U.S. Public Diplomacy
Interagency Coordination Efforts Hampered by the Lack of a National Communication Strategy Gao ID: GAO-05-323 April 4, 2005The war on terrorism has focused attention on the important role U.S. public diplomacy plays in improving the nation's image. The United States has undertaken efforts to "win hearts and minds" by better engaging, informing, and influencing foreign audiences; however, recent polling data show that anti-Americanism is spreading and deepening around the world. GAO was asked to examine (1) to what extent U.S. public diplomacy efforts have been coordinated and (2) whether the private sector has been significantly engaged in such efforts.
The White House has launched several recent initiatives designed to promote the coordination of U.S. public diplomacy efforts, but the government does not yet have a public diplomacy communications strategy. In 2002, a Strategic Communications Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) was created to help provide central direction to communication efforts. The committee drafted a national communication strategy, but the committee was disbanded in 2003 and no strategy was issued. In 2003, an Office of Global Communications was created to facilitate White House and interagency efforts to communicate with foreign audiences. According to a recent report by the Defense Science Board and comments by agency officials, the office has not implemented this role. Although a national communications strategy has not yet been developed, the White House established the Muslim World Outreach Policy Coordinating Committee in 2004 to coordinate public diplomacy efforts focused on Muslim audiences. The group is in the early phases of drafting strategic and tactical communications plans. In addition to White House efforts, the State Department created an Office of Policy, Planning, and Resources in 2004 to help coordinate and direct the department's wide-ranging public diplomacy operations. Further, the U.S. Agency for International Development and the Department of Defense are redefining their public diplomacy roles and operations in response to the increased attention given to U.S. outreach efforts. The State Department has had some success involving the private sector in the area of international exchanges. However, other efforts to engage the private sector have met with limited success. For example, in 2003 State formed a panel of outside advisors to recommend areas where the department and the private sector could coordinate their efforts. The panel's July 2003 report suggested a number of possibilities; however, none of these suggestions was acted upon due to a lack of resources, bureaucratic resistance, and limited management commitment.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-05-323, U.S. Public Diplomacy: Interagency Coordination Efforts Hampered by the Lack of a National Communication Strategy
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Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Science, State, Justice, and
Commerce, and Related Agencies, Committee on Appropriations, House of
Representatives:
April 2005:
U.S. Public Diplomacy:
Interagency Coordination Efforts Hampered by the Lack of a National
Communication Strategy:
GAO-05-323:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-05-323, a report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on
Science, State, Justice, and Commerce, and Related Agencies, House
Appropriations Committee:
Why GAO Did This Study:
The war on terrorism has focused attention on the important role U.S.
public diplomacy plays in improving the nation‘s image. The United
States has undertaken efforts to ’win hearts and minds“ by better
engaging, informing, and influencing foreign audiences; however, recent
polling data show that anti-Americanism is spreading and deepening
around the world. GAO was asked to examine (1) to what extent U.S.
public diplomacy efforts have been coordinated and (2) whether the
private sector has been significantly engaged in such efforts.
What GAO Found:
The White House has launched several recent initiatives designed to
promote the coordination of U.S. public diplomacy efforts, but the
government does not yet have a public diplomacy communications
strategy. In 2002, a Strategic Communications Policy Coordinating
Committee (PCC) was created to help provide central direction to
communication efforts. The committee drafted a national communication
strategy, but the committee was disbanded in 2003 and no strategy was
issued. In 2003, an Office of Global Communications was created to
facilitate White House and interagency efforts to communicate with
foreign audiences. According to a recent report by the Defense Science
Board and comments by agency officials, the office has not implemented
this role. Although a national communications strategy has not yet been
developed, the White House established the Muslim World Outreach Policy
Coordinating Committee in 2004 to coordinate public diplomacy efforts
focused on Muslim audiences. The group is in the early phases of
drafting strategic and tactical communications plans. In addition to
White House efforts, the State Department created an Office of Policy,
Planning, and Resources in 2004 to help coordinate and direct the
department‘s wide-ranging public diplomacy operations. Further, the
U.S. Agency for International Development and the Department of Defense
are redefining their public diplomacy roles and operations in response
to the increased attention given to U.S. outreach efforts.
The State Department has had some success involving the private sector
in the area of international exchanges. However, other efforts to
engage the private sector have met with limited success. For example,
in 2003 State formed a panel of outside advisors to recommend areas
where the department and the private sector could coordinate their
efforts. The panel‘s July 2003 report suggested a number of
possibilities; however, none of these suggestions was acted upon due to
a lack of resources, bureaucratic resistance, and limited management
commitment.
Key White House and State Initiatives Launched to Improve Public
Diplomacy Coordination:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that (1) the Director of the Office of Global
Communications fully implement the role mandated for the office in the
President‘s executive order, including facilitating the development of
a national communications strategy, and (2) the Secretary of State
develop a strategy to guide department efforts to engage the private
sector in pursuit of common public diplomacy objectives. The State
Department, Broadcasting Board of Governors, and U.S. Agency for
International Development generally concurred with the report‘s
conclusions and recommendations.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-323.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Jess T. Ford at (202) 512-
4128 or fordj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Government Public Diplomacy Coordination Efforts Lack Strategic
Direction:
State Department Efforts to Engage the Private Sector Have Met with
Mixed Results:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Related Reports and Testimony:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State:
Appendix IV: Comments from the Broadcasting Board of Governors:
Appendix V: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International
Development:
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Benefits and Challenges of Public-Private Partnerships:
Table 2: GAO Reports on Public Diplomacy and International
Broadcasting:
Table 3: Related GAO Testimony:
Table 4: Selected Reports on Public Diplomacy:
Figures:
Figure 1: Foreign Public Opinion of the United States:
Figure 2: State, USAID, and DOD Officials Participate in Tsunami Relief
Efforts in Indonesia:
Abbreviations:
BBG: Broadcasting Board of Governors:
DOD: Department of Defense:
OGC: White House Office of Global Communications:
USAID: U.S. Agency for International Development:
Letter April 4, 2005:
The Honorable Frank R. Wolf:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on Science, State, Justice, and Commerce, and Related
Agencies:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
Dear Mr. Chairman:
The 9/11 Commission highlighted the important role U.S. public
diplomacy plays in improving the image of the United States abroad,
particularly in the fight against terrorism. Despite U.S. efforts to
better inform, engage, and influence foreign audiences, recent polling
data show that anti-Americanism is spreading and deepening around the
world. Such anti-American sentiments can increase foreign public
support for terrorism directed at Americans, impact the cost and
effectiveness of military operations, weaken the United States' ability
to align with other nations in pursuit of common policy objectives, and
dampen foreign publics' enthusiasm for U.S. business services and
products. Countering these downward shifts in foreign public opinion
requires the coordinated effort of both the government and the private
sector.[Footnote 1] Government agencies have a strategic edge with
regards to knowledge of foreign policy objectives, in-depth
intelligence on regional and local conditions, and a worldwide network
of broadcast resources and public affairs officers. The private sector
enjoys an advantage when it comes to marketing and public relations
skills, perceived independence and credibility, and resources.
Prior reports by GAO and a number of other groups suggest that U.S.
public diplomacy efforts conducted over the past several years have
generally not been successful in responding to growing negative
sentiments directed towards the United States.[Footnote 2] Lack of
interagency coordination and limited involvement of the private sector
have been highlighted as key problems in some of these
reports.[Footnote 3] You asked that we update these earlier findings by
reviewing the status of White House, State Department, Broadcasting
Board of Governors (BBG), U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID), and Department of Defense (DOD) activities. As agreed with
your staff, this report examines (1) to what extent U.S. public
diplomacy efforts have been coordinated and (2) whether the private
sector has been significantly engaged in such efforts.
To accomplish our objectives, we reviewed key documents and reports and
met with officials from relevant government agencies, interagency
coordinating entities, and private sector representatives. White House
officials declined requests to meet with us to discuss their
coordination role; however, we were able to gather sufficient
information on their activities by speaking with agency officials and
reviewing published data and reports. We did not include psychological
operations or covert information operations conducted by the Department
of Defense or the intelligence community in our review. We performed
our work from May 2004 through February 2005 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards. Detailed information
on our scope and methodology appears in appendix I.
Results in Brief:
The White House has launched several recent initiatives designed to
promote the coordination of U.S. public diplomacy efforts, and agencies
are working to improve public diplomacy operations, but the government
does not yet have a national communication strategy. Two of the White
House initiatives were designed to broadly facilitate the coordination
of all U.S. strategic communication efforts, but they have not been
fully implemented. In September 2002, the National Security Council
created a Strategic Communications Policy Coordinating Committee to
facilitate interagency public diplomacy efforts. The committee drafted
a national communication strategy to help address a range of messaging
and program issues; however, the committee disbanded in 2003 and did
not issue this strategy. In January 2003, the President formally
established the Office of Global Communications (OGC) to facilitate and
coordinate the strategic direction of White House and individual agency
efforts to communicate with foreign audiences. This office has not
developed a national communication strategy. Moreover, according to a
recent report by the Defense Science Board and senior agency officials,
the office has not facilitated the development of strategic guidance,
which would serve to promote the effective coordination of U.S. public
diplomacy efforts. The White House and other agencies have also made
efforts to coordinate communications on a smaller scale. In July 2004,
the National Security Council created a Muslim World Outreach Policy
Coordinating Committee and tasked this group with developing strategic
and tactical plans to help guide and coordinate U.S. communications
with Muslims around the world. According to senior officials at State,
the group has drafted a communications strategy and is developing a
tactical plan to implement this strategy. The State Department, USAID,
and DOD are seeking to improve and evolve their public diplomacy
operations in recognition of the increased importance attached to U.S.
outreach efforts. State has formed an office to help the Under
Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs guide and coordinate
the agency's diverse public diplomacy efforts. USAID and DOD are
defining expanded public diplomacy roles for themselves. The
Broadcasting Board of Governors continues to implement the largely
independent role mandated by Congress for international broadcasting,
while focusing its coordination efforts on policy-level discussions
with the State Department.
State has engaged the private sector in U.S. public diplomacy efforts,
primarily in the area of international exchange programs. State
Department data indicate that three of the department's top exchange
programs received roughly one-quarter to one-half of their funding from
nongovernment sources. However, other efforts led by State's Under
Secretaries for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs to engage the
private sector have not yielded significant results. In 2003, the then
Under Secretary sponsored the formation of a panel of outside advisors
to review and recommend areas where the department and the private
sector could coordinate their efforts. The panel issued a report in
July 2003 with a number of suggested areas of cooperation; however,
none of these suggestions was acted upon due to a lack of resources,
bureaucratic resistance, and a lack of management commitment. Current
engagement efforts by the Under Secretary's office are limited to
periodic contacts and small-scale initiatives with the private sector.
This report recommends that the Director of the Office of Global
Communications fully implement the role envisioned for the office in
the President's executive order, including facilitating the development
of a national communications strategy to help guide and coordinate the
diverse public diplomacy efforts of the State Department, USAID, BBG,
and DOD. We also recommend that the Secretary of State develop a
strategy to promote the active engagement of the private sector beyond
international exchanges. In commenting on a draft of this report,
State, USAID, and BBG generally concurred with our findings,
conclusions, and recommendations. We have reprinted their comments in
appendixes III through V. We also incorporated technical comments from
DOD, State, and BBG where appropriate. The White House declined to
comment on a draft of this report.
Background:
According to State Department officials, the goal of public diplomacy
is to increase understanding of American values, policies, and
initiatives and to counter anti-American sentiment and misinformation
about the United States around the world. This includes reaching beyond
foreign governments to promote better appreciation of the United States
abroad, greater receptivity to U.S. policies among foreign publics, and
sustained access and influence in important sectors of foreign
societies. Public diplomacy is carried out through a wide range of
government programs and activities that employ person-to-person
contacts and attempts to reach mass audiences through print, broadcast,
and electronic media. Coordinating these various efforts is critical to
the short-and long-term success of U.S. public diplomacy efforts. As
noted by the Defense Science Board[Footnote 4] in its 2001 review of
U.S. public diplomacy efforts,[Footnote 5] coordinated information
dissemination is an essential tool in a world where U.S. interests and
long-term policies are often misunderstood, where issues are complex,
and where efforts to undermine U.S. positions increasingly appeal to
those who lack the means to challenge American power. Effective
communications strategies and well-coordinated information systems can
shape perceptions and promote foreign acceptance of U.S. strategic
objectives.
Since 2001, GAO and others have issued several reports on public
diplomacy. These reports have called for a transformation in public
diplomacy efforts, noting its renewed importance in the post-9/11
world. According to these reports, U.S. public diplomacy efforts face
several challenges, including the lack of a national communication
strategy and insufficient resources. To overcome these challenges, the
reports have recommended, among other things, increased presidential
leadership, structural changes at the White House and other agencies,
and closer coordination of public diplomacy activities.
Foreign Public Opinion of the United States Remains Highly Negative:
Recent foreign public opinion polling data conducted by such entities
as the Pew Research Center for People and the Press and Zogby
International indicate that the United States faces a chronic and
widespread image problem. Although a host of factors can explain
negative attitudes, the data document that a problem exists and provide
general insights on the success or failure of U.S. public diplomacy
efforts. As shown in figure 1, anti-American sentiments are not limited
to the Muslim world; however, the relative depth of negative sentiments
in this area of the world is pronounced and noteworthy.
Figure 1: Foreign Public Opinion of the United States:
[See PDF for image]
Note: Data exclude "don't know/refused to answer" responses.
[End of figure]
According to a number of sources, unpopular U.S. foreign policy
decisions, such as U.S. military actions in Iraq, are a major root
cause of anti-American sentiments. In addition, research conducted by
Business for Diplomatic Action[Footnote 6] suggests additional causes
for anti-American sentiments, including: (1) a feeling of exclusion
from the globalization movement led by U.S. business expansion, (2)
resentment regarding certain elements of popular U.S. culture, and (3)
negative views of the behavior of individual Americans.
U.S. Public Diplomacy Involves Multiple Entities:
U.S. public diplomacy efforts are distributed across several entities,
including the White House, State, USAID, BBG, and DOD. U.S. public
diplomacy program funding is concentrated in the State Department and
BBG, which shared a combined annual budget of almost $1.2 billion in
fiscal year 2004. USAID and DOD have relatively small budgets
explicitly devoted to public diplomacy activities.
The White House:
The President created the Office of Global Communications in January
2003 to facilitate the strategic direction and coordination of diverse
outreach efforts by multiple government entities. The National Security
Council oversees the creation and management of policy coordinating
committees that provide a key means for coordinating and directing
interagency efforts.[Footnote 7] The Muslim World Outreach Policy
Coordinating Committee, established in July 2004, was formed to address
the administration's most pressing strategic communications challenge
and is cochaired by the National Security Council and the Under
Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. The
committee replaced the Strategic Communications Policy Coordinating
Committee, which was active between September 2002 and March 2003.
State Department:
With a budget of over $620 million in fiscal year 2004, the State
Department has lead responsibility for implementing U.S. public
diplomacy efforts, including international exchange programs, which
account for more than half of the department's public diplomacy
spending. State's efforts are directed by the Under Secretary for
Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, who oversees the operations of the
Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, the Bureau of International
Information Programs, and the Bureau of Public Affairs. The Under
Secretary's efforts are supplemented by public diplomacy resources
located in the regional and functional bureaus and by a worldwide
network of public affairs officers. State also plays a leading role in
two interagency coordination bodies: the Interagency Strategic
Communication Fusion Team and the Interagency Working Group on U.S.
Government-Sponsored International Exchanges and Training. The fusion
team, which was established to support the Strategic Communications
Policy Coordinating Committee and later the Muslim World Outreach
Policy Coordinating Committee, continues to meet weekly and brings
together program-level officers to discuss ongoing and proposed public
diplomacy initiatives across the federal government. The interagency
working group meets quarterly to coordinate the exchange and training
activities of 12 federal departments and 15 independent
agencies.[Footnote 8]
USAID, DOD, and BBG:
Each supporting agency has a distinct role to play in promoting U.S.
public diplomacy objectives. USAID's role in public diplomacy is
focused on telling America's assistance story to the world. To the
degree that U.S. assistance plays a role in fostering a positive view
of the United States, the efforts of other assistance agencies, such as
the Middle East Partnership Initiative, the Millennium Challenge
Corporation, and the Peace Corps are also part of U.S. public diplomacy
efforts. Historically, DOD has been reluctant to define any of its
activities in public diplomacy terms, though the department has begun
to develop a "defense support for public diplomacy" strategy, which
acknowledges that the department has a role to play in this arena. For
example, DOD, State, and USAID humanitarian and relief efforts in
response to the recent tsunami disaster in Asia have significant public
diplomacy implications for the United States (see fig. 2).[Footnote 9]
Overall, the BBG's stated mission is to promote the development of
freedom and democracy around the world by providing foreign audiences
with accurate and objective news about the United States and the world.
The BBG pursues this mission through the collective efforts of the
Voice of America, Radio/TV Marti, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty,
Radio Free Asia, Radio Sawa, and the Alhurra satellite television
network. BBG broadcast efforts are required by law to present a
balanced and comprehensive projection of American thought and
institutions, as well as to present the policies of the United States
clearly and effectively.
Figure 2: State, USAID, and DOD Officials Participate in Tsunami Relief
Efforts in Indonesia:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Government Public Diplomacy Coordination Efforts Lack Strategic
Direction:
The White House has launched several recent initiatives designed to
promote the coordination of U.S. public diplomacy efforts, while other
agencies are also working to improve public diplomacy operations. The
Strategic Communications Policy Coordinating Committee was established
in 2002 and drafted a national communication strategy; however, the
committee disbanded in 2003 and did not issue this strategy. In 2003,
the White House established the Office of Global Communications to
facilitate coordination of the United States' global public diplomacy
efforts, but the office has not fulfilled the strategic role envisioned
by the President. The Muslim World Outreach Policy Coordinating
Committee was formed in July 2004 to facilitate U.S. outreach efforts
to the Muslim world, but this effort is still in the early stages of
development. The State Department recently created an Office of Policy,
Planning, and Resources in the Office of the Under Secretary for Public
Diplomacy and Public Affairs to help direct and coordinate its diverse
public diplomacy operations. While it is still too early to determine
the effectiveness of this office, it is designed to play a major role
in coordinating the delivery of U.S. public diplomacy efforts. USAID is
evolving its operations to respond to the new prominence the
administration has given to development assistance. DOD has begun to
work on a defense support for public diplomacy strategy, which is being
actively debated by various offices in the department. Finally,
mechanisms have been established to coordinate policy-level discussions
between the BBG and State; however, some agency officials said that the
BBG is not effectively coordinating with other agencies with regard to
program content.
First Attempt at Interagency Coordination Terminated:
In September 2002, the National Security Council announced the
establishment of the Strategic Communications Policy Coordinating
Committee. This group was charged with coordinating interagency
activities to ensure that all agencies work together and with the White
House to develop and disseminate the President's message to foreign
audiences. As part of this effort, the group drafted a national
communication strategy. However, the strategy was never released
because the group's activities terminated with the departure of the
then Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, who
cochaired the group, and the onset of the war in Iraq.
The absence of a national strategy complicates the task of conveying
consistent messages and thus achieving mutually reinforcing benefits.
The absence of a strategy also increases the risk of making
communication mistakes and diminishing the overall efficiency and
effectiveness of governmentwide public diplomacy efforts. As suggested
in the Defense Science Board's latest report on strategic
communications,[Footnote 10] this strategy should originate at the
White House level. The report notes that a unifying vision of strategic
communications starts with presidential direction and that only White
House leadership, with support from cabinet secretaries and Congress,
can bring about needed changes. The report suggests that transforming
U.S. government communications efforts is critical to protecting U.S.
national security interests and must match the strength of commitment
made to traditional diplomacy, defense, intelligence, law enforcement,
and homeland security.
The Office of Global Communications Has Not Assumed a Strategic
Coordination Role:
The OGC has not assumed its intended role in facilitating the strategic
direction and coordination of U.S. public diplomacy efforts as provided
in the President's executive order, which established the office in
January 2003.[Footnote 11] The OGC's mission is to advise the
President, offices within the Executive Office of the President, and
the heads of executive departments and agencies on the most effective
means for the U.S. government to promote the interests of the United
States abroad, prevent misunderstanding, and build support for and
among coalition partners of the United States. To carry out this
mission, the President tasked the OGC with several responsibilities,
including:
* facilitating the development of a communications strategy among
appropriate agencies for disseminating messages about the United State;
* assessing the methods and strategies used by the U.S. government to
deliver information to audiences abroad and coordinating with
appropriate agencies messages that reflect the strategic communications
framework and priorities of the United States;
* ensuring message consistency to promote the interests of the United
States abroad, prevent misunderstanding, build support for and among
coalition partners, and inform international audiences; and:
* coordinating the creation of temporary teams of communicators for
short-term placement in areas of high global interest and media
attention.
According to a recent report by the Defense Science Board and officials
from the key agencies responsible for implementing U.S. public
diplomacy efforts, the OGC has not facilitated the development of
strategic guidance to direct and coordinate interagency activities. The
Defense Science Board met with officials from the OGC and concluded in
its September 2004 report that the office has "evolved into a second-
tier organization devoted principally to tactical public affairs
coordination." The board added that the OGC has been ineffectual in
carrying out its intended responsibilities relating to strategic
communication planning, coordination, and evaluation. We were also told
by DOD officials that the board's 2001 and 2004 reports on strategic
communications represented an attempt by the department to fill the
planning void left by the lack of strategic direction from the White
House.
State and USAID officials we spoke with supported the report's
conclusions. According to senior State Department officials, the Office
of Global Communications has not facilitated the development of a
strategic communications plan for the United States, provided guidance
on the need for regional or country-specific action plans tailored to
local conditions, pushed for an analysis of the root causes for anti-
American sentiments and the best means to address such root causes, or
encouraged the development of mechanisms to increase private sector
involvement in U.S. outreach efforts. According to these officials, the
OGC has focused on tactical level activities, such as preparing message
briefs and holding a daily conference call with relevant agency
staff.[Footnote 12] A senior State official told us the OGC is
primarily an information provider and does not provide any long-term
strategic planning for public diplomacy. According to another official
at State, the OGC's planning horizon generally extends only a couple of
days in advance, and its services are purely tactical. The Executive
Director of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy said that
the OGC has tremendous potential, but this potential remains
unfulfilled.[Footnote 13] According to a senior official at USAID, the
office has not adopted the role of coordinator, despite its
responsibility to coordinate the formulation of messages that reflect
the strategic communications priorities of the United States. In
contrast to the other comments we heard, the Chairman of the BBG noted
that the BBG has had an excellent relationship with the Office of
Global Communications and was satisfied with both the strategic and
tactical guidance it provided.
This lack of leadership has led agencies to define and coordinate
public diplomacy programs on their own. For example, several senior
State Department officials told us that the department has had to
coordinate its public diplomacy activities with other agencies on an ad
hoc basis. This ad hoc coordination increases the risk of program
overlap and duplication and diminished program impact because limited
resources may be dispersed over too many or even conflicting program
objectives.
Effectiveness of Muslim Outreach Committee Remains to be Determined:
In July 2004, the National Security Council created the Muslim World
Outreach Policy Coordinating Committee to replace the Strategic
Communications Policy Coordinating Committee. This initiative is still
in its formative stage but, according to officials at State, it has
already developed a communication strategy to direct and coordinate
agency outreach efforts to the Muslim world. According to a senior
State official, the group is working on three specific activities. To
date, the committee has collected ideas from embassies in Muslim-
majority countries, developed a strategic plan for communicating with
the Muslim world, and is drafting a tactical paper to operationalize
the strategy. In its poll of embassies, the committee collected
information on outreach activities to Muslim audiences. According to an
official at State familiar with the committee's activities, the
committee then developed a strategy to address the problems faced by
the public diplomacy community and outlined two broad goals: working
with moderate Muslims and countering extremism. The committee is
finalizing this strategy, which emphasizes the role of regional
partnerships and the need to tailor programs to specific countries, and
plans to present it to the National Security Council in early 2005.
Following approval, the strategy and tactics papers will be sent to
embassies around the world. State expects the implementation of this
strategy to begin in early 2005.
State Creates a New Office to Tackle Public Diplomacy Coordination and
Evaluation Issues:
State's Office of Policy, Planning, and Resources was created in August
2004 in response to earlier recommendations by the Advisory Group on
Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World and a call by the Deputy
Secretary of State to fix the department's public diplomacy apparatus.
The advisory group's October 2003 report[Footnote 14] identified the
need for such an Office of Policy, Planning, and Resources to set a new
strategic direction for public diplomacy efforts in the region. The
report recommended that such an office should coordinate the
development of a strategy, oversee the process of producing country-
specific implementation plans, monitor the execution of these plans,
and assist in the allocation and management of both financial and human
resources. With the exception of overseeing the development and
implementation of country-specific plans, the report's recommendations
appear to have been addressed. However, it remains to be seen whether
the department devotes sufficient resources to this new office, whether
the office successfully implements its various mandates, whether future
Under Secretaries continue to support the office's operations, and
whether bureaus outside of the Under Secretary's direct control support
the office's efforts to coordinate across bureau lines.
The memorandum establishing the office outlines a broad agenda,
including:
* assisting the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs
with developing a long-term, wide-ranging strategic vision for public
diplomacy for the department and communicating this vision to
department principals, affected staff overseas and in relevant bureaus,
the interagency community at large, and the private sector;
* coordinating with all affected bureaus within the department and
developing resource allocation recommendations to support the Under
Secretary's strategic vision and priorities;
* providing a focal point for public diplomacy and public affairs
personnel issues;
* serving as the Under Secretary's clearinghouse for all public
diplomacy and public affairs issues that cut across bureau lines;
* developing performance evaluation indicators that can be applied to
the department's public diplomacy and public affairs activities; and:
* analyzing the results of such evaluation efforts to determine the
impact of public diplomacy and public affairs programs and identify
what program adjustments or changes might be indicated.
The Director of the Office of Policy, Planning, and Resources noted
that her office is currently drafting a strategic plan to guide and
coordinate State's public diplomacy efforts--although a specific
release date for the strategy has not yet been established. The plan
will include guidance on how to develop realistic measures of the
effectiveness of the department's public diplomacy and public affairs
activities. Toward that end, the office has created a public diplomacy
evaluation council, which brings together evaluation staff from across
affected bureaus to develop a unified and rigorous approach to
collectively assessing the department's activities. State is
considering broadening the membership of the council to include other
agencies, providing the possibility that the effectiveness of public
diplomacy efforts may ultimately be assessed across agency lines.
USAID and DOD Roles and Responsibilities Are Evolving:
Historically, USAID and DOD have had limited roles in U.S. public
diplomacy efforts, but recently both agencies have made efforts to
coordinate their activities with the broader interagency community.
USAID has begun to work closely with State and has established a new
position to publicize U.S. assistance efforts at each of its posts. DOD
has designated the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy as its lead on
public diplomacy and is defining a role for defense support for public
diplomacy.
USAID is Seeking to Increasingly Tell America's Assistance Story:
In the past, USAID's role in U.S. public diplomacy activities has been
limited, according to agency officials, to discrete efforts to
publicize specific development projects. These past promotion efforts
have not met with great success. For example, we noted in our last
report on U.S. public diplomacy efforts that according to U.S. embassy
officers in Egypt only a small percentage of Egyptians were aware of
the magnitude of U.S. assistance--despite the fact that Egypt is the
second largest recipient of U.S. assistance in the world.[Footnote 15]
This idea is echoed by the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the
Arab and Muslim World, which notes that much of USAID's work is "public
diplomacy at its best;" yet, according to USAID officials, development
work has little public diplomacy value to the American people unless
the agency communicates it.
The President's National Security Strategy, which elevated the role of
development in foreign policy, led USAID to develop a joint strategic
plan with State to better tell America's humanitarian and development
assistance story. One of the plan's strategic goals is public
diplomacy, which emphasizes communicating with younger audiences,
countering propaganda, and listening to foreign audiences. The State-
USAID Policy Council was created to support the joint strategic plan by
helping both agencies coordinate more closely on foreign policy and
assistance issues. A Public Diplomacy Working Group was created under
the joint policy council to improve coordination between State and
USAID in areas such as information outreach, exchanges and training,
interagency communication, and funding for public diplomacy programs.
In September 2004, USAID established a position to help embassies,
USAID missions, and implementing partners publicize U.S. assistance
activities. These newly established Development Outreach and
Communications Officers are expected to act as a one-stop resource for
information regarding USAID's work and will collaborate with the public
affairs officer at post to maximize exposure and understanding of U.S.
assistance efforts.[Footnote 16] USAID plans to have one of these
officers in each of its 84 missions around the world by September 2005.
The Department of Defense is Working to Better Define its Role:
The Department of Defense recognizes that it plays a supporting role in
public diplomacy and has made recent efforts to define its role in the
U.S. public diplomacy apparatus. According to an October 2001 report by
the Defense Science Board, DOD's public diplomacy efforts consist of
actions such as combined troop training and exercises, official visits,
and defense contacts with foreign officials.[Footnote 17] During
crises, DOD communicates to foreign audiences through military
spokespersons, news releases, and media briefings. For example, the
U.S. military supported relief efforts for the Asian tsunami, deploying
approximately 13,000 personnel to deliver food and medical supplies.
These activities provide U.S. public diplomacy and public affairs
channels with the content and context to foster goodwill toward the
United States.
In October 2003, DOD issued an Information Operations Roadmap, which
discusses the roles and responsibilities of DOD's public affairs,
public diplomacy, and information operations and how these elements
should work together and with other government agencies to communicate
strategically with foreign audiences. This document refers to a
strategy for defense support for public diplomacy, but it does not
outline such a strategy. According to DOD officials, the strategy is
still being actively debated by various groups within the department
and remains to be formally issued.
DOD has also made structural changes to better define its role in U.S.
public diplomacy activities. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
has been designated as DOD's lead for public diplomacy activities. DOD
officials told us that the department drafted a directive in September
2004 directing the Under Secretary to develop and oversee DOD strategic
communications efforts and to serve as DOD's focal point for strategic
communications efforts. Additionally, within the Under Secretary's
office, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Affairs has assumed responsibility for coordinating and overseeing
defense support for public diplomacy. In September 2004, the Defense
Science Board recommended the creation of a new Deputy Assistant
Secretary for International Security Affairs to coordinate all
activities associated with defense support for public diplomacy.
Broadcasting Board of Governors Coordination Largely Tied to Policy-
Level Discussions with State:
Congress has defined a role for the Broadcasting Board of Governors
that is designed to maintain the independence and credibility of U.S.
broadcast efforts while ensuring that such efforts are consistent with
the broad foreign policy objectives of the United States. We found that
BBG, as required by Congress, is coordinating with the State Department
at the policy level through a variety of means. BBG officials stated
that they work cooperatively with other agencies to develop and
broadcast suggested program ideas and content that BBG deems
appropriate to its mission. However, some USAID and DOD officials
commented that BBG has not been receptive to considering suggestions on
programming content.
Under BBG's statutory authority, a so-called "firewall" was established
between policy makers and broadcasters to ensure that U.S. broadcast
efforts are perceived as credible and unbiased. Separating the State
Department and BBG provides deniability for the department when other
governments voice complaints about specific broadcasts. However, BBG is
also subject to an explicit requirement for policy-level coordination
between BBG and State Department. Several mechanisms exist to help
ensure such coordination. First, the Secretary of State or his/her
designee serves as a member of the BBG and provides it broad policy
advice. Second, BBG's Office of Policy works closely with State to
produce the government-labeled editorials that the Voice of America is
required to carry. Third, BBG seeks input from State officials for its
annual language service review process, which determines where and how
many broadcast services are pursued.
Concerns exist regarding BBG's coordination with other agencies on
program content. BBG officials indicated that they are open to
receiving other agencies' programming suggestions that support BBG's
news and information function. One BBG official noted that such
requests do not represent a violation of the firewall, although he
added that care must be exercised in deciding whether and how to
incorporate such content to avoid the appearance of becoming a
government mouthpiece bent only on promoting U.S. interests. While
State officials said that their daily, ad hoc coordination with BBG
includes content and delivery issues, officials at USAID and DOD
indicated that BBG has not been receptive to content suggestions. For
example, USAID officials told us that they have approached BBG
officials with stories to promote their attempts to "tell America's
assistance story," but BBG did not respond positively to these
suggestions. In addition, a senior DOD official noted that combatant
commanders have asked BBG to carry public service announcements
illustrating DOD's assistance to foreign publics but met with a similar
lack of success. In commenting on a draft of this report, BBG officials
indicated a willingness to consider establishing a more formal channel
of communication for programming suggestions.
State Department Efforts to Engage the Private Sector Have Met with
Mixed Results:
Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, State has attempted to
increase its engagement with the private sector to improve the image of
the United States overseas. These efforts have focused on student and
visitor exchanges, where some success has been achieved in leveraging
private sector resources. More recent attempts by the department to
form public-private partnerships have met with limited success.
State's Exchange Programs Engage the Private Sector:
The Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs is the primary focus for
public-private sector partnerships within State and has, according to
State officials, demonstrated an ability to engage the private sector.
These partnerships involve nongovernmental organizations, volunteer
communities, and influential individuals in the United States and
overseas. For example, Sister Cities International receives funding
from State, USAID, and private corporations to support and strengthen
the sister cities network between U.S. and international communities.
According to the Interagency Working Group on U.S. Government-Sponsored
International Exchanges and Training, three of the Bureau's top
exchange programs received roughly one-quarter to one-half of their
funding from nongovernment sources.
Analysis prepared by the Interagency Working Group on U.S. Government-
Sponsored International Exchanges and Training suggests that a number
of benefits and challenges are associated with the use of such public-
private partnerships. Table 1 summarizes the group's analysis.
Table 1: Benefits and Challenges of Public-Private Partnerships:
Benefits:
* Leveraging of government funds;
* Sharing of technical and professional expertise;
* Cross-pollination of ideas and approaches;
* Dialogue, cooperation, and synergy leading to more effective combined
programs.
Challenges:
* Tensions over jurisdiction and program ownership;
* Problems relating to diverse goals, values, and perspectives;
* Burden on program staff who must implement partnership arrangements.
Source: Interagency Working Group on U.S. Government-Sponsored
International Exchanges and Training.
[End of table]
Other State Department Attempts to Engage the Private Sector Have Met
with Limited Success:
Aside from the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, State has
been unable to leverage the private sector to any significant
degree.[Footnote 18] In 2003, the then Under Secretary for Public
Diplomacy and Public Affairs sought to identify specific suggestions on
how the private sector could be significantly engaged to better support
U.S. public diplomacy efforts. She helped form a Subcommittee on Public-
Private Partnerships and Public Diplomacy under the auspices of State's
Advisory Committee on International Economic Policy.[Footnote 19] The
subcommittee concluded in its June 2003 report that the U.S. private
sector can and should play an important role in supporting ongoing U.S.
government outreach to foreign audiences in a manner that can help
build long-term friendships and advance U.S. interests abroad. The
report made a number of recommendations, several of which address the
root causes for anti-American sentiments, including the need to:
* create an inventory of current government programs specifically
designed to promote the image of the United States abroad;
* encourage public and private support for multilingualism and cross-
cultural education starting at the corporate level and working down to
the foundation of our educational system;
* increase funding for English language training abroad and provide
incentives for the private sector to carry out this activity;
* encourage private sector support for American studies programs abroad
by developing curriculum, texts, and internet support materials;
* encourage U.S. media outlets to dub their programming into Arabic and
make it available for distribution throughout the Middle East; and:
* encourage the private sector to expand social investment programs
abroad through such models as USAID's Global Development Alliance.
The head of State's Office of Commercial and Business Affairs noted
that the subcommittee was disbanded after its report was issued and
that none of its recommendations was ever implemented.
In January 2004, the Under Secretary's successor promoted greater
private sector involvement by designating a member of her immediate
staff as a special advisor to help facilitate interactions between her
office and outside parties. This individual continues to serve this
role for the current Under Secretary, facilitating outreach efforts by
serving as a point of contact with the private sector and coordinating
the Under Secretary's attendance at key outside meetings. Examples of
actions taken by the advisor include State's efforts to assist the
Wheelchair Foundation by publicizing its activities through posts
overseas and its role in persuading Steinway and Sons to donate a piano
to the Iraqi National Symphony in Baghdad. While these efforts have
some merit, their impact may be limited if not backed by a more robust
action plan or senior-level commitment to further engage the private
sector. A commitment of additional resources would also be necessary to
engage the private sector in more meaningful ways.
Finally, in October 2004, State's Policy Planning Staff submitted a
proposal to the White House calling for the creation of a clearinghouse
titled the Center for Partnership and Human Dignity.[Footnote 20] This
proposal defines a new model for conducting public diplomacy and calls
for a dramatic expansion of the private sector's role. The proposal
suggests that the government should concentrate on explaining U.S.
foreign policy while the clearinghouse focuses on coordinating private
sector-led outreach efforts (in such areas as sports, cultural
activities, and medical assistance) with the strategic input and advice
of State and other relevant agencies. According to one official, the
new Secretary of State has been briefed on this proposal and its
potential.[Footnote 21]
USAID has engaged the private sector through its Global Development
Alliance. USAID reports that the alliance leveraged over $2 billion in
private sector contributions in fiscal years 2002 and 2003, using about
$500 million in USAID funding. The Global Development Alliance
represents the agency's commitment to changing the way it implements
assistance and currently represents one of the four pillars of U.S.
economic assistance.[Footnote 22] The Global Development Alliance
mobilizes the ideas, efforts, and resources of governments, businesses,
and civil society by forging public-private alliances to stimulate
economic growth, develop businesses and workforces, address health and
environmental issues, and expand access to education and technology.
The Global Development Alliance business model is designed to leverage
unique private sector assets, such as foreign direct investment,
experience with leading business practices, and technological
innovations. According to USAID, the agency has established alliances
in over 45 countries in the developing world, involving over 150
private sector partners.
Conclusions:
Coordination of public diplomacy activities is hampered by the lack of
a national communication strategy. An initial effort, the creation of
the Strategic Communications Policy Coordinating Committee in 2002, did
not result in an overall strategy. The Office of Global Communications
has been charged by the President with facilitating White House and
interagency strategic planning and coordination efforts; however, a
recent study and several officials at affected agencies indicated that
the Office of Global Communications has not facilitated the
coordination of agency efforts by providing needed strategic direction.
In addition, the office has not developed a national communication
strategy. As a consequence, agencies have developed their own roles and
missions and coordinated their activities on an ad hoc basis.
The White House and other agencies have initiated efforts to improve
coordination on a smaller scale. The National Security Council created
the Muslim World Outreach Policy Coordinating Committee, which,
according to senior State officials, has developed a strategic
communications plan for Muslim audiences and is drafting a tactical
plan to implement this strategy. BBG has coordinated its efforts at the
policy level, while State, USAID, and DOD continue to evolve and
improve their public diplomacy operations and strategic planning
efforts.
State recognizes the importance and significance of engaging the
private sector in U.S. outreach efforts wherever feasible; however, the
department has never developed a strategy to make this goal a reality.
Past efforts by the department have focused on exchange programs, while
other attempts have met with only limited success. More successful
engagement of the private sector will require, among other things,
seeking venues to actively solicit private sector support and removing
potential obstacles to partnerships.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To better ensure that the United States' public diplomacy efforts are
adequately coordinated, we recommend the Director of the Office of
Global Communications fully implement the role defined for it by the
President's executive order, including facilitating the development of
a communications strategy, assessing the methods and strategies used by
the U.S. government to communicate with overseas audiences, and
coordinating the delivery of messages that reflect the strategic
communications framework and priorities of the United States.
To help ensure that private sector resources, talents, and ideas are
effectively leveraged and utilized, we recommend that the Secretary of
State develop a strategy to guide department efforts to engage the
private sector in pursuit of common public diplomacy objectives.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided State, BBG, USAID, DOD, and the White House with a draft of
this report for comment. State, BBG, and USAID provided us with written
comments that are included in appendixes III through V. They generally
concurred with the report's findings and conclusions. State strongly
endorsed our recommendation that the department develop a detailed
strategy for engaging the private sector more effectively and indicated
that working with the private sector will be a priority for the
department's new leadership. BBG and State said that our report did not
accurately reflect the nature of their coordination on suggested
programming content and provided further evidence to support their
positions. We modified our findings regarding BBG coordination with
State. BBG said it would explore the establishment of a more formal,
transparent channel of communication for programming ideas. In
addition, BBG, along with State and DOD, provided technical comments,
which have been incorporated throughout the report where appropriate.
DOD and USAID said that developing a public diplomacy strategy is
insufficient without addressing the content of U.S. public diplomacy
activities.
The White House declined to comment on a draft of this report.
We are sending copies of this report to other interested Members of
Congress. We are also sending copies to the Secretary of State, the
Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Broadcasting Board of
Governors, the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International
Development, and the Director of the White House Office of Global
Communications. We will also make copies available to others upon
request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the
GAO Web site at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. If you or your staff
have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-
4128 or [Hyperlink, fordj@gao.gov]. Staff contacts and other key
contributors to this report are listed in appendix VI:
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Jess T. Ford:
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
[End of section]
Appendixes:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
The Chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Science,
State, Justice, and Commerce, and Related Agencies asked us to examine
(1) to what extent U.S. public diplomacy efforts have been coordinated
and (2) whether the private sector has been significantly engaged in
such efforts. Our review focused on the efforts of the Department of
State, the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID), and the Department of Defense (DOD).
We did not include psychological operations or covert information
operations conducted by DOD or the intelligence community in our
review.
To determine how U.S. public diplomacy efforts have been coordinated
across agency lines, we met with senior officials in State's Office of
the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, the Bureau
of International Information Programs, the Bureau of Educational and
Cultural Affairs, and a regional bureau. We also interviewed officials
at BBG, USAID, and DOD, as well as representatives from the private
sector. We reviewed planning, program, and other documentation from the
relevant agencies and examined recent studies from the Defense Science
Board, the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, the Council on
Foreign Relations, and others. Officials at the White House Office of
Global Communications declined to meet with us to discuss their role in
interagency coordination activities; however, we were able to develop a
basic understanding of the office's operations by reviewing published
data and by speaking with government officials familiar with White
House coordination efforts.
To assess the extent to which the private sector has been effectively
engaged in U.S. public diplomacy efforts, we discussed outreach efforts
with officials at State and USAID, including State's Bureau of
Commercial and Business Affairs and USAID's Global Development
Alliance. We also met with representatives from the private sector,
including Business for Diplomatic Action, as well as nonprofit
organizations, academia, and the media. We reviewed State documents
detailing the department's private sector outreach efforts, as well as
a proposal that State's Policy Planning Staff submitted to the White
House calling for expanded public-private partnerships. We also
examined recent data from polling organizations and reviewed a Business
for Diplomatic Action analysis of root causes of anti-Americanism.
We performed our work from May 2004 through February 2005 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Related Reports and Testimony:
Table 2: GAO Reports on Public Diplomacy and International
Broadcasting:
Report title: U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Expands Efforts
but Faces Significant Challenges (GAO-03-951);
Date: September 2003;
Selected conclusions: State has expanded its public diplomacy efforts
in Muslim-majority countries since September 11, 2001; State needs a
comprehensive strategy that integrates all of its public diplomacy
activities; State is not comprehensively measuring progress toward its
public diplomacy goals.
Report title: U.S. International Broadcasting: New Strategic Approach
Focuses on Reaching Large Audiences but Lacks Measurable Program
Objectives (GAO-03-772);
Date: July 2003;
Selected conclusions: The Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) has
initiated several projects designed to attract larger audiences in
priority markets; BBG's plan lacks program objectives designed to
measure the success of its new approach to broadcasting; BBG has not
established a strategic vision for how many languages should be
pursued.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
Table 3: Related GAO Testimony:
Testimony title: U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department and
Broadcasting Board of Governors Expand Post-9/11 Efforts but Challenges
Remain (GAO-04-1061T);
Date: August 23, 2004;
Comments: Based on GAO- 03-951, U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department
Expands Efforts but Faces Significant Challenges, and GAO-03-772, U.S.
International Broadcasting: New Strategic Approach Focuses on Reaching
Large Audiences but Lacks Measurable Program Objectives.
Testimony title: U.S. International Broadcasting: Challenges Facing the
Broadcasting Board of Governors (GAO-04-711T);
Date: April 29, 2004;
Comments: Based on GAO-04-374, U.S. International Broadcasting:
Enhanced Measure of Local Media Conditions Would Facilitate Decisions
to Terminate Language Services; GAO-03-772; and GAO/NSIAD-00-222, U.S.
International Broadcasting: Strategic Planning and Performance
Management System Could Be Improved.
Testimony title: U.S. International Broadcasting: Challenges Facing the
Broadcasting Board of Governors (GAO-04-627T);
Date: April 1, 2004;
Comments: Based on GAO-04-374, GAO-03-772, and GAO/NSIAD-00-222.
Testimony title: U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department and the
Broadcasting Board of Governors Expand Efforts in the Middle East but
Face Significant Challenges (GAO-04-435T);
Date: February 10, 2004;
Comments: Based on GAO-03-951 and GAO-03-772.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
Table 4: Selected Reports on Public Diplomacy:
Author: U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy;
Report title: 2004 Report;
Date: September 2004;
Selected conclusions: The agents and structures of public diplomacy
need coordination; Public diplomacy messaging must become more
strategic and responsive; Public diplomacy should be a national
security priority, requiring an aggressive strategy and increased
resources; The public and private sectors need to work together to face
public diplomacy challenges.
Author: Defense Science Board;
Report title: Strategic Communication;
Date: September 2004;
Selected conclusions: Strengthening and coordinating strategic
communications requires presidential leadership; Structural changes are
necessary within the National Security Council, State, and DOD to
transform strategic communications; A quasi-governmental entity should
be created to provide information and analysis and facilitate private
sector involvement in public diplomacy.
Author: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United
States;
Report title: The 9/11 Commission Report;
Date: July 2004;
Selected conclusions: The U.S. government must define its message and
what it stands for; The United States needs to defend its ideals abroad
through increased broadcasting efforts and rebuilt scholarship,
exchange, and library programs.
Author: Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim
World;
Report title: Changing Minds Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction
for U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World;
Date: October 2003;
Selected conclusions: Public diplomacy requires a new strategic
direction, led by the President and Congress and adequately funded and
staffed; Structural changes at the White House, the National Security
Council, and State are necessary; USAID and DOD must be incorporated in
the new strategic direction; Public diplomacy should engage the full
range of American civil society, including the private sector and
nongovernmental organizations.
Author: Council on Foreign Relations;
Report title: Finding America's Voice: A Strategy for Reinvigorating
U.S. Public Diplomacy;
Date: June 2003;
Selected conclusions: Lack of political will and the absence of an
overall strategy have hindered public diplomacy programs; Public
diplomacy should be considered in the formulation of foreign policy;
The U.S. public diplomacy coordinating structure needs strengthening,
leadership, and increased resources; An expanded private sector role
would help public diplomacy deliver more bang for the government buck.
Author: U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy;
Report title: Building America's Public Diplomacy Through a Reformed
Structure and Additional Resources;
Date: September 2002;
Selected conclusions: Public diplomacy requires structural reform,
including presidential leadership, the integration of Congress in
public diplomacy efforts, and the involvement of the private sector;
Public diplomacy should be redeveloped by building its resources.
Author: Defense Science Board;
Report title: Managed Information Dissemination;
Date: October 2001;
Selected conclusions: The U.S. government requires a coordinated means
to speak with a single voice abroad; Presidential leadership is
required to strengthen the United States' ability to communicate with
foreign audiences and coordinate public diplomacy, public affairs, and
information operations; Structural changes at the National Security
Council, State, and DOD are required to coordinate public diplomacy
activities.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State:
United States Department of State:
Assistant Secretary and Chief Financial Officer:
Washington, D. C. 20520:
Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers:
Managing Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001:
MAR 18 2005:
Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers:
We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "U.S. PUBLIC
DIPLOMACY: Communications Strategy Needed to Improve Interagency
Coordination Efforts," GAO Job Code 320283.
The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.
If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact
Elizabeth Whitaker, Director, Office of Policy, Planning and Resources
for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, at (202) 647-0553.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Christopher B. Burnham:
cc: GAO-Mike Tenkate:
R-Tim Isgitt:
State/OIG-Mark Duda:
Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report: U.S. Public
Diplomacy: Communications Strategy Needed to Improve Interagency
Coordination Efforts (GAO-05-323, GAO Code 320283):
Thank you for allowing the Department of State the opportunity to
comment on the draft report "U.S. Public Diplomacy: Communications
Strategy Needed to Improve Interagency Coordination," which addresses
the status of coordination among agencies in reaching out to foreign
publics.
Coming as another in a series of reports from the public and private
sector on public diplomacy, the GAO report is the most up-to-date we
have seen, and we appreciate the recognition of the Department's
efforts over recent months at re-establishing its interagency
leadership in public diplomacy through the Muslim World Outreach Policy
Coordinating Committee.
With regard to coordination between the Department and the BBG, the
report correctly identifies the formal channels of policy coordination,
but makes no mention of daily ad-hoc coordination between the two
entities, concerning broadcast content and delivery, as well as other
interagency coordination. Right now for example, the Department's
International Women's Issues Office is working with Alhurra to identify
speakers and program ideas, which appeal to women in the Middle East.
The Department's EUR and OBO bureaus have been working closely with
RFE/RL for the last two years to help them identify an alternate
location for their headquarters within Prague that poses less of a
security risk. WHA and OCB are working together to improve the
effectiveness--in both content and delivery--of the Radio and TV Marti
broadcasts. EUR and SA are working with IBB engineering to make sure a
transmitter--bound for Tajikistan--is making it through customs in the
8 countries it has to travel through from Paris. The BBG and NEA have
been working hand-in-hand for over a year to secure transmitter rights
for Radio Sawa in Egypt. Every day, policy questions are explored and
vetted through the Department's country desks. There are many, many
examples of daily, positive and active, albeit informal, coordination
between the Department and the BBG (and its entities) that should be
mentioned.
We believe the description of the BBG's reaction to suggestions on
broadcast content, specifically the promotion of Hi magazine in
exchange for promotion of the BBG's efforts, is misleading. While this
interaction did happen, the BBG never formally excluded the idea of
cross-promoting State's products, including Hi magazine. At the time,
there were concerns on BBG's part about the content on fledgling
broadcasts to the Middle East. In recent days, however, these
discussions have begun again, and look promising, and we look forward
to working with the BBG to address this issue.
During this transition period between the first and second Bush
Administrations, we will follow with interest the reaction to the GAO's
recommendation to the White House that the Director of the Office of
Global Communications fully implement the role mandated for that
office.
We heartily endorse the GAO's recommendation to develop a detailed
strategy for the Department on better engaging the private sector in
mutually reinforcing efforts to reach out to foreign publics. As new
players take their places within the Department, how to build on and
consolidate the Department's accomplishments in working with the
private sector will be one of the areas for early focus.
Once again, we appreciate the opportunity to comment on the draft
provided to us.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Comments from the Broadcasting Board of Governors:
BROADCASTING BOARD OF GOVERNORS:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
March 15, 2005:
Mr. Jess T. Ford:
Director:
International Relations and Trade:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Ford:
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the GAO's draft report
entitled, "U.S. Public Diplomacy: Communications Strategy Needed to
Improve Interagency Coordination Efforts."
We are pleased at the GAO's finding that the BBG coordinates with the
State Department at the policy level through a variety of means. The
Board maintains close ties with the Office of the Under Secretary for
Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs and enjoys a mutually supportive
working relationship with that office.
The GAO report also states, however, that "some agency officials
asserted that the BBG is not effectively coordinating with other
agencies with respect to program content," and provides several
examples where BBG entities declined to pursue program suggestions or
air content from other agencies. In considering these examples, it is
important to keep in mind the BBG's legislative mandate and the
journalistic nature of BBG programming. The legislation under which we
operate is clear that the final decision on what is broadcast lies in
the hands of our journalists. The U.S. International Broadcasting Act
requires that both the Secretary of State and the Board shall respect
the professional independence and integrity of the broadcasting
services. While the Board is open to suggestions related to broadcast
content, and is happy to pass these ideas along for broadcast
consideration, it cannot and should not require the journalists to
implement these suggestions.
The GAO report also indicates that the Board would be open to receiving
requests to broadcast "other agency content." While the Board has
welcomed suggestions for programming, we do not mean to imply that the
BBG would serve as a broadcast platform for programming created by
other government agencies.
The Board has not been aware of any specific instance when a suggestion
on program content was not considered by a BBG broadcast entity.
Furthermore, the Board has not received any specific complaints from
the State Department in recent years with respect to programming.
BBG entities have been receptive to program suggestions from U.S.
Government officials. For example, at the suggestion of U.S. Embassy
Beijing, VOA recently produced a special program commemorating the 60tH
anniversary of Sino-U.S. Cooperation during World War II when U.S. Army
engineers worked to restore ground transportation between China and the
outside world. With interviews with U.S. Embassy officials in Beijing,
the story highlighted the tremendous loss of American lives in
completing this route that helped alleviate the suffering of Chinese
people during the war's final months.
In general, BBG programming is shaped by its journalists who track the
news and develop the program content with an eye toward the program's
relevance to the audience. BBG journalists are also mindful of their
broadcast mission to represent America and its policies. Programming
provides a focus on U.S. policy concerns and an emphasis on a product
that is a tool to support the development of freedom and democracy. For
example, each of the broadcast entities of the BBG used coverage of the
confirmation hearings for Secretary of State Rice to both introduce the
Secretary-designate to the world and to showcase the U.S. confirmation
process, in which one branch of government vets the proposals and
decisions of the other. Several broadcast entities broadcast nearly
gavel-to-gavel coverage. Others used portions of the hearing to
illustrate U.S. policies to particular parts of the world.
Through their regular contact with U.S. Government officials and
coverage of major policy speeches and Congressional hearings, our
journalists present Administration and Congressional views on high
priority issues that constitute "front page" news. To the extent that
policymakers make themselves available for comment and that BBG
journalists are made part of the press pools accompanying
Administration officials on official travel, program content is greatly
enhanced.
The anecdotal reports collected by GAO that indicate frustration from
State Department officials regarding the suggestion of program ideas,
indicate that a more formal channel of communication for such ideas
should perhaps be established through the Board. The Board will explore
the establishment of a more transparent avenue of communications.
However, as the Board is the firewall between the policymakers and the
journalists, and must protect against government pressures to skew the
content of the programming, such requests must be handled carefully.
Establishment of a formal channel through which program ideas may be
communicated should not create the expectation that all program ideas
will be implemented.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Kenneth Y. Tomlinson:
Chairman:
[End of section]
Appendix V: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International
Development:
USAID:
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE:
MAR 25 2005:
Jess T. Ford:
Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
U.S. General Accounting Office:
441 G Street, N.W.:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Ford:
I am pleased to provide the U.S. Agency for International Development's
(USAID) formal response on the draft GAO report entitled U.S. PUBLIC
DIPLOMACY: Communications Strategy needed to Improve Interagency
Coordination Efforts.
I have enclosed a short paper from the Agency's Bureau of Legislative
and Public Affairs regarding comments and suggested language that might
assist you in improving the overall report.
Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the GAO draft report and
for the courtesies extended by your staff in the conduct of this
review.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Steve Wisecarver:
Acting Assistant Administrator:
Bureau for Management:
Enclosure: A/S:
DRAFT GAO REPORT ON U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY:
Comments from USAID's Bureau for Legislative and Public Affairs (LPA)
March 21, 2005:
The following suggested addition is being provided by USAID staff
members in the Legislative and Public Affairs Bureau who had an
opportunity to review GAO's Draft of its upcoming report on U.S. Public
Diplomacy.
Page 16, bottom of the page:
This GAO study obviously is about public diplomacy and engaging the
private sector in State and other agency's public diplomacy efforts-not
specifically about public-private partnerships. While there are several
paragraphs about public-private partnerships, there is almost no
mention of the Global Development Alliance (GDA) business model wherein
we reach to both non-traditional partners in the US, and to non-
traditional partners in throughout the world. An additional paragraph
on page 16 might provide a positive example of successful efforts being
made to date with public-private partnerships:
Suggested addition: "One promising example of public-private
partnerships has been USAID's Global Development Alliance. The Global
Development Alliance is a USAID-wide initiative to promote public-
private alliances among government, the private and the non-profit
sectors that was launched by former Secretary of State Colin Powell in
2001. The GDA is akin to a joint venture model in the private sector-a
joint venture in which all the partners have an enlightened self-
interest in improving some aspect of the quality of life for people in
one or more countries in which both USAID and partner companies
operate. The GDA business model is to leverage businesses to bring
unique assets to developing countries such as foreign direct
investment, experience with leading business practices (especially
related to environmental and workers' issues), technological
innovations, and the ability to use buying power to affect change along
supply chains.
GDA prods USAID and its private partners to collectively define and
pool their talents and resources to have greater impact on a
development problem than any one of the partners could have alone.
Since it's inception in 2002, almost 300 alliances have taken form
Agency-wide-roughly $1 billion in USAID funds have leveraged over $3.0
billion in partner resources. Alliances have been established in over
45 countries in the developing world and over 150 private business
partner organizations are now involved."
[End of section]
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Diana Glod, (202) 512-8945:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the person named above, Michael ten Kate, Robert Ball,
Loren DeJonge, and Joe Carney made key contributions to this report.
Martin de Alteriis, Ernie Jackson, and Mark Speight provided technical
assistance.
(320283):
FOOTNOTES
[1] The private sector includes nonprofit and for-profit organizations,
academia, and the American people.
[2] Prior GAO reports have examined the public diplomacy activities of
the State Department and Broadcasting Board of Governors. See U.S.
Public Diplomacy: State Department Expands Efforts but Faces
Significant Challenges, GAO-03-951 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 4, 2003)
and U.S. International Broadcasting: New Strategic Approach Focuses on
Reaching Large Audiences but Lacks Measurable Program Objectives, GAO-
03-772 (Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2003).
[3] Appendix II provides a listing of major reports issued since 2001
and their summary findings.
[4] The Defense Science Board, composed of civilian officials, advises
DOD on scientific, technical, manufacturing, acquisition process, and
other matters of special interest to the department.
[5] Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Managed
Information Dissemination (Washington, D.C.: October 2001).
[6] Incorporated in January 2004 by interested private sector leaders,
Business for Diplomatic Action seeks to counter anti-American
sentiments that can harm U.S. business interests by helping to
coordinate the outreach efforts of U.S. multinational companies.
[7] Established by the current administration to replace coordination
mechanisms established by earlier Presidents, National Security Council
policy coordinating committees are responsible for the management of
national security policies and are the main day-to-day forums for
interagency coordination of national security policy.
[8] The Interagency Working Group on U.S. Government-Sponsored
International Exchanges and Training was established by an executive
order of the President in 1997 and legislated by Congress in 1999.
Among other activities, the interagency working group has been tasked
with developing a database on U.S. exchange and training programs,
promoting greater understanding and cooperation among government
agencies, identifying areas of program overlap and duplication, and
developing a coordinated and cost-effective program strategy for
government agencies to follow.
[9] In March 2005, a report by State's Office of Research concluded
that Indonesian views of the United States had improved following
tsunami relief efforts.
[10] Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic
Communication (Washington, D.C.: September 2004).
[11] The Office of Global Communications is the successor to the
Coalition Information Centers established in Washington, London, and
Islamabad during the early stages of U.S military operations in
Afghanistan in 2001. These centers were created to provide a rapid
response capability to counter inaccurate portrayals of U.S. actions
and optimize reporting of news favorable to the United States.
[12] According to State officials, one of the office's main efforts is
the development of the daily "Global Messenger," a one-page fact sheet
sent worldwide to disseminate key points and daily activities on global
issues.
[13] The U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy is a bipartisan
panel created by Congress and appointed by the President to provide
oversight of U.S. government activities intended to understand, inform,
and influence foreign publics. It is responsible for assessing public
diplomacy policies and programs of the U.S. State Department,
Broadcasting Board of Governors, other government agencies, and the
private sector.
[14] Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World,
Changing Minds Winning Peace (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 1, 2003). The
group was formed in June 2003 at the request of Congress and submitted
its findings to the House Appropriations Committee.
[15] GAO-03-951.
[16] According to a senior USAID official, Development Outreach and
Communication Officers will handle information related to USAID
projects as well as other agencies' projects that are being implemented
by USAID. USAID does not plan to handle assistance projects emanating
from other sources, such as the Millennium Challenge Corporation.
[17] DOD also uses public affairs activities and military psychological
operations to communicate with foreign audiences.
[18] Some private sector groups may be reluctant to coordinate with the
U.S. government due to concerns over a loss of credibility. For
example, a representative of Business for Diplomatic Action told us
that any direct collaboration between her group and the U.S. government
was unlikely given the government's lack of credibility with target
audiences.
[19] The advisory committee consists of representatives of American
organizations and institutions, including business, labor, environment,
academia, legal consultancies, and other public interest groups. It
reports to the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs. Within this
bureau, the Office of Commercial and Business Affairs serves as State's
primary point of contact for all issues dealing with the private
sector.
[20] This proposal was submitted without the prior review or approval
of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. The
Under Secretary explained that she saw potential merit in the idea;
however, she was worried that creating a new entity would take scarce
resources away from existing programs.
[21] This proposal incorporates elements of similar suggestions
regarding the establishment of quasi-independent entities to promote
public-private partnerships by the Defense Science Board and the
Council on Foreign Relations. In its September 2004 report, the Defense
Science Board recommended the establishment of a Center for Strategic
Communications modeled on federally funded research and development
centers such as the Rand Corporation or National Endowment for
Democracy. In its report entitled "Finding America's Voice: A Strategy
for Reinvigorating U.S. Public Diplomacy" (New York, N.Y.: June 2003),
the Council on Foreign Relations recommended that an independent, not-
for-profit Corporation for Public Diplomacy be established to
facilitate public and private sector interchange.
[22] The four pillars are: (1) Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian
Assistance; (2) Economic Growth, Agriculture and Trade; (3) Global
Health; and (4) the Global Development Alliance.
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