Afghanistan Security
Efforts to Establish Army and Police Have Made Progress, but Future Plans Need to Be Better Defined Gao ID: GAO-05-575 June 30, 2005After more than two decades of war, Afghanistan had no army or functioning police and, before September 11, 2001, was a haven for international terrorists. In April 2002, the United States and several other nations agreed to reform the five pillars of Afghanistan's security sector--creating an Afghan army, reconstituting the police force, establishing a working judiciary, combating illicit narcotics, and demobilizing the Afghan militias. As the leader for the army pillar, the United States has provided about $3.3 billion. For the German-led effort to reconstitute the Afghan police, the United States has provided over $800 million. We examined the progress made, and limitations faced, in developing the army and police forces. We also identified challenges that must be addressed to complete and sustain these forces.
As of March 2005, Defense had trained more than 18,300 Afghan combat troops--over 42 percent of the army's projected total of 43,000--and deployed them throughout the country. During 2004, the Department of Defense significantly accelerated Afghan combat troop training. However, Defense efforts to fully equip the increasing number of combat troops have fallen behind, and efforts to establish sustaining institutions, such as a logistics command, needed to support these troops have not kept pace. Plans for completing these institutions are not clear. Germany and the United States had trained more than 35,000 police as of January 2005 and expect to meet their goal of training 62,000 police by December 2005. However, the Department of State has just begun to address structural problems that affect the Afghan police force. Trainees often return to police stations where militia leaders are the principal authority; most infrastructure needs repair, and the police do not have sufficient equipment--from weapons to vehicles. Furthermore, limited field-based mentoring has just begun although previous international police training programs have demonstrated that such mentoring is critical for success. Moreover, the Afghan Ministry of the Interior (which oversees the police force) requires reform and restructuring. Finally, neither State nor Germany has developed plans specifying how much the program will cost and when it will be completed. Without strong and self-sustaining Afghan army and police forces and concurrent progress in the other pillars of security sector reform, Afghanistan could again become a haven for terrorists. However, establishing viable Afghan army and police forces will almost certainly take years and substantial resources. Available information suggests that these programs could cost up to $7.2 billion to complete and about $600 million annually to sustain. Furthermore, the other lead nations have made limited progress in reforming Afghan's judiciary, combating illicit narcotics, and demobilizing the militias.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-05-575, Afghanistan Security: Efforts to Establish Army and Police Have Made Progress, but Future Plans Need to Be Better Defined
This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-05-575
entitled 'Afghanistan Security: Efforts to Establish Army and Police
Have Made Progress, but Future Plans Need to Be Better Defined' which
was released on June 30, 2005.
This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part
of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this
document to Webmaster@gao.gov.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this
material separately.
Report to the Committee on International Relations, House of
Representatives:
June 2005:
Afghanistan Security:
Efforts to Establish Army and Police Have Made Progress, but Future
Plans Need to Be Better Defined:
GAO-05-575:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-05-575, a report to the Committee on International
Relations, House of Representatives:
Why GAO Did This Study:
After more than two decades of war, Afghanistan had no army or
functioning police and, before September 11, 2001, was a haven for
international terrorists. In April 2002, the United States and several
other nations agreed to reform the five pillars of Afghanistan‘s
security sector–creating an Afghan army, reconstituting the police
force, establishing a working judiciary, combating illicit narcotics,
and demobilizing the Afghan militias. As the leader for the army
pillar, the United States has provided about $3.3 billion. For the
German-led effort to reconstitute the Afghan police, the United States
has provided over $800 million. We examined the progress made, and
limitations faced, in developing the army and police forces. We also
identified challenges that must be addressed to complete and sustain
these forces.
What GAO Found:
As of March 2005, Defense had trained more than 18,300 Afghan combat
troops”over 42 percent of the army‘s projected total of 43,000”and
deployed them throughout the country. During 2004, the Department of
Defense significantly accelerated Afghan combat troop training.
However, Defense efforts to fully equip the increasing number of combat
troops have fallen behind, and efforts to establish sustaining
institutions, such as a logistics command, needed to support these
troops have not kept pace. Plans for completing these institutions are
not clear.
Germany and the United States had trained more than 35,000 police as of
January 2005 and expect to meet their goal of training 62,000 police by
December 2005. However, the Department of State has just begun to
address structural problems that affect the Afghan police force.
Trainees often return to police stations where militia leaders are the
principal authority; most infrastructure needs repair, and the police
do not have sufficient equipment”from weapons to vehicles. Furthermore,
limited field-based mentoring has just begun although previous
international police training programs have demonstrated that such
mentoring is critical for success. Moreover, the Afghan Ministry of the
Interior (which oversees the police force) requires reform and
restructuring. Finally, neither State nor Germany has developed plans
specifying how much the program will cost and when it will be completed.
Without strong and self-sustaining Afghan army and police forces and
concurrent progress in the other pillars of security sector reform,
Afghanistan could again become a haven for terrorists. However,
establishing viable Afghan army and police forces will almost certainly
take years and substantial resources. Available information suggests
that these programs could cost up to $7.2 billion to complete and about
$600 million annually to sustain. Furthermore, the other lead nations
have made limited progress in reforming Afghan‘s judiciary, combating
illicit narcotics, and demobilizing the militias.
Five Pillars of Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Secretaries of Defense and State develop more
detailed plans for completing and sustaining the Afghan army and police
forces. GAO also recommends that the Secretaries work to help ensure
that progress in the other security pillars is congruous with the army
and police programs. Defense, Justice, and State generally concurred
with the report‘s recommendations.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-575.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact David Gootnick, (202) 512-
3149 or GoodnickD@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
U.S. Training of Afghan Combat Troops Has Outpaced Efforts to Equip and
Sustain Them:
Difficult Conditions Have Hampered Reconstituting of Police and State
Does Not Have an Overall Plan to Complete the Effort:
Efforts to Complete and Sustain the Afghan Army and Police Face Major
Challenges:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Assistance Provided to Afghan Army and Police by Non-U.S.
Donors:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Justice:
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of State:
Tables:
Table 1: U.S. Support for the Afghan Army and Police, Fiscal Years
2002- 2006:
Table 2: Number of Afghan Police Reported Trained as of January 2005
and Training Targets for December 2005:
Table 3: Estimated Value of Assistance Provided to Afghan Army and
Police by Non-U.S. Donors:
Figures:
Figure 1: Five Pillars of Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan:
Figure 2: Afghan Army Commands and Police Training Centers:
Figure 3: Kabul Military Training Center:
Figure 4: Defective Boot Purchased Locally and an Afghan Soldier
Wearing Sandals:
Figure 5: Police Regional Training Center in Jalalabad-Dining Facility
and Classroom Building:
Figure 6: Jalalabad Police Station:
Figure 7: Heavy Weapons Cantonment Site Outside Kabul:
Abbreviations:
State/INL: Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs:
OMC-A: Office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan:
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization:
Letter June 30, 2005:
The Honorable Henry J. Hyde:
Chairman:
The Honorable Tom Lantos:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on International Relations:
House of Representatives:
After more than two decades of war left Afghanistan without an army or
a functioning police force, the country became a haven for
international terrorists, including the al Qaeda terrorist group that
attacked two U.S. cities on September 11, 2001. Since ousting the
Taliban regime from Afghanistan in 2001, the United States has spent
almost $3 billion to help reconstruct this poor and ethnically divided
country.[Footnote 1] However, pervasive internal security threats--
including terrorists, ethnic and regional militias commanded by
powerful warlords, and a large trade in illegal narcotics--continue to
undermine efforts to rebuild Afghanistan's shattered economy,
government, and infrastructure. The United States and allied nations
maintain more than 28,000 combat and support troops in Afghanistan to
counter these threats.[Footnote 2]
To help Afghanistan provide for its own security, the United States and
several other nations agreed at a conference in December 2002 to help
create multiethnic, professionally trained Afghan national army and
police forces.[Footnote 3] Donor nations also agreed to help establish
a working judicial sector, combat the narcotics trade, and demobilize
Afghanistan's militias. As leader of the effort to create the new army,
the United States provided approximately $3.3 billion during fiscal
years 2002 through 2005 toward the goal of eventually establishing a
70,000 man force that includes 43,000 ground combat troops. The
Department of Defense facilitates the training and equipping of the
Afghan army through its Combined Forces Command's Office of Military
Cooperation-Afghanistan (OMC-A) in the capital city of Kabul. As the
largest donor for the reconstitution of the national police, which is
led by Germany, the United States provided about $804 million during
fiscal years 2002 through 2005 for police training, equipment, and
infrastructure. The Department of State oversees the U.S. police effort
through its Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs (State/INL) in Washington, D.C., and the U.S. Embassy in Kabul,
with assistance from the Department of Justice. In its fiscal year 2006
budget request, the executive branch has requested nearly $60 million
for the Afghan police but, according to Defense officials, no
additional funds for the Afghan army.
To review the status of U.S. efforts to strengthen Afghanistan's
security, we (1) examined the progress made, and limitations faced, by
the United States and other donor nations in building Afghanistan's
national army; (2) examined the progress made, and limitations faced,
by the United States and other donor nations in reconstituting
Afghanistan's national police forces; and (3) identified challenges
that the United States, other donor nations, and Afghanistan must
address to complete and sustain the Afghan army and police forces. To
address these objectives, we reviewed pertinent Defense and State
planning, funding, and evaluation documents for the Afghan army and
police programs. We discussed these programs with cognizant officials
from the Departments of Defense, Justice, and State in Washington,
D.C., and Kabul, Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, we traveled to Herat and
Jalalabad to view Afghan army facilities and a police training site,
respectively, and to meet with cognizant U.S. and Afghan officials. We
also met with government officials from Germany and other key donor
nations. We determined that the data provided to us were sufficiently
reliable for the purposes of this report. (See app. I for a more
complete description of our scope and methodology.)
We conducted our review from January 2004 through May 2005 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Results in Brief:
The United States has made important progress in training and deploying
Afghan army combat troops but has not fully addressed limitations that
impede its progress in establishing a self-sustaining Afghan army.
Defense has established programs for recruiting and training battalions
of ethnically mixed combat troops, including a field-based mentoring
program. In 2004, as security concerns persisted, Defense significantly
accelerated Afghan combat troop training, and as of March 2005 more
than 42 percent of the army's total projected combat strength of 43,000
troops was deployed in strategic locations throughout the country.
However, OMC-A's efforts to fully equip the increasing number of combat
troops being trained have fallen behind. In addition, OMC-A's efforts
to establish institutions needed to support these troops have not kept
pace with the accelerated training program. Plans for the completion of
these institutions are not clear. Nonetheless, U.S. trainers and other
military officials have stated that Afghan combat troops generally
perform well in small units, despite some shortcomings.
Germany and the United States have made progress in training individual
Afghan policemen and policewomen but have not addressed many
limitations impeding the reconstitution of a national police force. As
of January 2005, the Department of State and Germany have trained more
than 35,000 police and expect to meet their goal of training 50,000
national and highway police and 12,000 border police by December 2005.
However, trainees face difficult working conditions. They return to
district police stations that need extensive reconstruction or
renovation; militia leaders are often the principal authority; and they
lack weapons, vehicles, communications, and other equipment. In
addition, the police training includes limited field-based training and
mentoring, although previous international peacekeeping efforts showed
that such mentoring is critical to the success of police training
programs. Furthermore, the Afghan Ministry of the Interior (which
oversees the police force) faces several problems, including corruption
and an outdated rank structure, that require reform and restructuring.
Finally, neither State nor Germany have developed an overall plan
specifying how or when construction tasks and equipment purchases will
be completed, how much the buildup of the police will cost, and when
the overall effort to reconstitute the police will be finished.
The United States, other donors, and the new Afghan government face
significant challenges to establishing viable Afghan army and police
forces. Although Defense and State have not yet prepared official cost
estimates, the army and police programs could cost up to $7.2 billion
to complete and about $600 million annually to sustain. Moreover, slow
progress in resolving other Afghan security problems--the lack of an
effective judiciary, the substantial illicit narcotics industry, and
the continued presence of armed militias--threaten to undermine overall
progress made toward providing nationwide security and ensuring the
stability of the Afghan government.
We are recommending that the Secretaries of Defense and State develop
detailed plans for completing and sustaining the Afghan army and police
forces, including clearly defined objectives and performance measures;
milestones; funding requirements; and a strategy for sustaining the
results achieved. In addition, we are recommending that the Secretaries
work with the other lead nations to help ensure that progress in the
other pillars of Afghan's security reform is congruous with the
progress made in the army and police programs. In both cases, we
recommend that the Secretaries report their progress to the Congress.
In commenting on a draft of this report, the Departments of Defense and
State generally concurred with our recommendations, but both stated
that appropriate reporting mechanisms are already in place. The
Department of Justice strongly concurred in regards to the Afghan
police training program and noted that its expertise could be more
effectively utilized.
Background:
Afghanistan, a mountainous and land-locked country in central Asia, is
one of the poorest countries in the world. More than 60 percent of its
population is illiterate. Afghanistan lacks effective nationwide
communications, banking, and transportation systems. Its estimated per
capita gross domestic product for 2003 was about $700. The
International Monetary Fund estimates that Afghan government revenues
will average $387 million per year during 2005 through 2008--less than
half of its projected average annual expenditures for government
salaries and operations of $879 million. Afghanistan remains dependent
on other nations for support; international assistance provided 93
percent of Afghanistan's $4.75 billion budget for 2005.
Afghanistan's economic plight is partially the result of its long
history of war and civil strife. Afghanistan's ethnically mixed
population is due to its location on historical invasion and trade
routes. The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979 and withdrew only
after waging a prolonged and destructive war against Afghan resistance
groups. Following a protracted civil war, most of Afghanistan fell
under the control of the fundamentalist Taliban group by 1998. Under
the Taliban, Afghanistan became a haven for terrorists, and, as a
result, the United States and a coalition of its allies invaded
Afghanistan after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.
Afghanistan's security institutions, including its national army,
police, and judiciary, collapsed or were severely damaged prior to the
U.S. occupation. During the Taliban rule the army disintegrated and was
superseded by various ethnic and regional militias. The Afghan national
police force, which was organized as a two-track system of career
officers and largely untrained conscripts who served for 2 years, had
also declined over the past 25 years.
Afghanistan continues to face significant internal threats. Widespread
trade in opium and heroin provides drug producers and traffickers with
the resources and motivation to resist efforts to curb the illicit
narcotics industry. Taliban fighters and terrorist groups remain active
in parts of the country, and attacks on civilian reconstruction workers
have prompted some international assistance groups to leave the
country. Regional warlords maintain thousands of militia fighters who
could be used to challenge the authority of Afghanistan's new central
government.
To help Afghanistan address such threats, the United States and several
other donor nations met in Geneva, Switzerland, in April 2002. At the
conference, the donors established a five-pillared security reform
agenda and designated a donor country to take the lead in reforming
each pillar. The United States volunteered to lead the army reform
effort, and Germany volunteered to lead the police reform effort (see
fig. 1).
Figure 1: Five Pillars of Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Army:
At a December 2002 conference (Bonn II) near Bonn, Germany, the Afghan
government and the donor nations agreed that the new Afghan army should
be ethnically balanced, voluntary, and consist of no more than 70,000
individuals (including all civilian and Ministry of Defense personnel).
They also agreed that the army's commands should be located in Kabul
and other geographically strategic locations. The Afghan government and
the donors did not set a deadline for the completion of the army.
Following the Bonn II conference, U.S. Defense planners, in conjunction
with Afghan officials, developed a force structure for the army that
includes (1) 43,000 ground combat troops based in Kabul and four other
cities, (2) 21,000 support staff organized in four sustaining commands
(recruiting, education and training, acquisition and logistics, and
communications and intelligence), (3) 3,000 Ministry of Defense and
general staff personnel, and (4) 3,000 air staff to provide secure
transportation for the President of Afghanistan.[Footnote 4] According
to Defense, the mission of the new army will include providing security
for Afghanistan's new central government and political process,
replacing all other military forces in Afghanistan, and combating
terrorists and other destructive elements in cooperation with coalition
and peacekeeping forces. As of May 2005, Defense's target date for
completing the army is the fall of 2009.
U.S. efforts to establish the army are led by Defense, with support
from State. The Defense-staffed Office of Military Cooperation-
Afghanistan (OMC-A) in Kabul oversees the development of the Afghan
army's force structure, decision processes, and garrisons, and provides
equipment. OMC-A works closely with Task Force Phoenix, which is a
joint coalition task force charged with training Afghan army battalions
at the Kabul Military Training Center and elsewhere in the country. The
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and U.S. Central Command provide planning
and other support, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is constructing
facilities for the Afghan army's central and regional commands (see
fig. 2). In Washington, D.C., the Defense Security Cooperation Agency
uses Defense and State funds to provide financial and administrative
support for OMC-A. The agency purchases services and equipment
requested by OMC-A through the U.S. Army Security Assistance Command
and transfers funds to OMC-A to allow it to procure services and
equipment from local vendors.
Figure 2: Afghan Army Commands and Police Training Centers:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Police:
Afghanistan's police reform process began formally in February 2002,
when Germany, as the leader for this sector, convened a conference in
Berlin to discuss international support for the Afghan police.
Subsequently, donor nations agreed to establish a multiethnic,
sustainable, and countrywide 62,000-member professional police service
that is fully committed to the rule of law. The overall goal of the
program is to enhance security in the provinces and districts outside
of Kabul. They did not set a deadline for completing the police.
U.S. support for the police sector is overseen by State/INL in
Washington, D.C., and by staff at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul. State has
a contract with DynCorp Aerospace Technology to train and equip the
police, advise the Ministry of Interior, and provide infrastructure
assistance, including constructing several police training centers (see
fig. 2). Defense has also provided infrastructure and equipment to
police in border regions. In addition, Germany has a training program
for police officers at the Kabul Police Academy and has convened
several donors' conferences. Germany also tracks pledges and projects
implemented by various donors. Furthermore, various donors established
the United Nations' Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan to help
ensure that the police are paid regularly and are issued adequate
equipment.
U.S. Support:
The United States has provided approximately $4.1 billion during fiscal
years 2002 through 2005 to support the Afghan army and police
force.[Footnote 5] In the President's budget request for fiscal year
2006, the administration has requested an additional $58.5 million for
the Afghan police program but, according to Defense officials, no
additional funds for the Afghan army. (See table 1.)
Table 1: U.S. Support for the Afghan Army and Police, Fiscal Years 2002-
2006:
Dollars in millions.
Afghan army:
State[A];
Fiscal year: 2002: $74.9;
Fiscal year: 2003: $191.4;
Fiscal year: 2004: $434.4;
Fiscal year: 2005 (estimated): $421.4;
Fiscal year: 2005 Supplemental (estimated): $0;
Fiscal year: 2006 (proposed): $0;
Total: $1,122.1.
Defense[B];
Fiscal year: 2002: $4.3;
Fiscal year: 2003: $156.2;
Fiscal year: 2004: $285.0;
Fiscal year: 2005 (estimated): $429.3;
Fiscal year: 2005 Supplemental (estimated): $1,285.0;
Fiscal year: 2006 (proposed): $0;
Total: $2,159.8.
Subtotal;
Fiscal year: 2002: $79.2;
Fiscal year: 2003: $347.6;
Fiscal year: 2004: $719.4;
Fiscal year: 2005 (estimated): $850.7;
Fiscal year: 2005 Supplemental (estimated): $1,285.0;
Fiscal year: 2006 (proposed): $0;
Total: $3,281.9.
Afghan police:
State[C];
Fiscal year: 2002: $26.6;
Fiscal year: 2003: $0;
Fiscal year: 2004: $160.0;
Fiscal year: 2005 (estimated): $65.0;
Fiscal year: 2005 Supplemental (estimated): $360.0;
Fiscal year: 2006 (proposed): $58.5;
Total: $670.1.
Defense[D];
Fiscal year: 2002: $0;
Fiscal year: 2003: $0;
Fiscal year: 2004: $47.0;
Fiscal year: 2005 (estimated): $7.8;
Fiscal year: 2005 Supplemental (estimated): $137.3;
Fiscal year: 2006 (proposed): $0;
Total: $192.1.
Subtotal;
Fiscal year: 2002: $26.6;
Fiscal year: 2003: $0.0;
Fiscal year: 2004: $207.0;
Fiscal year: 2005 (estimated): $72.8;
Fiscal year: 2005 Supplemental (estimated): $497.3;
Fiscal year: 2006 (proposed): $58.5;
Total: $862.2.
Total;
Fiscal year: 2002: $105.8;
Fiscal year: 2003: $347.6;
Fiscal year: 2004: $926.4;
Fiscal year: 2005 (estimated): $923.5;
Fiscal year: 2005 Supplemental (estimated): $1,782.3;
Fiscal year: 2006 (proposed): $58.5;
Total: $4,144.1.
Source: Departments of Defense and State.
[A] Most of State's funds for the Afghan army come from its Foreign
Military Financing program. Foreign Military Financing funds are
administered by Defense through its Defense Security Cooperation
Agency, which provides funds, equipment, and services for the army
through OMC-A. State also supports the Afghan army through its Peace
Keeping Operations program (from which the salaries for Afghan troops
are financed) and International Military Education and Training
program.
[B] Defense funds for the Afghan army are drawn from three principal
sources:
The Afghan Freedom Support Act (P.L. 107-327), as amended, states that
the President may exercise his drawdown authorities (as authorized
under section 506 (A) (2) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961) by
supplying Afghanistan with defense services, articles, and education
"acquired by contract or otherwise." Under this provision, OMC-A has
been given authority to spend U.S. Army operations and maintenance
funds to train and equip the Afghan army. During fiscal years 2002
through 2004, approximately $287 million was drawn down via such
contracts by Defense. In addition, under section 506 (A) (2) of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, approximately $11 million
in military trucks and armored personnel vehicles were drawn down from
Defense for the Afghan army. For more details on such drawdowns, see
Foreign Assistance: Reporting of Defense Articles and Services Provided
through Drawdowns Needs to Be Improved, [Hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-02-1027] (Washington, D.C.: Sept.
20, 2002).
The Emergency Supplemental Appropriation Act for Defense and for the
Reconstruction Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004, (P.L. 108-106), and the
Defense Appropriations Act for fiscal year 2005 (P.L. 108-287)
authorize Defense to use U.S. Army operations and maintenance funds for
several purposes, including training and equipping the new Afghan armed
forces. Defense has provided a total of $440 million in such funds for
the Afghan army.
The Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global
War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, for the fiscal year ending September
30, 2005, and for other purposes (P.L. 109-13) authorizes Defense to
provide up to $1.285 billion in assistance to the Afghan army. Of this
amount, $290 million will be used to reimburse the U.S. Army for costs
incurred to train, equip, and provide related assistance to the Afghan
army.
[C] State has supported the Afghan police through programs managed by
its Bureau for International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement
Affairs. Of the $160 million that State provided in 2004, $50 million
was drawn from fiscal year 2003 Emergency Response Funds.
[D] Defense has supported the Afghan police with counternarcotics
funding provided through its Office for Special Operations and Low
Intensity Conflict, as authorized by the Emergency Supplemental
Appropriation Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and
Afghanistan, 2004, (P.L. 108-106). Defense also drew on approximately
$17 million in Commanders Emergency Response Program funds to support
police projects.
[End of table]
Other Donor Support:
More than 40 nations and international organizations have also provided
funds, equipment, and training to support the Afghan army and police.
As of March 2005, other donors had provided about $193 million to
supplement U.S. efforts to create the Afghan army and about $246
million for reconstituting the Afghan police. (See app. II for more
information on other donors' support for the army and police.)
Allied and multilateral forces:
Pending the creation of functioning Afghan army and police forces, more
than 28,000 foreign troops operate in Afghanistan. These include about
18,000 U.S. troops, an estimated 1,900 troops from other members of the
coalition, and over 8,300 peacekeepers from the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO). In August 2003, NATO assumed control over the
International Security Assistance Force in response to a United
Nations' mandate to provide security in the Kabul area and to support
the reconstruction of Afghanistan. In addition, NATO's members agreed
to begin establishing provincial reconstruction teams in northern and
western Afghanistan. Although NATO has had difficulty persuading
nations to provide the resources needed for these teams, it has
established seven provincial reconstruction teams. After taking control
of a team sponsored by Germany in Kabul, NATO announced in June 2004
that it would also assume control of four additional teams in northern
Afghanistan. These teams are sponsored by the United Kingdom, Germany,
and the Netherlands. British and German officials informed us that
their teams focus primarily on reconstruction and have limited roles in
providing direct security for local Afghans and in working with the
Afghan army and police. On May 31, 2005, NATO took control of two
additional provincial reconstruction teams in western Afghanistan. They
are sponsored by Italy and the United States.
U.S. Training of Afghan Combat Troops Has Outpaced Efforts to Equip and
Sustain Them:
Defense, with the government of Afghanistan, has established programs
for recruiting and training battalions of Afghan combat troops. OMC-A
significantly accelerated Afghan combat troop training in 2004, and
over 42 percent of the army's total projected combat strength of 43,000
soldiers was deployed throughout the country. However, OMC-A's efforts
to fully equip the increasing number of combat troops have fallen
behind. In addition, OMC-A's efforts to establish the institutions
needed to support these troops have not kept pace, and plans for their
completion are not clear. Despite some shortcomings, OMC-A personnel
and the embedded trainers we met with told us that Afghan combat troops
have generally performed well under U.S. supervision.
The United States Has Established Recruiting Effort:
Defense, in conjunction with the government of Afghanistan, is
establishing recruiting stations in each of Afghanistan's 34 provinces.
To help ensure that the army is ethnically balanced, Defense attempts
to form new battalions[Footnote 6] for training with volunteers drawn
from Afghanistan's major ethnic groups.[Footnote 7] Information
provided by OMC-A indicates that the army as a whole generally reflects
the country's balance of major ethnic groups.[Footnote 8]
While many of those initially recruited left the army before competing
their terms, by late 2004 the army's attrition rate had dropped to 1.1
percent per month.[Footnote 9] While attrition appears to have abated,
U.S. and Afghan officials told us that soldiers often leave their units
without permission for as long as 2 weeks to take their pay home to
their families. The officials attributed these unauthorized absences to
the lack of an Afghan national banking system and the absence of
significant penalties for such absences from the volunteer Afghan army.
Army Troops Receive Basic and Field Training:
OMC-A and Task Force Phoenix have established programs for training
Afghan army troops in battalions at locations including the Kabul
Military Training Center (see fig. 3) and in the field. Battalions now
receive 14 weeks of training at the center and elsewhere, including
training for officers and noncommissioned officers. According to Joint
Chiefs of Staff planners, this training includes 6 weeks of basic
training, 6 weeks of advanced individual training, and 2 weeks of
collective training. The program also includes training on human rights
and the laws of war, as well as specialized training for some troops in
tank maintenance, logistics, and medical skills. OMC-A and Task Force
Phoenix officials informed us that the Afghan army now conducts basic
training classes. U.S. officials also stated that France and the United
Kingdom have helped train Afghan army personnel.
Figure 3: Kabul Military Training Center:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Training at the Center is followed by training in the field. OMC-A
embeds a team of U.S. trainers and mentors in each battalion to help
achieve full operational capability. The embedded team accompanies the
battalion into the field and provides leadership, tactical training,
and logistical support. As originally envisioned, embedded trainer
teams were to include 16 U.S. officers and noncommissioned officers and
remain with battalions for 2 years.
Defense Accelerated Training:
At OMC-A's recommendation, Defense accelerated its training of Afghan
combat troops throughout 2004 by more than doubling the number of
battalions in basic training at a given time. As a result, OMC-A had
deployed more than 42 percent of the army's total projected combat
strength at commands throughout the country as of March 2005. OMC-A
projects that it will complete basic training for all 43,000 combat
troops by the fall of 2007.
Defense time frames for building the Afghan army were in flux
throughout 2004. As security concerns persisted, OMC-A accelerated the
training and fielding of combat troops.[Footnote 10] In January 2004,
OMC-A increased the number of battalions in training at one time from
two to three; in May 2004, it began training four battalions; and, as
of the end of January 2005, it was training five. These concerns also
prompted Defense and the Afghan government to change their plans for
establishing the army's four regional commands. At the beginning of
2004, they had planned to establish the four regional commands in
sequence, with the fourth command to be established in 2006. By May
2004, Defense and the Afghan government had decided to establish all
four regional commands by the end of September 2004, with as few as 150
troops stationed at each one.
According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff planning staff, as of March
2005, more than 18,300 troops--over 42 percent of the army's total
projected combat strength of 43,000 men--had completed basic training.
Having fully staffed the Kabul central command with about 10,500
troops, OMC-A assigned the remaining 7,800 troops to the four regional
commands.[Footnote 11] It plans to field combat troops to the regional
commands as quickly as possible to provide more security for
Afghanistan's parliamentary elections (currently planned for September
2005). Accordingly, it increased the number of combat troops assigned
to regional commands by more than 18 percent between February and March
2005.
In early 2005, OMC-A projected that it would complete basic training
for the remaining 24,700 combat troops by the fall of 2007 if it
continued to train five battalions at once. However, in May 2005, OMC-
A proposed increasing the number of combat troops in the planned force
structure from 43,000 to 46,000 and projected that it could train the
additional 3,000 combat troops by the fall of 2007. Although OMC-A is
seeking permission to begin training six battalions at once, it has not
been able to fully equip the units already trained and faces a shortage
of embedded trainers.
Afghan Army Is Experiencing Equipment Shortages:
According to U.S. Defense and Afghan army personnel, Afghan army units
are experiencing equipment shortages. U.S. embedded trainers and other
defense personnel informed us that Afghan soldiers have had to cope
with shortages of useable uniforms, boots, communications gear,
infantry weapons, ammunition, and vehicles.[Footnote 12] Embedded
trainers provided us with examples of poorly made uniforms and boots
and told us that Afghan army units must use old and often faulty small
arms and ammunition. OMC-A logistics personnel confirmed that Afghan
battalions do not have needed vehicles. Embedded trainers told us that
the equipment shortages have negatively affected the army's
effectiveness and discipline.
OMC-A is responsible for managing efforts to supply the army's rapidly
growing combat element needed equipment, but it has had difficulty
establishing requirements and complying with security assistance
procedures to fulfill those requirements. Defense Security Cooperation
Agency and U.S. Army Security Assistance Command personnel informed us
that in many cases OMC-A had not provided them with adequately prepared
requests and forecasts of future requirements in a timely manner. For
example, Defense Security Cooperation Agency staff noted that OMC-A
required almost a year to establish specific requirements for a
standard light tactical vehicle to transport Afghan troops.[Footnote 13]
OMC-A and other Defense personnel told us that several factors
complicate OMC-A's efforts to project the army's requirements and to
use the defense security assistance process. These include the numerous
changes that OMC-A made in its plans to build the army, including
accelerating the number of battalions in training and establishing the
regional commands simultaneously in 2004. OMC-A officials also noted
that the involvement of nascent Afghan army units in combat and the
lack of historical data on material usage rates further complicated
their efforts to project requirements. In addition, Defense Security
Cooperation Agency, U.S. Army Security Assistance Command, and State
officials in Washington, D.C., and OMC-A officials told us that OMC-A
has not had adequate numbers of personnel trained in security
assistance procedures to support its efforts. OMC-A officials stated
that OMC-A has never been staffed at more than about 71 percent of its
approved personnel level.[Footnote 14] They also noted that Defense
efforts to train OMC-A personnel in defense security assistance
procedures and preserve the institutional knowledge of lessons learned
from former personnel are constrained by the rotation of Air Force,
Navy, and Marine personnel from OMC-A after as few as 4
months.[Footnote 15]
To address some shortages of needed equipment, OMC-A bought items
directly from non-U.S. vendors.[Footnote 16] However, it sometimes
purchased faulty items because it did not take adequate steps to ensure
their quality. For example, OMC-A purchased combat boots from regional
vendors to support the new higher basic training rate of five
battalions. OMC-A officials told us that many boots proved to be
defective because OMC-A had given vendors too much latitude in filling
their contracts. U.S. trainers told us that Afghan troops sometimes
wore sandals during operations in mountainous, difficult terrain
because their boots had failed (see fig. 4). OMC-A personnel informed
us that they now use a broader array of local vendors, set more
stringent specifications, and employ Afghan civilians to inspect the
quality of locally procured goods.
Figure 4: Defective Boot Purchased Locally and an Afghan Soldier
Wearing Sandals:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Defense has also experienced difficulties in obtaining adequate
supplies of serviceable Soviet-era equipment. Early in the Afghan army
program, Defense decided to equip the army with donated and salvaged
Soviet weapons and armored vehicles. It did so because (1) such
equipment was widely used by the former Afghan army and by Afghan
militias and (2) several coalition nations once allied with the former
Soviet Union were willing to provide equipment from their arsenals.
However, much of the donated and salvaged equipment proved to be worn
out, defective, or incompatible with other equipment. For example,
Defense officials abandoned plans to use Soviet armored personnel
carriers after they determined that the vehicles had been manufactured
to differing standards depending on the country of origin. Defense and
State officials also informed us that the demobilization of Afghan
militias had yielded fewer serviceable Soviet AK-47 assault rifles and
ammunition caches than anticipated. In response, OMC-A has cannibalized
serviceable parts from the assault rifles obtained to make usable
weapons and has purchased more weapons than originally planned. Defense
and State officials informed us that they are stepping up efforts to
obtain donations of serviceable arms.
Number of Embedded Trainers Does Not Meet Needs:
OMC-A's acceleration of the number of battalions in basic training has
strained its embedded trainer team program. By increasing the number of
battalions in training from four to five, OMC-A's requirement for
embedded trainers increased from about 410 to nearly 700. Because it
was unable to obtain the additional trainers from the military services
in a timely manner, Task Force Phoenix reassigned officers from other
duties in Afghanistan. It also temporarily reduced the number of
embedded trainers assigned to a battalion from 16 to 12.
According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff's Afghanistan desk, another 192
trainers will be needed if OMC-A increases the number of battalions in
basic training to six. Because individuals with the skills needed to
serve as trainers are in demand in other theaters, increasing the
training rate to six battalions could require Defense to reassign U.S.
personnel in Afghanistan to serve as embedded trainers.[Footnote 17]
OMC-A's need for more embedded trainers could further increase if it
determines that individual battalions are not yet ready to operate
without trainers. While some battalions have already operated with
embedded trainers for longer than the initially planned 2-year period,
OMC-A has not yet fully implemented recently developed criteria for
assessing a battalion's readiness to operate without trainers. As of
May 2005, none of the Afghan battalions had graduated from the embedded
trainer program.
Sustaining Institutions Are Lagging and Plans for Their Completion Are
Not Clear:
OMC-A's efforts to establish sustaining institutions (such as an
acquisition and logistics command) needed to support the combat troops
have not kept pace with the accelerated basic training program. The
Afghan army currently consists almost entirely of infantry forces that
cannot sustain themselves. At the beginning of 2005, Defense planners
envisioned that the army would need 21,000 support personnel in four
sustaining commands to provide essential services to the army's combat
elements. However, as of March 2005, it had assigned only 1,300
personnel to the sustaining commands. In an apparent attempt to address
this shortfall, OMC-A proposed, in May 2005, that the number of
personnel assigned to these commands be reduced from 21,000 to 14,000
and that the time frames for completing these commands be extended from
the end of 2008 to the fall of 2009.
Without fully functioning sustaining commands, the Afghan army will
continue to rely on OMC-A, embedded trainers, and other U.S. military
forces for acquisition, logistics, communications, and other key
support functions. OMC-A informed us that it would continue to sustain
the Afghan army on an interim basis to ensure the rapid introduction of
Afghan army combat units. According to Defense officials, they plan to
use $210 million from the 2005 emergency supplemental to help ensure
that the sustaining commands can keep pace with the fielding of combat
units.
To ensure that the Afghan army's combat elements are fully trained and
supplied and can readily communicate with one another, OMC-A would have
to recruit, train, and organize at least 12,000 individuals for the
sustaining commands. To ease the difficulty of doing so in a largely
illiterate country that has had little exposure to U.S. logistical
practices, OMC-A may recruit former militia fighters with logistics
experience. However, Defense plans for ensuring that these sustaining
commands are fully functional by the fall of 2009 are not clear.
Defense has not yet adopted plans that would guide OMC-A's efforts to
complete these commands nor have Defense planners in the United States
and OMC-A reached agreement on an overall concept of operations for the
Afghan army.
Afghan Troops Said to Perform Well Despite Shortcomings:
Defense officials in Afghanistan, including representatives of the U.S.
combat operations command, told us that U.S.-trained Afghan troops had
accompanied U.S. forces in operations against terrorist groups, helped
restore stability in Herat in response to riots and clashes between
militias, assisted in providing security for Afghanistan's first
democratic presidential election, and protected army infrastructure
construction sites around Afghanistan. U.S. embedded trainers we met
with near Kabul and in Herat, as well as U.S. combat officers, praised
the quality, morale, and motivation of the Afghan troops in conducting
these operations. For example, they noted the speed with which Afghan
units were able to mobilize for transportation to Herat and their
ability to quell civilian rioters.[Footnote 18] The commander of OMC-A
told us that coalition forces have sought out opportunities to work
with Afghan troops. According to U.S. embedded trainers and OMC-A
officials, the multiethnic Afghan army units typically have developed
good relations with Afghan citizens in different parts of the country.
None reported significant evidence of ethnic discord within the army.
However, U.S. Defense personnel informed us that Afghan troops and
officers have not yet gained significant experience in battalion-level
operations. They also noted the army's command processes are limited by
the high rate of illiteracy among the troops.
Difficult Conditions Have Hampered Reconstituting of Police and State
Does Not Have an Overall Plan to Complete the Effort:
Germany--the lead nation for rebuilding the Afghan police--and the
United States have trained thousands of Afghanistan police officers and
patrolmen and expect to meet training targets for end of 2005. However,
many trainees return to difficult working conditions, including police
stations where resources are inadequate and militia leaders are still
the principal authority, and they receive limited opportunities for
follow-up training or mentoring. Furthermore, Afghan's Ministry of the
Interior, which oversees the Afghan police, faces pervasive problems
that require reform or restructuring. Finally, neither State nor
Germany has an overall plan delineating what is needed to complete the
rebuilding of the police sector.
Donors Expect to Meet Police Training Targets:
As of January 2005, Germany and the United States had trained more than
35,000 national, highway, and border police, and they expect to meet
the overall goal of training 62,000[Footnote 19] by December 2005 (see
table 2). The United States initiated its police training program in
Afghanistan in 2003 because of concerns that the German training
program was moving too slowly and was concentrating on officers.
Initially, the U.S. program focused on training police patrolmen (and
some women) to establish a national police presence for the Afghan
presidential elections.[Footnote 20] The U.S. program has emphasized
meeting specific training targets set by the Afghan government in
consultation with U.S. and German governments.[Footnote 21]
Table 2: Number of Afghan Police Reported Trained as of January 2005
and Training Targets for December 2005:
Afghan police role[A]: National police;
Police reported trained as of January 2005[B]: 33,903;
Training target for December 2005: 47,400.
Afghan police role[A]: Highway police;
Police reported trained as of January 2005[B]: 220;
Training target for December 2005: 2,600.
Afghan police role[A]: Border police;
Police reported trained as of January 2005[B]: 1,151;
Training target for December 2005: 12,000.
Afghan police role[A]: Total;
Police reported trained as of January 2005[B]: 35,274;
Training target for December 2005: 62,000.
Source: State/INL data (includes German officer training data).
[A] National police fill the traditional role of community law
enforcement. Highway police focus on road security outside of Kabul.
Border police are responsible for border protection and control.
[B] State/INL could not readily identify the numbers of officers versus
patrolmen and women by police role.
[End of table]
The United States employs a "train the trainer" approach. More than 800
Afghans who have completed a 3-week instructor development course
conduct the training with DynCorp advisors. The basic training consists
of an 8-week course for new recruits and a 2-week program for veteran
police. Highway and border police receive 2 weeks of additional
specialized training. U.S. trainers have also developed a shortened
training program to accommodate illiterate recruits. According to
State/INL and DynCorp officials, the Afghan police trainees are
generally eager to learn and they support the idea of a national police
force dedicated to the rule of law. In addition, according to these
officials, attrition rates have been low.
Germany's chief role in rebuilding the police has been to refurbish the
Kabul Police Academy near Kabul and establish a permanent training
program there for commissioned and noncommissioned Afghan police
officers.[Footnote 22] The program, which began in August 2002,
provides 3 years of training for officers and 1 year of training for
noncommissioned officers. According to a German Ministry of Interior
official, as of January 2005, 41 officers and 2,583 noncommissioned
officers had completed the full German program, and an additional 4,880
commissioned and noncommissioned officers had received short-term
specialized training. According to this same official, Germany plans to
train an additional 4,950 commissioned and noncommissioned officers at
the Academy and the regional training centers by December 2005.
Although the Bonn II agreement calls for a multiethnic police force,
the Afghan government, Germany, and the United States do not track the
ethnicity of police trainees. German and State officials reported that
they had received no complaints about the ethnic composition of police
units or deployments or their interaction with minority populations.
However, neither had systematically surveyed the impact of ethnicity on
police performance, relying instead on anecdotal accounts.
DynCorp completed construction of the Central Training Center for
Police in Kabul in May 2003, and in 2004 it constructed and began
training at seven regional centers across the country. (Fig. 5 shows
the police training center in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.) The Department
of Justice's International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance
Program developed the curriculums, which include such topics as crime
investigation, operational police skills, and human rights.
Figure 5: Police Regional Training Center in Jalalabad-Dining Facility
and Classroom Building:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Police Face Difficult Working Conditions:
A number of difficult conditions hamper the effort to rebuild the
police in Afghanistan. Newly trained police often return to community
police stations staffed by poorly trained, illiterate conscripts or
former militia members who have little loyalty to the central
government. According to State/INL and Defense officials, many of the
untrained officers remain loyal to local militias in an environment
dominated by ethnic loyalties. Working with untrained colleagues, newly
trained policemen often find it difficult to apply the principles they
learned during training. For example, according to several DynCorp
trainers, some recently trained police were forced to give their new
equipment to more senior police and were pressured by their commanders
to participate in extorting money from truck drivers and travelers.
U.S. and other donor officials told us that many police resort to
corrupt practices, in part because their salaries are low and
inconsistently paid. The Afghan Ministry of the Interior has limited
awareness over police operations outside of Kabul and has not
systematically vetted existing police staff for human rights violations
or corruption, which complicates the ministry's efforts to support and
oversee the police.
In addition, police across Afghanistan confront shortages of equipment.
According to a 2002 German government assessment, less than 10 percent
of the police had adequate equipment, and U.S. and other donor
government officials noted that the police are often outgunned by
militias, criminals, and drug traffickers because they lack adequate
numbers of weapons or ammunition supplies. According to DynCorp, the
Ministry of the Interior has approximately 36,500 serviceable rifles
and pistols on hand, mainly seized weapons. DynCorp officials estimate
that the police need an additional 48,500 side arms, 10,000 automatic
rifles, and 6,250 machine guns. Through March 2005, trainees were not
receiving firearms training, because the United States and the other
donors had not yet provided weapons and ammunition. Further, DynCorp
officials estimated that the Afghan national police have approximately
3,000 serviceable vehicles and require an additional 7,400 vehicles.
Most police do not perform routine patrols because they lack adequate
numbers of vehicles and the fuel to operate them. State/INL officials
reported that police often rely on civilian complainants for
transportation during law enforcement investigations.
Moreover, poor infrastructure conditions hamper police work. According
to the 2002 German government assessment, approximately 80 percent of
police infrastructure was destroyed. According to a Defense estimate,
varying degrees of construction or renovation are needed for more than
800 buildings among Afghanistan's provincial police stations, district
police and border police brigade stations, and subdistrict and village
level stations.[Footnote 23] State/INL officials reported that criminal
suspects are sometimes detained in private residences because most
police stations lack secure holding facilities or reliable electricity
and drinking water and have only rudimentary office furniture and
equipment. On our visit to a Jalalabad police station (see fig. 6), we
observed prisoners in a communal holding facility with dirt floors and
rudimentary toilet facilities. We also noted that police manning a
nearby guard tower were sleeping outside between their shifts.
Figure 6: Jalalabad Police Station:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
In addition, although the U.S. government recently constructed a
communication network that links the provincial headquarters with the
Ministry of Interior, police at the provincial, district, and
subdistrict levels are generally unable to communicate with police in
other locations. DynCorp officials estimate that the police need 420
base radios for district and border stations, more than 10,400 mobile-
vehicle mounted radios, and 20,700 hand-held radios.
Limited Follow-Up Training, Mentoring, or Evaluation of Trainees:
In early 2005, DynCorp deployed police trainers to the field for the
first time--12 outside of Kabul and 4 at a district headquarters in
Kabul. International peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia, Kosovo, and East
Timor have shown that such training is critical to the success of
similar programs.[Footnote 24] Field-based training and mentoring
allows trainers to build on classroom instruction and provide a more
systematic basis for evaluating police performance. Nevertheless, the
German, U.S., and Afghan governments have only limited ability to
evaluate police trainees' performance after graduation--especially in
the more remote areas of Afghanistan. State/INL officials cited the
high costs, the security threat to training personnel stationed in the
field, and the difficulty of recruiting sufficient numbers of
international police as impediments to implementing a countrywide field-
based program. OMC-A estimates a first-year cost for implementing a
countrywide training and mentoring program at approximately $160
million.
Nonetheless, U.S. government and other donor officials reported overall
improvements in police performance since the training programs began
and noted that public attitudes toward the police are becoming more
positive. According to U.S. officials, police played a stabilizing role
before and during the presidential elections in October 2004. For
example, according to U.S. military personnel, police confiscated
weapons and explosives in 12 separate incidents on election day in
Jalalabad. However, according to OMC-A officials, police failed to
control a riot that occurred after the Afghan government removed the
provincial governor from power in Herat in August 2004. As a result,
the Afghan army was called in to restore order.
Afghan Ministry of the Interior Undergoing Reform:
The Afghan Ministry of the Interior, which is responsible for managing
the country's national police force, faces a number of problems that
require reform or restructuring. According to State/INL and DynCorp
officials, these problems include pervasive corruption; an outdated
rank structure overburdened with senior level officers; lack of
communication and control between central command and the regions,
provinces, and districts; pay disparity between the army and the
police; and a lack of professional standards and internal discipline.
To address these problems, State embedded 30 DynCorp advisors within
the ministry at the end of 2004 and drafted a comprehensive reform
program. According to ministry and State officials, the reform package
was accepted by the Afghan Government, and implementation has begun.
The ministry adopted a new, streamlined organizational structure to
address command and control problems, including a new rank structure
with salaries commensurate with responsibilities. The ministry also
created a professional standards unit (similar to an internal affairs
unit) that is responsible for disciplining corrupt or underachieving
officers throughout the police force. DynCorp officials stated that the
operation of this unit will be critical to the success of the police
reform effort. However, according to DynCorp officials, the overall
reform program will require more than a year to implement and will not
produce results across the country for several years.
The Ministry of the Interior has not yet reformed its police pay
system. Patrolmen generally are paid $30 to $50 per month, less than
the $70 per month new army recruits are paid and often less than day
laborers can earn on construction sites. According to DynCorp
officials, patrolmen's salaries are insufficient to support a family's
living expenses and often cause policemen to resort to corruption to
augment their income. Ministry officials told us that they are aware
that low salaries are hurting the professionalism of the police force
and that they are working to institute a new salary structure.
State and Germany Do Not Have an Overall Plan for Reconstituting the
Afghan National Police:
In 2003, Germany developed a strategy paper that assessed the condition
of the police and proposed ways to reconstituting the police sector.
However, this strategy was not widely circulated and was not adopted by
other donors, including the United States; State/INL officials told us
that they could not provide us a copy of the German strategy because
they did not possess a copy themselves. According to cognizant German
officials, Germany has viewed its role as one of advising and
consulting with other donors and the Afghan government rather than as
the major implementer or funding source for the police sector.
State has not developed a plan for addressing the overall requirement
of equipping and fielding a fully functioning police force by a stated
end date. Budget estimates produced (at our request) by DynCorp provide
a partial listing of essential elements for building the police--
personnel, equipment, facilities and communication equipment--through
2006 that totals more than $580 million. However, State has not
specified how or when these equipment purchases and construction
projects will be completed; what additional infrastructure, equipment,
and training are needed; how much the total buildup of the police will
cost; and when the overall effort to build the Afghan police will be
finished.
In addition, State did not have adequate staff in Kabul to manage the
day-to-day activities of the police program, hampering State's effort
to plan for and execute the rebuilding of the Afghan police. In 2003,
the U.S. Embassy in Kabul had one full-time staff member assigned to
manage the police program. When this person left to take another
position with the Afghan Ministry of the Interior, State used a series
of temporary duty staff in 2004 and 2005 to manage the program,
employing one temporary staff member for more than 6 months to manage
both the Embassy's police and counternarcotics programs.[Footnote 25]
According to the temporary-duty official, because of understaffing she
was limited in her ability to oversee and monitor the program,
dependent on DynCorp contractors for progress reports and management
support, and unable to attend many donor and other coordination
meetings. In January 2005, to help address this problem, State/INL
established a Narcotics Affairs Section in Kabul to oversee the U.S.
police and counternarcotics programs. At the time, one full-time U.S.
direct-hire employee and one personal services contractor were
assigned.
Efforts to Complete and Sustain the Afghan Army and Police Face Major
Challenges:
The United States, other donors, and the new Afghan government face
significant challenges to their plans to establish viable Afghan army
and police forces. Completing and sustaining the army and police will
cost several billion dollars over the next decade. Moreover, slow
progress in resolving other Afghan security problems could undermine
the prospects for effective army and police forces.
Long-Term Costs Unclear but Likely to Be Substantial:
Defense and State have not clearly defined the long-term costs of
completing the army and police programs. However, available information
suggests that these institutions could cost up to $7.2 billion to
complete and about $600 million per year to sustain.
* Defense has not clearly defined the cost of completing the Afghan
army. However, in November 2004, OMC-A officials indicated that
completing the army could cost another $5.4 billion (in fiscal year
2005 dollars).[Footnote 26] Future funding would be used to fully
supply the Afghan army with equipment and vehicles; train Afghan
troops; complete the regional and sustaining commands; and provide the
capability to safely transport the Afghan president by air. However,
these funds would not suffice to provide the army with the capability
to airlift large numbers of troops from one part of the country to
another. OMC-A officials told us that adding this capability could cost
as much as $3 billion.[Footnote 27]
* State has not clearly defined the cost of reconstituting the police.
However, our analysis of State and Defense planning documents suggest
that completing the police program could cost between $800 million and
$1.8 billion.[Footnote 28] Most of these funds would pay for
construction and equipment, including more than $500 million to
construct police stations and buildings; about $100 million for trucks,
buses, and other vehicles; and more than $85 million to provide each
patrolman a weapon, uniform, ammunition, and related gear.
Similarly, Defense and State have not clearly defined the annual cost
of sustaining the completed army and police forces. OMC-A officials and
Joint Chiefs of Staff planners told us that sustaining the completed
Afghan army could cost at least $420 million (in 2005 dollars)
annually. The majority of these costs would be for general equipment
repair, maintenance, supplies, medical support, salaries, and food.
DynCorp police planning documents project that maintaining police force
operations could cost $180 million annually (in 2005 dollars). Of this
amount, about $100 million would cover personnel costs. The rest would
pay for fuel, vehicle replacement and maintenance, ammunition, and
facilities upkeep.
The United States has not committed to pay for creating and sustaining
the army and police. To date, the United States has been the major
contributor to Afghan's security sector reform, providing about 90
percent of funding for the Afghan army and the largest share of funding
for police, judiciary, and counternarcotics efforts. At the same time,
other nations have not demonstrated the willingness to provide the
funds that may be needed to complete and sustain these forces. For
example, while the United States has provided the $277 million it
pledged at a 2004 police donor conference, as of March 2005, the other
donor nations had provided only about half of the $73 million that they
pledged at the same conference. Also, donors have provided the United
Nations Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan with about $60 million
of the $149 million pledged for April 2004 through March 2005.
Slow Progress in Addressing Other Pillars Could Undermine Afghan
Security:
The ability to field fully functioning Afghan army and police forces is
dependent on concurrent success in the other security sector reform
pillars. The lack of an effective judicial sector, the substantial
illicit narcotics industry, and the continued existence of armed
militias threatens to undermine overall progress toward providing
nationwide security and the stability of the Afghan government.
Afghanistan Lacks Effective Judicial Sector:
Establishing a working judiciary based on the rule of law is a
prerequisite for effective policing. However, according to donor
officials, few linkages exist between the judiciary and the police, and
the police have little ability to enforce judicial judgments. In
addition, judges and prosecutors are not being exposed to police
training and practices, and the police training curriculum does not
include instruction on criminal law and procedure. Moreover, according
to U.S. embassy officials, the Afghan judiciary has not yet acquired
the political authority needed to adjudicate a criminal or drug case
against a high-level political or warlord figure.
Supported by the United States, other donors, and international
organizations, Italy--the lead nation for reforming the judiciary--has
followed a three-pronged strategy: (1) developing and drafting legal
codes, (2) training judges and prosecutors, and (3) renovating the
country's physical legal infrastructure. The Italian government has
provided approximately $10 million annually to support the judicial
reform, and the United States has provided approximately $28 million
for fiscal years 2003 through 2004. However, according to Italian and
U.S. government officials, the reform program is under funded and
understaffed.
Italy and the other donors have made some progress in promoting reform.
These include drafting a new criminal procedure code, training several
hundred judges, and renovating courthouses. However, these
accomplishments address only a small portion of Afghanistan's overall
need for judicial reform. Afghanistan's judicial sector is currently
characterized by a conflicting mix of civil, religious, and customary
laws, with few trained judges, prosecutors, or other justice personnel.
Furthermore, its penal system is nonfunctioning, and its buildings,
official records, and essential office equipment and furniture have
been damaged extensively. U.S. and donor officials informed us that
progress in rebuilding the judicial sector lags far behind the other
security pillars and that the reform effort is being undermined by
systemic corruption at key national and provincial justice
institutions.
Illicit Narcotics Industry Threatens Government Authority:
The production and trafficking of illicit narcotics poses a serious
challenge to the Afghan government's authority. According to the United
Nations, Afghanistan produces almost 90 percent of the world's illicit
opium, generating revenues equivalent to about 60 percent of
Afghanistan's gross domestic product for 2003. According to State,
narcotics revenues breed corruption at virtually all levels of the
Afghan government while providing resources to Taliban remnants, drug
lords, and other terrorist groups. Solving the narcotics problem in
Afghanistan is widely seen as critical to achieving security in
Afghanistan.
The United Kingdom is leading international counternarcotics efforts in
Afghanistan and is trying to persuade other nations to contribute to a
new Afghan counternarcotics trust fund. From 2002 to 2004, the United
States obligated approximately $380 million and assisted the
counternarcotics efforts by training Afghan narcotics interdiction
units, constructing border and highway checkpoint facilities, and
supplying operational support and nonlethal equipment to Afghan
eradication teams. For fiscal year 2005, the United States has provided
about $966 million for a counternarcotics program that includes public
information, alternative livelihoods, law enforcement, interdiction,
and eradication campaigns. The goal of the new U.S. program is to
ensure that narcotics production and drug trade do not subvert efforts
to rebuild the Afghan police and army.
Although the president of Afghanistan took several counternarcotics
initiatives at the end of 2004,[Footnote 29] the decree banning opium
production has been weakened by the Afghan government's lack of a
transparent criminal justice system and the underequipped,
decentralized police force. The Afghan government's eradication force
and provincial forces have undertaken only marginal crop destruction in
a few locations. U.S. officials stated that these eradication efforts
have had no material effect on the quantity of opium produced. In
addition, U.S. proposals for large-scale aerial eradication programs
have been resisted by Afghan government officials and other
international donors. According to U.S. officials, opium is being
produced in record amounts in all 34 provinces, and a centrally trained
and directed Afghan counternarcotics force would likely face
significant opposition from provincial drug lords and many citizens.
Although U.S. and internationally sustained counternarcotics and
security programs could potentially reduce the amount of opium produced
over time, State officials expect that drug processing and trafficking
will continue until security is established.
Militias Have Not Been Fully Reintegrated:
Although the number of known militia fighters has been reduced in
recent months, the disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating of
members of Afghanistan's once-dominant militias is not complete. While
many militias are under the nominal authority of the Afghan Defense
Ministry, they pose a threat to the stability of the Afghan government
and its ability to extend control throughout Afghanistan. Of concern,
according to Japanese officials, is that former combatants may be
attracted by the higher salaries provided by militia leaders in the
illegal narcotics industry.
To help the Afghan government disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate
militia fighters, donor nations established the Afghan New Beginnings
Programme in early 2003. Under the auspices of Japan and the United
Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan, the program oversaw the
demobilization of more than 34,000 former combatants by January 2005.
The program also oversaw the seizure or destruction of more than 90
percent of the heavy weapons formerly controlled by militias (see fig.
7). Defense is providing transportation for heavy weapons and is
monitoring the surrender of militias' small arms and light weapons.
Also, the U.S. Agency for International Development donated $4 million
to the Afghan New Beginnings Programme in fiscal year 2005.
Figure 7: Heavy Weapons Cantonment Site Outside Kabul:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
However, the program's success is not assured. According to U.S. and
Japanese government officials responsible for monitoring the
demobilization process, the total number of troops still belonging to
militias and other armed factions remains unknown.[Footnote 30] In
addition, U.S. troops monitoring and assisting in the disarmament
process reported that the Afghan government has collected only limited
numbers of poor-quality assault rifles and that better quality weaponry
may still be held by the former combatants and their commanders.
Former combatants have limited employment opportunities when they leave
the militias and attempt to reintegrate into society. As of January
2005, only one reintegration center in Kabul provided vocational
training to former combatants. Although Afghanistan plans to open
another seven regional centers by early 2005, the eight centers
together can retrain only 2,000 students per year.
Conclusions:
Without strong and self-sustaining Afghan army and police forces,
international terrorists could again create a haven in Afghanistan and
jeopardize donor efforts to develop the country. However, Afghanistan
remains dependent on other nations for support--international
assistance provided over 90 percent of Afghanistan's $4.75 billion
budget for 2005. The International Monetary Fund estimates that Afghan
government revenues will average less than $400 million per year
through 2008--less than half its projected expenditures just for
government salaries and operations.
The United States has provided over $4.1 billion since 2002 to help
create a new Afghan army and reconstitute Afghanistan's police force.
Despite initial progress, the United States and the other donors
continue to face numerous challenges. Although Defense has succeeded in
training and fielding thousands of Afghan combat troops, it has not
been able to fully equip them and it has lagged in establishing the
institutions the Afghan army needs to sustain itself. Similarly, while
State has trained thousands of police, it has just begun to address the
structural problems that affect the Afghan police force. In addition,
neither Defense nor State has fully addressed how and when Afghanistan
will be able to sustain its completed security forces.
Establishing viable Afghan army and police forces will almost certainly
require years of effort and the investment of additional resources.
Available information suggests the army and police programs could cost
up to $7.2 billion to complete and an estimated $600 million annually
to sustain. However, Defense and State have not developed detailed
plans, performance measures, cost estimates, or milestones for
completing and sustaining these forces. Moreover, progress in the other
pillars of Afghan's security reform is critical to eventually
sustaining and maximizing the effectiveness of the Afghan army and
police forces. Yet, reform of the Afghan judiciary lags behind the
other security pillars, trafficking in illicit narcotics remains a
challenge to the Afghan government's authority, and thousands of
militia fighters have not been disarmed and reintegrated into society.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Because of Afghanistan's prolonged conflict and its limited financial
resources, we recommend that the Secretaries of Defense and State
develop detailed plans for completing and sustaining the Afghan army
and police forces. The plans should include clearly defined objectives
and performance measures; milestones for achieving stated objectives;
future funding requirements; and a strategy for sustaining the results
achieved, including transitioning program responsibility to
Afghanistan. The Secretaries should provide this information to the
Congress when the executive branch next requests funding for the Afghan
army or police forces.
In addition, because reform in the other pillars of the Afghan security
sector--building an effective judiciary, curbing the production and
trafficking of illicit narcotics, and disarming and reintegrating
militia fighters--is critical to the success of the army and police
programs, we recommend that the Secretaries of Defense and State work
with the other lead donor nations to help ensure that progress in the
other pillars is congruent with the progress made in the army and
police programs. The Secretaries should regularly report to the
Congress, but no less than annually, on the progress made in addressing
these other security pillars.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
The Departments of Defense, Justice, and State provided written
comments on a draft of this report. See appendixes III, IV, and V,
respectively. We also met with cognizant officials from Defense and
State to discuss their comments and observations. Both departments
provided technical comments and updates that we incorporated throughout
the report, as appropriate. Overall, Defense, Justice, and State found
the report helpful, thorough, and accurate.
Justice characterized the Afghan police training program as extremely
important and enormously complex. It shared our concerns that more
detailed plans for the creation of a sustainable and effective Afghan
police force must be developed. Justice went on to note that its
International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program is
providing critical support to the Iraqi Police Service and has assisted
other police training programs around the world, but has almost no role
in the ongoing efforts to assist the Afghan police.
Although Defense and State generally concurred with our
recommendations, both suggested that existing reporting requirements
addressed the need to report their plans for completing and sustaining
the Afghan army and police forces. Defense indicated that detailed
plans will allow it to effectively manage already scarce manpower and
resources and should foster deliberate and proactive long-term planning
with State. State noted that coordination efforts have characterized
these programs since inception and will continue.
We do not dispute that current law, including the Afghan Freedom
Support Act of 2002, as amended, and the fiscal year 2005 emergency
supplemental, mandate a number of reports on Afghanistan. However, our
analysis of past Defense and State reporting--both internally and to
the Congress--indicates that the departments do not have detailed plans
for equipping and fielding fully functioning Afghan army and police
forces by a stated end date. We continue to believe that developing and
following such plans and ensuring concurrent progress in the other
security pillars is essential to the overall future success of the
Afghan security effort. Whatever reporting mechanisms Defense and State
choose, the departments need to specify what their objectives are and
how they will assess progress, when the effort to build the Afghan army
and police will be completed, and what future funding will be needed.
In addition, in light of the Justice comments, we encourage State to
take advantage of Justice's police training expertise in developing its
detailed plans for completing and sustaining the Afghan police program.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days
from the date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies of this
report to interested congressional committees and to the Secretaries of
Defense and State. We will also make copies available to others on
request. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on the
GAO Web site at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-3149 or [Hyperlink, GootnickD@gao.gov]. Key
contributors to this report were Al Huntington, Pat Dickriede, Reid
Lowe, Pierre Toureille, Eve Weisberg, and Joe Zamoyta.
Signed by:
David Gootnick, Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
[End of section]
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To examine the progress made, and limitations faced, by the United
States and other donor nations in creating a new Afghan national army,
we reviewed documents obtained from several offices and agencies in the
U.S. Department of Defense, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff/J-5
(Office of Strategic Plans and Policy's Afghanistan Desk), U.S. Central
Command, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (Middle East, Asia and
North Africa division), the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the U.S. Army
Security Assistance Command, the Office of Military Cooperation-
Afghanistan, and Task Force Phoenix. We also reviewed documents from
State's Bureau of South Asian Affairs. Our review of these documents
provided us with information concerning the program's structure,
current time frames and objectives, progress, limitations, and funding
status. In addition, we met with the following various cognizant
officials to discuss the progress made and limitations faced by the
United States:
* In Washington, D.C., we met with officials from the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Defense Security
Cooperation Agency, the U.S. Army Security Assistance Command, and the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. At State, we met with officials from
State's South Asia and Political-Military Affairs bureaus. In Tampa,
Florida, we met with officials of the U.S. Central Command, which has
military oversight for Afghanistan.
* We attended a meeting on the status of Afghan military construction
projects at the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' Transatlantic Programs
Center in Winchester, Virginia, which oversees the Corps' construction
projects in Afghanistan.
* We attended a 3-day conference in New Cumberland, Pennsylvania, where
representatives from the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, the U.S.
Army Security Assistance Command, and the Office of Military
Cooperation-Afghanistan discussed problems that were impeding security
assistance to the Afghan army.
In Kabul, Afghanistan, we met with officials of the Combined Forces
Command, the Office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan, and Task Force
Phoenix; U.S. embedded trainers; and the Afghan Deputy Minister of
Defense. Also in Afghanistan, we traveled to Herat, where we met with
U.S. embedded trainers, the commander of the Afghan army's regional
command, and some Afghan army troops.
To examine the progress made, and limitations faced, by the United
States and other donor nations in reconstituting the Afghan national
police, we reviewed relevant documents on police program planning,
resources, and implementation. We analyzed documents from State's
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs/Resource Management
Office to obtain a detailed costs and funding sources. Defense's Office
of Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict provided us with
planning materials on the police-related counternarcotics program, as
well as funding documents for this program. In addition, we reviewed
the U.S. curricula for Afghan police training provided to us by the
Department of Justice. We also examined documentation from the United
Nations Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan to obtain an overview
of funding from non-U.S. donors. We reviewed German government
documents on the German strategy for the Afghan police, German police
program, and its funding information. We also met with the following
cognizant officials to discuss the progress made, and limitations
faced, by the United States and the other donors:
* In Washington, D.C., we met with officials from State's Bureau for
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs who focus on police
training and the rule of law, as well as with officials from State's
South Asia Bureau. At Justice, we spoke with officials from the
International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program. We
also met with representatives of DynCorp Aerospace Technology--the
State contractor for the Afghan police program. At Defense, we met with
officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense's Office for
Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict.
* In New York City, we held discussions with representatives of the
United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations' Civilian Police
Division and with officials from the United Nations Law and Order Trust
Fund for Afghanistan.
* In Afghanistan, we met with U.S. embassy officials overseeing the
police training program, officials at the Afghan ministry of Interior,
and representatives of the German embassy charged with overseeing
Germany's police program. In addition, we traveled to Jalalabad to meet
with DynCorp police trainers and Afghan police personnel; we also
toured a police training facility and inspected an Afghan police
station.
To identify future challenges that the United States, other donor
nations, and Afghanistan must address to complete and sustain the
Afghan army and police forces, we reviewed documents prepared by
Defense, State, the government of Afghanistan, foreign donor
governments, and international organizations. We also met with Defense,
State, and DynCorp officials in the United States and Afghanistan to
obtain information concerning the potential future costs of the army
and police programs. In Afghanistan, we met with officials at the
embassies of Italy, the United Kingdom, and Japan to discuss the Afghan
judiciary, the Afghan narcotics problem, and the continued presence of
militia fighters, respectively. In the United Kingdom and Germany, we
met with officials from those nations' ministries of foreign affairs
and defense to discuss overall Afghan security issues. In Belgium, we
met with U.S. officials at the U.S. Mission to the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization in Brussels, Belgium, and with officials at its
Supreme Headquarters for Allied Powers in Europe in Mons, Belgium, to
discuss their perspectives on the challenges posed by the Afghan
security situation.
To determine the reliability of the funding data, Afghan army troop
data, and Afghan police training data obtained from Defense and State
officials, we compared multiple reports and sources and interviewed
cognizant officials regarding the controls and checks they used to
compile the data.
* To help confirm the completeness and consistency of U.S. and
international funding data, we compiled and compared data from multiple
sources--Defense, State, Justice, and other donor countries--with
information from cognizant U.S. agency officials and donor country
officials in Washington, D.C., and Afghanistan. We used a questionnaire
to address the accuracy of the data; the security of the databases
used; and the limitations, if any, of the data. We also compared the
funding data to appropriations and authorization legislation,
congressional budget requests, and reports to the Congress. Although we
did not audit the funding data and are not expressing an opinion on
them, based on our examination of the documents received and our
discussions with cognizant agency officials, we concluded that the
funding data we obtained were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of
this engagement.
* To assess the reliability of the data regarding the number of Afghan
troops assigned to Afghan army commands, we discussed with Defense
officials how they check data from the commands and compared it with
information from embedded trainers and payroll records. To assess the
reliability of the data regarding the number of Afghan police trained,
we interviewed State officials who received data from DynCorp, Justice,
and the German Ministry of Interior to determine how they verify the
data; we also compared the various information sources provided to us.
However, because of the security situation in Afghanistan, we could not
independently verify or test the army and police training information
at field locations. Nevertheless, based on our assessments of the data
provided and our discussions with the cognizant officials, we concluded
that the Afghan army troop data and Afghan police training data
provided to us were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this
report.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Assistance Provided to Afghan Army and Police by Non-U.S.
Donors:
Forty-one non-U.S. donors have provided approximately $439 million in
cash, equipment, and services for the Afghan army and police (see table
3). Approximately $193 million was donated to supplement U.S. efforts
to build the Afghan army, and about $246 million was provided for the
Afghan police program (see table 3). Six donors--the Czech Republic,
the European Union, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the World
Bank--provided almost 65 percent of the total donations.
* For the Afghan army, over $52 million was donated in cash and an
estimated $141 million was donated in weapons, ammunition, vehicles,
infrastructure support, communications equipment, medical equipment,
and clothing.[Footnote 31]
* For the Afghan police, over $120 million was donated in cash to the
United Nations' Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan,[Footnote 32]
and an estimated $126 million was donated in equipment, construction
assistance, and training.
In addition, Defense estimates that approximately $24 million of
military equipment was recovered from the demobilization of militias
and other salvaged equipment in Afghanistan.
Table 3: Estimated Value of Assistance Provided to Afghan Army and
Police by Non-U.S. Donors:
Dollars in millions.
Albania;
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $*;
Police (as of January 2005): $0;
Totals: $*.
Australia;
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $0;
Police (as of January 2005): $1;
Totals: $1.
Belgium;
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $*;
Police (as of January 2005): $0;
Totals: $*.
Bosnia;
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $1;
Police (as of January 2005): $0;
Totals: $1.
Bulgaria;
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $17;
Police (as of January 2005): $0;
Totals: $17.
Canada;
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $2;
Police (as of January 2005): $10;
Totals: $12.
China;
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $0;
Police (as of January 2005): $2;
Totals: $2.
Croatia;
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $4;
Police (as of January 2005): $0;
Totals: $4.
Czech Republic;
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $59;
Police (as of January 2005): $0;
Totals: $59.
Denmark;
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $*;
Police (as of January 2005): $
*;
Totals: $*.
Egypt;
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $2;
Police (as of January 2005): $0;
Totals: $2.
European Union;
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $0;
Police (as of January 2005): $86;
Totals: $86.
Finland;
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $0;
Police (as of January 2005): $
*;
Totals: $*.
France;
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $5;
Police (as of January 2005): $20;
Totals: $25.
Germany;
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $1;
Police (as of January 2005): $68;
Totals: $69.
Greece;
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $2;
Police (as of January 2005): $0;
Totals: $2.
Hungary;
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $9;
Police (as of January 2005): $0;
Totals: $9.
Iceland;
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $1;
Police (as of January 2005): $0;
Totals: $1.
India;
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $10;
Police (as of January 2005): $0;
Totals: $10.
Ireland;
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $0;
Police (as of January 2005): $1;
Totals: $1.
Italy;
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $*;
Police (as of January 2005): $0;
Totals: $*.
Japan;
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $0;
Police (as of January 2005): $20;
Totals: $20.
Kazakhstan;
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $*;
Police (as of January 2005): $0;
Totals: $*.
Liechtenstein;
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $0;
Police (as of January 2005): $*;
Totals: $*.
Netherlands;
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $0;
Police (as of January 2005): $8;
Totals: $8.
New Zealand;
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $*;
Police (as of January 2005): $0;
Totals: $*.
Norway;
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $1;
Police (as of January 2005): $5;
Totals: $6.
Pakistan;
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $2;
Police (as of January 2005): $0;
Totals: $2.
Poland;
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $1;
Police (as of January 2005): $0;
Totals: $1.
Qatar;
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $5;
Police (as of January 2005): $0;
Totals: $5.
Romania;
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $8;
Police (as of January 2005): $0;
Totals: $8.
Russia;
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $1;
Police (as of January 2005): $0;
Totals: $1.
Slovenia;
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $2;
Police (as of January 2005): $0;
Totals: $2.
South Korea;
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $1;
Police (as of January 2005): $0;
Totals: $1.
Spain;
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $2;
Police (as of January 2005): $0;
Totals: $2.
Switzerland;
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $1;
Police (as of January 2005): $1;
Totals: $2.
United Arab Emirates;
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $3;
Police (as of January 2005): $0;
Totals: $3.
Ukraine;
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $1;
Police (as of January 2005): $0;
Totals: $1.
United Kingdom;
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $20;
Police (as of January 2005): $2;
Totals: $22.
World Bank;
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $0;
Police (as of January 2005): $22;
Totals: $22.
Other;
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $32;
Police (as of January 2005): $0;
Totals: $32.
Total;
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $193;
Police (as of January 2005): $246;
Totals: $439.
Source: GAO analysis of data from the U.S. Central Command and U.S.
Defense Security Cooperation Agency (Afghan army) and the German
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Afghan police).
*Less than $500,000.
[A] Bulgaria, Canada, France, Germany, Mongolia, Romania, South Korea,
and the United Kingdom also provided military trainers to the Afghan
army.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
DEFENSE SECURITY COOPERATION AGENCY:
WASHINGTON DC 20301-2800:
In reply refer to: 05/007846-ME:
Mr. David Gootnick:
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
US General Accounting Office:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Gootnick:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report (05-575), `AFGHANISTAN SECURITY: Efforts to Establish Army and
Police Have Made Progress But Future Plans Need to Be Better Defined,'
dated May 11, 2005 (GAO Code 320240, 320278).
DoD acknowledges receipt of the draft report, and we concur with the
report in principle. Our response to the recommendations posed by GAO
is attached.
The Department appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft
report. My point of contact on this matter is LTC Brett Floro. He may
be contacted by email: brett.floro@dsca.mil or by telephone at (703)
604-6626.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
JEFFREY B. KOHLER:
LIEUTENANT GENERAL, USAF:
DIRECTOR:
Attachments As stated:
GAO DRAFT REPORT DATED MAY 11, 2005 GAO-05-575 (GAO CODE 320240,
320278):
"AFGHANISTAN SECURITY: EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH ARMY AND POLICE HAVE MADE
PROGRESS BUT FUTURE PLANS NEED TO BE BETTER DEFINED"
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE GAO RECOMMENDATIONS:
RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretaries of Defense
and State develop detailed plans for completing and sustaining the
Afghan army or police forces. The plans should include clearly defined
objectives and performance measures; milestones for achieving stated
objectives; future funding requirements; and a strategy for sustaining
the results achieved, including transitioning program responsibility to
Afghanistan. The Secretaries should provide this information to the
Congress when the executive branch next requests funding for the Afghan
army or police forces. (p. 38/GAO Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: Partially Concur. Detailed plans will allow the
Departments to effectively manage already scarce manpower and resources
to meet the Combatant Commander's requirements. While there are
situations beyond U.S control which will impact on established plans,
detailed plans with specific requirements should foster deliberate and
proactive long-term planning between the Departments. The Department of
Defense also recommends that the information to be provided to Congress
be incorporated into existing reporting requirements of the recently
enacted FY 2005 Emergency Supplemental Act. Also, the Department
suggests that funding for Afghanistan security forces be made available
until expended to ensure funding availability corresponds with ongoing
multi-year programs.
RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretaries of Defense
and State work with the other lead donor nations to help ensure that
progress in the other pillars is congruent with the progress made in
the army and police programs. The Secretaries should regularly report
to the Congress, but no less than annually, on the progress made in
addressing these other security pillers. (p. 38/GAO Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: Concur. While we have made great strides training the
Afghan National Army, it is only one of the five pillars. For the
Government of Afghanistan to operate effectively, the other pillars
must be built, trained and sustained. Additionally, all five pillars
must develop close working relationships and learn to integrate their
actions among themselves.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Justice:
U.S. Department of Justice:
Criminal Division:
International Criminal Investigation Training Assistance Programs:
Washington, D.C 20530:
June 16, 2005:
David Gootnick, Director:
International Affairs and Trade (IAT):
United States Government Accountability Office (GAO):
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Gootnick,
The Department of Justice greatly appreciates the opportunity to
comment on this document, and lauds GAO's efforts to address an
extremely important and enormously complex program initiative.
We strongly support GAO's statement that "[w]ithout strong and self-
sustaining Afghan army and pol ice forces and concurrent progress in
the other pillars of security sector reform, Afghanistan could again
become a haven for terrorists. " Further, we share GAO's concerns that
more detailed plans for the creation of a sustainable and effective
Afghan police force must be developed posthaste - to include "clearly
defined objectives and performance measures; milestones; funding
requirements; and a strategy for sustaining the results achieved."
The Department's International Criminal Investigative Training
Assistance Program (ICITAP) is uniquely qualified to develop, implement
and manage such a large-scale program effort. ICITAP is the USG's lead
implementing agency in the area of international law enforcement
development and training worldwide with 19 years of unequaled
experience in over 50 countries. In Iraq for example, ICITAP has
provided critical support to the development of the Iraqi Police
Service since May of 2003. ICITAP and the Department's law enforcement
components work directly with Multi-National Security Transition
Command - Iraq (MNSTC-I) and the U.S. Embassy's Senior Law Enforcement
Advisor, who serves as the principal deputy of the MNSTC-I Civilian
Police Assistance and Training Team (CPATT). ICITAP has not only
participated in the leadership of CPATT since inception, but it has
developed and/or delivered roughly 15 distinct basic, advanced or
specialized police training courses, and has over 330 International
Police Trainers (IPTs) actively deployed in Iraq and Jordan in support
of these efforts. ICITAP has operational oversight of the mentoring
program, which includes up to 500 U.S. police liaison officers deployed
by the Department of State.
ICITAP currently has almost no role in on-going program efforts to
assist the Afghan police forces. While the report notes that ICITAP
developed curricula for the Afghanistan mission, it does not speak to
this matter, and it does not clearly articulate the role the Department
and ICITAP should play in future program efforts. We continue to be
dedicated to interagency cooperation and the ultimate success of the
USG's mission in Afghanistan, but are concerned that our expertise is
not being utilized - much to the detriment of the USG's efforts.
We believe GAO's recommendations should include consideration of the
USG's operational law enforcement interests that are directly tied to
U.S. national security. In that light, the Department of Justice should
logically have a prominent role in developing and training the Afghan
police forces and rule of law institutions, both from a national
security and a best practices perspective. Any ambiguity in this area
could be detrimental to the development of the Afghan police forces,
the emerging Afghan democracy, and our national security interests.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
R. Carr Trevillian, IV:
Deputy Director:
cc: Bruce C. Swartz:
Deputy Assistant Attorney General:
Criminal Division:
Department of Justice:
[End of section]
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of State:
United States Department of State:
Assistant Secretary and Chief Financial Officer:
Washington, D.C. 20520:
Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers:
Managing Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001:
Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers:
We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "AFGHANISTAN
SECURITY: Efforts to Establish Army and Police Have Made Progress But
Future Plans Need to Be Better Defined," GAO Job Code 320240.
The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.
If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact Ron
Packowitz, Afghanistan Desk Officer, Bureau of South Asian Affairs at
(202) 647-1113.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Sid Kaplan (Acting):
cc: GAO - Terry Hanford;
SA - Christina Rocca;
State/OIG - Mark Duda:
Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report "AFGHANISTAN SECURITY
- Efforts to Establish Army and Police Have Made Progress But Future
Plans Need to Be Better Defined" GAO-05-575 GAO Code 320240:
The Department of State has reviewed the draft report and the GAO's
recommendations. We concur in the recommendation that the Department of
State and Department of Defense develop more detailed plans for
completing and sustaining the Afghan army and police. We also concur in
the recommendation to work with other lead nations. Such internal and
international coordination efforts have characterized these training
programs since they were established and will be continued.
The U.S. Government's security assistance mission, providing support
for the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police, Border Police,
and Highway Patrol, is rapidly helping the Afghan government build
capacity to provide public security. Our goal is to develop competent,
professional security forces with sufficient training, equipment,
infrastructure, institutional capacity, and organizational structure.
Our support for the Afghan army and police is doing just that, and we
are pleased that FY 2005 supplemental funds will allow us to increase
our assistance in these vital efforts.
While the Department agrees with the recommendations noted in the first
paragraph above, we respectfully disagree with the recommendation for
new reporting to Congress. Currently mandated reports from the
Department of State on Afghanistan are quite comprehensive, and include
a report due later this year that will describe "the procedures of the
Department of State and Department of Defense to ensure the
coordination of police and army training efforts.." We believe we can
address the GAO's concerns in our currently mandated reports.
[End of section]
(320240, 320278):
FOOTNOTES
[1] For a detailed discussion of efforts to reconstruct postwar
Afghanistan, see our report Afghanistan Reconstruction: Deteriorating
Security and Limited Resources Have Impeded Progress; Improvements in
U.S. Strategy Needed, GAO-04-403 (Washington, D.C.: June 2, 2004).
[2] These forces include about 8,300 North Atlantic Treaty Organization
peacekeepers.
[3] The conference's final communiqué, also known as the "Bonn II"
Agreement, supports efforts started under the Bonn Agreement of
December 2001 to promote national reconciliation, lasting peace,
stability, and respect for human rights in Afghanistan.
[4] As currently planned, the air wing would not be able to transport
large numbers of Afghan troops from one part of the country to another.
[5] About $1.4 billion of this amount was provided during fiscal years
2002 through 2004, of which more than $980 million had been obligated
and more than $511 million had been expended as of January 2005. Over
$1.8 billion of this amount is part of the fiscal year 2005 emergency
supplemental which was enacted into law on May 11, 2005.
[6] An Afghan battalion consists of about 610 men.
[7] According to Defense officials, volunteers are vetted through
community elders and State. Ex-militia fighters may enlist on an
individual basis, but United Nations reports indicate that less than 2
percent had done so as of February 2005.
[8] According to the U.S. government, as of January 2004, the ethnic
composition of the Afghan population was 42 percent Pashtun, 27 percent
Tajik, 9 percent Hazara, 9 percent Uzbek, and 13 percent "other."
According to OMC-A, as of February 15, 2005, the ethnic composition of
the Afghan army was 49 percent Pashtun, 21 percent Tajik, 6 percent
Hazara, 3 percent Uzbek, and 22 percent "other" (the total of the
individual percentages is greater than 100 percent due to rounding).
Individual units vary in their ethnic balance. According to OMC-A, at
least two battalions have no or very few Uzbek troops.
[9] Defense fielding plans for the army assume an attrition rate of 2
percent per month. Soldiers absent for more than 60 days are dropped
from the army's rolls.
[10] The security concerns included factional unrest in Herat in March
and August 2004, as well as violence preceding Afghanistan's first-ever
democratic presidential election in October 2004.
[11] The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is constructing facilities at
these locations. As of January 2005, funding provided to the Corps for
this effort totaled $740 million.
[12] One embedded trainer informed us that he has had to rely on a cell
phone that he purchased at a U.S. retail outlet to communicate with his
unit during operations.
[13] The light tactical vehicle is essentially a modified pickup truck
that would replace four different types of vehicles now used by the
army. These vehicles were donated by the United Arab Emirates, Germany,
and Greece. OMC-A officials told us that these donations helped fill
the Afghan army's early requirement for transportation but are now
complicating the army's logistics situation.
[14] At the time of our work in Afghanistan, Defense had allocated OMC-
A 211 military positions and 95 contractor and civilian positions.
[15] According to OMC-A, Air Force personnel were assigned to
Afghanistan for 4 months, Navy and Marine Corps personnel for 6 months,
and Army personnel for 12 months. Defense officials in the United
States informed us that Air Force personnel may now be assigned to fill
certain critical positions for as long as 12 months.
[16] OMC-A requested and received offshore procurement waivers between
fiscal years 2002 and 2005 to spend up to $596 million to procure non-
U.S. items overseas.
[17] Defense officials informed us that NATO members may contribute
embedded trainers in the future.
[18] In 2004, Afghan troops were flown to Herat on U.S. military and
allied aircraft.
[19] The target numbers were derived by considering the security needs
and population density of geographic areas, as well as the expected
organizational structure of the police.
[20] More than 20,000 police were trained before the Afghan
presidential elections in October 2004.
[21] The United States assumed responsibility for the border police
when Norway and Germany did not follow through on commitments to
provide the training. Norway provided some funding for the renovation
of the border police academy.
[22] Commissioned and noncommissioned officers constitute the police's
upper and intermediate ranks, respectively, while patrolmen are lower
level.
[23] The fiscal year 2004 supplemental provided Defense's Office for
Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict $73 million to support
Afghan border security, law enforcement, and counter narcotics efforts.
The program was refocused in the spring of 2004 to concentrate on
police infrastructure and capabilities in southern and southeastern
Afghanistan.
[24] According to officials from the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping
Operations, field-based training of local police by international
police trainers was key to establishing professional police forces in
these countries.
[25] By contrast, Defense's Combined Forces Command had assigned up to
10 personnel to a law enforcement planning cell to prepare for a
possible Defense role in the police buildup.
[26] OMC-A officials stated that the total cost of the army program
would be at least $7 billion. The United States and other donors have
already provided approximately $1.6 billion for the army through fiscal
year 2004.
[27] Adding a larger air wing would also require English-language
training for a greater number of Afghans if the air wing were equipped
with U.S. manufactured aircraft.
[28] The higher estimate includes an expanded field-based training
program, additional civilian staffing, an aviation capacity, and a
doubling of the Afghan border police from the current plan of 12,000 to
24,000.
[29] Two days after Afghanistan's December 2004 presidential
inauguration, the president of Afghanistan launched a counternarcotics
campaign. The president appointed a cabinet-level minister for
counternarcotics and created a subcabinet interagency working group
that includes the Afghan counternarcotics, interior, finance, and rural
development ministries.
[30] Estimates of the total number of militia fighters and other armed
factions operating in Afghanistan in 2002 have ranged from 100,000 to
over 1 million.
[31] OMC-A and U.S. Central Command calculated the value of donated
resources and services in U.S. dollar equivalents in the year donated.
These figures do not include the value of donors' training teams or
support to the Kabul Military Training Center.
[32] Donors reported the monetary value of their donations to the
German Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the year they provided the
donations.
GAO's Mission:
The Government Accountability Office, the investigative arm of
Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional
responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability
of the federal government for the American people. GAO examines the use
of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides
analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make
informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO's commitment to
good government is reflected in its core values of accountability,
integrity, and reliability.
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony:
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no
cost is through the Internet. GAO's Web site ( www.gao.gov ) contains
abstracts and full-text files of current reports and testimony and an
expanding archive of older products. The Web site features a search
engine to help you locate documents using key words and phrases. You
can print these documents in their entirety, including charts and other
graphics.
Each day, GAO issues a list of newly released reports, testimony, and
correspondence. GAO posts this list, known as "Today's Reports," on its
Web site daily. The list contains links to the full-text document
files. To have GAO e-mail this list to you every afternoon, go to
www.gao.gov and select "Subscribe to e-mail alerts" under the "Order
GAO Products" heading.
Order by Mail or Phone:
The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2
each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent
of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or
more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent.
Orders should be sent to:
U.S. Government Accountability Office
441 G Street NW, Room LM
Washington, D.C. 20548:
To order by Phone:
Voice: (202) 512-6000:
TDD: (202) 512-2537:
Fax: (202) 512-6061:
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs:
Contact:
Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:
Public Affairs:
Jeff Nelligan, managing director,
NelliganJ@gao.gov
(202) 512-4800
U.S. Government Accountability Office,
441 G Street NW, Room 7149
Washington, D.C. 20548:
