State Department
Improvements Needed to Strengthen U.S. Passport Fraud Detection Efforts Gao ID: GAO-05-477 May 20, 2005Maintaining the integrity of the U.S. passport is essential to the State Department's efforts to protect U.S. citizens from terrorists, criminals, and others. State issued about 8.8 million passports in fiscal year 2004. During the same year, State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security arrested about 500 individuals for passport fraud, and about 300 persons were convicted. Passport fraud is often intended to facilitate other crimes, including illegal immigration, drug trafficking, and alien smuggling. GAO examined (1) how passport fraud is committed, (2) what key fraud detection challenges State faces, and (3) what effect new passport examiner performance standards could have on fraud detection.
Using the stolen identities of U.S. citizens is the primary method of those fraudulently applying for U.S. passports. False claims of lost, stolen, or damaged passports and child substitution are among the other tactics used. Fraudulently obtained passports can help criminals conceal their activities and travel with less scrutiny. Concerns exist that they could also be used to help facilitate terrorism. State faces a number of challenges to its passport fraud detection efforts, and these challenges make it more difficult to protect U.S. citizens from terrorists, criminals, and others. Information on U.S. citizens listed in the federal government's consolidated terrorist watch list is not systematically provided to State. Moreover, State does not routinely obtain from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) the names of other individuals wanted by federal and state law enforcement authorities. We tested the names of 67 federal and state fugitives and found that 37, over half, were not in State's Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS) database for passports. One of those not included was on the FBI's Ten Most Wanted list. State does not maintain a centralized and up-to-date fraud prevention library, hindering information sharing within State. Fraud prevention staffing reductions and interoffice workload transfers resulted in fewer fraud referrals at some offices, and insufficient training, oversight, and investigative resources also hinder fraud detection efforts. Any effect that new passport examiner performance standards may have on State's fraud detection efforts is unclear because State continues to adjust the standards. State began implementing the new standards in January 2004 to make work processes and performance expectations more uniform nationwide. Passport examiner union representatives expressed concern that new numerical production quotas may require examiners to "shortcut" fraud detection efforts. However, in response to union and examiner concerns, State eased the production standards during 2004 and made a number of other modifications and compromises.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-05-477, State Department: Improvements Needed to Strengthen U.S. Passport Fraud Detection Efforts
This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-05-477
entitled 'State Department: Improvements Needed to Strengthen U.S.
Passport Fraud Detection Efforts' which was released on June 29, 2005.
This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part
of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this
document to Webmaster@gao.gov.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this
material separately.
Report to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,
U.S. Senate:
May 2005:
State Department:
Improvements Needed to Strengthen U.S. Passport Fraud Detection
Efforts:
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-477]:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-05-477, a report to the Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate:
Why GAO Did This Study:
Maintaining the integrity of the U.S. passport is essential to the
State Department‘s efforts to protect U.S. citizens from terrorists,
criminals, and others. State issued about 8.8 million passports in
fiscal year 2004. During the same year, State‘s Bureau of Diplomatic
Security arrested about 500 individuals for passport fraud, and about
300 persons were convicted. Passport fraud is often intended to
facilitate other crimes, including illegal immigration, drug
trafficking, and alien smuggling. GAO examined (1) how passport fraud
is committed, (2) what key fraud detection challenges State faces, and
(3) what effect new passport examiner performance standards could have
on fraud detection.
What GAO Found:
Using the stolen identities of U.S. citizens is the primary method of
those fraudulently applying for U.S. passports. False claims of lost,
stolen, or damaged passports and child substitution are among the other
tactics used. Fraudulently obtained passports can help criminals
conceal their activities and travel with less scrutiny. Concerns exist
that they could also be used to help facilitate terrorism.
State faces a number of challenges to its passport fraud detection
efforts, and these challenges make it more difficult to protect U.S.
citizens from terrorists, criminals, and others. Information on U.S.
citizens listed in the federal government‘s consolidated terrorist
watch list is not systematically provided to State. Moreover, State
does not routinely obtain from the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) the names of other individuals wanted by federal and state law
enforcement authorities. We tested the names of 67 federal and state
fugitives and found that 37, over half, were not in State‘s Consular
Lookout and Support System (CLASS) database for passports. One of those
not included was on the FBI‘s Ten Most Wanted list. State does not
maintain a centralized and up-to-date fraud prevention library,
hindering information sharing within State. Fraud prevention staffing
reductions and interoffice workload transfers resulted in fewer fraud
referrals at some offices, and insufficient training, oversight, and
investigative resources also hinder fraud detection efforts.
Any effect that new passport examiner performance standards may have on
State‘s fraud detection efforts is unclear because State continues to
adjust the standards. State began implementing the new standards in
January 2004 to make work processes and performance expectations more
uniform nationwide. Passport examiner union representatives expressed
concern that new numerical production quotas may require examiners to
’shortcut“ fraud detection efforts. However, in response to union and
examiner concerns, State eased the production standards during 2004 and
made a number of other modifications and compromises.
Crimes Suspected of 37 Federal and State Fugitives Not in CLASS Who
Were Included in Our Test
Type of crime: Murder;
Federal fugitives: 5;
State fugitives: 4.
Type of crime: Felonious assault and related acts;
Federal fugitives: 2;
State fugitives: 7.
Type of crime: Child sex offenses;
Federal fugitives: 4;
State fugitives: 1.
Type of crime: Drug trafficking;
Federal fugitives: 3.
Type of crime: Attempted murder;
Federal fugitives: 1;
State fugitives: 1.
Type of crime: Bombings;
Federal fugitives: 1.
Type of crime: Child kidnapping;
State fugitives: 1.
Type of crime: Other crimes;
Federal fugitives: 4;
State fugitives: 3.
Total;
Federal fugitives: 20;
State fugitives: 17.
Sources: State Department and other federal agencies.
[End of table]
What GAO Recommends:
This report makes six recommendations to the Secretary of State to
consider ways to improve interagency information sharing, establish a
centralized and up-to-date fraud prevention library, consider
augmenting fraud prevention staffing, assess the extent to which
interoffice workload transfers may hinder fraud prevention, and
strengthen fraud prevention training and oversight. State generally
concurred with our recommendations and indicated that it has begun
taking steps to implement most of them.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-477.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Jess T. Ford at (202) 512-
4128 or fordj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Identity Theft a Primary Means of Committing Fraud:
State Faces Challenges to Fraud Detection Efforts:
Effect of New Examiner Performance Standards on Fraud Detection Remains
Unclear:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of State:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables Tables:
Table 1: Crimes Suspected of 20 Federal Fugitives Not in CLASS Who Were
Included in Our Test:
Table 2: Crimes Suspected of 17 State Fugitives Not in CLASS Who Were
Included in Our Test:
Figures:
Figure 1: Key State Department Units Involved in Passport-Related
Operations:
Figure 2: The Typical Passport Application and Adjudication Process:
Figure 3: Electronic Databases Available to Passport Examiners:
Abbreviations:
CLASS: Consular Lookout and Support System:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation:
OIG: Office of the Inspector General:
SSA: Social Security Administration:
TDIS: Travel Document Issuance System:
TSC: Terrorist Screening Center:
Letter May 20, 2005:
The Honorable Susan M. Collins:
Chairman:
The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
Maintaining the integrity of the U.S. passport is essential to the
State Department's effort to protect U.S. citizens and interests at
home and abroad in the post-September 11 world. The department issued
about 8.8 million passports in fiscal year 2004. Each year, State
passport examiners refer tens of thousands of applications they suspect
may be fraudulent to their local fraud prevention offices. In fiscal
year 2004, State's Diplomatic Security Service arrested about 500
individuals for passport fraud and about 300 were convicted. Passport
fraud is often intended to facilitate such crimes as illegal
immigration, drug trafficking, and alien smuggling.
You asked us to assess State's efforts to detect passport fraud and
whether new performance standards for passport examiners may require
them to adjudicate passport applications too quickly to adequately
detect such fraud. This report examines (1) how passport fraud is
committed, (2) what key challenges State faces in its fraud-detection
efforts, and (3) what effect new performance standards for passport
examiners could have on fraud detection.
To examine how passport fraud is committed, we reviewed fraud
statistics maintained by State's Bureau of Consular Affairs and
examined fraud statistics and selected investigative case files within
State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security. To assess the key challenges
State faces in detecting passport fraud, we directly observed State's
fraud detection efforts at 7 of the 16 domestic passport-issuing
offices located across the United States; tested State's use of
electronic databases for fraud detection; ran the names of 67 different
federal and state fugitives against State's name-check system; analyzed
State's fraud referral statistics within the Bureaus of Consular
Affairs and Diplomatic Security; and interviewed cognizant officials in
Consular Affairs' Office of Passport Services, Office of Consular Fraud
Prevention, and Consular Systems Division. We also met with cognizant
officials in the Bureau of Diplomatic Security and the Office of the
Inspector General. To assess what effect new performance standards for
passport examiners could have on fraud detection efforts, we reviewed
the test results and methodology that State used in developing the new
standards, and interviewed union representatives for passport
examiners, select examiners, the fraud prevention managers at all 16
domestic passport-issuing offices, and Consular Affairs officials
responsible for developing and implementing the new standards. Our work
was conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. (For a detailed discussion of our scope and methodology, see
app. I.)
Results in Brief:
Using the stolen identities and documentation of U.S. citizens is the
primary tactic of those fraudulently applying for U.S. passports.
Imposters' use of legitimate birth and other identification documents
belonging to others accounted for 69 percent of passport fraud detected
in fiscal year 2004, while false claims of lost, stolen, or damaged
passports; child substitution; and other methods accounted for the
remaining 31 percent. According to State's Bureau of Diplomatic
Security, passport fraud is often committed in connection with other
crimes, including narcotics trafficking, organized crime, money
laundering, and alien smuggling. Fraudulently obtained passports help
enable criminals to conceal their movements and activities. Further,
U.S. passports allow their holders entry into the United States with
much less scrutiny than is given to foreign citizens and also allow
visa-free passage into many countries around the world, providing
obvious benefits to criminals operating on an international scale.
Concerns exist that fraudulently obtained passports could also be used
to help facilitate terrorism.
State faces a number of challenges to its passport fraud detection
efforts, including limited inter-and intra-agency information sharing
and insufficient fraud prevention staffing, training, oversight, and
investigative resources. These challenges make it more difficult to
protect U.S. citizens from terrorists, criminals, and others who would
harm the United States. Specifically, State does not currently receive
information on U.S. citizens listed in the Terrorist Screening Center
(TSC) database--the federal government's consolidated terrorist watch
list--and State does not routinely obtain from the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) the names of other individuals wanted by both
federal and state law enforcement authorities for various crimes. Many
of these individuals are not identified in State's Consular Lookout and
Support System (CLASS) name-check database for passports[Footnote 1]
and could therefore obtain passports and travel internationally without
the knowledge of appropriate authorities or, in some cases, potentially
flee the country to escape charges. We tested the names of 67 different
federal and state fugitives--some wanted for serious crimes--and found
that fewer than half were in State's system. One of those not included
was on the FBI's Ten Most Wanted list. Though State, TSC, and the FBI
began exploring options for more routine information sharing on certain
passport- related matters in mid-to late 2004, such arrangements are
not yet in place. Further, State does not maintain a centralized
electronic fraud prevention library that enables comprehensive, well-
organized, and timely information sharing on fraud alerts, lost and
stolen birth and naturalization certificates, counterfeit documents,
and other fraud prevention resources among passport-issuing office
personnel across the United States. We found that, in 2004, fraud
prevention staffing changes at some domestic passport-issuing offices
may have resulted in fewer referrals of potential fraud cases to
Diplomatic Security for investigation. Interoffice transfers of
passport adjudication cases may have resulted in fewer fraud referrals
as well. We found that fraud prevention training is provided unevenly
at different passport-issuing offices and that some examiners have not
had formal fraud prevention training in years. Training and oversight
of passport acceptance agent operations are even more sporadic. State
does not have any way of tracking whether many acceptance agent
employees are receiving required training, it makes oversight visits to
only a limited number of acceptance facilities each year, and it does
not maintain records of all of the individuals accepting passport
applications at those facilities, posing a significant fraud
vulnerability.
Any effect that new passport examiner performance standards may have on
State's fraud detection efforts is unclear because State has continued
to adjust the standards. To make passport adjudication work processes
and related performance measurement more uniform across the 16
different domestic passport-issuing offices, State began implementing
the new standards in January 2004. The 2004 performance standards
placed more emphasis on meeting numerical production quotas because,
for the first time, a required average production rate stands alone as
a performance-rating element for examiners. Passport examiner union
representatives and some other examiners maintain that the numerical
production standards force examiners to take "shortcuts" in fraud
detection efforts. However, in response to union and examiner concerns,
State eased the production standards during 2004 and made a number of
other modifications and compromises at various times during the year.
As a result, while over 60 examiners were not achieving the required
production rate midway through 2004, all but 18 of about 480 examiners
nationwide were meeting the standards by year-end.
In commenting on a draft of this report, State generally concurred with
our findings and conclusions. State indicated that it has already begun
taking, plans to take, or is considering measures to address most of
our recommendations.
Background:
A U.S. passport is not only a travel document but also an official
verification of the bearer's origin, identity, and nationality. Under
U.S. law, the Secretary of State has the authority to issue passports.
Only U.S. nationals[Footnote 2] may obtain a U.S. passport, and
evidence of citizenship or nationality is required with every passport
application. For individuals 16 or older, a regular U.S. passport
issued on or after February 1, 1998, is valid for 10 years from the
date of issue; it is valid for five years for younger applicants.
Federal regulations list those who do not qualify for a U.S. passport,
including those who are subjects of a federal felony warrant.
State Passport Operations:
The Deputy Assistant Secretary for Passport Services oversees the
Passport Services Office, within State's Consular Affairs Bureau.
Passport Services, the largest component of Consular Affairs, consists
of three headquarters offices: Policy Planning and Legal Advisory
Services; Field Operations; and Information Management and Liaison. The
Office of Consular Fraud Prevention addresses passport, visa, and other
types of consular fraud. The Consular Systems Division is responsible
for the computer systems involved in passport services and other
consular operations. The Office for American Citizens Services handles
most issues relating to passport cases at overseas posts. The Bureau of
Diplomatic Security is responsible for investigating individual cases
of suspected passport and visa fraud. The State Department Office of
the Inspector General (OIG) also has some authority to investigate
passport fraud. Figure 1 shows the key State Department units involved
in passport-related operations.
Figure 1: Key State Department Units Involved in Passport-Related
Operations:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
State operates 16 passport-issuing offices in Boston; Charleston, South
Carolina; Chicago; Honolulu; Houston; Los Angeles; Miami; New Orleans;
New York; Norwalk, Connecticut; Philadelphia; Portsmouth, New
Hampshire; San Francisco; Seattle; and Washington, D.C.[Footnote 3]
These 16 offices employ the approximately 480 passport
examiners[Footnote 4] who are responsible for approving and issuing
most of the U.S. passports that are printed each year. The number of
passports issued by domestic passport offices has risen steadily in
recent years, increasing from about 7.3 million in fiscal year 2000 to
8.8 million in fiscal year 2004. Overseas posts deal with a much lower
volume of passports by comparison, handling about 300,000 worldwide in
fiscal year 2004. With only a few exceptions, applications submitted
and approved overseas are transmitted electronically to a domestic
passport office to be printed.
Passport Application and Approval Process:
The majority of passport applications are submitted by mail or in-
person at one of almost 7,000 passport application acceptance
facilities nationwide.[Footnote 5] Passport acceptance facilities are
located at certain U.S. post offices, courthouses, and other
institutions and do not employ State Department personnel. The passport
acceptance agents at these facilities are responsible for, among other
things, verifying whether an applicant's identification document (such
as a driver's license) actually matches that applicant. Applications go
to a passport office to be examined after their information is entered,
and payments are processed by a State Department contractor, Mellon
Bank, in Pennsylvania.
Through a process called adjudication, passport examiners determine
whether they should issue each applicant a passport. Adjudication
requires the examiner to scrutinize identification and citizenship
documents presented by applicants to verify their identity and U.S.
citizenship. It also includes the examination of an application to
detect potential indicators of passport fraud and the comparison of the
applicant's information against databases that help identify
individuals who may not qualify for a U.S. passport. When passport
applications are submitted by mail or through acceptance facilities,
examiners adjudicate the applications at their desks. A relatively
small percentage of the total number of passport applications are
submitted directly by applicants at one of State's domestic passport-
issuing offices. Applicants are required to demonstrate imminent travel
plans to set an appointment for such services at one of the issuing
office's public counters. "Counter" adjudication allows examiners to
question applicants directly or request further information on matters
related to the application, while "desk" adjudication requires
telephoning or mailing the applicants in such cases.[Footnote 6] Figure
2 depicts the typical passport application and adjudication process.
Figure 2: The Typical Passport Application and Adjudication Process:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Passport Fraud Detection Tools:
The passport adjudication process is facilitated by computer systems--
including the Travel Document Issuance System (TDIS), which appears on
passport examiners' screens when the adjudication begins. Figure 3
identifies the key computer databases available to help examiners
adjudicate passport applications and detect potential fraud.
Figure 3: Electronic Databases Available to Passport Examiners:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
TDIS automatically checks the applicant's name against several
databases--including State's Consular Lookout and Support System
(CLASS), which contains information provided by various offices within
State and information on outstanding criminal warrants provided by the
U.S. Marshal's Service, the FBI, and other state and federal agencies,
as well as Health and Human Services' database, which identifies
parents who have been certified by a state agency as owing more than
$5,000 in child support and therefore are not eligible for a passport.
If TDIS indicates the applicant may have applied for a passport at
another agency or been issued a U.S. passport within the last 10 years,
it prompts the examiner to reference computer databases outside of TDIS
to determine whether the prompt refers to the applicant or rather
someone who resembles the applicant.
In addition, examiners scrutinize paper documents and other relevant
information during the fraud detection process. Examiners compare the
application submitted by the applicant to the information on the screen
to make sure the information was entered properly, check for missing
information, and analyze application documentation for various types of
fraud indicators. In addition, examiners watch for suspicious behavior
and travel plans. Examiners and acceptance agents are instructed to
request additional proof of identification if they feel the documents
presented are insufficient. State officials said that in such cases,
some individuals abandon the application, and the names of those who do
are placed in State's name-check system and are more stringently
scrutinized if they apply again. When examiners detect potentially
fraudulent passport applications, they send the applications to their
local fraud prevention office for review and potential referral to
State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security for further investigation.
Identity Theft a Primary Means of Committing Fraud:
Using the stolen identities and documentation of U.S. citizens is the
primary tactic of those fraudulently applying for U.S. passports.
Applicants also commit fraud through other means. Passport fraud is
often linked to other crimes.
Passport Fraud Most Commonly Attempted by Imposters Using the
Legitimate Documents of Others:
State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security investigators stated that
imposters' use of assumed identities, supported by genuine but
fraudulently obtained identification documents, was a common and
successful way to fraudulently obtain a U.S. passport. This method
accounted for 69 percent of passport fraud detected in fiscal year
2004. Investigators found numerous examples of aliens and U.S. citizens
obtaining U.S. passports using a false identity. One example identified
by Diplomatic Security investigators involved an alien using another
person's identity to obtain a U.S. passport. In 2003, a woman using a
fraudulent identity claimed to be born in Puerto Rico[Footnote 7] and
provided a Puerto Rican birth certificate when applying for a passport
at a clerk of the court office in Florida. She also provided a Florida
driver's license.
Diplomatic Security investigators also found cases of U.S. citizens
using the documentation of others to hide their true identity. In 1997,
a naturalized U.S. citizen born in Cuba stole a Lear jet and
transported it to Nicaragua for use in charter services. At the time of
his arrest in 2003, he was using an assumed identity and possessed both
false and legitimate but fraudulently obtained identification
documents, including a U.S. passport in the name he used while posing
as a certified pilot and illegally providing flight instruction. Seized
at his residence when he was arrested were two Social Security cards,
four driver's licenses, three Puerto Rican birth certificates, one U.S.
passport, one pilot identification card, numerous credit cards and
checking account cards, and items used to make fraudulent documents. In
October 2004, he pled guilty to knowingly possessing five or more
"authentication devices" and false identification documents, for which
he was sentenced to 8 months' confinement. In another case, a man
wanted for murdering his wife obtained a Colorado driver's license and
a passport using a friend's Social Security number and date and place
of birth. Three and four years later he obtained renewal and
replacement passports, respectively, in the same assumed identity. He
was later arrested and pled guilty to making a false statement in an
application for a passport. He was sentenced to time served (about 7
months) and returned to California to stand trial for murdering his
wife. In a third example, a woman obtained a U.S. passport for herself
and her daughter using the assumed identity of a friend and that
friend's daughter. The individual fled the country, but was eventually
caught, returned to the United States, and tried for forgery, criminal
impersonation, and child abduction.
Various Other Methods Used to Fraudulently Obtain Passports:
Applicants commit passport fraud through other means, including
submitting false claims of lost, stolen, or mutilated passports; child
substitution; and counterfeit citizenship documents. Some fraudulently
obtain new passports by claiming to have lost their passport or had it
stolen or that it was damaged. For example, one individual who used
another person's Social Security number and Ohio driver's license to
report a lost passport obtained a replacement passport through the one-
day expedited service. This fraudulently obtained passport was used to
obtain entry into the United States 14 times in less than three years.
Diplomatic Security officials told us that another means of passport
fraud is when individuals obtain replacement passports by using expired
passports containing photographs of individuals they closely resemble.
This method of fraud is more easily and commonly committed with
children, with false applications based on photographs of children who
look similar to the child applicant.[Footnote 8] Assuming the identity
of a deceased person is another means of fraudulently applying for a
passport. Diplomatic Security investigated an individual who had been
issued a passport in the identity of a deceased person and was
receiving Social Security benefits in the deceased person's name. The
individual was charged with making false statements on a passport
application.
Passports Used to Commit Other Crimes:
According to State Bureau of Diplomatic Security documents, passport
fraud is often commited in connection with other crimes, including
narcotics trafficking, organized crime, money laundering, and alien
smuggling. According to Diplomatic Securityofficials, concerns exist
within the law enforcement and intelligence communities that passport
fraud could also be used to help facilitate acts of terrorism. Using a
passport with a false identity helps enable criminals to conceal their
movements and activities, according to a State Department document.
U.S. passports provide their holders free passage into our country with
much less scrutiny than is given to foreign citizens. U.S. passports
also allow visa-free passage into many countries around the world,
providing obvious benefits to criminals operating on an international
scale. According to State officials, the most common crime associated
with passport fraud is illegal immigration. For example, one woman was
recently convicted for organizing and leading a large-scale passport
fraud ring that involved recruiting American women to sell their
children's identities, so that foreign nationals could fraudulently
obtain passports and enter the United States illegally. According to
the Department of State, the woman targeted drug-dependent women and
their children, paying them about $300 for each identity and then using
the identities to apply for passports. The woman then sold the
fraudulently obtained passports to illegal aliens for as much as $6,000
each. Other leaders of alien smuggling rings have also been recently
convicted. One such ring had been smuggling hundreds of undocumented
aliens from Ecuador and other parts of South America into the United
States for fees of $12,000 to $14,000 each.
State Faces Challenges to Fraud Detection Efforts:
State faces a number of challenges to its passport fraud detection
efforts. Limited interagency information sharing between State and law
enforcement and other agencies makes it more difficult to protect U.S.
citizens from terrorists, criminals, and others who would harm the
United States. Intra-agency information sharing between passport-
issuing offices and headquarters, and between offices, is also limited
because State lacks a centralized and up-to-date fraud library
accessible by all staff. Additionally, insufficient fraud prevention
staffing, training, and oversight has resulted in reduced fraud
detection capabilities at the issuing offices. Finally, overstretched
investigative resources within State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security
and Office of Inspector General have prevented investigators from
devoting adequate time and continuity to passport fraud investigations.
Limited Interagency Information Sharing May Allow Individuals with
Terrorism Ties and Criminal Fugitives to Obtain Passports:
One of the key challenges to State's fraud detection efforts is limited
interagency information sharing. State does not have access to certain
information in the Terrorist Screening Center's (TSC) consolidated
watch list database. Additionally, State's CLASS name-check system does
not include names of all criminals wanted by federal and state law
enforcement authorities. Further, access to information from other
agencies varies.
State Lacks Access to TSC Database:
State currently lacks access to the names of U.S. citizen "persons of
interest" in TSC's consolidated terrorist watch list database. TSC was
created in 2003 to improve information sharing among government
agencies. By consolidating terrorist watch lists, TSC is intended to
enable federal agencies to access critical information quickly when a
suspected terrorist is encountered or stopped within the United States,
at the country's borders, or at embassies overseas. Because State's
CLASS name-check database for passports does not contain the TSC
information, U.S. citizens with possible ties to terrorism could
potentially obtain passports and travel internationally without the
knowledge of appropriate authorities.
Although TSC has been operational since December 1, 2003, State and TSC
did not begin exploring the possibility of systematically uploading
data from TSC database into passport CLASS until December 2004. State
initiated discussions with TSC after an official in State's Passport
Services Office attended an interagency meeting and became aware that
information on certain U.S. citizens was available in the TSC database.
A TSC official told us that the center had devoted substantial effort
in the first 16 months of its operation to reaching out to federal
agencies that could benefit from TSC information. However, efforts to
prevent the entry of or locate foreign citizens who would do harm to
the United States had been a higher immediate priority in the early
stages of operation than information-sharing efforts involving U.S.
citizens. The official also noted that, while TSC plays an outreach
role with other agencies, it is up to the individual agencies involved
to define their own specific information requirements.
State and TSC have not reached an agreement about the information-
sharing proposal, though State sent an official proposal to TSC in
January 2005. TSC has noted that it is in the process of addressing
certain legal questions relating to privacy. A TSC official told us
that she does not foresee any technical limitations because TSC already
has an "elaborate interface" with State's CLASS system for visas. She
added that TSC agrees that it is important to work out an agreement
with State.
State's CLASS Name-Check System Does Not Include Names of All Fugitives
Wanted by Federal and State Law Enforcement Authorities:
Because the FBI and other law enforcement agencies do not currently
provide State with the names of all individuals wanted by federal law
enforcement authorities, State's CLASS name-check system does not
contain the names of many federal fugitives, some wanted for murder and
other violent crimes; these fugitives could therefore obtain passports
and potentially flee the country. The subjects of federal felony arrest
warrants are not entitled to a U.S. passport. According to FBI
officials, FBI databases contain the names of approximately 37,000
individuals wanted on federal charges. State Department officials
acknowledge that many of these individuals are not listed in CLASS. We
tested the names of 43 different federal fugitives and found that just
23 were in CLASS; therefore, passport examiners would not be alerted
about the individuals' wanted status if any of the other 20 not in
CLASS applied for a passport. One of these 20 did obtain a U.S.
passport 17 months after the FBI had listed the individual in its
database as wanted.
A number of the 20 federal fugitives who were included in our test and
were found not to be in CLASS were suspected of serious crimes,
including murder. Table 1 lists the crimes suspected of the federal
fugitives in our test. Fourteen were wanted by the FBI--including one
on its Ten Most Wanted list (the names of all 14 were posted on the
FBI's Web site). Six other fugitives not in CLASS were wanted by other
federal agencies--two by the U.S. Marshal's Service; two by the Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives; and two by the U.S.
Postal Service.
Table 1: Crimes Suspected of 20 Federal Fugitives Not in CLASS Who Were
Included in Our Test:
Type of crime: Murder;
Number of fugitives: 5.
Type of crime: Felonious assault and related crimes;
Number of fugitives: 2.
Type of crime: Child sex offenses;
Number of fugitives: 4.
Type of crime: Drug trafficking;
Number of fugitives: 3.
Type of crime: Attempted murder;
Number of fugitives: 1.
Type of crime: Bombings;
Number of fugitives: 1.
Type of crime: Other crimes;
Number of fugitives: 4.
Sources: Various law enforcement agency databases and Web sites and the
State Department's CLASS name-check system.
[End of table]
State officials told us they had not initiated efforts to improve
information sharing with the FBI on passport-related matters until the
summer of 2004 because they had previously been under the impression
that the U.S. Marshal's Service was already sending to CLASS the names
of all fugitives wanted by federal law enforcement authorities. The
officials noted that the U.S. Marshal's Service had been cooperative in
providing names to CLASS from its main database of fugitives. However,
prior to the summer of 2004, State officials were not aware that the
information in the U.S. Marshal's database was not as comprehensive as
that contained in the FBI-operated National Crime Information Center
database. State officials became aware of this situation when the union
representing passport examiners brought to their attention that a
number of individuals on the FBI's Ten Most Wanted list were not in
CLASS.
In the summer of 2004, State requested, and the FBI agreed, to provide
the names from the FBI's Ten Most Wanted list, though State officials
told us they often obtain this information by periodically checking the
FBI's Web site. As part of these discussions, State and FBI explored
other information-sharing opportunities as well, and FBI headquarters
officials sent a message instructing agents in its field offices how to
provide names of U.S. citizens who are FBI fugitives (other than those
from the Ten Most Wanted list) to State on a case-by-case basis.
Additionally, State began discussions with the FBI about receiving
information on individuals with FBI warrants on a more routine and
comprehensive basis. During the most recent negotiations, in December
2004, FBI officials told State officials that they would need a written
proposal outlining State's specific technical and information needs,
following which negotiations could begin to develop a formal agreement.
One possibility that was discussed for additional name sharing was for
the FBI to send State weekly extracts from its databases, while another
possibility would be to give State officials the ability to access the
FBI's wanted-persons database. According to State, it sent a written
request to the FBI outlining its needs in April 2005. State also noted
that it had reached agreement in principal with the FBI on information
sharing efforts related to FBI fugitives.
According to FBI officials, State requested that the FBI provide only
the names of FBI fugitives and not those of individuals wanted by other
federal law enforcement entities. A State official told us that the
information provided by the U.S. Marshal's Service together with that
to be requested from the FBI would enable State to meet its regulatory
requirement that it not issue passports to subjects of federal felony
arrest warrants. However, we noted that the limited information State
was receiving on fugitives wanted by the U.S. Marshal's Service was not
as comprehensive or up to date as State officials believed: two of nine
individuals wanted by the U.S. Marshal's Service were not in CLASS at
the time of our test. The FBI is the only law enforcement agency that
systematically compiles comprehensive information on individuals wanted
by all federal law enforcement agencies, and, according to FBI
officials, it is the logical agency to provide such comprehensive
information to State.
The FBI is also the only law enforcement agency that compiles
comprehensive information on individuals wanted by state and local
authorities. According to FBI officials, FBI databases contain the
names of approximately 1.2 million individuals wanted on state and
local charges nationwide. FBI officials told us they believed it would
be more useful for State to have a more comprehensive list of names
that included both federal and state fugitives. These officials pointed
out that some of the most serious crimes committed often involve only
state and local charges. We tested the names of 24 different state
fugitives and found that just 7 were in CLASS; therefore, the CLASS
system would not flag any of the other 17, were they to apply for a
passport.[Footnote 9] Table 2 lists the crimes suspected of the 17
state fugitives not in CLASS who were included in our test.
Table 2: Crimes Suspected of 17 State Fugitives Not in CLASS Who Were
Included in Our Test:
Type of crime: Murder;
Number of fugitives: 4.
Type of crime: Felonious assault and related crimes;
Number of fugitives: 7.
Type of crime: Child sex offenses;
Number of fugitives: 1.
Type of crime: Attempted murder;
Number of fugitives: 1.
Type of crime: Child kidnapping;
Number of fugitives: 1.
Type of crime: Other crimes;
Number of fugitives: 3.
Sources: Various law enforcement agency databases and Web sites and the
State Department's CLASS name-check system.
[End of table]
State Department officials told us that having a comprehensive list of
names that included both federal and state fugitives could "clog"
State's CLASS system and slow the passport adjudication process. They
also expressed concern that the course of action required of State
would not always be clear for cases involving passport applicants
wanted on state charges. The officials pointed out that, though the law
is specific about denying passports to individuals wanted on federal
felony charges, the law was not as clear cut about doing so in the case
of state fugitives. However, FBI officials told us that, at a minimum,
State could notify law enforcement authorities that such individuals
were applying for a passport. Then, the relevant law enforcement
authorities could make their own determination about whether to obtain
a court order that would provide a legal basis for denying the passport
or to simply arrest the individual or take some other action. State
officials noted that, to work effectively, such an arrangement would
require the FBI to establish some sort of liaison office that State
could contact in such instances.
Access to Information from Other Agencies Varies:
State receives varying degrees of information from several other
agencies, including the Department of Health and Human Services, the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Social Security
Administration (SSA), and individual state departments of motor
vehicles.
* Health and Human Services provides names of parents who have been
certified by a state agency as owing more than $5,000 in child support
payments and are therefore not eligible for a U.S. passport. According
to State officials, this information-sharing arrangement has been very
successful in preventing such individuals from obtaining passports.
* State is negotiating with DHS to gain access to naturalization
records to verify applicants' citizenship. State officials currently
rely on ad hoc information from DHS colleagues, according to Passport
Services officials, and irregular notifications from DHS when
fraudulent passports are confiscated.
* State currently uses limited information from Social Security records
which are quickly becoming outdated that SSA provided to State on a one-
time basis in 2002. Though State and SSA signed an April 2004
memorandum of understanding giving State access to SSA's main database
to help verify passport applicant's identity, the memorandum had not
been implemented as of March 2005 because the system was still being
tested to ensure SSA privacy standards. The agreement will not include
access to SSA death records, though State officials said they are
exploring the possibility of obtaining these records in the future.
* Issuing office officials have contact with officials in individual
state departments of motor vehicles to confirm, for example, the
physical characteristics of individuals presenting drivers licenses as
identification. However, these are informal contacts cultivated by
individual State officials.
Limited Intra-agency Information Sharing and Unclear Fraud Support
Responsibilities May Be Affecting Fraud Detection Capability:
State does not maintain a centralized and up-to-date electronic fraud
prevention library, which would enable passport-issuing office
personnel in the United States, and overseas, to efficiently share
fraud prevention information and tools. As a result, fraud prevention
information is provided inconsistently to examiners among the 16
domestic offices. Though offices share information through local fraud
prevention files or by e-mailing relevant fraud updates, the types and
amount of information shared with passport examiners in each office
vary widely. For example, at some offices, examiners maintain
individual sets of fraud prevention materials. Some print out
individual fraud alerts and other related documents and file them in
binders. Others archive individual e-mails and other documents
electronically. Some examiners told us that the sheer volume of fraud-
related materials they receive makes it impossible to maintain and use
these resources in an organized and systematic way.
In contrast, the issuing office in Seattle developed its own online
fraud library that contained comprehensive information and links on
fraud alerts nationwide. Some information was organized by individual
state, including information such as the specific serial numbers of
blank birth certificates that were stolen. The library contained
sections on Social Security information, government documents related
to U.S. territories, recent fraud updates, and fraud-related news,
among other information. It included examples of legitimate as well as
counterfeit naturalization certificates, false driver's licenses, fraud
prevention training materials, and a host of other fraud prevention
information resources and links. Seattle offered a static version of
its library on CD-ROM to other issuing offices at an interoffice fraud
prevention conference in 2003. A few of the other offices used this
resource to varying degrees, but their versions have not been regularly
updated since 2003. An Office of Consular Fraud Prevention official
told us that they uploaded at least some of the information onto its
Web site, but that material has not been regularly updated, either. The
developer of the library has since been reassigned. Most of the 16
fraud prevention managers we talked to believed that the Bureau of
Consular Affairs should maintain one centralized, up-to-date fraud
prevention library, similar to the Seattle-developed model, that serves
offices nationwide.
Consular Affairs' Office of Consular Fraud Prevention maintains a Web
site and "e-room" with some information on fraud alerts, lost and
stolen state birth documents, and other resources related to fraud
detection, though fraud prevention officials told us the Web site is
not kept up to date, is poorly organized, and is difficult to navigate.
Fraud prevention officials also told us that most of the information on
the site relates to visas rather than U.S. passports. We directly
observed information available on this Web site and in the "e-room"
during separate visits to State's passport-issuing offices and noted
that some of the material was outdated. For example, in September 2004,
we noted that certain information on state birth and death records had
not been updated since September 2003 and that information on
fraudulent U.S. passports had not been updated in more than a year.
In addition to limited information sharing, State's fraud prevention
support services are not closely coordinated with the passport-issuing
offices. Multiple headquarters offices, including the Office of
Consular Fraud Prevention and Office of Passport Policy Planning and
Legal Advisory Services, claim some responsibility for fraud trend
analysis and fraud prevention support but fraud detection personnel in
issuing offices are unclear as to which offices provide which services.
Most of the 16 fraud prevention managers we interviewed said they do
not clearly understand the respective roles of these headquarters
offices in helping them with their fraud detection efforts. Also, while
officials in these two offices said they are responsible for analyzing
fraud-related data to identify national or region-specific trends on
factors such as the types, methods, and perpetrators of fraud, most
fraud prevention managers told us they could not recall having received
much analysis on fraud trends from these offices beyond individual
fraud alerts. We noted that the Office of Passport Policy Planning and
Legal Advisory Services only recently began to perform some basic fraud
trend analysis on a systematic basis.[Footnote 10] Office of Consular
Fraud Prevention officials told us they spend most of their time on
visa fraud because each domestic agency has its own fraud detection
apparatus. While this office provides some training services, these are
limited, and much other training is provided by issuing offices and is
not coordinated with headquarters.
Insufficient Fraud Prevention Staffing, Training, Oversight, and
Investigative Resources Make Fraud Detection More Difficult:
Limited fraud prevention staffing, training, oversight, and
investigative resources pose additional challenges to fraud detection
efforts. A staffing realignment reduced the time available to Fraud
Prevention Mangers to review cases and make decisions on fraud
referrals. Additionally, interoffice transfers of passport
adjudications have, in some cases, led to fewer fraud referrals back to
the originating offices. Further, State's lack of a standard refresher
training curriculum and schedule has led to uneven provision of such
training. Additionally, sporadic training and limited oversight of
passport application acceptance agents constitute a significant fraud
vulnerability. Finally, overstretched investigative resources hinder
fraud detection efforts.
Staffing Change Reduced Time Available to Review Fraud Cases:
In January 2004, State eliminated the assistant fraud prevention
manager position that had existed at most of its domestic passport-
issuing offices, and most Fraud Prevention Managers believe that this
action was harmful to their fraud detection program, in part by
overextending their own responsibilities. State eliminated the
permanent role of assistant primarily to expand participation of senior
passport examiners serving in that role on a rotational basis; the
purpose was to help the examiners gain a deeper knowledge of the
subject matter and, in turn, enhance overall fraud detection efforts
when the examiners returned to adjudicating passport applications.
[Footnote 11] Prior to the permanent position being abolished, 12 of
the 16 passport issuing offices had at least one assistant manager (2
offices had two).[Footnote 12] Of the 4 offices that did not have
permanent assistants, 3 did not have them because they had relatively
low workloads and 1 had been in operation only for a few years and had
not yet filled the position. Managers at 10 of the 12 offices that had
assistants told us that the loss of this position had been harmful to
their fraud detection program. In particular, managers indicated that
the loss of their assistant impacted their own ability to concentrate
on fraud detection by adding to their workload significant additional
training, administrative, and networking responsibilities. Fraud
Prevention Managers also said that taking on their assistant's tasks
had diverted their attention from their fraud trend analysis as well as
their preparation of reports to Washington, D.C., and cases for
referral to Diplomatic Security. Some managers said they are now
performing more case work than before because they lack an experienced
assistant and do not always believe they can rely on rotating staff to
do this work unsupervised.
Fraud Prevention Managers and other State officials have linked
declining fraud referrals to the loss of the assistant fraud prevention
manager position. In the 12 offices that previously had permanent
assistants, fraud referral rates from the managers to Diplomatic
Security decreased overall by almost 25 percent from fiscal year 2003
through 2004,[Footnote 13] the period during which the position was
eliminated, and this percentage was much higher in some
offices.[Footnote 14] Fraud Prevention offices screen fraud referrals
received from examiners, perform certain checks on applicant
information, and assess the examiner's rationale for making the
referral before the fraud prevention manager can determine whether to
refer the case to Diplomatic Security for further investigation.
Without their assistants helping them with these and other duties,
managers said they are making fewer fraud referrals to Diplomatic
Security because they lack the time and do not believe they can fully
rely on new rotational staff to take on this responsibility. In one
issuing office where referrals to Diplomatic Security were down 41
percent, the manager indicated that loss of his assistant had slowed
his ability to get cases to Diplomatic Security because he had to
perform many of the assistant's duties. A Diplomatic Security agent in
another issuing office, where the fraud referral rate was down by 55
percent, said the overall effect of eliminating the assistant manager
position had been harmful to fraud detection efforts at least in part
because the permanently assigned assistants had developed valuable
personal contacts and cooperative arrangements over time with state and
local law enforcement authorities, department of motor vehicle
officials, and others, and that such relationships could not be easily
developed or maintained by rotating staff.
Most Fraud Prevention Managers acknowledged the value of having senior
examiners rotate into the fraud prevention office for temporary
assignments; however, the managers said that rotating staff should
augment the efforts of a permanent assistant and not serve in place of
that role. Passport Services management told us they were not planning
to re-establish the permanent assistant role,[Footnote 15] but that
they are in the process of filling one to two additional fraud
prevention manager positions at each of the 2 offices with the largest
workloads nationwide. Both of these offices operate multiple shifts
each workday, and the new managers are intended to provide more
comprehensive fraud prevention support for all of the shifts. State
also plans to establish one additional fraud prevention manager
position at another issuing office with a large workload. There are no
current plans for additional positions at any of the other 13 offices.
Interoffice Transfers of Passport Adjudication Workload Result, in Some
Cases, in Fewer Fraud Referrals Back to Originating Office:
As adjudication workload and production capacity fluctuate at
individual passport-issuing offices, State routinely transfers
adjudication cases among the different offices to keep workload and
capacity in balance at each location. Fraud Prevention Managers at a
number of issuing offices said they had noticed that a lower percentage
of fraud referrals are being returned to them from the 3 offices that
were assigned the bulk of workload transfers from other
offices.[Footnote 16] The Fraud Prevention Managers noted that, over
the course of a year, the many thousands of passport applications
originating from one particular region should generally be expected to
generate a consistent rate of fraud referrals. In fiscal year 2004, 28
percent of passport applications were transferred to 1 of these 3
offices for adjudication, while other issuing offices adjudicated 72
percent. Although these 3 offices received 28 percent of the
applications, they provided only 11 percent of total fraud referrals to
the originating agencies; the other 89 percent were provided by
regional agency passport examiners (74 percent) and others, including
acceptance agents (15 percent). For fiscal year 2003, the 3 processing
centers adjudicated 26 percent of the applications but provided only 8
percent of the fraud referrals. In 2004, 1 of the issuing offices
transferred out to processing centers 63 percent of its applications
(about 287,000) but received back from the processing centers only 2
percent of the fraud referrals it generated that year. In 2003, this
office transferred out 66 percent of its workload, while receiving back
only 8 percent of its total fraud referrals.
Fraud Prevention Managers and other officials told us that one reason
fewer fraud referrals return from these 3 offices is that passport
examiners handling workload transfers from a number of different
regions are not as familiar with the demographics, neighborhoods, and
other local characteristics of a particular region as are the examiners
who live and work there. For example, some officials noted that, in
instances when they suspect fraud, they might telephone the applicants
to ask for additional information so they can engage in polite
conversation and ask casual questions, such as where they grew up, what
school they attended, and other information. The officials noted that,
since they are familiar with at least some of the neighborhoods and
schools in the area, applicants' answers to such questions may quickly
indicate whether their application is likely to be fraudulent. One
examiner in an office that handled workload transfers from areas with
large Spanish-speaking populations said that the office had an
insufficient number of examiners who were fluent in Spanish. She and
other officials emphasized the usefulness of that skill in detecting
dialects, accents, handwriting, and cultural references that conflict
with information provided in passport applications. Moreover, some
officials added that passport examiners at centers handling workload
transfers are not always well trained in region-specific fraud
indicators and do not have the same opportunity to interact directly
with applicants as do the examiners working at public counters in
regional offices.
State Lacks Established Refresher Training Curriculum; Such Training Is
Provided Unevenly across Offices:
State has not established a core curriculum and ongoing training
requirements for experienced passport examiners, and thus such training
is provided unevenly at different passport-issuing offices. While State
recently developed a standardized training program for new hires that
was first given in August 2004, the Fraud Prevention Managers at each
passport-issuing office have developed their own fraud detection
refresher training approaches and materials. We reviewed the training
programs and materials at all 7 issuing offices we visited and
discussed the programs and materials at other offices with the
remaining nine Fraud Prevention Managers by telephone and found that
the topics covered and the amount and depth of training varied widely
by office. Some had developed region-specific materials; others relied
more heavily on materials that had been developed by passport officials
in Washington, D.C., much of which were outdated. Some scheduled more
regular training sessions, and others held training more sporadically.
Several examiners told us they had not received any formal, interactive
fraud prevention training in at least 4 years.
Some Fraud Prevention Managers hold brief discussions on specific fraud
cases and trends at monthly staff meetings, and they rely on these
discussions to serve as refresher training. Some Fraud Prevention
Managers occasionally invite officials from other government agencies,
such as the Secret Service or DHS, to share their fraud expertise.
However, these meetings take place when time is available and may be
canceled during busy periods. For example, officials at one issuing
office said the monthly meetings had not been held for several months
because of high workload; another manager said he rarely has time for
any monthly meetings; and two others said they do not hold such
discussions but e-mail to examiners recent fraud trend alerts and
information.
Sporadic Training and Limited Oversight of Acceptance Agents Constitute
Significant Fraud Vulnerability:
Numerous passport-issuing agency officials and Diplomatic Security
investigators told us that the acceptance agent program is a
significant fraud vulnerability. Examples of acceptance agent problems
that were brought to our attention include important information
missing from documentation, such as evidence that birth certificates
and parents' affidavits concerning permission for children to travel
had been received, and identification photos that did not match the
applicant presenting the documentation. Officials at one issuing office
said that their office often sees the same mistakes multiple times from
the same agency.
These officials attributed problems with applications received through
acceptance agents to the sporadic training provided for and limited
oversight of acceptance agents. State has almost 7,000 passport
acceptance agency offices, and none of the 16 issuing offices provide
comprehensive annual training or oversight to all acceptance agency
offices in their area. Instead, the issuing offices concentrate their
training and oversight visits on agency offices geographically nearest
to the issuing offices, those in large population centers, those where
examiners and Fraud Prevention Managers had reported problems, and
those in high fraud areas.[Footnote 17] Larger issuing offices in
particular have trouble reaching acceptance agency staff. At one larger
issuing office with about 1,700 acceptance facilities, the Fraud
Prevention Manager said he does not have time to provide acceptance
agent training and that it is difficult for issuing office staff to
visit many agencies. A manager at another large issuing office that
covers an area including 11 states said she does not have time to visit
some agencies in less populated areas and concentrates her efforts in
higher fraud areas, which tend to be in the larger cities.
Officials at one issuing agency noted that State had worked together
with the U.S. Postal Service to develop CD-ROM training for use at
Postal Service acceptance facilities. The officials noted that, while
they believed the training had been well designed, State does not have
any way of tracking whether all postal employees responsible for
accepting passport applications actually receive the training.
Additionally, issuing office officials also said that acceptance agent
staff should receive training from outside agencies such as state
departments of motor vehicles, local police, and the FBI on document
authenticity and fraud. Other issuing office officials said acceptance
agents should also receive interview training.
Finally, while State officials told us it is a requirement that all
acceptance agency staff be U.S. citizens, issuing agency officials told
us they have no way of verifying that all of them are. Management
officials at one passport-issuing office told us that, while their
region included more than 1,000 acceptance facilities, the office did
not maintain records of the names of individuals accepting passport
applications at those facilities and the office did not keep track of
how many individuals acted in this capacity at those facilities.
Overstretched Investigative Resources Hinder Fraud Detection:
Although State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security has provided additional
resources for investigating passport fraud in recent years, its agents
must still divide their time among a number of competing demands, some
of which are considered a higher priority than investigating passport
fraud. A Diplomatic Security official told us that, after the September
11 terrorist attacks, the bureau hired about 300 additional agents, at
least partially to reduce investigative backlogs.[Footnote 18]
Diplomatic Security and passport officials told us that, while the
increased staff resources had helped reduce backlogs to some degree,
agents assigned to passport fraud investigations are still routinely
pulled away for other assignments. For example, a significant number of
agents from field offices across the country are required to serve on
"protective detail" in New York when the United Nations General
Assembly convenes and at various other diplomatic events. We found that
at most of the offices we visited during our fieldwork, few of the
agents responsible for investigating passport fraud were actually
physically present. At one office, all of the agents responsible for
investigating passport fraud were on temporary duty elsewhere, and the
one agent who was covering the office in their absence had left his
assignment at the local Joint Terrorism Task Force to do so. A number
of agents were on temporary assignments overseas in connection with the
2004 Summer Olympics in Greece. Agents at one office said that five of
the eight agents involved in passport fraud investigations there were
being sent for temporary duty in Iraq, as were many of their colleagues
at other offices.
Agents at all but 2 of the 7 bureau field offices we visited said they
are unable to devote adequate time and continuity to investigating
passport fraud because of the competing demands on their time. The
agents expressed concerns about the resulting vulnerability to the
integrity of the U.S. passport system. We noted that the number of new
passport fraud investigations had declined by more than 25 percent over
the last five years, though Diplomatic Security officials attributed
this trend, among other factors, to refined targeting of cases that
merit investigation. A number of Diplomatic Security agents pointed out
that passport fraud investigations are often "time sensitive" and that
opportunities to solve cases are often lost when too much time elapses
before investigative efforts are initiated or when such efforts occur
in fits and starts. The rotation of Diplomatic Security agents to new
permanent duty stations every 2 or 3 years also makes it more difficult
to maintain continuity for individual investigations. Passport-issuing
office officials told us that cases referred to Diplomatic Security
sometimes take a year or more to investigate. The officials also said
that the investigating agents often do not have time to apprise
passport-issuing offices of the status of individual investigations
and, thus, that the opportunity to convey valuable "real-time" feedback
on the quality of fraud referrals was lost. The Special-Agent-in-Charge
of a large Diplomatic Security field office in a high fraud region
expressed serious concern that, in 2002, the Bureau of Diplomatic
Security began requiring that most cases be closed after 12 months,
whether or not the investigations were complete. This requirement was
meant to reduce the backlog of old cases. The agent said that about 400
cases at his office were closed before the investigations were complete
and that this action had taken place over his strenuous objection. A
Diplomatic Security official in Washington, D.C., told us that, while
field offices had been encouraged to close old cases that were not
likely to be resolved, there had not been a formal requirement to close
all cases that had remained open beyond a specific time limit.
State officials agreed that Diplomatic Security agents are not
currently able to devote adequate attention to investigating passport
fraud. State officials told us that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security
plans to hire 56 new investigative agents over the next few years to
augment passport fraud investigation resources at each Diplomatic
Security field office nationwide. According to State officials, these
new investigators will be solely dedicated to investigating passport
and visa fraud and will not participate in protective details or other
temporary duties that would distract them from their investigative
work. The new hires are to be civil service employees and will not be
subject to the frequent rotations to new duty stations that regular
Diplomatic Security agents experience as foreign-service officers.
State Department OIG officials told us that the OIG also has authority
to investigate passport fraud. However, OIG officials told us that
budgetary constraints and related staffing reductions in recent years
had severely restricted its ability to investigate such fraud. The OIG
has invested more resources in efforts to pursue visa fraud, primarily
because visa fraud is more prevalent than passport fraud. The OIG has
focused most of its more recent passport-related efforts on assessing
systematic weaknesses in fraud detection efforts. The idea was to
produce broad findings that would be of greater benefit than individual
passport fraud investigations could be expected to yield with such a
low investment of staff resources available.
Effect of New Examiner Performance Standards on Fraud Detection Remains
Unclear:
Although State's approach to developing new nationwide passport
examiner production standards, which were implemented in January 2004,
raises a number of methodological concerns, subsequent changes to the
standards make an assessment of their impact on fraud detection
premature. State intended that the new nationwide standards would make
performance expectations and work processes more uniform among its 16
issuing offices. State tested examiner production capabilities before
standardizing the passport examination process and used the test
results in conjunction with old standards to set new nationwide
standards. The new standards put additional emphasis on achieving
quantitative targets. Responding to concerns about their fairness,
State made a number of modifications to the production standards during
the year, making it unclear what impact the standards have had on
passport fraud detection.
Methodological Concerns Exist Regarding State's Development and
Implementation of New Performance Standards:
Consular Affairs officials stated that they created nationwide
production standards to make performance expectations of examiners and
the passport examination process as similar as possible at all domestic
passport offices. Though the issuing offices already had production
standards for their examiners, the average number of cases examiners
were expected to adjudicate per hour varied from office to office,
creating confusion and raising questions about equity among passport
examiners, according to State officials. In an effort to identify
reasonable production standards that would be applicable nationwide,
State tested examiner production capabilities at all of its domestic
passport-issuing offices. Issuing office management in each of the 16
offices measured the number of passport cases completed by each
examiner over a two-week period in April 2003 and computed the hourly
average for their office. Management did not inform examiners that
their production rates were being measured for the test.
Passport Services officials set the new performance standards, but they
did not fully standardize some work processes and methods of counting
production until after the new numbers were set. After considering
nationwide test results, offices' old standards, and passport office
partnership council feedback,[Footnote 19] headquarters officials at
Passport Services decided on the new standards for both desk and
counter adjudication. The new standards were implemented in January
2004 and varied by pay grade level. After deciding on the production
standards, State standardized the work processes and counting methods
that were the basis of examiners' production averages. For example,
State officials encouraged all domestic passport offices to include
expedited cases in examiners' production averages to make examiners'
work more comparable nationwide, though some examiners and issuing
office managers said expedited cases take longer to complete because
they require additional steps. Also, State's decision to base
examiner's production averages on a 7-hour day starting in January 2004
marked a change for offices that previously had measured production
based on a 6½-or 7½-hour day.
State's decision to measure and compile nationwide production averages
before fully standardizing the application examination process and the
way completed cases are counted at the passport-issuing offices limited
the validity of State's test results. GAO has reported that consistency
is a key element for data reliability and that the data obtained and
used must be clear and well-defined enough to yield similar results in
similar analyses. However, we found that State had attempted to
uniformly measure production capacity at its 16 issuing offices when
the individual offices were still using differing work processes and
methods of counting production. Upon visiting 7 of the 16 offices after
the new standards had been implemented, we found that several
differences in passport adjudication practices and methods for counting
production still existed. For example, at some offices, the more
complex and time-consuming cases were included in examiner production
averages, while at other offices they were not. In addition, issuing
office and headquarters management told us that contract staff at some
issuing offices performed certain tasks that helped speed up examiner
production, while such tasks were performed by examiners at other
offices. State told us 5 months after they had implemented the
standards that domestic offices' requirements for counting completed
cases still varied and that this situation could make it easier for
examiners at some offices to meet their production standard. State
officials acknowledged that these processes and procedures should be
standardized to ensure that the standards are fair. If State had
standardized its work processes and procedures for measuring
performance before testing production, the test would presumably have
produced more valid results that could have been used to set uniformly
attainable production standards.
Production Standards' Effect on Fraud Detection Unclear:
Because State adjusted the impact of production on examiners'
evaluations, the production standards implemented in 2004 placed
increased pressure on examiners to focus on production numbers. Before
State introduced the new standards, quantitative production
requirements were grouped together with qualitative measures for
performance ratings. For example, one former evaluative element paired
the requirement that a GS-11 examiner adjudicate 25 to 28 cases per
hour with a qualitative assessment of the examiner's overall knowledge
of the adjudication process. Supervisors and management officials at
some of the domestic passport offices we visited said that if in
previous years examiners failed to meet their minimum production
number, the supervisor could still rate the examiner fully successful
based on better performance against qualitative standards within the
same rating element. However, the 2004 standards separated the
quantitative performance measures--production numbers and error rates-
-from qualitative elements. Examiners not meeting the minimum hourly
production average for the year were to receive an unsuccessful rating
on that performance element, regardless of qualitative
performance.[Footnote 20] An unsuccessful rating in one element results
in an unsuccessful rating overall, even if the examiner rates
outstanding in the other three skill elements. State officials said
they made this change to clarify the criteria on which examiners were
rated.
Since the new production standards were set, State has incorporated
computer upgrades and process changes that have enhanced fraud
detection, but may have slowed the examination process. For example, at
passport office counters, State upgraded the computer system to allow
examiners to perform cashiering functions and to produce a receipt
immediately for all financial transactions, thus adding time to each
case requiring a fee. In addition, State added a page to the standard
passport application in March 2005, thus requiring more information
from each new applicant. Headquarters officials, regional office
managers, and examiners agreed that these changes enhance fraud
prevention efforts. But while they were pleased with the enhanced fraud
detection capabilities, some examiners and examiners' union
representatives told us the changes may slow production now that
examiners are required, for example, to scrutinize longer applications.
Passport examiners and union officials argue that the new standards'
emphasis on production combined with changes to the examination process
have made it more difficult to meet the new production standards
without shortcutting fraud detection efforts. Some examiners we talked
to said changes to annual evaluation criteria and to the examination
process put additional pressure on them to focus on their numbers more
than their efforts to detect fraud. Some also told us they believe the
new standards were evidence that management prioritizes quantity of
work over quality. Union representatives said examiners frequently
complain that, to achieve their number targets, they have to skip
required steps in the examination process or scrutinize applications
less thoroughly than necessary to adequately detect fraud. A number of
examiners at each domestic office we visited either stated they take
shortcuts themselves or know colleagues who do. Some said, for example,
they do not thoroughly check Social Security information provided on
the computerized examination software against the information on the
individual's application. Others reported they do not thoroughly check
all "hits" generated by the computer software--information that may
help identify applicants flagged as fugitives or raise other concerns
in one of State's passport-related databases. An examiner noted that
most hits, when further scrutinized, prove to be invalid, and thus the
chances of missing a valid hit were low. Union representatives said
they are hesitant to share such examples with passport management
because examiners fear negative repercussions.
Headquarters and regional office management said it is difficult to
assess the number or magnitude of shortcuts being taken and the impact
of shortcuts on fraud detection. Management officials at some of the
offices we visited said supervisors audit only a limited percentage of
cases after they are examined and that audits would not necessarily
reveal that examiners had taken shortcuts. The impact of shortcuts on
fraud detection is also difficult to assess because the overall
incidence of detected fraud is low. One examiner noted that if she
failed to check any fraud indicators at all and granted a passport to
every applicant, she would be right more than 99 percent of the time.
State data show that less than one-half of 1 percent of applications in
2004 were identified as potential frauds.
Because State has modified the 2004 production standards in response to
management, union, and examiner concerns, the standards' effect on
fraud detection is unclear. State officials told us that, from the
outset of implementing the production standards, they had planned to
reassess the standards regularly and to adjust them as necessary. In
July 2004, State responded to a union suggestion to reduce by one-half
hour the number of daily work hours used to calculate the hourly
production average, thus acknowledging that time examiners spend doing
essential tasks, such as reading e-mail updates, should not be factored
into their hourly production averages. Both desk and counter
examination production standards were lowered during 2004, and certain
offices were exempted from either desk or counter measurement due to
regional workload variations. One such exemption occurred in September
2004, when State informed regional management that neither New York nor
Hawaii should rate examiners on desk examination production averages in
2004 because their desk workloads were too low to enable a fair rating
of examiners. Also, headquarters passport management lowered the
counter production requirement for GS-9 and GS-11 passport examiners
retroactive to January 1, 2004. While about 63 examiners were not
achieving the required production rate after the first quarter of 2004,
all but 18 of State's approximately 480 examiners nationwide had met
the standards by the end of the year. Because State's changes to the
production standards continued throughout 2004, the standards' net
effect on fraud detection efforts remains unclear.
Conclusions:
Maintaining the integrity of the U.S. passport is an essential
component of State's efforts to help protect U.S. citizens from those
who would harm the United States. The steadily increasing volume of
passports issued each year underscores the importance of this task.
State has a range of tools and resources at its disposal to help detect
passport fraud, and it has taken a number of important measures in
recent years to enhance its efforts in this area. However, State still
faces a number of key challenges. Included among them is limited
information sharing with TSC, the FBI, and other agencies, making it
more difficult to protect the United States from terrorists, criminals,
and others. State has begun working with these agencies to address this
problem and is dependent on their cooperation to remedy it. Limited
intra-agency information sharing and insufficient fraud prevention
staffing, training, oversight, and investigative resources also make
fraud detection more difficult. Together, these challenges constitute a
serious concern to the overall effort to secure the borders of the
United States and protect its citizens.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To improve the coordination and execution of passport fraud detection
efforts, we recommend the Secretary of State take the following six
actions:
* Expedite, in consultation with the U.S. Attorney General, Director of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Secretary of Homeland
Security, arrangements to enhance interagency information sharing, and
reach agreement on a plan and timetable for doing so, to ensure that
State's CLASS system for passports contains a more comprehensive list
of individuals identified in the Terrorist Screening Center database as
well as state and federal fugitives and that such information is made
available to State in an efficient and timely manner.
* Establish and maintain a centralized and up-to-date electronic fraud
prevention library that would enable passport agency personnel at
different locations across the United States to efficiently access and
share fraud prevention information and tools.
* Consider designating additional positions for fraud prevention
coordination and training in some domestic passport-issuing offices.
* Assess the extent to which and reasons why workload transfers from
one domestic passport-issuing office to another were, in some cases,
associated with fewer fraud referrals, and take any corrective action
that may be necessary.
* Establish a core curriculum and ongoing fraud prevention training
requirements for all passport examiners, and program adequate time for
such training into the staffing and assignment processes at passport-
issuing offices.
* Strengthen fraud prevention training efforts and oversight of
passport acceptance agents.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
State provided written comments on a draft of this report (see app.
II). State generally concurred with our findings, conclusions, and
recommendations. State indicated that it had agreed in principle with
the FBI on information-sharing arrangements concerning subjects of
federal felony arrest warrants and planned to establish an automated
mechanism for obtaining information from the FBI on the subjects of
state warrants. State said that it was designing a centralized passport
"knowledgebase" for passport examiners that includes information on
fraud prevention resources. It said it would consider rotating GS-12
Adjudication Supervisors through local fraud prevention offices to
relieve Fraud Prevention Managers of some of their training
responsibilities. State is also establishing a standardized national
training program for passport examiners, instituting a regular
nationwide quality review program for passport acceptance agent work,
and adapting and expanding computer-based training for U.S. Postal
Service acceptance facilities for more widespread use among acceptance
agents nationwide. State did not address our recommendation that it
assess the extent to which and reasons why workload transfers from one
domestic passport issuing-office to another were, in some cases,
associated with fewer fraud referrals and to take any corrective action
that may be necessary.
The FBI also reviewed a draft of this report for technical accuracy.
The FBI's comments have been incorporated into the report, as
appropriate.
As we agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the
contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until
30 days from the date of this letter. We will then send copies to
interested congressional committees and the Secretary of State. We will
also make copies available to others on request. In addition, the
report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-4128 or [Hyperlink, fordj@gao.gov]. Additional
GAO contacts and staff acknowledgments are listed in appendix III.
Signed by:
Jess T. Ford:
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
[End of section]
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To examine how passport fraud is committed, we reviewed State
Department Bureau of Diplomatic Security closed passport fraud case
files and Bureau of Consular Affairs statistics on passport fraud. We
also met with officials at State's Diplomatic Security Headquarters
Criminal Division and at Diplomatic Security's Field Office in Miami
and conducted telephone interviews with Diplomatic Security officials
at field offices in Chicago and San Francisco.
To identify and assess the key challenges State faces in detecting
passport fraud, we directly observed State's fraud detection efforts at
7 of its 16 domestic passport-issuing offices; tested State's use of
electronic databases for fraud detection; analyzed fraud referral
statistics from the Bureaus of Consular Affairs and Diplomatic
Security; and interviewed cognizant officials in both of these bureaus.
We visited State's passport-issuing offices in Charleston, South
Carolina; Los Angeles; Miami; New Orleans; New York; Seattle; and
Washington, D.C. We chose these fieldwork locations to gain an
appropriate mix of geographic coverage, workload, levels and types of
passport fraud, and counter-to-desk adjudication ratios. In addition,
we chose the Charleston office because it is one of the two passport
"megacenters" responsible for adjudicating applications from other
regions.
To test the electronic databases that State uses to help detect fraud,
we ran the names of 67 different federal and state fugitives against
State's CLASS name-check system. Our test was not intended to employ a
representative sample, and we did not generalize our results to the
universe of wanted U.S. citizens. The test results were intended to
provide a firsthand illustration of a problem that State and Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) officials acknowledge exists.
* We selected names of individuals with federal and state warrants from
a variety of government agencies and offices--the FBI; U.S. Marshal's
Service; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives; Drug
Enforcement Administration; U.S. Postal Service; and various state and
local law enforcement offices. Many of the names were taken from
publicly available Internet sites, including those operated by the FBI
and Department of Justice.
* We verified that all of the individuals were listed as "wanted" in
the FBI's national criminal database as of the date of our test in
December 2004.
* In December 2004, we supervised the entry of the name and date of
birth of each of the 67 fugitives into State's system by an Office of
Passport Services official. Three GAO employees verified each entry's
accuracy.
* For each entry, we recorded whether State's system contained a record
of that fugitive and, if it did, we noted the type of "lookout" that
had been entered, such as wanted person information from the U.S.
Marshal's Service or a child support "lookout" from Health and Human
Services.
We analyzed fraud referral statistics from the Consular Affairs Office
of Passport Services and the Bureau of Diplomatic Security for fiscal
years 2000 through 2004. We reviewed the statistics and verified their
accuracy by comparing select data with the individual issuing offices'
monthly reports that are State's original source for compiling these
data. Together with Passport Services officials, we identified the
methods used to capture and compile the data and determined that the
data were sufficiently reliable and generally usable for the purposes
of our study. We did not use data elements that we did not deem
reliable.
At each of the 7 offices we visited, we conducted interviews with
officials such as the Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director,
Fraud Prevention Manager, Adjudication Manager, Customer Service
Manager, supervisors, and certain passport examiners.[Footnote 21] We
interviewed some examiners who expressed an interest in meeting with us
and chose others at random. We conducted telephone interviews with the
Fraud Prevention Managers at all 9 of the offices that we did not
visit, using a list of questions identical to that used in interviews
with their counterparts at offices we visited. We also met with
Diplomatic Security agents attached to field offices responsible for
investigating fraud suspected at the offices we visited. In addition,
we interviewed cognizant officials in Consular Affairs' Office of
Passport Services, Office of Consular Fraud Prevention, and Consular
Systems Division; the Bureau of Diplomatic Security; and the Office of
the Inspector General. We also met with FBI and Terrorist Screening
Center officials, including attorneys, to discuss technical and
potential legal issues that might affect interagency information
sharing arrangements with State.
To assess the potential effect of new performance standards, which were
implemented in January 2004, on State's fraud detection efforts, we
reviewed the methodology and criteria that State used in developing the
new standards. We compared the adjudication processes that were in
place when State tested examiner production capacity with those in
place when State implemented the new standards and against which it
applied them. We interviewed passport examiner union representatives
and select examiners at the 7 offices we visited and the fraud
prevention managers at all 16 domestic passport-issuing offices to
obtain their views on the potential effect of the new standards on
fraud detection efforts. We also obtained views on the same subject
from the Consular Affairs Passport Services officials who oversaw the
development and implementation of and ongoing adjustments to the new
standards.
We conducted our work from May 2004 to March 2005 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of State:
United States Department of State:
Assistant Secretary and Chief Financial Officer:
Washington, D.C. 20520:
MAY 12 2005:
Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers:
Managing Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001:
Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers:
We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "STATE
DEPARTMENT: Improvements Needed to Strengthened U.S. Passport Fraud
Detection Efforts," GAO Job Code 320267.
The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.
If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact John
Hotchner, Director, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Office of Passport
Services, at (202) 663-2427.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Christopher B. Burnham:
cc: GAO - Michael Courts;
CA - Maura Harty;
State/OIG - Mark Duda:
Department of State Comments on Draft Report by the Government
Accountability Office Entitled: "Improvements Needed to Strengthen U.S.
Passport Fraud Detection Efforts." (GAO-05-477 GAO Code 320267):
The Department of State appreciates the opportunity to comment on the
report of the Government Accountability Office entitled: State
Department: Improvements Needed to Strengthen U.S. Passport Fraud
Detection Efforts (GAO-05-477).
The integrity of the U.S. passport and the issuance process is of
paramount importance to the Department of State. In view of the global
desirability of the U.S. passport, we have long recognized that people
may attempt to obtain one fraudulently. The Department has made
significant technological and security enhancements throughout all
aspects of our passport system to assist in combating fraud. The tragic
events of September 11 inspired the Department to carefully review all
aspects of passport operations to see where the security of the
passport document and issuance processes could be enhanced, while
providing the American traveling public with the best possible level of
service. These efforts are ongoing and include a partnership between
the Bureaus of Consular Affairs and Diplomatic Security and also
involve other federal agencies.
Interagency Information Sharing Efforts:
The Department is committed to working with other Federal agencies and
State governments to share information to ensure the safety and
security of our citizens and our nation, and was proactive in this area
well before 9/11. An example of this effort is the Department of
State's partnership with the Department of Health and Human Services
incorporating their 3-million plus name database of persons with child
support arrearages into Passport CLASS to ensure that such individuals
who are ineligible for a passport do not receive them.
Federal Level:
We have a long-standing and effective working relationship with the law
enforcement community. Today, we have nearly 50,000 names of fugitives
or individuals of interest to law enforcement in the Passport CLASS
lookout system. About half were entered individually as a result of our
reaching out to the law enforcement community and advising them of our
ability to help with interdicting fugitives. The other half of the law
enforcement entries represent the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS) federal
fugitive warrants, a database that the Department took the initiative
to obtain.
While our efforts with USMS have been successful, we can and do want to
do more to ensure that we have a comprehensive list of persons subject
to federal warrants. Thus, we now have an agreement in principle with
the FBI Headquarters Violent Crimes Section. The letter mentioned on
page 12 of the GAO report was discussed in draft with the FBI at the
end of February, and was sent in final on April 20. Making the data
exchange a reality at the earliest possible moment is among our highest
priorities.
In terms of terrorism, the Department of State already receives
extensive information from the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) on
foreign terrorists. We want similar information from the TSC on U.S.
persons of interest to be included in Passport CLASS. Both the
Department and TSC are actively working to establish this important
link.
State Level:
In the matter of wanted persons at the state level, the Department
receives some of this information directly from state and local law
enforcement agencies, largely as a result of our reaching out to the
law enforcement community and advising them of our ability to help with
interdicting fugitives. In this regard, in 2004 the Assistant Secretary
for Consular Affairs wrote to all the States' Attorneys General to
offer our services. State is anxious to establish an automated
mechanism through which we can integrate a comprehensive database of
state warrants information into Passport CLASS. We are continuing to
work toward this goal with both the FBI and the USMS, which maintains
an electronic file of state fugitive information.
Staffing of Passport Agency Fraud Office:
In 2003, the Department decided to increase the training of all
Passport Specialists in fraud prevention work by rotating them through
the fraud office and move away from permanent AFPM assignments. This
decision was made to afford all GS-11 Passport Specialists specialized
experience in detecting fraud. There are now at least two rotating
Specialists working in the fraud office of most agencies, one of whom
is on a long-term detail to serve as a back up to the FPM. The
Department continues to believe that rotating Specialists through the
Fraud Office will have the long-term effect of increasing fraud
detection by our front-line personnel.
This decision is already paying dividends. Statistics for the first
four months of FY 2005, after nearly a year of Passport Specialist
rotations, demonstrate that referrals to the fraud offices from
Passport Specialists are up 5% over last year, and referrals of
presumptive fraud from the FPMs to Diplomatic Security (DS) are up 11%.
This indicates that not only the quantity of referrals is up from the
Specialists, but also the quality of the referrals.
As further evidence of our anti-fraud efforts, we began last month the
first of a series of unannounced post-adjudication audits at our field
agencies and centers to determine the effectiveness of our Fraud
Prevention Program. The reviews are conducted on passport applications
that have been adjudicated, but not yet issued. The first of these
audits occurred the week of April 18. Three-person adjudication teams
visited four passport agencies/centers. In each agency the teams
examined a statistically valid number of applications with a confidence
interval of more than 98% and ran Choice Point checks on approximately
40% of the sample. As the attached report indicates, the teams reported
finding only minor adjudicative errors.
The move away from "permanent AFPM assignments" is still relatively
new. In response to concerns expressed by the FPMs about the amount of
time spent training newly assigned Specialists, we are currently
considering whether to rotate a GS-12 Adjudication Supervisor through
both the fraud prevention and customer service offices to shift more of
the training responsibility to that function rather than the FPM. We
will continue to seek input from our agency staff on ways to strengthen
our fraud prevention program.
Passport Specialists Performance Standards:
The Department is committed to the integrity of the passport process,
and will continue to monitor the Passport Specialists performance
standards in light of changing operational, technological and security-
related aspects of the passport function.
Headquarters Support:
The Department fully recognizes that workload changes and our enhanced
focus on security must be reflected in the way we staff and manage
Passport Services. The reorganization of Passport Services now in
progress calls for a reduced span of control for the Office Director
responsible for fraud prevention, as well as a division and division
chief to focus on fraud prevention.
Diplomatic Security:
Diplomatic Security (DS) support of the fraud prevention program is
increasing. DS will create 16 civil service Special Agent positions
this fiscal year for assignment to the DS field offices. These 16
agents will focus on providing continuity in the DS criminal
investigations program and mentoring new Foreign Service Special Agents
in investigations. The 16 positions will join 8 civil service Special
Agents placed in the field offices in FY 04. DS plans to establish
approximately 40 additional Special Agent positions as soon as
feasible.
As with any other law enforcement agency, DS must prioritize and
concentrate on the most substantive criminal investigations. The goal
is to devote more time to criminal investigations that have a higher
impact on the safety and security of the United States. High priority
investigations include cases with a possible terrorist nexus, vendors
of travel documents, fugitives, passports issued in error, or identity
theft. Simple passport fraud involving cases where the applicant never
obtained the passport, used low quality documents or unsophisticated
methods that were easily detected, and that have no apparent nexus to
terrorism are given a lower priority and fewer investigative assets are
assigned. In recent years field offices and headquarters criminal
investigative elements have been directed to prioritize their
investigations, which is critical given the large number of cases DS
investigates each year.
Fraud Prevention Training:
Acceptance Agents:
Each passport agency and center maintains an Acceptance Agent training
plan. Acceptance agents undergo continuous development including
through computer based training, monthly newsletters, periodic
bulletins, and classroom instructions that includes fraud detection
techniques. Some passport agencies conduct quality reviews of
acceptance facility work in their regions, with the Customer Service
Manager or assistant providing feedback directly to the facility. These
reviews have been so successful in improving the quality of the
applications received in those regions that we will institute a review
program nationwide. Additionally, plans are well underway to adapt the
comprehensive computer-based training USPS developed for its passport
acceptance staff for use with other types of acceptance agents.
National Training Program:
Another indication our commitment to the integrity of the passport
process is the implementation of a standardized national training
program, which covers adjudication and processing procedures for
Passport Specialists. Rather than providing training at the agency
level, we now train our Passport Specialists centrally so that all
Specialists receive the same level of training. We continue to review
and modify the curriculum to further enhance the program and to
accommodate changes in the law as they occur.
Passport Knowledge:
The Department recognizes that having a centralized data base of
passport information accessible to all Passport Specialists will
greatly enhance the adjudication process and our ability to combat
passport fraud. The Department is designing a centralized passport
"knowledgebase" for use by passport specialists. This on-line reference
library will include extensive sections on fraud prevention,
citizenship law and its application, and customer service.
Attachment:
Post Adjudication Audit Results:
Interim Report Passport Adjudication Audits Conducted Week of April 18-
22, 2005:
Agency: Boston;
Applications Reviewed: 1230;
Category 1: 1226;
Category 2: 2;
Category 3: 0;
Category 4*: 2.
Agency: CPC;
Applications Reviewed: 1282;
Category 1: 1269;
Category 2: 12;
Category 3: 0;
Category 4*: 1.
Agency: CT;
Applications Reviewed: 1121;
Category 1: 1121;
Category 2: 0;
Category 3: 0;
Category 4*: 0.
Agency: NPC;
Applications Reviewed: 1242;
Category 1: 1238;
Category 2: 4;
Category 3: 0;
Category 4*: 0.
Totals:
Applications Reviewed: 4875;
Category 1: 4854;
Category 2: 18 (.00369%);
Category 3: 0;
Category 4*: 3(.00063%).
Category 1 -No fraud problems detected or suspected; no or only minor
adjudication practice problems.
Category 2 - Serious adjudication flaws that should be brought to (lie
attention of the Adjudication Manager.
Category 3 - Presumed frauds based on findings and/or ChoicePoint;
referred to the Agency FPM for referral to DS.
Category 4 -Possible frauds, referred to (he FPM for further work
including verification of citizenship and/or identity evidence.
Extending these results out to a total workload of 9,750,000
applications results in:
Serious adjudication flaws: 36,000;
Possible frauds: 4,000.
* Category 4 (Possible Frauds) relates only to cases that were referred
for additional checking. They may turn out not to be frauds; one was
determined not to be a fraud while the team was on-site, and has been
deducted from the Possibel Frauds figure shown. The other cases
referred to the FPM will undergo further review and will be accounted
for in the final report.
Notes:
* About 30% of the applications were run against ChoicePoint.
This was the first group of reviews, and in some sense was a test of
the methodology, and review team concept. In general, these proved out.
Teams recommended that more applications be reviewed and that glitches
in the ChoicePoint process be worked out. The next set ofAudits will be
scheduled once the final report is complete, and those suggestions will
be considered.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Michael Courts, (202) 512-8980:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the individual named above, Jeffrey Baldwin-Bott, Joseph
Carney, Paul Desaulniers, and Edward Kennedy made key contributions to
this report. Martin de Alteriis, Etana Finkler, and Mary Moutsos
provided technical assistance.
(320267):
FOOTNOTES
[1] State maintains a separate CLASS database for visas. References to
CLASS throughout this report relate to the CLASS database for passports
only.
[2] National means a citizen of the United States or a noncitizen owing
permanent allegiance to the United States.
[3] There are two passport-issuing offices in Washington, D.C.: a
regional passport agency and a special issuance agency that handles
official U.S. government and diplomatic passports.
[4] State's official title for the position of passport examiner is
passport specialist.
[5] Number is as of March 2005. State officials noted that this number
changes frequently as new acceptance facilities are added and others
are dropped.
[6] Applications accepted and adjudicated at the counter also undergo a
number of desk adjudication steps to complete the fraud detection
process before deciding whether to approve each passport.
[7] Many issuing office managers and Diplomatic Security agents said
that applicants fraudulently using legitimate Puerto Rican birth
certificates is a key fraud concern. They said that legitimate Puerto
Rican birth certificates are readily available because they are
commonly required in Puerto Rico as identification for enrolling
children in school and other activities, and they aren't subsequently
taken care of properly. Also, there have been many instances of lost
and stolen blank Puerto Rican birth certificates. State recently began
requiring examiners to give additional scrutiny to Puerto Rican birth
certificates, and State officials also met with senior officials of the
Puerto Rican government to encourage them to impose more controls over
the issuance of multiple birth certificates.
[8] In an effort to address this problem, State established a new
requirement in February 2004 that children aged 14 and under appear
with their parents when applying for a passport to allow comparison of
the children to the photographs being submitted.
[9] We also noted that 10 of the 20 tested federal fugitives that were
not in CLASS were also wanted on state charges. Thus, if State
fugitives had been listed in CLASS, these individuals would have been
flagged, even if information on their federal warrants had been missed.
[10] About 10 years ago, the Office of Consular Fraud Prevention
stopped doing case work on individual potentially fraudulent
applications in an effort to become more involved with overall program
management and to identify overall trends.
[11] All 16 offices now have senior examiners rotate through the fraud
office--generally two at a time, one short and one longer term. The
long-term rotator is expected to do some of the tasks the assistant
manager performed; however, Fraud Prevention Managers said that not all
long-term rotational staff are capable of handling these tasks as well
as the permanent assistants had. Further, most managers spend
considerable time training rotating staff coming into the fraud office.
[12] Of the 12 offices, 10 already had senior examiners routinely
rotating through the office to assist in running the fraud prevention
program.
[13] In the 4 offices that did not previously have permanent
assistants, fraud referral rates decreased on average by only 7 percent
during the same period. As noted, 3 of these offices have low
workloads. One of the 4 has the second highest workload nationwide, and
its fraud referral rate remained relatively static during this period.
[14] Two offices that had assistant fraud prevention managers in 2003
saw increases in their fraud referral rates. These 2 offices received
just over 8 percent of the total applications received by offices that
had assistants.
[15] State officials told us they did not wish to re-establish the
permanent assistant fraud manager role at least in part because it had
never been an official State Department position with a position
description.
[16] Two of these 3 offices--Charleston, South Carolina, and
Portsmouth, New Hampshire--are passport processing "megacenters" that
do not cover a specific region of the country but rather process
applications from across the country. The third office, New Orleans,
does cover a specific region; however, it also performs some of the
functions of a megacenter by processing a substantial number of
applications that originate in regions other than its own.
[17] Management officials at one office said some acceptance facilities
have a particularly high fraud risk and their work has to be
scrutinized carefully. Management officials at another issuing office
said their goal is to train all acceptance agents once every 3 years,
but that they have not yet reached this goal.
[18] State officials also noted that the Bureau of Consular Affairs
funds more than 120 Diplomatic Security agent positions nationwide to
help support efforts to investigate passport fraud.
[19] Passport office partnership council participants include issuing
office management and union-designated employees.
[20] Examiners meeting the production requirement but not meeting
minimal requirements in the areas of adjudicative knowledge, customer
service, or fraud prevention would also receive an unsuccessful rating.
[21] At each office we visited, we met with almost all of these
officials. In a few instances, one or two of these officials were not
available during our visit, and, in these cases, we addressed the
relevant questions to their superiors.
GAO's Mission:
The Government Accountability Office, the investigative arm of
Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional
responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability
of the federal government for the American people. GAO examines the use
of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides
analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make
informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO's commitment to
good government is reflected in its core values of accountability,
integrity, and reliability.
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony:
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no
cost is through the Internet. GAO's Web site ( www.gao.gov ) contains
abstracts and full-text files of current reports and testimony and an
expanding archive of older products. The Web site features a search
engine to help you locate documents using key words and phrases. You
can print these documents in their entirety, including charts and other
graphics.
Each day, GAO issues a list of newly released reports, testimony, and
correspondence. GAO posts this list, known as "Today's Reports," on its
Web site daily. The list contains links to the full-text document
files. To have GAO e-mail this list to you every afternoon, go to
www.gao.gov and select "Subscribe to e-mail alerts" under the "Order
GAO Products" heading.
Order by Mail or Phone:
The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2
each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent
of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or
more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent.
Orders should be sent to:
U.S. Government Accountability Office
441 G Street NW, Room LM
Washington, D.C. 20548:
To order by Phone:
Voice: (202) 512-6000:
TDD: (202) 512-2537:
Fax: (202) 512-6061:
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs:
Contact:
Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:
Public Affairs:
Jeff Nelligan, managing director,
NelliganJ@gao.gov
(202) 512-4800
U.S. Government Accountability Office,
441 G Street NW, Room 7149
Washington, D.C. 20548:
