Combating Nuclear Smuggling
Efforts to Deploy Radiation Detection Equipment in the United States and in Other Countries Gao ID: GAO-05-840T June 21, 2005According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, between 1993 and 2004, there were 650 confirmed cases of illicit trafficking in nuclear and radiological materials worldwide. A significant number of the cases involved material that could be used to produce either a nuclear weapon or a device that uses conventional explosives with radioactive material (known as a "dirty bomb"). Over the past decade, the United States has become increasingly concerned about the danger that unsecured weapons-usable nuclear material could fall into the hands of terrorists or countries of concern. In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, there is heightened concern that terrorists may try to smuggle nuclear materials or a nuclear weapon into the United States. This testimony summarizes the results of our previous reports on various U.S. efforts to combat nuclear smuggling both in the United States and abroad. Specifically, this testimony discusses (1) the different U.S. federal agencies tasked with installing radiation detection equipment both domestically and in other countries, (2) problems with coordination among these agencies and programs, and (3) the effectiveness of radiation detection equipment deployed in the United States and other countries.
Four U.S. agencies, the Departments of Energy (DOE), Defense (DOD), State, and Homeland Security (DHS), are implementing programs to combat nuclear smuggling by providing radiation detection equipment and training to border security personnel. From fiscal year 1994 through fiscal year 2005, the Congress has appropriated about $800 million for these efforts, including about $500 million to DOE, DOD, and State for international efforts and about $300 million to DHS for installing radiation detection equipment at U.S. points of entry. The first major initiatives to combat nuclear smuggling concentrated on deploying radiation detection equipment at borders in countries of the former Soviet Union. In particular, in 1998, DOE established the Second Line of Defense program, which has installed equipment at 66 sites mostly in Russia through the end of fiscal year 2004. In 2003, DOE began its Megaports Initiative to focus on the threat posed by nuclear smuggling at major foreign seaports and to date has completed installations at two ports. Regarding efforts at U.S. points of entry, the U.S. Customs Service began providing its inspectors with portable radiation detection devices in 1998 and expanded its efforts to include larger-scale radiation detection equipment after September 11, 2001. This program is continuing under DHS, which reported in May 2005 that it has installed more than 470 radiation portal monitors nationwide at mail facilities, land border crossings, and seaports. A common problem faced by U.S. programs to combat nuclear smuggling is the lack of effective planning and coordination among the responsible agencies. For example, we reported in 2002 that there was no overall governmentwide plan to guide U.S. efforts, some programs were duplicative, and coordination among U.S. agencies was not effective. We found that the most troubling consequence of this lack of effective planning and coordination was that the Department of State had installed less sophisticated equipment in some countries leaving those countries' borders more vulnerable to nuclear smuggling than countries where DOE and DOD had deployed equipment. Since the issuance of our report, the agencies involved have made some progress in addressing these issues. Regarding the deployment of equipment in the United States, we reported that DHS had not effectively coordinated with other federal agencies and DOE national laboratories on longer-term objectives, such as attempting to improve the radiation detection technology. We found that a number of factors hindered coordination, including competition between DOE national laboratories and the emerging missions of various federal agencies with regard to radiation detection. The effectiveness of the current generation of radiation detection equipment is limited in its ability to detect illicitly trafficked nuclear material, especially if it is shielded by lead or other metal. Given the inherent limitations of radiation detection equipment and difficulties in detecting certain materials, it is important that the equipment be installed, operated, and maintained in a way that optimizes its usefulness. It is also important to note that the deployment of radiation detection equipment--regardless of how well such equipment works--is not a panacea for the problem of nuclear smuggling. Rather, combating nuclear smuggling requires an integrated approach that includes equipment, proper training of border security personnel in the use of radiation detection equipment, and intelligence gathering on potential nuclear smuggling operations.
GAO-05-840T, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Efforts to Deploy Radiation Detection Equipment in the United States and in Other Countries
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittees on the Prevention of Nuclear and Biological
Attack and on Emergency Preparedness, Science, and Technology,
Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT:
Tuesday, June 21, 2005:
Combating Nuclear Smuggling:
Efforts to Deploy Radiation Detection Equipment in the United States
and in Other Countries:
Statement of Gene Aloise, Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
GAO-05-840T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-05-840T, a testimony before the Subcommittees on the
Prevention of Nuclear and Biological Attack and on Emergency
Preparedness, Science, and Technology, Committee on Homeland Security,
House of Representatives:
Why GAO Did This Study:
According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, between 1993 and
2004, there were 650 confirmed cases of illicit trafficking in nuclear
and radiological materials worldwide. A significant number of the cases
involved material that could be used to produce either a nuclear weapon
or a device that uses conventional explosives with radioactive material
(known as a ’dirty bomb“). Over the past decade, the United States has
become increasingly concerned about the danger that unsecured weapons-
usable nuclear material could fall into the hands of terrorists or
countries of concern. In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, there is
heightened concern that terrorists may try to smuggle nuclear materials
or a nuclear weapon into the United States.
My testimony today summarizes the results of our previous reports on
various U.S. efforts to combat nuclear smuggling both in the United
States and abroad. Specifically, I will discuss (1) the different U.S.
federal agencies tasked with installing radiation detection equipment
both domestically and in other countries, (2) problems with
coordination among these agencies and programs, and (3) the
effectiveness of radiation detection equipment deployed in the United
States and other countries.
What GAO Found:
Four U.S. agencies, the Departments of Energy (DOE), Defense (DOD),
State, and Homeland Security (DHS), are implementing programs to combat
nuclear smuggling by providing radiation detection equipment and
training to border security personnel. From fiscal year 1994 through
fiscal year 2005, the Congress has appropriated about $800 million for
these efforts, including about $500 million to DOE, DOD, and State for
international efforts and about $300 million to DHS for installing
radiation detection equipment at U.S. points of entry. The first major
initiatives to combat nuclear smuggling concentrated on deploying
radiation detection equipment at borders in countries of the former
Soviet Union. In particular, in 1998, DOE established the Second Line
of Defense program, which has installed equipment at 66 sites mostly in
Russia through the end of fiscal year 2004. In 2003, DOE began its
Megaports Initiative to focus on the threat posed by nuclear smuggling
at major foreign seaports and to date has completed installations at
two ports. Regarding efforts at U.S. points of entry, the U.S. Customs
Service began providing its inspectors with portable radiation
detection devices in 1998 and expanded its efforts to include larger-
scale radiation detection equipment after September 11, 2001. This
program is continuing under DHS, which reported in May 2005 that it has
installed more than 470 radiation portal monitors nationwide at mail
facilities, land border crossings, and seaports.
A common problem faced by U.S. programs to combat nuclear smuggling is
the lack of effective planning and coordination among the responsible
agencies. For example, we reported in 2002 that there was no overall
governmentwide plan to guide U.S. efforts, some programs were
duplicative, and coordination among U.S. agencies was not effective. We
found that the most troubling consequence of this lack of effective
planning and coordination was that the Department of State had
installed less sophisticated equipment in some countries leaving those
countries‘ borders more vulnerable to nuclear smuggling than countries
where DOE and DOD had deployed equipment. Since the issuance of our
report, the agencies involved have made some progress in addressing
these issues. Regarding the deployment of equipment in the United
States, we reported that DHS had not effectively coordinated with other
federal agencies and DOE national laboratories on longer-term
objectives, such as attempting to improve the radiation detection
technology. We found that a number of factors hindered coordination,
including competition between DOE national laboratories and the
emerging missions of various federal agencies with regard to radiation
detection.
The effectiveness of the current generation of radiation detection
equipment is limited in its ability to detect illicitly trafficked
nuclear material, especially if it is shielded by lead or other metal.
Given the inherent limitations of radiation detection equipment and
difficulties in detecting certain materials, it is important that the
equipment be installed, operated, and maintained in a way that
optimizes its usefulness. It is also important to note that the
deployment of radiation detection equipment”regardless of how well such
equipment works”is not a panacea for the problem of nuclear smuggling.
Rather, combating nuclear smuggling requires an integrated approach
that includes equipment, proper training of border security personnel
in the use of radiation detection equipment, and intelligence gathering
on potential nuclear smuggling operations.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-840T.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Gene Aloise at (202) 512-
3841 or aloisee@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Messers. Chairmen and Members of the Subcommittees:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss our work assessing U.S.
government efforts to combat nuclear smuggling both at home and in
other countries through the deployment of radiation detection equipment
at border crossings and other points of entry.[Footnote 1] According to
the International Atomic Energy Agency, between 1993 and 2004, there
were 650 confirmed cases of illicit trafficking in nuclear and
radiological materials worldwide. A significant number of the cases
involved material that could be used to produce either a nuclear weapon
or a device that uses conventional explosives with radioactive material
(known as a "dirty bomb"). Over the past decade, the United States has
become increasingly concerned about the danger that unsecured weapons-
usable nuclear material[Footnote 2] from the former Soviet Union or
other countries could fall into the hands of terrorists or countries of
concern. In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, there is heightened
concern that terrorists may try to smuggle nuclear materials or a
nuclear weapon into the United States. This could happen in several
ways: nuclear materials could be hidden in a car, train, or ship;
carried in personal luggage through an airport; or walked across an
unprotected border. If terrorists were to smuggle a nuclear weapon or
dirty bomb into the United States, the consequences could be
devastating to our national and economic interests.
My testimony today summarizes the results of our previous reports on
various U.S. efforts to combat nuclear smuggling both in the United
States and in other countries. Specifically, I will discuss (1) the
activities of the various U.S. federal agencies tasked with installing
radiation detection equipment both domestically and in other countries,
(2) problems with coordination and planning among these agencies and
programs, and (3) the effectiveness of radiation detection equipment
deployed in the United States and other countries.
Summary:
Four U.S. agencies, the Departments of Energy (DOE), Defense (DOD),
State, and Homeland Security (DHS), are implementing programs to combat
nuclear smuggling in the United States and other countries by providing
radiation detection equipment and training to border security
personnel. From fiscal year 1994 through fiscal year 2005, the Congress
has appropriated about $800 million for these efforts, including about
$500 million to DOE, DOD, and State for international efforts and about
$300 million to DHS for installing radiation detection equipment at
U.S. points of entry. Initial concerns about the threat posed by
nuclear smuggling were focused on nuclear materials originating in the
former Soviet Union. As a result, the first major initiatives to combat
nuclear smuggling concentrated on deploying radiation detection
equipment at borders in countries of the former Soviet Union and in
Central and Eastern Europe. In particular, in 1998, DOE established the
Second Line of Defense program, which, through the end of fiscal year
2004, had installed equipment at 66 sites mostly in Russia. In 2003,
DOE implemented a second program, the Megaports Initiative, to focus on
the threat posed by nuclear smuggling at major foreign seaports. The
Megaports Initiative has completed installations at two foreign
seaports and is currently working to equip five others with radiation
detection equipment. Regarding efforts to combat nuclear smuggling at
U.S. points of entry, the U.S. Customs Service (now called the Bureau
of Customs and Border Patrol) began providing its inspectors with
portable radiation detection devices in 1998, and expanded its efforts
to include larger-scale radiation detection equipment after September
11, 2001. This program is continuing under DHS. In May 2005, DHS
reported that it has installed more than 470 radiation portal monitors
nationwide at sites including international mail and package handling
facilities, land border crossings, and seaports.
A common problem faced by U.S. programs to combat nuclear smuggling
both domestically and in other countries is the lack of effective
planning and coordination among the agencies responsible for
implementing these programs. For example, regarding U.S. efforts to
deploy radiation detection equipment in other countries, we reported in
2002 that there was no overall governmentwide plan to guide U.S.
efforts, some programs were duplicative, and coordination among the
various U.S. agencies involved with these efforts was not effective. We
found that the most troubling consequence of this lack of effective
planning and coordination was that different agencies had pursued
separate approaches to installing radiation detection equipment at
other countries' borders, and some agencies were installing better
equipment than others. As a result, some countries' border crossings
were more vulnerable to nuclear smuggling than others. Since the
issuance of our report, a governmentwide plan encompassing U.S.
international efforts to combat nuclear smuggling has been developed;
duplicative programs have been consolidated; and coordination among the
agencies, although still a concern, has improved. Regarding the
deployment of equipment in the United States, we reported that DHS had
not coordinated with other federal agencies and DOE national
laboratories on longer-term objectives, such as attempting to improve
the radiation detection technology used in portal monitors. We found
that a number of factors hindered coordination, including competition
between the DOE national laboratories and the emerging missions of
various federal agencies with regard to radiation detection. DHS agreed
with our assessment and told us that it is taking corrective actions to
address these concerns.
The effectiveness of the current generation of radiation detection
equipment is limited in its ability to detect illicitly trafficked
nuclear material, especially if it is shielded by lead or other metal.
In addition, the manner in which radiation detection equipment is
deployed, operated, and maintained can also limit its effectiveness.
For example, in October 2002, we testified that radiation pagers--small
radiation detection devices worn by inspectors on their belts--have
severe limitations and are inappropriate for some tasks. DOE officials
told us that radiation pagers have a limited range and are not designed
to detect weapons-usable nuclear material. Given the inherent
limitations of currently deployed radiation detection equipment and
difficulties in detecting certain dangerous nuclear materials, it is
important that the equipment be installed, operated, and maintained in
a way that optimizes its usefulness. We reported that the manner in
which DHS had deployed radiation detection equipment at some U.S.
points of entry reduced its effectiveness. For example, at one site we
visited, DHS was allowing trucks to pass through portal monitors at
speeds higher than what experts consider optimal for detecting nuclear
material. Regarding U.S. assistance to help other countries combat
nuclear smuggling, we found that serious problems with the
installation, operation, and maintenance of equipment had undermined
U.S. efforts. For example, we reported in 2002 that about half of the
radiation portal monitors provided to one country in the former Soviet
Union were never installed or were not operational. Additionally, we
reported in March 2005, that DOE's Megaports Initiative faces technical
challenges related to deploying radiation detection equipment at
foreign seaports. For example, environmental conditions at many ports,
such as the existence of high winds and sea spray, can affect radiation
detection equipment's performance and sustainability.
It is important to note that the deployment of radiation detection
equipment--regardless of how well the equipment performs--is not a
panacea for the problem of nuclear smuggling. Rather, as we have noted
in our past work, combating nuclear smuggling requires an integrated
approach that includes equipment, proper training of border security
personnel in the effective use of radiation detection equipment, and
intelligence gathering on potential nuclear smuggling operations.
Background:
Radiation detection equipment can detect radioactive materials used in
medicine and industry; in commodities that are sources of naturally
occurring radiation, such as kitty litter; and in nuclear materials
that could be used in a nuclear weapon. The capability of the equipment
to detect nuclear material depends on many factors, including the
amount of material, the size and capacity of the detection device, the
distance from the detection device to the nuclear material, and whether
the material is shielded from detection. Detecting actual cases of
illicit trafficking in weapons-usable nuclear material is complicated
because one of the materials that is of greatest concern--highly
enriched uranium--is among the most difficult materials to detect
because of its relatively low level of radioactivity. In contrast,
medical and industrial radioactive sources, which could be used in a
radiological dispersion device (or "dirty bomb"), are highly
radioactive and easier to detect. Because of the complexities of
detecting and identifying nuclear material, customs officers and border
guards who are responsible for operating detection equipment must also
be trained in using handheld radiation detectors to pinpoint the source
of an alarm, identify false alarms, and respond to cases of nuclear
smuggling.
Several U.S. Agencies Have Programs to Combat Nuclear Smuggling:
Four U.S. agencies have implemented programs to combat nuclear
smuggling both domestically and in other countries by providing
radiation detection equipment and training to border security
personnel. From fiscal year 1994 through fiscal year 2005, the Congress
has appropriated about $800 million for these efforts, including about
$500 million to DOE, DOD, and State for international efforts and about
$300 million to DHS for installing radiation detection equipment at
U.S. points of entry. Initial concerns about the threat posed by
nuclear smuggling were focused on nuclear materials originating in the
former Soviet Union. As a result, the first major initiatives to combat
nuclear smuggling during the late 1990s concentrated on deploying
radiation detection equipment at borders in countries of the former
Soviet Union and in Central and Eastern Europe. Assistance included
providing these countries with commercially available radiation
detection equipment such as portal monitors (stationary equipment
designed to detect radioactive materials carried by pedestrians or
vehicles) and smaller, portable radiation detectors. In addition, U.S.
agencies provided technical support to promote the development and
enforcement of laws and regulations governing the export of nuclear-
related technology and other equipment and training to generally
improve these countries' ability to interdict nuclear smuggling.
One of the main U.S. efforts providing radiation detection equipment to
foreign governments is DOE's Second Line of Defense program, which
began installing equipment at key border crossing sites in Russia in
1998. According to DOE, through the end of fiscal year 2004, the Second
Line of Defense program had completed installations at 66 sites, mostly
in Russia. Additionally, in 2003, DOE began its Megaports Initiative,
which seeks to install radiation detection equipment at major foreign
seaports to enable foreign government personnel to screen shipping
containers entering and leaving these ports for nuclear and other
radioactive material. In March 2005, we reported that the Megaports
Initiative had completed installations at two foreign ports and is
currently working to equip five others with radiation detection
equipment. Other U.S. agencies also have programs to provide radiation
detection equipment and training to foreign governments, including two
programs at the Department of State--the Nonproliferation and
Disarmament Fund and Export Control and Related Border Security
program--and two programs at DOD--the International
Counterproliferation Program and the Weapons of Mass Destruction
Proliferation Prevention Initiative.
In addition to these efforts at foreign borders, the U.S. Customs
Service began providing its inspectors at U.S. borders and points of
entry with small handheld radiation detection devices, known as
radiation pagers, in fiscal year 1998. After September 11, 2001, this
effort was expanded by DHS's Bureau of Customs and Border Patrol. In
the spring of 2002, DHS conducted a pilot project to test the use of
radiation portal monitors-larger-scale radiation detection equipment
that can be used to screen vehicles and cargo. In October 2002, DHS
began its deployment of portal monitors at U.S. points of entry. In May
2005, DHS reported that it has installed more than 470 radiation portal
monitors nationwide at sites including international mail and package
handling facilities, land border crossings, and seaports.
U.S. Programs to Combat Nuclear Smuggling in the United States and
Other Countries Have Lacked Effective Planning and Coordination:
A common problem faced by U.S. programs to combat nuclear smuggling
both domestically and in other countries is the lack of effective
planning and coordination among the agencies responsible for
implementing these programs. Regarding assistance to foreign countries,
we reported in 2002 that there was no overall governmentwide plan to
guide U.S. efforts, some programs were duplicative, and coordination
among the U.S. agencies was not effective. We found that the most
troubling consequence of this lack of effective planning and
coordination was that DOE, State, and DOD were pursuing separate
approaches to enhancing other countries' border crossings.
Specifically, radiation portal monitors installed in more than 20
countries by State are less sophisticated than those installed by DOE
and DOD. As a result, some border crossings where U.S. agencies have
installed radiation detection equipment are more vulnerable to nuclear
smuggling than others.[Footnote 3] We found that there were two offices
within DOE that were providing radiation detection equipment and two
offices within State that have funded similar types of equipment for
various countries. We made several recommendations to correct these
problems and, since the issuance of our report, a governmentwide plan
encompassing U.S. efforts to combat nuclear smuggling in other
countries has been developed; some duplicative programs have been
consolidated; and coordination among the agencies, although still a
concern, has improved.
Regarding efforts to deploy radiation detection equipment at U.S.
points of entry, we reported that DHS had not coordinated with other
federal agencies and DOE national laboratories on longer-term
objectives such as attempting to improve the radiation detection
technology used in portal monitors. We also noted that DHS was not
sharing data generated by portal monitors installed at U.S. points of
entry with DOE national laboratories other than Pacific Northwest
National Laboratory, which is DHS's primary contractor for deploying
radiation detection equipment at U.S. points of entry. Experts from
DOE's national laboratories told us that achieving improvements to
existing radiation detection technologies largely depends on analyzing
data on the types of radioactive cargo passing through deployed portal
monitors. We found that a number of factors hindered coordination,
including competition between the DOE national laboratories and the
emerging missions of various federal agencies with regard to radiation
detection. DHS agreed with our assessment and told us that it would be
taking corrective actions.
Additionally, other DOE national laboratories and federal agencies are
independently testing numerous different radiation portal monitors
using a variety of nuclear and radiological materials and simulating
possible smuggling scenarios. However, they are not sharing lessons
learned or the results of these tests with other federal agencies. For
example, DOD's Defense Threat Reduction Agency has a large testing
facility near Sandia National Laboratories in New Mexico and has pilot
tested radiation detection equipment at entrances to certain military
bases. However, it is unclear how and with whom the results of such
testing are shared to facilitate the development of improved radiation
detection technologies. In April 2005, DHS announced its intent to
create the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) to coordinate U.S.
efforts to develop improved radiation detection technologies. DHS has
requested over $227 million in fiscal year 2006 to initiate this
effort. Through DNDO, DHS plans to lead the development of a national
test bed for radiation detection technologies at the Nevada Test Site.
Currently Deployed Radiation Detection Equipment Has Limitations:
Recently, concerns have been raised about the ability of radiation
detection equipment to detect illicitly trafficked nuclear material. As
we have reported in the past, certain factors can affect the general
capability of radiation detection equipment. In particular, nuclear
materials are more difficult to detect if lead or other metal is used
to shield them. For example, we reported in March 2005 that a cargo
container containing a radioactive source passed through radiation
detection equipment that DOE had installed at a foreign seaport without
being detected because of the presence of large amounts of scrap metal
in the container. Additionally, detecting actual cases of illicit
trafficking in weapons-usable nuclear material is complicated because
one of the materials of greatest concern in terms of proliferation--
highly enriched uranium--is among the most difficult materials to
detect due to its relatively low level of radioactivity.
The manner in which radiation detection equipment is deployed,
operated, and maintained can also limit its effectiveness. Given the
inherent limitations of currently deployed radiation detection
equipment and difficulties in detecting certain nuclear materials, it
is important that it be installed, operated, and maintained in a way
that optimizes authorities' ability to interdict illicit nuclear
materials. In our past reports, we have noted many problems with the
radiation detection equipment currently deployed at U.S. and foreign
borders. Specifically, in October 2002, we testified that radiation
detection pagers have severe limitations and are inappropriate for some
tasks. DOE officials told us that the pagers have a limited range and
are not designed to detect weapons-usable nuclear material. According
to U.S. radiation detection vendors and DOE national laboratory
specialists, pagers are more effectively used in conjunction with other
radiation detection equipment, such as portal monitors.
In addition, the manner in which DHS had deployed radiation detection
equipment at some U.S. points of entry reduced its effectiveness.
Specifically, we identified a wide range of problems, such as (1)
allowing trucks to pass through portal monitors at speeds higher than
what experts consider optimal for detecting nuclear material, (2)
reducing the sensitivity of the portal monitors in an attempt to limit
the number of nuisance alarms from naturally occurring radioactive
materials, such as kitty litter and ceramics, and (3) not deploying
enough handheld radiation detection equipment to certain border sites,
which limited the ability of inspectors to perform secondary
inspections on suspicious cargo or vehicles.
Regarding problems with the U.S. programs to deploy radiation detection
equipment in other countries, we reported that:
* About half of the portal monitors provided to one country in the
former Soviet Union were never installed or were not operational.
Officials from this country told us that they were given more equipment
than they could use.
* A radiation portal monitor provided to Bulgaria by the Department of
State was installed on an unused road that was not expected to be
completed for 1-1/2 years.
* Mobile vans equipped with radiation detection equipment furnished by
the Department of State have limited utility because they cannot
operate effectively in cold climates or are otherwise not suitable for
conditions in some countries.
* DOE has found that environmental conditions at many seaports, such as
the existence of high winds and sea spray, can affect radiation
detection equipment's performance and sustainability.
Environmental conditions are not the only challenge facing DOE and DHS
in installing radiation detection equipment at seaports in the United
States and other countries. One of the biggest challenges at seaports
is adapting the equipment to the port environment while minimizing the
impact on the flow of commerce and people. DOE's Megaports Initiative
had made limited progress in installing radiation detection equipment
at foreign seaports it had identified as highest priority largely due
to concerns of some countries about the impact of radiation detection
equipment on the flow of commerce through their ports. DHS has faced
similar concerns from port operators in the United States.
It is important to note that radiation detection equipment is only one
of the tools in the toolbox that customs inspectors and border guards
must use to combat nuclear smuggling. Combating nuclear smuggling
requires an integrated approach that includes equipment, proper
training, and intelligence gathering on smuggling operations. In the
past, most known interdictions of weapons-usable nuclear materials have
resulted from police investigations rather than from detection by
radiation detection equipment installed at border crossings. However,
there have been recent reports of incidents where radioactive materials
were discovered and seized as a result of alarms raised by radiation
detection equipment. Because of the complexity of detecting nuclear
material, the customs officers or border guards who are responsible for
operating radiation detection equipment must also be well-trained in
using handheld radiation detectors to pinpoint the source of an alarm,
identifying false alarms, and responding to cases of nuclear smuggling.
Without a clear understanding of how radiation detection equipment
works and its limitations, inspectors may not be using the equipment as
effectively as possible.
Although efforts to combat nuclear smuggling through the installation
of radiation detection equipment are important, the United States
should not and does not rely upon radiation detection equipment at
foreign or U.S. borders as its sole means for preventing nuclear
materials or a nuclear warhead from reaching the United States.
Recognizing the need for a broad approach to the problem, the U.S.
government has multiple initiatives that are designed to complement
each other. For example, DOE is securing nuclear material at its source
through the Material Protection, Control, and Accounting program, which
seeks to improve the physical security of nuclear facilities in the
former Soviet Union. In addition, DHS has other initiatives to identify
containers at foreign seaports that are considered high risk for
containing smuggled goods, such as nuclear material and other dangerous
materials. Supporting all of these programs is intelligence information
that can give us advanced notice of nuclear material smuggling and is a
critical component to prevent dangerous materials from entering the
United States.
This concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to respond to
any questions that you or other Members of the Subcommittees may have.
Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
For further information about this testimony, please contact me at
(202) 512-3841 or at aloisee@gao.gov. R. Stockton Butler, Julie
Chamberlain, Nancy Crothers, Christopher Ferencik, Emily Gupta,
Jennifer Harman, Winston Le, Glen Levis, F. James Shafer, Jr., and Gene
Wisnoski made key contributions to this statement.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Preventing Nuclear Smuggling: DOE Has Made Limited Progress in
Installing Radiation Detection Equipment at Highest Priority Foreign
Seaports. GAO-05-375. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2005.
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Nonproliferation Programs Need Better
Integration. GAO 05-157. Washington, D.C.: January 28, 2005.
Customs Service: Acquisition and Deployment of Radiation Detection
Equipment. GAO-03-235T. Washington, D.C.: October 17, 2002.
Container Security: Current Efforts to Detect Nuclear Materials, New
Initiatives, and Challenges. GAO-03-297T. Washington, D.C.: November
18, 2002.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Combat Nuclear Smuggling. GAO-
02-989T. Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2002.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat
Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and Planning. GAO-02-
426. Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2002.
FOOTNOTES
[1] See GAO, Preventing Nuclear Smuggling: DOE Has Made Limited
Progress in Installing Radiation Detection Equipment at Highest
Priority Foreign Seaports, GAO-05-375 (Washington, D.C.: March 31,
2005); Customs Service: Acquisition and Deployment of Radiation
Detection Equipment, GAO-03-235T (Washington, D.C.: October 17, 2002);
Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat
Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and Planning, GAO-02-
426 (Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2002); and related GAO products cited at
the end of this testimony.
[2] Weapons-usable nuclear material is (1) uranium that has been
enriched to consist of 20 percent or more of uranium-235 or uranium-233
isotopes and (2) any plutonium containing less than 80 percent of the
isotope plutonium-238 and less than 10 percent of the isotopes
plutonium-241 and plutonium-242. These types of materials are of the
quality used to make nuclear weapons.
[3] Portal monitors installed by the Department of State do not have
the ability to detect neutron radiation, which translates into a
decreased ability of those monitors to be able to detect plutonium, one
of the nuclear materials of greatest proliferation concern.
