Overseas Security
State Department Has Not Fully Implemented Key Measures to Protect U.S. Officials from Terrorist Attacks Outside of Embassies Gao ID: GAO-05-688T May 10, 2005U.S. government officials working overseas are at risk from terrorist threats. Since 1968, 32 embassy officials have been attacked--23 fatally--by terrorists outside the embassy. As the State Department continues to improve security at U.S. embassies, terrorist groups are likely to focus on "soft" targets--such as homes, schools, and places of worship. GAO was asked to determine whether State has a strategy for soft target protection; assess State's efforts to protect U.S. officials and their families while traveling to and from work; assess State's efforts overseas to improve security at schools attended by the children of U.S. officials; and describe issues related to protection at their residences.
State has a number of programs and activities designed to protect U.S. officials and their families outside the embassy, including security briefings, protection at schools and residences, and surveillance detection. However, State has not developed a comprehensive strategy that clearly identifies safety and security requirements and resources needed to protect U.S. officials and their families abroad from terrorist threats outside the embassy. State officials raised a number of challenges related to developing and implementing such a strategy. They also indicated that they have recently initiated an effort to develop a soft targets strategy. As part of this effort, State officials said they will need to address and resolve a number of legal and financial issues. Three State initiated investigations into terrorist attacks against U.S. officials outside of embassies found that the officials lacked the necessary hands-on training to help counter the attack. The investigations recommended that State provide hands-on counterterrorism training and implement accountability measures to ensure compliance with personal security procedures. After each of these investigations, State reported to Congress that it planned to implement the recommendations, yet we found that State's hands-on training course is not required, the accountability procedures have not been effectively implemented, and key embassy officials are not trained to implement State's counterterrorism procedures. State instituted a program in 2003 to improve security at schools, but its scope has not yet been fully determined. In fiscal years 2003 and 2004, Congress earmarked $29.8 million for State to address security vulnerabilities against soft targets, particularly at overseas schools. The multiphase program provides basic security hardware to protect U.S. officials and their families at schools and some off-compound employee association facilities from terrorist threats. However, during our visits to posts, regional security officers were unclear about which schools could qualify for security assistance under phase three of the program. State's program to protect U.S. officials and their families at their residences is primarily designed to deter crime, not terrorism. The Residential Security program includes basic security hardware and local guards, which State officials said provide effective deterrence against crime, though only limited deterrence against a terrorist attack. To minimize the risk and consequences of a residential terrorist attack, some posts we visited limited the number of U.S. officials living in specific apartment buildings. To provide greater protection against terrorist attacks, some posts we visited used surveillance detection teams in residential areas.
GAO-05-688T, Overseas Security: State Department Has Not Fully Implemented Key Measures to Protect U.S. Officials from Terrorist Attacks Outside of Embassies
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and
International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of
Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT:
Tuesday, May 10, 2005:
Overseas Security:
State Department Has Not Fully Implemented Key Measures to Protect U.S.
Officials from Terrorist Attacks Outside of Embassies:
Statement of Jess T. Ford, Director, International Affairs and Trade:
GAO-05-688T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-05-688T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations,
Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives:
Why GAO Did This Study:
U.S. government officials working overseas are at risk from terrorist
threats. Since 1968, 32 embassy officials have been attacked”23
fatally”by terrorists outside the embassy. As the State Department
continues to improve security at U.S. embassies, terrorist groups are
likely to focus on ’soft“ targets”such as homes, schools, and places of
worship.
GAO was asked to determine whether State has a strategy for soft target
protection; assess State‘s efforts to protect U.S. officials and their
families while traveling to and from work; assess State‘s efforts
overseas to improve security at schools attended by the children of
U.S. officials; and describe issues related to protection at their
residences.
What GAO Found:
State has a number of programs and activities designed to protect U.S.
officials and their families outside the embassy, including security
briefings, protection at schools and residences, and surveillance
detection. However, State has not developed a comprehensive strategy
that clearly identifies safety and security requirements and resources
needed to protect U.S. officials and their families abroad from
terrorist threats outside the embassy. State officials raised a number
of challenges related to developing and implementing such a strategy.
They also indicated that they have recently initiated an effort to
develop a soft targets strategy. As part of this effort, State
officials said they will need to address and resolve a number of legal
and financial issues.
Three State initiated investigations into terrorist attacks against
U.S. officials outside of embassies found that the officials lacked the
necessary hands-on training to help counter the attack. The
investigations recommended that State provide hands-on counterterrorism
training and implement accountability measures to ensure compliance
with personal security procedures. After each of these investigations,
State reported to Congress that it planned to implement the
recommendations, yet we found that State‘s hands-on training course is
not required, the accountability procedures have not been effectively
implemented, and key embassy officials are not trained to implement
State‘s counterterrorism procedures.
State instituted a program in 2003 to improve security at schools, but
its scope has not yet been fully determined. In fiscal years 2003 and
2004, Congress earmarked $29.8 million for State to address security
vulnerabilities against soft targets, particularly at overseas schools.
The multiphase program provides basic security hardware to protect U.S.
officials and their families at schools and some off-compound employee
association facilities from terrorist threats. However, during our
visits to posts, regional security officers were unclear about which
schools could qualify for security assistance under phase three of the
program.
State‘s program to protect U.S. officials and their families at their
residences is primarily designed to deter crime, not terrorism. The
Residential Security program includes basic security hardware and local
guards, which State officials said provide effective deterrence against
crime, though only limited deterrence against a terrorist attack. To
minimize the risk and consequences of a residential terrorist attack,
some posts we visited limited the number of U.S. officials living in
specific apartment buildings. To provide greater protection against
terrorist attacks, some posts we visited used surveillance detection
teams in residential areas.
What GAO Recommends:
We are recommending that the Secretary of State develop a soft targets
strategy; develop counterterrorism training for officials; and fully
implement its personal security accountability system for embassy
officials. State generally agreed with our recommendations.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-688T.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Jess T. Ford at (202) 512-
4128 or fordj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here to discuss the report we are releasing today on
State Department efforts to protect U.S. officials and their families
from terrorist attacks outside of embassies.[Footnote 1]
U.S. government officials and their families living and working
overseas are at risk from terrorist threats. Since 1968, 32 embassy
officials have been attacked--23 fatally--by terrorists outside the
embassy. As the State Department continues to improve security at U.S.
embassies, concerns are growing that terrorist groups are likely to
focus on "soft" targets--such as homes, schools, and places of worship.
Recent terrorist attacks against housing complexes in Saudi Arabia, a
school in Russia, and places of worship in Turkey illustrate this
growing threat. State-initiated security assessments have further
documented this growing concern and recommended that State develop
better measures to protect U.S. officials and their families in soft
target areas.[Footnote 2]
Our report addresses four issues: (1) whether State has a strategy for
soft target protection, (2) an assessment of State's efforts to protect
U.S. officials and their families against terrorist attacks while
traveling to and from work, (3) State's efforts to improve security at
schools overseas attended by the children of U.S. officials, and (4)
issues related to protection of U.S. officials and their families at
residences. I will also discuss our recommendations to State and
State's response.
For our work on this subject, we reviewed State documents and
interviewed State officials in Washington, D.C., and at five posts in
four countries. We also attended security trainings and briefings
available to State officials. Our work was conducted in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
Summary:
State has a number of programs and activities to protect U.S. officials
and their families outside the embassy, including security briefings,
protection at schools and residences, and surveillance detection.
However, State has not developed a comprehensive strategy that clearly
identifies safety and security requirements and resources needed to
protect U.S. officials and their families abroad from terrorist threats
outside the embassy. State officials raised a number of legal,
management, and resources challenges related to developing and
implementing such a strategy, but agreed a strategy was needed. The
department is now in the process of developing a soft target strategy.
State has not fully implemented one of the most important safeguards
against terrorist attacks while traveling to and from work--
counterterrorism training. Three State-initiated investigations into
terrorist attacks against U.S. officials outside of embassies found
officials lacked the necessary training that could have saved their
lives, including surveillance detection and avoidance and defensive and
evasive driving techniques. The investigations recommended that State
provide hands-on counterterrorism training and implement accountability
measures to ensure compliance with personal security procedures.
However, we found that State has not fully implemented these
recommendations. For example, State's hands-on counterterrorism
training course is still not required, and ambassadors, deputy chiefs
of mission, and regional security officers are not trained to implement
State's counterterrorism procedures. In addition, the accountability
procedures, monitoring, and checklists developed in 2003 designed to
promote personal security were not being followed at any of the five
posts we visited.
In response to congressional directives, State instituted a program in
2003 designed to improve the protection of U.S. officials and their
families at schools and some off-compound employee associations from
terrorist threats. The multiphase program provides basic security
hardware, such as shatter-resistant window film, alarms, and radios,
and additional protective measures based on threat levels and
vulnerabilities. The first two phases are focused on department-
sponsored schools that have previously received grant funding from the
State Department. The third and fourth phases, which are similar to the
first and second phases, focus on the nondepartment-sponsored schools
with American students.[Footnote 3] During our visits to five posts,
Regional Security Officers were unclear about which schools qualified
for security assistance under phase three of the program. Some Regional
Security Officers raised questions about whether to fund schools in
which just a few American children were enrolled.
State's program to protect U.S. officials and their families at
residences is largely designed to deter crime. The Residential Security
program includes basic security hardware, such as alarms, shatter-
resistant window film, limited access control measures, and local
guards. To reduce the terrorist threat, some posts limit the number of
U.S. officials living in specific apartment buildings. Moreover, at
some of the posts we visited, surveillance detection teams were used to
help protect schools and residential areas. Several Regional Security
Officers told us that use of surveillance detection teams could provide
greater deterrence to potential terrorist attacks.
We are recommending that State, as it develops its soft targets
strategy, determine the full scope of its responsibilities and the
legal and financial ramifications of securing U.S. officials and their
families outside the embassy; develop corresponding protection programs
and activities; and integrate elements of the soft targets strategy
into embassy emergency action plans. We are also recommending that
State bolster its training and compliance procedures, including by
making counterterrorism training mandatory and delivered on a
prioritized basis, and by fully implementing the personal security
accountability system that State agreed to implement in response to the
2003 Accountability Review Board for all embassy officials.
State said it was in general agreement with most of our recommendations
and said that it would examine others.
Background:
Although State has not yet formally defined what constitutes a soft
target, State Department travel warnings and security officers
generally consider soft targets to be places where Americans and other
westerners live, congregate, shop, or visit, such as hotels, clubs,
restaurants, shopping centers, housing compounds, places of worship,
schools, or public recreation events. Travel routes of U.S. government
employees are also considered soft targets, based on their history of
terrorist attacks.
The State Department is responsible for protecting more than 60,000
government employees, and their family members, who work in embassies
and consulates abroad in 180 countries. Although the host nation is
responsible for providing protection to diplomatic personnel and
missions under the 1961 Vienna Convention, State has a variety of
programs and activities to further protect U.S. officials and family
members both inside and outside of the embassy.
Following a terrorist attack that involves serious injury or loss of
life or significant destruction of a U.S. government mission, State is
required to convene an Accountability Review Board (ARB). ARBs
investigate the attack and issue a report with recommendations to
improve security programs and practices. State is required to report to
Congress on actions it has taken in response to ARB recommendations. As
of March 2005, there have been 11 ARBs convened since the board's
establishment in 1986.
Concerned that State was not providing adequate security for U.S.
officials and their families outside the embassy, the American Foreign
Service Association testified on a number of occasions before the
Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State and the
Judiciary on the need for State to expand its security measures. The
subcommittee, in its 2002 and subsequent reports, urged State to
formulate a strategy for addressing threats to locales abroad that are
frequented by U.S. officials and their families. It focused its concern
about soft targets on schools, residences, places of worship, and other
popular gathering places. In fiscal years 2003, 2004, and 2005,
Congress earmarked a total of $15 million for soft target protection
each year, particularly to address security vulnerabilities at overseas
schools.[Footnote 4] Moreover, in 2005, the Senate appropriations
report directed State to develop a comprehensive strategy for
addressing the threats posed to soft targets no later than June 1,
2005.
State Lacks a Strategy to Cover Soft Target Areas; Key Issues Need to
Be Resolved:
State has a number of programs and activities designed to protect U.S.
officials and their families outside the embassy, including security
briefings, protection at schools and residences, and surveillance
detection. However, State has not developed a comprehensive strategy
that clearly identifies safety and security requirements and resources
needed to protect U.S. official and their families.
State officials cited several complex issues involved with protecting
soft targets. As the terrorist threat grows, State is being asked to
provide ever greater levels of protection to more people in more
dangerous locations, and they questioned how far State's protection of
soft targets should extend. They said that providing U.S. government
funds to protect U.S. officials and their families at private sector
locations or places of worship was unprecedented and raised a number of
legal and financial challenges--including sovereignty and separation of
church and state--that have not been resolved by the department. State
officials also indicated they have not yet fully defined the universe
of soft targets--including taking an inventory of potentially
vulnerable facilities and areas where U.S. officials and their families
congregate--that would be necessary to complete a strategy.
Although State has not developed a comprehensive soft target strategy,
some State officials told us that several existing programs could help
protect soft targets. However, they agreed that these existing programs
are not tied together in an overall strategy. State officials agreed
that they should undertake a formal evaluation of how existing programs
can be more effectively integrated as part of a soft target strategy,
and whether new programs might be needed to fill any potential gaps.
A senior official with State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) told
us that in January 2005, DS formed a working group to develop a
comprehensive soft targets strategy to address the appropriate level of
protection of U.S. officials and their families at schools, residences,
and other areas outside the embassy. According to State, the strategy
should be completed by June 1, 2005.
State Has Not Fully Implemented ARB Training and Accountability
Recommendations to Improve Security for Embassy Personnel:
To identify vulnerabilities in State's soft target protection, and
determine if State had corrected these vulnerabilities, we reviewed the
ARB reports conducted after U.S. officials were assassinated outside
the embassy. Of the 11 ARBs conducted since 1986, the majority (5) have
focused on soft target attacks, compared with attacks against embassies
(2) or other U.S. facilities (4). We found that, 17 years after the
first soft target ARB, State has still not addressed the
vulnerabilities and recommendations identified in that and more recent
reports: specifically, the need for hands-on counterterrorism training
and accountability mechanisms to promote compliance with personal
security procedures. Despite State's assurances to Congress that it
would implement recommendations aimed at reducing these
vulnerabilities, we found that State's hands-on training course is
still not mandatory, and procedures to monitor compliance with security
requirements have not been fully implemented. We also found that
ambassadors, deputy chiefs of mission, and regional security officers
were not trained in how to implement embassy procedures intended to
protect U.S. officials outside the embassies.
Despite State's Agreement That Counterterrorism Training Is Needed, It
Is Still Not Required:
Since 1988, State has reported to Congress that it agreed with ARB
recommendations to provide counterterrorism training. For example, in
1995, State reported that it "re-established the Diplomatic Security
Antiterrorism Course (DSAC) for those going to critical-threat posts to
teach surveillance detection and avoidance, and defensive and evasive
driving techniques." In 2003, State reported it agreed with the
recommendations that employees from all agencies should receive
security briefings and indicated that it would review the adequacy of
its training and other personal security measures.[Footnote 5]
Although State implemented the board's recommendation to require
security briefings for all staff, hands-on counterterrorism training is
still not mandatory, and few officials or family members have taken
DSAC. Senior DS officials said they recognize that security briefings
are no longer adequate to protect against current terrorist threats. In
June 2004, DS developed a proposal to make DSAC training mandatory. DS
officials said that DSAC training should be required for all officials,
but that issues such as costs and adequacy of training facilities were
constraining factors. As of April 18, 2005, the proposal had not been
approved.
Although State has agreed on the need to implement an accountability
system to promote compliance with personal security procedures since
1988, there is still no such system in place. Beginning in 2003, State
has tried to incorporate some limited accountability to promote
compliance. However, based on our work at five posts, we found that
post officials are following few, if any, of these new procedures.
In response to a 2003 ARB, State took a number of steps to improve
compliance with State's personal security procedures for officials
outside the embassy. In June 2003, State revised its annual assessment
criteria to take personal security into account when preparing
performance appraisals, and in December 2003, State revised its Foreign
Affairs Manual to mandate and improve implementation of personal
security practices. In May 2004, State notified posts worldwide on use
of a Personal Security Self-Assessment Checklist to improve security
outside the embassy. However, none of the posts we visited were even
aware of these and other key policy changes. For example, none of the
officials we met with, including ambassadors, deputy chiefs of mission,
regional security officers, or staff, were aware that the annual
ratings process now includes an assessment of whether staff are
following the personal security measures or that managers are now
responsible for the reasonable oversight of subordinates' personal
security activities. Furthermore, none of the supervisors were aware of
the checklist, and we found no one was using the checklists to improve
their personal security practices.
In explaining why posts were not aware of the new personal security
regulations, DS officials noted that posts were often overwhelmed by
work and may have simply missed the cables and changes in the Foreign
Affairs Manual. They also noted that changes like this take time to be
implemented globally.
Furthermore, State's original plan, to use the checklist as an
accountability mechanism, was dropped before it was implemented. In its
June 2003 report to Congress on implementation of the 2003 ARB
recommendations, State stipulated that staff would be required to use
the checklist periodically and that managers would review the
checklists to ensure compliance. However, State never implemented this
accountability mechanism out of concern it would consume too much staff
time.
We also found that key officials receive no training on how to promote
personal security outside the embassy. According to a number of State
officials, improvements in this area must start with the ambassador and
the deputy chief of mission. Yet no ambassadors, deputy chiefs of
mission, or regional security officers receive any training in how to
maximize soft target protection at embassies. DS officials agreed that
this critical component should be added to their training curriculum.
State Develops Soft Targets Program for Schools, but Scope Is Not Yet
Fully Defined:
In response to several congressional committee reports, State began
developing a "Soft Targets" program in 2003 to help protect overseas
schools against terrorism. The program has four proposed phases. The
first two phases are focused on department-sponsored schools that have
previously received grant funding from the State Department, and the
third and fourth phases focus on the nondepartment-sponsored schools
with American students.
In phase one, department-sponsored schools were offered funding for
basic security hardware such as shatter-resistant window film, two-way
radios for communication between the school and the embassy, and public
address systems. As of November 19, 2004, 189 department-sponsored
schools had received $10.5 million in funding for security equipment in
phase one of the program. The second phase provided additional security
enhancements, such as perimeter fencing, walls, lighting, gates, and
guard booths. As of November 2004, State has obligated over $15 million
for phase two security upgrades. For phases three and four, State plans
to provide similar types of security upgrades to eligible nondepartment-
sponsored schools.
The program also funds security enhancements for off-compound embassy
employee association facilities, such as recreation centers. Security
upgrades include funding for perimeter walls and shatter-resistant
window film. In fiscal year 2004, almost $1 million was obligated for
these enhancements.
Full Scope of School Program Not Yet Determined:
Regional Security Officers (RSO) said that identifying and funding for
security enhancements at department-sponsored schools were
straightforward because of the department's pre-existing relationship
with these schools. However, they said it has been difficult to
identify eligible nondepartment-sponsored schools for phase three
because of the vast number of schools that might qualify, the lack of
any pre-existing relationship, and limited guidance on eligibility
criteria. For example, some RSOs questioned how many American students
should attend a school for it to be eligible for security upgrades.
Some RSOs were considering funding schools with just a few American
students. Moreover, one RSO was considering providing security upgrades
to informal educational facilities, such as those attended by children
of U.S. missionaries.
State is trying to determine the appropriate scope of the program, and
sent cables to posts in the summer of 2004 asking RSOs to gather data
on nondepartment-sponsored schools attended by American students,
particularly U.S. government dependents. State officials acknowledged
that the process of gathering data has been difficult since there are
hundreds of such schools worldwide. According to an Overseas Buildings
Operations (OBO) official, as of December 2004, only about 81 out of
the more than 250 posts have provided responses regarding such schools.
OBO plans to use the data to develop criteria for which schools might
be eligible for funding under phase three and, eventually, phase four
of the program.
In anticipation of any future phases of the Soft Targets program, RSOs
have been asked to identify other facilities and areas that Americans
frequent, beyond schools and off-compound employee association
facilities, that may be vulnerable to a terrorist attack. State
Department officials were concerned about the large number of sites
RSOs could identify as potential soft target sites, and the
department's ability to protect them.
Issues Related to the Protection of U.S. Officials and Their Families
at Residences against Terrorist Threats:
State has a responsibility for providing a secure housing environment
for U.S. officials and their families overseas. However, we found that
State's primary program in place to protect U.S. officials and their
families at residences, the Residential Security program, is
principally designed to deter crime, not terrorism. The program
includes basic security hardware and guard service; and as the crime
threat increases, the hardware and guard services can be
correspondingly increased at the residences. State officials said that
while the Residential Security program, augmented by the local guard
program, provides effective deterrence against crime, it could provide
limited or no deterrence to minimize the risk and consequences of a
residential terrorist attack. State officials told us that the best
residential scenario for posts is to have a variety of housing options,
including apartments and single-family homes, to reduce the potential
for a catastrophic attack.
To provide greater protection against terrorist attacks, most posts we
visited used surveillance detection teams in the residential areas. The
program is intended to enhance the embassies' ability to detect
preoperational terrorist surveillance and stop the attack. According to
State's guidance, surveillance detection units are primarily designed
to protect embassies, and their use in residential areas is
discouraged.[Footnote 6] However, we found RSOs at some of the posts we
visited were routinely utilizing surveillance detection units to cover
areas outside the embassies, such as residences, school bus stops and
routes, and schools attended by U.S. embassy dependents. RSOs told us
that the Surveillance Detection program is instrumental in providing
deterrence against potential terrorist attacks, and argued that the
current program guidelines are too restrictive.[Footnote 7] Senior
State officials agreed that the use of the surveillance detection in
soft target areas could be beneficial, but noted that the program is
labor intensive and expensive, and any expansion of the program could
require significant funding.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my
prepared statement. I will be happy to answer any questions you may
have.
Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
For questions regarding this testimony, please call Diana Glod at (202)
512-8945. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony
included Edward George and Andrea Miller.
FOOTNOTES
[1] GAO, Overseas Security: State Department Has Not Fully Implemented
Key Measures to Protect U.S. Officials from Terrorist Attacks Outside
of Embassies, GAO-05-642 (Washington, D.C.: May 9, 2005).
[2] These reviews include (1) the 1985 Report of the Secretary of
State's Advisory Panel on Overseas Security (The Inman Report); (2)
Accountability Review Board reports that followed assassinations of
U.S. officials in 1988, 1989, 1995, 2002, and 2003; and (3) the 1999
Report by the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel (The Crowe Commission).
[3] Department-sponsored schools receive direct financial grants from
State's Office of Overseas Schools. There are over 185 department-
sponsored schools worldwide.
[4] For fiscal year 2003, Congress earmarked "up to" $15 million in the
Overseas Buildings Operations appropriations to address security
vulnerabilities of soft targets. State set aside $5 million to
undertake a review of the security of all overseas schools attended by
children of nonmilitary U.S. government employees. Of the fiscal year
2005 earmark, $10 million is for security at overseas schools attended
by dependents of U.S. government employees.
[5] The Overseas Security Policy Board is responsible for developing,
coordinating, and promoting uniform policies and standards on security
programs and projects that affect U.S. government civilian agencies
abroad, including diplomatic missions.
[6] Department of State, Surveillance Detection Management and
Operations Field Guide Version 2.0, FY 2002 and 12 FAH-7 H-530.
[7] The guidelines allow posts to use surveillance detection to observe
other areas besides the embassy and key residences, but only if there
are specific threats present at these locations.
