Drug Control
Air Bridge Denial Program in Colombia Has Implemented New Safeguards, but Its Effect on Drug Trafficking Is Not Clear Gao ID: GAO-05-970 September 6, 2005In the 1990s, the United States operated a program in Colombia and Peru called Air Bridge Denial (ABD). The ABD program targeted drug traffickers that transport illicit drugs through the air by forcing down suspicious aircraft, using lethal force if necessary. The program was suspended in April 2001 when a legitimate civilian aircraft was shot down in Peru and two U.S. citizens were killed. The program was restarted in Colombia in August 2003 after additional safeguards were established. To date, the United States has provided about $68 million in support and plans to provide about $26 million in fiscal year 2006. We examined whether the ABD program's new safeguards were being implemented and its progress in attaining U.S. and Colombian objectives.
The United States and Colombia developed additional safeguards for the renewed ABD program to avoid the problems that led to the accidental shoot down in Peru. The safety measures aim to reinforce and clarify procedures, bolster safety monitoring, enhance language skills of ABD personnel, and improve communication channels. We found the safeguards were being implemented by the Colombians and U.S. safety monitors. In addition, the program managers perform periodic reviews and evaluations, including an annual recertification of the program, and have made efforts to improve civilian pilots' awareness of the ABD program's procedures. Our analysis of available data indicates that the ABD program's results are mixed, but the program's progress cannot be readily assessed because performance measures with benchmarks and timeframes do not exist. The stated objective for the program--for the Colombian National Police to take control of suspicious aircraft--seldom happens. During October 2003 through July 2005, the Colombian Air Force located only 48 aircraft out of about 390 suspicious tracks pursued; and the military or police took control of just 14 aircraft--four were already on the ground. Only one resulted in a drug seizure. However, many of the suspicious aircraft land in remote locations controlled by insurgent groups that require time to enter safely. Yet, the air force rarely involves the police besides calling them at the start of a mission and before firing at the suspicious aircraft. In addition, many of the suspicious tracks are near border areas with Brazil and Venezuela, which is too far from an ABD air base for aircraft to intercept without refueling. Nevertheless, the number of suspicious tracks has apparently declined from 49 to 30 per month, but the track counts may not be consistent over time because they are based on subjective criteria, such as whether an aircraft has inexplicably deviated from its planned flight path. According to U.S. and Colombian officials, the reduction in suspicious tracks indicates that Colombia is deterring traffickers and regaining control of its airspace.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-05-970, Drug Control: Air Bridge Denial Program in Colombia Has Implemented New Safeguards, but Its Effect on Drug Trafficking Is Not Clear
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
September 2005:
Drug Control:
Air Bridge Denial Program in Colombia Has Implemented New Safeguards,
but Its Effect on Drug Trafficking Is Not Clear:
GAO-05-970:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-05-970, a report to congressional requesters:
Why GAO Did This Study:
In the 1990s, the United States operated a program in Colombia and Peru
called Air Bridge Denial (ABD). The ABD program targeted drug
traffickers that transport illicit drugs through the air by forcing
down suspicious aircraft, using lethal force if necessary. The program
was suspended in April 2001 when a legitimate civilian aircraft was
shot down in Peru and two U.S. citizens were killed. The program was
restarted in Colombia in August 2003 after additional safeguards were
established. To date, the United States has provided about $68 million
in support and plans to provide about $26 million in fiscal year 2006.
We examined whether the ABD program‘s new safeguards were being
implemented and its progress in attaining U.S. and Colombian
objectives.
What GAO Found:
The United States and Colombia developed additional safeguards for the
renewed ABD program to avoid the problems that led to the accidental
shoot down in Peru. The safety measures aim to reinforce and clarify
procedures, bolster safety monitoring, enhance language skills of ABD
personnel, and improve communication channels. We found the safeguards
were being implemented by the Colombians and U.S. safety monitors. In
addition, the program managers perform periodic reviews and
evaluations, including an annual recertification of the program, and
have made efforts to improve civilian pilots‘ awareness of the ABD
program‘s procedures.
Our analysis of available data indicates that the ABD program‘s results
are mixed, but the program‘s progress cannot be readily assessed
because performance measures with benchmarks and timeframes do not
exist. The stated objective for the program”for the Colombian National
Police to take control of suspicious aircraft”seldom happens. During
October 2003 through July 2005, the Colombian Air Force located only 48
aircraft out of about 390 suspicious tracks pursued; and the military
or police took control of just 14 aircraft”four were already on the
ground. Only one resulted in a drug seizure. However, many of the
suspicious aircraft land in remote locations controlled by insurgent
groups that require time to enter safely. Yet, the air force rarely
involves the police besides calling them at the start of a mission and
before firing at the suspicious aircraft. In addition, many of the
suspicious tracks are near border areas with Brazil and Venezuela,
which is too far from an ABD air base for aircraft to intercept without
refueling. Nevertheless, the number of suspicious tracks has apparently
declined from 49 to 30 per month, but the track counts may not be
consistent over time because they are based on subjective criteria,
such as whether an aircraft has inexplicably deviated from its planned
flight path. According to U.S. and Colombian officials, the reduction
in suspicious tracks indicates that Colombia is deterring traffickers
and regaining control of its airspace.
Suspicious Tracks Detected Over Colombia Became Concentrated Along Its
Borders, October 2003 and May 2005:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
We recommend that the Secretary of State establish performance measures
for the ABD program that include benchmarks and timeframes. We also
recommend that the Secretary of State encourage Colombia to (1) seek
ways to more actively involve the police in ABD missions and (2)
establish ABD air bases closer to the areas with the most suspicious
tracks. State found the report to be an accurate assessment of the
program, and stated that it is developing benchmarks and timeframes for
its performance measures.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-970.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Jess Ford at (202) 512-
4268 or FordJ@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
United States and Colombia Implemented New Safety Requirements:
Available ABD Program Data Shows Mixed Results, but the Program Lacks
Well-Defined Performance Measures:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: ABD Safety Checklist:
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State:
GAO Comments:
Table:
Table 1: U.S. Support for the ABD Program, Fiscal Years 2002-2006:
Figures:
Figure 1: Suspicious Tracks Identified, Pursued, and Located by the ABD
Program, October 2003-July 2005:
Figure 2: Law Enforcement Activities by Month since Inception of ABD
Program, October 2003-July 2005:
Figure 3: Suspicious Tracks Detected Over Colombia Became Concentrated
Along Its Borders, October 2003 and May 2005:
Figure 4: Distance a Typical Interceptor Aircraft Can Travel from the
Main Air Base in Apiay:
Abbreviations:
ABD: Air Bridge Denial:
JIATF-S: Joint Interagency Task Force-South:
NAS: Narcotics Affairs Section, U.S. Embassy, Bogotá:
State/INL: Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs:
Letter September 6, 2005:
The Honorable Tom Davis:
Chairman, Committee on Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Mark E. Souder:
Chairman, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human
Resources:
Committee on Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Charles E. Grassley:
Chairman, Caucus on International Narcotics Control:
United States Senate:
Drug traffickers in South America often move illegal drugs by aircraft
in and out of Colombia.[Footnote 1] This is referred to as the "air
bridge." To reduce this drug trafficking, the United States began
operating a program in the 1990s called Air Bridge Denial (ABD) in
Colombia and Peru. The ABD program identified aircraft suspected of
drug trafficking and forced them to land, using lethal force if
necessary. However, the program was suspended in April 2001 after a
legitimate civilian aircraft was shot down in Peru, killing two U.S.
citizens. In August 2003, Colombia and the United States resumed ABD
operations in Colombia after entering into a Letter of Agreement
outlining each country's responsibilities and safety measures to
address concerns.[Footnote 2]
The ABD program's stated goal is to help Colombia stop the trafficking
of illegal drugs--primarily cocaine--in its airspace by forcing
suspicious aircraft to land safely so that law enforcement authorities
can take control of the aircraft, arrest suspects, and seize drugs.
Aircraft suspected of involvement in drug trafficking are usually first
identified by relocatable over-the-horizon radar.[Footnote 3] Following
this initial identification, a surveillance aircraft containing
tracking equipment is sent to visually identify the source of the
suspicious radar track,[Footnote 4] and, if it appears to be a drug
trafficking aircraft, an aircraft equipped with weapons is sent to
intercept or force the aircraft to land using the minimal force
necessary. The Colombian Air Force operates the ABD program and
provides crews for both the U.S.-owned surveillance aircraft and
Colombia's interceptor aircraft. The program is overseen by the
Department of State's (State) Bureau for International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), which has a contract with a U.S.
company, ARINC, to maintain the surveillance aircraft and provide
safety monitors and operational and training support. In addition, the
Department of Defense's (Defense) Joint Interagency Task Force-South
(JIATF-South) provides radar intelligence to the Colombian Air Force
regarding suspicious tracks in and approaching Colombia, collects and
analyzes data on the performance of the program, and helps ensure that
the aircrews perform the required safety procedures.
At your request, we examined the status of the Colombian ABD program.
Specifically, we examined (1) the changes made to the ABD program to
address safety concerns raised after the Peru incident and whether
these new safeguards were being followed and (2) the program's progress
in attaining U.S. and Colombian objectives.
To address these objectives, we reviewed ABD program and budget
documentation and met with cognizant U.S. officials at the Departments
of State and Defense in Washington, D.C. We traveled to Colombia and
met with officials from the Colombian government, Colombian Air Force,
and the U.S. Embassy, as well as ARINC personnel operating the ABD
program. We also visited an ABD air base in Apiay, Colombia, where many
ABD missions originate, and visited the Colombian Air Force's ABD
command center in Bogotá. In addition, we met with JIATF-South
personnel in Key West, Florida, to discuss their role in the program.
We performed our work from January 2005 through August 2005 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Results in Brief:
To avoid the problems that led to the accidental shoot down in Peru,
the U.S. and Colombian governments established a number of safeguards,
which we found were being implemented by the Colombians and U.S. safety
monitors. Additionally, program managers perform periodic reviews and
evaluations, including an annual recertification of the program. In
April 2003, Colombia and the United States signed a Letter of Agreement
that requires the program to operate under the following conditions:
* A set of procedures, developed by the U.S. and Colombian governments,
must be followed during each ABD mission. All of the ABD participants
we met with were knowledgeable about the procedures listed in the
safety checklist and stated that the steps were followed.[Footnote 5]
We viewed video recordings of previous ABD missions and observed the
start of an ABD mission from the Colombian Air Force's ABD command
center in Bogotá and noted that the checklist was followed in detail.
* Some personnel are exclusively assigned to ensure that operations are
safe and deliberate. Three U.S. safety monitors supervise the
implementation of the procedural checklist for each mission and can
stop any mission in which they have safety concerns.
* All U.S. safety monitors must be fluent in Spanish and the Colombian
pilots and mission directors are required to be proficient in English.
They are tested annually by the State Department and ARINC. U.S. safety
monitors are native Spanish speakers or were formerly trained by the
U.S. military as linguists.
* A dedicated communication channel is reserved for the U.S. safety
monitors, and an ABD mission will not proceed if communication among
the monitors is lost. This has occurred three times since the restart
of the program.
In addition, in the Peru accident the pilot of the legitimate civilian
aircraft was not aware that the ABD aircrew was calling him over the
radio. The Letter of Agreement requires the Colombian government to
inform civilian pilots about the ABD program--in particular, about the
procedures used when intercepting an aircraft and the consequences of
not complying.
Our analysis of available program data indicates that the ABD program's
results are mixed, but the program's progress cannot be readily
assessed because performance measures with benchmarks and timeframes do
not exist.[Footnote 6] The Letter of Agreement's stated objective for
the program--for the Colombian police to take control of suspicious
aircraft--seldom happens. As of July 2005, out of about 390 suspicious
aircraft tracks pursued, the Colombian Air Force located only 48; and
the military or police took control of just 14 aircraft,[Footnote 7]
arresting four suspects and impounding several aircraft. Only one
resulted in a drug seizure. However, many of the aircraft pursued by
the ABD program land in remote locations that are often controlled by
insurgent groups, where, without sufficient time to prepare, the
National Police cannot reach the scene to make arrests or seize drugs.
Yet, the Colombian Air Force rarely involves the police besides
notifying them when a suspicious aircraft track is first pursued and
prior to firing at the aircraft. Furthermore, in recent months, many of
the suspicious tracks have been along Colombia's border with Brazil and
Venezuela[Footnote 8] where the ABD surveillance aircraft cannot reach
them before they leave Colombian airspace or disappear from radar.
Nevertheless, the number of suspicious aircraft tracks over Colombia
has apparently declined from about 49 to 30 per month, but the track
counts may not be consistent over time because they are partly based on
subjective criteria, such as whether an aircraft has inexplicably
deviated from its planned flight path. According to U.S. and Colombian
officials, the reduction in suspicious tracks indicates that Colombia
is deterring traffickers and regaining control of its airspace--one of
Colombia's goals for the program.
To help assess the ABD program's progress, we recommend that the
Secretary of State establish performance measures for the program that
include benchmarks and timeframes. To increase the program's law
enforcement activities, we recommend that the Secretary of State
encourage Colombia to seek ways to more actively involve the National
Police in ABD missions. Finally, to enhance Colombia's ability to
interdict suspicious aircraft, we recommend that the Secretary of State
encourage Colombia to establish ABD air bases closer to the area of
most current suspicious tracks. In commenting on a draft of this
report, State found it to be an accurate assessment of the program.
Additionally, State commented that they were in the process of
establishing benchmarks and timeframes for performance measures
implemented this year.
Background:
After the Peru accident, a joint investigation by the United States and
Peru reviewed the circumstances of the accident and made several
conclusions.[Footnote 9] The investigation team was comprised of U.S.
representatives from the Departments of State and Defense, as well as
Peruvian officials from its Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense.
According to U.S. officials, Colombian President Alvaro Uribe requested
the restart of the ABD program to help combat drug trafficking. After
initial discussions, the United States decided to assist Colombia in
restarting a revised ABD program that would be managed by the Colombian
Air Force and overseen by State/INL. In addition, U.S. officials said
that Colombia had existing infrastructure that facilitated the
program's restart, such as air bases and a national air command center.
Prior to the restart of Colombia's ABD program, a committee of
representatives from the Departments of State, Defense, and Justice, as
well as the Colombian government developed a Letter of Agreement
outlining the program's goal, safety requirements, operational
procedures, and each country's responsibilities. The Letter of
Agreement, which was signed in April 2003, states that the program's
goal is to increase the Colombian government's ability to stop aerial
drug trafficking over Colombia. Colombia is required to provide
personnel and interceptor aircraft, designate the areas where the
program can operate in Colombia's airspace, and manage the daily
operations. The United States is primarily responsible for providing
the program with surveillance aircraft, personnel, training, and funds
to maintain and operate the equipment, while ensuring that the program
is regularly reviewed. Finally, a U.S. Presidential determination was
necessary to restart the program, and is required annually to allow
U.S. employees and its agents to assist Colombia in the use of force
against civilian aircraft reasonably suspected to be primarily engaged
in illicit drug trafficking.[Footnote 10]
Since 2002, the United States has provided $68.4 million and
surveillance aircraft for the ABD program (see table 1) and plans to
provide an additional $25.9 million in fiscal year 2006. State/INL
provided $57.2 million to support ARINC operations, including the U.S.
personnel involved in the program and maintenance of the surveillance
aircraft. State's Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) in the U.S. Embassy
in Bogotá provided $11.2 million for training, aircraft operations,
logistics support, and construction at ABD air bases. At no cost to
State, the department also transferred five U.S.-owned Cessna Citation
surveillance aircraft used in the prior ABD programs, which are
equipped with tracking systems. Also, Defense gave Colombia two
additional surveillance aircraft, which have yet to be used for
surveillance. The fiscal year 2006 request for approximately $26
million for the program is planned to continue existing operations and
construct additional infrastructure. U.S. and Colombian officials said
they do not intend for Colombia to fully finance the program in the
near future.
Table 1: U.S. Support for the ABD Program, Fiscal Years 2002-2006:
Dollars in millions.
Department of State office: INL[A];
Fiscal year 2002: $9.0;
Fiscal year 2003: $15.6;
Fiscal year 2004: $14.0;
Fiscal year 2005: (estimated): $18.6;
Fiscal year 2006 (proposed): $21.0;
Total: $78.2.
Department of State office: NAS;
Fiscal year 2002: $3.6;
Fiscal year 2003: $1.9;
Fiscal year 2004: $1.1;
Fiscal year 2005: (estimated): $4.6;
Fiscal year 2006 (proposed): $4.9;
Total: $16.1.
Total;
Fiscal year 2002: $12.6;
Fiscal year 2003: $17.5;
Fiscal year 2004: $15.1;
Fiscal year 2005: (estimated): $23.2;
Fiscal year 2006 (proposed): $25.9;
Total: $94.3.
Source: State/INL.
[A] In 2003, State/INL began paying ARINC to maintain the surveillance
aircraft, supply personnel to monitor operations, and provide other
operational support.
Note: Funds from other NAS country accounts were used to support the
ABD program and these amounts are included above.
[End of table]
United States and Colombia Implemented New Safety Requirements:
In response to the findings of the Peru investigation and other
determinations, the United States and Colombia developed new safeguards
for the renewed ABD program which were implemented consistently in the
interdiction missions we observed. The program also undergoes multiple
evaluations to ensure that all elements of the Letter of Agreement are
followed.
New Safety Requirements Developed for ABD Program:
The renewed ABD program has new safeguards in place, which were
prompted by the review of the Peru accident. The investigation of the
Peru incident found that crewmembers did not fully perform some
procedures, neglected the safety of the mission, had limited foreign
language skills, and were talking on a congested communication system.
In response, safeguards were developed to reinforce and clarify
procedures, bolster safety monitoring, enhance language skills of ABD
personnel, and improve communication channels. Another factor of the
accident--the civilian pilot's unawareness of the ABD program's
procedures--was addressed by teaching civilian pilots about the
program.
In the Letter of Agreement for the renewed program, U.S. and Colombian
officials require ABD personnel to follow specific procedures
summarized in a safety checklist to ensure safe operations and clarify
the roles of the United States and Colombia (see app. I). According to
the Peru investigative report, the aircrews involved in the accident
did not fully execute the program's procedures, particularly aircraft
identification. Also, the documentation of ABD procedures had become
less specific over time. The procedural checklist for the renewed
program lists the specific steps that must be taken to execute an ABD
mission, including visually identifying the suspicious aircraft;
calling to the aircraft over the radio; and, if necessary, requesting
permission from the Commander of the Colombian Air Force to fire at the
aircraft. In particular, the list provides the exact wording for
crewmembers to use when confirming the completion of checklist steps to
avoid confusion among the participants. While at the Colombian Air
Force's ABD command center in Bogotá, we observed ABD personnel
following the checklist during the start of an ABD mission.
While, at the time of the accident, the program did not have U.S.
personnel dedicated to monitoring safety, three U.S. personnel are now
responsible for safety and implementation of safeguards for each
mission. The Peru investigation concluded that the interceptor
crewmembers were focused on forcing aircraft to land and not on the
overall safety of the mission. Under the renewed program, the three
U.S. safety monitors are located at the Colombian Air Force's command
center in Bogotá; at JIATF-South in Key West, Florida; and onboard the
surveillance aircraft. The safety monitor onboard the aircraft observes
the completion of checklist procedures and alerts the U.S. monitors on
the ground when each procedure is accomplished. If any of the three
monitors objects to an action taken during the mission, the monitor
immediately stops the mission. For example, if a monitor objects to the
firing of warning shots because he is not confident that the suspicious
aircraft is involved in drug trafficking, he will immediately pull all
U.S. resources out of the mission, including the surveillance aircraft
and U.S. personnel. However, if the problem is resolved, the mission
can resume. As of June 2005, the U.S. monitors had objected to actions
in ten missions, two of which were due to incorrect implementation of
the checklist.
The Letter of Agreement with Colombia requires all U.S. safety monitors
to be fluent in Spanish and the Colombian crewmembers, besides the
weapons controllers, to be proficient in English because language
barriers among the aircrew members contributed to the Peru accident.
The aircrews involved in the Peru accident had flown on previous
operational missions together and had some foreign language skills;
however, they were not proficient enough to communicate clearly during
the high stress of an interception. For example, one of the crewmembers
in the Peru incident obtained the suspicious aircraft's tail number so
that ground personnel could determine the owners of the aircraft.
However, other participants in the mission did not understand the
message, and never learned that the plane was a legitimate civilian
aircraft. Under the renewed program, the U.S. safety monitors are
native Spanish speakers or were formerly trained as linguists with the
U.S. military. Annually, ARINC tests the U.S. monitors fluency in
Spanish and the NAS tests the Colombians' proficiency in English.
Additionally, the renewed ABD program has incorporated improved
communications systems and procedures to ensure the communications
mishaps that contributed to the Peru accident do not reoccur. An ABD
interception requires the coordination of many individuals, including
ground personnel in the ABD command center in Bogotá and JIATF-South in
Key West, Florida, and aircrews in the surveillance and interceptor
aircraft. During the Peru accident, the aircrews were talking
simultaneously over the same radio channels and were not able to hear
each other clearly. For example, the crew of the suspicious aircraft
called the closest air control tower when they saw the interceptor
aircraft following them, but the control tower did not receive the call
because it was too far away. Although the ABD aircrews were monitoring
the tower's radio frequency, they did not hear the call because other
communication was occurring at the same time. For the new program, a
satellite radio channel is dedicated to the U.S. monitors, and the
Colombian crewmembers communicate on various radio channels. A
satellite phone is also available if radio communication is impaired.
The U.S. monitors must suspend the mission if communication among them
is lost, which has happened three times.
Although not a finding of the Peru investigation, the Letter of
Agreement with Colombia recognizes that a community of civilian pilots
unaware of the ABD program can threaten the safety of the program's
operations. Pilots who do not know how to respond to an ABD
interception may put themselves and the ABD aircrews at undue risk. The
pilot of the suspicious aircraft in Peru was unaware that he was being
called over the radio by the ABD aircrew. The Letter of Agreement with
Colombia requires the Colombian government to inform the public of the
program's operating procedures, which the government does through
publicly posted notices and required training courses for pilots and
air traffic controllers. The government also teaches the civilian
pilots how to respond to an ABD interception, as well as the
consequences of not complying with the Colombian Air Force's commands.
Program Regularly Reviewed:
The program managers that we interviewed said that the program's
operations are reviewed and evaluated regularly by the program managers
and cognizant U.S. agency officials. For example:
* The United States recertifies the program once a year, a process that
serves as the basis for the President's annual decision on whether to
continue supporting the program. The program was first certified in May
2003 before it could restart and again in July 2004 by a team of
representatives from the Departments of State, Defense, Homeland
Security, Justice, and Transportation. The 2004 certification team
ensured that the major components of the Letter of Agreement--
operational procedures, training requirements, logistics support, and
information to civilian pilots--were in place by reviewing official
documents, performing interviews, and observing training and
operational exercises.
* The crew of the surveillance aircraft records a video of each ABD
mission once the suspicious aircraft is located. Both Colombian and
U.S. program managers review the video to determine if the checklist
was followed. We reviewed recordings of some ABD missions and observed
the implementation of the safety procedures.
* U.S. and Colombian managers of the program meet every six months to
plan for the future and discuss Colombia's needs for the program. After
the U.S. managers consider Colombia's needs, they determine whether to
fund the requests for such items as repaving runways at ABD operating
locations.
In addition, the Congress requires an annual report from the President
on the program's resources and procedures used to intercept drug
trafficking aircraft. The report certifies that the procedures agreed
to in the Letter of Agreement were followed in the interception of
aircraft engaged in illegal drug trafficking during the preceding year.
Available ABD Program Data Shows Mixed Results, but the Program Lacks
Well-Defined Performance Measures:
Our analysis of available data--the number of suspicious tracks and law
enforcement activities--indicates that the ABD program's progress to
date is mixed. The Colombian Air Force surveillance aircraft pursued
less than half of the almost 900 suspicious tracks identified since
October 2003[Footnote 11] and few were located. But the number of
suspicious tracks appears to have declined, although the consistency of
the suspicious track data is unknown. The program's primary objective-
-to safely force suspicious aircraft to land so law enforcement
authorities can gain control of it--has not happened very often. In
addition, the location of most suspicious tracks has changed, making
them more difficult to locate and intercept.
State/INL does not have clear performance measures that can be used to
help assess the ABD program's progress toward eliminating aerial drug
trafficking in Colombia. State/INL officials told us that they began
developing measures in early 2005, but they do not contain benchmarks
or timeframes. These same officials said they will meet with Defense
shortly to review data related to these measures for the first time.
ABD Program Located Few Aircraft:
Since October 2003, the Colombians pursued about 390 out of
approximately 880 suspicious tracks, and located 48 of them (see fig.
1).[Footnote 12] Tracks are often difficult to locate because the
relocatable over-the-horizon radar does not provide the suspicious
aircraft track's altitude or the exact location. Furthermore, according
to Colombian Air Force officials, drug traffickers use hundreds of
clandestine airstrips in Colombia. Often the airstrips are camouflaged
and suspicious aircraft are hidden from view. Therefore, when
surveillance aircraft do not interdict suspicious aircraft in the air,
they are unlikely to find them once they land and disappear from radar.
Figure 1: Suspicious Tracks Identified, Pursued, and Located by the ABD
Program, October 2003-July 2005:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Recently, the Colombian Air Force asked the United States to
permanently increase the number of flight hours (from 180 to 300 per
month) for the surveillance aircraft to spend more time training and
locating clandestine airstrips. According to U.S. and Colombian
officials, once these airstrips are located, the ABD aircrews can focus
on them when searching for a suspicious aircraft in the area. To date,
based on our review of ABD documents, identification of clandestine
airstrips has not assisted in locating any suspicious aircraft. Some
State/INL officials are skeptical that more flying time, which would
increase maintenance and fuel costs, would produce greater results for
the program.
Suspicious Tracks Reduced, but Accuracy of Count Unknown:
The number of suspicious aircraft tracks over Colombia has apparently
declined from approximately 49 to 30 a month, a decrease of about 40
percent, between the first 11 months of the program and the last 11
months (see fig. 1). According to U.S. and Colombian officials, the
reduction in tracks indicates that the program is deterring drug
traffickers from transporting drugs by air, and is allowing the
Colombian government to meet its goal of regaining control of its
airspace, but performance measures with benchmarks and timeframes
linking the reduction of suspicious tracks to the overall goal have not
been developed. Moreover, the accuracy of the suspicious track data
over time is suspect due to the nature of the process, which relies on
some subjective criteria. The process for determining whether a track
is suspicious or legitimate is partly based on the judgment of JIATF-
South and Colombian Air Force personnel, who screen thousands of tracks
every month looking for suspicious movements. For example, personnel
consider whether the aircraft has inexplicably deviated from its
planned flight path or the aircraft's altitude is unusually low.
However, no definitive criteria exist for such factors, which can
therefore be interpreted differently among operators.
ABD Missions Lack Involvement of Law Enforcement Personnel:
The National Police seldom take control of suspicious aircraft, arrest
individuals suspected of drug trafficking, or seize drugs. Since
October 2003, law enforcement was involved in 14 instances (see fig.
2), arresting four suspects and impounding several aircraft. However,
in four of these instances, the aircraft was already on the ground.
Only one ABD mission resulted in a drug seizure--0.6 metric tons (about
1,300 pounds) of cocaine.[Footnote 13] Because State/INL has not
established performance measures regarding law enforcement activities,
determining whether the objectives of the ABD program are being met is
difficult. However, State/INL officials said they would like law
enforcement authorities to more often take control of suspicious
aircraft, which may contain drugs, weapons, or cash that goes
unaccounted for if the military or police do not arrive.
Figure 2: Law Enforcement Activities by Month since Inception of ABD
Program, October 2003-July 2005:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
As steps on the procedural checklist, ABD personnel contact the
Colombian National Police in Bogotá at the start of an interdiction
mission and prior to firing at the aircraft. But, besides these calls,
the Colombian Air Force usually does not involve the police in ABD
missions. Further, the police face various challenges in reaching the
locations where suspicious aircraft land--often in remote areas of
Colombia that are not accessible by road. The police cannot travel to
some locations without additional resources, including security and
transportation, according to INL officials.[Footnote 14] But, according
to U.S. officials, greater planning and coordination between the
Colombian Air Force and National Police could enable law enforcement to
more frequently take control of suspicious aircraft. For example, in
the February 2005 ABD mission that yielded 1,300 pounds of cocaine, one
armed Colombian Navy helicopter provided cover for another Navy
helicopter to land and seize as much cocaine from the aircraft as it
could carry, while the Colombian Army and National Police arrived later
and confiscated the remaining cocaine.
Changes in Suspicious Tracks Locations Limit Interdiction Capability:
In recent months, the majority of suspicious tracks are concentrated
along Colombia's borders (see fig. 3), making it more difficult for
surveillance and interceptor aircraft to reach the aircraft before it
lands or leaves Colombian airspace. Once a suspicious aircraft lands,
surveillance aircraft often have difficulty locating it.
Figure 3: Suspicious Tracks Detected Over Colombia Became Concentrated
Along Its Borders, October 2003 and May 2005:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
From November 2003 to July 2005, 141 suspicious tracks were not pursued
by surveillance aircraft because they were near borders or too far
away. In particular, suspicious tracks along Colombia's southeastern
border with Brazil and Venezuela are at least an hour flight from the
closest ABD air base in Apiay, leaving surveillance and interceptor
aircraft little time to find and intercept a suspicious aircraft before
having to refuel (see fig. 4). For example, one ABD interceptor
aircraft, the A-37B Dragonfly, takes 50 minutes to fly to Caruru (about
250 miles) in southeastern Colombia, but it can remain in that area for
only 10 minutes before leaving to refuel.[Footnote 15] ABD program
managers and safety monitors said it usually takes about 25 minutes to
complete an ABD mission when all resources are in place, from visually
locating the aircraft to forcing it to land. However, some ABD missions
have lasted as long as six or seven hours and utilized multiple
surveillance and interceptor aircraft.
Figure 4: Distance a Typical Interceptor Aircraft Can Travel from the
Main Air Base in Apiay:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Conclusions:
The United States agreed to help Colombia restart the ABD program at
the request of Colombian President Alvaro Uribe. U.S. funding provided
for the program through fiscal year 2005 totals over $68 million;
almost $26 million is proposed for 2006. We found the results of the
ABD program mixed.
A primary U.S. concern regarding the program--the safety of the ABD
aircrews and innocent civilians--is addressed in detail in the Letter
of Agreement between the United States and Colombia. However, the
agreement does not include performance measures with benchmarks and
timeframes to help with assessing results. Although State has begun
developing such measures, assessing the program's effectiveness and
determining whether additional resources might contribute to increased
results is difficult.
Although the number of suspicious aircraft tracks has apparently
declined--from about 49 to 30 per month, the Colombian Air Force seldom
locates the suspicious aircraft. Moreover, drug traffickers do not face
a great risk of being arrested even if they are detected. Out of about
390 suspicious tracks pursued since the start of the program, the
Colombian Air Force located 48; law enforcement or military authorities
went to the scene of 14, including four that were already on the
ground. Besides calling the Colombian National Police during a mission,
as required by the procedural checklist, the Colombian Air Force rarely
involves the police. Without sufficient notice, the police cannot
respond quickly and safely to suspicious aircraft on the ground because
much of Colombia is not controlled by the government. Moreover, many of
the suspicious aircraft tracks detected in recent months are along
Colombia's border regions with Brazil and Venezuela where ABD aircraft
are often too far away to threaten the trafficking mission.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
First, to help in assessing whether the ABD program is making progress
toward meeting its overall goal of reducing illegal drug trafficking in
Colombia's airspace, we recommend that the Secretary of State work with
Colombia to define performance measures with benchmarks and timeframes.
These performance measures, as well as results, should be included in
the annual report to the Congress regarding the ABD program. Second,
because the police are seldom involved in ABD missions, we recommend
that the Secretary of State encourage Colombia to seek ways to more
actively involve the National Police. Finally, because many of the
suspicious aircraft tracks are difficult for Colombia to locate and
interdict given the current location of its ABD air bases, we recommend
that the Secretary of State encourage Colombia to establish ABD air
bases closer to the current activity of suspicious aircraft tracks.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
State provided written comments on a draft of this report (see appendix
III). Overall, it found the report to be an accurate assessment of the
intent and execution of the program and noted that it is developing
benchmarks and timeframes for its performance measures. Defense did not
provide written comments. However, neither department commented on our
recommendations. In addition, State and Defense officials provided
technical comments and updates that we incorporated throughout the
report, as appropriate.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days
from the date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies of this
report to interested congressional committees and the Secretaries of
State and Defense. We will also make copies available to others upon
request. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on the
GAO Web site at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
call me at (202) 512-4268 or [Hyperlink, FordJ@gao.gov]. Key
contributors to this report were Al Huntington, Hynek Kalkus, Summer
Pachman, and Kerry Lipsitz. Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this report.
Signed by:
Jess T. Ford, Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
[End of section]
Appendixes:
Appendix I: ABD Safety Checklist:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology:
To review the changes made to the ABD program to address safety
concerns and to determine whether these safeguards were followed, we
reviewed ABD program documentation provided by the Department of
State's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
(State/INL) and the Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) at the U.S.
Embassy, Bogotá, and the Department of Defense's Joint Interagency Task
Force-South (JIATF-South). We also discussed the new safeguards with
knowledgeable U.S. officials at State and Defense in Washington, D.C;
Bogotá, Colombia; and Key West, Florida; officials from the Colombian
government and Colombian Air Force in Bogotá; and ARINC contractors
located in Bogotá and an ABD air base in Apiay, Colombia. We also
interviewed officials involved in the negotiation of the agreement
between the United States and Colombia prior to restarting the program.
To evaluate the program's progress in attaining U.S. and Colombian
objectives, we examined data regarding law enforcement activities;
suspicious tracks; aircraft pursued, located, and fired at. This data
was documented by NAS in reports prepared monthly for State/INL
containing the number of missions flown that month and their results.
However, complete data for August and September 2003 was unavailable,
and the data for October 2003 to March 2004 did not include the number
of tracks pursued and identified. By using an event log prepared by NAS
with narratives of ABD missions beginning in August 2003, we
extrapolated some of the data and corroborated all law enforcement
activities and aircraft fired on. We also compared the number of
suspicious tracks recorded by NAS with JIATF-South's count. The numbers
reported were not the same for most months. We used the NAS count of
suspicious tracks because it is more inclusive of tracks detected by
Colombia and does not include tracks that were later determined to be
friendly aircraft. We interviewed cognizant officials at State/INL,
NAS, and JIATF-South about the data. Further, we discussed the numbers
of suspicious tracks with the Colombian Air Force. Based on our ability
to corroborate most of the data with multiple sources, we determined
that it was sufficiently reliable for our purposes.
We traveled to Colombia in April 2005 and met with NAS officials and
other cognizant U.S. Embassy, Bogotá, officials, and with ARINC
managers at their offices at the Government of Colombia's Ministry of
Defense in Bogotá. We also visited an ABD air base in Apiay where we
met with ARINC contractors serving as monitors onboard the surveillance
aircraft. Additionally, we visited the Colombian Air Force's ABD
command center in Bogotá where we interviewed both ARINC contractors
and Colombian Air Force officials. We witnessed the start of an ABD
mission at the command center and reviewed video recordings of previous
ABD missions at the U.S. Embassy.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State:
United States Department of State:
Assistant Secretary and Chief Financial Officer:
Washington, D. C. 20520:
Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers:
Managing Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001:
AUG 23 2005:
Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers:
We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "DRUG
CONTROL: Air Bridge Denial Program in Colombia Has Implemented New
Safeguards, But Its Affect on Drug Trafficking Is Not Clear," GAO Job
Code 320384.
The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.
If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact Al
Matano, Deputy Director, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs, at (202) 647-7812.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Sid Kaplan (Acting):
cc: GAO - Addison Ricks:
INL - Nancy Powell (Acting):
State/OIG - Mark Duda:
Department of State Comments on GAO Report:
DRUG CONTROL: Airbridge Denial Program in Colombia Has Implemented New
Safeguards, But Its Affect on Drug Trafficking Is Not Clear (GAO-05-
970, GAO Code 320384):
The Department of State appreciates the opportunity to review and
comment on the draft Report "DRUG CONTROL: Airbridge Denial Program in
Colombia Has Implemented New Safeguards, But Its Affect On Drug
Trafficking Is Not Clear." This program is an important part of
Colombia's National Security Strategy and is a key component of
Colombia's effort to secure its national airspace against the aerial
trafficking of drugs and related contraband. The Department is
committed to executing its security assistance programs and its other
programs in support of Colombia in a coherent manner that complies with
United States law and helps the United States Government achieve its
foreign policy goals.
The report represents a generally accurate assessment of intent and
execution of the program. However, there are several issues that we
would like to address, which have implications for the overall
framework and tone of the report:
1) The draft report states that the Department has not established
performance measures. It notes in the beginning, and as a major
conclusion, that the program's progress cannot be readily assessed
because performance measures with benchmarks and timeframes do not
exist. In fact, performance indicators were established in April 2004,
but bilateral implementation of the full-range of measures did not
occur until this year and benchmarks and timeframes are being
developed.
2) Page 2: More emphasis needs to be placed in the text to highlight
that the Government of Colombia is the implementer of this program, and
the USG provides safety oversight. This is a principal division of
labor between the two governments, and drives the policy actions in
terms of USG participation and support of the ABD program.
3) Page 14: First paragraph, last sentence beginning with "However.."
This comment points out that the sorting criteria is subjective,
therefore the accuracy of calling a track suspect is itself suspect. In
fact, the sorting criteria has been used successfully over many years
in both this program and as a standard for all non-lethal programs in
the region. It could be said that this is the summation of years of
"best practices" implementation by experienced operators, thereby
overcoming the negative label of being subjective. Determination of
whether a track is to be declared "Unidentified, Assumed Suspect" is
just a step in a lengthy investigation sequence of events. The whole
safety checklist is comprised of steps that further investigate the
suspect aircraft. Recommendation: end paragraph without the last
sentence by deleting the sentence beginning with "However.."
4) Recommend that the sorting criteria be attached as an appendix to
the report, to demonstrate the thoroughness of the process used to
screen suspect aircraft.
5) Missing: There is no discussion in the report about the lack of
comprehensive USG intelligence to support Colombian ABD efforts. This
should be included as a classified annex to the report.
The following are GAO's comments on the Department of State's letter
dated August 23, 2005.
GAO Comments:
1. State officials provided us draft performance measures for the ABD
program that they told us were developed in April 2005 with
representatives from Defense and the Colombian government.
2. We recognized the U.S. role of program oversight and the Colombian
government's role of operating and managing the program throughout the
report.
3. We made no substantive changes. This section addressed only the
initial identification of a suspect track. Our analysis found that
three of the six criteria used to determine if a track is suspicious
were subjective. The checklist and other steps taken to further
identify suspect aircraft are discussed elsewhere in the report.
4. We gave examples of the criteria used to determine if an aircraft is
suspected of drug trafficking.
5. A discussion of U.S. government intelligence support to the ABD
program was not within the scope of our report.
[End of section]
(320384):
FOOTNOTES
[1] Almost all of the cocaine and nearly half of the heroin entering
the United States are from Colombia.
[2] The United States determined in 2003 not to implement the ABD
program in Peru.
[3] This type of radar bounces a radio wave off the earth's ionosphere
(from two locations in the United States and one in Puerto Rico) and
can scan an area up to 1,800 miles wide. The radar can determine the
location of an aircraft within a 7 to 10 mile radius, its speed, and
general course of movement. However, the radar cannot detect an
aircraft's altitude.
[4] Radar can identify the path of an aircraft, known as its track.
Tracks are considered suspicious if the aircraft has not filed a flight
plan or is flying at a low altitude. When the aircraft is visually
located, certain characteristics make it suspicious, such as having
blacked-out windows, a missing tail number, or flying at night without
lights.
[5] In two ABD missions, the safety procedures were not correctly
implemented. Since ABD missions that result in locating a suspicious
aircraft are recorded and reviewed, U.S. program officials were made
aware of the mistake and followed up with the aircrews.
[6] Although State and Defense developed draft performance measures in
early 2005, they lacked benchmarks and timeframes.
[7] Four of these aircraft were already on the ground when they were
identified as suspicious.
[8] Much of this area is at least an hour flight from the closest ABD
air base. The program's surveillance aircraft are located at three ABD
air bases - in Apiay, approximately 60 miles south of Bogotá; in
Barranquilla, near the coast of the Caribbean Sea; and in Cali, near
the coast of the Pacific Ocean.
[9] Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs, Peru Investigation Report: The April 20, 2001
Peruvian Shootdown Accident, (Washington, DC: 2001).
[10] The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (P.
L.103-337, Sec. 1012) as amended, provides civil immunity for U.S.
employees and agents assisting a foreign country in interdicting drug
trafficking aircraft where, among other things the President determines
that drug trafficking threatens the national security of that country.
The President is required to provide an annual report regarding the
procedures used to interdict aircraft to the Congress.
[11] Complete data for September 2003, the first full month of the
program, was not available.
[12] During October 2003 through March 2004, NAS did not document the
number of aircraft located. We counted the number of aircraft located
as those fired on or involved in a law enforcement activity. Beginning
in April 2004, NAS began documenting the number of aircraft located.
[13] By way of comparison, U.S. interdiction efforts seized or
disrupted 196 metric tons (approximately 432,000 pounds) of cocaine in
2004, according to the Office of National Drug Control Policy.
[14] Insurgent groups have some degree of control over 40 percent of
Colombia's territory and can pose a threat to the police.
[15] Caruru is an area where numerous suspicious aircraft have been
located.
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