Overseas Security
State Department Has Not Fully Implemented Key Measures to Protect U.S. Officials from Terrorist Attacks Outside of Embassies Gao ID: GAO-05-642 May 9, 2005U.S. government officials working overseas are at risk from terrorist threats. Since 1968, 32 embassy officials have been attacked--23 fatally--by terrorists outside the embassy. As the State Department continues to improve security at U.S. embassies, terrorist groups are likely to focus on "soft" targets--such as homes, schools, and places of worship. GAO was asked to determine whether State has a strategy for soft target protection; assess State's efforts to protect U.S. officials and their families while traveling to and from work; assess State's efforts overseas to improve security at schools attended by the children of U.S. officials; and describe issues related to protection at their residences.
State has a number of programs and activities designed to protect U.S. officials and their families outside the embassy, including security briefings, protection at schools and residences, and surveillance detection. However, State has not developed a comprehensive strategy that clearly identifies safety and security requirements and resources needed to protect U.S. officials and their families abroad from terrorist threats outside the embassy. State officials raised a number of challenges related to developing and implementing such a strategy. They also indicated that they have recently initiated an effort to develop a soft targets strategy. As part of this effort, State officials said they will need to address and resolve a number of legal and financial issues. Three State initiated investigations into terrorist attacks against U.S. officials outside of embassies found that the officials lacked the necessary hands-on training to help counter the attack. The investigations recommended that State provide hands-on counterterrorism training and implement accountability measures to ensure compliance with personal security procedures. After each of these investigations, State reported to Congress that it planned to implement the recommendations, yet we found that State's hands-on training course is not required, the accountability procedures have not been effectively implemented, and key embassy officials are not trained to implement State's counterterrorism procedures. State instituted a program in 2003 to improve security at schools, but its scope has not yet been fully determined. In fiscal years 2003 and 2004, Congress earmarked $29.8 million for State to address security vulnerabilities against soft targets, particularly at overseas schools. The multiphase program provides basic security hardware to protect U.S. officials and their families at schools and some off-compound employee association facilities from terrorist threats. However, during our visits to posts, regional security officers were unclear about which schools could qualify for security assistance under phase three of the program. State's program to protect U.S. officials and their families at their residences is primarily designed to deter crime, not terrorism. The Residential Security program includes basic security hardware and local guards, which State officials said provide effective deterrence against crime, though only limited deterrence against a terrorist attack. To minimize the risk and consequences of a residential terrorist attack, some posts we visited limited the number of U.S. officials living in specific apartment buildings. To provide greater protection against terrorist attacks, some posts we visited used surveillance detection teams in residential areas.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-05-642, Overseas Security: State Department Has Not Fully Implemented Key Measures to Protect U.S. Officials from Terrorist Attacks Outside of Embassies
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of Embassies' which was released on May 10, 2005.
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Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging
Threats, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform,
House of Representatives:
May 2005:
Overseas Security:
State Department Has Not Fully Implemented Key Measures to Protect U.S.
Officials from Terrorist Attacks Outside of Embassies:
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-642]:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-05-642, a report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on
National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations,
Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives:
Why GAO Did This Study:
U.S. government officials working overseas are at risk from terrorist
threats. Since 1968, 32 embassy officials have been attacked”23
fatally”by terrorists outside the embassy. As the State Department
continues to improve security at U.S. embassies, terrorist groups are
likely to focus on ’soft“ targets”such as homes, schools, and places of
worship.
GAO was asked to determine whether State has a strategy for soft target
protection; assess State‘s efforts to protect U.S. officials and their
families while traveling to and from work; assess State‘s efforts
overseas to improve security at schools attended by the children of
U.S. officials; and describe issues related to protection at their
residences.
What GAO Found:
State has a number of programs and activities designed to protect U.S.
officials and their families outside the embassy, including security
briefings, protection at schools and residences, and surveillance
detection. However, State has not developed a comprehensive strategy
that clearly identifies safety and security requirements and resources
needed to protect U.S. officials and their families abroad from
terrorist threats outside the embassy. State officials raised a number
of challenges related to developing and implementing such a strategy.
They also indicated that they have recently initiated an effort to
develop a soft targets strategy. As part of this effort, State
officials said they will need to address and resolve a number of legal
and financial issues.
Three State initiated investigations into terrorist attacks against
U.S. officials outside of embassies found that the officials lacked the
necessary hands-on training to help counter the attack. The
investigations recommended that State provide hands-on counterterrorism
training and implement accountability measures to ensure compliance
with personal security procedures. After each of these investigations,
State reported to Congress that it planned to implement the
recommendations, yet we found that State‘s hands-on training course is
not required, the accountability procedures have not been effectively
implemented, and key embassy officials are not trained to implement
State‘s counterterrorism procedures.
State instituted a program in 2003 to improve security at schools, but
its scope has not yet been fully determined. In fiscal years 2003 and
2004, Congress earmarked $29.8 million for State to address security
vulnerabilities against soft targets, particularly at overseas schools.
The multiphase program provides basic security hardware to protect U.S.
officials and their families at schools and some off-compound employee
association facilities from terrorist threats. However, during our
visits to posts, regional security officers were unclear about which
schools could qualify for security assistance under phase three of the
program.
State‘s program to protect U.S. officials and their families at their
residences is primarily designed to deter crime, not terrorism. The
Residential Security program includes basic security hardware and local
guards, which State officials said provide effective deterrence against
crime, though only limited deterrence against a terrorist attack. To
minimize the risk and consequences of a residential terrorist attack,
some posts we visited limited the number of U.S. officials living in
specific apartment buildings. To provide greater protection against
terrorist attacks, some posts we visited used surveillance detection
teams in residential areas.
What GAO Recommends:
We are recommending that the Secretary of State develop a soft targets
strategy; develop counterterrorism training for officials; and fully
implement its personal security accountability system for embassy
officials. State generally agreed with our recommendations.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-642.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Jess T. Ford at (202) 512-
4128 or fordj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
State Has Not Developed a Strategy to Cover Soft Target Areas; Key
Issues Need to Be Resolved:
State Has Not Fully Implemented ARB Training and Accountability
Recommendations to Improve Security for Embassy Personnel:
State Develops Soft Targets Program for Schools but Scope Is Not Yet
Fully Defined:
Issues Related to the Protection of U.S. Officials and Their Families
at Residences against Terrorist Threats:
Conclusion:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of State:
GAO Comments:
Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
Figures:
Figure 1: Number of U.S. Officials Killed by Terrorist Attacks Outside
Embassies, 1968-2003:
Figure 2: Approximate Percentage of Posts by Terrorism Threat Levels:
Figure 3: Terrorist Attacks by Location Assessed by the Accountability
Review Boards, 1986-2004:
Figure 4: Security Courses Available to U.S. Officials and Family
Members:
Figure 5: New Public Address System Funded by the Soft Targets Program:
Figure 6: School Fence to Be Replaced under the Soft Targets Program:
Figure 7: Local Guard at Embassy Housing:
Abbreviations:
AFSA: American Foreign Service Association:
ARB: Accountability Review Board:
COM: chief of mission:
DCM: deputy chief of mission:
DS: Bureau of Diplomatic Security:
DSAC: Diplomatic Security Antiterrorism Course:
FAH: Foreign Affairs Handbook:
FAM: Foreign Affairs Manual:
OBO: Overseas Buildings Operations:
OSPB: Overseas Security Policy Board:
RSO: regional security officer:
SAFE: Serving Abroad for Families and Employees:
Letter May 9, 2005:
The Honorable Christopher Shays:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International
Relations:
Committee on Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
Dear Mr. Chairman:
U.S. government officials and their families living and working
overseas are at risk from terrorist threats. Since 1968, 32 embassy
officials have been attacked--23 fatally--by terrorists outside the
embassy (see fig. 1). As the State Department continues to improve
security at U.S. embassies, concerns are growing that terrorist groups
are likely to focus on "soft" targets--such as homes, schools, and
places of worship.[Footnote 1] Recent terrorist attacks against housing
complexes in Saudi Arabia, a school in Russia, and places of worship in
Turkey illustrate this growing threat. State-initiated security
assessments have further documented this growing concern and
recommended that State develop better measures to protect U.S.
officials and their families in soft target areas.[Footnote 2]
Figure 1: Number of U.S. Officials Killed by Terrorist Attacks Outside
Embassies, 1968-2003:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Because of the large number of U.S. officials and their families living
abroad that are potentially at risk, you requested that we evaluate
State's programs and efforts to protect them from terrorist attacks
while outside the embassy. You specifically asked us to determine
whether State has a strategy for soft target protection; assess State's
efforts to protect U.S. officials and their families against terrorist
attacks while traveling to and from work; assess State's efforts
overseas to improve security at schools attended by the children of
U.S. officials;[Footnote 3] and describe issues related to protection
at their residences.
To determine how the State Department protects U.S. officials and their
families while outside the embassy, we reviewed State documents,
interviewed State officials in Washington, D.C., and attended security
training and briefings available to State officials. In addition, we
interviewed several members of the Overseas Security Policy Board
(OSPB), an interagency consultative body that considers, develops,
coordinates, and promotes security policies, standards, and agreements
on overseas security programs that affect U.S. personnel at missions.
We also reviewed documents, conducted interviews, and held roundtable
discussions with State and other agency officials, including family
members, at five posts in four countries. Post selection was based on a
number of factors, including variety in post size and post terrorism
threat levels. For the purpose of this report, our focus on soft target
protection primarily pertains to U.S. government officials and their
families and other post personnel who fall under chief of mission
authority. To limit the scope of our review, we did not look at post
evacuations, or security advice or assistance provided through the
Overseas Security Advisory Council, the Antiterrorism Assistance
Program, and the consular warden system. Appendix I provides more
information on our scope and methodology. We conducted our evaluation
from March 2004 through February 2005 in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards.
Results in Brief:
State has a number of programs and activities designed to protect U.S.
officials and their families outside the embassy, including security
briefings, protection at schools and residences, and surveillance
detection (these programs are discussed in more detail later in this
report).[Footnote 4] However, State has not developed a comprehensive
strategy that clearly identifies safety and security requirements and
resources needed to protect U.S. officials and their families abroad
from terrorist threats outside the embassy. State officials raised a
number of challenges related to developing and implementing such a
strategy. According to State officials, they have recently initiated an
effort to develop a soft target strategy. As part of this effort, State
officials said they will need to address and resolve a number of legal
and financial issues.
State has not fully implemented one of the most important safeguards
against terrorist attacks while traveling to and from work--
counterterrorism training. Three State-initiated investigations into
terrorist attacks against U.S. officials found that, among other
things, the officials lacked the necessary hands-on training to help
counter the attack. In response, the investigations recommended that
State provide hands-on counterterrorism training and implement
accountability measures to ensure compliance with personal security
procedures. However, State has not fully implemented these
recommendations. It does not require counterterrorism training for U.S.
officials and their families at high-or critical-threat posts. In
addition, State has not fully implemented accountability procedures for
monitoring and promoting security procedures. According to State,
training has been hindered by limitations in funding and training
capacities. Further, State has asserted that implementing new
accountability procedures globally is a long-term process. Moreover,
State has not been training its ambassadors, deputy chiefs of mission,
and regional security officers on ways to effectively promote the use
of the personal security procedures.
State instituted a program in 2003 to improve security at schools, but
the scope has not yet been fully determined. In fiscal years 2003 and
2004, Congress earmarked $29.8 million for State to address security
vulnerabilities against soft targets, particularly at overseas schools.
To respond to this congressional concern, State developed a multiphase
program that provides basic security hardware to protect U.S. officials
and their families at schools and some off-compound employee
association facilities overseas from terrorist threats.[Footnote 5]
However, during our visits to five posts, regional security officers
were unclear about which schools qualified for security assistance
under phase three of the program, with some regional security officers
considering whether to fund schools in which just a few American
children were enrolled.
State's program to protect U.S. officials and their families at their
residences is designed primarily for crime, not terrorism. The
Residential Security program includes basic security hardware, such as
alarms, shatter-resistant window film, limited access control measures,
and local guards. As the crime threat increases, hardware and guard
services can be correspondingly increased at the residences. State
officials said that while the Residential Security program provides
effective deterrence against crime, it could provide only limited
deterrence against a terrorist attack. To minimize the risk and
consequences of a residential terrorist attack, some posts we visited
limited the number of U.S. officials living in specific apartment
buildings. To provide greater protection against terrorist attacks,
some posts we visited used surveillance detection teams in the
residential areas.
We are recommending that the Secretary of State, working with the
Overseas Security Policy Board, develop a comprehensive soft targets
strategy with OSPB standards that takes funding limitations, training,
and accountability into consideration; develop stronger
counterterrorism training requirements for officials going to high-and
critical-threat posts; and fully implement a personal security
accountability system for all embassy officials, including developing
related personal security standards for the Foreign Affairs Manual.
Background:
With the changing security environment and the emergence of terrorist
coalitions that operate across international borders, the threat of
terrorism against U.S. interests and personnel abroad has grown. Over
the past decades, and in particular in response to the 1998 embassy
bombings in Africa, the State Department has been hardening its
official facilities to protect its embassies, consulates, and personnel
abroad. However, as State hardened embassies, the American Foreign
Service Association (AFSA) raised concerns about the vulnerability of
soft targets.[Footnote 6]
Soft Targets, Size, and Scope of American Overseas Diplomatic Presence
Defined:
According to a State Department travel warning, State considers soft
targets to be places, including but not limited to, where Americans and
other westerners live, congregate, shop, or visit. This can include
hotels, clubs, restaurants, shopping centers, housing compounds, places
of worship, schools, or public recreation events. Travel routes of U.S.
government employees are also considered soft targets, based on their
vulnerability to terrorist attacks. The State Department is responsible
for protecting more than 60,000 government employees who work in
embassies and consulates abroad in 180 countries. These government
officials at approximately 260 posts represent a number of agencies
besides State--including the Departments of Agriculture, Defense,
Homeland Security, Justice, and the Treasury, the Internal Revenue
Service, and the United States Agency for International Development--
and all fall under chief of mission authority. State officials
indicated that only about one-third of officials at all posts are from
the State Department.
Entities Responsible for Protection of U.S. Officials and Their
Families Abroad:
The responsibilities for the protection of U.S. officials and their
families are defined in federal legislation and policies. Under the
Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, the
Department of State is given responsibility for the protection of U.S.
officials and their families overseas.[Footnote 7] The act directs the
Secretary of State to develop and implement policies and programs,
including funding levels and standards, to provide for the security of
U.S. government operations of a diplomatic nature and establishes
within State the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS). The mission of DS
is to provide a safe and secure environment for the conduct of U.S.
foreign policy. Within DS, there are a number of offices that address
and implement security policies and practices to protect facilities and
personnel at posts.[Footnote 8] At posts abroad, the chiefs of mission
are responsible for the protection of personnel and accompanying family
members at the missions.[Footnote 9] Additionally, regional security
officers (RSOs) administer all aspects of security programs at posts.
The RSOs' responsibilities include providing post officials and their
families with security briefings upon their arrival; designing and
implementing residential security and local guard programs; liaising
and coordinating with the host country law enforcement and U.S. private
sector communities to discuss threat issues; and offering security
advice and briefings to schools attended by dependents of U.S.
government officials.
The host nation is responsible for providing protection to diplomatic
personnel and missions, as established by the 1961 Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations.[Footnote 10] The convention states the host
country should take appropriate steps to protect missions, personnel,
and their families, including protecting the consular premises against
any intrusion, damage, or disturbances.
The Overseas Security Policy Board, which includes representatives from
19 U.S. intelligence, foreign affairs, and other agencies, is
responsible for considering, developing, coordinating, and promoting
security policies, standards, and agreements on overseas operations,
programs, and projects that affect U.S. government agencies under the
authority of the chief of mission. This responsibility includes
reviewing and issuing uniform guidance for residential security and
local guard programs based on threat levels. The Security Environment
Threat List, published semiannually by State, reflects the level of
threat at all posts in six threat categories, including crime,
political violence, and terrorism.[Footnote 11] Over 50 percent of all
posts fall under the terrorism threat ratings of critical or high (see
fig. 2).[Footnote 12] State, in consultation with representatives of
the board, develops security standards, based on threat levels, for
U.S. missions overseas.[Footnote 13]
Figure 2: Approximate Percentage of Posts by Terrorism Threat Levels:
[See PDF for image]
Note: Calculations are based on 260 posts abroad. Threat levels
indicated are for transnational terrorism.
[End of figure]
When a security-related incident occurs that involves serious injury or
loss of life or significant destruction of property at a U.S.
government mission abroad, State is required to convene an
Accountability Review Board (ARB). ARBs are composed of five
individuals, four appointed by the Secretary of State and one by the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Members investigate the
security incident and issue a report with recommendations to promote
and encourage improved security programs and practices. State is
required to report to Congress on actions it has taken in response to
ARB recommendations. As of March 2005, there have been 11
Accountability Review Boards convened since the board's establishment
in 1986.
Appropriations Subcommittee Urges State to Develop a Soft Target
Strategy:
The Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State and
the Judiciary, in its 2002 and subsequent reports, urged State to
formulate a strategy for addressing, in the short and long term,
threats to locales abroad that are frequented by U.S. officials and
their families. This included providing security enhancements for
locations that are affiliated with the United States by virtue of the
activities and the individuals they accommodate and therefore might be
soft targets. In a number of subsequent reports, the subcommittee has
focused its concern about soft targets on schools, residences, places
of worship, and other popular gathering places. In fiscal year 2003, a
total of $15 million was earmarked for soft target protection,
particularly to address security vulnerabilities at overseas
schools.[Footnote 14] Moreover, in fiscal year 2004, Congress earmarked
an additional $15 million for soft targets.[Footnote 15]
More recently, the fiscal year 2005 Senate Appropriations Subcommittee
report and the subsequent House Conference Report on fiscal year 2005
appropriations further stressed the need to protect these
areas.[Footnote 16] The language in the Senate appropriations report
directs State to develop a comprehensive, sustained strategy for
addressing the threats posed to soft targets. Specifically, the report
language specifies that a strategy should be submitted to the committee
no later than June 1, 2005. For fiscal year 2005, Congress earmarked
$15 million to secure and protect soft targets, of which $10 million is
for security at overseas schools attended by dependents of U.S.
government employees.
State Has Not Developed a Strategy to Cover Soft Target Areas; Key
Issues Need to Be Resolved:
State has a number of programs and activities designed to protect U.S.
officials and their families outside of the embassy, including security
briefings, protection at schools and residences, and surveillance
detection (these programs are discussed in more detail later in this
report). Despite these efforts, State has not developed a comprehensive
strategy that clearly identifies safety and security requirements and
resources needed to protect U.S. officials and their families from
terrorist threats outside the embassy. State officials raised a number
of challenges related to developing and implementing such a strategy.
They indicated they have recently initiated an effort to develop a soft
target strategy. As part of this effort, State officials said they will
need to address and resolve a number of legal and financial issues.
State Cites Limitations in Developing a Soft Target Strategy:
State has not developed a comprehensive soft target strategy to protect
U.S. officials and their families from terrorist threats outside the
embassy. A comprehensive strategy would focus on protection of U.S.
officials and thief families in areas where they congregate, such as
schools, residences, places of worship, and other popular gathering
spots.
However, in a number of meetings, State officials cited several complex
issues involved with protecting soft targets and raised concerns about
the broader implications of developing such a strategy. DS officials
told us that the mission and responsibilities of DS continue to grow
and become more complex, and they questioned how far State's protection
of soft targets should extend. They said that providing U.S. government
funds to protect U.S. officials and their families at private sector
locations or to places of worship was unprecedented and raised a number
of legal and financial challenges, including sovereignty and separation
of church and state, that have not been resolved by the department.
They also told us that specific authorization language would be needed
to move beyond a State program that currently focuses on providing
security upgrades to schools and off-compound employee association
facilities abroad. State officials also indicated they have not yet
fully defined the universe of soft targets--including taking an
inventory of potentially vulnerable facilities and areas where U.S.
officials and their families congregate--that would be necessary to
complete a strategy.
Although State has not developed a comprehensive soft target strategy,
some State officials told us that several existing programs could help
protect soft targets. However, they agreed that these existing programs
are not tied together in an overall strategy. State officials agreed
that they should undertake a formal evaluation of how existing programs
can be more effectively integrated as part of a soft target strategy,
and whether new programs might be needed to fill any potential gaps.
A senior DS official told us that in January 2005, DS formed a working
group to discuss and develop a comprehensive soft targets strategy to
address the appropriate level of protection of U.S. officials and their
families at schools, residences, and other areas outside the embassy.
According to the DS official, the strategy should be completed and
provided to the Senate Appropriations Committee by June 1, 2005.
State Has Not Fully Implemented ARB Training and Accountability
Recommendations to Improve Security for Embassy Personnel:
Investigations into terrorist attacks against U.S. officials found
that, among other things, the officials lacked the necessary hands-on
training to help counter the attacks. The ARBs recommended that State
provide hands-on counterterrorism training to help post officials
identify terrorist surveillance and quickly respond to an impending
attack. They also recommended State implement an accountability system
to reduce complacency about following these procedures. After each
investigation, State told Congress it would implement these
recommendations, yet we found that State's hands-on training course is
still not mandatory for all personnel going to posts, and procedures to
monitor compliance with security requirements have not been fully
implemented. According to State, training has been hindered by
limitations in funding and training capacities, and implementing new
accountability procedures globally is a long-term process. We also
found that ambassadors, deputy chiefs of mission, and RSOs were not
trained in how to implement embassy procedures intended to protect U.S.
officials outside the embassies.
Investigations Identify Key Vulnerability, Recommend Training and
Accountability Safeguards:
Five of the 11 ARB investigations have focused on attacks of U.S.
officials on their way to work (see fig. 3): (1) the June 1988
assassination of a post official in Greece, (2) the April 1989
assassination of a post official in the Philippines, (3) the March 1995
assassination of two post officials in Pakistan, (4) the October 2002
assassination of a post official in Jordan, and (5) the October 2003
assassination in Gaza of three post contractors from Israel.[Footnote
17]
Figure 3: Terrorist Attacks by Location Assessed by the Accountability
Review Boards, 1986-2004:
[See PDF for image]
Note: Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding.
[End of figure]
Several of these ARBs recommended that State provide better training,
indicating that security briefings were not sufficient to identify
preoperational surveillance by terrorists, or to escape the attack once
under way. In addition, several ARBs found that State lacked monitoring
or accountability mechanisms to ensure that U.S. officials complied
with personal security measures. For example, a recent ARB recommended
that supervisors at all levels monitor their subordinates'
implementation of these countermeasures.
State Agreed to Implement ARB Recommendations in Reports to Congress,
but Implementation Is Incomplete:
Although State agreed with the ARB's recommendations and reported to
Congress that it planned to implement them, many have yet to be fully
implemented.[Footnote 18] For example, State's hands-on training
course, which teaches surveillance detection and counterterrorism
driving skills, is still not required and has been taken by relatively
few State Department officials and their families. State provided posts
with some additional guidance to improve accountability, such as making
personal security mandatory and holding managers responsible for the
"reasonable" oversight of their staff's personal security practices,
but we found implementation in the field to be incomplete. Furthermore,
there are no monitoring mechanisms to determine if post officials are
following the new security procedures.
Despite State Agreement that Counterterrorism Training Is Needed, It Is
Still Not Required:
State reported to Congress that it agreed with the ARB recommendations
to provide counterterrorism training. Specifically, in 1988, it
reported that it "agreed with the general thrust of the
recommendations" to provide hands-on training and refresher courses. In
1995, State reported that it "re-established the Diplomatic Security
Antiterrorism Course (DSAC) for those going to critical-threat posts to
teach surveillance detection and avoidance, and defensive and evasive
driving techniques." In 2003, State reported it agreed with the
recommendations that employees from all agencies should receive
security briefings and indicated that it would use the OSPB to review
the adequacy of its training and other personal security
measures.[Footnote 19]
State implemented the board's recommendation to require security
briefings for all staff. In December 2003, the OSPB members agreed that
predeparture security briefings should be mandatory for all officials
planning to work at posts abroad. On March 23, 2004, State notified
posts worldwide that, starting June 1, 2004, personal security
briefings would be required for all U.S. personnel working at posts.
State has required that its officials attend predeparture security
briefings, such as Serving Abroad for Families and Employees, since
1987.[Footnote 20] The briefing covers a variety of post-related
issues, including alcoholism, fires, crime, sexual assaults, and
terrorist surveillance. Once officials arrive at their posts, they
receive country-specific security briefings by the RSO. In addition,
RSOs can provide threat-specific security briefings on a case-by-case
basis. Family members are strongly encouraged to attend both
predeparture and post security briefings. Figure 4 provides additional
information on security briefing and training available to U.S.
officials and their families.
Figure 4: Security Courses Available to U.S. Officials and Family
Members:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
However, few officials or family members working at embassies have
taken DSAC. State offers DSAC as an elective to post officials and
spouses going to high-and critical-threat posts. State does not track
the number of officials who have taken DSAC; thus it is not clear how
many officials have received this training. State officials estimate
that 10 percent to 15 percent of department officials have taken the
course, and this appears consistent with our findings at the five posts
we visited. DSAC consists of 2 days of surveillance detection training,
2 days of counterterrorism driving, and 1 day of emergency medical
training.
During our visits to five posts, we found significant disparities in
the levels of security briefings and training of post personnel. We
held a variety of round-table discussions at each of the five posts we
visited, including with senior and junior State Department officials,
non-State officials, and officials from the law enforcement,
intelligence, and defense communities. We found that post officials
from law enforcement, intelligence, and defense communities had
generally received rigorous hands-on training in areas such as
surveillance detection, counterterrorism driving, emergency medical
procedures, and weapons handling. Officials who had completed DSAC-type
training agreed that hands-on training was needed to give people the
skills and confidence to identify and respond to terrorist threats. In
contrast, relatively few other officials, including those from State,
had received DSAC-type counterterrorism training. For example, we found
that roughly 10 percent of State Department officials indicated they
had taken hands-on training; the figure was even smaller for other
employees. Officials gave several reasons for not attending DSAC: they
were not aware the course was offered, did not believe they were
eligible, or were under pressure to quickly transfer to their new
posts. They also told us that the course often conflicted with other
training offered by State.
Senior DS officials said they recognize that security briefings, like
Serving Abroad for Families and Employees, are no longer adequate to
protect against current terrorist threats. In response, DS developed a
proposal in June 2004 to make DSAC training mandatory. The proposal
would provide training, at an estimated cost of about $3.6 million, to
about 775 officials, including 95 eligible family members, from all
agencies working at critical-threat posts. DS officials said that DSAC
training should also be required for all officials, but that issues
related to costs, adequacy of training facilities, and the ability to
obtain Overseas Security Policy Board agreement were constraining
factors. As of April 18, 2005, the proposal had not been approved.
Accountability Mechanism Still Not in Place to Promote Compliance with
Personal Security Guidelines:
Although State has agreed on the need to implement an accountability
system to promote compliance with personal security procedures since
1988, there is still no system in place to ensure that post-related
personnel are following personal security practices. Despite ARB
recommendations to implement accountability mechanisms for personal
security, it remains State's position that security outside the post is
primarily a personal responsibility. As a result, there is no way to
determine if post officials are following prescribed security
guidelines. Beginning in 2003, State has tried to incorporate some
limited accountability to promote compliance. However, based on our
work at five posts, we found that post officials are not following many
of these new procedures.
In response to the 2003 ARB, State took a number of steps to improve
compliance with State's personal security procedures for officials
outside the embassy, including the following:
* In June 2003, State revised its annual assessment criteria, known as
the core precepts, so that rating and reviewing officials could take
personal security into account when preparing performance appraisals.
Posts were notified of this new requirement on July 30, 2003.
* On December 23, 2003, State made a number of revisions to its Foreign
Affairs Manual (FAM), such as stating that employees should implement
personal security practices.
* On May 28, 2004, State notified posts worldwide on use of a Personal
Security Self-Assessment Checklist.
However, none of the posts we visited were even aware of these key
policy changes. For example, none of the officials we met with,
including ambassadors, DCMs, RSOs, or staff, were aware that the annual
ratings process now includes an assessment of whether staff are
following the personal security measures or that managers are now
responsible for the reasonable oversight of subordinates' personal
security activities. Furthermore, none of the supervisors were aware of
the checklist, and we found no one was using the checklists to improve
their personal security practices.
Furthermore, State's original plan, to use the checklist as an
accountability mechanism, was dropped before it was implemented. In its
June 2003 report to Congress on implementation of the 2003 ARB
recommendations, State stipulated that staff would be required to use
the checklist periodically and that managers would review the
checklists to ensure compliance. However, State never implemented this
accountability mechanism. According to State officials, they dropped
the accountability features out of concern that the review would be too
time consuming.
We found that State had not issued any guidance on how these new
policies and practices should be implemented or monitored. For example,
the Foreign Affairs Manual does not specify how managers are to provide
for the "reasonable" oversight of their staff's personal security
practices or how to provide for compliance and oversight. As a result,
post staff were not sure how these new policies should be implemented.
In addition, RSOs lacked guidance on how to promote these new policies.
RSOs and supervisors stated that they have no responsibility or
authority to monitor post employees for compliance with the new
security policies, and the officials we spoke with at five posts said
they did not have, and did not want, this responsibility.
In discussing our preliminary findings with DS officials, they noted a
range of challenges associated with improving security for officials
outside the post. State's primary focus has been, and will continue to
be, protecting U.S. officials inside the post since posts are
considered higher value targets symbolically and because of the
potential for mass casualties. In explaining why posts were not aware
of the new personal security regulations, DS officials noted that posts
were often overwhelmed by work and may have simply missed the cables
and changes in the Foreign Affairs Manual. They also noted that changes
like this take time to be implemented globally.
Nonetheless, improving security outside the embassy is critical and,
according to a number of State officials, improvements in this area
must start with the ambassador and the deputy chief of mission. Yet we
noted that they, along with the RSOs, were not trained in how best to
provide such security before going to post. For example, based on our
observations at the training courses and a review of the course
material, the ambassador, deputy chief of mission, and RSO training
courses did not address how State's personal security guidelines can be
best promoted. The instructors and DS officials agreed that this
critical component should be added to their training curriculum.
State Develops Soft Targets Program for Schools but Scope Is Not Yet
Fully Defined:
In response to congressional direction and funding, State, in 2003,
began developing a multiphase Soft Targets program that provides basic
security hardware to protect U.S. officials and their families at
schools and some off-compound employee association facilities.[Footnote
21] However, we found that the scope of the program is not yet fully
defined, including the criteria for school selection.
State Initiates Multiphase Program to Primarily Protect Schools:
In response to direction in both the House Conference report and Senate
Appropriations Subcommittee report, State addressed the issue of
providing security enhancements to overseas schools attended by
dependents of U.S. officials and American citizens. In 2003, State
began developing a plan, known as the Soft Targets program, to expand
security for overseas schools to protect against terrorism.
Specifically, State's Office of Overseas Schools, Overseas Buildings
Operations, and DS have been working together on the program. The
program has four proposed phases. The first two phases focused on
department-sponsored schools that have previously received grant
funding from the State Department.[Footnote 22] In phase one of the
program, department-sponsored schools were offered funding for basic
security hardware such as shatter-resistant window film, two-way radios
for communication between the school and the embassy or consulate, and
public address systems (see fig. 7). As of November 19, 2004, 189
department-sponsored schools had received $10.5 million in funding for
security equipment in phase one of the program.
Figure 5: New Public Address System Funded by the Soft Targets Program:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The second phase of the program addresses any additional security
enhancements that department-sponsored schools could benefit from and
takes into consideration the local threat level, the nature of the
vulnerability and measures required to correct the deficiency, and the
percentage of U.S. government dependent students in the school. Schools
have requested funding for security enhancements such as perimeter
fencing, walls, lighting, gates, and guard booths (see fig. 8). As of
November, 2004, State has obligated over $15 million in funding for
department-sponsored schools for phase two security upgrades.
Figure 6: School Fence to Be Replaced under the Soft Targets Program:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Phase three of the program plans to address security enhancement needs
of nondepartment-sponsored schools overseas attended by dependents of
U.S. government officials or U.S. citizens. This phase provides funding
for phase one enhancements such as the shatter-resistant window film,
radios, and public address systems. State plans to implement the fourth
phase of the Soft Targets program to include phase two enhancements for
nondepartment-sponsored schools overseas that qualify.
Within the Soft Targets program, State also has focused on enhancing
the security for embassy and consulate employee associations that have
facilities off-compound, such as recreation centers. The Bureau of
Overseas Buildings Operations has been collecting data on the security
needs of these facilities to determine the type of security equipment
or upgrades that would be most beneficial. The facilities, working with
the RSO at post, have been asked to identify physical security
vulnerabilities that could be exploited by terrorists. As of September
2004, 24 of the 34 posts with off-compound employee association
facilities had requested a total of $1.3 million in security upgrades,
which includes funding for perimeter walls and shatter-resistant window
film. In fiscal year 2004, almost $1 million was obligated by State for
security enhancements at off-compound employee association facilities.
Full Scope of School Program Not Yet Determined:
RSOs said that identifying and providing funding for security
enhancements at department-sponsored schools for phase one and phase
two security enhancements were straightforward because of the pre-
existing relationship with these schools. However, they said it has
been difficult to identify nondepartment-sponsored schools for phase
three of the program. Some RSOs told us they were not sure about the
criteria for approaching nondepartment-sponsored schools in phase three
and were seeking guidance from headquarters on this issue. For example,
some RSOs were not sure what the minimum number of American students
attending a school needed to be for the school to be eligible to
receive grant money for security upgrades. Some RSOs at the posts we
visited were considering offering funding to schools with as few as one
to five American students. Moreover, one RSO was seeking guidance on
what constitutes a school and questioned whether informal facilities
attended by children of U.S. missionaries could qualify for the
program.
State officials told us they sent cables to posts in the summer of 2004
with more detailed information on school selection. They explained that
they have asked RSOs to gather data on nondepartment-sponsored schools
attended by American students, particularly U.S. government dependents.
State officials from DS and the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations
(OBO) acknowledged that the process of gathering data has been
difficult since there are hundreds of such schools worldwide. According
to an OBO official, as of December 2004, only about 81 out of the more
than 250 posts have provided responses regarding such schools. OBO
officials stated they will use the data to develop criteria for which
schools might be eligible for funding under phase three and,
eventually, phase four of the program. In anticipation of any future
phases of the Soft Targets program, OBO officials further explained
they have also asked RSOs to identify other facilities and areas that
Americans frequent, beyond schools and off-compound employee
association facilities, that may be vulnerable against a terrorist
attack.
Issues Related to the Protection of U.S. Officials and Their Families
at Residences against Terrorist Threats:
State's primary program in place to protect U.S. officials and their
families at their residences, the Residential Security program, is
principally designed to deter crime, not terrorism. The program
includes basic security hardware and guard service; as the threat
increases, the hardware and guard services can be correspondingly
increased at the residences. State officials said that while the
Residential Security program, augmented by the local guard program,
provides effective deterrence against crime, it could provide limited
or no deterrence against a terrorist attack. To provide greater
protection against terrorist attacks, some posts we visited used
surveillance detection teams in residential areas, despite guidance
that limits their use primarily to the embassy.
Residential Security and Local Guard Programs Tied to Crime Levels:
State has a responsibility for providing a secure housing environment
for U.S. officials and their families overseas. Housing options could
include single-family dwellings, apartments, and compound and clustered
housing.[Footnote 23] Each post is responsible for designing and
implementing its Residential Security program based on factors that
include host country law enforcement capabilities, the post-specific
threat environment, and available funding. The Residential Security
program includes basic security hardware, such as alarms, shatter-
resistant window film, access control measures, and local guards. As
the threat increases, hardware and guard services can be
correspondingly increased at the residences. The standards used to
determine the minimum acceptable level of residential security
protection are guided by threat ratings established in the Security
Environment Threat List. For the Residential Security program, DS uses
the standards for the threat rating categories of political violence
and crime, though not for terrorism. Standards for residential security
also differ depending on the types of residences.
Security at the residences can be augmented by the use of local guards.
Local guard functions vary by threat ratings for crime and political
violence and by the type of residence protected. The local guard
program for residential security may include mobile patrols, quick
reaction forces, and stationary guards. Figure 9 provides an
illustration of a stationary guard at a residence. The mobile patrols
are assigned responsibility for visiting residences periodically, and
respond to alarms at residences or when emergencies arise. All posts we
visited utilized local guards for some aspect of residential security;
some posts, due to the higher threat levels, had more comprehensive
local guard coverage than others. For example, all posts we visited had
mobile patrols for residential neighborhoods, while only two posts had
stationary guards at residential housing. Moreover, some posts with
mostly apartment housing had a guard or doorman stationed at the
entrance of the building to provide a first line of security, primarily
against crime.
Figure 7: Local Guard at Embassy Housing:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Post officials, including RSOs, told us that the Residential Security
program provides effective deterrence against crime and could provide
some deterrence against a terrorist attack, though State officials felt
it could provide little or no deterrence against a terrorist attack.
State and post officials indicated that the biggest concern at
residences, when considering the type of security to implement, has
been the threat from crime.
However, as the threat environment has changed and terrorists have
changed tactics from kidnapping to detonating car bombs outside of
residences, some posts have changed their housing profile. Some posts
we visited limited the number of U.S. officials living in specific
apartments or neighborhoods to minimize the risk and consequences of a
residential terrorist attack. For example, post management at two of
the posts we visited have decided to limit the number of Americans in
apartment housing to 25 percent of the entire building population to
minimize the impact of a car bomb detonated outside residential
housing. Some senior DS officials told us that the best residential
scenario for posts is to have a variety of housing options, including
apartments and single-family homes. By having a mix of housing options,
post officials are dispersed, reducing the number of potential targets.
Use of Surveillance Detection Program at Residences:
To provide greater protection against terrorist attacks, most posts we
visited used surveillance detection teams in the residential areas. The
Surveillance Detection program was implemented in response to the U.S.
Embassy bombings in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The
mission of the program is to enhance the ability of all posts to detect
preoperational terrorist surveillance directed against primary
diplomatic facilities, such as the embassy. According to State's
Surveillance Detection Operations Field Guide and the Foreign Affairs
Handbook, surveillance detection units can be used to cover other
facilities, such as off-compound employee association facilities and
residences, only if there is a specific threat directed against such
areas.[Footnote 24] In addition, surveillance detection can be used to
cover large official functions.
At many of the posts we visited, the RSOs were routinely utilizing
surveillance detection units to cover areas outside key embassy
facilities, such as residences, school bus stops and routes, and
schools where U.S. embassy dependents attend. RSOs told us that the
Surveillance Detection program is instrumental in providing deterrence
against potential terrorist attacks. Furthermore, some RSOs told us
that the use of surveillance detection at school bus stops and outside
schools provides a sense of comfort for post officials and their
spouses who have dependents in international or American schools.
During our post visits, some RSOs argued that the current program
guidelines are too restrictive and that State should allow flexibility
in using surveillance detection for areas outside the embassy deemed
appropriate by the RSO.[Footnote 25] Senior State officials told us,
while the use of the surveillance detection in soft target areas could
be beneficial, the program is labor intensive and expensive and any
expansion of the program could require significant funding.
Conclusion:
The State Department is responsible for protecting more then 60,000
employees and their families who work overseas. Recent terrorist
attacks and threats have heightened demands that State provide adequate
safety and security outside embassy compounds. We found that State has
not yet developed a strategy addressing the appropriate level of
protection needed for schools, places of worship, and private sector
recreation facilities where employees and families tend to congregate.
State officials are concerned about the feasibility and costs
associated with providing protection for these "soft targets."
Prior investigations into attacks against U.S. officials have resulted
in recommendations that State implement improvements to protect U.S.
officials against terrorist attacks. However, our analysis indicated
that State has not fully implemented several of these recommendations
related to training and accountability mechanisms designed to improve
personal safety. Overall, we believe State should develop a strategy to
protect U.S. officials and their families, and as part of this effort,
undertake an assessment of the level of protection to be afforded to
officials and their families while commuting, and at residences,
schools, and other community-based facilities. We also believe that
State should provide adequate counterterrorism training and fully
implement its accountability mechanisms to afford greater awareness and
implementation of security safeguards for U.S. officials and their
family members while outside the embassy compounds.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
We recommend that the Secretary of State, working with the Overseas
Security Policy Board, take the following 11 actions:
* Include in the current development of a comprehensive soft target
strategy information that (1) determines the extent of State's
responsibilities for providing security to U.S. officials and their
families outside the embassy; (2) addresses the legal and financial
ramifications of funding security improvements to schools, places of
worship, and the private sector; (3) develops programs and activities
with FAM standards and guidelines to provide protection for those areas
for which State is deemed responsible for; and (4) integrates into the
embassy emergency action plan elements of the soft targets program.
* Mandate counterterrorism training and prioritize which posts,
officials, and family members should receive counterterrorism training
first; track attendance to determine compliance with this new training
requirement; and add a "soft target protection" training module to the
ambassadorial, deputy chief of mission, and RSO training to promote the
security of U.S. officials and their families outside the embassy.
* Fully implement the personal security accountability system that
State agreed to implement in response to the 2003 ARB for all embassy
officials, and develop related accountability standards for the Foreign
Affairs Manual that can be used to monitor compliance.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
The Department of State provided written comments on a draft of this
report (see app. II). State generally agreed with most of our report
recommendations and said it would examine the others. Specifically,
State agreed to incorporate a soft target training module into RSO
training, and stated that the department would ensure that similar
training be developed and added to the ambassadorial and deputy chief
of mission training to promote the security of U.S. officials and their
families outside the embassy. The department also agreed to track
attendance with the counterterrorism training course if it becomes a
requirement, and noted that, as of March 2005, all diplomatic security
courses are now tracked for enrollment and attendance. With regard to
the recommendation to fully implement the personal security
accountability system, State agreed to reiterate, through additional
notifications and guidance, the accountability requirements and other
tools available to improve personal security. Regarding our
recommendation that State develop a comprehensive strategy, State
indicated that it was prepared to examine, in conjunction with the
OSBP, the contents and recommendations of the report as they relate to
their security programs, but did not indicate whether they would
incorporate any of the specific elements of the recommendations into
its new soft targets security strategy.
State expressed concern that our draft report mischaracterized the
department's responsibility to protect Americans living abroad, and
implied that State was responsible for providing these Americans a
similar level of protection provided to diplomats and their families.
We have clarified the scope and methodology and text of the report to
focus on State's roles and responsibilities to protect U.S. diplomats
and their families, and have deleted references to how State provides
safety and security support to U.S. citizens abroad.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 1 day
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report
to interested congressional committees and to the Secretary of State.
We will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition,
the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-4268 or at [Hyperlink, fordj@gao.gov]. Another
contact and staff acknowledgments are listed in appendix III.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Jess T. Ford:
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
[End of section]
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To determine how the State Department protects U.S. officials and their
families while outside the embassy, we reviewed State documents and
conducted interviews with State officials in Washington, D.C. In
addition, we reviewed documents, conducted interviews, and held
roundtable discussions with State and other agency officials at four
U.S. embassies and one consulate overseas. In Washington, D.C., we
reviewed the Diplomatic Security sections of State's Foreign Affairs
Manual and Foreign Affairs Handbook and read numerous State cables
pertaining to personal security and other security practices. In
addition, we reviewed eight Accountability Review Board (ARB) reports
and State's responses to Congress based on these ARBs, and met with the
Chairman of the Amman, Jordan ARB. We interviewed officials from a
number of State bureaus and offices. We met with officials from State's
Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS), including officials from the Office
of International Programs, Office of Facility Protection Operations,
Office of Physical Security Programs, Office of Intelligence and Threat
Analysis, Office of Regional Directors, Office of Countermeasures, and
DS Training. We also met with officials from State's Bureau of Overseas
Buildings Operations, Office of Management Policy, Office of Overseas
Schools, Office of Commissary and Recreation Affairs, Foreign Service
Institute, and Office of the Inspector General. Moreover, we met with
representatives of the Overseas Security Policy Board. To better
understand the support for the Soft Targets program, we met with
executive members of the American Foreign Service Association and also
reviewed a number of congressional reports that mention the protection
of soft targets.
To obtain firsthand experience of security and antiterrorism training
available to State and non-State personnel, we attended a number of
training courses and briefings. We attended the 2-day Security Overseas
Seminar, the 5-day Diplomatic Security Antiterrorism Course, and
Regional Security Officer security in-briefings at posts we visited. We
also attended sections of the Ambassadorial Seminar and the Regional
Security Officer Training to better understand how the issue of
protecting U.S. officials and their families outside the embassy was
addressed.
We conducted fieldwork at five posts--four embassies and one consulate-
-in four countries.[Footnote 26] We chose the posts based on a number
of factors, including variety in post size and post terrorism threat
levels. At each of the posts, we generally met with the Ambassador, the
Deputy Chief of Mission, DS and other State officials, and post
officials representing other U.S. government agencies, including
personnel from the law enforcement, intelligence, and defense
communities. We also held roundtables, at all posts, with State and non-
State officials as well as spouses of post officials, to obtain
information on their security awareness and training. At most of the
posts we visited, we met with representatives of the post's Emergency
Action Committee and the host nation police. In addition, we met with
representatives of the Overseas Security Advisory Council at some
posts. To better understand the Soft Targets program, we met with
school officials at American or international schools in each country.
Finally, we observed residential security measures at post housing at
each post we visited.
To assess the reliability of the funding data for the Soft Targets
Program, we asked State officials to respond to a standard set of data
reliability questions. Based on their responses and follow up
discussions, we determined that the data used in the report for Soft
Targets funding is sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this
report.
Our focus on soft target protection pertains primarily to U.S.
government officials and their families and other post personnel who
fall under chief of mission authority and not to the entire American
community abroad. To limit the scope of our review, we did not assess
the security advice or assistance provided through the Overseas
Security Advisory Council, the Antiterrorism Assistance Program, the
consular warden system, or evacuations. We also did not undertake a
comprehensive review of residential housing to determine which
residential option provides the most effective deterrent against
terrorist attacks.
We conducted our work from March 2004 through February 2005 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of State:
United States Department of State:
Assistant Secretary and Chief Financial Officer:
Washington, D.C. 20520:
Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers:
Managing Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001:
Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers:
We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "OVERSEAS
SECURITY: State Department Has Not Fully Implemented Key Measures to
Protect U.S. Officials from Terrorist Attacks Outside of Embassies,"
GAO Job Code 320214.
The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.
If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact Lisa
Goodale, Program Analyst, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, at (571) 345-
2742.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Eric Hembree (Acting):
cc: GAO-Diana Glod;
DS-Greg Starr;
State/OIG-Mark Duda:
Department of State Comments on the Government Accountability Office
Draft Report OVERSEAS SECURITY: State Department Has Not Fully
Implemented Key Measures to Protect U.S. Officials from Terrorist
Attacks Outside of Embassies (GAO-05-386, GAO Code 320214):
The Department of State (DOS) thanks the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) for the opportunity to respond to their draft report,
resulting from the January 23, 2004 notification to review our programs
to protect U.S. officials outside embassy compounds.
We are concerned that the report rests on fundamental misconceptions
about the Department's authorities and responsibilities insofar as it
defines "soft targets", and refers to protection of "other Americans".
The inclusion of "other Americans" in the report language is not within
the stated scope of GAO's review, nor is the problem of safety of U.S.
citizens abroad in any way a similar problem. By law, DOS is
responsible for the protection of all United States Government
personnel on official duty abroad (other than Voice of America
Correspondents on official assignment and those personnel under the
command of the United States area military commander) and their
accompanying dependents. The report fails to recognize that the
Department has no authority or capacity similarly to protect private
U.S. citizens traveling or residing in foreign sovereign countries.
Such a mandate, moreover, would neither be feasible nor appropriate.
The protection of U.S. officials in dangerous environments relies
fundamentally on restriction of such personnel-specifying where they
live, where they work, how and where they travel, and ultimately
whether they remain in country at all. It would be wholly inappropriate
to impose similar restrictions on U.S. citizens abroad. Protection of
facilities, moreover, similarly involves not only considerable expense
but also significant restrictions on the location and construction of
such facilities, as well as detailed technical specifications, which
could not be similarly imposed on private facilities, even if the USG
were able. to fund the massive expense involved. This is not to say
that the Department of State is not concerned with the safety and well-
being of U.S. citizens abroad-to the contrary, this is a major focus
of attention. However, it is simply not possible to analogize the two
situations in approaching the problem of "soft targets". An assessment
of "soft targets" strategy and approach cannot use the Department's
programs for U.S. facilities and personnel security as a model or point
of departure.
The report says the "State Department defines soft targets to include
places where Americans and other Westerners live, congregate, shop or
visit, including hotels, clubs, restaurants, shopping centers,
identifiable Western businesses, housing compounds, transportation
systems, places of worship, schools, or public recreation events." The
Department has not established a definition for soft targets at this
time. The report's scope is built around this presumed definition and
it is on this basis that conclusions are made that the Department has
no comprehensive strategy. A narrower definition of soft targets
currently being addressed by the Department could dramatically change
that conclusion. If the report is relying on. the Appropriations
Subcommittee's direction on soft. targets, it should be made clear. The
Department is mindful of Congressional views on soft targets, and will
take these into consideration during continued development of a
comprehensive strategy for addressing the problem of soft targets, due
to the Senate Appropriations Committee in June.
The Department has, and long had, a security strategy for the
protection of U.S. Officials under the authority of the Chief of
Mission and their families outside embassy compounds. This includes a
number of robust and layered counterterrorism and physical and
technical security programs to address the threat of terrorist attacks.
The term "soft target" itself may be new to the lexicon of the
Department, but the meaning and programs designed to deter this threat
is not. We have long recognized that the threat of terrorist attacks is
much broader than the targeting of our embassies and consulates. A soft
target policy, however, must be flexible and evolving to meet the
unpredictability of global threats.
The vast majority of the Department's global security mission
originated from the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act
of 1986, as amended following the East Africa bombing in 1998. Numerous
Department programs for security upgrades to our diplomatic facilities
worldwide were established and funded, in large part due to this
legislation.
Historically, most actual attacks and threats trend significantly
toward our official facilities. A 1 Queda and its associated splinter
groups have favored soft targets when other hardened assets have proven
to be unattainable. Well before this terrorist threat, we designed
programs overseas to protect, inform, and educate U.S. officials, their
family members, and private American citizens. These programs cut
across many Department elements and continue to be refined to address
today's global threat against U.S. interests. They are inclusive of all
foreign affairs agencies under the authority of the Chief of Mission
and include our threat information sharing partnership with the
intelligence community.
The terror threat against our people and facilities remains high. Our
Government has rolled out a robust strategy to root out terror and the
sources of terror wherever it has taken hold. Our diplomats are in the
front lines of this fight, and the Department, our overseas missions
and the intelligence community continuously evaluate threat information
--to include threats against soft targets. In our report to the Senate
Appropriations Committee, we will outline the Department's ongoing
strategy for protecting U.S. officials and their families against soft
targets, as well as our broader efforts with respect to American
citizens abroad.
* Comments by Page number:
Page 1, paragraph 1:
"State has a number of programs and activities designed to protect U.S.
officials and their families outside of the embassy, including security
briefings, protection at schools and residences, and surveillance
detection. However, State has not developed a comprehensive strategy
that clearly identifies safety, and security requirements and resources
needed to protect U.S. official, their families, or other Americans
abroad from terrorist threats outside the embassy."
* As written, this paragraph is incorrect. The exclusion of "under the
authority of the Chief of Mission" and inclusion of "other Americans"
here and throughout the draft report (pages 4, 10, 11, 31 and 32) is
inconsistent with Appendix 1: Scope and Methodology which states:
"Our focus on soft target protection pertains only to U.S. government
officials and their families and other post personnel who fall under
Chief of Mission authority and not to the entire American community
abroad. To limit the scope of our review, we did not look at security
advice or assistance provided through the Overseas Security Advisory
Council, the Antiterrorism Assistance Program, the consular warden
system, or evacuations. We also did not undertake a comprehensive
review of residential housing to determine which residential option
provides the most effective deterrent against terrorist attacks."
The GAO review expressly does not include Department programs such as
the Overseas Security Advisory Council which advises the American'
private sector on security issues abroad; the Antiterrorism Assistance
Program which provides training and equipment to foreign law
enforcement and civilian security organizations to enhance
antiterrorism skills and abilities; consular efforts such as warnings
and advisories and the consular warden system which assists U.S.
citizens residing or traveling overseas; or evacuations.
Page 1, paragraph 3:
"However, during our visits to posts, regional security officers were
unclear about which schools could qualify for security assistance."
* This sentence incorrect as written. Phases I and II of the overseas
schools program offered grants for security enhancements to the 189
schools that had a pre-existing grant relationship with the Department.
Phase III is for schools enrolling U.S. citizens but which do not have
a pre-existing grant relationship with the Department. Participation by
grant and non-grant schools is voluntary.
The Department's Soft Targets Working Group (STWG) has not yet drawn
precise lines for which schools qualify under Phase III. The STWG asked
posts for information about non-grant schools to understand the
universe of potential recipients and determine priorities on the basis
of good data, not intuition. Without data, the STWG cannot thoughtfully
answer the question of who should receive funding. Regional Security
Officers (RSO) were asked to provide comprehensive security
vulnerability data for off-compound facilities, not just data on
schools they think should be eligible.
Page 2, Letter to Chairman Shays:
This paragraph does not clearly state the findings of the Inman Report
and the 1999 Overseas Presence Advisory Panel (OPAP) Report. With
regard to overseas security, these reports focused on the security of
overseas personnel (one of the primary target areas of the GAO study),
and the need for enhanced physical security at U.S. embassy and
consulate facilities. The reports also discussed residential security
for USG employees, and the human report briefly discussed security of
U.S. citizens abroad, making no recommendations. Because schools and
places of worship are mentioned in this paragraph as soft targets, a
reader might think that the Inman and OPAP Reports discussed security
at schools and churches, which they did not. This issue ties into the
definition of soft targets that has been provided in Appropriations
Subcommittee report language, and not by the Department.
Page 2, Footnote 1:
"State Department defines soft targets to include places where
Americans and other Westerners live, congregate, shop or visit,
including hotels, clubs, restaurants, shopping centers, identifiable
Western businesses, housing compounds, transportation systems, places
of worship, schools, or public recreation events."
* The Department has not established a definition for soft targets at
this time.
Page 3:
"You specifically asked us to determine whether State has a strategy
for soft target protection; assess State's efforts to protect U.S.
officials and their families against terrorist attacks while traveling
to and from work; assess State's efforts overseas to improve security
at schools attended by Americans; and describe issues related to
protection at their residences."
* We believe this sentence misstates the request from the Honorable
Christopher Shays, Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security,
Emerging Threats, and International Relations in his December 12, 2003
letter to the Honorable David M. Walker, Comptroller General which
stated, "Specifically, we ask that you address the following questions:
1. What are the Department of States' responsibilities and plans for
protecting U.S. officials living and traveling abroad?
2. How is State meeting these security requirements?
3. What improvements, if any, are needed to enhance the security of
U.S. officials living and traveling abroad?"
Page 4:
"However, State has not developed a comprehensive strategy that clearly
identifies safety and security requirements and resources needed to
protect U.S. officials, and their families, or other Americans abroad
from terrorist threats outside the embassy."
* The inclusion of other Americans is not within the stated scope of
GAO's review.
Page 7:
"State has defined soft targets as places, including but not limited
to, where Americans and other Westerners live, congregate, shop, or
visit. This can include hotels, clubs, restaurants, shopping centers,
housing compounds, places of worship, schools, or public recreation
events."
* The Department has not established a definition for soft targets at
this time.
Page 10:
"Despite these efforts, State has not developed a comprehensive
strategy that clearly identifies safety and security requirements and
resources needed to protect U.S. officials, and their families, or
other Americans abroad from terrorist threats outside the embassy."
* The inclusion of other Americans is not within the stated scope of
GAO's review.
Page 11:
"Specifically, the report language specifies that a strategy should be
submitted to the Committee no later than June 1, 2005."
* The entire discussion, pages 10-12, of the Senate Appropriations
Subcommittee report language (S. Rpt. No. 108-344) and protection of
non-official Americans abroad is not the subject of this GAO review.
Moreover, this report language is misleading insofar as it suggests
that the Department of State has either the mandate or even the
authority to engage in the wide-ranging functions that seem to be
implied. The language was not included in the Conference Report's Joint
Explanatory Statement and therefore cannot be said to represent the
views of the Congress. In general, it is inappropriate for the GAO to
judge the Department's performance against nonbinding report language
from a single subcommittee of Congress in the manner reflected in this
discussion, particularly when such assessment is outside the scope of
the review at hand. While the request for a strategy was not
incorporated into the Conference Report (H. Rpt. No. 108-792), the
Department plans to produce a strategy by the date specified.
"State has not developed a comprehensive soft target strategy to
protect U.S. officials, and their families, or other Americans abroad
from terrorist threats outside the embassy, as directed by a number of
appropriations committee reports."
* The inclusion of other Americans is not within the stated scope of
GAO's review.
Page 13:
"Five of the 11 ARB investigations have focused on attacks of U.S.
officials on their way to work (see fig. 3). These have been the (1)
June 1988 assassination of a post official in Greece, (2) April 1989
assassination of a post official in the Philippines, (3) March 1995
assassination of two post officials in Pakistan, (4) October 2002
assassination of a post official in Jordan, and (5) October 2003
assassination in Gaza of three post contractors from Israel."
* In example (5) GAO states that the Gaza motorcade was attacked on
their way to work. The occupants of the motorcade were traveling into
Gaza from Tel Aviv during the workday to conduct interviews of
Fulbright scholar candidates, so although not in a "hardened facility"
it is inaccurate to say they were on their way to work.
Page 31:
"Overall, we believe State should develop a strategy to protect U.S.
officials, their families, and other Americans abroad, and as part of
this effort, undertake an assessment of the level of protection to be
afforded to officials and their families while commuting, at
residences, schools, and other community-based facilities, and to
assess the level of protection State should provide other Americans
living abroad."
* The inclusion of other Americans is not within the stated scope of
GAO's review.
Page 32, Recommendations:
"1) Include in the current development of a comprehensive soft target
strategy information that (1) determines the extent of State's
responsibilities for providing security to U.S. officials, their
families, and other Americans outside the embassy; (2) addresses the
legal and financial ramifications of funding security improvements to
schools, places of worship, and the private sector; (3) develops
programs and activities with FAM standards and guidelines to provide
protection for those areas State is deemed responsible for; and (4)
integrates elements of the soft targets program into the embassy
emergency action plan."
* The Department will examine the contents and recommendations of the
report as they relate to our layered security strategy of awareness,
training, information sharing, and physical and technical programs.
"2) Mandate counterterrorism training and prioritize which posts,
officials, and family members should receive counter-terrorism training
first; track attendance to determine compliance with this new training
requirement; and add a "soft target protection" training module to the
Ambassadorial, Deputy Chief of Mission, and RSO training to promote the
security of U.S. officials and their families outside the embassy."
* Any decision to mandate counterterrorism training, such as the DS
Antiterrorism Course (DSAC), will require considerable funding and the
recruitment, hiring and training of additional instructor/support
staff. DSAC is heavily dependent upon the use of private training
facilities that are already severely limited in their availability and
training capacity.
The Foreign Service Institute (FSI), the Department's primary training
provider, and the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) are prepared to
work with the Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB) in reviewing the
Department's existing personal security training and the requirements
for mandatory hands-on counterterrorism training for State and other
agency personnel and their dependents assigned overseas under Chief of
Mission authority. A "soft target protection" module has been
incorporated into DS' RSO training and the Department will ensure that
similar training developed and added to FSI's Ambassadorial and Deputy
Chief of Mission training to promote the security of U.S. officials and
their families outside the embassy.
With regard to "track attendance to determine compliance with this new
training requirement [on counter-terrorism training]", enrollment and
attendance in all mandatory FSI training is tracked by the Department's
Student Training Management System (STMS). The Diplomatic Security
Training Center (DSTC) started to use the STMS to record training
effective March 2005.
"3) Fully implement the personal security accountability system that
State agreed to implement in response to the 2003 ARB for all embassy
officials, and develop related accountability standards for the Foreign
Affairs Manual that can be used to monitor compliance."
* The Department will reiterate, via Department Notice and ALDAC, all
personal security tools available that have originated from the past
two ARBs. The Office of Management Policy (M/P) will take the lead in
drafting such an ALDAC and Notice reminding U.S. officials of their
personal responsibility for their security and the security of their
family members.
M/P will clear the material throughout the Department and include
references to the Foreign Affairs Manual; prior ALDACs issued that
instructs post management, RSO's, and others at post where to find
security tools (to include DSWeb) to better improve personal security;
vary routes and times to and from work and, remind them of the changes
to the promotion precepts which were negotiated with American Foreign
Service Association.
The following are GAO's comments on State's letter dated April 18, 2005.
GAO Comments:
1. We agree that State does not have an official definition of soft
targets and modified the text, where appropriate, to make this clear.
Given this absence, we relied upon a State Department travel warning
that included the specific language used in the draft report.
2. State indicated that, had we used a narrower definition of soft
targets, it could have dramatically changed the conclusions of our
work. We disagree. Our report focuses on State Department efforts to
protect U.S. officials and their families from terrorist threats, at
their homes, recreation centers, schools, commuting, and living outside
the embassy compounds.
3. Although State, in its comments, indicated that it has long had a
"security strategy" to protect U.S. officials and their families
outside the embassy, it was never able to produce such a document. In
addition, while State has a number of programs and activities designed
to protect U.S. officials and their families at soft target areas,
senior DS officials agreed that these programs are not tied together in
an overall strategy. In January 2005, State agreed that it should
develop a comprehensive soft target strategy, and as part of that
effort, undertake a formal evaluation of how existing programs can be
more effectively integrated and whether new programs might be needed to
fill any potential gaps. State said it planned to complete the strategy
by June 1, 2005.
4. We have taken out reference to "other Americans" throughout the
report, except in reference to the Soft Targets Program, which covers
U.S. children and teachers who have no affiliation with the U.S.
government. We have also modified the scope and methodology to show
that our focus is "primarily" on the protection of U.S. government
officials and their families.
5. We have clarified the sentence by indicating that RSOs were unclear
about which schools could qualify for security assistance under phase
three of the Soft Targets Program. Phase three, because it can
encompass all schools in a country with one or more Americans, can
potentially include vastly more schools than in phase one or two of the
program. We recognize that the department's Soft Targets Working Group
is currently defining parameters for which schools could qualify under
phase three, in addition to identifying other vulnerable off-compound
facilities. We believe that a soft target strategy could help identify
which schools most urgently need security improvements.
6. We clarified the report to stipulate that these reports focused on
the security of U.S. officials.
7. See GAO comment 1. We have also changed the word "defines" to
"considers".
8. It is not uncommon for GAO to clarify, add specificity and thus make
adjustments or changes to a requested engagement, provided that these
adjustments and changes are discussed and agreed upon by the requester.
We informed State of these changes.
9. See GAO comment 4.
10. See GAO comment 1.
11. See GAO comment 4.
12. The appropriations subcommittee report language is within the scope
of the GAO review because it covers U.S. officials and their
dependents, which is the primary focus of our review. Moreover, this
language was based on testimony provided by AFSA out of concern that
the department was not providing adequate security for U.S. diplomats
and their families while they are outside of the embassy compound. GAO
agrees that the subcommittee report language is not binding and we are
not judging the department's performance against this language.
However, we agree with the subcommittee, as State has, that State
should develop a comprehensive soft targets strategy.
13. In our draft, we noted that the officials were attacked on their
way to work, either in their driveway or as they drove to a work site.
The Gaza attack occurred while the officials were on their way to the
work site.
14. See GAO comment 4.
We have incorporated technical comments in the report where
appropriate.
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
Jess T. Ford, (202) 512-4128;
Diana Glod, (202) 512-8945:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the above named individuals, Edward George and Andrea
Miller made key contributions to this report. Joe Carney, Martin De
Alteriis, Etana Finkler, Ernie Jackson, Elizabeth Singer, and Michael
Derr provided technical contributions.
(320348):
FOOTNOTES
[1] State, in commenting on our draft, stated it had not defined what
constituted a soft target. As a result, we used State Department
language contained in travel warnings concerning potential terrorist
attacks. We further confirmed this description based on similar
language contained in other State documents and discussions with
numerous State security experts. According to the State travel
warnings, the State Department considers soft targets to include places
where Americans and other westerners live, congregate, shop or visit,
including hotels, clubs, restaurants, shopping centers, identifiable
Western businesses, housing compounds, transportation systems, places
of worship, schools, or public recreation events.
[2] These reviews include (1) the 1985 Report of the Secretary of
State's Advisory Panel on Overseas Security (The Inman Report); (2)
Accountability Review Board reports that followed assassinations of
U.S. officials in 1988, 1989, 1995, 2002, and 2003; and (3) the 1999
Report by the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel (The Crowe Commission).
[3] Other places could include places of worship, restaurants, and
shopping centers.
[4] In instances of imminent threat, State can provide a variety of
measures, including armored vehicles for commuting purposes, protective
details, travel advisories for specific areas, or evacuations of family
members and U.S. officials.
[5] The schools include American and international schools attended by
dependents of U.S. government officials and American citizens. Some
schools are State Department-sponsored schools, which receive direct
educational grants from State's Office of Overseas Schools.
[6] AFSA is the professional representative and labor union of the
23,000 active and retired Foreign Service personnel serving in the
Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, Foreign
Commercial Service, Foreign Agriculture Service, and the International
Broadcasting Bureau. AFSA first raised the issue of soft targets during
its testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee
on Commerce, Justice, State, and the Judiciary, in May 2002. AFSA
stated that as security at posts and missions increases, terrorists
could shift their strategy to include soft targets outside embassy
walls.
[7] Public Law 99-399, codified at 22 U.S.C. 4801 et seq. The act also
establishes the security functions of the Secretary of State, as
delegated to the Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security.
[8] These include the Office of Facility Protection Operations, Office
of Intelligence and Threat Analysis, Office of Physical Security
Programs, and the Office of Training.
[9] The chief of mission is generally the ambassador, who is also
responsible for the safe and efficient evacuation of U.S. citizens when
their lives are endangered. In the absence of an ambassador at post,
the deputy chief of mission (DCM) assumes this responsibility.
[10] Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961. A subsequent 1963
convention reinforces the host country protection of diplomatic
officials. See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional
Protocol, 1963.
[11] The threat rating in each category can be designated as low,
medium, high, or critical.
[12] The figure is an approximation since the total number of posts
open abroad fluctuates.
[13] The OSPB standards for State programs appear in State's Foreign
Affairs Manual (FAM) and Foreign Affairs Handbook (FAH).
[14] For fiscal year 2003, Congress earmarked "up to" $15 million in
the Overseas Buildings Operations appropriations to address security
vulnerabilities of soft targets, particularly overseas schools. State
set aside $5 million to undertake a review of the security of all
overseas schools attended by children of nonmilitary U.S. government
employees. Additionally, under the Emergency Wartime Supplemental
Appropriations Act, 2003, $10 million in new funding was provided for
soft target protection in fiscal year 2003. We discuss State's review
of overseas schools protection, including funding allocation, in a
later section of this report.
[15] The final amount was $14.8 million after a rescission.
[16] S. Rpt. No. 108-344, 108TH Cong., 2ND Sess. 154 (2004); H. Rpt.
No. 108-792, 108TH Cong., 2ND Sess. 828 (2004).
[17] The remaining six ARBs include the April 1988 attack on U.S.
facilities in Honduras, the 1990 attack on a U.S. facility in Bolivia,
the 1992 attack on the Ambassador's residence in Peru, the 1995 attack
on a U.S. facility in Saudi Arabia, and the 1998 bombings of U.S
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The ARB reports were completed the
same year as the assassinations, except for the Jordan and Gaza ARBs,
which were completed the year following the assassinations.
[18] The reports are provided to the Chairman of the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives.
[19] The Overseas Security Policy Board is responsible for developing,
coordinating, and promoting uniform policies and standards on security
programs and projects that affect U.S. government civilian agencies
abroad, including diplomatic missions.
[20] Before Serving Abroad for Families and Employees, State officials
were required to take the Security Overseas Seminar, a 2-day briefing
course that covered a wide variety of security issues. The Security
Overseas Seminar was combined with another course, Working in an
Embassy, to create Serving Abroad for Families and Employees in early
2004.
[21] The schools include American and international schools attended by
dependents of U.S. government officials and American citizens. Some
schools are State Department-sponsored schools, which receive direct
educational grants from State's Office of Overseas Schools.
[22] Department-sponsored schools receive direct financial grants from
State's Office of Overseas Schools. There are over 185 department-
sponsored schools worldwide.
[23] According to State's Foreign Affairs Handbook, 12 FAH-8 H-146,
each type of housing has its advantages and disadvantages. We did not
undertake a comprehensive review to determine the most effective
housing option to deter terrorism.
[24] Department of State, Surveillance Detection Management and
Operations Field Guide Version 2.0, FY 2002 and 12 FAH-7 H-530.
[25] The guidelines allow posts to use surveillance detection to
observe other areas besides the embassy and key residences, but only if
there are specific threats present at these locations.
[26] For sensitivity reasons, we have not identified the posts we
visited.
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