Olympic Security
U.S. Support to Athens Games Provides Lessons for Future Olympics Gao ID: GAO-05-547 May 31, 2005The 2004 Summer Olympics in Athens, Greece, were held against the backdrop of growing concerns about international terrorism. Despite widespread fears of a potential terrorist attack on the Olympics, Greece hosted a safe and secure event with no terrorist incidents. To assist Greece in securing the 2004 Games, U.S. government agencies provided training and other support in the four years leading up to the Games. In addition, the U.S. government provided some security and other assistance to American athletes, spectators, and commercial investors, and expects to continue such support for future Olympics, including the upcoming 2006 Winter Olympics in Turin, Italy. GAO was asked to (1) determine the U.S. approach and coordination efforts for providing security assistance to the 2004 Summer Olympics; (2) examine the roles of U.S. agencies in Athens Olympics security and their financial outlays; and (3) review lessons learned in providing security assistance in support of the Olympics and how they are being incorporated into preparations for future Olympics. The Departments of State, Homeland Security, Defense, and Justice concurred with the report or had no comments.
In 2001, the United States began planning its security assistance for the 2004 Summer Olympics, responding to the heightened worldwide anxiety following the September 11 attacks and Greece's request for international advice on its security plan. The United States based much of its security assistance on knowledge gained through Greece's participation in the Department of State's Antiterrorism Assistance Program and through the staging of a major U.S. military exercise in March 2004. Based on these assessments, the United States employed a coordinated approach in providing security assistance to Greece for the Olympics. The U.S. Ambassador in Greece coordinated and led the U.S. interagency efforts in-country, while the State-chaired interagency working group in Washington, D.C., coordinated domestic contributions. Furthermore, the United States participated in a seven-country coordination group that aimed to identify potential areas of cooperation on security and support for Greece. Almost 20 entities and offices within a number of U.S. agencies provided more than $35 million in security assistance and support to the government of Greece. The Departments of State, Homeland Security, Defense, and Justice provided security training to various elements of the Greek government; the Departments of Energy and Justice provided crisis response assistance during the Olympics; and the State Department also provided special security and other assistance to U.S. athletes, spectators, and corporate sponsors. Following the 2004 Summer Games, these U.S. agencies identified a number of lessons learned, such as the importance of assessing host governments' security capabilities early to assist in planning U.S. support, appointing key personnel to craft unified messages for the U.S. security efforts, and coordinating with multilateral and other organizing entities. These lessons were then communicated by Washington, D.C.- and Athens-based personnel to U.S. officials in Italy who are preparing to support the 2006 Winter Olympics in Turin.
GAO-05-547, Olympic Security: U.S. Support to Athens Games Provides Lessons for Future Olympics
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
May 2005:
Olympic Security:
U.S. Support to Athens Games Provides Lessons for Future Olympics:
GAO-05-547:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-05-547, a report to congressional requesters:
Why GAO Did This Study:
The 2004 Summer Olympics in Athens, Greece, were held against the
backdrop of growing concerns about international terrorism. Despite
widespread fears of a potential terrorist attack on the Olympics,
Greece hosted a safe and secure event with no terrorist incidents.
To assist Greece in securing the 2004 Games, U.S. government agencies
provided training and other support in the four years leading up to the
Games. In addition, the U.S. government provided some security and
other assistance to American athletes, spectators, and commercial
investors, and expects to continue such support for future Olympics,
including the upcoming 2006 Winter Olympics in Turin, Italy.
GAO was asked to (1) determine the U.S. approach and coordination
efforts for providing security assistance to the 2004 Summer Olympics;
(2) examine the roles of U.S. agencies in Athens Olympics security and
their financial outlays; and (3) review lessons learned in providing
security assistance in support of the Olympics and how they are being
incorporated into preparations for future Olympics.
The Departments of State, Homeland Security, Defense, and Justice
concurred with the report or had no comments.
What GAO Found:
In 2001, the United States began planning its security assistance for
the 2004 Summer Olympics, responding to the heightened worldwide
anxiety following the September 11 attacks and Greece‘s request for
international advice on its security plan. The United States based much
of its security assistance on knowledge gained through Greece‘s
participation in the Department of State‘s Antiterrorism Assistance
Program and through the staging of a major U.S. military exercise in
March 2004. Based on these assessments, the United States employed a
coordinated approach in providing security assistance to Greece for the
Olympics. The U.S. Ambassador in Greece coordinated and led the U.S.
interagency efforts in-country, while the State-chaired interagency
working group in Washington, D.C., coordinated domestic contributions.
Furthermore, the United States participated in a seven-country
coordination group that aimed to identify potential areas of
cooperation on security and support for Greece.
Almost 20 entities and offices within a number of U.S. agencies
provided more than $35 million in security assistance and support to
the government of Greece. The Departments of State, Homeland Security,
Defense, and Justice provided security training to various elements of
the Greek government; the Departments of Energy and Justice provided
crisis response assistance during the Olympics; and the State
Department also provided special security and other assistance to U.S.
athletes, spectators, and corporate sponsors. Following the 2004 Summer
Games, these U.S. agencies identified a number of lessons learned, such
as the importance of assessing host governments‘ security capabilities
early to assist in planning U.S. support, appointing key personnel to
craft unified messages for the U.S. security efforts, and coordinating
with multilateral and other organizing entities. These lessons were
then communicated by Washington, D.C.- and Athens-based personnel to
U.S. officials in Italy who are preparing to support the 2006 Winter
Olympics in Turin.
2004 Summer Olympic Games Facts at a Glance:
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[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
U.S. Assistance Based on Security Capabilities Assessment, Supported by
Coordinated Effort:
Multiple U.S. Agencies Contributed to Security Support for Greece:
Security Planning Lessons Learned from Athens Are Being Applied to
Turin:
Agency Comments:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Figures:
Figure 1: Timeline of U.S. Support for 2004 Athens Olympics:
Figure 2: Timeline of Planned U.S. Support for Turin Olympics:
Figure 3: Turin Olympics Mountain Venues:
Abbreviations:
ATA: Antiterrorism Assistance Program:
DCI: data collection instrument:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
DOD: Department of Defense:
DOE: Department of Energy:
DOJ: Department of Justice:
FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation:
IOC: International Olympic Committee:
PDD: presidential decision directive:
State: Department of State:
USOC: U.S. Olympic Committee:
Letter May 31, 2005:
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye:
Co-Chairman:
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Gordon H. Smith:
Chairman:
The Honorable Byron L. Dorgan:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Trade, Tourism, and Economic Development:
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation:
United States Senate:
The 2004 Summer Olympics in Athens, Greece, were held against the
backdrop of growing concerns about international terrorism, combined
with the post-September 11, 2001, climate of heightened anxiety about
terrorism. Greece's history of domestic terrorism, increased security
tension worldwide created by the Iraq war, and two terrorist incidents
in Europe months prior to the Olympics created a challenging threat
environment for the 2004 Games. Despite widespread fears of a potential
terrorist attack on the Olympics, Greece hosted a safe and secure event
with no terrorist incidents. Although the host government is
responsible for the security of an Olympics, the United States provided
years of security assistance to Greece in advance of and throughout the
Games. The U.S. government expects to continue working to ensure the
security of U.S. athletes, spectators, and commercial investors at
future Olympics, including the upcoming 2006 Winter Olympics in Turin,
Italy.
You requested that we (1) determine the U.S. approach for providing
security assistance to Greece for the 2004 Summer Olympics and how such
security efforts were coordinated, (2) examine the roles of U.S.
agencies in Athens Olympics security and their financial outlays, and
(3) review lessons learned in providing security assistance in support
of the Olympics and how those lessons are being incorporated into
preparations for future Olympics, especially the 2006 Winter Olympics
in Turin, Italy.
To accomplish our objectives, we obtained and reviewed all available
interagency and agency-specific operations plans for and after-action
reports on the Athens Games and operations plans for the Turin Games.
We interviewed officials at the Departments of State (State), Justice
(DOJ), Homeland Security (DHS), Defense (DOD), and Energy (DOE) and at
certain intelligence agencies. In Athens, Greece, and Rome, Milan, and
Turin, Italy, we interviewed U.S. Embassy and consulate officials and
obtained documentation on the support provided by the United States for
the 2004 Summer Olympics and planned U.S. support for the 2006 Winter
Olympics. We interviewed Greek and Italian officials to obtain their
perspective on the U.S. security support provided. We also created and
distributed a data collection instrument that enabled us to collect and
analyze cost information provided by key agencies involved in
supporting the Athens Games. We conducted our review between October
2004 and May 2005 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards.
Results in Brief:
The United States began planning its security assistance for the 2004
Summer Olympics in 2001, responding to Greece's request for
international advice regarding its security plan and the heightened
worldwide concern regarding terrorism following the September 11
terrorist attacks. The United States based much of its plan for
providing security assistance on knowledge gained through Greece's long-
standing participation in State's Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA)
Program[Footnote 1] and through the staging of several military
exercises, including a major exercise in March 2004 that was
specifically tailored to address a theoretical terrorist attack on the
Olympics. Based on these assessments, the United States employed a
coordinated approach in providing security assistance to Greece for the
Olympics. The U.S. Ambassador in Greece coordinated and led the U.S.
interagency efforts in-country, while the State-chaired interagency
working group in Washington, D.C., coordinated domestic contributions.
Furthermore, the United States participated in a seven-country[Footnote
2] coordination group that aimed to identify potential areas of
cooperation on security and support for Greece.
Under the guiding principles of certain presidential
directives[Footnote 3] and U.S. agencies' own authorities,
approximately 20[Footnote 4] entities and offices within a number of
U.S. agencies provided more than $35 million in security assistance and
support to the government of Greece in fiscal years 2003 and 2004.
State, DHS, DOD, and DOJ provided security training to various elements
of the Greek government; DOE and DOJ provided crisis response
assistance during the Olympics; and State also provided special
security and other assistance to U.S. athletes, spectators, and
corporate sponsors. Most funds spent on the Olympics came from
agencies' normal operating budgets. U.S. government agencies identified
specific costs for the Olympics, including more than $10 million for
travel and lodging expenses for U.S. staff temporarily assigned to
Athens and more than $9 million in dedicated training to Greek
officials in a wide variety of specializations. In addition, the U.S.
government incurred other Olympics-related costs for activities that
were accelerated or positioned to coincide with the Olympics. For
example, DOE programs provided expertise and equipment to enhance
Greece's capability to detect nuclear devices and materials at certain
land borders and a major port, and the 2004 DOD European Command March
military exercise--which included participation by the U.S. Embassy and
Greek officials--focused on a theoretical terrorist attack on the
Olympics.
Following the 2004 Summer Games, the U.S. agencies involved with
providing security assistance identified a number of lessons learned,
such as the importance of assessing a host government's security
capabilities early to assist in planning U.S. support, appointing key
personnel to craft unified messages for the U.S. security efforts, and
coordinating with multilateral and other organizing entities. These
lessons were then communicated by Washington, D.C.-and Athens-based
personnel from State, DOJ, DHS, and DOD to their counterparts in Italy
who are preparing for the 2006 Winter Olympics in Turin. For the most
part, the key lessons learned are being applied in preparation for the
Turin Games. For example, U.S. officials in Athens noted that the long-
standing U.S. relationship with Greece helped in early identification
of potential security gaps and areas for U.S. assistance in security
preparations. For Turin, the partnership between the United States and
Italy in combat situations and counterterrorism efforts provides U.S.
agencies with relationships with relevant Italian agencies, as well as
knowledge about Italy's advanced capabilities to handle security for
the Olympics. In addition, U.S. officials pointed out the importance of
designating key U.S. officials to coordinate messaging and logistics
efforts with the host country. In line with this lesson, the U.S.
Embassy in Italy has appointed both an Olympic security coordinator and
an Olympic coordinator for logistics. Finally, U.S. officials noted the
importance of working with international, American, and local Olympics
officials to enable U.S. security elements to gain access to venues.
The application of this lesson has helped U.S. officials in Italy to
begin working with the local organizing committee in Turin on these
issues.
We provided a draft of this report to the Secretaries of Defense,
Homeland Security, and State and to the Attorney General for their
review and comment. The departments orally concurred with the content
of the report or had no comments. Technical comments provided by the
departments were incorporated as appropriate.
Background:
Since the revival of the Olympic Games in 1896, the event has grown
from 241 athletes representing 14 countries to, in the case of the 2004
Athens Games, approximately 10,500 athletes from 202 countries. While
the stated goal of the Olympic movement is "to contribute to building a
peaceful and better world," its history includes tragedy and terror as
well. At the 1972 Munich Games, Palestinian terrorists attacked the
Israeli Olympic team, resulting in the deaths of 11 Israeli athletes.
The 1996 Atlanta Olympics were marred by a pipe-bomb explosion that
killed one person and injured 110 others.
One of the International Olympic Committee requirements for countries
bidding to host the games is to ensure the security of the
participating athletes and spectators, an increasingly challenging task
in today's environment of terrorist threats. In February 2002, just
five months after the September 11 terrorist attacks, the United States
hosted the Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City, Utah. Amid tight security
coordinated under the auspices of the U.S. Secret Service and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)--with support from the U.S.
military--the Olympics concluded without any terrorist incidents. All
eyes then turned to Athens, Greece, for the 2004 Summer Olympics.
The challenges Greece faced in hosting an Olympics included a
continuing terrorist climate as well as complications arising from its
own infrastructure projects. In November 2003, terrorists attacked the
British consulate and a bank in Istanbul, Turkey, killing the British
Consul-General and 26 others, and in March 2004, a terrorist attack on
commuter trains in Madrid, Spain, killed nearly 200 people. In
addition, between the 1970s and early 2000s, the Greek domestic
terrorist group "November 17" specifically targeted Americans stationed
at the U.S. Embassy in Athens along with other western diplomats.
Finally, Greece experienced delays in completing its infrastructure
construction program of roads, public transit, and venue sites; the
late completion of some venue sites complicated advance security
planning as the Olympics opening ceremonies approached.
The second smallest country to host the Games, Greece spent
approximately $1.2 billion on security preparations for the Games,
along with about $10 billion for infrastructure improvements and other
costs. The United States, in partnership with six other countries,
worked with Greece over the four years preceding the Games to share
knowledge, expertise, and equipment. This assistance helped prepare
Greece for the security challenges of hosting this enormous
international event in a threat environment underscored by the ongoing
conflict in Iraq, recent terrorist attacks in the region, and Greek
security and other issues.
The next Olympics will be the Winter Games in Turin, Italy, February 10-
26, 2006. The United States is working with Italy to determine what
support it may be able to provide.
U.S. Assistance Based on Security Capabilities Assessment, Supported by
Coordinated Effort:
The U.S. assistance to Greece for the 2004 Summer Olympics was based on
security gaps identified through a needs assessment and Greece's
participation in several U.S. military exercises. Based on these
assessments, the U.S. Embassy in Athens led the governmentwide
coordination effort, in concert with a Washington, D.C.-based
interagency group and U.S. participation in a multilateral coordinating
body.
U.S. Security Assistance to Greece Informed by Needs Assessment and
Military Exercises:
In 2000, Greece began its security planning for the 2004 Summer
Olympics and asked seven countries that had previously hosted Olympics
or had significant counterterrorism expertise to provide advice on its
security plans. These seven countries--Australia, France, Germany,
Israel, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States--formed the
Olympic Security Advisory Group, which provided coordinated security
advice to Greece on its security planning. Following the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001, Greece revised its security planning in
light of the worldwide heightened concerns over terrorism, and the
United States began determining its approach for providing security
assistance to Greece and to Americans who would be participating in or
attend the Games.
The United States based its security assistance approach on knowledge
gained from Greece's participation in State's ATA Program since 1986.
In addition to this knowledge, the ATA Program led an interagency
effort to conduct a thorough needs assessment in December 2001 of the
Greek police and the country's capability to provide security during
the 2004 Summer Olympics. This assessment both reviewed progress gained
from past ATA Program training and identified several areas of
potential U.S. security assistance, including VIP security, port and
maritime security, canine explosives detection, and crisis response.
Based on the assessment, the United States provided additional training
in preparation for the Olympics under the ATA Program. This included
providing the Greek government with formal training courses and
seminars and training for more than 200 Hellenic Coast Guardsmen in
underwater explosive devices, advanced improvised explosive devices,
weapons of mass destruction first response, and Marine interdiction
procedures.
Along with the ATA Program, Greece also participated in several U.S.
military exercises that helped to identify security gaps. In the fall
of 2003 and spring of 2004, the U.S. DOD European Command arranged
several tabletop exercises that enabled Greek decision makers at
tactical and political levels to test their strategies for handling
security issues. The exercises involved role playing through various
crisis scenarios to determine and practice effective responses. In
March 2004, DOD's European Command coordinated the participation of the
U.S. Embassy in Athens, several components of the U.S. military, and
members of the newly elected Greek government in a consequence
management[Footnote 5] military exercise specifically tailored to
address a theoretical terrorist attack on the Olympics. For about two
weeks, staff at the American Embassy, U.S. military personnel, and
Greek officials played out roles and practiced their responses in the
event of such an attack. Greek officials stated that this consequence
management exercise enabled them to better identify areas for
improvement in their security plans and capabilities. Due to the March
2004 military exercise, along with the other training, the Greek
commanders at the various venues realized that in the event they could
not reach their commanding officers, they needed procedures and plans
in place for undertaking emergency evacuations on their own
authorities. In addition, they needed the ability to communicate
directly with counterparts within certain emergency response units,
such as the fire department or police department. Figure 1 provides a
timeline of U.S. security assistance for the 2004 Summer Olympics.
Figure 1: Timeline of U.S. Support for 2004 Athens Olympics:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
U.S. Olympic Security Assistance Coordinated by Embassy in Athens,
Supported by Interagency and Multilateral Efforts:
Based on the identified security needs, the U.S. Embassy in Athens led
the U.S. interagency coordination efforts in Greece. These efforts were
supported by a Washington, D.C.-based interagency coordination group,
in concert with the U.S. participation in the multilateral Olympic
Security Advisory Group.
U.S. Ambassador Played Key Coordination Role:
Because of State's leadership role in U.S. foreign policy efforts, the
U.S. Ambassador to Greece played a central coordination role for the
U.S. interagency effort to support the Athens Olympics. Several
agencies have identified the Ambassador's coordination role as key to
managing the complex interagency process within the Embassy, as well as
with each of the agencies' central offices in Washington, D.C., and the
DOD European Command headquarters in Germany. The Ambassador's single
point of contact for all U.S. assistance for the Olympics was the
Olympic Security Coordinator, a State Diplomatic Security agent who was
assigned to this role in the fall of 2001. As the head of the U.S.
Embassy in Athens that houses a number of U.S. agencies, the Ambassador
pulled together a central working group that included the Olympic
Security Coordinator, the State Senior Regional Security Officer, the
Defense Attaché, and the DOJ/FBI Legal Attaché. The Ambassador met with
this group regularly prior to the Olympics to determine the roles and
responsibilities for the various participating agencies in helping
Greece to prepare for hosting the Olympics. In addition, the Ambassador
led the planning for the agencies to provide additional security and
support services for U.S. athletes, officials, spectators, and
corporate sponsors for the Games.
Interagency Group Facilitated Domestic Contributions:
The State-chaired International Athletic Events Security Coordination
Group (interagency group), an interagency working group in Washington,
D.C., facilitated and coordinated agencies' contributions to security
assistance to Greece. Established in December 2001, this group serves
to coordinate U.S. government efforts for supporting U.S. embassies and
host governments of major international sporting events with a variety
of counterterrorism capabilities. The group played a key role in
supporting security efforts for the Athens Olympics, in coordination
with the Athens Embassy-based efforts. The interagency group determined
support roles and responsibilities to be carried out by the various
member agencies, and drafted response cables back to the Embassy. This
effort aimed to keep all of the agencies informed and prevent
duplicative or conflicting efforts by those involved. The interagency
group grew to include representatives from the intelligence community,
State, DOD, DOE, DOJ, DHS, and the Department of Health and Human
Services, among others.
United States Worked with Six Partner Countries to Coordinate Host
Country Security Assistance:
Along with its internal interagency coordination process, the United
States participated in the multilateral Olympic Security Advisory
Group. The advisory group reported to the Greek Minister of Public
Order on security issues at the strategic level. The group also
provided advice on technical support issues at the operational level.
The range of issues included intelligence, planning, training and
exercises, technology, command and control coordination, and venue
security. The United Kingdom chaired the group, which met monthly to
coordinate advice and information shared with Greece and assign
responsibility for providing Greece with security training and
equipment. One senior Greek official estimated that the United States
provided about 75 percent of the security assistance, the United
Kingdom about 20 percent, and other countries about 5 percent.
Multiple U.S. Agencies Contributed to Security Support for Greece:
Operating under general policy guidance and their own agency-specific
authorities, U.S. agencies coordinated their efforts to provide
security assistance for the 2004 Summer Olympics. The U.S. government
spent more than $35 million in fiscal years 2003 and 2004 in support of
the Olympics.
Agencies Operated under General Policy Guidance and Agency-Specific
Authorities:
Although the host government has ultimate responsibility for the
security of an Olympics, the United States has a vested interest in
ensuring the security of its citizens in all locations. In this regard,
Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 62 states,
"The first duty of government is the protection of its citizens. That
duty extends to Americans abroad, whether they are traveling in an
official or private capacity. The State Department, through its chiefs
of mission, will be responsible . . . for programs to preserve the
safety of private U.S. citizens abroad. U.S. citizens shall be
adequately warned of the danger of terrorist attack, advised regarding
precautionary measures and afforded appropriate assistance and
protection."
Furthermore, PDD 39 states,
"It is the policy of the United States to deter, defeat and respond
vigorously to all terrorist attacks on our territory and against our
citizens, or facilities, whether they occur domestically, in
international waters or airspace, or on foreign territory."
It also notes that State has the responsibility to reduce the
vulnerability affecting the general safety of American citizens abroad.
Under this general guidance, the U.S. government worked with the
government of Greece over the four years leading up to and through the
2004 Summer Olympic Games to ensure that American citizens attending
the Games would be safe and secure.
Under State's leadership, the other agencies used their individual
authorities to provide assistance. For example, according to DOJ
officials, FBI has the authority to bring cases to U.S. courts to
prosecute terrorist crimes committed against Americans abroad.[Footnote
6] Therefore, FBI had crisis management experts and agents prepared to
help Greece process crime scenes and to gather evidence in the event of
an attack. Similarly, the Transportation Security Agency, according to
an agency official, has authority to work with foreign governments to
address security concerns on passenger flights operated by foreign air
carriers in foreign air transportation, and, therefore, provided Greece
with security assessments and training at certain airports.
Some officials at State and DOJ stated that they lack specific guidance
for U.S. support of a foreign security event such as the Olympics. For
domestic-based "National Special Security Events," PDD 62 lays out
specific security roles and responsibilities for certain agencies, and
PDD 39 provides guidance for U.S. policy on counterterrorism. Agencies
used these PDDs to provide additional guidance to the U.S. efforts in
support of the Athens Olympics. For example, PDD 39 created the
interagency Foreign Emergency Support Team, which was deployed to the
Athens Olympics to provide assistance to Greek agencies if needed.
Although some agencies told us that the frameworks of these PDDs helped
to guide their security assistance efforts in Greece, they also said
that these PDDs outline specific agency roles only for domestic events,
not foreign-based events. Some agency officials at DOD, DOJ, and State
indicated that further clarification of the agencies' roles and
responsibilities in supporting foreign-based events might be helpful,
particularly for planning and budgeting resources.
Many U.S. Agencies Contributed Security Efforts for the Olympics:
Approximately 20 U.S. agencies or component entities contributed
security efforts to the Olympics. Following are some of the key
contributions:
Department of State:
State, as the lead U.S. agency for foreign affairs, led the interagency
effort both at the U.S. Embassy in Athens and by chairing the
interagency group in Washington, D.C. This coordination effort ensured
collaboration among agencies to prevent duplicative efforts.
* State's ATA Program coordinated training provided by multiple U.S.
agencies over the three years leading up to the Olympics.
* State's Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism heads U.S.
government efforts to improve counterterrorism cooperation with foreign
governments. The office ran several interagency-staffed
counterterrorism workshops in Greece prior to the Olympics to train
Greek senior policy officials. These workshops provided opportunities
for the Greek officials to test their security strategies and receive
critiques and suggestions for improvements from U.S. experts.
* State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security protects U.S. personnel and
missions overseas, advising U.S. ambassadors on all security matters
and providing a security program against terrorist, espionage, and
criminal threats at U.S. diplomatic facilities. For the Olympics,
Diplomatic Security agents provided security to U.S. athletes by
traveling with U.S. athletic teams between the Olympic Village and
various venues, and providing a security liaison with the Greek police
commanders at the Olympic venues.
* The Diplomatic Security Bureau also co-chairs the Overseas Security
Advisory Council, a joint venture between State and the U.S. private
sector to exchange timely information on overseas security issues with
U.S. businesses. During the Olympics, the council interacted with
corporate sponsors in mutually beneficial information sharing on
potential security issues.
* State's Bureau of Consular Affairs, which is responsible for
assisting American citizens traveling or living abroad, increased its
outreach to thousands of American spectators attending the Games,
providing services such as replacing lost passports and acting as
liaisons with Greek law enforcement.
Department of Justice:
The DOJ mission is to enforce the law and defend the interests of the
United States according to the law; to provide federal leadership in
preventing and controlling crime; to seek just punishment for those
guilty of unlawful behavior; and to ensure fair and impartial
administration of justice for all Americans.[Footnote 7]
* Under its broad authority, DOJ provided support to the Greek
government's efforts in dismantling the "November 17" domestic
terrorism network prior to the Games.
* Under its responsibility to provide training and development
assistance to foreign criminal justice systems, DOJ provided legal
assistance to Greece in preparing it to fulfill its law-enforcement
responsibilities.
* FBI has a responsibility to conduct professional investigations and
authorized intelligence collection to identify and counter the threat
posed by domestic and international terrorists and their supporters
within the United States, and to pursue extraterritorial criminal
investigations to bring the perpetrators of terrorist acts to justice.
During the Olympics, FBI agents were prestaged in Greece to provide
crisis management assistance in the event of a terrorist attack.
* As part of its mission to assist other law-enforcement agencies in
order to suppress and reduce violent crime as well as protect the
public, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
supplied agents to work with State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security as
security liaisons for the U.S. athletic teams.
Department of Defense:
DOD's purpose is to protect and advance U.S. national interests, such
the safety of U.S. citizens at home and abroad and the security and
well-being of allies and friends.
* The DOD European Command's large military exercise in March 2004
provided a unique opportunity for U.S. experts to interact with Greek
political and tactical officials as they practiced antiterrorism
responses to a theoretical Olympics-related terrorist attack.
* The Defense Threat Reduction Agency is responsible for reducing the
threat to the United States from nuclear, chemical, biological, and
conventional weapons. For the Olympics, it created some of the tabletop
scenarios involving weapons of mass destruction that were used in other
military exercises.
* The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency provides imagery, imagery
intelligence, and geospatial data and information for planning,
decision making and action in support of national security. It worked
with Greece to collect imaging data to provide detailed maps of the
rapidly changing Athens infrastructure prior to the Olympics. The
imaging and maps also provided the U.S. government with detailed
information on venues and surrounding areas in case there was a need
for emergency evacuations.
* U.S. Naval Forces Europe, which operates under the DOD European
Command, provided the temporary installation of a Dunlop barrier in the
Port of Pireaus during the Olympics. This large, floating barrier
helped to protect U.S. athletes, security officials, and VIPs who were
housed aboard ships in the port from potential terrorist attacks via
small boats.
Department of Homeland Security:
DHS is responsible for preventing and deterring terrorist attacks and
protecting against and responding to threats and hazards to the nation,
including safeguarding the American people and their freedoms, critical
infrastructure, property, and the economy.
* The department's Federal Air Marshal Service protects U.S. air
carriers and passengers against hostile acts, and, for the Olympics,
provided additional air marshals to accompany U.S.-based carriers
traveling to and from Greece for the Olympics.
* Transportation Security Administration experts provided assessments
of airport and mass transit security and helped to train Greek
government workers.
* Immigration and Customs Enforcement provided specialized training on
fraudulent document recognition.
* The U.S. Coast Guard provided training to the Greek Hellenic Coast
Guard under State's ATA Program.
* Secret Service agents provided expertise in VIP protection for
State's counterterrorism workshops in addition to providing their
normal protection services for certain VIPs.
Department of Energy:
DOE's overarching mission is to advance the national economic and
energy security of the United States.
* The DOE Office of the Second Line of Defense aims to strengthen the
overall capability to detect and deter illicit trafficking of nuclear
and other radioactive materials across international borders. Under
this responsibility, it provided expertise and radiation detection
equipment to the Greek Atomic Energy Commission for installation at
certain border crossings, Athens International Airport, and the Port of
Piraeus.
Other DOE programs provided related support, such as upgrading the
physical security around a Greek nuclear research reactor and securing
radiological sources at locations throughout Greece.[Footnote 8]
* DOE's National Nuclear Security Agency has a responsibility to
promote international nuclear safety and nonproliferation and to reduce
global danger from weapons of mass destruction. For the Olympics, it
provided personnel in support of the Foreign Emergency Support Team, a
State-led interagency rapid-response team that was deployed prior to
the Olympics.
Other Agencies:
U.S. Postal Inspectors, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the
Defense Intelligence Agency, among others, provided additional security
support for the Olympics.
Agencies Identified Additional Expenditures for Providing Security
Assistance:
We surveyed the U.S. agencies identified as contributing security
support in advance of and at the Athens Olympic Games, and the agencies
identified more than $35 million in additional expenditures in fiscal
years 2003 and 2004 to arrange and provide this U.S. assistance. The
majority of costs identified by the agencies were travel costs for U.S.
personnel supporting the Games and for training programs provided to
Greek officials and security personnel. Agencies reported to us they
spent more than $10 million in travel costs, including airfare,
lodging, and per diem costs for hundreds of staff who traveled overseas
in 2003 and 2004 to provide security assistance, with most travel
occurring during the Olympics. Agencies further reported to us more
than $9 million in training costs, including the costs for building and
executing the consequence management military exercises and FBI
forensics trainings, as well as for translation of training materials
and providing translators at the training sessions. Greece had received
about $1.6 million in previous ATA Program assistance between 1986 and
2001, and, in preparation for the Olympics, received over $15 million
in antiterrorism assistance between 2001 and 2004. While, State was
appropriated $2.763 million in fiscal year 2004 for costs related to
providing security assistance to the Olympics, all other security
assistance funding came from individual agencies' budgets and was
reprogrammed from other planned uses, which in some instances caused
other programs to be delayed to accommodate Olympics security needs.
For example, the public affairs section at the U.S. Embassy in Athens
canceled some cultural programs in order to focus on events that
promoted the Olympics.
The reported costs in fiscal years 2003 and 2004 do not capture the
entirety of costs for supporting the Olympics, particularly the
significant salary costs for the hundreds of personnel who supported
the U.S. security assistance effort. State identified about $660,000 in
fiscal years 2002 to 2004 in estimated salary, benefits, and related
costs for four staff who were hired to fill Olympics-related
coordination roles. However, the costs of salaries and benefits of
other U.S. officials who were deployed to Athens, or Embassy and other
personnel who worked for months or even years to support the U.S.
effort to the Games, are not included.
While the travel and training costs above were incurred directly in
support of the Olympics, some U.S. agencies accelerated or repositioned
other activities to coincide with Olympics preparations. For example,
Department of Energy programs to provide radiation detection equipment
to Greece were expedited so that the equipment could be installed at
Greece's ports of entry and at other locations in Greece in time for
the Olympics. In addition, the March 2004 DOD European Command military
exercise--a major exercise for training U.S. forces--was focused on
Olympics-related terrorist scenarios.
Security Planning Lessons Learned from Athens Are Being Applied to
Turin:
Following the Athens Games, U.S. agencies collected and distributed
lessons learned to agencies involved in security planning for the Turin
Games. These lessons included establishing bilateral relationships to
identify areas of potential assistance; designating key U.S. officials
to craft and deliver unified messages; and working with the local
organizing committee and multilateral contacts. These and other key
lessons learned from Athens are being applied in the planning efforts
for Turin. However, U.S. efforts to support the Turin Games face
significant infrastructure, funding, and coordination challenges.
U.S. Government Agencies Moved Quickly to Collect and Disseminate
Lessons Learned:
At the conclusion of the Athens Olympic Games, U.S. agencies involved
in the security assistance effort moved quickly to collect and
disseminate lessons learned to their Turin Games counterparts.
Officials at State, DOD, FBI, and other key agencies completed detailed
after-action reports on the aspects of security support that went well
and should be replicated in the future, where feasible, and what
aspects might be improved upon. In addition, in September 2004, less
than 2 weeks after the closing ceremony of the Athens Games, Athens-
based U.S. staff traveled to the U.S. Consulate in Milan, Italy, to
meet with their Italy-based colleagues for a 2-day workshop on lessons
learned in overall coordination. The U.S. Milan consulate also
organized and hosted a three-day interagency conference in October 2004
for Athens-and Washington, D.C.-based officials who will be working on
the Turin Winter Games.
Agencies and entities involved in the U.S. effort have also looked to
continually improve. For example, at the suggestion of agencies
involved in the Athens effort, the Washington, D.C.-based interagency
group has formed smaller subcommittees to focus on specific areas such
as logistics, transportation security, and intelligence support. The
subcommittees were named in late 2004, after the Athens lessons learned
were disseminated. Additionally, the United States is leading a Group
of Eight[Footnote 9] initiative to capture security best practices and
lessons learned in hosting major events like the Olympics. According to
DOJ officials, since the advent of the modern Olympics in 1896, Group
of Eight nations have hosted approximately 60 percent of all Olympics.
Final Group of Eight approval for the resulting handbook is expected
later this year.
U.S. Government Entities Are Planning for Security Support to 2006
Turin Olympics:
While the government of Italy had yet to request U.S. security
assistance as of April 2005, the U.S. government, led by State, is
actively working to coordinate a U.S. security presence to support the
interests of its athletes, spectators, and commercial industries during
the Games. The U.S. Olympic Security Coordinator relocated to Turin
from Milan in January 2005 and set up a support office in April 2005 to
provide the U.S. government with a forward-based infrastructure for
coordinating security support. The United States is also contracting
for additional office space in Turin to house the interagency joint
operations and intelligence center.
The U.S. Olympic Security Coordinator in Turin has already polled
participating U.S. agencies to determine their planned baseline, or
initial, presence. In April 2005, the American Embassy in Rome
projected that $4.4 million will be expended to support the ongoing
planning efforts and an interagency presence of about 150 to 200
additional personnel during the Games. The bulk of the planned U.S.
footprint comprises State Diplomatic Security agents, with supporting
roles from FBI, DOD European Command, and other agencies. Figure 2
presents a timeline of planned U.S. security assistance to the 2006
Winter Olympics.
Figure 2: Timeline of Planned U.S. Support for Turin Olympics:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Key Lessons Learned from Athens Being Applied to Turin:
Key lessons learned from Athens that were highlighted in numerous
agency after-action reports are being applied to the Turin Games
security planning. These lessons include the importance of planning
early by using existing bilateral relationships to assess the host
country's security capabilities; designating key U.S. officials to lead
logistics and messaging efforts; and working with multilateral,
bilateral, and specialized groups to improve coordination and ensure
smooth access for U.S. support. The lessons learned being applied to
Turin also include more detailed strategies and projects.
Importance of Early Planning, Informed by Existing Bilateral
Relationships:
Many agency after-action reports from Athens and U.S. officials'
comments indicate the importance of early planning, informed by
existing bilateral relationships that reveal host country security
capabilities. Such early insight enables advance planning of baseline
support, including logistics as well as training and military exercises
to enhance the host country's capabilities. For Athens, Greece's
participation in State's ATA Program and an interagency assessment in
2001 revealed Greece's capabilities, which allowed U.S. agencies to
develop a succession of training activities that began in 2002. In
addition, DOD's European Command began formally planning in 2003 for
its March 2004 exercise. Such specially tailored, elaborate exercises
take at least 6 months to plan, experts told us.
Furthermore, early planning of U.S. baseline support for an Olympics
enables agencies to coordinate their efforts and plan more efficiently
and effectively, including arranging accommodations, vehicle rentals,
and communications infrastructure. For example, advance notification of
the expected U.S. agency presence would allow for planning of support
infrastructure, including operations and intelligence centers. Due to
the short supply of large office space in Athens, the United States
divided its operations centers there into discrete areas. U.S.
officials who worked the Athens Olympics recommend that operations and
intelligence centers for future Olympics be collocated, to ensure the
efficient delivery and dissemination of information among U.S.
agencies; however, acquiring and outfitting suitable space for a joint
operations center requires advance planning. Additionally, Greece-and
Italy-based U.S. officials told us that hotel accommodations within the
host country can sell out up to 3 years in advance of the Olympics, and
prices on accommodations, vehicle rentals, and communications wiring
and infrastructure dramatically increase as the Games draw near.
Planning for and securing the U.S. presence early would prevent some of
the last-minute, high-cost expenditures incurred at the Athens
Olympics, such as for installation of communications lines in temporary
office space.
This lesson is being applied to Turin as the United States has used its
long-standing counterterrorism and military partnership with Italy to
better understand Italy's advanced security capabilities. Based on this
assessment, the interagency working group in Washington, D.C., is
determining the scope of each agency's baseline support operations to
prevent duplication of effort and identify the best sources and
capabilities among the representative agencies. The interagency group
has continued to meet monthly to determine which lessons learned from
Athens might be applicable to the Turin Games. At a recent meeting,
nearly 60 U.S. officials discussed intelligence reports, logistics
planning, and the development of an interagency joint operations-and-
intelligence center, as well as the identification of funding sources
for logistics, such as lodging, communications, and transportation.
Designating Key U.S. Officials for Logistics and Message Development:
The U.S. support for the Athens Games also demonstrated the importance
of designating key individuals to serve as point persons for logistics
and message development. As part of its coordinated approach in Athens,
the U.S. Embassy designated individuals to be responsible for
political, security, and logistics arrangements. Athens-and Washington,
D.C.-based officials told us this strategy worked well, and recommended
its future use. The clear establishment of U.S. roles and
responsibilities--including a single U.S. contact to Greece--helped
Greece avoid a barrage of separate requests for assistance from U.S.
agencies, while also minimizing overlap among and overreach by
participating U.S. agencies. As the U.S. focal points for the host
government and the public, these individuals may be further tasked, as
was the case in Athens, with crafting and ensuring a consistent message
and setting consistent expectations for the host country and
multilateral community regarding planned U.S. participation efforts.
This also proved useful in Athens, U.S. officials told us.
This lesson is being applied to Turin through State's appointment of an
Olympic Security Coordinator in November 2004. This coordinator in
Turin is acting as a focal point for contacts with the host government
and will work with the Consul General in Milan to develop and
communicate coordinated messages. Maintaining a U.S. government message
for Turin that is consistent, clear, and targeted--as was done in
Athens--is designed to avert possible confusion by the government of
Italy on which U.S. agency to speak with to obtain certain
capabilities. The strategy will also help ensure that U.S. citizens and
interests receive a consistent message on security or other critical
issues.
Working with Multilateral, Bilateral, and Specialized Groups:
U.S. support for the Athens Games demonstrated the importance of
working through formalized multilateral mechanisms and other bilateral
and specialized channels to avoid duplication of effort and ensure a
smooth and politically sensitive operation. Host country and U.S.
officials credited the Olympic Security Advisory Group with providing
capabilities and specialized support to the government of Greece from
its seven member nations and other nations, including Czech Republic,
which provided weapons of mass destruction response capabilities. Where
possible, such multilateral efforts should be employed in the future to
vet host country requests, provide multilateral assistance in a
coordinated manner, and avoid duplication of effort among contributing
countries, U.S. officials told us.
Officials who worked on the Athens Olympics also suggested working
closely with the International Olympic Committee (IOC), the U.S.
Olympic Committee (USOC), and local organizing committees early to
ensure adequate numbers of credentials with proper access rights are
granted to U.S. officials. The host country typically provides just
four credentials for officials from each participating country. Given
the hundreds of U.S. personnel on the ground to support the Athens
Games, U.S. officials worked with the local organizing committee over
many months to secure the necessary credentials for access to the
Olympic Village and venues. U.S. officials stated that the IOC needs to
adjust the security framework for post-September 11 Olympics, including
reassessing the issuance of credentials for security support personnel.
The multilateral Olympic Security Advisory Group provided feedback on
this issue to the IOC at the conclusion of the Athens Games, and USOC
officials stated that further discussion is planned with the IOC at
future meetings.
This lesson is being applied to Turin through U.S. officials' extensive
cooperation with local organizing committees and government of Italy
security officials, extending back to a formal security coordination
conference in Milan in October 2004, which included personnel from
State, DOJ, DHS, and DOD. The U.S. Olympic Security Coordinator has
forged a close relationship with the Turin-based government of Italy
Olympics security strategy official, and continues to work with him on
a regular basis to ensure that detailed plans are executed
appropriately. Further, key U.S. officials have also begun
communicating early with the local organizing committee to ensure
adequate numbers of credentials are provided with appropriate access
for U.S. personnel at Olympic venues.
Application of Lessons Learned also includes Specific Projects and
Strategies:
The Athens lessons learned applied for the Turin Games also include
more-detailed strategies and projects, highlights of which include the
following:
* In Athens, U.S. support was somewhat decentralized, utilizing
multiple operations centers for various functions, such as intelligence
and athlete support, which officials said was challenging. Therefore,
in Turin, U.S. agencies plan to better centralize resources by
collocating intelligence and interagency operations centers, as well as
by developing a dedicated Web site that will allow Americans to readily
access helpful information, such as how to replace lost passports and
locate English-speaking pharmacies.
* In Athens, some agencies struggled to identify funding sources to
make advance payments on housing and logistics needs. For Turin, State
is leveraging funds internally to make deposits on hotels, and agencies
will be responsible for identifying and securing funding for logistics,
such as lodging, communications, and transportation.
* Italy did not participate in the Olympic Security Advisory Group for
the Athens Olympics, which U.S. and Greek officials credited with
enhancing coordination and collaboration multilaterally. However, Italy
may be creating its own multilateral advisory group.
* In Athens, State's Diplomatic Security agents encountered problems
obtaining unlimited access to all venues. In Turin, the Olympic
Coordinator is working with the USOC on a plan to better deploy U.S.
agents.
U.S. Support for Turin Games Faces Additional Challenges:
In planning for the 2006 Winter Olympics in Turin, Italy, winter
conditions and weather present a host of new and different challenges
for U.S. security assistance. Winter Olympics are typicallyone-third
the scale of the Summer Olympics, but venues are spread out over more
land. Whereas the 2004 Summer Olympics were mostly centered in and
around the Greek capital city, where the United States had a large
embassy presence and infrastructure in place to provide administrative
and logistical support for the U.S. security efforts, the 2006 Winter
Games are located in the remote northwest corner of Italy. The nearest
U.S. presence is the consulate in Milan, about a 90-minute drive from
Turin. One Olympic Village will be in Turin, and two will be located in
mountain towns up to 60 miles away, where certain sports--such as
bobsled, luge, skiing, and snowboarding--will be located. Locating
suitable lodging for U.S. security and support personnel near key
venues is proving challenging. On-the-ground security details could
prove problematic, as spectators wearing bulky winter apparel will hope
to enter the venues with minimum wait outside in the cold, and traffic
may clog roads leading to mountain venues. Figure 3 presents images of
some of the roads leading to mountain venues, one of the venues to be
used for the Olympics, and one of the three Olympic Villages that will
house athletes.
Figure 3: Turin Olympics Mountain Venues:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The threat framework surrounding the 2006 Winter Olympics remains
largely the same. Italy has partnered with the United States in the war
on terror, including the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and al
Qaeda has named Italy as a target. In addition, Italy faced difficult
security challenges at other major events, such as the meeting of the
Group of Eight in Genoa in 2001, at which activists clashed violently
with Italian police forces, and for the funeral of Pope John Paul II in
April 2005.
Since Turin is located approximately 90 minutes from the nearest U.S.
Consulate in Milan, a temporary U.S. post is being created in Turin.
Opened in April 2005, this office will house the Olympic Security
Coordinator, the Olympic Coordinator for logistics, the FBI liaison,
and locally hired support staff. The consulate had to obtain special
permission to hire local staff in Turin and secure more than $235,000
for the office space lease and security upgrades. In addition, the
office had to be fully furnished and outfitted to support the needs of
the staff, including furniture, supplies, computers, and telephone and
fax lines. At the time of our visit in February 2005, the Milan Consul
General stated that the Embassy in Rome had worked to make funding for
the staff and infrastructure available from its own funds, but that
those funds would need to be reimbursed by State and other agencies. At
the interagency group meetings, State reminds other agencies to
identify funding for their support and release it to State for
immediate use to secure logistics support, such as contracting for
lodging and transportation. State does not have a "major events" fund,
so no monies have been budgeted for Olympics-related support. Other
agencies indicated similar constraints and lack of advance budgeting
for Olympics security assistance.
U.S. Role for Beijing Games Still Unclear:
While U.S. agencies are focusing on the 2006 Winter Olympics, they are
beginning to assess potential roles for U.S. security assistance for
the 2008 Summer Games in Beijing, China. These plans are still in the
early stages, although State expects that the U.S. mission in Beijing
will appoint both an Olympic Coordinator and an Olympic Security
Coordinator by the fall of 2005 to allow them to participate in the
U.S. assistance for the Turin Games. State officials have received
tentative inquiries from Chinese officials regarding Olympics security
issues. However, the United States has not assessed China's security
plans for the 2008 Olympics, and officials at key agencies stated they
are uncertain about the extent of assistance China may request or
permit from outside sources.
Agency Comments:
We provided a draft of this report to the Secretaries of Defense,
Homeland Security, and State and to the Attorney General for their
review and comment. The departments orally concurred with the content
of the report or had no comments. Technical comments provided by the
departments were incorporated, as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to other interested Members of
Congress. We are also sending copies to the Secretary of State,
Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Homeland Security, and Attorney
General. We will also make copies available at no charge on the GAO Web
site at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. If you or your staff has any
questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4128 or
[Hyperlink, fordj@gao.gov]. A GAO contact and key contributing staff
are listed in appendix II.
Signed by:
Jess T. Ford:
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
[End of section]
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
To fulfill our objectives in identifying U.S. security strategies in
supporting the 2004 Summer Olympics, the various roles of the U.S.
agencies involved, and the lessons they learned in supporting the
Olympics, we interviewed officials at the Departments of State (State),
Justice (DOJ), Homeland Security (DHS), Defense (DOD), and Energy (DOE)
and at certain intelligence agencies, and conducted fieldwork in
Athens, Greece. At all of the agencies, we obtained and reviewed all
available operations plans and after-action reports. At State, we
interviewed officials in the Bureau of Diplomatic Security,
Counterterrorism office, Overseas Security Advisory Council, and Bureau
of European and Eurasian Affairs, as well as the Olympic Security
Coordinator. At DOJ, we interviewed officials in the Criminal Division;
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives; and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), including an agent who was temporarily
assigned to Greece during the Games. At DHS, we met with officials in
the Transportation Security Administration, Secret Service, Coast
Guard, and Federal Air Marshal Service. At DOD, we spoke with officials
in the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, European Command, and National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, as well as the former Defense Attaché
for the Athens Embassy. At DOE, we interviewed an official who was
deployed to Greece with the State-led Foreign Emergency Support Team.
During our fieldwork in Athens in November 2004, we interviewed key
U.S. officials such as the Ambassador, Deputy Chief of Mission, Senior
Regional Security Officer, Legal Attaché, Public Affairs Officer,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement Attaché, the head of the Political
section, officials in the Defense Attaché Office and Consular section,
and an intelligence officer. In addition, we obtained and reviewed key
documents, including operational plans, after-action reports, planning
manuals and timelines, and assessments. We interviewed four Greek
officials identified by the Embassy as key to the Olympics process in
order to assess the Greek receptivity to U.S. assistance provided and
any lessons that can be applied to providing support to host
governments of future Olympics. These individuals were the former head
of the Greek police force, who had overall responsibility for the Greek
Olympics security strategy; the official who was in charge of the Greek
tactical operations center and who is now the head of the Greek police
force; and the individual who was in charge of the crisis management
systems during the Olympics. Finally, we interviewed one Greek-American
who was the Deputy General Manager for Security for the local Athens
Olympic Organizing Committee.
To determine cost estimates of U.S. security support to the Athens
Olympic Games, we developed a data collection instrument (DCI) to
survey agencies identified as contributing to the U.S. effort. A draft
DCI was pretested on two federal agencies. In October 2004, GAO sent
the revised DCI to the agencies identified by State in June 2004 as
supporting the U.S. security assistance effort,[Footnote 10] and
obtained 17 responses. Our DCI asked agencies to tell us how they
collected and tracked the data on costs. We conducted follow-ups with
agencies to clarify data collection issues based on the responses we
received. GAO notes that not all agency components collect and track
data in a consistent manner. Furthermore, the DCI did not attempt to
gather information on the costs of personnel salaries, which are
presumed to be a significant outlay for the agency components
involved.[Footnote 11] We determined that the data are sufficiently
reliable to be reported in aggregated form, rounded to millions, as
estimated cost outlays and by category of expenditure, but not in
precise, detailed form.
To assess how lessons learned in supporting Greece are being applied to
future Games, particularly the 2006 Winter Games in Turin, Italy, we
gathered information from the various agencies identified above,
reviewed operations plans and budget requests, attended meetings of the
State-chaired interagency working group in Washington, D.C., and
conducted fieldwork in Rome, Milan, Turin, and mountain areas of Italy.
During our fieldwork, we interviewed key U.S. officials in Rome,
including the Ambassador, Deputy Chief of Mission, Senior Regional
Security Officer, Financial Management Officer, Information Management
Officer, Consul General, intelligence officers, officials in the Office
of Defense Cooperation, Political section, and Legal Attaché office. In
addition, we interviewed the Italian Minister of Public Order in the
Ministry of the Interior to assess the way in which the United States
has presented offers of assistance for the Turin Games to the
government of Italy. In Milan, we interviewed the Consul General,
Acting[Footnote 12] Olympic Coordinator (for logistics), Public Affairs
Officer, U.S. Secret Service Attaché, and others involved in providing
logistical support, including contracting for cellular phones and
transportation services for the U.S. personnel working on the Olympics.
In Turin, we interviewed the Olympic Security Coordinator and the FBI
liaison, visited the then-proposed site for the logistical support
office established in April 2005, and the site of the planned
interagency joint operations and intelligence center. We also visited a
number of the Olympics venues in the city of Turin, including the ice
skating pavilion, hockey venues, the stadium for the opening and
closing ceremonies, the location of the medals ceremonies, and the site
of the Olympic Village. Finally, in order to understand the challenges
associated with providing security support to far-flung Olympics
venues, we traveled to the two mountain locations of the other Olympics
Villages and the locations of the alpine skiing venue and the
snowboarding venue. U.S. officials also provided us with information on
their early plans to support the Beijing Olympics in 2008. We also
interviewed two officials at the U.S. Olympic Committee for their
perspective on U.S. government security assistance to foreign-based
Olympics.
We conducted our work from October 2004 to May 2005 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Diana Glod, (202) 512-8945:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the individual named above, Sharron Candon, Michelle
Munn, Andrea Miller, Melissa Pickworth, Joe Carney, and Martin de
Alteriis made key contributions to this report.
(320318):
FOOTNOTES
[1] The Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) Program provides training and
related assistance to law-enforcement and security services of select
friendly foreign governments, aiming to enhance their skills to deter
and counter the threats of terrorism. The assistance addresses four
specific areas--crisis prevention, crisis management, crisis
resolution, and investigation--and can take many forms, such as airport
security, crime-scene investigations, and chemical and biological
attacks.
[2] The participating countries were Australia, France, Germany,
Israel, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
[3] The President manages the operations of the federal government
through executive orders and issues decisions on foreign affairs and
national security matters through presidential directives.
[4] GAO surveyed the 17 entities that State had identified as playing a
key role in support of the Athens Games (see app. I for more
information). We received additional information on other agencies that
also provided support for the Olympics.
[5] A foreign consequence management event is an incident that occurs
abroad and involves chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear
contamination. It is not limited to a terrorist incident; it also can
be caused by a war, natural cause, or accident. In addition, a foreign
consequence management event must threaten to overwhelm existing host-
nation response capabilities and prompt a host-nation request for
immediate international assistance. According to the Department of
State, the release of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear
contaminants is required by international agreements to be reported,
regardless of how the agent was released. Finally, consequence
management of an incident is the sole responsibility of the host
nation. The United States may be asked to provide assistance only.
[6] See 18USC2332b(f)&(g) concerning the Attorney General's primary
investigative authority for all federal crimes of terrorism, including
those occurring outside the United States.
[7] See also DOJ Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2003-2008.
[8] For more information on DOE's Second Line of Defense programs, see
GAO, Preventing Nuclear Smuggling: DOE Has Made Limited Progress in
Installing Radiation Detection Equipment at Highest Priority Foreign
Seaports, GAO-05-375 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2005); and Nuclear
Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat Nuclear
Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and Planning, GAO-02-426
(Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2002).
[9] The heads of state of the Group of Eight nations (Canada, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United
States) meet at an annual summit to discuss international economic and
political issues.
[10] We did not survey a few agencies that State did not identify;
these agencies were reported to have incurred some small costs.
[11] GAO identified four State personnel positions that were created
specifically for Olympics and requested cost data from State for those
positions only, which is included in this report.
[12] The official Olympic Coordinator began working in Turin, Italy, in
April 2005.
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