Border Security
More Emphasis on State's Consular Safeguards Could Mitigate Visa Malfeasance Risks Gao ID: GAO-06-115 October 6, 2005Issuing a U.S. visa to a foreign citizen in exchange for money or something of value is a crime that can facilitate entry into the United States of unqualified persons, including those who may wish to do our country harm. Internal controls make it difficult for an employee to commit visa malfeasance without being detected, but, despite these safeguards, visa malfeasance does occur. GAO examined (1) State's internal controls to prevent nonimmigrant visa malfeasance and if they are being implemented and (2) visa malfeasance cases from 2001-2004 and factors cited by State and the Department of Justice (Justice) that contributed to visa malfeasance and affected investigations and prosecutions.
State has a set of internal controls to prevent visa malfeasance and has taken actions to improve them; however, these internal controls are not being fully and consistently implemented by the posts we visited. While State's controls are consistent with accepted control standards, we found noncompliance with required supervisory oversight at 6 of the 11 posts we visited. This included failure to inventory items used to issue visas, review visa decisions, and follow State's procedures when issuing visas for applicants referred by officers within the post. Lack of full compliance with internal controls increases vulnerability to visa malfeasance. State recently established two headquarters entities to monitor post visa operations. While stronger oversight should help strengthen compliance with internal controls, State has not developed automated software to sort and analyze abnormalities in visa issuances that could indicate potential malfeasance. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security substantiated 28 visa malfeasance cases between 2001 and 2004 involving U.S. employees. The suspects were fired, chose to resign, or were arrested. State investigators could not tell us how many opened cases were referred to Justice for possible prosecution because they had not been routinely collecting that information. In fact, their case records did not permit investigators to identify malfeasance trends or consular managers to identify internal control weaknesses needing attention. Justice's Public Integrity Section successfully prosecuted 10 U.S. government employees. State Diplomatic Security and Justice officials noted that their investigations and prosecutions were impeded by constraints on evidence gathering. Additionally, investigators can not obtain U.S. search warrants to search consular officer's offices or residences overseas. Justice and State are discussing the possibility of pursuing legal changes and other means to address these constraints.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-06-115, Border Security: More Emphasis on State's Consular Safeguards Could Mitigate Visa Malfeasance Risks
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Report to the Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, House of
Representatives:
October 2005:
Border Security:
More Emphasis on State's Consular Safeguards Could Mitigate Visa
Malfeasance Risks:
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-115]:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-115, a report to the Chairman, Committee on the
Judiciary, House of Representatives:
Why GAO Did This Study:
Issuing a U.S. visa to a foreign citizen in exchange for money or
something of value is a crime that can facilitate entry into the United
States of unqualified persons, including those who may wish to do our
country harm. Internal controls make it difficult for an employee to
commit visa malfeasance without being detected, but, despite these
safeguards, visa malfeasance does occur. GAO examined (1) State‘s
internal controls to prevent nonimmigrant visa malfeasance and if they
are being implemented and (2) visa malfeasance cases from 2001-2004 and
factors cited by State and the Department of Justice (Justice) that
contributed to visa malfeasance and affected investigations and
prosecutions.
What GAO Found:
State has a set of internal controls to prevent visa malfeasance and
has taken actions to improve them; however, these internal controls are
not being fully and consistently implemented by the posts we visited.
While State‘s controls are consistent with accepted control standards,
we found noncompliance with required supervisory oversight at 6 of the
11 posts we visited. This included failure to inventory items used to
issue visas, review visa decisions, and follow State‘s procedures when
issuing visas for applicants referred by officers within the post. Lack
of full compliance with internal controls increases vulnerability to
visa malfeasance. State recently established two headquarters entities
to monitor post visa operations. While stronger oversight should help
strengthen compliance with internal controls, State has not developed
automated software to sort and analyze abnormalities in visa issuances
that could indicate potential malfeasance.
The Bureau of Diplomatic Security substantiated 28 visa malfeasance
cases between 2001 and 2004 involving U.S. employees. The suspects were
fired, chose to resign, or were arrested. State investigators could not
tell us how many opened cases were referred to Justice for possible
prosecution because they had not been routinely collecting that
information. In fact, their case records did not permit investigators
to identify malfeasance trends or consular managers to identify
internal control weaknesses needing attention. Justice‘s Public
Integrity Section successfully prosecuted 10 U.S. government employees.
State Diplomatic Security and Justice officials noted that their
investigations and prosecutions were impeded by constraints on evidence
gathering. Additionally, investigators can not obtain U.S. search
warrants to search consular officer‘s offices or residences overseas.
Justice and State are discussing the possibility of pursuing legal
changes and other means to address these constraints.
Selected Key Internal Control Requirements and Status of
Implementation:
Issue: Control of accountable items;
Requirement: State‘s internal controls call for the maintenance of
careful records on the use of controllable items;
Implementation: Most posts did not reconcile the differences between
inventory records and stocks of blank visas on hand quarterly as
required, although daily reconciliations were routinely performed.
Issue: Criteria for post-referred applicants;
Requirement: State requires posts to establish a formal post-wide
referral system, reissue the procedures annually, and ensure that the
applicants meet the departmentwide criteria specified on the forms;
Implementation: Compliance with State‘s referral policies and
procedures were not consistently followed at seven of the posts we
reviewed. Moreover, four posts did not have the required post policy to
supplement State policies.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
What GAO Recommends:
To improve the safeguards over the visa process GAO recommends that the
Secretary of State develop strategies to achieve strict compliance with
internal controls and improve existing mechanisms to combat visa
malfeasance. We also recommend that the Secretary of State and the
Attorney General determine whether seeking additional overseas search
authorities is warranted to facilitate investigations of visa
malfeasance.
State agreed with the conclusions in our report and is taking steps to
implement the recommendations.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-115.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Jess T. Ford at (202) 512-
4128 or fordj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Consular Affairs Has Internal Controls over the Visa Process, but
Controls Are Not Being Fully Implemented at Posts GAO Reviewed:
Documented Cases of Visa Malfeasance:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of State:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Table:
Table 1: State Department Key Internal Control Requirements and Status
of Implementation:
Figure:
Figure 1: The Nonimmigrant Visa Process:
Abbreviations:
VAU: Vulnerability Assessment Unit:
CMAT: Consular Management Assistance Teams:
Letter October 6, 2005:
The Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.:
Chairman:
Committee on Judiciary:
House of Representatives:
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Issuing a U.S. visa to a foreign citizen in exchange for money or
something of value is a crime that can facilitate entry into the United
States of unqualified persons, including those who may wish to do our
country harm. In fiscal year 2004, Department of State (State) consular
officers issued more than 5 million visas at 211 overseas
posts.[Footnote 1] According to State's criminal investigators, some
applicants offer bribes to U.S. government employees in an attempt to
obtain visas. The integrity of U.S. government employees and controls
over the visa process are pivotal to preventing visa malfeasance. Visa
officers are professional employees who undergo extensive background
checks, have top secret security clearances, and receive training and
guidance in visa procedures and ethical conduct. However, some cases of
visa malfeasance have occurred involving consular officers and other
U.S. government officials.[Footnote 2] For example, in 2004, two
consular officers were convicted and sentenced for selling visas for
hundreds of thousands of dollars between 2000 and 2003. In this case,
State's Bureau of Consular Affairs determined that the malfeasance
occurred in part because of breaches in internal control procedures.
Full compliance with internal controls makes it difficult for an
employee to commit visa malfeasance without being detected.
This report examines (1) State's internal controls to prevent visa
malfeasance, and whether they are being implemented, and (2) visa
malfeasance cases from 2001 to 2004, and factors cited by State and the
Department of Justice (Justice) that contributed to visa malfeasance
and affected investigations and prosecutions. To conduct our review, we
analyzed key internal controls over the visa process identified by
State. We visited posts in six countries: Mexico, Ecuador, Peru,
Vietnam, Thailand, and India. We observed visa adjudications and
assessed post adherence to those internal controls. We also obtained
statistics on cases of visa malfeasance and the investigative outcomes.
Additionally, we discussed the investigative process with State's
Bureau of Diplomatic Security and the Office of the Inspector General.
At Justice, we discussed general factors affecting Justice's decisions
to prosecute cases and obtained data on the results of some prosecuted
cases. We conducted our review from August 2004 to July 2005 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Appendix I provides more information on our scope and methodology. We
have issued a separate report on actions taken to improve the visa
process since 2002 and areas that need additional management
attention.[Footnote 3]
Results in Brief:
State's Bureau of Consular Affairs has a set of internal controls to
prevent visa malfeasance and has taken actions to improve them;
however, these internal controls are not being fully and consistently
implemented at the posts we visited. While State's controls are
consistent with accepted control standards, we found noncompliance with
required supervisory oversight of the visa process at 6 of the 11 posts
we visited. This was manifested in a number of ways, including failure
to (1) inventory accountable items used to issue visas, (2)
independently review issued visas, and (3) follow State's established
procedures when post officers refer applicants for expedited visa
adjudication. Lack of full compliance with internal controls increases
vulnerability to visa malfeasance. Consular Affairs recently
strengthened its headquarters' oversight of post visa operations. For
example, it established a headquarters unit to monitor visa
adjudications. However, State has not developed software to sort and
analyze abnormalities in visa issuances that could indicate potential
malfeasance, but is in the process of doing so. This stronger oversight
should help strengthen compliance with internal controls.
According to the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, it substantiated 28
cases of alleged employee visa malfeasance between 2001 and 2004. The
suspects were fired, chose to resign, or were arrested. Investigators
from State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security could not tell us how many
opened cases were referred to Justice for possible prosecution because
they had not been routinely collecting that information. In fact, their
case records did not allow for production of data on case trends, such
as vulnerabilities in the visa process, which would be useful to
consular managers. Justice's Public Integrity Section successfully
prosecuted 10 government employees during this time period.[Footnote 4]
Justice and State Diplomatic Security officials noted that prosecutions
were impeded by legal constraints on evidence gathering. In particular,
these officials said that it is difficult to investigate and prosecute
visa malfeasance because other employee witnesses may not report their
suspicions until they are reassigned to another post, and this delay
makes the timely collection of evidence difficult. Furthermore,
according to Justice and State, conducting investigations overseas is
cumbersome for various reasons. For example, according to Justice, some
host country laws can make it difficult for investigators to obtain
financial records of U.S. employees residing overseas. Also, under U.S.
law, U.S. magistrates generally cannot issue warrants for U.S.
investigators to search an employee's office or leased residence
overseas. Justice and State have discussed for some time the
possibility of pursuing additional search authorities to address these
constraints, but have not determined a course of action.
To emphasize the importance of internal controls to consular officers,
section heads, and post managers, we recommend that the Secretary of
State:
* Develop a strategy to achieve strict compliance with internal
controls. The strategy should include a system to spot check
compliance. The strategy should also include formalized procedures in
Fraud Prevention Units to document how the post will address the risk
of employee malfeasance and emphasize the importance of reporting
suspected malfeasance to consular managers and post security officers.
* Improve State's existing mechanisms to combat visa malfeasance. This
could be accomplished by (1) improving the software available to the
Vulnerability Assessment Unit to automatically sort data to identify
and analyze abnormalities in post visa issuance statistics that could
be an indication of malfeasance and (2) enhancing the investigative
case tracking systems used by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security to
better identify trends and vulnerabilities in the visa process for use
by investigators and consular managers.
We also recommend that the Secretary of State and the Attorney General
determine whether seeking additional overseas search authorities is
warranted to facilitate investigations of visa malfeasance. If they
determine that such authorities are warranted, the Secretary of State
and the Attorney General should develop an implementation plan and
notify the Congress of any required legislative changes.
State agreed with the conclusions in our report, is taking steps to
reinforce and monitor compliance with internal controls at overseas
posts, and plans to implement our recommendations.
Background:
Foreign citizens wishing to temporarily enter the United States
generally fill out a visa application; make an appointment; pay a fee;
submit photographs and other documents; provide 2-digit fingerprints;
and appear for a document review, name check against government watch
lists, and interview with a State consular officer at an American
Embassy or Consulate. Consular officers review applications, interview
applicants, execute name checks through the Consular Lookout and
Support System,[Footnote 5] make notations, and assess whether the
applicant may be an intending immigrant, a potential threat to national
security, or otherwise ineligible. Following these steps, the applicant
is granted or refused a visa, or subjected to additional security
checks. (See fig. 1.) Consular officers are assisted by locally hired
staff who are generally not U.S. citizens. These staff perform support
tasks but do not adjudicate visas.
Figure 1: The Nonimmigrant Visa Process:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The Bureau of Consular Affairs considers the visa process to be a major
element of national security. In addition to guidance on visa
processing, State provides visa adjudicators, who are typically entry-
level officers, with specific guidance and training on examining
applicants' documentation, interviewing, and screening out applicants
who may pose security concerns. This guidance is provided in the
Foreign Affairs Manual and the Consular Management Handbook, as well as
through periodic policy updates of standard operating procedures
transmitted to overseas posts and placed on an intranet site.
While the Office of the Inspector General and Diplomatic Security share
authority for investigating visa malfeasance, Diplomatic Security
conducts most of the investigations. In particular, Diplomatic
Security's Visa Fraud Branch investigates visa malfeasance cases and
carries out related enforcement functions for State. These cases are
typically pursued by a regional security officer and consular
management and involve observation of the suspected employee and
collection of evidence to document the malfeasance. In cases where
Justice determines sufficient evidence exits, it will prosecute
employees who are accused of malfeasance.
Consular Affairs Has Internal Controls over the Visa Process, but
Controls Are Not Being Fully Implemented at Posts GAO Reviewed:
The Bureau of Consular Affairs has established a number of key internal
controls designed to mitigate the risk of employee malfeasance, some of
which are new or have been reinforced since September 11, 2001. Among
the controls State has emphasized are: limiting employee access to visa
issuing systems and applicants, periodic reconciliations of visa
stocks, specific criteria for post employees to follow when referring
foreign individuals seeking visas for favorable treatment by consular
officials, and mechanisms to provide oversight of key consular
activities by post and Consular Affairs headquarters management. While
Consular Affairs' controls are consistent with accepted control
standards,[Footnote 6] we found that some of the controls were not
always being followed at the posts we visited.
Internal Controls Are in Place, and Many Are Either New or Have Been
Reinforced:
To prevent the issuances of nonimmigrant visas to unqualified
applicants, Consular Affairs has strengthened its efforts to limit
employee access to automated systems that issue visas and has taken
steps to ensure that visa applicants cannot predict which officers will
interview them. Additionally, Consular Affairs has a series of controls
over accountable items. It has also strengthened its criteria for
applicants referred by post employees for favorable consideration in
obtaining a visa and expedited processing by consular officers.
Further, Consular Affairs has increased its emphasis on both
headquarters and post supervisory oversight. It also requires posts to
certify in writing annually their compliance with key internal
controls. Consular Affairs has issued guidelines on reporting
suspicious behavior that may involve malfeasance. It has also enhanced
its malfeasance prevention efforts.
Controlled Access to Visa Issuing Systems:
The increased dependence of consular officers on automated systems
requires Consular Affairs to have effective management controls over
these systems. Consular Affairs has strengthened its existing controls
over visa issuing systems by restricting employee access to key systems
and safeguarding passwords, thereby emphasizing consular officers'
accountability for visa issuance and providing an audit trail to
document which officer issued each visa. For example:
* The Consular System Administrator controls employees' access to the
automated consular systems by assigning user identifiers and roles.
Designated consular officers ensure appropriate access to consular
automated functions; an administrator specifically assigns each
consular employee a specific role; and the computer system only allows
consular staff to perform functions associated with that role. For
example, only officers that adjudicate visas are assigned a system role
that permits them to authorize visa issuance.
* In February 2004, Consular Affairs strengthened controls over access
to employee computers by requiring that passwords be known only to the
users and that they be changed semi-annually. In the past, employee
passwords were assigned by the system administrator, but are now chosen
by the employee. As an additional safeguard, employees are now reminded
to lock their computers when not at their desks, and the system is set
to automatically lock after an interval of idleness.
* Consular Affairs controls access of applicants to visa adjudicators
and consular staff. To prevent applicants targeting a particular
consular officer, Consular Affairs requires that consular officers
interview applicants in a random manner, with no single person
controlling the process. When translators are used, they are to be
rotated among the adjudicators.
Controls over Accountable Items:
To reduce the risk that blank visas will be stolen or that visas will
be issued without being properly recorded in the consular systems, it
is Consular Affairs' standard practice to safeguard blank visas and
other accountable items, closely monitor usage, conduct frequent
inventories, and reconcile discrepancies quickly. Each post must
designate a primary and backup accountable consular officer to be
responsible for controlled items. Further, Consular Affairs procedures
require controlled items to be reconciled daily, verified quarterly,
and certified annually by senior consular or post officials. At least
quarterly, the accountability officer must physically count the stock
of each accountable item and reconcile the inventory ledger, ensuring
that the number of the item on hand in fact matches the number that the
ledger indicates should be on hand. Discrepancies between inventory
records and stocks of blank visas on hand that can not be resolved must
be reported within 24 hours to Consular Affairs management.
Criteria for Post-Referred Applicants:
U.S. officers from any U.S. government agency posted at embassies and
consulates may refer to the consular section for favorable
consideration and expedited processing foreign applicants where visa
issuance would support U.S. interests or those of the mission.[Footnote
7] This so-called visa referral is a means for other embassy officials
to provide additional information on a visa case and to document a
perceived U. S. national interest served in facilitating the travel of
the applicant. According to a 2005 State Inspector General's
report,[Footnote 8] embassy staff or prominent local figures often
appeal to ambassadors or other mission managers for favorable
consideration in obtaining visas, and consular officers have felt
pressure to provide such assistance. To ensure that post staff refer
visas only for qualified applicants, Consular Affairs has strengthened
and formalized its criteria for issuing referred visas.[Footnote 9]
Prior to 2002, posts individually interpreted the guidelines on making
referrals and many posts did not have formal referral policies. In
2002, Consular Affairs required posts to establish a formal postwide
referral system. Under this system, referral procedures are to be
reissued annually, and supervisory consular officers are to
periodically review referral activities, specifically noting frequency
of referrals by officer as well as applicant return-to-country rates.
Consistent with the new congressionally mandated biometric and
interview requirements, the new referral criteria require:
* fingerprinting and photos of all applicants and personal interviews
of nearly all referred visa applicants,
* mandatory use of revised referral forms,
* certification that the applicant is personally known to the sponsor
and presents no threat to national security,
* supervisory approval of the referral request by the sponsor's
supervisor,
* scanning of applicant forms and referral requests into the
nonimmigrant visa system to provide a record and an audit trail, and:
* post management reviews of aggregate visa trends by referrer.
Since 2002, Consular Affairs has repeatedly reiterated referral
criteria in policy updates and clarifications to overseas posts.
Moreover, during our review, in June 2005, Consular Affairs again
revised the referral policy reiterating the need for senior consular
officers to adjudicate Class A referrals and requiring posts to provide
the Bureau of Consular Affairs copies of their referral policies. In
addition, Consular Affairs said that it gives briefings to every
ambassador, deputy chief of mission, and principal officer emphasizing
the importance of strict compliance with the visa referral policy, that
visa referrals are tracked, and that mission leaders bear
responsibility and liability for their own referrals.
Emphasis on Supervisory Oversight:
Citing cases of consular malfeasance resulting from lax supervision
over consular functions, Consular Affairs has continually emphasized
the need for supervisory oversight of the visa function, particularly
by ambassadors, deputy chiefs of mission, or principal officers.
Depending on the size of the post, daily oversight is exercised by
senior consular officers over nonimmigrant visa section chiefs (who
supervise adjudicating officers and other consular staff) or by the
most senior available post officer. Senior consular section chiefs, who
generally adjudicate referrals or other visas at smaller posts, are
supervised by senior post managers. Consular Affairs requires that
supervisors review all visa refusals daily and perform spot-checks of
issuances, as well as undertake periodic reviews of post referrals.
Supervisors have tools to assist with this responsibility. For example,
the Nonimmigrant Visa application allows on-line oversight through
reports of consular activities, such as daily visa refusals and
issuances, including the time of visa issuance; the applicants
interviewed and their nationalities; and the types of visas issued,
including those for visitors, students, businesspersons, professionals,
and performing artists, as well as the reasons for denials.
Additionally, reports providing aggregate information on the number and
types of referrals made by each post officer and their disposition are
available. A recent enhancement to the system permits supervisors to
view applications and referral forms showing applicant's purpose of
travel and whether the referral was signed appropriately and reviewed
as required.
Consular Affairs also has emphasized in cables and training the
importance of ambassadors, deputy chiefs of mission, and principal
officers' supervisory role in reviewing the visa function. According to
State officials, training courses for these offices have included
information on the consular function, oversight responsibilities, and
employee malfeasance. According to State training records, the senior
managers at six posts we visited had received this training.
Certification of Internal Controls:
To ensure that the internal controls over the visa process are being
implemented, State requires that chiefs of mission certify annually
that the controls are adequate.[Footnote 10] In addition, since
September 2002, State has required that consular managers certify their
compliance with key controls over the visa process to chiefs of mission
and to Consular Affairs. Each year, posts are required to issue a
report certifying their compliance with internal controls, including
routine inventory counts of controlled items, established referral
policies and procedures, and supervisory reviews of visa refusals and
issuances. In October 2004, Consular Affairs required the review of 19
controls by each post.
Assessing Visa Malfeasance and Reporting Suspicious Behavior:
To safeguard the visa process, consular sections are required to assess
post vulnerability to employee malfeasance.[Footnote 11] Posts are to
identify internal visa malfeasance risks, such as inadequate oversight
procedures, and to assess post vulnerability to external fraud, such as
bribery.[Footnote 12] To assess this vulnerability, Consular Affairs
has established Fraud Prevention Units at posts and designated Fraud
Prevention Manager positions. The units are responsible for detecting
suspected fraud by visa applicants as well as possible employee
malfeasance, and coordinating with the regional security officer and
local law enforcement authorities as necessary. The positions are often
filled on a part-time basis by consular officers who are responsible
for making vulnerability assessments along with their other
duties.[Footnote 13]
Consular Affairs also has guidance on reporting suspicious behavior.
Employees are required to report suspicions of employee malfeasance to
the senior consular manager at post and the regional security officer,
unless one of them is believed to be involved in the malfeasant
activity.[Footnote 14] Further, State's guidance on reporting
malfeasance emphasizes the need to protect the integrity of an
investigation and the commitment of confidentiality to the source of an
allegation. As such, State's standard operating procedures call for
potential malfeasance information to be closely held at post and in the
department.
Increased Headquarters' Oversight:
With 211 visa issuing posts, State requires adequate and continuous
oversight to reduce the risks of visa malfeasance.[Footnote 15]
Headquarters management is an essential part of that oversight. To
assist headquarters in monitoring post operations, State established
the Vulnerability Assessment Unit (VAU) jointly staffed by Consular
Affairs and Diplomatic Security. In addition, Consular Affairs
established Consular Management Assistance Teams (CMAT). VAU,
established in 2003, attempts to detect and prevent possible employee
malfeasance by analyzing consular data from State's Consular
Consolidated Database. VAU reviews several different reports for
variations that could indicate malfeasance. Among other things, these
reports and other information can (1) identify whether senior officers
with responsibility for reviewing adjudications have access to
automated systems to do required reviews of visa adjudications, as well
as whether they are actually doing so; (2) determine whether post
employees follow procedures and use appropriate forms to make referrals
for applicants; (3) review issuance and refusal rates of adjudicators;
and (4) review rates of visa refusals overturned by senior officers. In
2003, State instituted CMATs to perform informal reviews of consular
functions. The teams, which are provided VAU reports on consular
activities, examine access controls, inventory reconciliations,
training and knowledge of consular applications, appropriate use of
referral procedures, supervisory reviews of daily adjudications, and
other visa issues. Posts are selected for CMAT examination if there is
knowledge of a management problem and a review can help to identify a
systemic problem, if posts request a review, or if there has been a
previous case of malfeasance at the post. CMAT reports, which may
include recommendations to improve post management, are sent to State's
Bureau of Consular Affairs and to the posts. State has conducted 81
CMAT reviews, including reviews of several posts twice, since program
inception.
Internal Controls Not Fully and Consistently Implemented:
Consular Affairs has established and reinforced a system of internal
controls, described above, designed to reduce visa malfeasance risks;
however, we found that the controls were not being fully and
consistently implemented. All the posts we visited had limited employee
access to systems and applicant access to consular staff. However, we
found that inventory counts of accountable items were performed
inconsistently. Further, the referral policy was not followed. Also,
supervisory adjudication reviews were not performed consistently.
Moreover, we found that some posts had certified compliance with these
controls when we, and in some cases, CMAT teams, indicated that they
were not in compliance. In addition, staff were unclear on employee
malfeasance reporting policies. Finally, headquarters oversight has
been hindered by the lack of enhanced technical tools to identify
potential malfeasance. Table 1 summarizes the results of our review of
internal controls over the visa process at the 11 posts we visited.
Table 1: State Department Key Internal Control Requirements and Status
of Implementation:
Issue: Access to sensitive systems;
Requirement: These controls restrict employee access to key systems,
safeguard passwords, and require additional oversight over controlled
items;
Implementation: We found that all 11 posts were in compliance with the
internal controls designed to prevent unauthorized personnel from
having access to sensitive systems.
Issue: Access to adjudicators;
Requirement: Consular sections are to ensure random access between
applicants and adjudicators;
Implementation: When able, most posts have implemented the systems and
procedures necessary to ensure random access between applicants and
adjudicators.[A].
Issue: Control of accountable items;
Requirement: Specific records must be kept regarding the shipment, use,
and destruction of controllable items on a daily, quarterly, and annual
basis;
Implementation: Most posts did not reconcile the differences between
inventory records and stocks of blank visas on hand quarterly as
required, although daily reconciliations were routinely performed.
Issue: Criteria for applicants referred by officers within the post;
Requirement: Posts must establish a formal post-wide referral system,
reissue the procedures annually, and ensure that the applicants meet
the departmentwide criteria specified on the referral forms;
Implementation: Compliance with State's referral policies and
procedures were not consistently followed at seven of the posts we
reviewed. Moreover, four posts did not have the required post policy
supplementing State issued policies.
Issue: Emphasis on; post supervisory oversight;
Requirement: Supervisory reviews are required daily on all visa
refusals and spot- checks of issuances, as well as monthly reviews of
post referrals;
Implementation: Required daily supervisory reviews of visa
adjudications were not always done at six of the posts we visited.
Issue: Certification of internal controls;
Requirement: Chiefs of missions must certify annually that internal
controls are adequate. These certifications are based on consular
managers' assessment of the section's adherence to internal controls;
Implementation: We found that six posts had erroneously certified their
compliance with internal controls and some posts submitted incomplete
certifications.
Issue: Assessing visa malfeasance;
Requirement: Posts are required to have fraud prevention programs to
address visa fraud risks, including employee malfeasance risks.
Moreover, Consular Affairs encourages posts to develop standard
procedures for all consular functions;
Implementation: Although posts told us they have fraud prevention
programs, many posts did not have the plans documented. None of the
posts indicated they had written procedures for mitigating malfeasance
risks.
Issue: Reporting of suspicious behavior;
Requirement: Internal control standards require agencies to clearly
establish areas of authority and appropriate lines for reporting
malfeasance. Consular Affairs requires suspected malfeasance be
reported to Consular Affairs Managers and the Regional Security
Officer;
Implementation: Many staff at the posts we visited were not aware that
suspected malfeasance should be reported to the Regional Security
Officer. This could compromise subsequent investigations.
Issue: Increased HQ oversight;
Requirement: Internal control standards require top level analysis of
agency performance;
Implementation: State has established two units that provide top-level
management with information on post performance.
Source: GAO.
[A] Posts with one or two consular officers have difficulty ensuring
random access to adjudicators.
[End of table]
Access to Visa Systems and Staff Controlled:
To reduce the risks of visa malfeasance, all the posts we visited had
complied with department directives to limit employee access to visa
issuing systems. This compliance ensured that employees only had
appropriate level access to accomplish their responsibilities. We also
observed at all posts that consular staff did not have exposed
passwords at their workspace, and they logged off systems each time
they left their desks. Moreover, most posts ensured that applicants did
not have access to consular sections and that consular staff and
applicants were interviewed in a random manner.
Inventory Reconciliations Performed Inconsistently:
To prevent malfeasant issuance of visas, Consular Affairs requires that
blank visas (visa foils) be counted and safeguarded along with other
controlled equipment.[Footnote 16] We found that not all posts
reconciled visa inventories as required. Seven posts had not conducted
quarterly reconciliations as required, although posts did routinely
perform daily reconciliations. Moreover, some posts had certified that
they had complied with inventory controls when they had not, and other
posts did not accurately characterize their compliance. For example:
* At one post, the accountable consular officer was absent and the back
up officer did not have the combination to the controlled area.
Therefore, we could not review inventory logs nor could the backup
perform the required daily reconciliation.
* Two posts had discrepancies in their monthly reconciliations due to
miscounting. At one post, this discrepancy was discovered later when
the post prepared for a CMAT review.
Referral Policy Not Followed:
A referral is also a useful foreign policy tool. However, if it is not
implemented properly, it could create risks in the visa process by
allowing expedited visa processing for potentially unqualified
applicants to enter the United States. We found problems with the
implementation and monitoring of referrals at seven posts. Moreover, in
2002, an Inspector General Report cited several instances where
malfeasant employees sold referrals and recommended strengthening the
nonimmigrant visa referral policy. The cases cited by the Inspector
General involved Drug Enforcement Administration and Department of
Commerce employees, but sales of referrals by State employees have also
occurred.[Footnote 17]
Consular Affairs has issued and reinforced guidance on referrals to
posts three times since 2002. However, the Inspector General noted in
March 2005 that the Bureau of Consular Affairs needed to be better
informed of referral procedures in place at overseas posts. The report
cited concerns that not all posts were following State guidance and
recommended that posts verify that applicants had returned at the end
of their authorized stay in the United States.[Footnote 18] State
subsequently required posts to conduct periodic studies on whether
referred applicants left the United States before their visa expired.
State requires that all posts have a referral policy that defines
specific criteria referred applicants must meet. The post policies are
intended as a supplement to overall Consular Affairs guidance on
referrals. As a further safeguard, referrals must be (1) adjudicated by
senior consular officers, (2) reviewed by supervisors, and (3)
monitored by post management.[Footnote 19] Class A referents,[Footnote
20] generally high-level foreign government, business, or cultural
officials, are fingerprinted and undergo a document review but do not
have to be interviewed by the consular section.[Footnote 21] We found
that four posts did not have a current post-specific referral policy.
Furthermore, based on our spot-checks of visa referral records, there
was no evidence at six posts that some supervisors had performed the
required reviews. In fact, at three of these posts, the supervisors,
principal officers, or deputy chiefs of mission were not enabled to
access the systems designed to permit and document supervisory review.
Consular Affairs indicated that it encourages supervisors to document
their review within the consular computer system. Our review of
referral forms and applications revealed that not all referred
applicants met State's referral criteria. For example,
* A senior consular officer at one post issued referrals that did not
meet Class A criteria, including approving referrals for the secretary
of a foreign official and the adult children of foreign officials on
personal travel, when only minor children accompanying the official
qualify.
* One post could not identify the individual who had made a referral.
The recent referral was approved by the consular section in February
2005. The individual making the referral did not appear on the post
roster, and the post agency where the referrer was assigned could not
identify the individual at the time of our visit. U.S. personnel not
under the authority of the Chief of Mission cannot use the referral
system, according to Consular Affairs. As a result, the post was unable
to verify that the referral was legitimate.
To monitor the referral process, State requires consular managers to
review referral adjudications daily (as they do other issuances) and to
annually examine 12 months of referrals for anomalies. To comply, all
posts had prepared, as required, executive management aggregate reports
of referrals by employee. Our review of these aggregate reports
indicated no abnormalities; however, when we reviewed individual
referral and applicant forms available online, we found that referrals
had not been submitted or adjudicated appropriately. For example:
* One referral was made by a local employee, when only U.S. officers at
the post are allowed to make referrals.
* At one post, a referral was made and adjudicated by the same officer.
Consular officers may not refer and approve the same applicants for
visas. This referral was for a cousin of a consular section employee,
and consular officers are not allowed to adjudicate matters involving
friends.
* Three posts had incorrectly used the Class A referral for local
employees on personal travel. State permits Class A referrals for
locally employed staff only for official travel.
Supervisory Adjudication Reviews Inconsistent:
Nonimmigrant Visa chiefs are to review daily all refusals and a sample
of issuances.[Footnote 22] When visa section chiefs adjudicate, senior
consular officers are to perform the reviews, while at small posts with
one or two consular officers, the deputy chief of mission, principle
officer, or other senior post staff are to do so. State policy
recommends on-line reviews, but permits paper reviews as well.
Reviewers have an automated system that provides management reports
that would reveal anomalies in consular officer visa issuances.
However, we found little evidence that reviews were being undertaken
consistently at the posts we visited. For example:
* Six posts did not consistently perform State required daily reviews
of visa issuances and refusals. For example, at one post a review of
the Nonimmigrant Visa system showed that required daily reviews had not
been done for a month.
* At one post, with the consular section located in a different
building from the embassy, we saw several months of visa adjudications
on the floor awaiting review by the deputy chief of mission.
* A review of Nonimmigrant Visa adjudication reports at the posts we
visited showed that some posts consistently reviewed daily visa
applicant refusals, but did not follow Consular Affairs' policy to spot-
check daily visa issuances.
Certification of Internal Controls May Not Disclose Shortcomings:
Due to inaccurate or incomplete submissions, the certifications of
consular management controls may not provide the level of assurance
desired that internal controls are being followed. For example:
* Seven of the posts we visited had not conducted quarterly
reconciliations, as required, although five had certified compliance
with inventory controls. The October 2004 CMAT reviews of two of these
posts had found similar problems, noting that required inventory
controls had not been reconciled on a quarterly basis, although all had
routinely performed daily reconciliations.
* Some posts submitted the required certifications but did not indicate
whether they were in compliance. Two posts, for example, reported
reviewing controlled items, but did not note whether they were
reconciled.
Staff Unaware of Malfeasance Reporting Procedures:
Many consular staff at most posts were aware that they should report
suspected visa malfeasance but did not know the appropriate reporting
procedures. Internal control standards require agencies to clearly
establish areas of authority and appropriate lines for reporting. State
policy requires that suspicions of malfeasance at posts be reported to
Consular Affairs' consular section chiefs and Diplomatic Security's
regional security officers, unless they are the subject of the
allegations.[Footnote 23] In practice, most consular staff we spoke
with said they report suspicions of consular malfeasance up their chain
of command.[Footnote 24] If suspected malfeasance is not promptly
reported to the regional security officer, subsequent investigations
could be affected. In August 2005, Consular Affairs and Diplomatic
Security provided more explicit guidance to the field on the actions
that posts, in particular consular and security officers, must take in
the event they suspect or uncover malfeasance.
Headquarters Oversight Hindered by the Lack of Enhanced Technical
Tools:
Consular Affairs' headquarters oversight unit, the VAU, does not have
adequate tools to assist their review of the visa process to identify
fraud trends. The Consular Consolidated Database contains various
reports that provide information on daily visa issuances, denials, and
referrals by consular staff. Currently, the VAU can only recall this
information on an ad-hoc basis, which is time consuming for the two
staff assigned to the unit. For example, it took several hours for us
and a VAU staff to review two categories of data--assigned roles
allowing post staff to use consular databases and whether daily reviews
of visa refusals and issuances were being conducted at five posts.
Moreover, the unit has no automated means to sort data and generate
reports that flag unusual variances in visa issuances or to track
trends. As a result, the unit is currently reactive, focusing its
research on supporting allegations and investigations of malfeasance
and generating reports on individual post consular activities in
preparation for CMAT team visits to posts. Unit officials indicated
that they are working toward developing a more proactive approach to
malfeasance analysis that will allow automated searches of anomalies,
fraudulent or not, through a more efficient data mining and search
capability. The new capability will include identification of consular
activity outside of normal operating patterns, unusual timing of
issuances, adjudications made by someone unauthorized to do so by
controlled systems, and overrides of visa refusals, and would also
result in further inquiry into the anomalies. Consular Affairs
indicated that the software enhancements' usefulness would be tested
beginning in late September 2005.
Documented Cases of Visa Malfeasance:
Between 2001 and 2004, Diplomatic Security substantiated through
investigation 28 cases of U.S. employee visa malfeasance that resulted
in various actions.[Footnote 25] In examining these case files, we
could not discern why the malfeasance occurred in part because the data
were not contained in Diplomatic Security case files or because in some
instances the case was ongoing. However, in examining case data on
several prosecuted cases, we found that a breakdown in post adherence
to internal controls could have been a contributing factor. Several
factors impede visa malfeasance investigations, including differences
in U.S. and foreign laws, investigative techniques, and other issues.
Malfeasance prosecutions also face several impediments.
Nature and Substance of Malfeasance Allegations:
Cases are opened only for those allegations found to be supported by
some evidence, even if that evidence is eventually determined to be
unreliable. Allegations of visa malfeasance, initiated from tips or
reporting of suspicious activity, are vetted through post security
officers and investigated when warranted. According to Diplomatic
Security Investigators, the investigative process can result in several
outcomes:
* unfounded, with no reliable evidence found to support the allegation;
* unsubstantiated, with some evidence found that might indicate
wrongdoing, but not sufficient to establish culpability and build a
criminal case; or:
* substantiated, with sufficient evidence found to support the
allegation of malfeasance.
Substantiated cases lead to further investigation and typically result
in resignation, termination, arrest, or referral to Justice for
criminal prosecution.
The 28 substantiated cases of visa malfeasance between 2001 and 2004
resulted in various dispositions, according to Diplomatic Security
records. Thirteen investigations resulted in arrests, 13 resulted in
termination of the employee, and 2 resulted in employee resignations.
Generally, the officers involved in these cases were arrested and the
majority of Foreign Service Nationals were terminated. Most of the 28
cases we reviewed involved the alleged sale of visas by both consular
and other post officers and Foreign Service nationals. However,
possibly because the information provided was not complete, we could
not identify any particular trend in the cases we reviewed covering
2001 to 2004 or in the 28 cases that were substantiated. Diplomatic
Security does not have the capability to automatically pinpoint
specific types of visa malfeasance or perform trend analyses. As a law
enforcement entity, Diplomatic Security and its regional security
officers overseas focus on gathering sufficient evidence to
substantiate the allegation and do not focus on what allowed the
alleged activity to occur. Consequently, in reviewing the information
provided, we could not consistently determine across cases, for
example, how the alleged malfeasance was discovered, the exact nature
of the malfeasance, the rank of the individual allegedly involved in
the malfeasance, and whether similar allegations were made when the
individual was at other posts. This type of information would benefit
investigations and could be a tool for consular management's monitoring
and training efforts. Diplomatic Security officials acknowledged this
capability would be useful but noted that progress in developing this
capability has been slow because Diplomatic Security has other
priorities.
Of the 28 cases substantiated, at least 10 individuals have been
prosecuted.[Footnote 26] The individuals prosecuted received prison
terms ranging from 18 to 63 months, and two individuals were given
probation. In some of these cases, it appeared that the lack of
adherence to internal controls could have played a role in allowing
employee malfeasance to go undetected for a considerable period of
time. Consular officials indicated that strict compliance to internal
controls could not prevent malfeasance. However, they acknowledged that
lack of strict compliance could create an environment that would make
it easier to commit malfeasance. The following are examples of visa
malfeasance or alleged visa malfeasance and how lack of strict
compliance with internal controls may have been a contributing factor
in creating an environment where the malfeasance could take place.
* Consular Affairs requires supervisors to review reports on visa
refusals and issuances to detect anomalous activity.[Footnote 27]
Between 2000 and 2003, two consular employees at one post sold visas to
unqualified applicants. Diplomatic Security said it did not know how
many visas were sold. However, 181 visas were revoked after the
malfeasance was discovered. Diplomatic Security believes that many of
the persons with revoked visas had already entered the country. We
believe that strict compliance with internal controls could have
identified this malfeasance earlier. Applicants for nonimmigrant visas
generally apply at an embassy or consulate with jurisdiction over their
place of normal residence, although they are not required to do so.
However, in this case, there were a large number of third country
nationals receiving visas from the same officer. Supervisory review of
the issuances to the third country nationals or review of a standard
report on visa issuances could have alerted management to this unusual
activity. The consular officer ceased the illegal activity following a
supervisory reprimand but soon was able to resume selling visas. The
convicted employees received a 63-month sentence and forfeited $750,000
in illicit gains.
* Consular managers are required to continually oversee visa functions
and suspicions of malfeasance must be examined carefully. Between 2000
and 2002 a senior consular officer at a small post accepted fraudulent
applications and documents from a visa broker, issued them outside the
normal process, and returned visas to the broker. After a supervisory
reprimand, the officer revised the fraud scheme and conspired with the
broker to approve visas for applicants with false passports. The
officer received money for processing 85 visas, was convicted, and
received a 24-month sentence.
During the course of our work, State reported another case of visa
malfeasance where we believe that lack of strict compliance with
internal controls could have been a contributing factor. State requires
consular and post management to periodically review referral activities
and check on the return rates of applicants receiving a visa. Between
1999 and 2001, a State political officer at a small post allegedly
referred unqualified applicants for visas, according to a State press
release issued in April 2005. In the absence of the senior consular
officer, the political officer was also responsible for visa
adjudications and allegedly provided blank visa applications to an
individual, assisted in filling them out, and then issued them to
unqualified applicants. In return for these services the officer
allegedly received a vintage BMW motorcycle. The officer was arrested
in 2005.
Consular Affairs emphasized that although some of its officers have
engaged in visa malfeasance, other U.S. government employees and
Foreign Service nationals have as well. Between 2000 and 2001, a U.S.-
based Foreign Agricultural Service officer recommended 99 unqualified
applicants and was able to influence the visa process through his
recommendations and the submission of fraudulent documents, according
to court documents. In exchange, the officer received bribes totaling
$77,400. The officer, who was given the names of ineligible applicants
by visa brokers,[Footnote 28] provided the applicants, on U.S.
Department of Agriculture letterhead, letters stating that the
individuals were agricultural specialists invited to the United States
for official meetings. The officer then sent follow-up faxes to posts
confirming the invitations. The individuals, who all listed the same
destination address, presented the letters at embassy visa offices and
unlawfully obtained visas. The officer was sentenced to 21 months in
prison for participating in the visa malfeasance scheme.
Factors Affecting Visa Malfeasance Investigations:
Visa malfeasance investigations are impeded by several factors,
according to Diplomatic Security officials, including untimely
reporting of alleged visa malfeasance. The ability to gather evidence
is adversely affected, for example, when allegations are made several
years after the alleged malfeasance occurred and witnesses have been
reassigned, or are unavailable. In particular, entry-level officers,
fearing reprisal, may delay reporting malfeasance until after they have
been reassigned to a new post, according to State officials. In such
cases, reconstructing the actions constituting any malfeasance is
difficult because years may have passed since the incident occurred.
When visa malfeasance occurs overseas, differences in legal systems can
pose obstacles to investigators. Local laws may not permit the use of
U.S. investigative techniques such as recorded conversations,
undercover operations, or interrogation of suspects, according to
Diplomatic Security officials. Additionally, according to Diplomatic
Security investigators, investigations of local employees may be
complicated due to differences in U.S. and foreign laws. According to
Diplomatic Security officials, bribery is not a criminal offense in
some countries and therefore it is difficult and sometimes impossible
to obtain local warrants for searches in these countries.
Conflicting priorities may also impede evidence gathering. For example,
at one post, the Diplomatic Security investigator noted that he had to
concentrate on ensuring the security of the post and was not able to
devote adequate attention to investigating a recent allegation of visa
malfeasance.[Footnote 29] Diplomatic Security officials confirmed that
protecting personnel and infrastructure is the first priority of post
security officers. Additionally, when malfeasance is suspected,
Consular Affairs' and Diplomatic Security's differing objectives may
affect evidence gathering. Diplomatic Security officials abroad and in
headquarters, as well as Justice officials, all noted that documenting
the illegal activity and gathering a sufficient amount of evidence to
make a criminal case often requires allowing the suspect to continue
working, unaware of the investigation. Consular Affairs noted that when
this occurs, consular management closely reviews the suspect's
adjudications and monitors his or her activities to prevent issuances
to ineligible applicants. However, Consular Affairs management
interviewed on this issue expressed a preference for removing suspected
individuals from their positions as quickly as possible. At one post,
the ambassador, at the recommendation of the senior consular officer,
took action to remove an employee under investigation in order to stop
even the possibility that a visa could be issued to an ineligible
applicant, thereby ending the covert investigation. As a result, a
criminal case could not be developed, and the employee was dealt with
administratively and was fired.
Malfeasance Prosecutions Face Impediments:
Justice's efforts to prosecute malfeasance are limited by a range of
factors, including the inability to use U.S. warrants to search U.S.
employees' offices and residences overseas, according to Justice. U.S.
magistrates generally cannot issue warrants for overseas searches.
Further, Justice officials noted that they only accept for prosecution
cases with sufficient evidence to warrant convictions.
Under Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedures, U.S.
magistrates do not have the authority to issue search warrants for
locations outside their districts, such as an embassy or residence
overseas.[Footnote 30] According to Diplomatic Security officials, the
ability to obtain U.S. search warrants, rather than relying on local
warrants issued and executed by the host government, is important since
investigations of visa malfeasance generally focus on embassy property
or diplomatic residences. The U.S. mission[Footnote 31] and the
residences of certain U.S. diplomats in country are inviolable, which
means that agents of the host government may not enter the premises
without the consent of the head of the mission, according to State
officials. State officials also told us that the United States will
never waive inviolability for the U.S. mission, and, therefore,
investigators could not rely on a host country's warrant to search an
employee's office at the U.S. mission. However, in certain instances,
State officials said that they would waive inviolability for the
personal residences of U.S. diplomats, located outside the U.S.
mission.
In instances where inviolability is waived, the United States can use
current tools, such as letter rogatories[Footnote 32] and Mutual Legal
Assistance Treaties, to request that a host government issue and
execute a search warrant under the host government's laws. Nonetheless,
Diplomatic Security officials cited many difficulties they say can
arise when using these tools. For example, according to these
officials, differences between the United States' and some host
government's techniques in gathering evidence can affect the
admissibility of that evidence in U.S. courts. As a result of these and
other difficulties, diplomatic security officials told us that they do
not often utilize these tools to obtain local search warrants.
In discussing with State and Diplomatic Security officials the
possibility of obtaining additional search authorities under U.S. law,
these officials raised issues regarding the magnitude of the need, as
well as concerns over sovereignty and reciprocity. For example,
Diplomatic Security officials indicated that in approximately six cases
in the past year they would have wanted to conduct searches of employee
residences and offices in connection with suspected visa malfeasance.
State officials raised concerns that should the United States execute
U.S. search warrants overseas, host governments could view this as a
challenge to their sovereignty. Further, if the United States were to
execute U.S. warrants overseas, the question arises whether the United
States would have to extend the same privilege to foreign governments
to execute their own warrants here in the United States.
Conclusions:
A visa system that is beyond reproach, with strong internal controls to
protect against consular malfeasance, is critical to ensuring the
integrity of visa decisions, national security, and U.S. immigration
objectives. There is no way to prevent applicants from offering bribes;
therefore, State recognizes that along with the integrity of its
employees, an effective internal control program is needed to guard
against employee malfeasance. Established internal controls make it
more difficult for an employee to commit visa malfeasance. State has
established a system of internal controls. However, at the posts we
visited, we found that compliance with some of these internal controls
was inconsistent. This increases the risk of visa malfeasance.
Furthermore, most consular staff we spoke with did not know the
appropriate way to report suspicions of employee visa malfeasance,
which could hinder investigations. A further weakness to investigations
is the lack of data on allegations and investigations to identify
vulnerable points in the visa process. Finally, U.S. investigators
cannot obtain a U.S. search warrant to search the offices or residences
overseas of employees, which, according to Justice and Diplomatic
Security officials, affects their ability to gather evidence in
malfeasance cases. However, there are numerous factors that would need
to be considered in pursuing additional search authorities.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To emphasize the importance of internal controls to consular officers,
section heads, and post managers, we recommend that the Secretary of
State take the following two actions:
* Develop a strategy to achieve strict compliance with internal
controls. The strategy should include a system to spot check
compliance. The strategy should also include formalized procedures in
Fraud Prevention Units to document how the post will address the risk
of employee malfeasance and emphasize the importance of reporting
suspected internal malfeasance to consular managers and post security
officers.
* Improve State's existing mechanisms to combat visa malfeasance. This
could be accomplished by (1) improving the software available to the
Vulnerability Assessment Unit to automatically sort data to identify
and analyze abnormalities in post visa issuance statistics that could
be an indication of malfeasance and (2) enhancing the investigative
case tracking systems used by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security in
order to better identify trends and vulnerabilities in the visa process
for use by investigators and consular managers.
We also recommend that the Secretary of State and the Attorney General
determine whether seeking additional overseas search authorities is
warranted to facilitate investigations of visa malfeasance. If they
determine that such authorities are warranted, the Secretary of State
and the Attorney General should develop an implementation plan and
notify the Congress of any required legislative changes.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of State and
Justice. The Department of State provided written comments, which are
included in appendix II. State concurred with our conclusions and
recommendations and has begun taking actions to improve and monitor
posts' adherence to internal controls. Specifically, the department
said it will review and approve post referral policies, and it has
established an ombudsman to ensure that there is no undue influence on
consular officers to issue visas. To monitor compliance with internal
controls, the department plans to establish an automated control system
for controlled items, field test an automated data mining system of
consular activities, and launch a worldwide fraud case tracking system
in 2006. Lastly, the department said it will work with the Attorney
General to determine if additional authority for overseas searches of
employees' residences and offices is warranted and, if so, how it could
best be achieved. Justice did not comment on our recommendations, but
provided technical comments, which we incorporated in the report as
appropriate.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days
after its issue date. At that time, we will send copies of the report
to relevant congressional committees and subcommittees, the Secretary
of State, the Attorney General, and other interested parties. In
addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web
site at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-4128. Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this
report are listed in appendix III.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Jess T. Ford:
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
The scope of our work covered the visa application and adjudication
process at selected U.S. Consulates and Embassies overseas. To assess
the policies and procedures governing visa operations, we obtained
copies of written procedures and interviewed officials from the Bureau
of Consular Affairs. At the embassies and consulates we visited, we
interviewed foreign service nationals, foreign service officers,
adjudicating officers, the Nonimmigrant Visa section chiefs, the
consular section chiefs, and the deputy chiefs of mission or principal
officers. When available, we also interviewed consuls general and
ambassadors.
To assess the internal controls designed to prevent the illegal
provision of visas, we asked State to identify the policies,
procedures, and key internal controls governing visa operations. State
identified a number of key internal controls, and, in particular,
identified the Consular Management Handbook (Chapter 600), their
Standard Operating Procedures, and the relevant sections of the Foreign
Affairs Manual as sources for these controls. We obtained and examined
the Department of State's Consular Management Handbook, Standard
Operating Procedures, key sections of the Foreign Affairs Manual, and
documents related to how the department develops and enforces standards
of conduct for visa adjudication officers from the department's Bureau
of Consular Affairs. To determine if supervisors were reviewing records
of visa issuances, we reviewed on line reports at posts and at the
Vulnerability Assessment Unit (VAU). To assess whether the key internal
controls were being followed, we examined post records for the year
preceding our visit, except in the case of referral policies, where we
examined judgmental samples of four months of referrals at each post.
We visited 11 consular posts in six countries to observe and verify the
implementation of the key internal controls. These posts are Nogales,
Guadalajara, and Mexico City, Mexico; Quito and Guayaquil, Ecuador;
Lima, Peru; Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi, Vietnam; Bangkok and Chiang
Mai, Thailand; and Mumbai, India. To select the posts to visit, we
reviewed overall post staffing data and issuance rates and selected
posts that had both large and small staffing levels with varied
experience. Selected posts performed a varying amount of adjudications,
and some had regional responsibilities for fraud detection and
investigations. Some posts had also undergone internal reviews and
permitted examination of external oversight functions. Lastly, some
posts selected had been the subject of fraud allegations, enabling the
review of investigative procedures. Our reported results apply to the
posts we visited, and we cannot generalize the results to posts not
visited.
To assess the nature and extent of malfeasance, we examined records
provided by State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security on investigations of
visa malfeasance involving employees between 2001 and 2004. We reviewed
140 cases collected by Diplomatic Security covering alleged visa
malfeasance involving employees over the last 4 years. The cases
reviewed represented 2004, 2003, and 2002, as well as prominent, but
not all cases from 2001. The reports included information on the types
of employees being investigated for visa malfeasance, such as U.S.
Foreign Service officers, and employees of other U.S. government
agencies overseas and locally hired staff. Diplomatic Security does not
maintain automated data on employee malfeasance, and it obtained these
reports for us by reviewing its files on all types of visa fraud and
identifying those where employee malfeasance was involved. While
Diplomatic Security reported that it made its best efforts to obtain
complete data from 2002 through 2004, it could not assure us that it
had identified every case that had been opened and involved employee
malfeasance. These data covered 2001 to 2004 because this was the most
recent information available. However, there were a number of
limitations in these data. For example, the information available did
not include a comprehensive set of allegations, nor completely describe
the nature of the fraudulent activity under investigation. We
determined that these data were sufficiently reliable to provide
details on approximate figures of the employee malfeasance cases that
were opened, as well as details about the types of cases. We also
obtained information from the Department of Justice on visa fraud
prosecutions by the Public Integrity Section conducted between January
2001 and March 2005. These data allowed us to determine how many cases
this office in Justice has pursued in the last 4 years, as well as the
status or outcome of those cases. Additionally, we interviewed
officials from State's Office of the Inspector General, Consular
Affairs' Office of Fraud Prevention, and its VAU. We observed VAU
officials as they conducted their analysis and queries. We interviewed
the fraud prevention staff and management at all the embassies and
consulates visited, and also interviewed the Regional Security Officers
and Assistant Regional Security Officers/Investigators at all posts
where such officers were posted and available.
To determine how State and Justice interact to investigate suspicious
activity and allegations of employee malfeasance, we interviewed
officials from State's Bureaus of Consular Affairs and Diplomatic
Security, and Justice's Criminal Division, Public Integrity Section,
and the Executive Office for United States Attorneys.
We conducted our work from August 2004 through July 2005 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of State:
United States Department of State:
Assistant Secretary and Chief Financial Officer:
Washington, D.C. 20520:
Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers:
Managing Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001:
SEP 22 2005:
Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers:
We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "BORDER
SECURITY: More Emphasis on State's Consular Safeguards Could Mitigate
Visa Malfeasance Risks," GAO Job Code 320298.
The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.
If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact
Diane Bean, Senior Advisor, Visa Office, Bureau of Consular Affairs, at
(202) 663-1155.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Sid Kaplan (Acting):
cc: GAO - John Brummet;
CA - Maura Harty;
State/OIG - Mark Duda:
Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report:
BORDER SECURITY: More Emphasis on State's Consular Safeguards Could
Mitigate Visa Malfeasance Risks (GAO-05-931, GAO Code 320298):
Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the report entitled Border
Security: More Emphasis on State's Consular Safeguards Could Mitigate
Visa Malfeasance Risks. We appreciate the GAO's recognition that the
State Department has strengthened internal controls to guard against
employee malfeasance in recent years. We are disappointed that during
its own investigation, the GAO found individual cases of non-compliance
with those controls, but we will use these findings to supplement plans
already underway to improve even further our monitoring of the visa
function and to guard against malfeasance.
With respect to the individual areas the GAO addressed, we are pleased
that the GAO determined all posts properly controlled access to
sensitive consular systems and, by randomizing interview officers,
prevented visa applicants from targeting particular visa adjudicating
officers. Regarding GAO's observation that some posts did not perform
the required quarterly reconciliations of controlled consular items, we
note only that the daily reconciliations, which the GAO found to be
performed by every post, are the most critical reconciliations in
spotting inventory problems and investigating or resolving them before
they continue. The quarterly reconciliations are redundant; we suspect
this is the reason some were not done. Still, we will certainly remind
consular managers that controlled items need to also be reconciled
quarterly, as required in the Consular Management Handbook.
The GAO's conclusion that some posts did not strictly follow referral
procedures is of great concern to the Department. The referral process
is a foreign policy tool by which any officer in a mission overseas can
request expedited visa processing for an important official contact,
whose travel to the United States is in the national interest. Consular
officers are usually pleased to offer this service to facilitate the
travel of important USG contacts and as a professional courtesy to
embassy colleagues. The Department has long recognized that the
referral process could be subject to abuse or undue influence by senior
mission officers and must be strictly controlled, and has, as the GAO
observed, issued repeated guidance and strengthened procedures on what
posts must do to institute an effective referral program that is free
from fraud, malfeasance or undue influence. In addition, we have
instituted a requirement that post-specific referral policies be
reviewed by the Visa Office before being issued at post and have
designated a senior consular officer as an ombudsman to handle
instances of real or perceived undue influence on the visa process.
Even though minor violations of established referral procedures may not
be seen at posts to have a negative impact upon U.S. visa integrity or
security, the Department seeks strict compliance with referral
policies. In recent. years CA has emphasized to all new ambassadors,
deputy chiefs of mission and principal officers their responsibility
for strict adherence to the Department's and the post's referral
policies, which --as noted above --must be submitted to the Department
for approval. In light of the GAO's observations, the Department will
explore ways to reinforce this message further.
The Department is similarly concerned about post and consular managers
who fail to review daily visa adjudications properly, who erroneously
certify compliance with internal controls, or who submit incomplete
certifications. The Department will seek ways to remedy these lapses,
including the increased use of enhanced technology to ensure
compliance, as explained below.
Finally, with respect to assessing visa malfeasance at posts and
reporting suspicious behavior, the Department acknowledges that there
is always room for improvement in fighting malfeasance. The Department
is committed to ensuring the integrity of the visa process and has
unambiguously stated and frequently reinforced its zero tolerance
policy toward employee visa malfeasance. We have repeatedly directed
our missions to be vigilant in investigating and reporting malfeasance,
most recently in August 2005. That cable is attached to this letter as
Exhibit 1.
So far in 2005, four USG employees have been arrested for visa
malfeasance. Malfeasant activity has occurred in a variety of sections
in missions large and small.
When visa malfeasance is suspected overseas, the Bureau of Diplomatic
Security (DS), through its Regional Security Officers (RSOs), and CA,
through its consular managers overseas, work closely together. The RSOs
take the investigatory lead, under the direction of DS at headquarters,
in coordination with CA, to determine how best to proceed in a manner
that permits evidence to be developed while controlling further
malfeasant activity by the suspect. If allegations are substantiated,
the Department will take appropriate actions against the employee(s)
involved, including dismissal or criminal prosecution if warranted.
Prevention and prosecution of fraud and malfeasance is a priority for
the Department.
There are now 25 high-fraud posts with DS personnel who are focused
solely on criminal investigations of visa and passport fraud and
employee malfeasance. An additional three new posts and nine more local
investigators are being proposed using new fraud prevention fees
collected under the provisions of the "L-1 Visa and H1-B Visa Reform
Act of 2004." In addition, under the Intelligence Reform Bill of 2004,
DS is establishing a new analytical unit to develop and disseminate
information on terrorist travel, document vendors, etc. The analysts in
this new unit will also document all types of fraud trends, including
case studies and analysis of recent malfeasance cases. Analytical
personnel have already been hired and the establishment and training of
this unit should be completed by late 2005.
We note, however, that such measures will supplement, not replace, the
vigilance and insight of officers on the ground. Most employee
malfeasance cases have been uncovered by consular officers who notice
quirks in applications procedures that might not be picked up by
technology or statistical analysis.
Our responses to the GAO's specific recommendations follow:
Recommendation 1: The Secretary of State should develop a strategy to
achieve strict compliance with internal controls. The strategy should
include a system to spot check compliance. The strategy should also
include formalized procedures in Fraud Prevention Units to document how
the post will address the risk of employee malfeasance and emphasize
the importance of reporting suspected internal malfeasance to consular
managers and post security officers.
We concur with these recommendations, and have already taken actions to
implement them.
The Department is continuing to turn to enhanced technology to reduce
the vulnerability of consular operations to malfeasance and to
strengthen management control and accountability. CA has begun to
develop a comprehensive, uniform and fully automated system to track
and account for sensitive, controlled and accountable consular items,
such as visa foils and passports. This project, called "Automation
Support for Consular Controlled Items Accountability," is well
underway, and CA expects to complete it in 2006. The automated control
system will record Department warehouse records of receipt, inventory
and shipment of controlled items, will connect these records with
posts' records to provide greater control over inventory worldwide,
will track dispatch and receipt of shipments, and will maintain
historical records, including providing an audit trail of critical
transactions and activities involving controlled items.
At each post, the new automated system will also track inventory and
usage in each of the consular automated systems applications, including
NIV of course, of all of the controlled items associated with that
function. The' system will assist the Accountable Consular Officers
(ACO) in their daily, quarterly and annual reconciliations;
accountability, reconciliation and record keeping will be carried out
within an electronic paradigm, while allowing for printed-paper copies
of certain key records. More importantly, speaking directly to the
GAO's recommendations, CA will be able to spot-check and monitor
compliance with accountability procedures electronically from
headquarters.
With respect to instructing posts on procedures to document and report
suspected malfeasance, the Department has recently issued a cable to
all diplomatic and consular posts providing more explicit guidance to
the field on the actions posts, in particular consular and RSOs, must
take in the event they suspect or uncover malfeasance. The cable is
State ALDAC 141874, and is attached to this letter as Exhibit 1.
Recommendation 2: The Secretary of State should improve State's
existing mechanisms to combat visa malfeasance. This could be
accomplished by (1) improving the software available to the
Vulnerability Assessment Unit to identify abnormalities in post visa
issuance statistics that could be an indication of malfeasance, and (2
enhancing the investigative case tracking systems used by the Bureaus
of Diplomatic Security in order to better identify trends and
vulnerabilities in the visa process for use by investigators and
consular managers.
State is already implementing just such actions.
The DS-CA jointly-staffed VAU, established specifically to detect and
deter visa and other consular malfeasance (e.g., passports), has in
recent months begun to focus more on the factors and circumstances that
might encourage malfeasance or allow it to flourish. In order to do
this, the unit requires more robust automated systems that will go
beyond the reports on activity currently available in the Consular
Consolidated Database. The unit is about to start field-testing a new
risk analysis program which will alert VAU personnel when certain
factors are present at a post which might indicate the need for
management assistance, CMAT help or an investigation. Examples of such
factors include: a spike in 3RD-country national applicants, visa
processing activity after hours, severe staffing problems, a drop in
the refusal rate, or issuance of a visa to a watch-listed individual.
This new system will be a great improvement over the current set-up,
which requires mining databases for individual records or specific
information on an ad hoc basis. The new system will also give the VAU
an automated means of generating pertinent information, flagging
anomalies and interrupting the activity. This will allow the unit to
shift to a more proactive posture, rather than simply verifying
allegations of malfeasance or coming across problems when preparing
background material for a CMAT.
DS is currently in the process of developing its own new worldwide case-
tracking database that will provide more detailed and comprehensive
data, as recommended by the GAO. This new system is designed to allow
DS to add features to the system such as analytical tools, new
management reports, etc. This new database is currently in pilot phase,
and the tentative launch date for version one of this new system will
be early 2006. Work on version two will start immediately thereafter,
to continue updating and improving the DS criminal case tracking
system.
Recommendation 3: The Secretary of State and the Attorney General
should determine whether seeking additional overseas search authorities
is warranted to facilitate investigations of visa malfeasance. If they
determine such authorities are warranted, the Secretary of State and
the Attorney General should develop an implementation plan and notify
the Congress of any required legislative changes.
We concur with this recommendation and with the observation that
letters rogatory and MLATs have not been very helpful in investigating
employee malfeasance overseas. State's Legal Adviser's Office will work
with the Justice Department to determine whether seeking additional
overseas search authorities is warranted and, if so, to develop an
implementation plan and notify Congress of any necessary legislative
changes.
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Jess Ford (202) 512-4128:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the person named above, John Brummet, Assistant
Director; Claude Adrien; Joseph Carney; Martin de Alteriis; Etana
Finkler; Patricia Martin; and Mary Moutsos made key contributions to
this report.
(320298):
FOOTNOTES
[1] For the purposes of this report, visas refer to nonimmigrant visas
for temporary entry to the United States. State also issues immigrant
visas for permanent entry to the United States.
[2] For the purposes of this report, visa malfeasance refers to fraud
committed by a U.S. government employee. This type of malfeasance is
also called internal fraud. External fraud or fraud committed by a visa
applicant or non-U.S. government personnel is not covered in this
report.
[3] See GAO, Border Security: Strengthened Visa Process Would Benefit
from Improvements in Staffing and Information Sharing, GAO-05-859
(Washington D.C.: Sept. 13, 2005).
[4] State does not keep records on all cases involving prosecution of
its employees. Some of the individuals prosecuted were involved in the
same fraud schemes. The United States Attorneys Offices also prosecute
malfeasance cases. Although prosecuted by these offices, cases may be
compiled and sorted according to the statute charged, for example, 18
U.S.C. 1546, available data do not separate out visa fraud cases that
specifically charge malfeasance, as opposed to other types of visa
fraud. Thus, we did not examine such cases.
[5] This system, called CLASS, is a State name-check database that
posts use to access critical information for visa adjudication. The
system contains records provided by numerous agencies and includes
information on persons with visa refusals, immigration violations,
criminal histories, and terrorism concerns.
[6] "Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,"
(GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1, Nov. 1999) identifies the need for internal
controls such as physical controls over vulnerable assets, segregation
of duties to reduce the risk of fraud, limited access to and
accountability of resources and systems, and top-level reviews of
actual performance.
[7] Class A referrals are generally for high level foreign officials,
business persons, the press, military trainees, cultural exchanges, or
well-known performers. The interview may be waived for these referrals.
Class B referrals result in procedural courtesies, such as early
appointments, and require both fingerprinting and applicant interviews.
[8] Report of Inspection: Nonimmigrant Visa Adjudication: the Visa
Referral Process, ISP-CA-05-56, March 2005.
[9] State 9 FAM Appendix K, "Visa Referral Systems," dated May 16,
2002, provides criteria that posts must use in developing their
referral policies. Unique characteristics of a post may dictate
additional procedures that officers should follow when making a
referral.
[10] State Cables to posts 247059 and 201680, "Annual Certification of
Consular Management Controls" dated August 2003 and September 2004,
respectively.
[11] Standard Operating Procedure 56, "Checklist for Preventing and/or
Reporting Consular Malfeasance," December 2003 and updated in State
cable 141874, "Reminder-Reporting Consular Malfeasance," August 1,
2005.
[12] External fraud involves non-U.S. government employee assistance to
individuals attempting to enter the United States illegally.
[13] State established a Fraud Prevention Program in 1986 to combat
visa fraud. Fraud Prevention Units at overseas posts have dedicated
investigator positions, which generally are staffed by local hires. As
of 2005, 13 Consular Affairs Officer positions worldwide were dedicated
full-time to fraud prevention programs.
[14] Standard Operating Procedure 56, "Checklist for Preventing and/or
Reporting Consular Malfeasance," December 2003 and updated in State
cable 141874, "Reminder-Reporting Consular Malfeasance," August 1,
2005.
[15] Consular Management Handbook Section 600, Management Controls,
Anti-Fraud, and Malfeasance, March 9, 2001.
[16] Consular Management Handbook, Section 654.5-2, "Receipt,
Inventory, and Accountability," March 9, 2001, and Standard Operating
Procedure 55: Accountability of Controlled Consular Items, December
2003.
[17] Inspector General report, "Review of Nonimmigrant Visa Issuance
Policy and Procedures," Memorandum Report ISP-I-03-26, December 2002.
[18] Inspector General report, "Nonimmigrant Visa Adjudication: the
Visa Referral Process," ISP-CA-05-56, March 2005.
[19] State 102994, "Standard Operating Procedure 66-Referral Policy
Clarification," May 2004.
[20] Class B referrals result in procedural courtesies such as
expedited appointments and applicants are interviewed.
[21] State requires employees who make referrals to attest to consular
officers that they know the referred applicant personally, that the
issuance of the visa to the applicant is in the national interest of
the United States, and that the applicant does not constitute a threat
to the safety or security of the United States.
[22] 9 FAM 41.121 PN1.2-8 (2/25/2002) and State cable to posts 034743,
"Front Office Oversight of Consular Function-A Reference Tool
Continued," February 2004.
[23] State 346750, Standard Operating Procedure 56, "Checklist for
Preventing and/or Reporting Consular Malfeasance," December 2003.
[24] Consular sections and Diplomatic Security investigators have
different but valid objectives in addressing alleged visa malfeasance.
For example, Diplomatic Security officials we spoke with prefer that
allegations be reported to post security officers rather than consular
officers to protect the integrity of the investigative process, while
Consular Affairs' priority is to immediately stop the possibility of
visa issuances to unqualified applicants.
[25] Diplomatic Security reported opening about 140 cases involving
employee visa malfeasance allegations between 2001 and 2004.
[26] State was not able to provide comprehensive data on the total
number of visa malfeasance cases brought to court. We were able to
obtain data from Justice's Public Integrity Section for the 10
prosecutions involving State or other U.S. employees. Justice
prosecuted 14 additional persons involved in visa malfeasance schemes
who were not employed by the U.S. government. The U.S. Attorneys
Offices may also prosecute visa malfeasance cases. Although these cases
may be compiled and sorted according to the statute charged, for
example, 18 U.S.C. 1546, available Offices data do not separate out
visa fraud cases that specifically charge internal consular
malfeasance, as opposed to other types of visa fraud. Thus, we did not
examine such cases.
[27] Consular Management Handbook, section 642.1, March 9, 2001,
updated in August 2003 in Standard Operating Procedure 31, "Visa
Referral Program."
[28] Visa brokers are individuals that assist visa applicants in
obtaining a visa, often through fraudulent means.
[29] Diplomatic Security is in the process of adding additional
officers at 25 posts to concentrate on investigations of visa fraud,
including visa malfeasance.
[30] The U.S.A. PATRIOT Act (P.L. 107-56) amended Rule 41 to allow
magistrates to issue search warrants for property, but only in cases
involving domestic and international terrorism; according to Diplomatic
Security officials, this is generally not applicable to a typical case
of visa malfeasance. According to a Justice official, in 1990 the
United States Judicial Conference approved an amendment to Rule 41 that
would have provided U.S. magistrates search warrant authority. However,
in reviewing the recommendation, the Supreme Court concluded that the
matter required further consideration and no action has been taken.
[31] The U.S. mission generally refers to the buildings and land used
for the purpose of the mission. This includes the embassies and
consulate, as well as the residence of the head of the mission.
[32] Letter Rogatories are letters of request from a court in one
country to a foreign court requesting judicial assistance. Such
requests can include the obtaining of testimony or other evidence from
a person located in the foreign country. Requests rest entirely on the
comity of courts towards each other, and customarily embody a promise
of reciprocity.
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