Border Security
State Department Rollout of Biometric Visas on Schedule, but Guidance Is Lagging Gao ID: GAO-04-1001 September 9, 2004As a complement to the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program--a governmentwide program to better control and monitor the entry, visa status, and exit of visitors--the State Department (State) is implementing the Biometric Visa Program at all 207 overseas consulates by October 26, 2004. This program, required by the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, requires that all persons applying for U.S. visas have certain biometrics (fingerprints) and a digital photograph collected during the visa application interview. This information must be cleared through the DHS Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT) before an applicant can receive a visa. GAO reviewed State's rollout of the program, including its implementation progress and how State and DHS envision the program being used to help adjudicate visas.
State is installing the equipment and software for the Biometric Visa Program on schedule and will likely meet the October 26, 2004, implementation deadline. However, DHS and State have not fully developed guidance for the program's use. As of September 1, 2004, State had installed program hardware and software at 201 out of a total of 207 overseas posts and plans to complete the installation at the remaining 6 posts by September 30. The posts with the program are now collecting fingerprints of each visa applicant and processing the prints through the DHS IDENT database. Although the technology installation has progressed smoothly, DHS and State have not developed and not provided comprehensive guidance that includes directions to consular officers on when in the visa process prints are to be scanned and when and how information from the IDENT database on visa applicants should be considered by consular officers. In the absence of such guidance, GAO found that consular officers are unclear on how to use the program and the information available from IDENT on visa applicants. For example, officers are unclear about whether fingerprints of visa applicants should be collected before or during the visa interview, whether information on visa applicants from the DHS database should be considered by the visa-adjudicating officer during or after the interview, and who should have responsibility for reviewing the IDENT information before visa issuance. Answers to these questions could significantly affect how each post manages workflows and processes visa applicants, which could have staffing and resource implications.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-04-1001, Border Security: State Department Rollout of Biometric Visas on Schedule, but Guidance Is Lagging
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Report to the Chairman, Committee on Government Reform, House of
Representatives:
September 2004:
BORDER SECURITY:
State Department Rollout of Biometric Visas on Schedule, but Guidance
Is Lagging:
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-1001]:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-04-1001, a report to the Chairman, Committee on
Government Reform, House of Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
As a complement to the Department of Homeland Security‘s (DHS) United
States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT)
program”a governmentwide program to better control and monitor the
entry, visa status, and exit of visitors”the State Department (State)
is implementing the Biometric Visa Program at all 207 overseas
consulates by October 26, 2004. This program, required by the Enhanced
Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, requires that all
persons applying for U.S. visas have certain biometrics (fingerprints)
and a digital photograph collected during the visa application
interview. This information must be cleared through the DHS Automated
Biometric Identification System (IDENT) before an applicant can receive
a visa. GAO reviewed State‘s rollout of the program, including its
implementation progress and how State and DHS envision the program
being used to help adjudicate visas.
What GAO Found:
State is installing the equipment and software for the Biometric Visa
Program on schedule and will likely meet the October 26, 2004,
implementation deadline. However, DHS and State have not fully
developed guidance for the program‘s use. As of September 1, 2004,
State had installed program hardware and software at 201 out of a total
of 207 overseas posts and plans to complete the installation at the
remaining 6 posts by September 30. The posts with the program are now
collecting fingerprints of each visa applicant and processing the
prints through the DHS IDENT database. Although the technology
installation has progressed smoothly, DHS and State have not developed
and not provided comprehensive guidance that includes directions to
consular officers on when in the visa process prints are to be scanned
and when and how information from the IDENT database on visa applicants
should be considered by consular officers. In the absence of such
guidance, GAO found that consular officers are unclear on how to use
the program and the information available from IDENT on visa
applicants. For example, officers are unclear about whether
fingerprints of visa applicants should be collected before or during
the visa interview, whether information on visa applicants from the
DHS database should be considered by the visa-adjudicating officer
during or after the interview, and who should have responsibility for
reviewing the IDENT information before visa issuance. Answers to these
questions could significantly affect how each post manages workflows
and processes visa applicants, which could have staffing and resource
implications.
Example of Fingerprints and Photograph Capture:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that DHS and State develop and provide to consular
posts guidance on how the program should be used to help adjudicate
visas and that State direct each consular post to develop an
implementation plan based on this guidance.
DHS and State generally concurred with these recommendations.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-1001.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Jess Ford at (202)
512-4128 or fordj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Implementation Moving Forward, yet Guidance Is Lacking:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Scope and Methodology:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
GAO Comments:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of State:
GAO Comments:
Figures:
Figure 1: Biometric Fingerprint Analysis Process:
Figure 2: Potential Timing of IDENT Response on Visa Applicants:
Abbreviations:
IDENT: DHS Automated Biometric Identification System:
INA: U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act:
Letter September 9, 2004:
The Honorable Tom Davis:
Chairman, Committee on Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
Since September 11, 2001, the U.S. government has made a concerted
effort to strengthen border security by enhancing visa issuance
policies and procedures, as well as improving screening of the millions
of foreign visitors who enter the United States annually. A major
initiative is the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) United States
Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program--
a governmentwide program to collect, maintain, and share information on
foreign nationals and better control and monitor the entry, visa
status, and exit of visitors. As a complement to US-VISIT, the State
Department (State) is implementing the Biometric Visa Program at all
207 nonimmigrant visa-issuing overseas consulates by October 26,
2004.[Footnote 1] This program requires that all persons applying for
U.S. visas have certain biometrics[Footnote 2] (fingerprints) and
digital photographs collected during the visa application interview and
cleared through the DHS Automated Biometric Identification System
(IDENT) before receiving a visa. The program is also consistent with
the 9/11 Commission report issued on July 22, 2004, that recommends
using biometric identifiers for border and transportation systems and a
biometric entry-exit screening system for travelers.
For this report, we assessed State's implementation of the Biometric
Visa Program for nonimmigrant visas,[Footnote 3] including progress in
installing equipment and software and how State and DHS envision the
program should be used to help adjudicate visas. We obtained and
reviewed State's guidance to consular posts, analyzed technical data,
and interviewed officials from State and DHS about the Biometric Visa
Program. We also visited consular posts in El Salvador and the
Dominican Republic to observe the visa process under the new system. We
conducted our review in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards.
Results in Brief:
State is installing the equipment and software for the Biometric Visa
Program on schedule and will likely meet the October 26, 2004,
implementation deadline. However, DHS and State have not developed
comprehensive guidance for the program's use. As of September 1, 2004,
State had installed program hardware and software at 201 out of a total
of 207 overseas posts and plans to complete the installation at the
remaining 6 posts by September 30. The posts with the program are now
collecting fingerprints of each visa applicant and processing the
prints through the DHS IDENT database. Although the technology
installation has progressed smoothly, DHS and State have not developed
and not provided comprehensive guidance to consular posts that includes
directions to consular officers on when in the visa process prints are
to be scanned and when and how information from the IDENT database on
visa applicants should be considered by consular officers in
adjudicating visas. In the absence of such guidance, we found that
consular officers are unclear on how to use the program and the
information available from IDENT on visa applicants. For example,
officers are unclear about whether fingerprints of visa applicants
should be collected before or during the visa interview, whether
information on visa applicants from the DHS database should be
considered by the visa-adjudicating officer during or after the
interview, and who should have responsibility for reviewing the IDENT
information before visa issuance. Answers to these questions could
significantly affect how each post manages workflows and processes visa
applicants, which could have staffing and resource implications.
Consular officers overseas need to know how the program's information
about visa applicants is intended to be used in order to maximize
program effectiveness and determine optimal workflow management and
resource issues. Therefore, we are recommending that the Secretaries of
Homeland Security and State develop and provide to consular officers
comprehensive guidance on how all aspects of the Biometric Visa Program
should be used and that each consular post develop an implementation
plan based on this guidance.
In commenting on a draft of our report, DHS generally concurred,
stating that GAO's identification of areas where improvements are
needed in the Biometric Visa Program will contribute to ongoing efforts
to strengthen the visa process. State acknowledged that there may be a
lag in guidance and that this may be inevitable given the rapid
implementation of this program. Both departments noted that posts have
been allowed flexibility in implementing the program based on potential
staffing and facility limitations. Our recommendations provide a basis
for DHS and State to address these potential limitations.
Background:
The multibillion dollar DHS US-VISIT program aims to improve the
nation's capacity for collecting information on foreign nationals who
travel to the United States, as well as control the pre-entry, entry,
status, and exit of these travelers. The goals of US-VISIT are to
facilitate legitimate travel and trade and enhance national security.
Under the program, most foreign visitors are required to submit to
fingerprint scans of their right and left index finger and have a
digital photograph taken upon arrival at U.S. ports of entry.[Footnote
4]
As a complement to US-VISIT, State's Biometric Visa Program, which is
budgeted at more than $162 million through fiscal year 2005, is
designed to deny U.S. visas to questionable travelers to stop them
before they enter the country and to verify the identity of legitimate
travelers who use visas to enter the United States. Under the program,
consular officers collect visa applicants' fingerprints and photographs
at overseas posts to verify the identity of foreign nationals who plan
to enter the United States. Then inspectors at U.S. ports of entry use
State's records to verify that the original visa applicant is, indeed,
the person now entering the United States on that visa. According to
the Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs, the Biometric Visa
Program will enhance the integrity of the U.S. visa process, better
equipping the consular officers who are the nation's "first line of
defense." DHS and State share responsibility for policy and
implementation of the Biometric Visa Program. According to a Memorandum
of Understanding[Footnote 5] between the Secretaries of State and
Homeland Security, DHS is responsible for establishing visa policy,
reviewing implementation of the policy, and providing additional
direction, while State is responsible for managing the visa process.
Fingerprinting Process:
In September 2003, the State Department began installing fingerprint
scanners and related software at U.S. consulate posts abroad. Foreign
nationals who apply for nonimmigrant visas at U.S. consulates with
scanners are required to submit to a scan of their right and left index
fingers. Once a print is captured, it is transmitted electronically
from the consulate's server[Footnote 6] to State's server. The State
server then transmits the print to IDENT--a DHS database that includes
some 5 million people who may be ineligible to receive a visa. Our
review of State's data on processing times indicates that transmitting
the fingerprints from posts through State to DHS and receiving a
response generally takes about 30 minutes. (See fig. 1.)
Figure 1: Biometric Fingerprint Analysis Process:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
IDENT contains two sets of data: (1) "watch list" fingerprint records
including immigration violators and a subset of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation's (FBI) fingerprint database containing records on
terrorists and individuals with felony convictions[Footnote 7] and (2)
fingerprint and photograph records of persons previously entered into
the system either at a U.S. port of entry or by applying at a U.S.
consular post for a visa. IDENT searches for matches, triggering a
response back to the consulate indicating a "hit" or no existing record
("N/R"). A hit means a person is on a watch list or that the person has
been previously entered into the system. Then applicants with no
previous IDENT records are entered into the system for future
transactions. If the system cannot determine whether the applicant's
prints match a set previously entered, the system sends the data to
biometric experts to determine if a subject's print has a match or that
there is no record in the system.[Footnote 8] These responses are sent
back to the DHS IDENT database and then routed to consulates through
the State server. If an IDENT hit response is returned on a visa
applicant, the consulate's software will not allow a visa to be printed
unless it is reviewed and cleared by a consular officer.
Implementation Moving Forward, yet Guidance Is Lacking:
State's implementation of the technology aspects of the biometric visa
program is currently on schedule to meet the October 26, 2004,
deadline. A well-planned rollout of equipment and software and fewer
technical problems than anticipated have contributed to smooth
implementation of the technological aspects of the program at the 201
posts that had the program operating as of September 1. But amid the
fast pace in rolling out the program to meet the deadline, DHS and
State have neither developed comprehensive guidance for the program,
including determining who should scan fingerprints, where and who
should review information about applicants returned from IDENT, and
technical requirements for the IDENT system, nor provided comprehensive
guidance for consular posts on how the information about visa
applicants made available through the Biometric Visa Program should be
used to help adjudicate visas.
State Is Expected to Meet the Legislative Deadline:
State planned the rollout of the equipment (hardware and software) to
take advantage of already-scheduled contractor upgrades to software and
hardware at many of the overseas posts,[Footnote 9] thereby decreasing
the overall burden on the posts and managing the costs of the program.
The program's funding was included in the department's appropriation--
nearly $54 million for fiscal years 2003 and 2004--and is projected at
more than $108 million for fiscal year 2005. In addition, State
arranged for additional installation teams to be deployed as needed to
avoid potential delays in the implementation schedule for posts.
Overall, implementation of the technological aspects of the Biometric
Visa Program is on schedule. According to State officials at
headquarters and at the two posts we visited, State has experienced
fewer technical problems than anticipated. Early on, State had a few
difficulties in transmitting data between the posts and the DHS IDENT,
primarily related to server and firewall (computer security) issues.
According to State, most issues were resolved within a few days.
Fingerprinting Raising Issues in Visa Process:
According to State, the time required to collect fingerprints has not
significantly affected interview times. State officials estimate that
it can take as little as a few seconds to collect prints, and the
average time is about 30 seconds. In San Salvador, El Salvador, and
Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, we observed that capturing prints
for some applicants fell within these time frames but, in some cases,
the fingerprint collection times were significantly longer. In one
case, it took more than 10 minutes for an elderly woman to understand
the interviewing officer's verbal instructions on where to place her
finger so that the prints could be captured. For security reasons,
interviewing officers are separated by a glass window from the
applicants. As a result, they can only give verbal instructions or hold
up a finger to demonstrate which one to use, and they cannot physically
touch an applicant's finger to position it correctly on the scanner.
According to State's data, from February to August 2004, the total
biometric visa process averaged about 30 minutes for an applicant's
prints to be sent from an overseas post to the State server, then on to
DHS for IDENT analysis, and then for the response to be returned
through State's server to the post. To date, the analysis time required
by the IDENT database to search for a match to an applicant's prints
has fallen within the time frame agreed to by State and DHS--within 15
minutes if no human analysis is required.[Footnote 10] If human
analysis is required, DHS has up to 24 hours to provide a response back
to the post.
Our observations at posts in San Salvador and Santo Domingo
demonstrated the importance of the length of the time required to
receive an IDENT response. We observed that most interviews average
only a few minutes, but the IDENT response time currently is 30
minutes. Thus, if interviewing officers collect prints during
interviews, the IDENT responses will not be available to these consular
officers by the end of the interviews.
IDENT response time could potentially affect visa issuance times
because a visa cannot be issued to an applicant until the post has
received the IDENT response on the person. Long delays in the IDENT
response times could have a major effect on the visa issuance process
and inconvenience visa applicants. Consular Affairs has encouraged
officials to issue visas the day after interviews since part of the
visa process now relies on another agency's system. However, some posts
still issue same-day visas, such as Santo Domingo.
Implementation Continues at Largest-Volume Posts:
While the IDENT database response times have not adversely affected
visa processes to date, officials remain cautious about the potential
for IDENT database capacity issues and longer response times as the
large-volume posts are added to the program. State began the program's
rollout at small-and medium-sized posts to work out potential problems
before deploying it at posts with the largest applicant volumes. As of
September 1, 2004, 201 of the 207, or 97 percent, of the visa issuance
posts have implemented the program. In terms of nonimmigrant visa
application volume, this number represents about 89 percent of the
total worldwide volume. Taipei, Taiwan; and Manila, Philippines; are
the last "extra-large volume" visa issuing posts that are scheduled to
become operational in the program in mid-September.
DHS and State are closely monitoring the IDENT response times as the
final 6 consular posts--representing 11 percent of the worldwide visa
application volume--are added to the program. Increased volumes of visa
applications combined with the increased volume of entrants at U.S.
ports of entry due to summer tourism could potentially affect the speed
of IDENT's response. In addition, IDENT processing may be further
affected by the September 30, 2004, requirement that the database
system analyze fingerprint records for all visitors from countries in
the Visa Waiver Program[Footnote 11] at U.S. ports of entry.
Overall Impact of IDENT Responses on Visa Decisions Is Low:
According to State, the overall impact of IDENT responses on visa
issuance decisions has been relatively low to date, primarily due to
the program's infancy. According to State officials, nearly 1.7 million
sets of visa applicant prints had been processed by August 19, 2004,
and of those, 1,197 were identified as watch list hits--having
derogatory criminal or immigration information on file. At the two
posts we visited, nine applicant records were returned as watch list
hits between February and May 2004. The adjudicating officers had
already refused eight of the applicants on other grounds[Footnote 12]
during their interviews; one applicant's visa had been preliminarily
approved by the interviewing officer pending review of the IDENT
response, but then due to the derogatory information IDENT returned,
the visa was not issued.
Guidance Lagging behind Implementation:
Due to the rapid deployment of the hardware and software technology to
meet the required deadline, comprehensive guidance on using the
Biometric Visa Program and the information available through IDENT has
lagged behind implementation. State and DHS have yet to agree on the
details of how all aspects of the program will be used, including
determining who should scan fingerprints, where and who should review
information about applicants returned from IDENT, and technical
requirements for the IDENT system, and have not provided comprehensive
guidance for consular posts on how the information about visa
applicants made available through the Biometric Visa Program should be
used to help adjudicate visas. State consular officers using IDENT face
a range of issues without such guidance, including the following:
* Workflow management: the time, place, and person responsible for
collecting fingerprints and reviewing IDENT responses on applicants. At
some posts, staff other than the interviewing officer take the
fingerprints of visa applicants, but some interviewing officers told us
that they prefer to take prints from those that they interview to
ensure accountability. While Santo Domingo has designated a window to
scan applicants' prints prior to the interview, sometimes that window
may be needed for interviews during heavy volume. Both San Salvador and
Santo Domingo have designated an officer to review and clear all hit
information on applicants, so some interviewing officers do not look at
IDENT responses for those they interview.
* Information availability: the information available to the consular
officers and how easily it can be accessed. We observed that a line on
the interviewers' computer screens notified them with a "Hit" or "N/R"
when information on an applicant was returned from IDENT. The officers
open a screen that displays IDENT information to learn more about the
hit--for example, was it a previous entry into the United States where
prints and photograph were taken or derogatory criminal information?
While the former might corroborate an applicant's story, the latter may
indicate grounds for refusing a visa.
* System requirements: the IDENT turnaround time necessary to ensure
timely visa issuance. For example, if a designated officer will review
all the IDENT information, and posts are no longer issuing same-day
visas, an IDENT response time of up to a few hours may be acceptable.
Because they lack specific guidance on the system's use, consular
officers at overseas posts are unclear as to how they should implement
the Biometric Visa Program and are currently using the returned IDENT
responses in nonuniform ways. For example, we found that, in cases
where the IDENT response information is available to the overseas post
by the time of the interview, some consular officers review information
before the interview, some review it during the interview, and some do
not review it at all, relying on a designated officer or the line chief
to review the information after the interview is completed and before
affected visas are printed. (See fig. 2.) One State official noted that
key information about an applicant could be overlooked if the
interviewing officer was not the same officer who reviews the IDENT
information, such as the timing and frequency of prior visits to the
United States.
Figure 2: Potential Timing of IDENT Response on Visa Applicants:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Enterprise Architecture Program Design Lacking for US-VISIT:
In September 2003, we identified the US-VISIT program as a high-risk
endeavor.[Footnote 13] We reported that an operation such as US-VISIT
requires an operational context--or "enterprise architecture"--that
is, a program design that sets out the key program decisions, such as
what functions are to be performed and by whom, when and where they are
to be performed, what information is to be used to perform them, and
what rules and standards will govern the application of technology to
support them. In the absence of an enterprise architecture, certain
policy and standards information necessary to effectively define,
establish, and implement the US-VISIT program was not available.
In the same report, we recommended that DHS establish an advisory board
comprising representatives from key US-VISIT federal stakeholder
organizations that would oversee US-VISIT management including overall
vision and strategic direction. This board was created and has been
operational since January 26, 2004, but has not yet provided
stakeholder agencies with a clearly defined vision and operational
context for the various components under US-VISIT. For example, DHS
awarded a contract in June that includes developing a detailed Program
Plan for US-VISIT that would focus on such areas as business
functionality, information technology strategy, facilities strategy,
and implementation. State officials indicated that they are waiting for
DHS to articulate its vision on these areas, which would guide further
State actions on the Biometric Visa Program.
In our current review, we found that the lack of a clear enterprise
architecture, or operational context, for US-VISIT affects State's
Biometric Visa Program, which, although administered by State, falls
under the overall visa policy area of the DHS Directorate of Border and
Transportation Security. In the absence of a cohesive vision defined by
DHS and State for using the information available through the Biometric
Visa Program, State will have difficulty providing guidance and
technical requirements for IDENT response time and determining optimal
workflow processes to enable users to maximize the program's
effectiveness.
In May 2004, we reported[Footnote 14] that designing, developing, and
implementing a biometrics program requires consideration of factors
such as how the technology will be used, cost-benefit analysis, trade-
offs between the increased security that the use of biometrics would
provide, and the effect on areas such as privacy and convenience. For a
biometric security program, the high-level goals of the program need to
be defined, and the concept of operations that will embody the people,
process, and technologies required to achieve these goals needs to be
developed.
Potential Program Uses and Related Issues:
The Biometric Visa Program has the potential to be a powerful tool for
protecting the nation's borders, while facilitating legitimate travel
to the United States. The program can enhance the integrity of U.S.
visas, provide a "safety net" for consular officers to ensure that they
catch individuals who have been watchlisted, and equip consular posts
as "forward based defense." However, there is no comprehensive guidance
that articulates the program's many potential uses and provides
guidance to consular officers on how best to implement them.
* Through the collection of fingerprints at consular posts and their
transmission to IDENT, the program ensures that biometric data on all
visa applicants becomes part of the DHS US-VISIT database. According to
State and DHS, this process enhances the integrity of U.S. visas by
ensuring that the same person who applies for a visa is the one who
enters the United States using that visa.[Footnote 15] In May 2004, GAO
reported[Footnote 16] that biometric programs depend on accurate
processes for the initial collection and verification of applicants'
identities and biometrics. To date, however, State has not clarified
guidance for important aspects of scanning fingerprints. The
interviewing officers in San Salvador noted that assisting applicants
to understand the fingerprinting process (for example, how to place
their fingers on the scanners) sometimes led them to give the
applicants more time in their interviews than previously. In addition,
some officers noted that the mechanics of taking the prints interrupted
the flow of the interview, and officers lost some of the key first
impressions that helped them make adjudication decisions. Some felt
that having someone beside the interviewing officer collect the prints
helped to speed the process and enable interviewing officers to conduct
the interviews.
* The program can also provide a "safety net" for visa decisions to
catch those on the watch list. State is already using the program in
this way, as noted earlier, in the case where the interviewing officer
initially approved an applicant for a visa, but the visa was not issued
when IDENT returned derogatory information. State does not have a
specific category designated for refusing visas due to derogatory
information returned by IDENT and, therefore, State could not provide
data on the total number of such refusals. Many of the 18 adjudicating
officers we interviewed at the consular posts in San Salvador and Santo
Domingo indicated that they liked having the information available from
the IDENT database, which may have additional information on potential
immigration violations or criminal records that they can review prior
to visa issuance.
* The program has the potential to equip consular posts as "forward
based defense" to prevent potential terrorists and problematic or other
questionable travelers from entering the United States. Along with the
watch list information, the response from the DHS IDENT database also
includes information on travelers' entries to the United States that
have been obtained by the US-VISIT program at major seaports and land
ports, including photographs, fingerprint records, and date and time of
each entry. This information can establish an applicant's travel
patterns, which could help to inform interviewing officers. For
example, in San Salvador we observed that the IDENT record on one
applicant showed that she had entered the United States a number of
times over the past several months. Since we had observed the
interviewing throughout the day, we knew that this woman was a flight
attendant, and the IDENT record corroborated her story. However, the
officer who reviewed her IDENT record was not the same one who
interviewed her earlier in the day, so the information meant little to
him, but he cleared her visa for issuance regardless. According to
State, consular officers are trained to use the best information
available to them to make the best decision as early as possible in the
information chain, but interviewing officers are not currently required
to review applicants' IDENT information. Had the interviewing officer
reviewed this applicant's IDENT response, he or she would have seen the
US-VISIT photographs of the applicant in her uniform, verifying both
her identity and her legitimate need for a visa.
According to a senior State official, the department envisions that as
the program matures, the information it provides on visa applicants may
prove increasingly useful for adjudicating officers. However, he
acknowledged that the department's current focus is compliance with the
legislated requirement to implement the Biometric Visa Program by
October 26, 2004; as a result, State has not fully developed policies
and guidance in advance of the program's implementation.
Conclusions:
At the cost of some $162 million, the new Biometric Visa Program
coupled with the DHS US-VISIT program has, according to State, improved
the integrity of the visa process and has potential to better identify
visa applicants and travelers of concern to U.S. law enforcement, while
also facilitating travel by legitimate travelers. Although State's
rollout of the technology aspects of the Biometric Visa Program has
exceeded expectations regarding schedule and technical issues, the lag
in guidance has resulted in consular officers at overseas posts being
unclear as to how they are to use the available IDENT information on
applicants. In the absence of guidance on how the information available
through the program is to be used, consular posts are not able to
identify optimal workflow arrangements, facility setup, and staffing
issues that may be necessary for interviewing officers to make visa
decisions and to process visas efficiently and effectively. We raise
these issues so that facility and resource issues can be better
addressed as the program is implemented.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
GAO is making two recommendations in this report:
* We recommend that the Secretaries of Homeland Security and State
develop and provide comprehensive guidance to consular posts that
includes direction to consular officers on how to best implement the
Biometric Visa Program. The guidance should address the planned uses
for the Biometric Visa Program at consular posts including directions
to consular officers on when in the visa process prints are to be
scanned and when and how information from the IDENT database on visa
applicants should be considered by consular officers during their
interviews. In developing the guidance, State and DHS should consider
factors such as program security goals, resources in terms of personnel
and costs, response times, and the burden on the applicant.
* We also recommend that the Secretary of State direct each consular
post to develop an implementation plan based on this guidance.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Homeland
Security and State for their comment. Their comments, along with our
responses to specific points, are reprinted in appendixes I and II,
respectively.
The Department of Homeland Security said that it generally concurred
with the report and our recommendations and that GAO's identification
of areas where improvements are needed in the Biometric Visa Program
will contribute to ongoing efforts to strengthen the visa process. The
State Department acknowledged that there may be a lag in guidance and
that this may be inevitable given the rapid implementation of this
program. Both departments noted that the consular posts have been
permitted flexibility in implementing the program to account for
personnel and facility limitations. While we understand these resource
concerns, we believe it is important that the departments reach
agreement and provide guidance to consular posts on how information
made available to consular posts through the Biometric Visa Program is
intended to be used to help consular officers adjudicate visas. With
this guidance, consular posts would be able to better assess personnel
and facility constraints and develop specific plans to better implement
the program, including requesting additional resources if necessary. In
addition, both departments provided further information on what they
have done to implement the program and its accomplishments.
Scope and Methodology:
To assess State's implementation of the Biometric Visa Program for
nonimmigrant visas, including the program's progress and how State
plans to use it, we interviewed State officials and reviewed their
schedule for rollout. We also visited the DHS Biometric Support Center
to observe the fingerprint expert backup for IDENT analysis and
interviewed DHS officials on their roles in support of State's visa
program. We obtained data from State and DHS on IDENT response times
and reviewed State's methodology for collecting and reporting this
information. We determined that the data reliability was sufficient for
our reporting purposes. We performed fieldwork at consular posts in San
Salvador, El Salvador, and Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic. According
to State, these two high-volume posts process visa applicants from both
rural and urban populations--a classification that represents extremes
in the visa applicant pool better than variation across world
geographic regions. We observed the visa process incorporating the
collection of biometric fingerprints, review of IDENT response
information, and clearance of hits for visa printing. We conducted our
work between April and August 2004 in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards.
We are sending copies of this report to interested Members of Congress,
the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Homeland Security. We also
will make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the
report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff has any questions concerning this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-4128 or at [Hyperlink, fordj@gao.gov]. Key
contributors to this report were John Brummet, Sharron Candon, Jeanette
Espínola, Jon Fremont, Janey Cohen, and Martin de Alteriis.
Signed by:
Jess T. Ford:
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
[End of section]
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Washington, DC 20528:
August 24, 2004:
Homeland Security:
Jess T. Ford:
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
United States Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N W:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Ford:
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appreciates the opportunity
to comment on the Government Accountability Office's (GAO's) draft
report entitled: Border Security --State Department Rollout of
Biometric Visas on Schedule, but Policy and Guidance Are Lagging. GAO's
identification of areas where improvements are needed in the biometric
visa program will contribute to ongoing efforts to strengthen the visa
process. We generally concur with the report and its recommendations;
however, there are several areas within the report that we would like
to comment.
First, GAO is recommending the Secretaries of State and Homeland
Security set an overall policy on how to use the Biometric Visa
Program. Such a statement is misleading and warrants some
clarification. Prior to the terrorist attack on September 11, Congress
twice mandated the creation of an electronic entry-exit system.
Following the events of September 11, Congress added the requirement
that the entry-exit system incorporate biometric technology as a means
to verify the identity of foreign travelers. DHS established the US-
VISIT program ahead of schedule, and began operating US-VISIT at 115
ports of entry on January 5, 2004. US-VISIT enhances the security of
our citizens and visitors; facilitates legitimate travel and trade;
ensures the integrity of our immigration system; and protects the
identities and privacy interests of our visitors.
GAO's recommendations are really more focused on operational issues
(i.e., whether to collect fingerprints before or during the interview
process). Responsibility for post resource management falls within the
Department of State's purview, with input when necessary from DHS.
Individual consular posts must make decisions based on staffing and
space availability which will impact when fingerprints are collected.
In close coordination with DHS, the Department of State has already
provided guidance to their consular posts on operational goals and
strategies for the Biometric Visa Program. Moreover, DHS is developing
a visa policy strategy, with corresponding goals and objectives that
DHS will pursue to achieve our twin aims of securing our borders while
keeping our doors open to legitimate travelers.
We believe that workflow concerns identified by GAO do not adversely
impact security objectives of this program. For example, for
nonimmigrant visas, the system is locked and visas cannot be issued
until IDENT results are returned to posts and the applicants are
cleared. DHS works closely with State to ensure that whatever workflow
a consular post employs does not comprise the security benefit of
reviewing IDENT results; regardless of whether IDENT results are
reviewed before or after an interview.
Second, in GAO's September 2003 report and as noted in this draft, GAO
recommended that DHS establish an advisory board comprising
representatives from key US-VISIT federal stakeholder organizations. In
response to this recommendation, the US-VISIT Federal Stakeholders
Advisory Board was formed to provide advice on the overarching vision
of the US-VISIT program and strategic direction and its responsiveness
for all operational missions, both within DHS and with its
participating government agencies. The Advisory Board provides a
communication link for aligning strategic direction, priorities, and
resources with stakeholder operations. Additionally, with the award on
May 28, 2004, of the US-VISIT prime contract (Smart Border Alliance),
the effort to define a more detailed vision and operational context for
a comprehensive travel and immigration tracking system is now well
underway. This planning effort will be accomplished with input from the
members of the Advisory Board. The members of the Advisory Board will
review and comment on the vision documents prior to acceptance.
Conclusion:
DHS and Department of State (DOS) have worked very closely together in
establishing biometric policy to create consistency between the DOS's
biovisa program and Homeland Security's US-VISIT program, including who
should be subject to and exempt from fingerprinting, and how many
fingerprints should be taken and stored for verification purposes.
Together, DHS and DOS have created a continuum of identity verification
measures that begins overseas, when a traveler applies for a visa, and
continues upon entry and exit from this country. The system stores
biometric and biographic data in a secure, centralized database and
uses travel and identity documents to access that information for
identity verification and watch list checks. Today, more than 180
nonimmigrant visa-issuing posts and 90 immigrant visa issuing posts
have begun to capture finger scans and digital photographs of foreign
nationals when they apply for visas, regardless of their country of
origin. This process will be in place at all 211 visa-issuing posts
worldwide within 60 days. Beginning on September 30, 2004, nationals
from Visa Waiver Program (VWP) countries will also begin to be enrolled
in US-VISIT.
Through the US-VISIT and the Biometric Visa Program, DHS and DOS have
already identified many individuals who are the subjects of lookout
records, included rapists, drug traffickers, and those who have
committed immigration offenses or visa fraud. Both of these programs
are critical to our national security as well as our economic security.
We believe the coordination between DHS and DOS on these important
programs is already making a significant contribution to the efforts of
DHS and the DOS to provide a safer and more secure America. DHS will
continue to work closely with DOS on future biometric issues, including
the addition of alien categories to the US-VISIT program and biometric
passports.
DHS recognizes that we have a long way still to go, and we will build
upon the initial framework and solid foundation to ensure that we
continue to meet our goals to enhance the security of our citizens and
visitors while facilitating travel for the millions of visitors we
welcome each year.
I appreciate your comments and recommendations to DHS, and I look
forward to working with you on future homeland security issues.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Andrew B. Maner:
Chief Financial Officer:
The following are GAO's comments on the Department of Homeland
Security's letter dated August 24, 2004.
GAO Comments:
1. We adjusted our wording throughout the report to clarify that our
observations and recommendations are focused on the need for
comprehensive guidance on how information available through the program
is to be used by consular officers and not on the overall policy
framework for US-VISIT and the Biometric Visa Program.
2. While we understand posts' resource concerns, we believe it is
important that the departments reach agreement and provide guidance to
consular posts on how information on applicants that is available
through the Biometric Visa Program is intended to be used to help
consular officers adjudicate visas. With this guidance, consular posts
would be able to better assess personnel and facility constraints and
develop specific plans to better implement the program, including
requesting additional resources if necessary.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of State:
United States Department of State:
Washington, D. C. 20520:
AUG 18 2004:
Ms. Jacqueline Williams-Bridgers:
Managing Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001:
Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers:
We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "BORDER
SECURITY: State Department Rollout of Biometric Visas on Schedule, but
Policy and Guidance Are Lagging," GAO Job Code 320268.
The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.
If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact John
G. Cook, Consular Officer, Bureau of Consular Affairs, at (202)
261-8016.
Sincerely,
Signed for:
Christopher B. Burnham:
cc: GAO - John Brummet
CA - Catherine Barry
State/OIG - Mark Duda:
Department of State Comments on Draft Report by the Government
Accountability Office Entitled: "Border Security --State Department
Rollout of Biometric Visas on Schedule, but Policy and Guidance Are
Lagging." (GAO-04-1001):
The Department of State appreciates the opportunity to comment on the
report of the Government Accountability Office entitled: Border
Security --State Department Rollout of Biometric Visas on Schedule, but
Policy and Guidance Are Lagging. The GAO correctly reports that the
Biometric Visa Program is on schedule to meet the legislative deadline
of October 26, 2004. The GAO observation that policy and guidance are
lacking in the Biometric Visa Program deserves some clarification.
Biometric Visa Program --Unprecedented Global Enrollment:
The global deployment of the Biometric Visa Program is a truly
unprecedented undertaking; there has never before been a biometric
enrollment of millions of people from such a wide variety of cultures
in countries around the world. The enrollment rollout began in
September 2003 and will finish in October 2004. During this period all
207 nonimmigrant visa-issuing posts will have begun biometric
enrollment of applicants. For immigrants, the undertaking has been even
more complex. Not only are biometrics being collected from all
immigrants, but in conjunction with biometric immigrant visa enrollment
a machine-readable immigrant visa is being issued for the first time,
security advisory opinions are being processed electronically, and the
processing of immigrant visas and diversity visas has been merged into
a single system.
Major Policy Objectives Well Communicated via 13 Telegrams:
The policy underlying the biometric visa program, explained to overseas
posts prior to and during implementation, has two major objectives:
prevent visa issuance to persons on the IDENT biometric watchlist; use
biometric identity verification to ensure that the person issued the
visa is the person who presents it at the port of entry. Posts
implementing the Biometric Visa Program are well aware of these basic
objectives. The Department has sent 13 telegrams to all posts
explaining the Biometric Visa Program:
--Latest on Biometric Deployment (September 4, 2003);
--NIV Biometric Collection Procedures (October 21, 2003);
--Biometric Deployment - Contingency Press Guidance (October 21, 2003);
--NIV Biometric Installation Schedule (October 22, 2003);
--Biometrics and US-VISIT - Enhancing Border Security Together (October
29, 2003);
--Biometric Deployment - Machine-Readable Immigrant Visas Coming Soon
(November 18, 2003);
--US-VISIT Update (December 30, 2003);
--Biometrics - Press Coverage Encouraged (February 5, 2004);
--IDENT Rollout (February 13, 2004);
--IDENT and SAO Electronically: NIV 04.02.00 (April 15, 2004);
--Release of NIV 4.02.02 - Help With Fingerprinting is Here (June 7,
2004);
--IDENT Procedures (July 20, 2004);
--Further Guidance on Biometric Collection (July 20, 2004);
These telegrams provided the operational context and goals and
strategies for the Biometric Visa Program.
No Security Vulnerabilities on Policy and Guidance:
The observation by the Government Accountability Office that policy and
guidance are lagging relates primarily to policy and guidance on
procedures to follow in processing matches of visa applicant
fingerprints against IDENT, the Automated Biometric Identification
System of the Department of Homeland Security. For example, the report
notes that some posts collect fingerprints prior to visa interviews so
that the IDENT results are generally available at the time of the
interview, while other posts collect the fingerprints at the time of
the interview, and the IDENT results are reviewed later. The Department
intentionally allowed posts to use a variety of workflows to process
biometric visas in order to allow consular managers flexibility to
account for different staffing levels and workloads. The important
point is that there is no security compromised by whichever approach a
post may adopt; the nonimmigrant visa system is locked and visas cannot
be issued until the IDENT results are returned and the applicants are
cleared.
Complex BioVisa-IDENT Interface a Remarkable Achievement:
During the early months of the Biometric Visa-IDENT connection, which
began in January 2004, the Department was reviewing the types of
matches obtained from IDENT and working with the Department of Homeland
Security to develop the most effective procedures for handling IDENT
matches and other IDENT issues. It should be remembered that during
these first few months of the Biometric Visa-IDENT connection there
were continual modifications and enhancements to the basic interface
created between the systems of the Department of State and the
Department of Homeland Security. This interface enables the processing
of biometric and biographic visa data packages from posts around the
world through IDENT and back to the posts within the 30-minute target
turnaround time, which is being met. The 87-page interface control
document Visa Applicant-IDENT/US-VISIT Lookup Interface demonstrates
the complexity of the systems issues involved in making this connection
work. It is remarkable that such a complex system could be created and
deployed in such a short period of time.
Guidance on IDENT Phased for Optimal Results:
While it is true that the most detailed guidance on IDENT matches was
not sent to posts until the telegram IDENT Procedures of July 20, 2004,
which contains 21 paragraphs on a variety of issues related to IDENT,
that was not the first guidance sent on IDENT. The IDENT Rollout
telegram of February 13, 2004, explained the basic procedures related
to the use of IDENT. The telegram of April 15, 2004, on IDENT and SAO
Electronically: NIV 04.02.00 provided posts with additional guidance on
IDENT and Biometric Visa procedures. Having studied the matches
received from IDENT and having worked with the Department of Homeland
Security to develop the best procedures to follow to address issues
related to the Biometric Visa-IDENT connection, the Department was able
to send the comprehensive IDENT Procedures telegram in July. There will
undoubtedly be more guidance to follow as the Biometric Visa Program
continues to develop.
Key Performance Indicator Captured by Consular Database Report:
In order to gauge the performance of the Biometric Visa Program, the
Department created a new report in the Consular Consolidated Database
that shows how many applicants identified as category one (very
serious) visa
ineligibilities would have been identified with the name-based Consular
Lookout and Support System (CLASS) and how many were caught strictly by
the biometric check against IDENT. This is the key performance
indicator, which the Department had the foresight to establish before
the Biometric Visa Program was deployed. The results through July 2004
show that of the total visa applicants under the Biometric Visa Program
that had hits against the IDENT watchlist related to visa
ineligibilities, 33 percent were not detected by the CLASS name-based
check. That is the value added of the IDENT clearance.
Optimal Cooperation with US-VISIT Program:
Without optimal cooperation with the Department of Homeland Security,
the Biometric Visa Program would not be a success. Teams from State and
DHS have been meeting weekly or more often since July 2003, including
late on Christmas and New Year's Eves, to establish the Biometric Visa-
IDENT interface, and also to enhance the Visa Datashare connection so
that visa data is now projected onto the computer screens of Customs
and Border Protection Officers at primary inspection at ports of entry.
These complex system integration efforts are working effectively to
prevent persons from entering the United States with photo-substituted
or counterfeit visas.
Concerning the GAO Recommendations for Executive Action:
The report recommends that the Secretaries of Homeland Security and
State set an overall policy on how the Biometric Visa Program should be
used. The 13 telegrams sent to all posts about the Biometric Visa
Program, some of which specifically covered the BioVisa Program's
relationship to the US-VISIT Program, demonstrate that State and DHS
are already closely coordinating policy on the Biometric Visa Program.
We will continue to do so, and to work with our posts to ensure that
officers are fully trained and aware of this policy. Although some lags
in guidance are perhaps inevitable at times of rapid, groundbreaking
change, we will continue to make every effort to communicate with the
field to keep guidance current and clear.
In regard to the specific GAO recommendation as to whether consular
officers should consider IDENT information on applicants during
interviews, the Department recognizes it would be ideal for consular
officers to have the IDENT information available during interviews.
However, to enable receipt of IDENT results prior to interviews,
cleared Americans would have to collect all fingerprints in advance of
the interviews. This would require the hiring of additional cleared
Americans and provision of space for collection of the fingerprints in
advance, as well as for waiting rooms large enough for the applicants
to wait for the IDENT returns. Many posts would have difficulty hiring
the Americans and providing the necessary space. It would be costly to
make posts obtain IDENT results prior to visa interviews; costs that
are hard to justify when fewer than one in a thousand visa applicants
has a hit against the IDENT watchlist. Moreover, not having the IDENT
results available during the interview is not a security concern
because the nonimmigrant visa system is locked and visas cannot be
issued until the IDENT results are returned to posts and the applicants
are cleared.
Conclusion:
The Biometric Visa Program is preventing criminals and immigration
violators who are ineligible for visas from changing identities to
obtain visas in a false identity. It is also ensuring the integrity of
the U.S. visa through biometric identity verification at ports of
entry. The Department of State considers the Biometric Visa Program to
be a resounding success.
The following are GAO's comments on the Department of State's letter
dated August 18, 2004.
GAO Comments:
1. We adjusted our wording throughout the report to clarify that our
observations and recommendations are focused on the need for
comprehensive guidance on how information available through the program
is to be used by consular officers and not on the overall policy
framework for US-VISIT and the Biometric Visa Program.
2. State has provided some guidance telegrams to posts over the course
of the implementation of the Biometric Visa Program, including two
telegrams sent to posts in July following GAO fieldwork at two overseas
consular posts in May. The telegrams include guidance on such areas as
moving away from same-day visa issuance toward mail or courier visa
delivery to applicants, how to fix potential misidentifications for
applicants' fingerprints, and clarifications on FBI information
available in watch list IDENT returns. However, these telegrams do not
include guidance on certain key items we have identified, for example
(1) how data on applicants' travel patterns and/or previous enrollment
in the database should be considered by adjudicating officers and (2)
who should review and clear information returned from IDENT on
applicants prior to visa issuance. Guidance on such issues could help
set parameters for consular posts to most effectively implement the
program and help them identify resource or facility constraints that
might impair the program's full and effective implementation.
3. While we understand posts' resource concerns, we believe it is
important that the departments reach agreement and provide guidance to
consular posts on how information on applicants that is available
through the Biometric Visa Program is intended to be used to help
consular officers adjudicate visas. With this guidance, consular posts
would be able to better assess personnel and facility constraints and
develop specific plans to better implement the program, including
requesting additional resources if necessary.
(320268):
FOOTNOTES
[1] Section 303 of the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform
Act of 2002 (Pub. L. No. 107-173) requires that no later than October
26, 2004, the State Department issue visas that use biometric
identifiers.
[2] Biometrics is a wide range of technologies that can be used to
verify a person's identity by measuring and analyzing his or her
physiological characteristics. In this case, and for the purposes of
this report, "biometric identifiers" refers to fingerprints. See GAO,
Technology Assessment: Using Biometrics for Border Security, GAO-03-174
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 14, 2002).
[3] In this report, we use the term "visa" to refer to nonimmigrant
visas only. The United States also grants visas to people who intend to
immigrate to the United States. A visa allows a foreign visitor to
present himself or herself at a port of entry for admission to the
United States.
[4] US-VISIT is currently deployed at major U.S. seaports and airports
and will eventually be deployed at land ports.
[5] Memorandum of Understanding Between the Secretaries of State and
Homeland Security Concerning Implementation of Section 428 of the
Homeland Security Act of 2002, Sept. 30, 2003.
[6] A server is a computer on a network that manages network resources,
such as storing files, managing printers, managing network traffic, or
processing database queries.
[7] IDENT data includes FBI information on all known and suspected
terrorists, selected wanted persons (foreign-born, unknown place of
birth, previously arrested by DHS), and previous criminal histories for
high risk countries; DHS Immigration and Customs Enforcement
information on deported felons and sexual registrants; and DHS
information on previous criminal histories. Information from the bureau
includes fingerprints from the Integrated Automated Fingerprint
Identification System.
[8] One in 1,000 cases require examination by a fingerprint expert,
according to State officials.
[9] On a revolving 24-to 36-month schedule, State replaces hardware and
upgrades or installs software at the consular posts. Where possible,
State added the installation of the fingerprint capture software and
the fingerprint scanners to these scheduled visits.
[10] State officials told us that DHS and State have an informal
arrangement that the response time must be within 15 minutes for IDENT
analysis or, if biometric experts must examine the prints, up to 24
hours. The officials said that State and DHS are formalizing this
agreement in a memorandum of understanding.
[11] Under the Visa Waiver Program, citizens of 27 countries are not
required to obtain visas for business or pleasure stays of short
duration.
[12] The most common reason for denial of a visa is that the applicant
intends to come to the United States and remain. Section 214(b) of the
U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) presumes that every alien
(other than a nonimmigrant) is an immigrant until he or she establishes
eligibility for nonimmigrant status under the INA. See 8 U.S.C.
§1184(b) and 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(15).
[13] See GAO, Homeland Security: Risks Facing Key Border and
Transportation Security Program Need to Be Addressed, GAO-03-1083
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 19, 2003).
[14] GAO, Aviation Security: Challenges in Using Biometric
Technologies, GAO-04-785T (Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2004).
[15] DHS currently does not have information on individuals apprehended
at ports of entry when their prints and photographs did not match those
captured at the consular posts for the visa they were using. On July
19, 2004, DHS implemented a system to assist in identifying such cases
and will have better information in the future.
[16] GAO-04-785T.
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