Border Security
Strengthened Visa Process Would Benefit from Additional Management Actions by State and DHS Gao ID: GAO-05-994T September 13, 2005In adjudicating a visa application, Department of State (State) consular officers are on the front line of defense against those whose entry would likely be harmful to U.S. national interests. In October 2002, we identified shortcomings and made recommendations on the role of national security in the visa process. This testimony discusses our report issued today on actions taken since our 2002 report to strengthen the visa process, as well as areas that deserve additional management actions. It also discusses our July 2005 report on the status of the assignment of Department of Homeland Security (DHS) personnel to U.S. consular posts overseas.
State and DHS have taken many steps to strengthen the visa process as an antiterrorism tool. Consular officers are receiving clear guidance on the importance of addressing national security concerns through the visa process, and State has established clear procedures on visa operations worldwide. State has also increased its hiring of consular officers and language proficient Foreign Service officers, and has enhanced training and fraud prevention efforts. Further, consular officers have access to more information from intelligence and law enforcement agencies. However, some areas require additional attention. For example, officers we spoke with said that guidance is needed on DHS staff's roles and responsibilities overseas. In addition, while State has hired more consular officers, it continues to experience shortages in supervisory staff. As of April 30, 2005, 26 percent of midlevel positions were either vacant or filled by entry-level staff. During our February 2005 visits to three consular posts in Saudi Arabia and Egypt--all of which are of interest to U.S. antiterrorism efforts--the visa sections were staffed with first-tour officers and no permanent midlevel visa chiefs to provide direct oversight. Further improvements are also needed in training and fraud prevention, as well as information sharing with the FBI. In September 2003, DHS assigned visa security personnel to consular posts in Saudi Arabia. According to DHS, State's consular officials, and the deputy chief of mission in Saudi Arabia, the DHS officers in Saudi Arabia strengthen visa security. However, DHS does not maintain comprehensive data on their activities and thus is unable to fully demonstrate the program's impact. Further, DHS has not developed a strategic plan for visa security operations in Saudi Arabia or for the planned future expansion of the program.
GAO-05-994T, Border Security: Strengthened Visa Process Would Benefit from Additional Management Actions by State and DHS
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and
International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of
Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT:
Tuesday, September 13, 2005:
Border Security:
Strengthened Visa Process Would Benefit from Additional Management
Actions by State and DHS:
Statement of Jess T. Ford, Director, International Affairs and Trade:
GAO-05-994T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-05-994T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations,
Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives:
Why GAO Did This Study:
In adjudicating a visa application, Department of State (State)
consular officers are on the front line of defense against those whose
entry would likely be harmful to U.S. national interests. In October
2002, we identified shortcomings and made recommendations on the role
of national security in the visa process. This testimony discusses our
report issued today on actions taken since our 2002 report to
strengthen the visa process, as well as areas that deserve additional
management actions. It also discusses our July 2005 report on the
status of the assignment of Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
personnel to U.S. consular posts overseas.
What GAO Found:
State and DHS have taken many steps to strengthen the visa process as
an antiterrorism tool. Consular officers are receiving clear guidance
on the importance of addressing national security concerns through the
visa process, and State has established clear procedures on visa
operations worldwide. State has also increased its hiring of consular
officers and language proficient Foreign Service officers, and has
enhanced training and fraud prevention efforts. Further, consular
officers have access to more information from intelligence and law
enforcement agencies. However, some areas require additional attention.
For example, officers we spoke with said that guidance is needed on DHS
staff‘s roles and responsibilities overseas. In addition, while State
has hired more consular officers, it continues to experience shortages
in supervisory staff. As of April 30, 2005, 26 percent of midlevel
positions were either vacant or filled by entry-level staff. During our
February 2005 visits to three consular posts in Saudi Arabia and
Egypt”all of which are of interest to U.S. antiterrorism efforts”the
visa sections were staffed with first-tour officers and no permanent
midlevel visa chiefs to provide direct oversight. Further improvements
are also needed in training and fraud prevention, as well as
information sharing with the FBI.
In September 2003, DHS assigned visa security personnel to consular
posts in Saudi Arabia. According to DHS, State‘s consular officials,
and the deputy chief of mission in Saudi Arabia, the DHS officers in
Saudi Arabia strengthen visa security. However, DHS does not maintain
comprehensive data on their activities and thus is unable to fully
demonstrate the program‘s impact. Further, DHS has not developed a
strategic plan for visa security operations in Saudi Arabia or for the
planned future expansion of the program.
Improvements and Remaining Challenges to the Visa Process:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
What GAO Recommends:
In our report issued today and our July report, we recommended further
improvements to the visa process and the management of DHS‘s Visa
Security Program. In addition, we recommended that Congress consider
requiring State and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to report
on the options for and feasibility of providing visa adjudicators with
more detailed information from the FBI‘s criminal history records, and
to allow DHS personnel in Saudi Arabia the flexibility to determine the
extent of their application reviews.
State and DHS agreed with most of our conclusions. Both agencies
indicated that they were taking steps to implement the majority of our
recommendations. State did not agree on the need for a comprehensive
staffing plan.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-994T.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Jess T. Ford at (202) 512-
4128 or fordj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
September 13, 2005:
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here to discuss our reports issued today and in
July[Footnote 1] on the actions that the Departments of State (State)
and Homeland Security (DHS) have taken to strengthen the nonimmigrant
visa[Footnote 2] process as an antiterrorism tool. All 19 of the
September 11, 2001, terrorist hijackers were issued a visa, which is a
U.S. travel document foreign citizens must generally obtain before
entering the country temporarily for business, tourism, or other
reasons. In deciding to approve or deny a visa application, State's
consular officers are on the front line of defense in protecting the
United States against potential terrorists and others whose entry would
likely be harmful to U.S. national interests. But consular officers
must balance this security responsibility against the need to
facilitate legitimate travel. In October 2002, we identified
shortcomings and made recommendations aimed at strengthening the role
of national security in the visa process, procedures for addressing
heightened border security concerns, staffing, and counterterrorism
training of consular officers.[Footnote 3] Similarly, staff of the
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, or the
9-11 Commission, reported that while there were efforts to enhance
border security prior to September 11, no agency of the U.S. government
at that time thought of the visa process as an antiterrorism
tool[Footnote 4]. Indeed, the 9-11 Commission staff reported that
consular officers were not trained to screen for terrorists.
Today I will discuss the changes made since our 2002 report to
strengthen the visa process, as well as areas that deserve additional
management attention. First, I will focus on our report issued today on
changes in visa policy and guidance; consular resources, including
staffing and training; and the extent to which U.S. agencies share
information with visa adjudicators. Second, I will discuss our July
2005 report on the placement of DHS Visa Security Officers (VSO) at
U.S. embassies and consulates overseas.
In conducting this work, we reviewed relevant legislation and agency
documents, and interviewed State, DHS, and Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) officials in Washington, D.C., as well as visa
chiefs and other consular affairs staff from 25 posts overseas. We
observed visa operations and interviewed U.S. government officials at 8
U.S. consular posts in seven countries--Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia,
Morocco, Spain, Saudi Arabia, and the United Kingdom. Our work was
conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. In addition, GAO has conducted extensive reviews of
different aspects of the visa process and related areas (see appendix I
for a list of GAO reports).
Summary:
State and DHS have taken many steps to strengthen the visa process as
an antiterrorism tool. Specifically, State has provided clear
instructions to consular officers on the importance of national
security to the visa process. At every post we visited, including those
of special interest to antiterrorism efforts, consular staff viewed
security as their top priority, while recognizing the importance of
facilitating legitimate travel. To further strengthen the visa process,
State has increased hiring of consular officers, targeted recruitment
of foreign language proficient officers, revamped consular training
with a focus on counterterrorism, and increased resources to combat
visa fraud. Further, intelligence and law enforcement agencies have
shared more information for consular officers' use in conducting name
checks on visa applicants. Despite these improvements, we found that
further actions are needed to enhance the process. Consular officers we
interviewed said that guidance is needed on interagency protocols
regarding DHS staff's roles and responsibilities overseas. Actions are
also needed to ensure that State has sufficient experienced staff with
the necessary language skills at key consular posts. While State has
hired more consular officers, it continues to experience shortages in
supervisory staff. As of April 30, 2005, 26 percent of midlevel
positions were either vacant or filled by entry-level staff. Moreover,
State has not prioritized the staffing of more experienced officers to
key posts. For example, we found that the visa sections in critical
posts in Saudi Arabia and Egypt were staffed with first-tour, entry-
level officers and no permanent midlevel visa chiefs to provide direct
supervision and oversight. Our report issued today also calls for
further improvements in training and fraud prevention, as well as
information sharing with the FBI.
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 authorized the assignment of DHS
employees to U.S. embassies and consulates to provide expert advice and
training to consular officers regarding visa security, among other
things.[Footnote 5] In September 2003, DHS assigned VSOs to consular
posts in Saudi Arabia and plans to assign staff to other posts to
strengthen the visa process at these locations. VSOs assigned to Saudi
Arabia review all visa applications prior to final adjudication by
consular officers as required by the Homeland Security Act. These VSOs
also assist consular officers with interviews and fraud prevention.
According to DHS, State's consular officials, and the deputy chief of
mission in Saudi Arabia, the VSOs in Riyadh and Jeddah have
strengthened visa security. However, no comprehensive data exists to
demonstrate the VSOs' impact. In addition, the requirement to review
all visa applications in Saudi Arabia limits the VSOs' ability to
provide additional training and other services to consular officers,
such as assisting with interviews. Furthermore, DHS planned to expand
the Visa Security Program[Footnote 6] to five locations in fiscal year
2005 and intends further expansion in future years; however, chiefs of
mission at the posts chosen for expansion in fiscal year 2005 delayed
approvals needed for the expansion. Embassy and State officials
attributed the delays to various questions and concerns about the
program's goals, staffing requirements, and coordination plans.
According to DHS officials, the department provided sufficient
responses throughout 2004 and 2005 to answer the concerns. However, DHS
has not developed a strategic plan for visa security operations in
Saudi Arabia or the future expansion posts that defines mission
priorities and long-term goals and identifies the outcomes expected at
each post.
In our report issued today and our July report, we have recommended
actions to further improve both the visa process and the management of
the Visa Security Program. In addition, we have recommended that
Congress consider requiring State and the FBI to report on the options
for and feasibility of providing visa adjudicators with more detailed
information from the FBI's criminal history records, and to allow DHS
the flexibility to determine which visa applications its personnel in
Saudi Arabia will review.
In general, State and DHS agreed with the majority of our conclusions
in both reports. Both agencies indicated that they have begun taking
steps to implement our recommendations. However, State believed that it
already had a plan to address vulnerabilities in consular staffing and
that development of a comprehensive plan that we recommended was not
necessary. The Department of Justice did not comment on the matter for
congressional consideration regarding visa adjudicators' access to
certain information in the FBI's criminal history records; it provided
additional information about other efforts that the department is
taking to enhance the sharing of law enforcement and intelligence
information in connection with visa processing.
Background:
The 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, is the primary
body of law governing immigration and visa operations.[Footnote 7] The
Homeland Security Act of 2002 generally grants DHS exclusive authority
to issue regulations on, administer, and enforce the Immigration and
Nationality Act and all other immigration and nationality laws relating
to the functions of U.S. consular officers in connection with the
granting or denial of visas.[Footnote 8] As we reported in July
2005,[Footnote 9] the act also authorized the assignment of DHS
employees to U.S. embassies and consulates to provide expert advice and
training to consular officers regarding visa security, among other
things. In particular, the act mandated that VSOs on-site in Saudi
Arabia review all visa applications prior to final adjudication by
consular officers.
A September 2003 Memorandum of Understanding between State and DHS
further outlines the responsibilities of each agency with respect to
visa issuance. State manages the visa process, as well as the consular
corps and its functions at 211 visa-issuing posts overseas. In
addition, State provides guidance, in consultation with DHS, to
consular officers regarding visa policies and procedures. DHS is
responsible for establishing visa policy, reviewing implementation of
the policy, and providing additional direction. This agreement also
broadly defines the DHS officers' responsibilities in reviewing visa
applications at consular posts overseas, indicating, among other
things, that they will provide expert advice to consular officers
regarding specific security threats relating to visa adjudication and
will also provide training to consular officers on terrorist threats
and applicant fraud.
The process for determining who will be issued or refused a visa
contains several steps, including documentation reviews, in-person
interviews, collection of biometrics (fingerprints), and cross-
referencing of the applicant's name against the Consular Lookout and
Support System (CLASS) [Footnote 10] (see fig. 1).
Figure 1: Visa Adjudication Process at a U.S. Embassy:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
In 2002, we recommended actions to strengthen the visa process as an
antiterrorism tool, including:
* establishing a clear policy on the priority attached to addressing
national security concerns through the visa process;
* creating more comprehensive, risk-based guidelines and standards on
how consular officers should use the visa process to screen against
potential terrorists;
* performing a fundamental reassessment of staffing and language skill
requirements for visa operations; and:
* revamping and expanding consular training courses to place more
emphasis on detecting potential terrorists.
Visa Process Strengthened, and Further Actions Would Support Ongoing
Improvements:
Since 2002, State, DHS, and other agencies have taken numerous steps to
strengthen the visa process as an antiterrorism tool and increase its
overall efficiency and effectiveness. In particular, the Assistant
Secretary in the Bureau of Consular Affairs has taken a leading role in
implementing changes to the visa process and promoting its use as a
screen against potential terrorists. However, additional actions could
enhance the visa process. State has increased and clarified visa
policies and guidance, but additional steps are needed to ensure these
changes are implemented. Additionally, State has increased resources to
strengthen the visa process, including hiring additional consular
officers, targeting recruitment, and expanding training efforts;
however, staffing limitations remain a concern, posts seek further
training, and other gaps remain. Lastly, while interagency information-
sharing efforts have increased, consular officers do not have direct
access to detailed information from the FBI's criminal records, which
would help facilitate the approval of legitimate travelers.
Visa Policies, Procedures, and Guidance Enhanced, but Additional Steps
Needed to Ensure They Are Implemented:
We reported in October 2002 that consular officers held differing views
on balancing the need for national security and customer service in the
visa process. In addition, State had not issued comprehensive policy
guidance to posts regarding how consular officers should react to the
heightened border security concerns following the September 11 attacks.
Over the past three years, State has implemented several changes to
address these issues, and consular officials stated that the report and
its recommendations provided a framework for these changes. For
example, in February 2003, Consular Affairs issued guidance identifying
national security as the first priority of the visa process. Consular
officers we interviewed said the guidance was generally clear, and
officers at all eight posts we visited viewed security as the most
critical element of the visa process. In addition, Consular Affairs
identified certain areas where additional guidance was needed to
streamline visa procedures. State has issued more than 80 standard
operating procedures, in consultation with DHS, to inform consular
officers on issues such as fingerprinting and special clearance
requirements.
Despite these improvements, some consular officers we interviewed
stated that it has been difficult to synthesize and consistently apply
all of the changes to the visa process. The guidance provided to
consular officers in the field is voluminous and can change rapidly,
according to consular officials. The Consular Affairs Bureau may notify
its officers overseas of policy changes through cables, postings on its
internal Web site, and informal communications. However, the bureau has
not consistently updated the consular and visa chapters of the Foreign
Affairs Manual--State's central resource for all regulations, policies,
and guidance--to reflect these changes. Throughout 2005, the bureau has
updated several portions of the manual, but, as of June 2005, some
sections had not been updated since October 2004. Consular officials
stated that they are overhauling the standard operating procedures to
eliminate those that are obsolete and incorporate current requirements
into the manual. However, while the Consular Affairs Bureau's internal
Web site contains all of the standard operating procedures, it also
links to out-of-date sections in the manual. As a result, there is no
single, reliable source for current information.
Consular officers also indicated that additional guidance is needed on
certain interagency protocols. Specifically, 15 out of 25 visa chiefs
we interviewed reported that additional guidance would be helpful
regarding the interaction between the Bureau of Consular Affairs and
DHS. For example, DHS personnel stationed overseas work on a variety of
immigration and border security activities and serve in a regional
capacity. However, DHS has not provided guidance to consular officers
regarding the roles and geographic responsibilities for its personnel.
Resources for Visa Function Increased, but Staffing Shortages and Other
Gaps Remain a Concern:
In 2002, we found that at some posts the demand for visas, combined
with increased workload per visa applicant, exceeded the available
staff. As a result, we recommended that State perform a fundamental
reassessment of staffing requirements for visa operations. In our
report issued today, we have noted that State has received funding to
address staffing shortfalls, but we continue to see the need for a
reassessment of resource needs worldwide. Through the Diplomatic
Readiness Initiative and other sources,[Footnote 11] State has
increased its Foreign Service officer consular positions by 364, from
1,037 in fiscal year 2002 to 1,401 in fiscal year 2005. Moreover, a
senior human resource official anticipates that many officers hired
under the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative will begin to reach promotion
eligibility for midlevel positions within the next two years. However,
as we have previously reported in 2003,[Footnote 12] the overall
shortage of midlevel Foreign Service officers would remain until
approximately 2013. As of April 30, 2005, we found that 26 percent of
midlevel consular positions were either vacant or filled by an entry-
level officer (see fig. 2). In addition, almost three-quarters of the
vacant positions were at the FS-03 level--midlevel officers who
generally supervise entry-level staff--which consular officials
attribute to low hiring levels prior to the Diplomatic Readiness
Initiative and the necessary expansion of entry-level positions to
accommodate increasing workload requirements after September 11, 2001.
Figure 2: Authorized Foreign Service Officer Consular Positions and
Distribution of Staff by Grade, as of April 30, 2005:
[See PDF for image]
Note: Vacancy figures may not reflect recent promotions of officers to
a higher grade who were still serving in lower-grade positions as of
April 30, 2005.
[End of figure]
During our February 2005 visits to Riyadh, Jeddah, and Cairo, we
observed that the consular sections were staffed with entry-level
officers on their first assignment with no permanent, midlevel visa
chief to provide supervision. Although these posts had other mid-or
senior-level consular officers, their availability on visa issues was
limited because of their additional responsibilities. For example, the
head of the visa section in Jeddah was responsible for managing the
entire section as well as services for American citizens due to a
midlevel vacancy in that position. At the time of our visit, the Riyadh
Embassy did not have a midlevel visa chief. Similarly, in Cairo, there
was no permanent midlevel supervisor between the winter of 2004 and the
summer of 2005, and Consular Affairs used five temporary staff on a
rotating basis during this period to serve in this capacity. Entry-
level officers that we spoke with stated that due to the constant
turnover, the temporary supervisors were unable to assist them
adequately. At the U.S. consulate in Jeddah, entry-level officers
expressed concern about the lack of a midlevel supervisor. Officers in
Jeddah stated that they relied on the guidance they received from the
DHS visa security officer assigned to the post. However, as of July
2005, visa security officers are stationed only at two consular posts
in Saudi Arabia--not at any of the other 209 visa-issuing posts
overseas.
If the Consular Affairs Bureau identifies a need for additional staff
in headquarters or overseas, it may request that the Human Resources
Bureau establish new positions.
In addition, posts can also describe their needs for additional
positions through their consular packages--a report submitted annually
to the Consular Affairs Bureau that details workload statistics and
staffing requirements, among other things. For example, in December
2004, during the course of our work, the consular section in Riyadh
reported to Washington that there was an immediate need to create a
midlevel visa chief position at post, and State worked with human
resource officials to create this position, which, according to State
officials, will be filled by summer 2005.
However, the current assignment process does not guarantee that all
authorized positions will be filled, particularly at hardship
posts.[Footnote 13] Historically, State has rarely directed its
employees to serve in locations for which they have not bid on a
position, including hardship posts or locations of strategic
importance, due to concerns that such staff may be more apt to have
poor morale or be less productive. Further, though Consular Affairs can
prioritize positions that require immediate staffing, according to a
deputy assistant secretary for human resources, it generally does not
do so. For example, Consular Affairs could choose not to advertise
certain positions of lesser priority during an annual assignment cycle.
However, senior Consular Affairs officials acknowledged that they
rarely do this. According to these officials, Consular Affairs does not
have direct control over the filling of all consular positions and can
often face resistance from regional bureaus and chiefs of mission
overseas who do not want vacancies at their posts. Therefore, due to
State's decision to not force assignments, along with the limited
amount of midlevel officers available to apply for them,[Footnote 14]
important positions may remain vacant.
Improvements Made in Recruitment, Training, and Fraud Prevention, and
Additional Actions Would Support Ongoing Initiatives:
In 2002, we found that not all consular officers were proficient enough
in their post's language to hold interviews with applicants. We also
found that training for new consular officers was focused on detecting
intending immigrants through the visa process, with little training
given on detecting possible terrorists. Today we are reporting that
State has made a number of improvements in its recruitment of language
proficient Foreign Service officers, expanded and revamped consular
training, and increased the attention paid to fraud prevention.
However, we found that additional actions would support ongoing
improvements. For example,
* State has created programs to better target its recruitment of
Foreign Service officers who speak critical languages. For example, in
March 2004, State created the "Critical Needs Language Program," which
increases the opportunities for appointment to the Foreign Service for
new hires proficient in Arabic, Chinese, Indic, Korean, Russian, or
Turkic, and who have passed the Foreign Service Exam. From March 2004
through May 2005, 172 of the 564 Foreign Service officers hired were
proficient in one of these languages. Despite these improvements,
additional actions are needed to fill continuing language proficiency
shortfalls. As of April 30, 2005, State reported that about 14 percent
of consular-coned[Footnote 15] Foreign Service officers in language
designated positions did not meet language requirements for their
position.
* State has revamped and expanded consular training to enhance visa
security. For example, in October 2003, the Basic Consular Course was
extended from 26 days to 31 days, and classes were added in analytical
interviewing and fraud prevention. In addition, in March 2002, State
created a new course in advanced name-checking. However, additional
training could further assist consular officers. All of the posts we
contacted reported that additional training on terrorist travel trends
would be helpful, with 16 posts responding that such training would be
extremely helpful. Some posts also reported that additional briefings
on counterterrorism techniques specific to post and fraud prevention
would be helpful.
* State has taken several steps to increase its focus on preventing and
detecting fraud in the visa process. For example, by 2004, State's
Bureau of Diplomatic Security had deployed 25 visa fraud investigators
to U.S. embassies and consulates. In addition, State's Office of Fraud
Prevention Programs has developed several ways for consular officers in
the field to learn about fraud prevention, including developing an
Internet-based "E-room," with more than 500 members, which serves as a
discussion group for consular officers, as well as a place to post
cables and lessons learned from prior fraud cases. However, until
recently, the department has not used a systematic process to identify
consular posts with the highest degree of visa fraud. According to
State officials, fraud rankings for consular posts have not been based
on an objective analysis using standardized criteria, but have been
self-reported by each post. As a result, previous resources for fraud
prevention, including the 25 visa fraud investigators assigned in 2004,
may not have been allocated to posts with the highest need. We also
plan to report later this year on the internal controls that are in
place to mitigate the risks of visa malfeasance--the provision of a
visa in exchange for money or something else of value--and intend to
make several recommendations to help ensure adherence to these
controls.
Number of Intelligence and Law Enforcement Records in CLASS Increased,
but Additional Information Would Help Facilitate Legitimate Travel:
The September 11 attacks highlighted the need for comprehensive
information sharing. In January 2005, GAO identified effective
information sharing to secure the homeland as a high-risk area of the
U.S. government due to the formidable challenges the federal government
still faces in this area.[Footnote 16] With cooperation from other
federal agencies, State has increased the amount of information
available to consular officers in CLASS. Name-check records from the
intelligence community have increased fivefold from 48,000 in September
2001 to approximately 260,000 in June 2005, according to consular
officials. Moreover, consular officials told us that, as of fall 2004,
CLASS contained approximately 8 million records from the FBI. In
addition, State has developed more efficient methods of acquiring
certain data from law enforcement databases. For example, State
established a direct computer link with the FBI to send descriptive
information from the FBI's National Crime Information Center (NCIC) to
CLASS on a daily basis.
While the additional records in CLASS have helped consular officers
detect those who might seek to harm the United States, many consular
officers we interviewed stated that the increased volume of records and
lack of access to other detailed information can lead to visa-
processing delays. In particular, consular officers do not have direct
access to detailed information in the FBI's criminal history records.
Section 403 of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001[Footnote 17] directs the
Attorney General and the FBI to provide State with access to extracts
of certain files[Footnote 18] containing descriptive information for
the purpose of determining whether a visa applicant has a criminal
history record contained in the NCIC Interstate Identification Index
(or Index). The USA PATRIOT Act also states that access to an extract
does not entitle consular officers to obtain the full contents of the
corresponding records. In accordance with this mandate, FBI officials
stated that the bureau provides to CLASS extracts that contain all
available biographical information, such as the date of birth and
height of the person with the criminal record.[Footnote 19] As a
result, when conducting a CLASS name check, consular officers told us
they may not be able to determine whether an FBI file matches an
applicant because the extracts lack sufficient biographical
information. Moreover, in accordance with section 403, the extracts do
not contain details such as charges or dispositions of the cases, which
are necessary to determine if the applicant might be ineligible for a
visa.[Footnote 20] For example, the information in CLASS does not
distinguish between a conviction for a crime such as kidnapping, or an
acquittal on charges of driving while intoxicated.
Consular officers, therefore, must fingerprint applicants who have a
potential match in the Index for positive identification in FBI records
to then ascertain whether the information contained in the criminal
record would make the applicant ineligible for a visa.[Footnote 21] In
fiscal year 2004, of the more than 40,000 sets of fingerprints consular
officers sent to the FBI for verification, about 29 percent were
positive matches between the applicant and a criminal record in the
Index. State officials we spoke with estimated that of those applicants
who were positively identified, only about 10 percent were denied a
visa based on the information provided by the FBI. Moreover,
fingerprinted applicants are charged an additional $85 processing fee
and, as of the spring of 2005, must wait an estimated 4 to 8 weeks for
a response from Washington, D.C., before adjudication can proceed.
According to FBI and State officials, the processing delays are due to
inefficiencies in the way the prints are sent to the FBI for clearance
(see fig. 3).
Figure 3: Fingerprint Requirements for Access to Detailed Information
in FBI Files and Proposed Changes:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
To facilitate more efficient fingerprint processing, State and the FBI
are implementing an electronic fingerprint system whereby consular
officers will scan the applicants' fingerprints at post and submit them
directly into the FBI's database. FBI and State officials told us that
posts would be notified if the record in question matched the applicant
within 24 hours. However, thousands of visa applicants could still face
lengthier wait times and additional fingerprinting fees that they would
otherwise not have incurred because consular officers lack enough
information at the time of the interview to determine if the records in
CLASS match the applicant.
The FBI and State have discussed several options to help ensure that
consular officers can facilitate legitimate travel; however, each would
require legislative changes and would entail associated trade-offs.
These options include the following:
* Consular officials told us that access to additional information in a
criminal history file, such as the charge and disposition of a case,
would allow their officers to determine which crimes are serious enough
to require a positive fingerprint match prior to adjudication. However,
FBI officials noted that there are some technical limitations on
extracting specific pieces of data from the criminal history records.
* To avoid some of the technical limitations associated with the Index,
FBI officials stated that it would be easier to provide visa
adjudicators access to the full criminal history records. However,
these officials told us that assurances would need to be in place to
prevent misuse of the information, given its sensitive nature. Indeed,
State and the FBI have already negotiated a Memorandum of Understanding
aimed at protecting the information passed from NCIC to CLASS. However,
consular officials indicated that their officers may need access only
to the criminal charge and disposition of the case to adjudicate a visa
case more efficiently.
Recommendations:
In our report issued today, we are recommending, among other things,
that State and DHS, in consultation with appropriate agencies, clarify
certain visa policies and procedures and facilitate their
implementation, and ensure that consular sections have the necessary
tools to enhance national security and promote legitimate travel,
including effective human resources and training. In particular, we
recommend that State develop a comprehensive plan to address
vulnerabilities in consular staffing worldwide, including an analysis
of staffing requirements and shortages, foreign language proficiency
requirements, and fraud prevention needs, among other things--the plan
should systematically determine priority positions that must be filled
worldwide based on the relative strategic importance of posts and
positions and realistic assumptions of available staff resources. We
also suggest that Congress consider requiring State and the FBI to
develop and report on a plan to provide visa adjudicators with more
efficient access to certain information in the FBI's criminal history
records to help facilitate the approval of legitimate travelers.
In commenting on a draft of our report, State noted that it is a fair
and balanced evaluation of the improvements made to the visa process.
State agreed with most of our conclusions, and indicated that it is
taking action to implement the majority of our recommendations.
However, State disagreed with our recommendation that it prepare a
comprehensive plan to address vulnerabilities in consular staffing.
State argued that it already had such a plan. Based on our analysis, we
continue to believe it is incumbent on the department to conduct a
worldwide analysis to identify high-priority posts and positions, such
as supervisory consular positions in posts with high-risk applicant
pools or those with high workloads and long wait times for applicant
interviews. As we note in our report, at the time of our work, the
midlevel visa chief positions in Riyadh and Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and
Cairo, Egypt, were not filled with permanent midlevel officers. This
was a serious deficiency given that the visa sections were staffed with
officers on their first tour. Although State noted that it anticipated
addressing this shortage of midlevel consular officers before 2013, it
did not indicate when that gap would be filled. Moreover, State's
bidding and assignment process does not guarantee that the positions of
highest priority will always be filled with qualified officers.
Therefore, a further assessment is needed to ensure that State has the
right people in the right posts with the necessary skill levels.
Actions Needed to Strengthen Management of DHS's Visa Security Program:
In September 2003, DHS assigned Visa Security Officers (VSO) to
consular posts in Saudi Arabia and plans to assign staff to other posts
to strengthen the visa process at these locations. As we addressed in
our July 2005 report, according to State Department consular officers,
the deputy chief of mission, and DHS officials, VSOs in Saudi Arabia
enhance the security of the visa adjudication process at these consular
posts, though several issues raise concerns about the VSOs' role and
impact. VSOs in Saudi Arabia provide an additional law enforcement
capability to the visa adjudication process and have access to and
experience using important law enforcement information not readily
available to consular officers. Moreover, VSOs' border security and
immigration experience can assist consular officers during the visa
process. The consular sections in Riyadh and Jeddah have incorporated
the VSOs' review of all visa applications into the adjudication process
in Saudi Arabia. In addition to reviewing applications, the VSOs may
conduct secondary interviews with some visa applicants based either on
findings from their application reviews or a consular officer's
request. Despite the VSOs' positive effect on visa operations, however,
several concerns exist about their role and overall impact.
* The requirement that VSOs review all visa applications in Saudi
Arabia limits the amount of time they can spend on training and other
valuable services. We observed that VSOs in Riyadh and Jeddah must
spend a significant amount of time reviewing all visa applications,
including those of low-risk applicants or individuals who do not pose a
threat to national security, as well as those that have preliminarily
been refused by consular officers. A Visa Security Program official
noted that this mandate is only for visa security operations in Saudi
Arabia and not other posts to which DHS plans to expand the program.
VSOs, DHS and State officials, and the deputy chief of mission all
agreed that the mandate to review all applications was forcing the VSOs
to spend time on lower priority tasks, limiting their ability to
perform other important activities, such as providing training or
conducting additional secondary interviews of applicants.
* DHS has not maintained measurable data to fully demonstrate the
impact of VSOs on the visa process. The VSOs that were stationed in
Riyadh during our visit estimated that, based on their review of visa
applications, they had recommended that visas be refused after the
preliminary decision to issue a visa by consular officers in about 15
cases between October 2004 and February 2005. In addition, the DHS
officials in Saudi Arabia and in Washington, D.C., were able to provide
anecdotal examples of assistance provided to the consular officers.
However, DHS has not developed a system to fully track the results of
visa security activities in Saudi Arabia. For example, DHS could not
provide data to demonstrate the number of cases for which they have
recommended refusal.
DHS's Planned Expansion of Security Program Delayed:
DHS plans to expand the Visa Security Program to five additional posts
in fiscal year 2005; however, the assignments of VSOs were delayed at
four of the five selected expansion posts. DHS attributed the delay to
resistance by State, as well as funding problems; State and chiefs of
mission attributed the delays to various outstanding questions about
the program. Following DHS's initial request in June 2004 to assign 21
VSOs to five expansion posts, embassy officials raised questions and
concerns, including regarding the criteria used by DHS to select
expansion posts, the reasoning for the number of VSOs requested for the
posts, and DHS's plans to coordinate with existing law enforcement and
border security staff and programs at post. In 2004 and 2005, DHS
provided responses, through State's Bureau of Consular Affairs, to the
questions raised by the chiefs of mission at four of the expansion
posts. According to DHS, the responses were sufficient to answer the
concerns. We reviewed DHS's responses to the posts, and identified a
number of issues that had not been fully addressed, such as what
criteria DHS would use to demonstrate the effectiveness of its
officers. Nonetheless, the chiefs of mission at three posts approved
DHS's National Security Decision Directive 38[Footnote 22] requests in
March and June 2005, while, as of June 2005, one post had still not
approved the request.
Although DHS plans to expand the Visa Security Program in fiscal year
2005 and beyond, it does not a have a strategic plan that defines
mission priorities and long-term goals and identifies the outcomes
expected at each post. We have identified the development of a
strategic plan as an essential component of measuring progress and
holding agencies accountable.[Footnote 23] The development of an
overall strategic plan for the Visa Security Program prior to the
expansion of the program may have addressed the questions initially
raised by State and embassy officials that led to the delay of the
assignment of VSOs. Moreover, a strategic plan would provide a
framework for DHS to address broader questions regarding the selection
criteria for expansion, the roles and responsibilities of VSOs, and the
cost of establishing the program at posts. Officials from DHS and
State, as well as consular officials we contacted overseas, all agreed
that the development of such a plan would be useful to guide visa
security operations in Saudi Arabia and other posts. It would also be
useful to inform the Congress, as well as State and other agencies who
participate in the visa process at consular posts overseas.
Recommendations:
In our July 2005 report, we recommended that DHS develop a strategic
plan to guide the operations of the Visa Security Program in Saudi
Arabia and the program's expansion to other embassies and consulates.
This plan should define mission priorities and long-term goals and
identify expected outcomes. In addition, the strategic plan and
supporting documents should include the criteria used to select the
locations for expansion, justification for the number of VSOs at each
post, costs associated with assigning VSOs overseas, and their roles
and responsibilities in relation to other agencies at post. In
addition, we recommended that DHS develop and maintain comprehensive
performance data that track the results and demonstrate impact of VSO
activities. We also proposed that Congress consider amending current
legislation, which requires the review of all visa applications in
Saudi Arabia, to allow DHS the flexibility to determine which
applications VSOs will review prior to final adjudication by consular
officers. This would allow VSOs to focus on the applications of those
who may pose a risk to national security, providing them time to
perform other tasks that could benefit consular officers.
In commenting on our report, DHS stated that it was taking actions to
implement performance measurements and a strategic plan for the Visa
Security Program, as described in our recommendations. DHS indicated
that it is expanding the tracking and measurement of performance data
to better reflect program results, and is developing a strategic plan
that will integrate the key elements described in our recommendation.
Regarding the matter for congressional consideration to provide DHS
with the flexibility to determine the review of visa applications in
Saudi Arabia, DHS noted that a legislative change should maintain the
department's authority and discretion in determining the scope of the
VSOs' review. DHS agreed that it needed to expand some of the VSOs'
activities in Saudi Arabia, such as providing additional training,
which we found were not being provided because of the volume of work
that resulted from fulfilling the legislative requirement.
Conclusions:
The visa process presents a balance between facilitating legitimate
travel and identifying those who might harm the United States. State,
in coordination with other agencies, has made substantial improvements
to the visa process to strengthen it as a national security tool. DHS
has also taken steps to assign personnel to consular posts to provide
an additional layer of security to the visa process in these locations.
However, we identified areas where additional management actions are
needed by State and DHS to further improve the efficiency and
effectiveness of the visa process.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I will be happy to
answer any questions you or Members of the Subcommittee may have.
Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
For questions regarding this testimony, please call Jess T. Ford, (202)
512-4128 or fordj@gao.gov. Individuals making key contributions to this
statement include John Brummet, Assistant Director, and Joseph Carney,
Daniel Chen, Kathryn Hartsburg, and John F. Miller.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Border Security: Strengthened Visa Process Would Benefit From
Improvements in Staffing and Information Sharing. GAO-05-859. September
13, 2005.
Border Security: Actions Needed to Strengthen Management of Department
of Homeland Security's Visa Security Program. GAO-05-801. July 29,
2005.
Border Security: Streamlined Visas Mantis Program Has Lowered Burden on
Foreign Science Students and Scholars, but Further Refinements Needed.
GAO-05-198. February 18, 2005.
Border Security: State Department Rollout of Biometric Visas on
Schedule, but Guidance Is Lagging. GAO-04-1001. September 9, 2004.
Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Eliminate Weaknesses in
the Visa Revocation Process. GAO-04-795. July 13, 2004.
Visa Operations at U.S. Posts in Canada. GAO-04-708R. May 18, 2004.
Border Security: Improvements Needed to Reduce Time Taken to Adjudicate
Visas for Science Students and Scholars. GAO-04-371. February 25, 2004.
State Department: Targets for Hiring, Filling Vacancies Overseas Being
Met, but Gaps Remain in Hard-to-Learn Languages. GAO-04-139. November
19, 2003.
Border Security: New Policies and Procedures Are Needed to Fill Gaps in
the Visa Revocation Process. GAO-03-798. June 18, 2003.
Border Security: Implications of Eliminating the Visa Waiver Program.
GAO-03-38. November 22, 2002.
Technology Assessment: Using Biometrics for Border Security. GAO-03-
174. November 15, 2002.
Border Security: Visa Process Should Be Strengthened as an
Antiterrorism Tool. GAO-03-132NI. October 21, 2002.
State Department: Staffing Shortfalls and Ineffective Assignment System
Compromise Diplomatic Readiness at Hardship Posts. GAO-02-626. June 18,
2002.
FOOTNOTES
[1] See GAO, Border Security: Actions Needed to Strengthen Management
of Department of Homeland Security's Visa Security Program, GAO-05-801
(Washington, D.C.: July 29, 2005), and GAO, Border Security:
Strengthened Visa Process Would Benefit From Improvements in Staffing
and Information Sharing, GAO-05-859 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 13, 2005).
[2] The United States also grants visas to people who intend to
immigrate to the United States. In this testimony, the term "visa"
refers to nonimmigrant visas only.
[3] GAO, Border Security: Visa Process Should Be Strengthened as an
Antiterrorism Tool, GAO-03-132NI (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2002).
[4] 9-11 Commission, 9/11 and Terrorist Travel: Staff Report of the
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
(Washington, D.C; Aug. 21, 2004).
[5] P.L. 107-296.
[6] For the purpose of this statement, we refer to DHS's program that
oversees the implementation of the requirements in sect. 428 (e) and
sect. 428 (i) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 as the Visa Security
Program.
[7] P.L. 82-414, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.
[8] State retains authority in certain circumstances as outlined in the
act. See P.L. 107-296.
[9] GAO-05-801.
[10] CLASS is a State Department name-check database that posts use to
access critical information for visa adjudication. The system contains
records provided by numerous agencies and includes information on
persons with visa refusals, immigration violations, and terrorism
concerns.
[11] In 2001, State launched the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative--a 3-
year effort to ensure global diplomatic readiness.
[12] GAO, State Department: Targets for Hiring, Filling Vacancies
Overseas Being Met, but Gaps Remain in Hard-to-Learn Languages, GAO-04-
139 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 19, 2003).
[13] State defines hardship posts as those locations where the U.S.
government provides differential pay incentives--an additional 5
percent to 25 percent of base salary depending on the severity or
difficulty of the conditions--to encourage employees to bid on
assignments to these posts and to compensate them for the hardships
they encounter.
[14] The assignment process begins when Foreign Service employees who
are eligible to be transferred from their current assignment each year
receive a list of instructions and upcoming vacancies for which they
may compete. Staff then must submit a list of those positions for which
they want to be considered.
[15] State requires that a generalist applicant to the Foreign Service
select a "cone," which is a functional area of specialization, when
applying to take the written examination. For generalists, Foreign
Service specializations are management, consular, economic, political,
and public diplomacy.
[16] GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-05-207 (Washington, D.C.:
January 2005).
[17] P.L. 107-56.
[18] The files include the NCIC's Interstate Identification Index,
which is the FBI's database of criminal history records, Wanted Persons
Files, and any other files maintained by NCIC that may be mutually
agreed upon by the Attorney General and the agency receiving access.
[19] According to FBI officials, examples of the information provided
to CLASS, when available, include the FBI record number, name and
alias, date of birth, place of birth, citizenship, sex, race, eye
color, hair color, height, or weight.
[20] To render an alien ineligible under INA 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), the
conviction must be for a statutory offense that involves moral
turpitude, which includes many serious crimes, such as kidnapping and
murder, but does not include other crimes that may be reflected in the
NCIC database.
[21] This requirement is also consistent with the National Crime
Prevention and Privacy Compact Act of 1998 (42 U.S.C. 14611 et seq.)
(or Compact Act), which organizes an electronic information-sharing
system among the federal government and states to exchange criminal
history records, such as those contained in the Index, for noncriminal
justice purposes. The Compact Act requires that consular officers, as
noncriminal justice personnel, first submit the visa applicant's
fingerprints, or other approved form of identification, for positive
identification before the record can be released.
[22] The National Security Decision Directive-38 process requires non-
State agencies to seek approval of chiefs of missions on any proposed
changes in the size, composition, or mandate of their staff.
[23] See GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government
Performance and Results Act, GAO/GGD-96-118 (Washington, D.C.: June
1996).
