State Department
Stronger Action Needed to Improve Oversight and Assess Risks of the Summer Work Travel and Trainee Categories of the Exchange Visitor Program Gao ID: GAO-06-106 October 14, 2005Exchange programs, which bring over 280,000 foreign visitors to the United States annually, are widely recognized as an effective way to expose citizens of other countries to the American people and culture. Past GAO and the Department of State (State) Office of Inspector General reviews have reported that some exchange visitors have participated in unauthorized activities and cited problems in the management and oversight of the programs. Strong management oversight is needed to ensure that the programs operate as intended and are not abused. This report examines how State manages the Summer Work Travel and the Trainee programs to ensure that only authorized activities are carried out under the programs and identifies potential risks of the programs and the data available to assess these risks.
State has not exerted sufficient management oversight of the Summer Work Travel and the Trainee programs to guard against abuse of the programs and has been slow to address program deficiencies. State attempts to ensure compliance with program regulations through its processes of approving and annually reviewing the organizations that sponsor exchange visitors. These processes, however, are not sufficient to ensure that visitors participate only in authorized activities because the procedures consist primarily of document reviews, and State rarely visits the sponsors or host employers of the exchange visitors to make sure they are following the rules to investigate complaints. Moreover, some sponsors have asserted that the program regulations need updating. Further, State officials believe that the sanctions provided in the regulations are difficult to enforce. State acknowledged that it has been slow to address identified deficiencies and update the regulations, but had indicated that it is beginning to revise the regulations and is establishing a unit to monitor exchange activities. However funding of the unit has not been secured. A number of potential risks are associated with the programs, including that exchange visitors might use it to remain in the United States beyond their authorized time. There is also the potential for the Trainee Program to be misused as an employment program. Further, negative experiences for exchange participants could undermine the purpose of the programs. However, State has little data to measure whether such risks to the program are significant. As a result, State cannot determine if additional management actions are needed to mitigate the risks.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-06-106, State Department: Stronger Action Needed to Improve Oversight and Assess Risks of the Summer Work Travel and Trainee Categories of the Exchange Visitor Program
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Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security,
and Claims, Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives:
October 2005:
State Department:
Stronger Action Needed to Improve Oversight and Assess Risks of the
Summer Work Travel and Trainee Categories of the Exchange Visitor
Program:
GAO-06-106:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-106, a report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on
Immigration, Border Security, and Claims, Committee on the Judiciary,
House of Representatives:
Why GAO Did This Study:
Exchange programs, which bring over 280,000 foreign visitors to the
United States annually, are widely recognized as an effective way to
expose citizens of other countries to the American people and culture.
Past GAO and the Department of State (State) Office of Inspector
General reviews have reported that some exchange visitors have
participated in unauthorized activities and cited problems in the
management and oversight of the programs. Strong management oversight
is needed to ensure that the programs operate as intended and are not
abused.
This report examines how State manages the Summer Work Travel and the
Trainee programs to ensure that only authorized activities are carried
out under the programs and identifies potential risks of the programs
and the data available to assess these risks.
What GAO Found:
State has not exerted sufficient management oversight of the Summer
Work Travel and the Trainee programs to guard against abuse of the
programs and has been slow to address program deficiencies. State
attempts to ensure compliance with program regulations through its
processes of approving and annually reviewing the organizations that
sponsor exchange visitors. These processes, however, are not sufficient
to ensure that visitors participate only in authorized activities
because the procedures consist primarily of document reviews, and State
rarely visits the sponsors or host employers of the exchange visitors
to make sure they are following the rules to investigate complaints.
Moreover, some sponsors have asserted that the program regulations need
updating. Further, State officials believe that the sanctions provided
in the regulations are difficult to enforce. State acknowledged that it
has been slow to address identified deficiencies and update the
regulations, but had indicated that it is beginning to revise the
regulations and is establishing a unit to monitor exchange activities.
However funding of the unit has not been secured.
A number of potential risks are associated with the programs, including
that exchange visitors might use it to remain in the United States
beyond their authorized time. There is also the potential for the
Trainee Program to be misused as an employment program. Further,
negative experiences for exchange participants could undermine the
purpose of the programs. However, State has little data to measure
whether such risks to the program are significant. As a result, State
cannot determine if additional management actions are needed to
mitigate the risks.
Summer Work Travel Participants and Trainee Participants, 2003 and 2004
Program: Summer Work Travel;
2003: 88,000;
2004: 89,453[A].
Program: Trainee;
2003: 31,084;
2004: 27,475.
Source: The Department of State.
[A] As of November 2004.
[End of table]
What GAO Recommends:
This report recommends that the Secretary of State take strong action
to enhance the overall management and monitoring of the Summer Work
Travel and Trainee programs, including fully implementing a compliance
unit to monitor exchange activities; updating and amending regulations;
and developing strategies to obtain data on overstays, program abuses,
and other risks associated with the programs. State acknowledged
weaknesses in the programs and described actions it is taking to
address our recommendations.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-106.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Jess Ford (202) 512-4128
or fordj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
State Has Maintained Limited Oversight of Exchange Programs:
State Has Not Assessed Potential Risks:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of State:
Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
Table:
Table 1: Top-10 Countries Participating in the Summer Work Travel and
the Trainee Programs in 2004:
Figures:
Figure 1: J-1 Visas Issued Fiscal Years 1995-2004:
Figure 2: Roles and Responsibilities of Sponsoring Organizations:
Abbreviations:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
OMB: Office of Management and Budget:
OIG: Office of Inspector General:
SEVIS: Student and Exchange Visitor Information System:
Letter October 14, 2005:
The Honorable John N. Hostettler:
Chairman,
Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims:
Committee on the Judiciary:
House of Representatives:
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Exchange programs are widely recognized as an effective way to expose
citizens of other countries to the American people and culture.
According to former Secretary of State Colin Powell, a good stay in
this country is the best public diplomacy tool the United States has.
The Department of State's (State) 2004 public diplomacy strategy calls
for broader and deeper use of exchanges--people-to-people contacts--
that, according to the strategy, can change hearts and minds. More than
280,000 foreign nationals travel to the United States annually using a
J-1 visa[Footnote 1] to participate in the Exchange Visitor Program.
This program encompasses 13 categories of educational and cultural
exchanges designed to enhance understanding between the people of the
United States and those of other countries. Among the largest exchange
programs are the Summer Work Travel Program, which allows bona fide
foreign college and university students to learn about life in the
United States through temporary work and travel, and the Trainee
Program, which, through a structured training program, allows
participants to enhance their skills in their chosen career field.
State's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs administers the
Exchange Visitor Program through the Office of Exchange Coordination
and Designation. Past GAO and State Office of Inspector General (OIG)
reviews cited a few specific cases where J-1 visa holders participated
in unauthorized activities and cited problems in program management. In
particular, the OIG reported instances where companies were using
exchange visitors to fill regular staff positions and not trainee
positions as mandated by the Exchange Visitor Program
regulations.[Footnote 2]
This report (1) examines how State manages the Summer Work Travel and
the Trainee programs to ensure that only authorized activities are
carried out under the programs and (2) identifies potential risks of
the programs and the data available to State to assess these risks.
To accomplish our objectives, we reviewed previous GAO and OIG reports
and examined current and proposed program regulations, State cables,
sponsoring organizations' annual reports, agency databases, and other
information pertaining to the Summer Work Travel and Trainee programs.
We also met with representatives of nine sponsoring organizations of
the Summer Work Travel Program that accounted for 75 percent of the
participants in 2004 and representatives of 13 sponsors of the Trainee
Program that accounted for 54 percent of the participants in 2004.
Additionally, we visited three overseas posts--Minsk, Belarus; Warsaw,
Poland; and Dublin, Ireland--where we discussed the programs with U.S.
embassy officials, including consular officers, and the overseas
partners of the U.S. sponsors of the exchanges. We selected these posts
because they are among the top sending countries for the Summer Work
Travel Program. We focused on the Summer Work Travel and the Trainee
programs because they bring in nearly one-half of the Exchange Visitor
Program participants. In addition, the Trainee Program was the subject
of a 2000 OIG report. We conducted our review from November 2004 to
August 2005 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Appendix I provides more information on our scope and
methodology.
Results in Brief:
State has not exerted sufficient management oversight of the Summer
Work Travel and the Trainee programs to ensure that only authorized
activities are undertaken. Sponsoring organizations, employers, third-
party organizations, and exchange visitors are required to comply with
the Exchange Visitor Program regulations. These regulations require,
for example, that sponsors monitor the exchange visitors to ensure that
they engage only in activities consistent with the Exchange Visitor
Program category listed on their certificate of eligibility. State
attempts to ensure compliance with the regulations through its
processes of designating and redesignating (every 2 years)
organizations that sponsor J-1 exchange visitors. However, the process
of redesignating sponsor organizations and the review of sponsors'
annual reports are not sufficient to ensure that visitors participate
only in authorized activities. State officials rarely visit the
sponsors, host employers or third-party organizations of the exchange
participants to ensure compliance with the rules or investigate
complaints. For example, in the last 4 years, State officials made just
eight visits to its 206 designated Summer Work Travel and/or Trainee
sponsors. Moreover, some sponsors stated that the regulations need
updating to clarify how the programs should be implemented. In
addition, State officials in charge of the programs said the sanctions
outlined in the regulations are difficult to enforce. State is
currently establishing a compliance unit and revising the regulations,
including developing new sanction regulations; but these changes have
not been fully implemented.
There are a number of potential risks associated with the Summer Work
Travel and the Trainee exchange programs. These include the potential
risk of (1) foreign nationals using the program as a means of entering
the United States and remaining illegally after their visa expires; (2)
the Trainee Program being misused as a work program; and (3) exchange
participants being exploited, resulting in negative experiences, which
could undermine the purpose of the programs. State and Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) officials and some sponsors that we met with
provided evidence of such abuse. For example, DHS and the overseas
posts provided data on potential overstays[Footnote 3] that indicated
that some exchange visitors had remained in the United States after
their programs concluded. As an example of abuse of the Trainee
Program, State and some of the sponsors described an incident in which
650 electrical engineers entered the United States to participate in
training programs but were instead employed on construction projects as
electricians, contrary to the program's intent. In another example, a
State official described an incident in which about 45 current Summer
Work Travel participants were placed in substandard housing, which was
apparently leased by an employee of the sponsoring organization. GAO
internal control standards instruct agencies to identify risks that
could impede the efficient and effective achievement of program
objectives and assess their impact. However, State has insufficient
data to assess whether potential risks to the programs are significant.
For example, due to weaknesses in the DHS' system for tracking
visitors' arrivals and departures,[Footnote 4] the full extent of the
overstays is not known. Moreover, State does not systematically
document program abuse. Furthermore the State and the Department of
Labor (Labor) do not compile or analyze data concerning the potential
impact of program abuse on the U.S. labor market, although Labor
officials said that it is not likely that the exchange programs will
have any effect on U.S. employment opportunities because of the small
number of J-1 exchange visitors relative to the U.S. workforce.
Additionally, State does not know the extent to which participants have
negative experiences because it does not systematically document and
analyze reports of complaints made by program participants and serious
problems submitted by the sponsors.
This report recommends that the Secretary of State take the following
three actions to enhance the overall management and monitoring of the
Summer Work Travel and the Trainee programs:
* fully implement a compliance unit to better monitor Exchange Visitor
Program activities and address deficiencies;
* update and amend the regulations where necessary; and:
* develop strategies to obtain data, such as information on overstays
and labor market abuses, to assess the risks associated with the
exchange program categories, and use the results of its assessment to
focus its management and monitoring efforts.
In commenting on a draft of this report, State acknowledged weaknesses
in its oversight and administration of the Exchange Visitor Program and
reported that it has designated program oversight and administration as
a weakness under the Federal Managers Financial Integrity Act.[Footnote
5] State described a number of actions it is taking to implement each
of our recommendations.
Background:
The Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961[Footnote 6]
authorizes the J-1 Exchange Visitor Program. The program provides
foreign nationals with opportunities to participate in exchange
programs in the United States and return home to share their
experiences, while also encouraging Americans to participate in
educational and cultural programs in other countries. Foreign nationals
who participate in the program enter the United States with a J-1 visa.
The program has grown considerably over the years. Figure 1 shows the
number of J-1 visas issued since 1995.
Figure 1: J-1 Visas Issued Fiscal Years 1995-2004:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of Department of State data.
[End of figure]
The program is comprised of 13 categories of exchanges, which are
grouped under private sector programs or academic and government
programs. The private sector programs include the Alien Physician, Au
Pair, Camp Counselor, Summer Work Travel, and Trainee categories. The
academic and government programs include the Government Visitor,
International Visitor, Professor and Research Scholar, Short-Term
Scholar, Specialist, Student (Secondary School Student,
College/University Student), and Teacher categories. The Exchange
Visitor Program had about 282,000 exchange visitors in the 13 program
categories for fiscal year 2004.
State's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs administers the
Exchange Visitor Program through the Office of Exchange Coordination
and Designation. This office administers the program through the
designation of United States organizations to conduct exchange programs
in the various exchange categories. There are 1,457 designated exchange
programs. Designated sponsors are responsible for screening and
selecting qualified applicants for program eligibility. The office
determines which organizations will be designated to administer the
international exchange programs on the basis of information provided
during the application process in accordance with regulatory
requirements. The office also develops and administers policy and
regulations for the exchange categories and oversees sponsoring
organizations' compliance.
Sponsors may be for profit or nonprofit organizations; businesses;
state, local, or federal government agencies; and education-related
institutions. Sponsors sometimes contract with overseas organizations-
-such as student travel agencies--as local partners to help identify
and screen exchange program applicants. Some sponsors serve as
intermediaries between the exchange visitor and a third party, which
engages the exchange visitor in the program activity for the category
in which they are being sponsored. For example, for trainees, the third
parties are the organizations where the exchange visitors will receive
training. Third parties consist of a variety of organizations, which
include--but are not limited to--hotels, law firms, restaurants,
Internet companies, and other private and public sector businesses and
organizations. Sponsors are responsible for overseeing the operations
of their overseas partners, and any third parties they work with.
Also chief among the sponsors' responsibilities is that of managing
information on the exchange participant in DHS' Student and Exchange
Visitor Information System (SEVIS), which has been in operation since
January 2003. SEVIS, which is maintained and administered by DHS' U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, is an Internet-based system that
electronically collects information on all nonimmigrants that enter the
United States with student visas and exchange visitor visas, and their
dependents. Once a participant's data are entered into SEVIS by the
sponsor, a Form DS-2019 is issued by the system in the applicant's
name. This identifying information in SEVIS can be reviewed by a
consular officer at the time of the visa interview and during the
processing of the exchange visitor at the port of entry. Upon the
arrival of the Exchange Visitor Program participant, the sponsor is
required to document their participation in their program activity and
record information on the location of the visitor's employment or
training and U.S. residence address. Figure 2 describes the sponsoring
organizations' roles and responsibilities.
Figure 2: Roles and Responsibilities of Sponsoring Organizations:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Summer Work Travel and Trainee Programs:
The Summer Work Travel Program is among the largest of the 13
categories of exchanges, with about 89,453[Footnote 7] participants in
2004. This program is designed to achieve the educational objectives of
international exchange by involving bona fide foreign college or
university students directly in the daily lives of U.S. citizens
through travel and temporary work opportunities. The Trainee Program,
with about 27,475 participants in 2004, provides foreign nationals the
opportunity to enhance their skills in their chosen career field
through participation in a structured training program. Summer Work
Travel sponsors help the participants obtain jobs[Footnote 8] and
provide pre-arrival information, an orientation to life in the United
States, and contact information in the event of problems. Sponsors of
trainees are also required to provide pre-arrival information to the
trainees and are directly responsible for all aspects of the trainees'
program, including the selection, orientation, training, supervision,
and evaluation. About 52 Summer Work Travel and 170 Trainee sponsors
operated programs in 2005.[Footnote 9]
Thousands of employers participate in the Summer Work Travel and the
Trainee programs. Typical Summer Work Travel employers include
amusement parks, resorts, hotels, and restaurants. The jobs generally
include ride operators, waiters, lifeguards, receptionists, and guides.
The types of organizations that utilize trainees include corporations,
architectural firms, hotels, restaurants, development organizations,
airlines, investment and financial services entities, and manufacturing
companies. The participants are placed in locations wherein they
receive training in engineering, drafting and design, biomedical
technology, agricultural technology, hospitality administration and
management, marketing, agricultural and food products processing,
culinary arts and chef training, financial management, and many other
careers.
Throughout the existence of the Summer Work Travel Program, there has
been a geographic shift in which countries provide the most program
participants. In the past, Western Europe had the largest numbers of
participants. However, more recently, the largest numbers of Summer
Work Travel participants have been citizens of Eastern European
countries, including Poland, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, and Romania.
Table 1 lists the 10 countries with the largest numbers of Summer Work
Travel and Trainee participants.
Table 1: Top-10 Countries Participating in the Summer Work Travel and
the Trainee Programs in 2004:
Summer Work Travel Program: Country: Poland;
Summer Work Travel Program: Number of participants: 18,691;
Trainee Program: Country: Germany;
Trainee Program: Number of participants: 3,021.
Summer Work Travel Program: Country: Russia;
Summer Work Travel Program: Number of participants: 9,962;
Trainee Program: Country: France;
Trainee Program: Number of participants: 1,748.
Summer Work Travel Program: Country: Bulgaria;
Summer Work Travel Program: Number of participants: 6,993;
Trainee Program: Country: United Kingdom;
Trainee Program: Number of participants: 1,023.
Summer Work Travel Program: Country: Slovakia;
Summer Work Travel Program: Number of participants: 5,581;
Trainee Program: Country: Canada;
Trainee Program: Number of participants: 660.
Summer Work Travel Program: Country: Brazil;
Summer Work Travel Program: Number of participants: 5,477;
Trainee Program: Country: China;
Trainee Program: Number of participants: 458.
Summer Work Travel Program: Country: Ireland;
Summer Work Travel Program: Number of participants: 4,309;
Trainee Program: Country: Netherlands;
Trainee Program: Number of participants: 408.
Summer Work Travel Program: Country: Czech Republic;
Summer Work Travel Program: Number of participants: 3,053;
Trainee Program: Country: Mexico;
Trainee Program: Number of participants: 403.
Summer Work Travel Program: Country: Peru;
Summer Work Travel Program: Number of participants: 2,978;
Trainee Program: Country: Japan;
Trainee Program: Number of participants: 371.
Summer Work Travel Program: Country: Romania;
Summer Work Travel Program: Number of participants: 2,901;
Trainee Program: Country: Ireland;
Trainee Program: Number of participants: 364.
Summer Work Travel Program: Country: Belarus;
Summer Work Travel Program: Number of participants: 2,607;
Trainee Program: Country: India;
Trainee Program: Number of participants: 344.
Source: Department of State.
[End of table]
State Has Maintained Limited Oversight of Exchange Programs:
State has not exerted sufficient management oversight of the Summer
Work Travel and the Trainee programs to guard against abuse of the
programs. State primarily ensures compliance with program regulations
through a paperwork review, and there is inconsistent monitoring by
sponsors. Moreover, some sponsors believe that the program regulations
need updating, and State officials have expressed concerns about the
enforceability of the sanction/revocation process provided for in the
Exchange Visitor Program regulations. Sponsors have also expressed
concern about their communication with State. State has acknowledged
problems, is establishing a compliance unit to monitor program
activities, and is revising the regulations; however progress has been
slow.
State's Monitoring Efforts Are Minimal:
State's monitoring efforts largely consist of reviewing written
information provided by sponsors, with minimal efforts of verifying
such information through program visits. State relies on sponsors to
provide written information, primarily through annual reports, which
describe the number of individuals a sponsor has placed and a brief
narrative on program activities, difficulties encountered, and their
resolution. Exchange program regulations require that sponsors promptly
notify State about any serious problem or controversy that could cause
State or the sponsor's Exchange Visitor Program notoriety or disrepute.
When a sponsor reports a problem, State officials follow-up by
telephone, e-mail, fax or letter, according to sponsors and State
officials. However, State rarely visits sponsors to observe program
activities and verify the information that they provide, although such
visits are a good internal control practice for ensuring that
management's directives are being carried out. We found that in the
past 4 years, State officials made visits to only 8 of its 206 Summer
Work Travel and/or Trainee sponsors.
Additionally, information on problematic incidents provided by the
sponsors and any notes or correspondence on the matter are filed as
part of the material that is examined when the sponsor applies for
redesignation, which is required every 2 years.[Footnote 10] In their
applications for redesignation to State, all sponsors are required to
estimate the number of exchange visitors their organization would like
to place and provide information on their legal, financial, and
managerial resources to manage exchange programs in compliance with
federal regulations. State reviews these applications along with the
annual reports and other documentation collected over the 2-year period
and determines whether it should grant a 2-year designation to a
sponsor and the number of participants the sponsor will be authorized
to include in their exchange program activity. The vast majority of
sponsors who apply for redesignation are approved. State officials said
that their staffing levels and lack of travel funds do not allow for
intensive monitoring of the Exchange Visitor Program sponsors. The
Office of Exchange Coordination and Designation has five Program
Designation officers who serve as the point of contact and are
responsible for the day-to-day administration and management of the 13
exchange programs.
Sponsors' Monitoring of Employers and Third Parties Is Limited:
Exchange Visitor Program regulations require sponsors to effectively
administer and monitor their Exchange Visitor Program and ensure
exchange participants engage in activities consistent with the
appropriate exchange category. Nevertheless, recent discoveries by
consular officers overseas suggest that some sponsors do not
consistently carry out their oversight and monitoring responsibilities.
For example:
* A trainee applicant submitted a training offer that included the name
and organizational information of a legitimate financial services
company, but listed as a contact an individual with a noncompany e-mail
address. When the consular officer checked the contact information, he
learned that the contact person was not affiliated with the financial
services company. The sponsor admitted to only spot-checking the
viability of third party organizations and training plans.
* When a consular officer at another post checked a company's Web site
to verify the job offer of a foreign student applying for the Summer
Work Travel Program, he discovered that the company was a topless bar.
* In another case, consular officers noticed a number of trainee
applicants who said they were going to the United States to work as
kitchen help and wait staff. When State contacted the U.S. sponsor
about these applicants, the sponsor stated that it relied on another
organization to help it select and place the trainees and admitted that
it had not followed up directly with each trainee and employer to
ensure that its standards were being satisfied.
Sponsors are required to take all reasonable steps to ensure that third
parties know and comply with applicable provisions of the Exchange
Visitor Program regulations. However, State does not offer any guidance
on how the sponsors should carry out their monitoring and oversight
responsibilities. Two of the sponsors we met with said that, after they
discovered that trainees whom they had sponsored were not receiving any
training, they established new practices to visit at least 10 percent
of their exchange program participants and all employers and exchange
participants where there were problems.
Various Concerns Exist About Program Regulations:
During our review, several sponsors we met with raised concerns about
the clarity of the program regulations and also complained that varying
interpretations of the regulations make it difficult for them to
implement the program. Moreover, State officials believed that the
sanctions provided in the regulations are not adequate to control the
activities of sponsors who incorrectly implemented the program. State
has been revising the regulations but has not finalized the changes.
Regulations Need Revising:
Six of the 13 sponsors that we met with described a range of problems
pertaining to the regulations, particularly regarding the Trainee
Program. Their comments included the following:
* The Trainee regulations lack specificity and are open to differing
interpretation by State and the sponsors.
* Dealing with State has become more complicated for sponsor
organizations because State has at times changed rules outside of the
formal regulation-setting process.
* The Trainee regulations are so cumbersome that it is unclear what
should be included in a training plan.
* Training plans vary widely among sponsors, and there is no guidance
on what constitutes a good plan.
* The regulations should include a separate category for interns.
A past OIG report also cited problems with the regulations and
recommended in particular that, for the Trainee Program, the training
regulations should more clearly define what is not considered
training.[Footnote 11]
Six of the sponsors we met with and the representative of an
association of sponsors expressed concern with State's interpretation
of certain provisions of the regulations, while seven sponsors and the
association representative also said that State does not consistently
disseminate its interpretations or guidance on the regulations to the
sponsors. For example, the regulations state that the maximum period of
the participation in the Exchange Visitor Program for a trainee, with
the exception of flight training, shall not exceed 18 months. Some
sponsors said they interpreted this provision to mean that an
individual could come to the United States one or more times as a
trainee as long as the combined duration of the visits did not exceed
18 months. In 2002, however, some sponsors said they were told that the
Trainee Program was restricted to a one-time training session not to
exceed 18 months. This clarification in regulations has surprised some
sponsors, according to one of the sponsors who was notified about this
change through a fax from State. A State official explained that all
Trainee sponsors were sent a message through SEVIS in October 2003,
explaining State's policy on this matter. According to the
documentation, the message was to be addressed to all sponsors that
conduct Trainee programs and all responsible officers and their
alternates.
Moreover, a few sponsors said guidance or interpretations of various
provisions of the regulations have been communicated inconsistently.
For example, representatives of two sponsoring organizations said that
State is no longer requiring that sponsors recruit no more than 10
percent of repeat Summer Work Travel participants, as specified in the
regulations, but State did not make any formal effort to inform the
sponsors of the change. One of the sponsors said that the organization
learned about the change from the U.S. Embassy in Warsaw. A State
official explained that policy changes are announced in the Federal
Register or by written notice to all sponsors. According to the
official, two cables were sent to all overseas posts clarifying the
requirements of the Summer Work Travel Program and the removal of the
10 percent rule regarding repeat participants. In addition, copies of
these cables were sent, by e-mail, to all Summer Work Travel sponsors,
according to the official.
State Officials Believe Regulations Lack Enforceable Sanctions:
State is also reviewing the sanctions provided in the regulations.
State officials, including the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, said the current
sanction/revocation process that State may use to limit the activities
of sponsors that do not comply with the regulations--or remove a
sponsor from the program altogether--is difficult to enforce. The
sanctions range in severity from a letter of reprimand to an action to
revoke a sponsor's designation. One sanction that State uses is to deny
the sponsor's request for certification forms until the compliance
issue has been resolved. For example, State officials described a
recent case in which State's attempt to revoke a sponsor's designation
was challenged by the sponsor in district court. In this case, State
received complaints from two trainees who alleged they were not
receiving the training that they had expected and were displeased with
their training assignments and compensation. The sponsor in this case
had placed individuals in positions in the hospitality industry. State
investigated the sponsor's operation, interviewed a number of program
participants, and concluded that the sponsor was not placing
participants in management training positions but was operating a work
program, in violation of the regulations. State's in-house revocation
board agreed and supported the sanction of revocation. However, in
remanding the matter to the board for further proceedings, the district
court concluded that State's investigation had been too limited and had
not produced evidence adequate to support the severe punishment of
revocation. After a second hearing, the board overturned the
revocation, thereby enabling the sponsor to resume its program. State
concluded that the sanctions' provisions needed streamlining and
tightening for more effective and assured application.
State Slow to Revise Regulations:
State has acknowledged that the regulations need revising; however,
more than 3 years after revisions were suggested by the exchange
industry they are still in draft form. According to the Acting Director
of the Office of Exchange Coordination and Designation revisions are in
process. For example, State is revising the Trainee regulations to
create a separate Intern category to accommodate younger, less
experienced applicants, such as students or recent university graduates
seeking to gain practical work experience. The exchange community
generally supports the creation of a new Intern category and, in
November 2001, an association of organizations that sponsor exchange
students submitted its proposals for revising the regulations to State.
The Acting Director of the Office of Exchange Coordination and
Designation said that the sections of the regulations on interns and
trainees are still being reviewed at State and attributed the delay in
completing the regulations to the review process. He also stated that
State's Office of Legal Advisor was given the responsibility to develop
new sanctions for the program 2 years ago. According to the Assistant
Legal Advisor for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, revised
sanctions regulations were drafted and shared with the Bureau of
Educational and Cultural Affairs for review and comment. The Assistant
Legal Advisor stated that recent guidance from the Bureau's Principal
Deputy Assistant Secretary suggested that further revisions were
warranted to best suit evolving program needs. Once State has completed
its review, the Department of Justice will be consulted prior to
publication of the revised regulations. She stated that while this
process could take an additional 2 to 6 months to complete, the timing
should fall well within the time lines and milestones set forth in a 24-
month corrective action plan proposed by the Bureau in March 2005.
Communication between State and Sponsors and with Posts Has Raised
Concerns:
According to GAO guidance on internal controls, managers should ensure
that effective external communications occur with groups that impact
its program, projects, operations, and other activities. According to
seven of the sponsors we met with and the organization representing
sponsors, communication with State is a problem. For example, one
sponsor described State as reactive rather than proactive in its
communication practices. Representatives of four of the sponsoring
organizations complained that program officers were not always
responsive to their inquiries or were difficult to reach. Some sponsors
attributed the difficulties to an insufficient number of State staff.
Some sponsors also complained about a lack of feedback from a study
commissioned by State on SEVIS compliance and other issues, which was
completed in December 2003. The report concluded that in some cases the
sponsors' staff was not adequately trained, that the sponsors did not
maintain required records, and did not fully provide oversight of their
foreign partners, employers, third-party organizations, or the exchange
participants. The report made a number of recommendations on how State
should further clarify the program regulations and help train the
sponsors on both State regulations and their role in maintaining SEVIS
data. We met with six sponsors that participated in the study, and none
had received feedback from State on the results of the study. One said
the Acting Director of the Office of Exchange Coordination and
Designation made some general comments about the study at a meeting of
an industry association.
Communication between the Office of Exchange Coordination and
Designation and the overseas posts has also been cited as a concern.
For example, one sponsor said there is no mechanism to ensure
consistent interpretation of the regulations by the overseas posts,
while another said the posts are the last to know about program
changes. For example, a sponsor said that even though the office has
told them that applicants can have only one trainee placement, one post
was still telling applicants in 2004 that they can participate more
than once. Further, a representative of an exchange industry
organization stated that the Office of Exchange Coordination and
Designation knows too little about what is really going on in the
field. This situation may have been the reason ineligible students from
at least one country, Ireland, were allowed to participate in the
Summer Work Travel Program for over 30 years before an apparent
misinterpretation of the regulations was discovered. In 2002, a
consular officer in Dublin asked for clarification on the eligibility
of students who had completed their course work but had not formally
graduated, according to an embassy official. In response, State
instructed the posts not to change their selection procedures for the
2003 season. However, according to the Acting Director of Office of
Exchange Coordination and Designation, State ultimately confirmed that
such students were not eligible for the program, unless they could
demonstrate enrollment in another degree program, and sent a cable to
the posts with its decision in 2004. According to the local program
representatives, such students had constituted up to a third of the
participants from Ireland.
Establishment of a Compliance Unit Not Fully Implemented:
State has been slow to implement the OIG's 2000 recommendation that it
devote the necessary resources to perform more rigorous oversight. The
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Educational and
Cultural Affairs and the Acting Director of the Office of Exchange
Coordination and Designation acknowledged that State has been slow to
establish a compliance unit. The Acting Director of the Office of
Exchange Coordination and Designation said funding to establish a
compliance unit has been requested for several years without success.
The Bureau requested funding in fiscal years 2002 and 2003 for five
additional positions for the compliance unit, but State did not approve
the request for submission to the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB), according to a State official. The Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs stated that
the unit was not funded initially because of a lack of senior
managerial support. State has since supported the request for funding
because of congressional interest and the increased emphasis on
strengthening program management, according to the Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary. Subsequent requests for funding for the unit for
fiscal years 2004 to 2006 were approved by State but not approved by
OMB. However, the officials told us they realized that the program
regulations have been ignored by some exchange program sponsors, agreed
that a compliance unit was needed, and are in the process of the
establishing the unit by diverting existing positions.
According to State officials, the unit as it is currently conceived
would initially consist of one Foreign Service officer and two program
analysts and will report to the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary.
The officials stated that the compliance unit will rely on structured
reviews conducted by contractors. They said State will utilize the
system currently in place at DHS, which uses contractors for on-site
reviews of schools to verify their eligibility to register foreign
students into the SEVIS system. The contractors will verify the
information that the sponsors submit as part of the redesignation
process and may check the names of the responsible and alternate
responsible officers--and possibly board members--through law
enforcement databases, according to the State officials. They said that
as part of the new compliance effort, sponsors for all nonacademic
exchanges will be required to contract for and submit annual audits of
their activities. The compliance unit will develop a management
template to guide the audits. Currently only sponsors of the Au Pair
Program are required to submit such audits.[Footnote 12]
It is too early to determine whether implementation of the planned
compliance unit will resolve all of the issues identified by GAO and
OIG. For example, using contractors to visit the sponsors will address
OIG's criticism that State does not visit the sponsors. However, State
has not determined what information the contractors need to review to
assess how well the sponsors monitor employers and third parties.
Moreover, State has not provided a written plan describing in detail
how the compliance unit will operate. Funding also remains an issue.
State initially plans to cover the cost of the new compliance unit by
redirecting current appropriations and obtaining--as agreed upon by
OMB--about $450,000 of the SEVIS fees collected from exchange program
sponsors by DHS. Further, State will again request funding for the
compliance unit in the 2007 budget request.
State Has Not Assessed Potential Risks:
GAO internal control standards instruct agencies to identify risks that
could impede the efficient and effective achievement of its objectives
and assess their impact. A number of potential risks are associated
with the Summer Work Travel and the Trainee programs, including the
risk of participants using the programs to remain in the United States
beyond their authorized time. Exchange participants may also use the
programs as a means to fraudulent immigration. There is also the
potential for the Trainee Program being misused as an employment
program, although State does not have data on the extent that such
abuse occurs. The exchange participants could be exploited by employers
or other third parties. While State investigates complaints, it does
not know the extent to which participants have negative experiences
because it does not systematically document and analyze complaints made
by program participants and reports of serious problems reported by the
sponsors.
Some Exchange Participants Have Used the Programs to Remain in the
United States:
Although exchange program participants are expected to return to their
country following completion of their program, there is information
indicating that some participants remain beyond the time that they were
authorized to stay. Information on overstays is available from DHS's
arrival and departure database and the results of returnee validation
studies conducted by overseas posts. For example, we asked DHS to check
the total number of J-1 visa recipients in all exchange categories who
had completed their program since January 2003 against its arrival and
departure database to determine which visa holders had departed the
country. The results showed that about 362,000 exchange participants
had concluded their program during this period. The data showed that
about 36 percent of the participants had departed the United States by
the end of their program and about 24 percent were potential
overstays.[Footnote 13] However, the full extent of overstays is
uncertain because DHS could not find information on an additional 40
percent of the J-1 visa holders because they may have entered the
United States before the current entry system was operational. DHS'
primary method for estimating overstays is to match the arrival portion
of a form collected by DHS when the visitor enters the United States to
the departure portion of the form generally collected by the airlines
when the visitor departs. One of the weaknesses in this system is that
the departure portion of the form is not always submitted to airline
staff. Further, data entry errors by DHS contractors also make it
difficult to match the forms. The U.S. government is phasing in a more
comprehensive entry-exit system, US-VISIT, to correct the weaknesses in
its current system.
Some overseas posts periodically conduct validation studies to
determine if visa applicants who received J-1 visas at their post have
returned to that country. These studies generally consist of telephone
inquiries to the visa recipient, while some posts have required J-1
visa recipients to report to the post upon their return. The results
vary. For example, one post in the former Soviet Union conducted a
study of its 2004 Summer Work Travel season that showed that, as of
January 20, 2005, 26 percent of the 2004 participants from that country
remained in the United States. This post reported overstay rates of 29
percent for 2003, 25.6 percent for 2002, and 27 percent for 2001. Other
posts have reported lower overstay rates. For example, a post in a
Western European country conducted a validation study of its 2004
Summer Work Travel Program that showed that all of the visa applicants
in the sample who were issued J-1 visas returned home, as required. The
posts can use the results of such studies to guide their decision
making when they adjudicate visas. For example, the post with a 26
percent overstay rate in 2004 developed additional selection factors
for the 2005 Summer Work Travel season to assess the potential for
individuals to return to their country after their programs are
completed. However, these studies are not always statistically valid.
Moreover, the Acting Director of Exchange Coordination and Designation
said the post validation studies are not useful to program officials
because the posts do not follow a standardized methodology.
J-1 visitors who remain in the United States beyond their program do
not necessarily stay for long periods of time, and not all of them
remain in the United States illegally. According to consular officials
we talked with at one post, some participants in the Summer Work Travel
Program from their country who remain in the United States beyond their
program date might typically overstay anywhere from a few days to no
more than a few months. The consular officials said the participants
sometimes remain in the United States longer if they have not earned
sufficient money to cover their expenses. Others change their visa
status to another nonimmigrant category. For example, the 2004
validation study by one post in the former Soviet Union country showed
that 39 percent of those who had remained in the United States beyond
the completion of the program had either changed their visa status, got
married, or were seeking asylum. Changing status from a J-1 visa to
another visa category is permitted under U.S. immigration laws in
certain circumstances, but Bureau of Consular Affairs and other
officials have stated that it is not the intent of the program.
Potential Exists for Fraudulent Immigration Claims:
DHS data show that a growing number of J-1 visa holders had applied for
political asylum between 1995 and 2004, about 6,300 individuals who
entered the United States with J-1 visas applied for asylum. According
to DHS, the numbers of asylum applications from J-1 visa holders from
former Soviet Union countries have more than doubled since 2000. These
countries include Russia, Belarus, Armenia, and Ukraine. The officials
are concerned that some of these claims are fraudulent, as they doubt
that J-1 visa holders--who have to be students in good standing in
their countries--are being persecuted. The recent increase in numbers
of such claims and the similarities of the stories--which indicate
coaching, are also indicators of fraud, according to DHS officials.
DHS' Fraud Detection and National Security Unit and State's Bureau of
Consular Affairs Office of Consular Fraud Prevention are monitoring
this issue. These units would turn over any suspected fraud to U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement for investigation. According to a
DHS official, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement is conducting
asylum fraud investigations in Los Angeles and Cleveland. Among the
targets of those investigations are individuals who were admitted with
J-1 visas, as well as several other classes of nonimmigrants.
Trainee Category Is Vulnerable to Misuse as Employment Program:
The potential exists for the Trainee Program to be misused as an
employment program. Regulations strictly prohibit the use of the
trainee category for ordinary employment purposes, stating in
particular that sponsors may not place trainee participants in
positions that are filled or would be filled by full-time or part-time
employees. State and the overseas posts provided some information
describing Trainee Program abuses, but they did not have information on
the extent of the problem.
* In one example, a sponsor learned that an organization it had
contracted with to help select and place trainees had placed the
participants with employers that had contracts to provide H-2B
temporary workers.[Footnote 14] The organization had participated in
the Trainee Program because the H-2B visa category was at its limit and
it was looking for an alternative way to receive foreign workers.
* In another example, a staffing agency recruited about 650 electrical
engineers, primarily from Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania, to come to
the United States as trainees. Ostensibly, the plan was to train the
engineers in the United States because they would be working on
projects in Europe that required knowledge of U.S. standards. However,
the organization served as an electrical contractor, placing the
trainees on U.S. construction projects as electricians. Because it was
not designated to sponsor trainees, the staffing agency approached a
few designated sponsors to issue the DS-2019 forms. State received
complaints from the trainees and the electrician's union and
investigated this case. To correct the situation, the sponsors and the
union eventually found appropriate placements for some of the
engineers. Others returned to their countries. According to a State
official, the staffing agency went out of business, and the principal
party was indicted on criminal charges.
The Acting Director of the Office of Exchange Coordination and
Designation described agricultural training programs as problematic
because of the potential for fraud. He said the abuses are not hidden
and that there is not even an attempt to represent jobs as training,
and that employers refer to the participants as employees rather than
trainees. For example, a 2004 DHS investigation involved four Chinese
nationals brought to the United States by an individual to participate
in an agricultural program sponsored by a Florida university. The
trainees were placed with a dairy farm that had an agreement with the
university. DHS found that only one trainee had a firm grasp of
English, which called into question the trainees' eligibility for a J-
1 visa as well as whether the trainees were receiving training or
simply employed at the farm. Upon further investigation DHS found that
the individual had brought 17 trainees to the United States to
participate in the university's training program. The trainees were
placed at four participating dairies. DHS also found that only one of
the dairies reported having a structured training plan. According to
DHS, the university violated regulations concerning sponsoring
organizations for exchange trainees by failing to ensure that the J-1
trainees were properly compensated and possessed the required language
ability to participate in an English language-based training program.
DHS further stated that the dairies were exploiting the J-1 trainees
for cheap labor and in most cases were not concerned with actually
training them beyond what was necessary to perform their work. The
OIG's 2000 report also described abuse of the Trainee Program. In two
of the cases that the OIG investigated, U.S. workers complained that
they were replaced by trainees.
Despite such misuses, Labor officials stated that it is not likely that
the exchange programs will have any effect on the U.S labor market
because of the small number of J-1 exchange visitors (about 283,000 in
fiscal year 2004) relative to the U.S. workforce.[Footnote 15] However,
the U.S. government does not collect data to assess any potential
effect of exchange programs on the U.S. labor market. Labor officials
said that a monthly household survey, the Current Population Survey,
reviews a sample of households to compile labor statistics on foreign-
born workers. However, the numbers of exchange program participants is
so small that even if they were captured by these surveys there is no
way to separate out the effect of their labor participation from that
of the other foreign-born workers. Also, it is possible that exchange
participants would not be captured in the survey because of their
housing arrangements. For instance, if they do not reside in
traditional housing units and live in dormitories or resort-provided
housing, they may not be included in the survey sample.
Some Exchange Participants Could Be Exploited or Have Otherwise
Negative Experiences:
The Summer Work Travel and Trainee participants generally have positive
experiences in the United States, according to the sponsors and
participants we met with. Some sponsors and overseas representatives
survey their participants on their experiences. One of the sponsors
said its research showed that about 85 percent of its participants were
satisfied with their placement. All of the Summer Work Travel and
Trainee participants whom we met with described their overall
experiences as positive.
When the participants do complain, the complaints are generally minor,
usually involving disappointments with their placement, housing, or
location. The Office of Exchange Coordination and Designation
investigates all complaints that are brought to its attention,
according to State officials. In addition, the regulations require the
sponsors to inform State of any serious problems or controversy that
could be expected to bring State or the sponsors' exchange programs
into disrepute. However, we found that although State may follow up on
such reports, it does not systematically document or analyze them. Such
an analysis could be used to identify program weaknesses. State
acknowledged that is does not have procedures for recording and
maintaining all complaints in all categories and stated such procedures
are currently being prepared and will be incorporated into the Foreign
Affairs Manual.
Occasionally, the exchange participants have negative experiences as a
result of exploitation by a third party. A State official described an
incident in which about 45 current Summer Work Travel participants were
placed in substandard housing. Apparently, the housing was leased by an
employee of the sponsoring organization. The sponsor subsequently
placed the students in better housing, and the OIG is investigating the
incident at the Exchange Visitor Program office's request. State
officials described another situation in which they fear a third party
might have exploited the exchange participants. In this case, Bulgarian
Summer Work Travel participants were approached by an employee of the
local program representative while they were still in Bulgaria and told
that the jobs arranged for them in New Jersey by the U.S. sponsor were
no longer viable and that they were instead to report to jobs in
Florida. As a result, when the Bulgarians arrived in the United States,
they refused to continue on to New Jersey with the sponsor's
representative, who met them at the airport. Instead, they had tickets
to Florida and went there to work for a third-party organization that
provided cleaning services to hotels. State and DHS are currently
investigating this case.
When such situations receive negative media attention, it can further
undermine the purpose of the program. For example, a July 13, 2005,
article in a New Hampshire newspaper reported on the plight of three
students from Romania who arrived in the United States on July 5, 2005,
to find that the jobs they were promised no longer existed. News of
these situations may even reach the foreign media. For example, a June
2004 United Press International article concerning an incident
affecting Russian students stated the incident was also reported by the
Moscow Times. As a result of such situations at least one foreign
government has discussed its concerns with U.S. embassy officials in
their country, according to a Bureau of Consular Affairs official.
Conclusions:
The Summer Worker Travel and Trainee Exchange Visitor Program
categories are important components of U.S. public diplomacy efforts.
However, State has not exercised sufficient management oversight of the
programs to ensure that they operate as intended and are not abused.
State has taken some action to address identified deficiencies, such as
beginning efforts to revise the regulations; but progress has been
slow. Also, State has been slow in establishing a compliance unit,
which would bolster oversight efforts, despite recommendations from
State's OIG to do so. GAO guidance on internal control standards
instructs agencies to identify risks that could impede the efficient
and effective achievement of program goals. Once these risks are
identified, they should be analyzed for possible effect. For example,
an analysis of complaints and problems that participants and sponsors
report could uncover program weaknesses, and these results could be
used to guide the efforts of the compliance unit. Assessing such risks
is a necessary step to mitigating the risks. But State has not taken
action to assess the risks associated with the Summer Work Travel and
the Trainee programs, in part because limited data are available.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
This report recommends that the Secretary of State take the following
three actions to enhance the overall management and monitoring of the
Summer Work Travel and the Trainee programs:
* fully implement a compliance unit to better monitor exchange program
activities and address deficiencies;
* update and amend the regulations where necessary; and:
* develop strategies to obtain data, such as information on overstays
and program abuses, to assess the risks associated with the program,
and use the results of its assessment to focus its management and
monitoring efforts.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
State provided written comments on a draft of this report. These
comments are reprinted in appendix II. State and DHS also provided
technical comments, which we have incorporated into the report as
appropriate.
In its comments, State acknowledged weaknesses in its oversight and
administration of the Exchange Visitor Program and reported that it has
designated program oversight and administration as a weakness under the
Federal Managers Financial Integrity Act. State described a number of
actions it is taking to implement each of our recommendations,
including developing a corrective action plan, establishing a
compliance unit, working to revise program regulations, and working
with DHS to gather data related to the tracking of overstays.
As we agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the
contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it
until 30 days from the date of this letter. We will then send copies of
this report to interested congressional committees, and the Secretaries
of State, DHS, and Labor. We will also make copies available to others
upon request. In addition, the report will be available at [Hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-4128 or [Hyperlink, fordj@gao.gov]. Contact
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs
may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major
contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Jess T. Ford:
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
[End of section]
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To examine how State manages the Summer Work Travel and the Trainee
programs to ensure that only authorized activities are carried out
under the programs, we:
* reviewed previous GAO and OIG reports, program regulations and
guidance, cables, sponsors' annual reports, and other information
pertaining to the programs;
* reviewed program files maintained by the Bureau of Educational and
Cultural Affairs, Office of Exchange Coordination and Designation, for
selected Summer Work Travel and Trainee sponsors to gain an
understanding about the kinds of problems that the sponsors report to
the Department of State (State) and how State has addressed them;
* interviewed State officials, including the Bureau of Educational and
Cultural Affairs and the Bureau of Consular Affairs, and the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) to discuss how the U.S. government manages
the programs;
* interviewed Department of Labor (Labor) officials about the impact of
the programs on the U.S. labor market, and the Social Security
Administration on issues related to Social Security cards for exchange
visitors; and:
* met with nine sponsors of the Summer Work Travel Program that
accounted for 75 percent of the participants in 2004 and 13 sponsors of
the Trainee Program that accounted for 54 percent of the participants
in 2004,[Footnote 16] as well as an official of an association of
exchange program sponsors to discuss how sponsors carry out their
monitoring and oversight responsibilities.
We relied on data from DHS' Student and Exchange Visitor Information
System (SEVIS) to identify sponsors and the number of participants. The
SEVIS database is used by exchange program managers, sponsors, and U.S.
government agencies to keep track of individuals who enter the United
States on exchange visitor and student visas. We reviewed SEVIS data
and discussed its reliability with State and DHS officials and
sponsors, based on the descriptions of the database, procedures for
entering and managing the data, and the internal checks that are part
of the system. We believe these data are sufficiently reliable for our
purposes. We relied on data from the sponsors to identify their
overseas representatives, exchange participants, employers, and host
companies.
We met with 28 exchange participants to discuss their views of the
programs. We reviewed data provided by the sponsors to identify
exchange participants who were in their programs during our fieldwork
and who were in nearby locations. We visited exchange participants in
Boston, Massachusetts; Bolton Valley and Smugglers' Notch, Vermont; and
Washington, D.C. We used the results of our interviews for illustrative
purposes and not to generalize to all participants.
We also visited three overseas posts--Minsk, Belarus; Warsaw, Poland;
and Dublin, Ireland--where we observed visa interviews of exchange
program applicants, reviewed post validation studies and other exchange
program guidance, and discussed the exchange programs with consular and
embassy officials. We also met with the local representatives of the
U.S. sponsors to discuss how they recruited and screened Summer Work
Travel and Trainee applicants. We selected Belarus because of consular
concerns about overstays and the integrity of the overseas partners.
Belarus is also one of the top sending countries for the Summer Work
Travel Program. We selected Poland because it was the number one
sending country for Summer Work Travel participants and within the top-
10 sending posts for trainees in 2004. We selected Ireland because it
is also within the top-10 sending countries for both the Summer Work
Travel and the Trainee programs and because of the decreased
participation in the Summer Work Travel Program after State's ruling
concerning the eligibility of certain students. We used the results of
our fieldwork for illustrative purposes and not to generalize to all
posts.
To examine the potential risks of the programs we reviewed past GAO and
OIG reports, and examined post validation studies, cables, and other
documents. We followed up on information we obtained in Belarus on
asylum seekers with J-1 visas with (1) the Bureau of Consular Affairs'
Office of Consular Fraud Prevention; (2) DHS' Citizenship and
Immigration Services, Asylum Division; and (3) DHS' Fraud Detection
National Security Unit. We also requested data on overstays from the
National Security Investigations Division of DHS' Office of
Investigation, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. The overstay
data that DHS provided were primarily obtained from DHS' arrival and
departure information system. Past GAO reports have discussed the
weaknesses in the U.S. government's methods of collecting overstay
data. However, despite the lack of precision of both the DHS and post
data on overstays, these data are sufficiently reliable to indicate
overstays are a cause for concern.
We conducted our review from November 2004 to August 2005 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of State:
United States Department of State:
Assistant Secretary and Chief Financial Officer:
Washington, D. C. 20520:
Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers:
Managing Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001:
OCT - 4 2005:
Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers:
We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "STATE
DEPARTMENT: Stronger Action Needed to Improve Oversight and Assess
Risks of the Summer Work Travel and Trainee Categories of the Summer
Work Travel and Trainee Categories of the Exchange Visitor Program,"
GAO Job Code 320322.
The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.
If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact
Stanley Colvin, Director, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs,
at (202) 203-7415.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Sid Kaplan (Acting):
cc: GAO - Maria Oliver;
ECA - Dina Powell;
State/OIG - Mark Duda:
Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report STATE DEPARTMENT:
Stronger Action Needed to Improve Oversight and Assess Risks of the
Summer Work Travel and Trainee Categories of the Exchange Visitor
Program (GAO-06-106, GAO Code 320322):
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on your draft report entitled
"State Department: Stronger Action Needed to Improve Oversight and
Assess Risks of the Summer Work Travel and Trainee Categories of the
Exchange Visitor Program." This Report recommends that the Department
(1) fully implement a compliance unit; (2) update and amend program
regulations; and, (3) develop strategies to obtain data, such as
information on overstays and program abuses, to assess the risks
associated with the program, and use the results of its assessment to
focus its management and monitoring efforts.
The Department has reviewed the recommendations of this Report and
offers the following comment thereon:
1. The Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA) brought various
issues regarding the Department's oversight and administration of the
Exchange Visitor Program (EVP) to the attention of the Department's
Management Controls Steering Committee (MCSC) in February of 2005. The
MCSC determined that the issues regarding oversight and administration
merited the listing of EVP oversight as a reportable condition for the
Federal Managers Financial Integrity Act purposes.
2. ECA has prepared and presented to the MCSC a corrective action plan
regarding oversight and administration of the EVP. This corrective
action plan identified the establishment and staffing of a compliance
unit as a milestone toward correcting oversight deficiencies. The
compliance unit has been administratively established and its chief
appointed. Recruitment and selection efforts are underway at this time
to staff two compliance officer positions.
3. ECA is working towards a revision of existing EVP regulations. Draft
regulations addressing the revision of trainee regulations and the
establishment of an intern category have been drafted and are in the
internal clearance process. Internal review will be completed in
October, the Office of Management and Budget has 90 days to review and
a 60-day public comment period is given. ECA has identified October of
2006 as the completion date for the revision of the trainee
regulations.
4. The Department welcomes the recommendation regarding the development
of strategies to obtain information on overstays and program abuses. As
the GAO report "Overstay Tracking, A Key Component of Homeland Security
and a Layered Defense, GAO-04-82," points out, overstay tracking is the
responsibility of the Department of Homeland Security. The Department
of State will work with DHS to gather data related to the tracking of
EVP participant overstays. The Department has also established a law
enforcement working group comprised of representatives from the
Department's Office of Inspector General, Diplomatic Security, Consular
Affairs, and Legal Adviser's Office. This working group is focused on
the gathering of information and analysis thereof for enforcement
purposes.
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Jess T. Ford (202) 512-4128:
Staff Acknowledgment:
In addition to the individual named above, John Brummet, Assistant
Director; Joseph Brown; Joseph Carney; Maria Oliver; and La Verne
Tharpes made key contributions to this report.
(320322):
FOOTNOTES
[1] A J-1 visa is a nonimmigrant visa issued to foreign nationals to
visit the United States temporarily to teach, instruct or lecture,
study, observe, conduct research, consult, demonstrate special skills,
or receive training.
[2] Office of Inspector General, The Exchange Visitor Program Needs
Improved Management and Oversight, 00-CI-028 (Washington, D.C.:
September 2000).
[3] An overstay is a foreign national who was legally admitted to the
United States as a nonimmigrant for a specific period but remained in
the country after that period expired.
[4] Weaknesses include noncollection of many departure forms that
visitors to the United States are required to submit when they leave
the United States and an inability to match departure forms to data on
arrivals.
[5] The Federal Managers Financial Integrity Act of 1982 (P. L. 97-255)
requires agency heads to establish a continuous process for assessment
and improvement of their agency's internal control and to annually
report on the status of their efforts.
[6] P. L. 87-256, as amended, 22 U.S.C. §2451 et seq.
[7] As of November 2004.
[8] Regulations require sponsors to ensure that at least half of their
Summer Work Travel participants identify jobs before they leave their
home country. The rest of the participants can look for jobs once they
arrive in the United States.
[9] Some sponsors are designated to administer exchange programs in
more than one exchange category. In 2005, there were 206 individual
organizations that sponsored the Summer Work Travel and/or the Trainee
programs.
[10] According to the program regulations, sponsors' designations are
effective for 5 years, although State may designate a shorter period.
The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (P.L.
107-173) requires State to conduct a review every 2 years of the
entities designated to sponsor exchange programs to determine if they
are in compliance with certain recordkeeping and reporting
requirements. State designated all sponsors for 2 years when they were
entered in SEVIS in January 2003. State has drafted revisions to its
regulations that will reflect the change in the period of designation
from 5 to 2 years.
[11] OIG OO-CI-028.
[12] Compliance unit staff will analyze the results of the contractor
reviews and the audits, although a regulatory change is needed to
implement the audit requirement, according to the Acting Director of
the Office of Exchange Designation and Coordination.
[13] Some of these individuals may have changed their immigration
status legally. DHS would need to analyze each individual record to
determine if these individuals were actually overstays.
[14] An H-2B visa is a nonimmigrant visa issued to foreign nationals
who are temporarily coming to the United States to perform
nonagricultural services or labor, if an unemployed person capable of
performing such work cannot be found in the United States.
[15] For example, the total civilian workforce in the United States was
over 147 million as of September 2004.
[16] We visited 13 sponsors in all. Seven of the 13 managed both Summer
Work Travel and Trainee programs.
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