Weapons of Mass Destruction
Nonproliferation Programs Need Better Integration Gao ID: GAO-05-157 January 28, 2005Since 1992, the Congress has provided more than $7 billion for threat reduction and nonproliferation programs in the former Soviet Union (FSU). These programs have played a key role in addressing the threats of weapons of mass destruction and are currently expanding beyond the FSU. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 mandated that GAO assess (1) Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of Energy (DOE) strategies guiding their threat reduction and nonproliferation programs and (2) efforts to coordinate DOD, DOE, and Department of State threat reduction and nonproliferation programs that share similar missions.
GAO found that there is no overall strategy that integrates the threat reduction and nonproliferation programs of the DOD, DOE, and others. DOD and DOE have strategies governing their respective programs, which generally contain the elements of a strategy as established by the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993. These strategies include a mission statement and goals, identify external factors that could affect meeting these goals, establish metrics to evaluate the performance of the programs, provide cost estimates, and cover a period of at least 5 years. Given the involvement of multiple agencies, and the expansion of the threat reduction and nonproliferation programs beyond the FSU, integration of agencies' strategies is important. The agencies' implementation of very similar programs has not always been well coordinated. While the majority of programs in DOD and DOE are distinct, GAO found three program areas that perform similar functions in the FSU. GAO found that the coordination of programs enhancing security at Russian nuclear warhead sites improved after the National Security Council (NSC) staff issued guidance. Specifically, the guidance delineates agencies' roles, interactions, and ways to resolve disputes. The biological weapons scientist employment programs in DOD, DOE, and State are well coordinated and also have NSC staff guidance addressing roles, interactions, and disputes. By contrast, there is no governmentwide guidance delineating the roles and responsibilities of agencies managing border security programs. According to DOD and DOE officials managing these programs, agencies' roles are not well delineated and coordination could be improved.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-05-157, Weapons of Mass Destruction: Nonproliferation Programs Need Better Integration
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Report to Congressional Committees:
January 2005:
Weapons of Mass Destruction:
Nonproliferation Programs Need Better Integration:
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-157]:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-05-157, a report to the Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate, and the Committee on Armed Services, House of
Representatives:
Why GAO Did This Study:
Since 1992, the Congress has provided more than $7 billion for threat
reduction and nonproliferation programs in the former Soviet Union
(FSU). These programs have played a key role in addressing the threats
of weapons of mass destruction and are currently expanding beyond the
FSU. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004
mandated that GAO assess (1) Department of Defense (DOD) and Department
of Energy (DOE) strategies guiding their threat reduction and
nonproliferation programs and (2) efforts to coordinate DOD, DOE, and
Department of State threat reduc-tion and nonproliferation programs
that share similar missions.
What GAO Found:
GAO found that there is no overall strategy that integrates the threat
reduction and nonproliferation programs of the DOD, DOE, and others.
DOD and DOE have strategies governing their respective programs, which
generally contain the elements of a strategy as established by the
Government Performance and Results Act of 1993. These strategies
include a mission statement and goals, identify external factors that
could affect meeting these goals, establish metrics to evaluate the
performance of the programs, provide cost estimates, and cover a period
of at least 5 years. Given the involvement of multiple agencies, and
the expansion of the threat reduction and nonproliferation programs
beyond the FSU, integration of agencies‘ strategies is important.
The agencies‘ implementation of very similar programs has not always
been well coordinated. While the majority of programs in DOD and DOE
are distinct, GAO found three program areas that perform similar
functions in the FSU. GAO found that the coordination of programs
enhancing security at Russian nuclear warhead sites improved after the
National Security Council (NSC) staff issued guidance. Specifically,
the guidance delineates agencies‘ roles, interactions, and ways to
resolve disputes. The biological weapons scientist employment programs
in DOD, DOE, and State are well coordinated and also have NSC staff
guidance addressing roles, interactions, and disputes. By contrast,
there is no governmentwide guidance delineating the roles and
responsibilities of agencies managing border security programs.
According to DOD and DOE officials managing these programs, agencies‘
roles are not well delineated and coordination could be improved.
DOD and DOE Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation Program Areas:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends (1) that the Secretaries of Defense and Energy develop
an integrated plan for all U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation
programs and (2) that the Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs issue clear guidance for the coordination of border
security programs. DOE agreed with the recommendations, while State and
the NSC staff did not comment. DOD concurred with the need for better
integrated nonproliferation programs, but did not specify whether it
agreed with the need for an integrated plan. DOD concurred with the
need for guidance governing border security programs.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-157.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Joseph A. Christoff,
(202) 512-8979 or christoffj@gao.gov; or Gene Aloise, (202) 512-3841 or
aloisee@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
DOD and DOE Strategic Plans for Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation
Programs Are Not Integrated and Do Not Address U.S. Programs Worldwide:
NSC Staff Guidance Delineating Agencies' Roles, Information Sharing,
and Dispute Resolution Results in Improved Program Coordination:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments:
Scope and Methodology:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: DOD and DOE Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation Projects,
Fiscal Year 2004:
Appendix II: DOD and DOE Metrics Used to Assess the Performance of
Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation Programs:
Appendix III: DOD, DOE, and State Department Projects Addressing
Similar Missions:
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Energy:
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix VI: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: Selected GPRA Criteria for Strategic Planning:
Table 2: Calls for Governmentwide Plans for Threat Reduction and
Nonproliferation Programs:
Table 3: Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction Projects:
Table 4: Department of Energy Nonproliferation Projects within Defense
Nuclear Nonproliferation:
Table 5: DOD and DOE Performance Metrics:
Table 6: DOD and DOE Warhead Security Projects:
Table 7: DOD, DOE, and State Biological Weapons Scientist Employment
Projects:
Table 8: Overview of Border Security Projects:
Figures Figures:
Figure 1: DOD Offices That Are Involved in Strategic Planning for the
CTR Program:
Figure 2: DOE Offices That Are Involved in Strategic Planning for
Nonproliferation Programs:
Figure 3: DOD and DOE Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation Program
Areas:
Abbreviations:
CTR: Cooperative Threat Reduction:
DNN: Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation:
DOD: Department of Defense:
DOE: Department of Energy:
DTRA: Defense Threat Reduction Agency::
FSU: former Soviet Union:
GPRA: Government Performance and Results Act of 1993:
NNSA: National Nuclear Security Administration:
NSC: National Security Council:
WMD: weapons of mass destruction:
Letter January 28, 2005:
The Honorable John Warner:
Chairman:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
Since 1992, the Congress has provided more than $7 billion for threat
reduction and nonproliferation programs in the former Soviet Union
(FSU). These programs encompass a range of projects, including removing
nuclear weapons from Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan; securing nuclear
materials and warheads in Russia; and paying former weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) scientists to engage in peaceful research. The
National Security Council (NSC) staff has the principal role in
coordinating the many U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation
programs that are implemented primarily through the Departments of
Defense (DOD) and Energy (DOE), although the Departments of State,
Commerce, and Homeland Security implement related programs. DOD and DOE
threat reduction and nonproliferation programs have played a key role
in addressing the threats posed by WMD in the FSU; these efforts have
expanded in size and scope beyond the FSU states. For example, the
United States recently provided assistance to dismantle WMD
infrastructure in Libya, and DOE recently announced a new program to
provide employment opportunities for Iraqi weapons scientists.
Furthermore, in November 2003, the Congress authorized DOD to allow the
Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program to spend up to $50 million
annually of its existing funding to address proliferation threats
outside the FSU. A bill pending in the Senate would allow DOD increased
flexibility to undertake nonproliferation projects outside of the
FSU.[Footnote 1]
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004[Footnote 2]
mandated that we assess the current management of DOD and DOE threat
reduction and nonproliferation programs. We agreed to approach this
assessment in two phases. First, this report assesses (1) DOD and DOE
strategies guiding their respective threat reduction and
nonproliferation programs and how they are integrated with those of
other agencies and (2) efforts to coordinate the implementation of DOD,
DOE, and State threat reduction and nonproliferation programs that
share similar missions, goals, and activities. We included State in
assessing the coordination of threat reduction and nonproliferation
programs because it shares responsibility in coordinating two programs.
In the second phase, we plan to issue individual reports on DOD and DOE
internal controls for their threat reduction and nonproliferation
programs. A list of our prior reports concerning DOD and DOE threat
reduction and nonproliferation programs is included at the end of this
report.
To assess DOD and DOE strategies guiding their respective threat
reduction and nonproliferation programs, we assessed the agencies'
strategic plans against criteria established by the Government
Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA). We also relied on our
previous reviews of the CTR program in DOD and nonproliferation
programs in DOE. Furthermore, we met with officials at DOD, DOE, and
State and reviewed documents to determine if a plan exists that
integrates the implementation strategies of DOD, DOE, and other
agencies. To assess efforts to coordinate DOD, DOE, and State threat
reduction and nonproliferation programs, we reviewed agency documents
and interviewed agency officials. DOD officials included the Deputy
Undersecretary of Defense for Technology Security Policy and
Counterproliferation and other senior leaders. DOE officials included
the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation and other
senior leaders. We spoke with State Department officials in the Office
of the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia and the
Bureau of Nonproliferation. Although NSC officials did not respond to
our requests to meet, we were able to meet our audit objectives by
obtaining records and having discussions with DOD, DOE, and State
officials regarding the role of the NSC staff and the extent of its
participation in coordinating programs. Additionally, we provided a
draft of this report to NSC staff to obtain their comments. We
performed our review in Washington, D.C., from February 2004 to
November 2004 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.
Results in Brief:
While both DOD and DOE have individual strategies governing their
respective threat reduction and nonproliferation programs, there is no
overall strategy that integrates these plans with one another, or with
those of other agencies. DOD and DOE individual strategies generally
contain the elements of a plan developed using GPRA criteria. These
strategies include a mission statement and goals, identify external
factors that could affect meeting these goals, establish metrics to
evaluate the performance of the programs, provide cost estimates, and
cover a period of at least 5 years. In 2004, DOD and DOE implemented 39
threat reduction and nonproliferation projects costing approximately
$1.8 billion. While it is important and valuable for DOD and DOE to
have strategies to guide their respective programs, the expansion of
these programs beyond the FSU and the involvement of multiple agencies
make integration of all agencies' strategies important. Since the mid-
1990s, the Congress, GAO, and others[Footnote 3] have called for the
executive branch to develop governmentwide plans to coordinate U.S.
threat reduction and nonproliferation programs worldwide. The NSC staff
and State have prepared plans in response to these calls, but these
plans either focus solely on one agency or on one geographic location.
Therefore, these plans do not address U.S. threat reduction and
nonproliferation programs worldwide.
The agencies' implementation of similar threat reduction and
nonproliferation programs has not always been well coordinated.
Coordination requires a delineation of each agency's roles and
responsibilities, regularized interactions, and clear procedures for
resolving interagency disputes. While the majority of programs in DOD
and DOE have distinct missions, we identified one area where DOD and
DOE programs share similar missions, goals, and activities and two
areas shared by DOD, DOE, and State. Both DOD and DOE have programs to
improve the security of sites where Russian nuclear warheads are
stored. Warhead security programs experienced coordination problems in
the past because DOD and DOE were pursuing different approaches to
securing nuclear warhead sites in Russia.[Footnote 4] On the basis of
our review of NSC staff guidance and discussions with programs
officials, coordination improved when guidance specified agencies'
roles, interactions, and ways to resolve disputes. DOD, DOE, and State
have programs employing former biological weapons scientists and
enhancing the ability of countries to secure their borders against the
smuggling of WMD materials. The biological weapons scientist employment
programs in DOD, DOE, and State are well coordinated and have NSC staff
guidance addressing roles, interactions, and disputes. Furthermore,
DOD, DOE, and State Department officials were satisfied with the
coordination of these programs. However, coordination of DOD, DOE, and
State border security programs could be improved. DOD and DOE officials
managing border security programs stated that agencies' roles are not
defined, information sharing is infrequent, and there are no procedures
to resolve differences among agencies.
We are recommending (1) that the Secretaries of Defense and Energy, in
consultation with other agencies that manage threat reduction and
nonproliferation programs, develop an integrated plan for all U.S.
threat reduction and nonproliferation programs to ensure that the
programs are effectively coordinated and (2) that the Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs, through the NSC staff, issue
clear guidance for the coordination of DOD, DOE, and State Department
border security programs, as it has done with programs to employ former
biological weapons scientists and warhead security.
DOE agreed with the recommendations in this report, while State and the
NSC staff did not comment on them. DOD concurred with the need for
better integrated threat reduction and nonproliferation programs, but
did not specify whether it agreed with the need for an integrated plan.
DOD concurred with the recommendation for NSC staff guidance governing
border security programs. DOD, DOE, and State provided technical
comments that we incorporated as appropriate.
Background:
After the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia inherited the
world's largest arsenal of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.
As Russia adopted economic reforms and moved toward an open society,
its economy and central controls deteriorated, thereby making it
difficult to maintain security at its weapons sites. Recognizing these
difficulties, the Congress began authorizing funds in 1992 for programs
to help destroy Russian weapons and improve WMD security. More
recently, the events of September 11, 2001, have increased U.S.
concerns that terrorists might obtain WMD materials or weapons at
poorly secured sites. While DOD and DOE implement most of the U.S.
threat reduction and nonproliferation programs, the Departments of
State, Commerce, and Homeland Security implement related programs.
The Congress established DOD's CTR program in 1992 to reduce the WMD
threat posed to the United States from weapons remaining in the FSU.
The program was designed to assist the FSU in securing and destroying
WMD and its means of delivery.[Footnote 5] Initial CTR assistance was
provided to Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Russia, which had
inherited the majority of the Soviet Union's WMD. The program helped
Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus remove nuclear weapons from their
soil, eliminating the potential emergence of three additional nuclear
states. CTR also facilitated Russia's efforts to reduce its massive
nuclear weapons arsenal and address its arms control commitments. In
fiscal year 2004, CTR had 22 projects (see app. I). One of the newest
CTR projects--the WMD Proliferation Prevention Initiative--is designed
to strengthen the ability of non-Russian FSU states to deter, detect,
and interdict illicit trafficking of WMD and related materials. For
example, DOD is providing equipment and training to Uzbekistan to
enhance its ability to monitor its borders for illegal transport of
radioactive material. Additionally, the CTR program has expanded
outside of the FSU, as DOD will use CTR funds to help Albania eliminate
its chemical weapons stockpile. Furthermore, a bill introduced in the
Senate in November 2004 would grant DOD additional flexibility to
expand the CTR program outside the FSU. DOD implements the CTR program
through the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), which receives
policy guidance from the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
In 1993, DOE began implementing programs funded by DOD, to help secure
weapons-usable nuclear materials in the FSU. DOE also received funding
in 1994 from State to employ former Soviet weapons scientists and
engineers in cooperative research projects with U.S. laboratories and
industry to deter their employment by rogue states. In 1996, with the
growth of these programs, funding shifted directly to DOE. These
programs remained focused on the FSU and were spread throughout DOE. In
October 1999, DOE's nonproliferation programs were consolidated within
the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA).[Footnote 6] Since
that time, NNSA's nonproliferation mission has been implemented by the
Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN), which seeks to
detect, prevent, and reverse WMD proliferation. This mission has now
expanded to address proliferation threats in more than 70 countries to
prevent the spread of WMD. For example, DNN is initiating a new program
to provide employment opportunities to Iraqi scientists, technicians,
and engineers. In fiscal year 2004, DOE had 19 projects addressing
nonproliferation threats worldwide (see app. I). The threat reduction
and nonproliferation programs have evolved from a $400 million DOD
program in 1992 to approximately $1.8 billion in programs at DOD and
DOE in 2004.[Footnote 7]
The State Department also manages its own nonproliferation programs and
coordinates U.S. assistance to the FSU. In 1992, the Freedom Support
Act[Footnote 8] established the Office of the Coordinator within the
State Department to coordinate U.S. assistance to the FSU. The
coordinator's responsibilities include resolving program and policy
disputes among U.S. government agencies regarding their programs in the
FSU. In 1994, State and DOD established the International Science and
Technology Center in Moscow to fund peaceful research carried out by
otherwise underpaid weapons scientists.[Footnote 9] The center
supplements the income of scientists, purchases equipment for
scientific research, and supports programs to help scientists identify
and develop commercially viable research projects. In 1996, the
Congress established State's Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism,
Demining, and Related Programs Account to fund programs addressing the
spread of WMD. For example, the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund
supports projects to prevent the proliferation of WMD, their delivery
systems, and related materials.
NSC staff coordinates U.S. policy for threat reduction and
nonproliferation programs and conducted reviews of these programs that
validated the need to maintain them in 2001 and 2002.[Footnote 10] The
Proliferation Strategy Policy Coordinating Committee, chaired by the
Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for
Proliferation Strategy, Counterproliferation and Homeland Defense, sets
general policy for U.S. nonproliferation programs. NSC staff
establishes guidelines but does not implement programs or control their
budgets.
DOD and DOE Strategic Plans for Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation
Programs Are Not Integrated and Do Not Address U.S. Programs Worldwide:
DOD and DOE prepare their own individual strategies to implement their
respective threat reduction and nonproliferation programs, but there is
no governmentwide strategy that integrates them with one another or
with those of other agencies that implement threat reduction and
nonproliferation programs.[Footnote 11] We found that DOD and DOE
strategies to address security issues for their authorized agency
missions generally meet selected criteria for strategic planning
established by GPRA. Recognizing the importance of coordinating U.S.
efforts, using resources effectively, and enhancing agencies' abilities
to anticipate growing nonproliferation concerns, the Congress, GAO, and
others have required or recommended integrated planning among DOD, DOE,
and other agencies' threat reduction and nonproliferation programs. NSC
staff and State created plans in response to the above requirements and
recommendations, but these plans either focus solely on one agency or
on one geographic location. Furthermore, these programs are expanding
beyond the FSU and may potentially involve the response of multiple
U.S. agencies.
DOD and DOE Strategies for Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation
Programs Generally Meet Criteria Established by the Government
Performance and Results Act:
DOD and DOE each have strategic plans governing their respective threat
reduction and nonproliferation programs.[Footnote 12] We found that
each agency's strategic plan generally meets the selected GPRA criteria
for strategic planning. See table 1 for a listing of the selected GPRA
criteria. Additionally, we found that DOD and DOE have their own
methods to prioritize their respective activities and programs.
Furthermore, DOD and DOE threat reduction and nonproliferation programs
undergo periodic internal and external reviews to improve program
management.
Table 1: Selected GPRA Criteria for Strategic Planning:
Strategic plan element: Mission;
Description: A comprehensive and concise statement describing the basic
purpose of the agency, with a particular focus on its major agency
functions and operations.
Strategic plan element: Goals;
Description: Provide clear direction to the work, services, programs,
and activities of an organization and desired outcomes.
Strategic plan element: External factors;
Description: Describe the broader environment that can influence
inputs, outputs, and outcomes, such as policy or economic changes.
Strategic plan element: Performance metrics;
Description: Provide a succinct and concrete statement of expected
performance for subsequent comparison with actual performance.
Strategic plan element: Cost estimates;
Description: Describe the resources required to achieve the goals.
Strategic plan element: Covers 5 years;
Description: A strategic plan covers a period of at least 5 years
forward.
Source: GAO analysis of GPRA.
[End of table]
Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction Planning:
The CTR Policy Office, in conjunction with DTRA, produces and updates a
strategy for the CTR program.[Footnote 13] We found that this strategy
generally contains the elements of a strategic plan developed using
GPRA criteria. Additionally, all CTR projects develop detailed plans
that also contain these elements. Figure 1 depicts DOD offices that are
involved in strategic planning for the CTR programs.
Figure 1: DOD Offices That Are Involved in Strategic Planning for the
CTR Program:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
In accordance with GPRA, the CTR program's mission statement is
comprehensive and concise: that is, to prevent the proliferation of WMD
and related materials, technologies, and expertise from FSU states--
including providing for the safe destruction of Soviet-era WMD,
associated delivery systems, and related infrastructure. The CTR
program's strategy also includes the following specific goals: (1)
dismantle FSU WMD and associated infrastructure, (2) consolidate and
secure FSU WMD and related technology and materials, (3) increase
transparency and encourage higher standards of conduct, and (4) support
defense and military cooperation with the objective of preventing
proliferation. These goals provide clear direction to the activities
and desired outcomes of the CTR program.
The CTR strategy also cites external factors that could affect the
program, describes how performance will be measured, and states budget
requirements. For example, the level of Russian cooperation is cited as
an external factor that will affect the successful implementation of
the program. The strategy provides metrics by which performance of the
program can be measured, such as the number of missiles destroyed. DOD
and DOE performance metrics are shown in appendix II. In accordance
with GPRA criteria, the CTR plans include cost estimates and cover a
period of 5 years. For example, the overall CTR funding request for
fiscal year 2005 is $409 million, and the 5-year plan calls for an
additional $1.5 billion between fiscal years 2006 and 2009.
The CTR program has five program areas, with several projects under
each program area. Each project has a plan that details its broad
mission, specific objectives, external factors that could affect the
achievement of these objectives, metrics that are used to evaluate the
performance of the project, and cost estimates. For example, the
mission of the Automated Inventory Control and Management System
project, under the nuclear weapons safety and security program area, is
to enhance Russia's capability to account for and track the strategic
and tactical nuclear weapons scheduled for dismantlement. Specific
objectives include installing hardware and software at 18 sites within
Russia and providing initial training and data entry. External factors
cited for this program include whether Russia will grant sufficient
access to the sites and improve the equipment storage conditions. The
project uses milestone dates, which range from the procurement of the
software to the final certification of the system at all sites, as one
method to measure its performance. The project is estimated to cost
$50.2 million.
Additionally, according to agency officials, DOD has not had to
prioritize CTR projects on the basis of available funds. The CTR
program generally receives the funding requested for its projects. DOD
develops its budget request for the CTR program on the basis of funding
needed to continue existing programs and implement new programs. As a
result, projects have not competed for funding.
Furthermore, the CTR program has undergone internal performance reviews
in order to improve management practices. In 2003, the CTR Policy
Office conducted a 6-month, project-by-project review of the program
that changed the scope of several CTR projects to ensure that program
activities met threat reduction goals. The review also resulted in a
decision to stop funding activities that did not contribute directly to
threat reduction goals. For example, the CTR program no longer funds
the restoration of the environment surrounding missile sites but
continues to fund the elimination of the nuclear missiles and silos.
The CTR program also has undergone several external reviews to identify
areas needing improvement. For example, in 1996, we recommended that no
funds should be obligated for constructing a chemical weapons
destruction facility in Russia until reliable cost estimates were
completed.[Footnote 14] (See prior GAO reports listed at the end of
this report.) The DOD Inspector General also recommended that the CTR
program adopt numerous controls to improve program management. For
example, the DOD Inspector General recommended amendments to CTR
program implementing agreements with Russia to ensure that Russia
provides its weapons systems and their components scheduled for
destruction, that it grants access rights to DOD, and that it is
penalized for failure to use DOD assistance. As a result of this
recommendation, DOD required Russia to sign an agreement specifying
that all of Russia's declared nerve agents could be destroyed at a
facility under construction by the CTR program.[Footnote 15] However,
DOD did not include a penalty for noncompliance.
Department of Energy Nonproliferation Planning:
DNN produces a broad strategy for DOE's nonproliferation programs, and
DNN's six program offices prepare strategic plans for their projects.
Collectively, these plans generally contain the elements of a strategic
plan developed using GPRA criteria. Figure 2 depicts DOE offices that
are involved in strategic planning for DOE's nonproliferation programs.
Figure 2: DOE Offices That Are Involved in Strategic Planning for
Nonproliferation Programs:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
In accordance with GPRA, DNN's strategic plan clearly states its
mission--which is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, nuclear
weapons-usable and radiological materials, technologies, and
expertise. This plan also describes broad goals for its
nonproliferation mission. For example, one of its goals is to secure
nuclear and radiological materials at potentially vulnerable sites
overseas. DNN's plan identifies external factors that could affect its
program goals, such as delays in its program to employ weapons
scientists due to lengthy Russian government clearance procedures.
Although DNN's strategic plan does not list performance measures for
each of its nonproliferation projects, DNN maintains a database of
goals and performance metrics for each of its six program areas. For
example, to measure performance in preventing the migration of WMD
expertise, DNN tracks the annual number of former Soviet weapons
scientists, engineers, and technicians engaged by its programs.
Appendix II contains performance metrics for DOE's nonproliferation. In
accordance with GPRA criteria, DNN plans include cost estimates and
cover a period of 5 years. For example, DNN is requesting $1.3 billion
for fiscal year 2005 and is projected to request an additional $5.7
billion between fiscal years 2006 and 2009.
In the past, DNN generally received requested funding for its
nonproliferation programs, but as the scope of these programs expanded,
DNN began to prioritize projects within program areas, according to
agency officials. In fiscal year 2004, DOE first applied several
criteria, such as risk, availability of funding, and legal obligations,
to prioritize projects. The criteria were used to identify activities
with the greatest proliferation risk, on which DOE focused its
resources. For example, in fiscal year 2004, Russia provided access to
more nuclear warhead storage sites than originally planned. DOE
diverted funds from lower priority activities, such as converting
weapons-grade uranium[Footnote 16] to uranium that cannot be used in
weapons,[Footnote 17] in order to fund security enhancements at the new
nuclear warhead storage sites.
DNN's nonproliferation programs have undergone internal and external
reviews to identify areas needing improvement. The NNSA Under Secretary
biannually reviews each program's budget, accomplishments, and any
other concerns. DOE also uses the results of external audits to
identify areas needing improvement. For example, audits conducted by
the DOE Inspector General have recommended improvements to NNSA's
process for matching program requirements with budgetary resources and
managing the program to eliminate weapons-grade uranium in research
reactors. In addition, we have conducted numerous reviews of various
aspects of DOE's nonproliferation programs. For example, in 2001, we
found duplication between DOE's two programs to employ former weapons
scientists in Russia and recommended consolidating the
programs.[Footnote 18] In response, DOE merged the programs into a new
program, the Russian Transition Initiatives.
The Congress and Others Have Called for a Governmentwide Plan, but None
Has Been Developed to Address U.S. Programs Worldwide:
Since the mid-1990s, the Congress and others have called for the
executive branch to develop governmentwide plans to govern threat
reduction and nonproliferation programs. The Congress found that
although U.S. nonproliferation efforts in the FSU have achieved
important results in securing WMD materials, technology, and knowledge,
the effectiveness of these efforts has suffered from a lack of
coordination within and among agencies.[Footnote 19] Recognizing the
importance of integrated planning of threat reduction and
nonproliferation programs, the Congress required the executive branch
to develop three plans. To comply with the requirements of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, as amended,[Footnote
20] the President submitted a plan and an annual report on the
implementation of the plan covering all agency efforts to secure
nuclear weapons, material, and expertise in the FSU. This plan
addressed the specific requirements of the legislation, including
identifying the goals and objectives of the programs and strategies for
terminating U.S. contributions to the programs.
The Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003 requires (1)
the State Department to provide the appropriate congressional
committees with a 3-year international arms control and
nonproliferation strategy and (2) the President to provide the Congress
with a plan detailing coordination of nonproliferation
programs.[Footnote 21] State submitted the 3-year international arms
control and nonproliferation strategy to the Congress in August 2003.
The strategy focuses on the State Department's programs and activities,
discusses broad U.S. arms control and nonproliferation goals, and
describes State's efforts under way to achieve these goals. For the
coordination plan, the Congress required the establishment of an
interagency committee consisting of representatives of the Departments
of Defense, Energy, State, Commerce, Homeland Security, and the
Attorney General and other officials that the President deems
necessary. This committee will exercise responsibility for coordinating
all U.S. threat reduction efforts and enhance the U.S. government's
ability to anticipate growing nonproliferation areas of concern. This
committee is required to submit a coordination plan in May 2005.
[Footnote 22]
In past work, we found that the development of a governmentwide
strategy could strengthen the coordination of threat reduction and
nonproliferation programs.[Footnote 23] The strategy should identify
overall goals, time frames for meeting those goals, and ways to set
priorities for allocating resources governmentwide to address all U.S.
nonproliferation concerns.
The executive branch also called for the development of a
governmentwide plan for U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation
programs. Specifically, the President's National Strategy to Combat
Weapons of Mass Destruction of 2002 calls on the Proliferation Strategy
Policy Coordinating Committee, chaired by NSC staff, to prepare a 5-
year governmentwide plan by March 2003.[Footnote 24] To achieve greater
efficiency through program coordination, the strategy stated that this
governmentwide plan should include all threat reduction and
nonproliferation programs in the FSU that are funded wholly or in part
by the U.S. government. As of November 2004, the plan had yet to be
developed.
In addition, independent panels have also called for the development of
governmentwide plans. In 1998, the Congress established the Commission
to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to Combat the
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (the Deutch Commission),
which recommended coordinated and consistent governmentwide strategies
to address nonproliferation threats to the United States. In 2001, the
Baker-Cutler Commission, established by the Secretary of Energy,
recommended the development of a national strategic plan to secure all
Russian nuclear weapons-useable material and prevent WMD expertise from
leaving Russia. No reports have been developed that address either
commission's recommendations. Table 2 is a listing of the various calls
for governmentwide plans and their status.
Table 2: Calls for Governmentwide Plans for Threat Reduction and
Nonproliferation Programs:
Report name/Requester: National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal
year 2002, as amended;
Requirement/Summary: Requires the President to submit a plan and an
annual report on the implementation of the plan for all agency efforts
to secure nuclear weapons and materials and prevent the outflow of WMD
expertise from the FSU;
Status: Initial strategy was due in June 2002 and the annual report on
implementation was due in January 2003, and annually thereafter; Both
the strategy and 2003 annual plan were delivered late to the Congress
on March 11, 2003; As of November 2004, the 2004 annual implementation
report had not been delivered.
Report name/Requester: Foreign Relations Authorization Act, fiscal year
2003;
Requirement/Summary: Requires the State Department to submit a 3-year
international arms control and nonproliferation strategy for reducing
and controlling the proliferation of WMD, which includes (1) U.S. goals
for arms control and nonproliferation of WMD and (2) a description of
State Department programs intended to accomplish these goals;
Status: State Department sent report to the Congress on August 11,
2003.
Report name/Requester: Foreign Relations Authorization Act, fiscal year
2003;
Requirement/Summary: Requires the President to submit a strategy to
coordinate the threat reduction and nonproliferation objectives of the
executive branch agencies;
Status: Report is not due until 120 days after the 2005 inauguration.
Report name/Requester: National Strategy to Combat WMD;
Requirement/Summary: Requires the Proliferation Strategy Policy
Coordinating
Committee to develop a 5-year plan for all threat reduction and
nonproliferation programs in the FSU;
Status: Plan was due in March 2003; No plan was delivered as of
November 2004.
Report name/Requester: Deutch Commission;
Requirement/Summary: Recommends developing coordinated and consistent
governmentwide strategies that include country-specific, long-term
plans to reduce the demands for WMD;
Status: No deadline for submission; No plan was delivered as of
November 2004.
Report name/Requester: Baker-Cutler Commission;
Requirement/Summary: Recommends a plan for securing all nuclear
weapons-usable material in Russia and to prevent the outflow of
scientific expertise that could be used for nuclear or other WMD,
which includes clearly defined goals and measurable objectives,
associated budgets for each program, and criteria for success;
Status: No deadline for submission; No plan was delivered as of
November 2004.
Source: GAO description of legislation and reports related to
nonproliferation programs.
[End of table]
None of the existing plans in table 2 integrates agencies' plans with
one another or addresses U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation
programs worldwide. For example, the plan developed as a result of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 did not address
programs to secure and eliminate chemical weapons in Russia or the
infrastructure used to develop chemical and biological weapons
throughout the FSU. Similarly, the 2003 arms control plan that State
prepared addressed U.S. arms controls efforts, but the plan is limited
to a description of DOE's programs for addressing these goals.
NSC Staff Guidance Delineating Agencies' Roles, Information Sharing,
and Dispute Resolution Results in Improved Program Coordination:
On the basis of our review of NSC staff guidance and discussions with
DOD and DOE officials, we found that coordination among programs that
share similar missions, goals, and activities is improved when each
agency's roles and responsibilities are delineated, information sharing
is formalized, and procedures for resolving interagency disputes are
clear. While the majority of programs in DOD and DOE are distinct,
three program areas perform similar functions in the FSU: (1) improving
the security of sites where Russian nuclear warheads are stored, (2)
employing former biological weapons scientists, and (3) enhancing the
ability of countries to secure their borders against the smuggling of
WMD materials. The warhead security programs implemented by DOD and DOE
were not well coordinated in the past, but NSC staff guidance that
describes each agency's role, formalizes meetings, and establishes a
dispute resolution process has improved coordination, according to
agency officials. DOD, DOE, and State officials in the biological
weapons scientists programs understand each agency's roles and
responsibilities, meet monthly, and follow dispute resolution
procedures as described in governmentwide guidance for this program
area. By contrast, there is no governmentwide guidance delineating the
roles and responsibilities of agencies managing border security
programs. As a result, DOD and DOE officials managing border security
programs stated that agencies' roles are not defined, information
sharing is infrequent, and there are no procedures to resolve
differences among agencies.
Most DOD and DOE Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation Programs Are
Distinct:
We found that most threat reduction and nonproliferation projects in
DOD and DOE have distinct missions, goals, and activities. DOD's CTR
program has few projects that are similar to those in DOE and State.
Figure 3 folds DOD's projects into broader program areas and
distinguishes those distinct program areas from those that are similar.
First, DOD has several projects in the FSU to destroy strategic weapons
systems such as bombers, missiles, and submarines. Second, DOD funds
the safe and secure transport of the Russian nuclear warheads scheduled
for elimination. Third, DOD is constructing a chemical weapons
destruction facility at Shchuch'ye to help eliminate Russia's declared
stockpile of nerve agents. Fourth, DOD is assisting in the elimination
of WMD infrastructure by, for example, dismantling biological weapons
facilities in Kazakhstan. Finally, the CTR program engages in projects
that facilitate contact between U.S. and FSU defense and military
personnel. Program events include conferences, seminars, and combined
military exercises designed to strengthen defense partnerships between
the United States and FSU states.
Figure 3: DOD and DOE Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation Program
Areas:
[See PDF for image]
[A] Currently, DOD only has programs employing biological weapons
scientists, whereas DOE and State's programs employ chemical, nuclear,
missile, and biological weapons scientists.
[End of figure]
We also found that most DOE projects have distinct missions, goals, and
activities addressing the proliferation threat posed by nuclear and
radiological materials (see fig. 3). First, fissile materials
disposition projects eliminate weapons-grade nuclear materials. For
example, DOE has a project to eliminate surplus Russian plutonium by
turning it into fuel for use in civilian nuclear power plants. Second,
DOE is assisting Russia by shutting down three nuclear power plants
that produce plutonium and replacing them with power plants fueled by
coal. Third, DOE conducts nonproliferation research and development,
such as developing technologies used to detect, locate, and identify
nuclear explosions. Fourth, DOE consolidates and secures radioactive
materials that could be used in dirty bombs.[Footnote 25] Finally,
DOE's highly enriched uranium transparency project monitors the
conversion of material from Russian nuclear warheads into fuel for
civilian nuclear power plants.
We found three program areas where both DOD and DOE have projects that
perform similar activities in the FSU. First, both agencies have
projects to improve the security of sites where Russian nuclear
warheads are stored, such as installing fences and security systems.
Second, both agencies have projects to employ former biological weapons
scientists to prevent the proliferation of their expertise to states
and terrorist organizations. Third, both agencies have projects to
enhance the ability of countries to secure their borders against the
smuggling of WMD materials. The State Department has its own programs
to employ biological former biological weapons scientists and secure
borders against the trafficking of WMD materials and plays a role in
coordinating U.S. efforts in these areas. See appendix III for more
information regarding DOD, DOE, and State's projects in these areas.
Warhead Security Program Coordination Has Improved:
We have previously reported that DOD and DOE were pursuing different
approaches to securing nuclear warhead sites in Russia.[Footnote 26]
DOD and DOE had plans to upgrade some of the same storage sites, and
DOD had already purchased equipment to upgrade security at some of
those sites. Additionally, DOD and DOE used different vendors to
purchase different equipment to perform the same function, which could
have resulted in extra training and maintenance costs. As a result of
our work, DOD and DOE coordinated their efforts to avoid duplication by
identifying the agency with the best access to and cooperation of the
Russians to install the security upgrades. Furthermore, we recommended
that an integrated plan be developed for these programs on issues such
as resolving equipment standardization concerns.
During the course of our audit work, NSC staff issued common policy
guidance for DOD and DOE programs that help Russia secure its nuclear
warheads. The policy guidance prohibited assistance to operational
sites due to concerns that U.S. assistance may enhance Russia's
military capability. Additionally, NSC staff established interagency
procedures for coordinating warhead security assistance activities
through a working group that reviews all requests for assistance, with
neither DOD nor DOE being allowed to implement a project without the
group's approval. In the case of a dispute, an agency can escalate the
request for assistance to a higher level interagency group. According
to both DOD and DOE officials, the guidelines and procedures
implemented since our report have improved coordination, such as
holding interagency meetings. In commenting on a draft of this report,
DOE stated that DOD and DOE include representatives from the other
agency on each other's bilateral forums with the Russians. Other
working group participants acknowledged that coordination concerns have
been reduced but stated that information sharing should be improved,
especially about issues escalated above the working group level.
Biological Weapons Scientist Employment Programs Have Elements of Well
Coordinated Programs:
We found that the coordination of biological weapons scientist
employment programs is characterized by clearly delineated roles and
responsibilities, regular interaction, and dispute resolution
procedures. In September 2002, NSC staff issued guidelines governing
the coordination of the biological weapons scientist employment
programs, which addressed these three elements. These guidelines state
the roles of each agency, formalize information sharing, and include
procedures for resolving disputes. Additionally, the guidelines
describe oversight requirements and other factors to be considered when
implementing these programs.
Agency officials managing the biological weapons scientist employment
programs did not report any difficulties pertaining to coordination or
to the activities of other agencies. These officials stated that the
NSC staff guidelines are valuable in ensuring that activities are
undertaken by the appropriate agency and agencies' programs work toward
common U.S. objectives. These guidelines established the
Nonproliferation Interagency Roundtable, which ensures that all
agencies are aware of each other's activities in employing biological
weapons scientists in the FSU and that the agencies avoid duplication
of efforts. Proposals for new projects are reviewed and voted on
monthly by the Nonproliferation Interagency Roundtable. If
disagreements arise after the voting process has occurred, agencies may
escalate the decision to a group chaired by NSC staff. Officials we
spoke with stated that coordination has worked successfully. DOD, DOE,
and State officials all cited the NSC staff guidelines when discussing
their programs with us and confirmed that these guidelines were applied
governmentwide.
Border Security Programs Lack Elements of Well Coordinated Programs:
There is no governmentwide guidance for border security programs that
delineates agencies' roles and responsibilities, establishes regular
information sharing, and defines procedures for resolving interagency
disputes, according to DOD and DOE officials. Although the State
Department prepared a strategic plan that identifies and describes
border security programs and interagency coordination mechanisms in
Eurasia, the plan does not clearly establish the departments' roles or
how information is shared.[Footnote 27] The plan also acknowledges that
NSC staff will provide policy oversight and guidance to implement the
border security programs, but DOD and DOE officials with whom we met
were unaware of such guidance.
The primary coordination mechanism for all border security programs is
an interagency working group chaired by the State Department's
Nonproliferation Bureau. According to DOD and DOE officials, the group
does not have regularly scheduled meetings.[Footnote 28] DOE officials
stated they would prefer to meet more often to facilitate coordination
of their programs and reduce the amount of informal coordination, such
as telephone conversations and e-mails, which they believe is less
efficient. State Department officials acknowledged that coordination of
these programs could be better, but stated that they lack the authority
to resolve conflicts over coordination.
In the absence of guidance for coordination, agency officials question
the other agencies' roles and responsibilities. For example, both State
and DOD officials acknowledged that their border security programs
conduct similar activities, such as training border security guards and
providing equipment for detecting illicit trafficking of WMD.
Furthermore, State Department officials questioned whether some aspects
of DOD's International Counterproliferation Program were targeting
countries that may no longer require the type of assistance being
provided. For example, DOD's program provided basic level WMD courses
to officials from Bulgaria, which is beyond the need for basic level
training, according to a State Department official.
In May 2002, we reported problems with the coordination of border
security programs.[Footnote 29] We found that portal monitors provided
through the State Department's border security program did not meet the
standards established by DOE.[Footnote 30] Since our report, the State
Department has transferred responsibility of operation and maintenance
of the monitors to DOE, and State is no longer funding the installation
of portal monitors. According to State and DOE officials, the specific
problems we highlighted have since been resolved, such as the
coordination of agencies' border security activities. We have follow-up
work under way regarding this issue.
Conclusions:
DOD and DOE develop their own strategic plans, prioritize their own
program activities, and measure their own program performance. While
this approach helps keep the departments on track to meet their own
objectives, it does not provide governmentwide guidance for U.S. threat
reduction and nonproliferation programs, which would include goals,
time frames for meeting those goals, and mechanisms for establishing
priorities across the various departments involved in program
implementation. In light of the U.S. government's elimination of
nuclear infrastructure in Libya, recent agreement to eliminate chemical
weapons in Albania, and the growing likelihood of other efforts
expanding outside the FSU, overall strategic guidance becomes
increasingly important given the involvement of multiple agencies.
While NSC staff has provided guidance to agencies implementing programs
to secure Russian warheads and employ former Soviet biological weapons
scientists, there is no governmentwide strategy for agencies
implementing threat reduction and nonproliferation programs worldwide.
The requirement in the Fiscal Year 2003 Foreign Relations Authorization
Act for a Presidential report detailing the coordination of
nonproliferation programs provides an opportunity for the
administration to review its broad array of threat reduction and
nonproliferation programs to ensure that the programs and capabilities
of the various departments address all proliferation threats worldwide.
As part of this effort, DOD and DOE can draw upon lessons learned from
programs in the FSU.
In addition, while the majority of threat reduction and
nonproliferation programs do not address similar missions, it is still
important for policy makers and program managers at DOD and DOE to (1)
understand how their efforts contribute to broader U.S. goals and (2)
have formal mechanisms for sharing information and lessons learned that
cut across programmatic boundaries. In those areas where more than one
department is addressing a similar mission, interagency coordination is
important to avoid duplication and collectively meet common goals. We
found that interagency coordination of threat reduction and
nonproliferation programs appears to work best when there is clear
guidance from NSC staff regarding the roles of the various departments,
regularized agency interactions, and resolution of interagency
disputes, as is the case with the projects to employ biological weapons
scientists and secure warhead sites. However, we found that
coordination is limited among the border security projects where there
is no NSC staff guidance.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
We recommend that the Secretaries of Defense and Energy, in
consultation with other agencies involved in threat reduction and
nonproliferation programs, develop an integrated plan for all U.S.
threat reduction and nonproliferation programs to ensure that the
programs are effectively coordinated and address all threats. The
results of this review should be reported to the Congress as part of
the President's response to section 1339 of the Fiscal Year 2003
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, which requires the President to
submit a report after each presidential inauguration on threat
reduction and nonproliferation objectives and how executive branch
efforts will be coordinated.
We also recommend that the Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs, through the NSC staff, lead the development of a plan
guiding the implementation and coordination of threat reduction and
nonproliferation programs addressing border security as they have done
with the programs addressing the employment of biological weapons
scientists. This plan should identify U.S. government goals and
objectives, designate departments' roles and responsibilities, and
establish procedures to resolve policy and program disputes.
Agency Comments:
DOE and DOD provided comments on a draft of this report, which are
reproduced in appendixes IV and V. DOE agreed with the report and the
corresponding recommendations. DOD concurred with the need for better
integrated nonproliferation and threat reduction programs, but did not
specify whether it agreed with the need for an integrated plan. DOD
concurred with the need for NSC staff guidance governing border
security programs. State Department and the NSC staff did not comment
on this report. DOE, DOD, and State provided technical comments, which
we incorporated as appropriate.
Scope and Methodology:
To assess DOD and DOE's strategies to implement their respective threat
reduction and nonproliferation programs, we obtained agencies'
strategic plans, project/program planning documents, budget documents,
and annual reports. To assess attempts to integrate these strategies,
we consulted relevant public laws and met with experts at the Nuclear
Threat Initiative, a global initiative that seeks to raise public
awareness of WMD threats and carries out threat reduction work; the
Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of
International Studies, a nongovernmental organization in the United
States that provides research and training on nonproliferation issues;
and the U.S. - Russia Corporate Partnerships Advancing Nonproliferation
and National Security, a congressional bipartisan study group. To
assess DOD and DOE strategies to implement their threat reduction and
nonproliferation programs, we compared them against select criteria
contained in GPRA and reviewed our prior work relating to performance
metrics and program assessment. We also interviewed DOD and DOE
officials, including the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for
Technology Security Policy and Counterproliferation, the Director and
Deputy Director of DTRA's CTR program, and senior leadership from the
CTR program office. The DOE officials we interviewed include the Deputy
Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation and senior officials
from the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention Program. In addition,
we spoke with officials from the DOD and DOE Inspector's General
office, the Office of Management and Budget, the Congressional Research
Service, and the intelligence community.
To assess efforts to coordinate DOD, DOE, and State programs with
similar missions, we obtained documents from these agencies regarding
their threat reduction and nonproliferation programs. We also reviewed
NSC staff guidance on biological weapons scientists' employment and
warhead security programs. We also reviewed DOD, DOE, and State
documents regarding their border security programs. Finally, we relied
on our previous reviews of the CTR program and several nonproliferation
programs within DOE and the State Department. We also interviewed
numerous officials, including the Director and Deputy Director of
DTRA's CTR program, the Office of the Secretary of Defense Policy for
CTR programs, and the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Technology
Security Policy and Counterproliferation. DOE officials include the
Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, the
Assistant Deputy Administrator of the Office of International Material
Protection and Cooperation, and other senior officials from the other
DNN program areas. At the State Department, we interviewed the
Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia and met with
officials from the Bureau of Nonproliferation. We also met with the
managers of programs addressing border security, weapons security, and
employment of biological weapons scientists. NSC officials did not
respond to our requests to meet. However, we discussed the role of the
NSC staff and the extent of its participation in coordinating programs
with DOD, DOE, and State officials.
We also relied on related prior GAO reports. We performed our review in
Washington, D.C., from February 2004 to November 2004 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees; the National Security Council; and the Secretaries of
Defense, Energy, and State. We will also make copies available to
others upon request. In addition, the report will be available on the
GAO Web site at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you have questions regarding this report, please contact Mr.
Christoff at (202) 512-8979 or [Hyperlink, christoffj@gao.gov] or Mr.
Aloise at (202) 512-3841 or [Hyperlink, aloisee@gao.gov]. GAO contacts
and staff acknowledgments are listed in appendix VI.
Signed by:
Joseph A. Christoff:
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
Signed by:
Gene Aloise:
Acting Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
[End of section]
Appendixes:
Appendix I: DOD and DOE Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation Projects,
Fiscal Year 2004:
Table 3: Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction Projects:
Project: Emergency Response Support Equipment;
Description: Provides equipment to Russia for use in an emergency
response train should accidents occur during transportation of
ballistic missiles. The equipment, including a rail-mounted crane,
hydraulic tools, concrete pulverizers, and an excavator, is available
to support missile transportation and dismantlement.
Project: Solid Propellant Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM)
and Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) and Mobile Launcher
Elimination;
Description: Will refurbish and operate Russian missile disassembly
facilities;
provide the equipment for and operation of, mobile launcher elimination
facilities;
and perform destruction of treaty-limited components.
Project: Liquid Propellant ICBM and Silo Elimination;
Description: Eliminates silos and destroy missiles in accordance with
treaty requirements. Activities include deactivating silos, providing
upgrades to the missile elimination and destruction facility at
Surovatikha, and furnishing equipment to store and transport liquid
missile propellant.
Project: SLBM Launcher Elimination/Ballistic Missile Submarine
Dismantlement;
Description: Assists Russia in eliminating submarine missile launchers
in accordance with treaty requirements and provide assistance to
dismantle and eliminate submarine.
Project: Spent Naval Fuel Disposition;
Description: Supports submarine missile launcher elimination and
associated ballistic missile submarine dismantlement through dry
storage of spent nuclear fuel removed when defueling submarines. In
addition to storing the fuel in storage/ transportation containers, a
means of transporting the containers by rail from the shipyard to a
final storage/disposition location is included.
Project: Liquid Propellant SLBM Elimination;
Description: Assists in destroying submarine missiles from the Russian
Northern and Pacific Fleets. The destruction process includes shipping,
defueling, neutralization, and cutting into pieces all proliferable
components of submarine missiles.
Project: Personnel Reliability and Safety;
Description: Provides training and equipment to assist Russia in
determining the reliability of its guard forces.
Project: Site Security Enhancements;
Description: Enhances the safety and security of Russian nuclear
weapons storage sites through the use of vulnerability assessments to
determine specific requirements for upgrades. The Department of Defense
(DOD) will then develop security designs to address those
vulnerabilities and install the equipment necessary to bring security
standards consistent with those at U.S. nuclear weapons storage
facilities.
Project: Nuclear Weapons Transportation;
Description: Assists Russia in shipping nuclear warheads to more secure
sites or dismantlement locations.
Project: Railcar Maintenance and Procurement;
Description: Assists Russia in maintaining nuclear weapons cargo
railcars. Funds maintenance of railcars until no longer feasible, then
purchases replacement railcars to maintain 100 cars in service. DOD
will procure 15 guard railcars to replace those retired from service.
Guard railcars will be capable of monitoring security systems in the
cargo railcars and transporting security force personnel.
Project: Weapons Transportation Safety Enhancements;
Description: Will provide emergency response vehicles containing
hydraulic cutting tools, pneumatic jacks, and safety gear to enhance
Russia's ability to respond to possible accidents in transporting
nuclear weapons. Meteorological, radiation detection and monitoring,
and communications equipment is also included.
Project: Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility;
Description: Is constructing a destruction facility for Russian nerve
agent-filled munitions near the town of Shchuch'ye. The United States
will fund the design, construction, equipment acquisition and
installation, systems integration, training, and start-up of the
destruction facility. The Russians will construct one of the two
buildings in which the nerve agent will be removed from munitions and
neutralized, and the drained munitions will be decontaminated.
Project: Chemical Weapons Production Facility Demilitarization;
Description: Will demilitarize former nerve agent weapons production
facilities by decontaminating, dismantling, and destroying specialized
equipment and special features related to the production, transfer,
and storage of chemical agent/weapons in accordance with treaty
requirements.
Project: SS-24 Missile Motor Elimination;
Description: Is contingent on Ukraine agreeing to a means of missile
motor disposal other than the original "water washout method."
According to DOD, this method was fiscally and technologically risky.
If an alternate means is agreed upon, the project would also fund
continued storage of the motors until eliminated.
Project: Biological Weapons (BW) Infrastructure Elimination;
Description: Assesses all known former BW facilities and institutes in
the former Soviet Union where access is provided. These assessments
provide detailed vulnerability and threat analyses for each institute
and facility, which will then be used to develop implementation plans
for reducing BW proliferation threats and prioritizing facility
dismantlement efforts.
Project: Biosecurity and Biosafety;
Description: Provides security and safety upgrades at institutes
engaged only in legitimate dangerous pathogen research. Tasks include
identification and implementation of necessary structural improvements
and consolidation of dangerous pathogen collections to reduce the
number of sites in a given country storing pathogens.
Project: Cooperative Biological Research;
Description: Engages former BW scientists in peaceful pursuits in order
to prevent the proliferation of BW expertise to terrorist groups and
rogue states. The United States works with institutes and scientists
employed in legitimate research to develop collaborative projects
involving dangerous pathogens for prophylactic, preventive, or other
peaceful purposes.
Project: BW Threat Agent Detection and Response;
Description: Will promote biosecurity and biosafety at biological
facilities in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan by strengthening dangerous
pathogen detection and response networks, enabling discovery of the
diversion or accidental release of biological materials, and removing
pathogens from existing field stations by safely and securely
transporting and consolidating them in central labs.
Project: Caspian Sea Maritime Interdiction;
Description: Seeks to provide Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan with a
comprehensive capability for WMD detection and interdiction of illicit
trafficking in WMD-related materials and components along the maritime
borders of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan and the Caspian Sea.
Project: Uzbekistan Portal Monitors;
Description: Provides a comprehensive nuclear detection and
interdiction capability of illicit trafficking in WMD-related materials
at key ports of entry.
Project: Ukraine Land Border Proliferation Prevention;
Description: Provides Ukraine, in conjunction with DOE's Second Line of
Defense, with a comprehensive capability for nuclear detection and
interdiction of illicit trafficking in WMD-related materials along the
Ukraine/ Moldova border.
Project: Defense and Military Contacts;
Description: Expands contacts between defense establishments in the
former Soviet Union in order to stem the proliferation of WMD, support
the implementation of new strategic frameworks, and increase U.S.
access by strengthening defense partnerships. Events will include,
among other things, exchange visits of senior and midlevel officers,
combined military exercises, conferences, and seminars.
Source: GAO summary of DOD threat reduction projects.
[End of table]
Table 4: Department of Energy Nonproliferation Projects within Defense
Nuclear Nonproliferation:
Project: Global Radiological Threat Reduction;
Description: Secures radiological sources no longer needed in the
United States and locate, identify, recover, consolidate, and enhance
the security of radioactive materials outside the United States.
Project: Global Nuclear Material Threat Reduction;
Description: Eliminates the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in
civilian nuclear facilities around the world by converting research
reactors to the use of low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel, returns U.S.-
origin HEU and LEU spent fuel to the United States from U.S.-supplied
research reactors around the world, returns Russian-origin fresh and
spent HEU fuel to Russia from Russian-supplied research reactors around
the world, secures plutonium-bearing spent nuclear fuel from the BN-350
fast breeder reactor in Kazakhstan, and recovers nuclear materials at
vulnerable locations throughout the world.
Project: Proliferation Detection Project;
Description: Develops advanced remote sensing and ground-based
technologies, in support of other agencies, to address problems related
to detection, location, and analysis of foreign weapons programs.
Project: Nuclear Explosion Monitoring Project;
Description: Develops satellite and ground-based technologies to detect
nuclear test explosions.
Project: HEU Transparency Implementation Project;
Description: Monitors Russian uranium processing facilities to provide
assurance that LEU sold to the United States for civilian nuclear power
plants under the 1993 HEU Purchase Agreement is derived from weapons-
usable HEU removed from dismantled Russian nuclear weapons.
Project: Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production Project;
Description: Provides replacement fossil-fuel energy that will allow
Russia to shutdown its three remaining weapons-grade plutonium
production reactors.
Project: International Emergency Management Project;
Description: Assists foreign governments and international
organizations in the development of emergency policy and preparedness
infrastructure, emergency operations facilities, emergency procedures,
exercise programs, and technical and training assistance.
Project: Nonproliferation Policy Project;
Description: Works to develop U.S. policy options and technical
measures for use with foreign governments to promote safe, secure
nuclear reductions and transparent monitoring of nuclear warheads,
fissile material, and associated facilities;
to strengthen regional security in order to reduce states' incentives
to obtain WMD;
and to strengthen global nonproliferation regimes. Works with DOE/NNSA
and National Laboratories to ensure compliance with applicable
nonproliferation treaties and agreements.
Project: Export Control Policy and Cooperation Project;
Description: Regulates the use and supply of technologies that could
contribute to the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons
as well as missile systems for the delivery of such weapons.
Project: International Safeguards Project;
Description: Develops and delivers technology applications to
strengthen capabilities to detect and verify undeclared nuclear
programs; enhances the physical protection and proper accounting of
nuclear material; and assists foreign national partners to meet
safeguards commitments.
Project: Russian Transition Initiatives Project;
Description: Redirects WMD scientists to peaceful, civilian employment.
Project: Nuclear Warhead Protection Project;
Description: Provides material protection, control, and accounting
upgrades to enhance the security of Navy HEU fuel and nuclear
material.
Project: Weapons Material Protection Project;
Description: Provides material protection, control, and accounting
upgrades to nuclear weapons, uranium enrichment, and material
processing and storage sites.
Project: Material Consolidation and Civilian Sites Project;
Description: Enhances the security of proliferation-attractive nuclear
material in Russia by supporting material protection, control, and
accounting upgrade projects at Russian civilian nuclear facilities.
Project: National Infrastructure and Sustainability Project;
Description: Develops national and regional resources in the Russian
Federation to help establish and sustain effective operation of
upgraded nuclear material protection, control, and accounting systems.
Project: Second Line of Defense and Megaports Initiative Project;
Description: Negotiates cooperative efforts with the Russian Federation
and other key countries to strengthen the capability of enforcement
officials to detect and deter illicit trafficking of nuclear and
radiological material across international borders. This is
accomplished through the detection, location, and identification of
nuclear and nuclear-related materials, the development of response
procedures and capabilities, and the establishment of required
infrastructure elements to support the control of these materials.
Project: Surplus U.S. HEU Disposition Project;
Description: Disposes of surplus domestic HEU by down-blending it.
Project: Surplus U.S. Plutonium Disposition Project;
Description: Disposes of surplus domestic plutonium by fabricating it
into mixed oxide fuel for irradiation in existing, commercial nuclear
reactors.
Project: Surplus Russian Plutonium Disposition Project;
Description: Supports Russia's efforts to dispose of its weapons-grade
plutonium by working with the international community to help pay for
Russia's program.
Source: GAO summary of DOE nonproliferation projects.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix II: DOD and DOE Metrics Used to Assess the Performance of
Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation Programs:
DOD and DOE assess the performance of their threat reduction and
nonproliferation programs. They establish goals and assess progress
toward meeting these goals using performance metrics. Table 5 lists
these DOD and DOE goals and metrics.
Table 5: DOD and DOE Performance Metrics:
DOD:
Goal: Eliminate Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, Submarine Launched
Ballistic Missiles, and nuclear-capable Air to Surface Missiles;
Metric: 1. Number of missiles eliminated.
Goal: Eliminate silos, rail/road-mobile launchers, ballistic missile
submarine launch tubes, and bombers;
Metric: 2. Numbers of launchers eliminated;
Metric: 3. Percentage of design completed;
Metric: 4. Percentage of construction completed;
Metric: 5. Projected total program cost.
Goal: Eliminate Former Soviet Union (FSU) nuclear, chemical weapon, and
biological weapon infrastructure at "n" sites;
Metric: 6. Number of sites.
Goal: Conduct vulnerability assessments to consolidate and secure FSU
nuclear, chemical and biological weapons facilities and materials;
Metric: 7. Number of sites.
Goal: Develop site designs to consolidate and secure FSU nuclear and
biological weapons facilities and materials;
Metric: 8. Number of sites.
Goal: Complete site upgrades to consolidate and secure FSU nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons facilities and materials;
Metric: 9. Number of sites.
Goal: Construct a Fissile Missile Storage Facility (FMSF) to provide
safe and secure storage for fissile material from dismantled warheads;
Metric: 10. Percentage of FMSF completed without transparency;
Metric: 11. FMSF transparency system;
Metric: 12. Projected total program cost.
DOE:
Goal: Develop new technologies to improve U.S. capabilities to detect
and monitor nuclear weapons production and testing;
Metric: 1. Number of advanced radiation and remote sensing technologies
developed and evaluated;
Metric: 2. Number of advanced technologies and operational systems
(e.g., satellite payloads and seismic station calibration data sets)
delivered to U.S. national security users;
Metric: 3. Number of professional papers/exchanges presented, each
representing Science and Technology knowledge and U.S. leadership in
program area;
Metric: 4. Annual percentage of all active research and development
projects for which an independent research and development merit
assessment has been completed within the last 3 years.
Goal: Detect, prevent, and reverse the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) materials, technology, and expertise, and to
strengthen the nonproliferation regime;
Metric: 5. Annual number of safeguards or physical protection courses
conducted;
Metric: 6. Annual percentage of U.S. exports reviewed for proliferation
concern;
Metric: 7. Cumulative number of cooperative agreement actions
completed;
Metric: 8. Cumulative kilograms of HEU purchased and delivered.
Goal: Prevent nuclear terrorism by working in Russia and other regions
of concern to (1) secure and eliminate vulnerable nuclear weapons and
weapons-usable material; (2) locate, consolidate, and secure
radiological materials that can be used in a dirty bomb; and (3)
install detection equipment at border crossings and Mega-Seaports to
prevent and detect the illicit transfer of nuclear material;
Metric: 9. Percentage of 39 Russian Navy warhead sites secured;
Metric: 10. Percentage of 25 Russian Strategic Rocket Forces sites
secured;
Metric: 11. Percentage of 600 metric tons (MT) of weapons-usable
nuclear material secured;
Metric: 12. Percentage of 27 MTs of HEU converted to LEU;
Metric: 13. Cumulative number of Second Line of Defense sites with
nuclear detection equipment installed;
Metric: 14. Annual percentage of buildings scheduled for completion of
security upgrades in a year that are done on time.
Goal: Prevent adverse migration of WMD expertise by engaging weapons
experts in peaceful efforts and by helping to downsize the Russian
nuclear weapons complex;
Metric: 15. Annual number of former Soviet weapons scientists,
engineers, and technicians engaged;
Metric: 16. Cumulative number of technologies commercialized or
businesses created;
Metric: 17. Cumulative percentage of nuclear complex reduction targets
completed at six weapons facilities;
Metric: 18. Annual percentage of non-U.S. government funding
contributions obtained.
Goal: Assurance that the LEU being purchased under the 1993 U.S./
Russian HEU Purchase Agreement is derived from HEU extracted from
dismantled Russian nuclear weapons, by developing and implementing
mutually agreeable transparency measures to ensure that the 500 MT of
HEU covered by the agreement is permanently down blended and eliminated
from Russian inventory;
Metric: 19. Number of Blend-Down Monitoring Systems operational and
the annual percentage of operation during the HEU blend-down process;
Metric: 20. Percentage completed of the 24 annually allowed Special
Monitoring Visits to the four Russian HEU-to- LEU processing
facilities;
Metric: 21. Percentage of the year that the on-site Transparency
Monitoring Office is staffed at the Ural Electrochemical Integrated
Plant.
Goal: Reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism by facilitating shutdown
of the three remaining weapons-grade plutonium production reactors in
Russia through (1) construction of a new fossil-fuel plant, (2)
refurbish an existing fossil-fuel power plant, and (3) execution of a
nuclear safety upgrades project to improve reactor safety pending
shutdown of the reactors;
Metric: 22. Percentage of progress toward constructing a fossil plant
in Seversk;
Metric: 23. Percentage of progress toward constructing a fossil plant
in Zheleznogorsk facilitating shutdown of one weapons-grade plutonium
production reactor;
Metric: 24. Percentage of progress toward completing interim safety
upgrades to the three operating Russian plutonium production reactors;
Metric: 25. Amount of Russian Federation weapons-grade plutonium
production eliminated annually, and cumulatively, from the 1.2 MT per
year baseline.
Goal: Eliminate surplus Russian plutonium and surplus U.S. plutonium
and HEU;
Metric: 26. Percentage of the design and construction of the Pit
Disassembly and Conversion Facility completed;
Metric: 27. Percentage of the design and construction of the mixed
oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility completed;
Metric: 28. Amount of HEU shipped to the United States Enrichment
Corporation for down blending;
Metric: 29. Amount of off-specification HEU down blended;
Metric: 30. Russianize the design and construct the MOX Fuel Facility
in Russia.
Goal: Identify, secure, remove, and/or facilitate the disposition of
vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials and equipment around the
world;
Metric: 31. Cumulative number of vulnerable radiological sites secured
internationally;
Metric: 32. Cumulative number of U.S. excess and unwanted sealed
sources recovered;
Metric: 33. Cumulative number of targeted research/test reactors
converted from HEU to LEU fuel;
Metric: 34. Cumulative kilograms of HEU fresh fuel and spent fuel from
Soviet- supplied research reactors repatriated to Russia;
Metric: 35. Cumulative number of fuel assemblies containing U.S.-
origin spent fuel returned from foreign research reactors.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD and DOE data.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: DOD, DOE, and State Department Projects Addressing
Similar Missions:
DOD and DOE and State have projects in three areas that address similar
missions in the FSU. These areas are the employment of former
biological weapons scientists to prevent the proliferation of their
expertise, improvement of security at sites where Russian nuclear
warheads are stored, and the enhancement of countries' ability to
secure their borders against the smuggling of WMD materials. Tables 6,
7, and 8 show the different projects, funding and countries served for
all three agencies and areas.
Table 6: DOD and DOE Warhead Security Projects:
Dollars in millions.
Site Security Enhancements;
Lead agency: DOD;
Description: This project is designed to enhance the safety and
security of Russian nuclear weapons storage sites by conducting
vulnerability assessments and providing equipment such as fences and
sensor systems;
2004 funding: $$47.9;
Location: Russia.
Warhead Security Program;
Lead agency: DOE;
Description: DOE is enhancing the security around some strategic rocket
forces sites and some Navy sites. Threat assessments are conducted at
the sites and security equipment is provided;
2004 funding: $107.0;
Location: Russia.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD and DOE data.
[End of table]
Table 7: DOD, DOE, and State Biological Weapons Scientist Employment
Projects:
Dollars in millions.
Biological Weapons Proliferation Prevention (BWPP) Program's
Cooperative Biological Research (CBR) Project;
Lead agency: DOD;
Description: The CBR project engages former biological weapons (BW)
scientists in peaceful pursuits in order to prevent the proliferation
of BW expertise to terrorist groups and rogue states;
2004 funding: $$6.1;
Location: Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and soon-to-be Georgia.
Russian Transition Initiative (RTI) Program's;
Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) Project;
Lead agency: DOE;
Description: The IPP project engage scientists in the FSU in peaceful
commercial activities;
2004 funding: $23.3;
Location: Russia and the FSU.
Office of Proliferation Threat Reduction Program's Bio-Chem Redirect
Program;
Lead agency: State Department;
Description: The Bio-Chem Redirect Program funds efforts to redirect
former biological and chemical weapons scientists via civilian research
projects in collaboration with the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, Department of Agriculture, and Environmental Protection
Agency;
2004 funding: $19.9;
Location: Russia and the FSU.
BioIndustry Initiative;
Lead agency: State Department;
Description: The initiative seeks to engage and strategically transform
former Soviet biological production facilities, their technology and
expertise for sustainable, commercial, and peaceful enterprises;
2004 funding: $2.0;
Location: The FSU.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD, DOE, and State data.
[End of table]
Table 8: Overview of Border Security Projects:
Dollars in millions.
Project: Lead agency: Description: 2004 funding: $[Empty].
Second Line of Defense Program;
Lead agency: DOE;
Description: The Second Line of Defense Program seeks to provide
detection equipment to combat nuclear material smuggling;
2004 funding: $$52.0;
Location: FSU states and other countries.
WMD Proliferation Prevention Initiative;
Lead agency: DOD;
Description: Bolsters states' ability to prevent proliferation of WMD
across their borders, DOD will provide equipment and logistics support,
training, and other support to those agencies of recipient governments
vested with the authority to monitor borders for illegal transport of
WMD or related materials;
2004 funding: $29.0;
Location: Non-Russian FSU states.
International Counter-proliferation Program;
Lead agency: DOD;
Description: Provides a series of training courses and equipment to
counter and respond to WMD-related incidents in-country and at borders,
this is a DOD coordinated effort with the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and U.S. Customs designed to detect, deter, and prevent
smuggling of WMD and related materials;
2004 funding: $10.0;
Location: The FSU, Baltic states, and Eastern Europe.
Export Control and Border Security;
Lead agency: State Department;
Description: Provides technical assistance, develops training
materials, and provides support to enhance countries' export control
and related border security capabilities;
2004 funding: $35.8;
Location: The FSU, Baltic states, and Eastern Europe.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD, DOE, and State data.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Energy:
Department of Energy:
National Nuclear Security Administration:
Washington, DC 20585:
JAN 11 2005:
Joseph A. Christoff:
Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Christoff:
The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) appreciates the
opportunity to have reviewed the Government Accountability Office's
(GAO) draft report GAO-05-127, "WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION:
Nonproliferation Programs Need Better Integration." While we agree with
the report and the corresponding recommendations, NNSA is submitting
the attached comments to clarify or correct information contained in
the draft report.
NNSA is also aware that the Department of Defense provided comments to
the draft report. Since there is a recommendation for the Secretaries
of Defense and Energy, we believe it is important for GAO to know that
NNSA agrees with the Department of Defense's response that they
submitted to GAO.
Should you have any questions related to this response, please contact
Richard Speidel, Director, Policy and Internal Controls Management. He
may be contacted at 202-586-5009.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Michael C. Kane:
Associate Administrator for Management and Administration:
Attachment:
cc: Paul Longsworth, Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation:
Robert Braden, Senior Procurement Executive:
Karen Boardman, Director, Service Center:
Comments on Draft GAO Report: Weapons of Mass Destruction:
Nonproliferation Programs Need Better Integration:
Page 12, chart and paragraph immediately below:
Rationale: accuracy: Change office of International Nuclear Safety and
Cooperation to Office of Nuclear Risk Reduction:
Rationale: accuracy: insert after "technologies and expertise..."
"eliminate or secure inventories of surplus nuclear materials usable
for nuclear weapons."
Page 21:
Delete last sentence of first paragraph "Other working group
participants..." Rationale: It is contradicting and is not "sourced. "
Also, it is a truism that "information sharing could be improved, " so
there's no need to say it. It's obvious and true in every setting no
matter how good the working relationships are: Insert after "such as
holding interagency meetings" the following statements: "For example,
coordination and information sharing have improved through the practice
of DoD and DOE including representatives from the other agency on each
other's bilateral forums with the Russians (e.g., DoD now sends a
representative to DOE's Joint Coordinating Group, and DOE sends a
representative to DoD's Implementation Working Group). Moreover, a
number of issues - ranging from security system design concepts to
sustainability strategies - have been resolved outside formal work
settings during frequent technical exchanges held jointly by DOE and
DoD."
Page 33:
Rationale: accuracy: Amend language in Global Nuclear Material Threat
Reduction description box to state: "Eliminate the use of high enriched
uranium (HEU) in civilian nuclear facilities around the world by
converting research reactors to the use of low enriched uranium (LEU)
fuel; return US-origin HEU and LEU spent fuel to the US from US-
supplied research reactors around the world; return Russian-origin
fresh and spent HEU fuel to Russia from Russian-supplied research
reactors around the world; secure plutonium-bearing spent nuclear fuel
from the BN-350 fast breeder reactor in Kazakhstan; and recover nuclear
materials at vulnerable locations throughout the world."
Rationale: accuracy: Amend language in HEU Transparency Project
description box to read: "Monitors Russian uranium processing
facilities to provide assurance that low enriched uranium (LEU) sold to
the U.S. for civilian nuclear power plants under the 1993 HEU Purchase
Agreement is derived from weapons-usable HEU removed from dismantled
Russian nuclear weapons."
Rationale: The Nonproliferation Policy project really shouldn't be
included at all since it is a policy office. However, if GAO insists in
including it in the final report, it should be amended for accuracy
reasons. The description should read: "Works to develop U.S. policy
options and technical measures for use with foreign governments to
promote safe, secure nuclear reductions and transparent monitoring of
nuclear warheads, fissile material and associated facilities; to
strengthen regional security in order to reduce states' incentives to
obtain WMD; and to strengthen global nonproliferation regimes. Works
with DOE/NNSA and National Laboratories to ensure compliance with
applicable nonproliferation treaties and agreements."
RTI:
Rationale: accuracy: Amend description to read: "Redirects WMD
scientists to peaceful, civilian employment."
Pages 35 - 37:
Rationale: accuracy/incorporate updated information: Table labeled
"DOD and DOE Performance Metrics" delete metric #5, 14, 33, 34, 35, and
the goal associated with these last three metrics. Add the following
goal:
* Goal: Identify, secure, remove and/or facilitate the disposition of
vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials and equipment around the
world.
2) Cumulative number of vulnerable radiological sites secured
internationally;
3) Cumulative number of US excess and unwanted sealed sources
recovered;
4) Cumulative number of targeted research/test reactors converted from
HEU to LEU fuel;
5) Cumulative kgs of HEU fresh fuel and spent fuel from Soviet-supplied
research reactors repatriated to Russia;
6) Cumulative number of fuel assemblies containing US-origin spent fuel
returned from foreign research reactors.
[End of section]
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense:
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:
POLICY:
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON:
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000:
Mr. Joseph A. Christoff:
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
JAN 07 2005
Dear Mr. Christoff:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the draft GAO
report, "WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: Nonproliferation Programs Need
Better Integration," dated November 30, 2004 (GAO Code 320255/GAO-05-
157). We have reviewed the draft report and are providing the following
comments:
GAO Recommendation (1): the Secretaries of Defense and Energy, in
consultation with relevant agencies, develop an integrated plan for all
U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation programs.
* DoD concurs with the view that better integrated threat reduction and
nonproliferation programs are in the U.S. national security interest,
and believes the National Security Council (NSC) staff plays a useful
role assisting in the coordination of U.S. threat reduction and
proliferation prevention programs. NSC staff-developed guidelines for
warhead security, biological weapons (BW) threat reduction, and other
nonproliferation programs have facilitated sound interagency
coordination.
The NSC's Proliferation Strategy Policy Coordinating Committee is
chaired by the Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director
for Proliferation Strategy, Counterproliferation and Homeland Defense;
it includes all relevant U.S. Government agencies; and it has been
charged with establishing priorities for U.S. nonproliferation efforts
in the former Soviet states, coordinating the implementation of those
efforts, and recommending overall policies and budget options to the
President through the NSC Deputies and Principals Committees.
GAO Recommendation (2): the National Security Council issue clear
guidance for the coordination of border security programs.
* DoD concurs with this recommendation.
We appreciate the opportunity to respond to this report and will
provide additional administrative comments directly to the author. My
point of contact for this report is James H. Reid at (703) 696-7737,
james.reid@osd.mil.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Lisa Bronson:
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense,
Technology Security Policy and Counterproliferation:
cc: ATSD (NCB) Director, DTRA:
[End of section]
Appendix VI: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
Dave Maurer (202) 512-9627 F. James Shafer (202) 512-6002:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition, Hynek Kalkus, Wyatt R. Hundrup, Nanette J. Ryen, William
Lanouette, Dorian L. Herring, Stacy Edwards, Lynn Cothern, Etana
Finkler, Judy Pagano, and Ernie Jackson made significant contributions
to this report.
FOOTNOTES
[1] S. 2980, 108TH Congress, 2ND Session.
[2] Public Law 108-136, Section 3611.
[3] Other calls for governmentwide planning include the President's
National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, the Baker-
Cutler Commission, and the Commission to Assess the Organization of the
Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction (the Deutch Commission).
[4] GAO, Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Russian Cooperation
Needed to Facilitate U.S. Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites,
GAO-03-482 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 24, 2003).
[5] Missiles, bombers, and missile carrying submarines may deliver WMD.
[6] NNSA also manages DOE's nuclear weapons and naval reactors
programs.
[7] In 2004, DOD programs were appropriated $451 million and DOE
programs were appropriated $1.33 billion, which includes funds for
programs in the United States, the FSU, and countries outside the FSU.
Although the DOD and DOE budget data are being used for background
purposes only, we assessed the reliability of these data and found they
were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.
[8] Public Law 102-511.
[9] A similar center was also established in Ukraine.
[10] The 2001 review focused on programs implemented in Russia; the
2002 review focused on programs in non-Russian FSU states.
[11] Other agencies involved in threat reduction and nonproliferation
programs include the Departments of State, Commerce, and Homeland
Security.
[12] The agencies have a variety of planning documents--such as
strategies, annual plans, and multiyear project plans--which we refer
to collectively as strategic plans.
[13] The CTR Policy Office is located within the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy.
[14] GAO, Weapons of Mass Destruction: Status of the Cooperative Threat
Reduction Program, GAO/NSIAD-96-222 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 27, 1996).
[15] Department of Defense Inspector General, Cooperative Threat
Reduction: Cooperative Threat Reduction Program Liquid Propellant
Disposition Project, Report No. D-2002-154 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30,
2002) and Cooperative Threat Reduction: Cooperative Threat Reduction
Construction Projects, Report No. D-2004-039 (Washington, D.C.: Dec.
18, 2003).
[16] Weapons-grade uranium is also known as highly enriched uranium.
[17] Uranium that cannot be used in weapons is also known as low
enriched uranium.
[18] GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE's Efforts to Assist Weapons
Scientists in Russia's Nuclear Cities Face Challenges, GAO-01-429
(Washington, D.C.: May 3, 2001).
[19] Public Law 107-228, Section 1332.
[20] Public Law 107-107, Section 1205; Public Law 107-314, Section
1205.
[21] Public Law 107-228, Section 1309.
[22] The legislation calls for a report to be submitted to the Congress
120 days after each presidential inauguration.
[23] GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Coordination of U.S. Programs
Designed to Reduce the Threat Posed by Weapons of Mass Destruction,
GAO-02-180T (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 14, 2001).
[24] For our assessment of the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of
Mass Destruction of 2002, see Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of
Selected Characteristics in National Strategies Related to Terrorism,
GAO-04-408T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3, 2004).
[25] Dirty bombs are designed to disperse radioactive material by
packaging explosives, such as dynamite, with radioactive material.
[26] GAO-03-482.
[27] Eurasia is defined as including the following countries: Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.
[28] In commenting on a draft of this report, the State Department
informed us that as of December 6, 2004, its Nonproliferation Bureau
established a schedule for regular meetings of the interagency working
group on border security issues. These meetings are scheduled to be
held every 2 months during calendar year 2005.
[29] GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Other
Countries Combat Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and
Planning, GAO-02-426 (Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2002).
[30] Portal monitors are stationary equipment designed to detect
radioactive materials carried by pedestrians or vehicles.
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Fax: (202) 512-6061:
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs:
Contact:
Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:
Public Affairs:
Jeff Nelligan, managing director,
NelliganJ@gao.gov
(202) 512-4800
U.S. Government Accountability Office,
441 G Street NW, Room 7149
Washington, D.C. 20548:
