform in Colombia,
but individual projects often produce limited results. USAID reports
progress in promoting a more responsive, participatory, and accountable
democracy in Colombia, but many of the projects are implemented on the
scale of demonstration projects. State indicates that it has made
progress toward enhancing state presence and public security through
specially trained police units, but these units have limited equipment
and show mixed results. Finally, Justice reports that it has made some
progress in strengthening Colombia's justice sector, but budget cuts
have impeded the Colombian government's ability to take over full
program responsibility, and Justice has lowered its initial targets in
some cases.
USAID's Program to Further Democracy:
USAID's primary objective is to promote a more responsive,
participatory, and accountable democracy in Colombia. Its Casa de
Justicia (Justice House) program is designed to increase Colombians'
access to legal services, as well as to enhance the presence of the
state throughout the country. Justice houses are multi-agency centers
of information, orientation, reference, and conflict resolution. People
in poor, marginalized areas visit these centers to receive both formal
and informal legal services. To date, 37 justice houses have been
built, and USAID plans to expand this number to 40 by 2005. Since the
start of the program, more than 2 million cases have been handled in
the justice houses. However, the USAID contractor told us some justice
houses cannot provide services to residents on a daily basis because
government of Colombia personnel do not always show up for work.
Another project supported by USAID is a public defense pilot center.
Until recently, public defenders in Colombia worked on a part-time
basis, were paid a low fixed salary, and handled less than 10 percent
of cases involving poor defendants. In September 2003, USAID opened a
public defense pilot center in Bogotá specifically designated to handle
cases requiring a public defender. The center houses offices and a law
library and makes it possible to have a permanent public defense
service. USAID pays half the salaries of public defense lawyers, while
Colombia has responsibility for the other half. As a pilot project, the
center's benefits have been limited--the 15 full-time public defenders
that the center employs are the only ones in the country.
USAID's Peace Initiatives Program consists primarily of support for the
peace negotiations and implementation of coexistence and resolution
activities. These activities include establishing self-determination
projects and coexistence centers. Both are designed to provide basic
government services at the municipal level.[Footnote 23]
* The self-determination projects promote cooperation, coordination,
and confidence building between citizens and the state in
municipalities. These projects have two principal components: (1)
training in peaceful coexistence, local governability, and civic
education; and (2) financial and technical support for infrastructure.
In Cauca, for example, the citizens of one municipality formed a
committee to determine the community's needs. They decided that they
needed a road connecting the various small towns in the area. Using
USAID funds, the citizens are planning to build the road themselves.
USAID has implemented self-determination projects in three
municipalities; its goal is to have 40 projects by 2005.
* Coexistence centers, like justice houses, provide government services
to marginalized populations. They are located in municipalities
considered too small for justice houses.[Footnote 24] Coexistence
centers provide on-site administrative and legal assistance,
educational opportunities for children, youth, and adults, and a
neutral space for community meetings, dialogue, and events. Some of the
services offered include libraries, ludotecas (which are similar to
preschools), and municipal family services. Although USAID's goal was
to establish 6 coexistence centers by September 30, 2003, 4 coexistence
centers had been established through the end of 2003. USAID intends to
establish 14 centers by the end of 2005.
State's Program to Enhance State Presence:
State's primary objective is to enhance state presence and public
security. Reestablishing a government of Colombia presence in all
municipalities is also one of President Uribe's primary strategic
objectives. When President Uribe assumed office in August 2002, 158
municipalities in Colombia lacked a police presence. As of February
2004, State reported that all municipalities in Colombia had a police
presence for the first time in history. According to State's 2003 Human
Rights Report, as a result of the Colombian government's emphasis on
improving security, murders were reduced by 20 percent over the year,
kidnappings by 39 percent, and forced displacements of persons by 49
percent.
State has assisted the Colombian National Police in organizing,
training, and equipping more than 16,500 police officers. Once trained,
special police units were sent to targeted municipalities to establish
a secure base and begin the process of restoring public security.
According to State, afterwards, permanent police units of a minimum of
46 police were sent in; the more conflictive municipalities received
units of up to 180 police. Anecdotal evidence indicates that these
units may have improved conditions in some areas. State officials say
that judges and prosecutors will now be able to visit some
municipalities that were previously deemed too dangerous and provide
local justice services to citizens whose only prior recourse was
appealing to the local insurgency leader.
However, some of the police units cannot safely leave their posts, and
they face difficulty patrolling their areas of responsibility. For
example, Colombian National Police mobile police squadrons, which are
tasked with reinforcing security in rural conflict zones, have a
limited ability to do so.
The United States is providing basic equipment[Footnote 25] to the
squadrons, while the government of Colombia is responsible for
maintaining them. To date, none of the mobile squadrons has been fully
equipped.[Footnote 26]
Justice's Program to Strengthen the Justice Sector:
Justice's primary objective is to strengthen Colombia's justice sector.
Its Justice Sector Reform Program is intended to help Colombia develop
and sustain a modern, effective, and efficient criminal justice system.
The program consists of 12 interrelated project areas, including
developing human rights investigative units; combating organized
financial crime; supporting joint case investigations and prosecutions;
and providing witness and judicial officer protection. For example,
Justice has supported satellite human rights units to investigate and
prosecute human rights cases in Colombia. Investigations increased
significantly in fiscal years 2002 and 2003; arrest warrants increased
by 35 percent, accusations by 73 percent, and guilty pleas by more than
200 percent. However, Justice has reduced its original target to
establish 32 satellite units to as few as 15 units; as of January 2004,
11 had been created. Justice officials expect funding for this program
to decrease.[Footnote 27] Although Justice has budgeted $4 million for
fiscal year 2004 and requested $3 million for fiscal year 2005, the
department plans to reduce the funding level to less than $2 million in
later years.
Justice has also assisted the Colombian government in developing a new
criminal procedure code. As we noted in a prior report, Colombia
enacted constitutional reform in 1991 that called for criminal justice
reform, but little progress had been made.[Footnote 28] According to
Justice, the new code provides the framework for an accusatory criminal
justice system and oral trials. In order to prepare for and support the
code's implementation, Justice trained 122 prosecutors in criminal
trial techniques in fiscal year 2003 and plans to train 10,000 judicial
police investigators by 2005 for their new roles as witnesses in oral
trials. The department also plans to train an additional 3,000
prosecutors in the new procedural code and their changed roles in an
accusatory system. Justice uses a "train-the-trainer" approach to
encourage and facilitate the transition of program responsibility to
Colombian personnel.
Management and Financial Challenges Continue to Complicate Project
Implementation:
Although the U.S. nonmilitary assistance programs are beginning to
achieve some of the results originally envisioned, Colombia and the
United States must address management and financial challenges. USAID
has not yet maximized the mutual benefits of its programs, and State
and USAID have not coordinated their assistance programs to internally
displaced persons. State, Justice, and USAID have not established
timelines, nor have State or USAID developed an overall strategy for
turning programs over to the Colombian government or to the private
sector. In addition, funding constraints and Colombia's long-standing
conflict will complicate sustainability efforts.
Program Benefits May Not be Maximized Due to Lack of Coordination:
As we reported in 1998, U.S. counternarcotics activities were hampered
by a lack of planning and management coordination.[Footnote 29] While
U.S. agencies recognize the need for greater coordination to maximize
program benefits, we found this was not always happening. USAID was not
maximizing the interrelationships among its programs for alternative
development, vulnerable groups, or democracy, and its implementing
partners expressed concern that they were often not aware of one
another's projects even when they were nearby. Moreover, State and
USAID were not coordinating their programs for internally displaced
persons.
The three nonmilitary assistance programs are interrelated. Alternative
development can provide legitimate income generation for coca and opium
poppy farmers. An increased state presence and strengthened judicial
system can provide greater protection and a safer environment for those
who want to grow licit crops and participate in other licit income-
generating alternatives. A more secure situation can lead to fewer
people leaving their homes and depending on assistance for internally
displaced persons.
The USAID/Colombia mission recognizes this interrelationship among its
programs. Its recently amended strategy for fiscal years 2006 through
2008 recognizes the need to explore opportunities for program synergies
and efficiencies.
However, coordination among USAID's implementing partners is not always
occurring. A February 2004 evaluation of USAID's alternative
development projects in Putumayo concluded that the successful
continuation of these projects depended, in part, on greater
coordination among USAID's contractors and grantees.[Footnote 30] Many
of the grantees and contractors implementing USAID's three nonmilitary
assistance programs told us they had never met as a group to discuss
and coordinate their efforts. In our meetings with grantees working
with vulnerable groups, the representatives also suggested that
specific barriers limit coordination. For instance, if grantees from
two different programs implement a joint project, only one of them can
claim an achievement for having served the project beneficiaries.
According to one grantee, this is a disincentive to cooperate with
other grantees. Another barrier cited was general confusion among
grantees about how to account for money taken from different programs-
-according to some grantees, USAID's rules and regulations about using
funding from different strategic objectives are prohibitively complex.
USAID officials and representatives of many of its implementing
partners told us that while USAID holds monthly meetings to ensure that
alternative development grantees and contractors coordinate with one
another, no mechanisms exist for ensuring that similar coordination
occurs among grantees and contractors working in USAID's other
assistance programs, even in areas of the country where several
projects are taking place near one another. For example, in January
2004 we met with local USAID democracy grantees in Antioquia. All told
us they had never met each other and did not know about one another's
projects, even when they dealt with similar issues. They reported that
as a result of their meeting with us, they would make a better effort
to coordinate with one another.[Footnote 31]
In addition to coordination problems among the nonmilitary assistance
programs, coordination is weak within the vulnerable groups program.
Although State and USAID have agreed to split responsibilities for
providing emergency aid and longer-term development assistance to
internally displaced persons, respectively, they do not have any
procedures for coordinating or transitioning from one to the other.
USAID's and State's Strategic Plan for fiscal years 2004 through 2009
does not include any specifics for joint program implementation. We
found that:
* during a site visit to a USAID-funded project outside of Bogotá, an
agency official was surprised to learn that State also funded a project
in the same location; and:
* half of the grantees involved in USAID's program were unaware of
State's program to assist the displaced and did not know whether their
project beneficiaries had first received emergency humanitarian
assistance from State.
While State and USAID are not explicitly required to assist the same
beneficiaries, agency officials and program documents indicate that
their goal is to ensure that internally displaced persons who receive
emergency aid are then provided longer-term assistance, if needed. In
2001, we reported that the U.S. government had difficulty coordinating
and managing its programs to aid the internally displaced.[Footnote 32]
These challenges continue in Colombia.
Limited Financial Resources Continue to Affect Program Implementation
and Sustainability:
Under the original concept of Plan Colombia, the government of Colombia
pledged $4 billion and called on the international community to provide
$3.5 billion. We reported in June 2003 that this international
assistance--apart from that provided by the United States--did not
materialize as expected.[Footnote 33] International donations not
directly related to Plan Colombia have also been limited. For example:
* The United Nation's Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for $62 million
in humanitarian assistance to Colombia is underfunded. Donations as of
November 2003 amounted to approximately $14 million, of which the
United States contributed about 42 percent.
* As we reported in August 2001, scarce or declining budgetary
resources provided by the international donor community inhibit
agencies from expanding their internally displaced person protection
and assistance activities.[Footnote 34]
The Colombian government has dedicated some of its own resources for
nonmilitary assistance programs, although they are not sufficient to
sustain ongoing programs. For example, according to a United Nations
agency, Colombia is providing resources to support internally displaced
persons, and Colombian law exempts internally displaced persons from
paying fees for education, health, and other basic services. However,
the report (dated May 2003) goes on to note that only 43 percent of the
total number of internally displaced persons registered with the
Colombian government received relief items. Furthermore, the
government's response to displacement does not reach remote areas and
is inadequate in urban areas. Similarly for democracy programs, the
Colombia Human Rights Ombudsman's office agreed to produce a
sustainability plan outlining its financial and technical
responsibilities on a long-term basis by January 2004. As of May 2004,
the plan had not been completed. Specifically within the rule of law
program, Colombian nondefense budget reductions have prevented the
government from taking control of the human rights investigative units
as originally planned and funds for maintaining the justice houses may
be in jeopardy.
A number of domestic and foreign factors have limited the Colombian
government's ability to contribute more resources. In August 2003,
President Uribe promoted a referendum designed to produce fiscal
reform. However, voter turnout was short of the threshold required, and
the referendum failed. To mitigate the effects of these failed cost-
cutting measures, State said that the Uribe administration introduced
new economic austerity legislation in the Colombian Congress. According
to State officials, these measures included taxes on wealth, personal
income, and financial transactions; creation of anti-evasion policies;
and an expansion of the tax base. However, these measures will not
entirely eliminate the fiscal shortfall. According to State, the tax
bill that passed the Colombian Congress in December 2003 provided
$817 million in added revenues, leaving a $286 million gap to be
bridged by spending cuts.
Fiscal constraints due to revenue shortfalls and an International
Monetary Fund requirement to reduce the combined sector deficit to 2.5
percent of gross domestic product will preclude the government from
increasing both defense and nondefense spending in 2004. Because the
success of President Uribe's democratic security policy depends in part
on increasing the size of Colombia's security forces, President Uribe
has announced that nondefense spending will be cut to enable the
Colombian government to meet its fiscal targets. This strategy should
enable the government to meet its short-term fiscal targets. However,
without significant cuts in expenditures for pensions and other
earmarks, U.S. embassy officials stated that the Colombian government
may also need to reduce defense spending to meet its long-term goal of
significantly reducing public debt. At a time when nonmilitary
assistance programs are beginning to produce intended results, such
budget cuts could impede project implementation and sustainability.
Colombia's Long-Standing Conflict Complicates Assistance Efforts:
The government of Colombia has stated that ending the country's civil
conflict is central to solving Colombia's problems, from improving
economic conditions to stemming illicit drug activities. The continuing
violence limits both the U.S. and Colombian government's ability to
institute economic, social, and political improvements. A peaceful
resolution to the decades-old insurgency would help stabilize the
nation, speed economic recovery, help ensure the protection of human
rights, and restore the authority and control of the Colombian
government in the coca-growing regions.
Although the Colombian National Police, with U.S. assistance, have
reestablished a presence in every municipality, rebel groups continue
to exercise control in large geographic areas. State estimates that
Colombia still does not control up to 40 percent of the country. Lack
of government control intensifies the difficulty of implementing
assistance programs. According to USAID officials, the agency is still
prohibited from operating in certain parts of the country because of
security concerns. Within the alternative development program, for
example, it makes the process of verifying that communities are
adhering to voluntary eradication agreements highly risky. Moreover,
while many human rights indicators improved last year due to the
Colombian government's efforts to improve security, both armed forces
and insurgents continue to commit serious human rights abuses,
according to human rights organizations, as well as State's 2003 Human
Rights Report. The ongoing violence often prevents USAID and contractor
officials from visiting project sites to implement and monitor efforts.
Furthermore, it discourages private business groups from traveling to
and investing in remote parts of Colombia.
The long-standing insurgency also limits the government's ability to
address the socio-economic conditions--including poverty, inadequate
social services, and high unemployment--that encourage illicit
activities. Several USAID officials emphasized the importance of job
creation in the fight against violence and illicit activities, yet
unemployment was over 14 percent in September 2003. In 2002, the World
Bank estimated that 60 percent of Colombia's population lives below the
poverty line, and rural poverty in Colombia is estimated at 79 percent.
The World Bank also calculated that even if a positive growth path is
reestablished and sustained, Colombia will require more than a decade
to reduce poverty to the levels recorded in 1995--an economic
performance that Colombia has not been able to achieve in recent years.
Conclusions:
Colombia is a long-time ally and significant trading partner of the
United States and, therefore, its economic and political stability is
important to the United States as well as to the Andean region.
Colombia's long-standing insurgency and the insurgents' links to the
illicit drug trade complicate the country's efforts to tap its natural
resources and make systemic economic reforms. Solving these problems is
important to Colombia's future stability.
Colombia and the United States continue to face financial and
management challenges in implementing and sustaining counternarcotics
and counterinsurgency programs in Colombia. Namely, the government of
Colombia does not have the capacity to sustain alternative development
projects, provide the level of assistance needed for vulnerable groups,
or implement democracy and judicial reform. Colombia's financial
resources are limited and its economy is weak, and thus it will need
U.S. assistance for the foreseeable future. In 2000 and 2001, USAID
determined that an alternative development program for the estimated
136,600 families involved in illicit drugs could cost up to $4 billion.
At least one organization has predicted that providing basic services
to Colombia's displaced population could cost $1 billion.[Footnote 35]
If demobilization occurs on a large scale, it could cost well over $250
million. In addition, we note that these estimates do not include
future funding needed for other U.S. programs in Colombia, including
support for the Colombian Army and Colombian National Police.
In recent years, world events--from the global war on terrorism to the
massive reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq--have diverted
scarce U.S. resources and made it paramount that the United States
fully consider the resources committed to its overseas assistance
programs. Because of competing demands, the United States very likely
cannot continue current levels of assistance to Colombia; in some
instances, State, Justice, and USAID have already begun to limit or
curtail their programs. Yet, State and USAID have not systematically
coordinated their programs to maximize the interrelated benefits or
developed a plan for turning program responsibilities over to the
Colombian government and the private sector.
Recommendation for Executive Action:
Because of Colombia's prolonged conflict and the limited financial
resources available for nonmilitary assistance programs, we recommend
that the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney General
and the Administrator, USAID, develop a detailed plan for improving
systematic coordination among the three nonmilitary assistance programs
in Colombia. The plan should include clearly defined objectives and
future funding requirements for the programs; a timeline for achieving
the stated objectives; and a strategy for sustaining the results
achieved, including transitioning program responsibility to the
government of Colombia and the private sector. Particular attention
should be placed on establishing a coordination mechanism between State
and USAID to facilitate internally displaced persons' transition from
emergency aid to longer-term assistance. The Secretary of State should
provide this information to the Congress for consideration in the
fiscal year 2006 appropriations cycle.
Agency Comments:
State, Justice, and USAID provided written comments on a draft of this
report. See appendixes I, II, and III, respectively. Overall, the
agencies found the report helpful, but none specifically commented on
our recommendation. Justice did not address coordination. State and
USAID noted instances of where coordination was occurring and said that
they are looking for ways to improve. For instance:
* State reported that it is exploring ways in Washington, D.C., and the
field to improve coordination between State and USAID on the hand-off
of beneficiaries from State's emergency assistance to USAID's longer-
term assistance.
* USAID acknowledged that more can be done to improve coordination and
detailed new initiatives designed to do so, including the creation of a
Joint Policy Council between State and USAID. USAID also noted that,
with the start-up phase of its programs completed, it was developing
approaches and programs that are more sustainable and relying on
private sector support to leverage additional resources where possible.
Our recommendation was intended to help ensure that State, Justice, and
USAID worked together to build on the progress that each of the
nonmilitary programs is making by taking advantage of the synergies
among the programs. Without a more formal plan for improving systematic
coordination, we do not believe that the U.S. nonmilitary assistance to
Colombia will be leveraged to the extent possible.
Each agency also provided additional information and elaborated on the
status of their programs. In addition, the agencies provided us
technical comments and updates that we have incorporated throughout the
report, as appropriate.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days
from the date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies of this
report to interested congressional committees, the Secretary of State,
the Attorney General, and the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for
International Development. We will also make copies available to others
on request. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on
the GAO Web site at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-4128 or [Hyperlink, FordJ@gao.gov], or Al
Huntington, Assistant Director, at (202) 512-4140 or
[Hyperlink, HuntingtonA@gao.gov]. Other key contributors to this report
were José M. Peña, Elizabeth Singer, and Judith Williams.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Jess T. Ford, Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
[End of section]
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To identify the objectives of each program; determine the programs'
reported accomplishments; as well as the factors, if any, limiting
their implementation, we:
* analyzed project design documents, including funding documents and
contracts and grant agreements, describing the projects from State,
Justice, and USAID;
* reviewed project documentation, including progress reports and other
documents prepared by the grantees and contractors implementing the
projects;
* interviewed cognizant contractor and grantee officials both in
Washington, D.C., and Colombia; and:
* interviewed State, Justice, and USAID officials responsible for
program oversight and implementation both in Washington, D.C., and at
the U.S. Embassy in Bogotá.
We traveled to Colombia in January 2004. In Colombia, we held two
roundtable discussions with representatives of most of the grantees and
contractors responsible for alternative development and vulnerable
groups projects. We observed U.S.-funded projects in Bogotá and Soacha
(near Bogotá), Medellín, and Puerto Asís and Villa Garzón in Putumayo.
During these site visits, we met with project beneficiaries and
interviewed representatives of the nongovernmental organizations
implementing the projects.
To determine the challenges faced by Colombia and the United States in
sustaining these programs, we obtained program information and economic
data prepared by a variety of sources and interviewed U.S. and
Colombian government officials. In Washington, D.C., we interviewed
agency officials from State, Justice, and USAID. We also examined
political and economic reports prepared by the Congressional Research
Service, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. We
reviewed several studies evaluating issues of concern and U.S.
assistance to Colombia, particularly alternative development,
vulnerable groups, and democracy and rule of law programs. In Colombia,
we reviewed program documents, including USAID's draft 5-year strategic
plan, a February 2004 evaluation of USAID's programs in the Putumayo,
the U.S. Embassy's Mission Performance Plan, and contractor and grantee
organization reports. In addition, we interviewed U.S. embassy
officials knowledgeable about Colombia's economic and political
situation and met with Colombian government officials knowledgeable
about the state of the Colombian economy and the Colombian government's
budgetary constraints, including the director of the Office of National
Planning, which is similar to the U.S. Office of Management and Budget.
To determine the reliability of the funding data used in this report,
we examined State, Justice, and USAID quarterly progress reports and
other financial management activity reports. Agency officials also
verified the data. Moreover, we obtained copies of State, Justice, and
USAID Inspector General audits of their respective agencies'
consolidated financial statements, which reported, among other things,
on their internal control structures. All three agencies received
unqualified opinions. However, State's Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs did not provide complete funding
data for the programs it supports. As a result, the funding figures may
not reflect what was actually programmed, obligated, and expended for
assisting vulnerable groups, promoting democracy and rule of law
programs, and enhancing state presence and public security. Moreover,
we did not audit the funding data and are not expressing an opinion on
them. However, based on our examination of the documents received and
our discussions with cognizant agency officials, we concluded that the
funding data we obtained were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of
this engagement.
To determine the reliability of the performance measurement data we
obtained, we asked State, Justice, and USAID program officials how the
data were collected and verified. We found that because of the
difficult security situation in Colombia, U.S. agencies (USAID in
particular) must often rely on third parties, including the United
Nations, to document performance data, such as the number of hectares
voluntarily eradicated. We also found that while U.S. embassy officials
conduct oversight to assess the accuracy of program data submitted by
grantees and contractors, not all do. For example, according to State,
it does not independently verify estimates of the number of
beneficiaries assisted by the international organizations it funds. In
addition, any data collected by the agencies is subject to some
limitations. For example, the November 2003 Inspector General report
stated that the alternative development program might be overstating
the number of families benefited due to the way program data are
collected. In addition, the vulnerable groups program may double count
project beneficiaries, and the statistics collected through the justice
houses are generally not reliable because they are not equipped to
collect data regularly on their own.
However, USAID has taken measures to address these limitations. For
example, in response to its Inspector General's concerns, USAID agreed
to separate the alternative development program data between crop
substitution and infrastructure projects to avoid double counting.
Similarly, to avoid the double counting in the vulnerable groups
program, the agency asks grantees to jointly report on individuals
assisted in areas where more than one grantee was present. Finally, to
correct data collection difficulties associated with the justice
houses, the USAID contractor plans to have a national automated
information system by 2005.
Nevertheless, based on our discussions with State, Justice, and USAID
officials, we concluded that the performance data we obtained were
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this engagement.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of State:
United States Department of State:
Assistant Secretary and Chief Financial Officer:
Washington, D. C. 20520:
Ms. Jacqueline Williams-Bridgers:
Managing Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
General Accounting Office:
441 G Street, N.W.:
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001:
JUN 28 2004:
Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers:
We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report,
"DRUG CONTROL: U.S. Nonmilitary Assistance to Colombia is Beginning to
Show Intended Results but Programs Are Not Readily Sustainable," GAO
Job Code 320207.
The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.
If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact
Jeffrey Patmore, Program Officer, Bureau of International Narcortics
and Law (202) 647-7827.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Christopher B. Burnham:
cc: GAO - Jose Pena:
INL - Robert Charles:
State/OIG - Mark Duda:
State/H - Paul Kelly:
Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report "DRUG CONTROL: U.S.
Nonmilitary Assistance to Colombia is Beginning to Show Intended
Results but Programs Are Not Sustainable" (GAO-04-726, GAO Code
320207):
The Department of State (DOS) thanks the General Accounting Office
(GAO) for the opportunity to respond to their review of Nonmilitary
Assistance to Colombia. In general, we found the Report to be
supportive and the findings to be positive.
The main recommendations in the Report are that the coordination
between State and USAID on the hand-off of beneficiaries from State's
emergency assistance to USAID's longer-term assistance could be
improved. Solutions to this are being explored on a working level both
in Washington, DC and in the field.
Throughout the Report were specific items that the officers managing
the projects felt misrepresented the details of their programs. We
recognize that it is daunting to review a program of the size and
complexity of U.S. Nonmilitary Assistance to Colombia, and it is to be
expected that professionals spending every working hour on the program
might be aware of some details that a review team overlooked due to
their timeline and focus. Below are respectfully submitted the
corrections we would like to see made to the text of the Report.
Clarifications of the text of the Report (in order of page number):
ONE:
"State and USAID have not coordinated their assistance programs to
internally displaced persons to help those who need to transition from
State's emergency assistance program to USAID's longer-term
assistance." [page 4] and:
"State officials told us that they have no mechanism to "hand off'
their program beneficiaries to USAID's longer-term assistance program
after they have received the emergency aid." [page 15, 22, 23, 24]
Clarification:
The "formal" mechanism for transiting from emergency to longer-term
assistance is difficult due to the marginalized and shifting nature of
the recipients. State and USAID are working closely together on
assistance activities, often traveling in the field to conduct site
visits together, meeting with local and national government officials
together and participate in many of the international forums, seminars
and workshops together to assist the GOC or other IOs in the policies
and strategies for assistance to the displaced population. It is the
goal of both State and USAID to both provide appropriate assistance and
to "graduate" recipients from emergency assistance, to long-term
assistance and finally to self-sufficiency. This is an Augean task in
the best environment, in the chaotic situation of modern Colombia the
trade-off between administrative overhead and provision of services
demands a professional judgment of when there are diminishing returns
for the division of assistance recipients between "emergency" and
"long-term" needy.
USAID and State officials have met numerous times to discuss this
transition gap together and with their respective partners. For
example, State/PRM and USAID have developed a formal consultation
mechanism, meeting biweekly at the working level, quarterly at the
Assistant Secretary/Assistant Administrator level. It should also be
noted that USAID provides funding to three of PRM's partners (CHF
International, UNICEF and UNHCR) that provide longer-term assistance.
CHF is a prime example where many beneficiaries receiving emergency
assistance (PRM-funded) move on to received long-term development
assistance (USAID-funded) from CHF. CHF has also partnered with IOM to
provide housing, water and sanitation assistance to Colombian
repatriating from Panama. There are also many examples where UNICEF and
the American Red Cross (both PRM-funded) have collaborated with IOM and
PADF (both USAID-funded). ICRC is another example, where they have
passed off some of their beneficiaries to CHF and IOM for follow-on
long-term assistance programs.
It is important to realize that the partners working on emergency
humanitarian assistance programs are set up to respond to emergency
crisis, such as massive displacement, that require them to mobilize
quickly to wherever the crisis is. They provide the emergency
assistance and can assist many of the families return to their original
communities. However, it is not always efficient for those implementing
partners working on longer-term development programs to respond quickly
to attend to the displaced that have benefited from the emergency
assistance. To carry out long-term socio-economic reintegration
programs requires extended planning and development to ensure the best
opportunity for their successful reintegration. Therefore, it should be
noted that in some cases it is inappropriate to plan a "hand-off' from
the emergency assistance to the long-term program.
The bottom line is, it should be noted in the Report that PRM and USAID
are working closely together to narrow the transition gap. PRM and
USAID will benefit from a more formal mechanism to address this
transition gap, and are working to develop that mechanism, but this
does not detract from the extensive informal mechanism currently active
in the field today.
TWO:
The GAO recommends that the Secretary of State and USAID develop a
detailed plan for improving systematic coordination for assistance to
internally displaced persons. The plan should include a timeline for
achieving the stated objectives, an estimate of future funding,
requirements, and a strategy for sustaining the results achieved. [page
5]
Clarification:
PRM and USAID currently work closely together on assistance to the
displaced population in Colombia. GAO's recommendation to meld our
respective strategies for assistance to the displaced population and
develop a coordinated USG plan and policy for addressing USG assistance
to the vulnerable population, primarily displaced, in Colombia is one
that all parties are already working towards.
THREE:
"State and USAID do not track individuals after they receive
assistance." [page 14]
Clarification:
PRM grantees do track some individuals after receiving assistance as
they become beneficiaries in other longer-term assistance programs with
PADF, IOM, or CHF. In other cases it is inefficient to continue
tracking beneficiaries.
It should be noted that all of PRM's partners are required to
coordinate closely with the GOC's Social Solidarity Network (RSS -
Spanish acronym), to make sure there is no duplication of assistance
and to try to make sure that registered IDPs are attended to. ICRC
coordinates closely with the RSS on selection of sites for emergency
assistance, to assure optimal coverage of vulnerable internally
displaced persons and avoid duplication. The American Red Cross's
partner organization, the Colombian Red Cross, was criticized last year
for this lack of coordination, but has made this a priority for this
year's program.
Despite the RSS' lack of resources for direct implementation of
activities, in most regions of the country they do provide viable
coordination among implementing agencies willing to work with them.
FOUR:
"State does not have any written strategy outlining the objectives and
performance goals of its vulnerable groups program." (p. 15):
Clarification:
The strategy is the Policy and Program Review Committee (PPRC) regional
policy paper, a mechanism that, we understand, has been praised in
earlier GAO reports. The current regional strategy paper is PPRC #
2004-38, signed by PRM A/S Dewey on February 10, 2004.
PRM prepares a Regional Policy Paper for the Western Region each year
that is reviewed and approved by PRM's Policy Program and Review
Committee (PPRC). This paper discusses the Key Factors impacting the
region, reviews previous performance in each sub-region, sets goals for
the year, and lays out an implementation plan for each of the sub-
regions. It also addresses monitoring/evaluation and availability of
funding. In previous reports, the GAO praised PRM's strategy mechanism.
In addition to the annual Regional Policy Paper, there is a PPRC review
of each grantee that is awarded a grant or cooperative agreement from
PRM. In that review, PPRC reviews the project objectives, planned
beneficiary numbers and program indicators. Grantees are required to
submit periodic reports on their accomplishments and beneficiaries
assisted to PRM. An Annual Program Evaluation is performed prior to the
granting of any additional awards.
With regards to tracking program beneficiaries, this is easy to do with
the US PVOs, but not as easy to carry out with the International
Organizations (IOs), such as ICRC and UNHCR. IOs normally receive funds
from many international donors and they do not itemize how many
beneficiaries were assisted based on contributions from each donation
country. We can only make a best estimate based on the total number of
beneficiaries attended by the 10 and the percentage of funds donated by
the USG.
FIVE:
"State officials also told us that they have no mechanism to "hand off'
their program beneficiaries to USAID's longer-term assistance program."
(p 15):
Clarification:
Increasing coordination is one of the leitmotifs of the Report.
However, there are also ample examples of good coordination between the
programs. While more coordination is possible, it would be untrue to
say there was no coordination.
* Regional refugee coordinator corroborates our information from Bogota:
his own coordination with the AID Mission, OCHA and other system
coordination mechanisms, sectoral meetings, the government's
coordination, etc.
* For the Washington end, the ICRC (PRM-funded, emergency assistance)
coordinates with IOM (USAID-funded, longer-term); CHF is funded by both
PRM and USAID, for emergency and longer-term, respectively, and has no
problem coordinating with itself.
The Humanitarian Action Plan - a joint coordination product of the UN
system and the government of Colombia - is yet another excellent
example of cooperation and coordination.
SIX:
"According to one cognizant State official, the emergency assistance
program is essentially being phased out." (p. 17):
Clarification:
There may be confusion between the source of funding for the program
and the program itself. It is not being phased out, it is being
mainstreamed into Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA). As the money
PRM receives from the Andean Counterdrug Initiative decreases - from
around $10,000,000 annually in FY2000 through FY2003, to $5,000,000 in
FY2004, and zero in FY2005 - the amount dedicated to assistance in the
Andean region from the (MRA) is rising.
SEVEN:
"Each of the three US nonmilitary assistance programs has begun to
produce results envisioned in 2000 when US funding for Plan Colombia
was approved. However, each program has limitations." . "The
assistance for vulnerable groups program cannot address all the needs
identified because of limited resources, and the number of individuals
displaced and needing assistance in is increasing." [page 9-10] "State
and USAID program to assist Colombia's vulnerable groups are achieving
some of the intended results, but US assistance cannot address all the
identified needs. One organization estimates that providing a basic
package of services to all of Colombia's internally displaced persons
would cost approximately $1 billion." [page 17]
Clarification:
The $1 billion price tag attributed by one NGO ought not to be accepted
without further review from the GAO. I believe USAID and PRM could
develop more realistic figures, however what country in the world
wouldn't like to have the USG devote another billion dollars to
providing basic services . including the USA?
EIGHT:
"USAID and State's Strategic Plan for fiscal years 2004-09 does not
include any specifics for joint program implementation. We found that:
* During a site visit to a USAID-funded project outside of Bogota, an
agency official was surprised to learn that State also funded a project
in the same location.
* Half of the grantees involved in USAID's program were unaware of
State's program to assist the displaced and did not know whether their
project beneficiaries had first received emergency humanitarian
assistance from State.
While State and USAID are not explicitly required to assist the same
beneficiaries, agency officials and program documents indicate that
their goal is to ensure that internally displace persons who receive
emergency aid are then provided longer-term assistance, if needed. In
2001, we reported that the US government had difficulty coordinating
and managing its programs to aid the internally displaced. These
challenges continue in Colombia." [p.25]
Clarification:
It is not surprising that organizations do not know which implementing
agencies are funded by State. Many of our organizations, such as the UN
agencies and ICRC, work in very chaotic zones of Colombia. If insurgent
groups were to know that a good portion of their funding was from the
US government, it could compromise their ability to be seen as a
neutral entity and could come under attack by either insurgent group.
Therefore, many of the USAID agencies may be.working with the PRM-
funded organizations, but not realize that they are funded by PRM. This
PRM policy will continue for the protection of the IO staffs.
NINE:
"...Moreover, both armed forces and insurgents continue to commit
serious human rights abuses, according to human rights organizations as
well as State's 2003 Human Rights Report." [page 28]
Clarification:
Illegal armed groups cause most of the displacement, with a fraction
attributed to public security forces. To lump both groups together in
the above sentence seems to inaccurately portray the situation in
Colombia.
The following is a quote from the 2003 Human Rights report. "The
Government's emphasis during the year on improving security resulted in
significant improvements in many human rights indicators. Murders fell
by 20 percent, kidnappings declined 39 percent, and forced
displacements of persons were cut by 49 percent. The number of newly
displaced persons appeared to decline for the first time since 1999.
The overall number of large-scale massacres and other killings
committed by AUC terrorists appeared to decline during the year. Labor
leaders and activists continued to be victims of high levels of
violence; however, the number of union leaders killed during the year
declined significantly.
"The Government's human rights record remained poor; however, there
were significant improvements in some areas. An increasingly small
percentage of total human rights abuses reported were attributed to
security forces.
Paramilitaries committed numerous political and unlawful killings,
primarily in areas they disputed with guerrillas and generally in the
absence of a strong government presence. According to the CCJ,
paramilitaries were responsible for at least 892 such killings during
the first 9 months of the year.
Guerrillas, particularly the FARC, committed hundreds of unlawful
killings. According to the CCJ, guerrillas were responsible for 427
unlawful killings during the first 9 months of the year, 203 of them
massacres. The MOD attributed 70 percent of civilian deaths to
guerrillas in 2002.
According to the CCJ, state security forces were responsible for at
least 101 politically motivated extra-judicial killings and 1 social
cleansing killing during the first 9 months of the year.
The Colombian NGO, CODHES, which works on human rights and displaced
issues reported the following causes for displacement in 2003.
Guerrillas: 38%;
Paramilitary: 29%;
Guerrilla - Paramilitary confrontations: 17%;
Guerrilla - Public Forces confrontations: 3%;
Paramilitary - Public Forces confrontations: < 1 %;
Public Forces:
