Security Assistance
Efforts to Secure Colombia's Cano Limon-Covenas Oil Pipeline Have Reduced Attacks, but Challenges Remain Gao ID: GAO-05-971 September 6, 2005Oil is one of Colombia's principal exports. The Cano Limon-Covenas oil pipeline transports almost 20 percent of Colombia's oil production. The pipeline originates in the Department of Arauca in northeast Colombia. It carries oil nearly 500 miles to the Caribbean port of Covenas. The pipeline has been a principal infrastructure target for terrorist attacks by Colombia's insurgent groups. During 2001, attacks on the pipeline cost the Colombian government an estimated $500 million in lost revenues for the year. The United States agreed to assist Colombia in protecting the first 110 miles of the pipeline where most of the attacks were occurring. We examined how the U.S. funding and resources provided to Colombia have been used, and what challenges remain in securing the pipeline.
Since fiscal year 2002, the United States has provided about $99 million in equipment and training to the Colombian Army to minimize terrorist attacks along the first 110 miles of the Cano Limon-Covenas oil pipeline, mostly in the Arauca department. U.S. Special Forces have provided training and equipment to about 1,600 Colombian Army soldiers. However, the delivery of 10 helicopters purchased for the program was delayed--arriving mid 2005. Without the helicopters, the Colombian Army's ability to respond rapidly to pipeline attacks has been limited. Additionally, some equipment, such as night vision goggles, has not arrived due to the long lead-time required to obtain these items because of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Despite the delays in equipment deliveries, the number of attacks on the Cano Limon-Covenas oil pipeline has declined and security in the area has improved. In addition, the Colombian Army and Colombian National Police have improved relations with the civilian population and new oil exploration is occurring in the area due to the improved security. However, challenges to securing the pipeline remain. More attacks are occurring on the Cano Limon-Covenas oil pipeline outside the 110-mile long area originally addressed. Most of the Colombian Army stationed in these other areas has not received U.S. training. In addition, the insurgents have attacked the electrical grid system that provides energy to the Cano Limon oilfield. Without electricity, oil cannot be pumped. Because the U.S. funds provided for the program will be depleted by the end of September 2005, sustainability of the progress made is uncertain. Colombia cannot fully operate and maintain the helicopters provided without continued U.S. support; and due to U.S. commitments in other parts of the world, U.S. Special Forces will be reducing personnel in Colombia, which will limit future training.
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Director: Team: Phone:GAO-05-971, Security Assistance: Efforts to Secure Colombia's Cano Limon-Covenas Oil Pipeline Have Reduced Attacks, but Challenges Remain
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
September 2005:
Security Assistance:
Efforts to Secure Colombia's Caño Limón-Coveñas Oil Pipeline Have
Reduced Attacks, but Challenges Remain:
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-971]:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-05-971, a report to congressional requesters:
Why GAO Did This Study:
Oil is one of Colombia‘s principal exports. The Caño Limón-Coveñas oil
pipeline transports almost 20 percent of Colombia‘s oil production. The
pipeline originates in the Department of Arauca in northeast Colombia.
It carries oil nearly 500 miles to the Caribbean port of Coveñas. The
pipeline has been a principal infrastructure target for terrorist
attacks by Colombia‘s insurgent groups. During 2001, attacks on the
pipeline cost the Colombian government an estimated $500 million in
lost revenues for the year. The United States agreed to assist Colombia
in protecting the first 110 miles of the pipeline where most of the
attacks were occurring. We examined how the U.S. funding and resources
provided to Colombia have been used, and what challenges remain in
securing the pipeline.
What GAO Found:
Since fiscal year 2002, the United States has provided about $99
million in equipment and training to the Colombian Army to minimize
terrorist attacks along the first 110 miles of the Caño Limón-Coveñas
oil pipeline, mostly in the Arauca department. U.S. Special Forces have
provided training and equipment to about 1,600 Colombian Army soldiers.
However, the delivery of 10 helicopters purchased for the program was
delayed”arriving mid 2005. Without the helicopters, the Colombian
Army‘s ability to respond rapidly to pipeline attacks has been limited.
Additionally, some equipment, such as night vision goggles, has not
arrived due to the long lead-time required to obtain these items
because of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Despite the delays in equipment deliveries, the number of attacks on
the Caño Limón-Coveñas oil pipeline has declined and security in the
area has improved. In addition, the Colombian Army and Colombian
National Police have improved relations with the civilian population
and new oil exploration is occurring in the area due to the improved
security. However, challenges to securing the pipeline remain. More
attacks are occurring on the Caño Limón-Coveñas oil pipeline outside
the 110-mile long area originally addressed. Most of the Colombian Army
stationed in these other areas has not received U.S. training. In
addition, the insurgents have attacked the electrical grid system that
provides energy to the Caño Limón oilfield. Without electricity, oil
cannot be pumped. Because the U.S. funds provided for the program will
be depleted by the end of September 2005, sustainability of the
progress made is uncertain. Colombia cannot fully operate and maintain
the helicopters provided without continued U.S. support; and due to
U.S. commitments in other parts of the world, U.S. Special Forces will
be reducing personnel in Colombia, which will limit future training.
Caño Limón-Coveñas Oil Pipeline Attacks, 1996–July 2005:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
We recommend that the Secretary of State, in consultation with the
Secretary of Defense, develop a plan for transitioning the pipeline
security program to Colombia. State commented that the report was an
accurate assessment of the program and concurred with our
recommendation.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-971.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Jess T. Ford at (202) 512-
4268 or FordJ@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Helicopters and Other Equipment Were Delayed:
Improved Security and Governance in the Department of Arauca, but
Challenges Remain:
Conclusions:
Recommendation for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of State:
Table:
Table 1: U.S. Support for Protecting the Caño Limón Pipeline, Fiscal
Years 2002 and 2003:
Figures:
Figure 1: Map of Colombia and Caño Limón Pipeline:
Figure 2: Oil Spill from Pipeline Attack:
Figure 3: State-Constructed Facilities on an Army Base near the Town of
Saravena:
Figure 4: Caño Limón Pipeline Attacks, 1996-July 2005:
Figure 5: Electrical Grid System Attacks that Have Affected Occidental,
2000-July 2005:
Abbreviations:
MilGroup: Military Group, U.S. Embassy, Bogotá:
NAS: Narcotics Affairs Section, U.S. Embassy, Bogotá:
Letter September 6, 2005:
The Honorable Tom Davis:
Chairman, Committee on Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Mark E. Souder:
Chairman, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human
Resources:
Committee on Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Charles E. Grassley:
Chairman, Caucus on International Narcotics Control:
United States Senate:
Oil is one of Colombia's principal export commodities. The Caño Limón-
Coveñas oil pipeline[Footnote 1] originating in the Department of
Arauca transports almost 20 percent of Colombia's oil production,
approximately 100,000 barrels of oil per day. Since 1986, however, the
Caño Limón pipeline has been a principal infrastructure target for
terrorist attacks[Footnote 2] by Colombia's insurgent groups.[Footnote
3] During 2001, attacks on the pipeline reduced production by an
estimated 70,000 barrels of oil per day, and cost the Colombian
government an estimated $500 million in lost revenues for the year.
This loss crippled the Arauca department's government, which receives
90 percent of its revenue from the pipeline oil royalties. In response
to these attacks, Colombia developed an infrastructure security
strategy. For the first phase of the strategy, Colombia requested
equipment and military training from the United States to secure the
first 110 miles of the Caño Limón pipeline primarily in Arauca, which
was the portion most often attacked.[Footnote 4] Prior to 2001, the
Arauca department, a remote and sparsely populated area, held little
interest for the Colombian government. As a result, insurgent groups
infiltrated all aspects of the department, threatening its governance
and security.
In 2002, the United States agreed to assist Colombia in phase one of
its infrastructure security strategy. The Department of State's (State)
Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs and State's Bureau for
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, and various
components of the Department of Defense (Defense)[Footnote 5] developed
a program to assist the Colombian Army in regaining control of Arauca;
defending the pipeline and civilian population; and preventing,
interdicting, and disrupting insurgents before they attack the pipeline
and nearby communities. The pipeline security program called for the
delivery of helicopters, equipment, logistical and infrastructure
support, and training. Since fiscal year 2002, the United States has
provided $99 million for this program.
In response to your request, we examined (1) how the U.S. funding and
resources provided have been used to secure the first 110 miles of the
Caño Limón pipeline and (2) what progress has been made in securing the
pipeline and what challenges remain. In order to address these
objectives, we examined State and Defense project information and
budget documents, and interviewed knowledgeable officials involved in
the program. We traveled to Colombia and met with cognizant officials
from the U.S. Embassy in Bogotá; the Government of Colombia; and
Ecopetrol and Occidental Petroleum Corporation, which operate the Caño
Limón pipeline and oilfield. We traveled to Arauca and met with the
local commanders of the Colombian Army and Colombian National Police,
and spoke with U.S. Special Forces who were training the Colombian
Army. We also toured a State-constructed facility in Arauca that will
house helicopters to help the Colombian Army move more rapidly
throughout the area. We conducted our review from January 2005 to July
2005 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.
Results in Brief:
In 2002, the United States agreed to provide equipment and military
training to the Colombian Army to help minimize terrorist attacks along
110 miles of the Caño Limón pipeline. Since fiscal year 2002, the
United States has provided about $71 million for 10
helicopters[Footnote 6] and related logistical support and ground
facilities, and about $28 million for training and other equipment.
* To station the helicopters in Arauca, State built facilities on a
Colombian Army base near the town of Saravena. The helicopters, which
were to arrive in Colombia as early as May 2004, started arriving in
April 2005 and the last delivery occurred in June 2005. State
attributed some of the delay to negotiations over the type of
helicopters to purchase and transportation problems. Without the
helicopters, the Colombian Army's ability to respond rapidly to
pipeline attacks has been limited and has put them at risk for
ambushes.
* Defense also provided U.S. Special Forces training and equipment for
about 1,600 Colombian Army soldiers. Because the helicopters only
arrived recently, U.S. Special Forces have extended training through
fiscal year 2005 to overlap with their arrival. Additionally, some
equipment, such as ammunition, night vision goggles, and medical
supplies, has not arrived due to the long lead-time required to obtain
these items because of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and
Iraq.
Despite the delays in the arrival of the helicopters and other
equipment, the number of attacks on the pipeline has declined and
governance and security in Arauca has improved. State and Defense
officials attributed the decrease in attacks to strong Colombian
leadership; U.S. Special Forces training; and better coordination among
the Colombian Army, police, and Colombian Ministry of Justice
prosecutors (known as fiscalia). In addition, the Colombian Army and
police have improved relations with the civilian population, and
arrests and prosecutions of insurgents have occurred. New oil
exploration is also occurring due to improved security in the area.
However, several challenges remain. Attacks on the pipeline continue--
though at a reduced rate--and the insurgents have changed their
tactics.
* Attacks have increased on the Caño Limón pipeline in the neighboring
Department of Norte de Santander, which is outside the 110-mile range
of the first phase of the original infrastructure security program.
Most of the Colombian Army stationed in Norte de Santander has not
received U.S. training.
* The nature of attacks on oil production in Arauca has changed. In
recent years, the insurgents have attacked the electrical grid system
that provides energy to the Caño Limón oilfield. Without electricity,
the oil wells cannot operate.
Finally, the Colombian Army does not have the capacity to fully operate
and maintain the helicopters it possesses without continued U.S.
support.[Footnote 7] According to the U.S. Embassy, Bogotá, Colombia
will not have a sufficient number of trained pilots and mechanics to
operate all the U.S.-provided helicopters it has until fiscal years
2008 and 2010, respectively. In addition, due to U.S. commitments in
other parts of the world, U.S. Special Forces will be reducing training
in Arauca and throughout Colombia.
We recommend that the Secretary of State, in consultation with the
Secretary of Defense, develop a plan for transitioning the pipeline
security program to Colombia. The plan should delineate (1) how the
helicopters will be used and maintained, (2) how progress to date will
be sustained, and (3) an expected completion date for U.S. involvement.
In commenting on a draft of this report, State said it was an accurate
assessment of the program and concurred with our recommendation, but
expressed some concern that the report overemphasized the time required
to deliver the helicopters.
Background:
In 2004, Colombia was the fourth largest Latin American supplier of
crude oil and petroleum-related products to the United States and the
16th leading supplier worldwide. One of Colombia's largest oilfields--
Caño Limón--was discovered in 1983 in the Department of Arauca and
today accounts for almost 20 percent of Colombia's oil production. The
oilfield is located in north-central Arauca about six miles south of
the Venezuelan border. The Caño Limón pipeline carries oil from the
oilfield northwest about 477 miles, though seven departments[Footnote
8] to the Caribbean port of Coveñas (see fig. 1). The Caño Limón
oilfield is operated by an association comprised of Colombia's state-
owned oil company, Ecopetrol; a United States company, Occidental
Petroleum Corporation; and a Spanish oil company, Repsol. Between 1986
and 2002, the Caño Limón oilfield generated $800 million in national
royalties and another estimated $1.2 billion in regional royalties for
the seven departments it traverses. In particular, the oilfield
provides Arauca with 90 percent of its total revenues--about $40
million a year.
Figure 1: Map of Colombia and Caño Limón Pipeline:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Throughout Colombia's history, the Department of Arauca has been a
remote area that held little interest for the Colombian government and
lacked an effective police presence. Over the past 25 years, the
discovery of oil and the establishment of the illegal drug trade have
brought the department a measure of wealth and attracted the attention
of Colombia's insurgent groups. These groups had infiltrated all
aspects of the Arauca government and conducted a variety of illegal
activities, such as extortion of oil revenues; terrorist attacks on
economic infrastructure;[Footnote 9] drug trafficking; and attacks
against citizens, department officials, and military and police
forces.[Footnote 10] Civilians caught between the insurgent groups and
government forces, often sided with the insurgent groups out of fear.
In Arauca, the pipeline has been the principal economic infrastructure
target of attacks. During 2001, the Caño Limón pipeline was attacked
170 times,[Footnote 11] resulting in the pipeline shutting down for
over 200 days, costing Colombia approximately $500 million in lost
revenues and considerable environmental damage (see fig. 2). For
example, in early November 2001, one attack resulted in 7,000 barrels
of oil spilling over a 50-mile area--including the Arauca River--which
greatly affected agricultural production in the area. However, despite
the frequency of attacks, between 1986 and 2001 Colombia's fiscalia--
prosecutors--arrested only three people of attacking the pipeline.
Figure 2: Oil Spill from Pipeline Attack:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Infrastructure Security Strategy:
To regain control of Arauca and decrease economic infrastructure
attacks, the Government of Colombia developed a three-phased
infrastructure security strategy. The initial phase focused on securing
the first 110 miles of the pipeline, which was the section most often
attacked. The second phase was proposed to protect the remaining 367
miles of the pipeline, and phase three called for protecting 338 other
critical economic infrastructure targets throughout the
country.[Footnote 12]To help implement the first phase of the strategy,
Colombia asked the United States to provide military training and
equipment to its army, and a memorandum of agreement was signed between
the two countries in 2003. As stipulated in the agreement, a bilateral
working group was formed, and it developed a plan to protect the Caño
Limón pipeline. The Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) in the U.S.
Embassy, Bogotá, administers the day-to-day aviation components of the
program, and the Military Group (MilGroup) in the U.S. Embassy, Bogotá,
administers the day-to-day nonaviation components of the program.
U.S. assistance was directed toward Colombia's 18TH army brigade
headquartered in the Department of Arauca, whose area of responsibility
includes all of Arauca and parts of the Boyaca and Norte de Santander
departments to the northwest. The 18TH army brigade is charged with
providing roadway security, controlling Colombian-Venezuelan border
traffic, conducting counternarcotic operations, ensuring public order,
and securing the Caño Limón pipeline and other infrastructure.
In addition to U.S. assistance in Arauca, Ecopetrol and Occidental have
contributed financial support to the Colombian armed forces, as well as
community programs. In particular, each year Ecopetrol and Occidental
contribute about $8.65 million to help secure the Caño Limón pipeline,
according to Ecopetrol. This money supports the army, air force, and
fiscalia in the department and has been used for housing, food, land
and air transportation, communication equipment, gasoline, and medical
assistance. In addition, Occidental has built barrack facilities for
soldiers on an army base near the town of Saravena, and has established
a foundation to promote community development programs throughout the
region.
Future of Colombia's Oil Production:
From 1999 to 2004, Colombia's oil production steadily declined. Much of
this was due to the depletion of Colombia's mature oilfields and the
lack of new major oilfield discoveries. Security for Colombia's oil
industry infrastructure, however, is an ongoing concern due to the
threats posed by insurgent groups operating in Colombia's oil
production areas. With a decreasing pool of proven oil reserves,
industry experts have stated that Colombia may become a net importer of
oil by 2008. In an effort to attract private investors to Colombia, the
Colombian government implemented regulatory and institutional reforms
to create a more conducive climate for the exploration of oil
reserves.[Footnote 13]
Helicopters and Other Equipment Were Delayed:
In fiscal year 2002, the Congress provided $6 million to initiate
training of the Colombian Army units in Arauca, and in fiscal year 2003
an additional $93 million was provided.[Footnote 14] Of this funding,
State used $71 million to acquire two UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters,
eight UH-II helicopters, and related logistical support and ground
facilities. However, the helicopters were not delivered on schedule.
The lack of airlift capabilities has put the army at-risk for insurgent
attacks and limited the Colombian Army's ability to quickly respond to
infrastructure attacks. Defense used the remaining $28 million for U.S.
Special Forces training and equipment for the Colombian Army (see table
1); however, much of this equipment has not arrived.
Table 1: U.S. Support for Protecting the Caño Limón Pipeline, Fiscal
Years 2002 and 2003:
Dollars in millions.
Items purchased: Helicopters: Two UH-60 Helicopters;
Cost: $26.8.
Items purchased: Helicopters: Eight UH-II Helicopters;
Cost: $20.1.
Items purchased: Helicopters: Helicopter facilities;
Cost: $14.3.
Items purchased: Helicopters: Helicopter maintenance and equipment;
Cost: $8.8.
Items purchased: Training: Equipment, ammunition, and parts;
Cost: $15.4.
Items purchased: Training: U.S. Special Forces training;
Cost: $12.7.
Items purchased: Training: Aerial eradication program[A];
Cost: $0.9.
Total;
Cost: $99.0.
Sources: State and Defense (data).
[A] Funds were used for converting the building contractors' living
quarters and related facilities for use by State's aerial eradication
program.
[End of table]
Helicopter Facilities Were Built, but the Helicopters Arrived Late:
State built helicopter and barrack facilities on a Colombian Army base
near the town of Saravena to support the 10 helicopters. The facilities
were completed in December 2004, but remained vacant for 5 months
awaiting the arrival of the helicopters. The UH-60 Black Hawks and four
of the UH-II helicopters were delivered to Colombia in April 2005. They
were moved to Arauca in May for training and air operations. In late
June 2005, the remaining four UH-II helicopters arrived in Colombia and
were moved to Arauca in August.
The helicopter facilities include helicopter pads, a hangar, training
rooms, equipment storage, and building security. State also built
barracks with exercise rooms, kitchen and laundry facilities, and
conference rooms (see fig. 3). While the 10 helicopters will be
stationed at the new facilities and routine maintenance will occur at
this location, depot-level[Footnote 15] maintenance will be done at the
Colombian Army base in Tolemaida.[Footnote 16]
Figure 3: State-Constructed Facilities on an Army Base near the Town of
Saravena:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Although the helicopters recently arrived in Colombia, they were
expected to arrive as early as May 2004.[Footnote 17] However, some
State officials said the helicopters were always planned to arrive in
December 2004. They noted that the lead time to order the helicopters
precluded an earlier delivery date. State officials did not provide any
planning documents that detailed timeframes and milestones associated
with the helicopter delivery, but did provide documents coordinating
the construction of facilities with the arrival of the helicopters in
late 2004. According to State officials, negotiations over what type of
helicopters to purchase caused some delay, and problems with
transportation and delivery accounted for the 4 to 6 month delay from
the December 2004 timeframe.
Nevertheless, in the absence of the helicopters, the Colombian Army did
not move any of its other air assets, including similar helicopters, to
Arauca to assist in infrastructure security training[Footnote 18] and
operations. As a result, the army in Arauca responded to pipeline
attacks using the roads, placing them at greater risk for ambushes by
insurgents and taking more time to reach an area of an attack.
According to Defense officials, Colombian Army soldiers have been
killed traveling on the roads in the Arauca department.
U.S. Special Forces Provided Training, but Much of the Equipment Is
Delayed:
U.S. Special Forces provided training and equipment for about 1,600
Colombian Army soldiers to improve their ability to act quickly in
minimizing terrorist attacks along the Caño Limón pipeline. In November
2002, a team of U.S. Special Forces traveled to Arauca to assess the
area and determine the training needs of the Colombian Army. In January
2003, U.S. Special Forces started training in Arauca and planned for
training to continue through December 2004.[Footnote 19] U.S. Special
Forces focused on helping the Colombian Army take a more proactive and
aggressive approach to defend the pipeline; regain control of the area
around the pipeline; and prevent, interdict, and disrupt the insurgents
before they attack the pipeline. Training included developing quick
reaction capabilities, small unit tactics, planning and conducting
operations, reconnaissance, collecting and analyzing timely
intelligence, and medical support.
U.S. Special Forces also facilitated joint and combined operations
between the Colombian Army and police to restore public confidence and
security throughout Arauca. The U.S. Special Forces' civil affairs and
psychological operations officers helped the Colombian Army improve
relationships with the civilian population by hosting local events and
developing radio broadcasts and leaflets. For example, officers
assisted in providing medical and dental exams and vaccinations to over
1,760 individuals during a 2-day event.
Because the helicopters did not arrive until mid-2005, U.S. Special
Forces extended their training in Arauca to overlap with their arrival.
In a March 2004 cable from the U.S. Embassy in Bogotá, officials
recognized that if the U.S. trainers did not overlap with the arrival
of the helicopters in Arauca, the Colombian Army units would not
receive the appropriate training. According to a MilGroup official, to
extend the original training funds through September 2005, the U.S.
Special Forces had to reduce the number of trainers and support staff
in Arauca. Since the helicopters have just arrived, U.S. Special Forces
will only have 3 months to provide the necessary operational training.
A MilGroup official said they would have liked to have had 6 to 9
months of training to ensure the Colombian Army was fully capable of
employing the helicopters to support infrastructure protection and
related combat operations. Again, however, State could not provide us
any documentation that coordinated the planned arrival of the
helicopters with the necessary training.
Defense also purchased equipment for the Colombian Army for use in
Arauca, but much of it has not arrived. Equipment purchased includes
night vision goggles, ammunition, weapons, helmets, and medical
supplies. According to the MilGroup, the delivery time for some items
is now almost 2 years because of the demand for supplies created by
U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. For example, night
vision goggles for the Colombian Army were ordered in late 2003 and a
partial shipment arrived in July 2005.
Improved Security and Governance in the Department of Arauca, but
Challenges Remain:
Despite the delays in the arrival of the helicopters and other
equipment, attacks on the Caño Limón pipeline have declined.
Additionally, governance and security in Arauca has improved, and new
oil exploration is also occurring due to improved security conditions.
However, despite these improvements, challenges remain, particularly as
more attacks on the pipeline are occurring in the neighboring
Department of Norte de Santander. In addition, insurgents are attacking
the electrical grid system that provides energy to the Caño Limón
oilfields. Finally, because nearly all the $99 million in U.S.
assistance will be obligated or expended by the end of September 2005,
and Colombia's capability to operate and maintain the helicopters
without U.S. support is limited, sustainability of the progress made is
uncertain.
Attacks on the Caño Limón Pipeline Have Decreased:
Attacks on the pipeline have declined since 2001, until recently. As
illustrated in figure 4, attacks on the Caño Limón pipeline reached a
high of 170 in 2001. In 2002, the attacks dropped to 41; and in 2004,
dropped even further to 17. However, in the first 7 months of 2005,
attacks on the pipeline are almost equal to all of 2004. State and
Defense officials said they were not sure why pipeline attacks were
apparently increasing.
Figure 4: Caño Limón Pipeline Attacks, 1996-July 2005:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Attacks in Norte de Santander Have Increased:
While attacks are decreasing on the Caño Limón pipeline in Arauca, more
attacks are occurring in the neighboring Department of Norte de
Santander. In the first 7 months of 2005, of the 13 attacks that
occurred along the pipeline, 9 were in Norte de Santander. About 200
miles of the pipeline passes through Norte de Santander, and much of it
is in rough mountainous terrain. This makes getting to the affected
areas difficult, which delays repairs. Occidental officials said that
in some cases, it takes up to 8 days to access, secure, and repair the
damaged pipeline. In addition, according to Occidental, attacks on the
pipeline in the mountains are hard to contain as spilled oil runs down
the mountains, causing environmental problems.
Additionally, most of Norte de Santander is secured by a different
Colombian Army brigade, which has not received U.S. infrastructure
security training. According to the MilGroup, U.S. Special Forces are
trying to determine if they can train additional soldiers in Norte de
Santander. However, no military training facilities exist in the
department. In commenting on this report, the MilGroup stated that NAS
is studying the feasibility of deploying some of the helicopters to
this region to support operations as required.
Insurgents Are Attacking the Electrical Grid System:
In addition to pipeline attacks, insurgents are attacking the
electrical grid system that provides energy to the Caño Limón oilfield.
Occidental is able to produce 50 percent of its energy requirements;
however, the remaining 50 percent is purchased from the nation's
electrical grid system. According to a Colombian Army official,
attacking the electrical grid can shut down oil pumping
completely.[Footnote 20] In 2002, eight towers were destroyed within
Arauca. Attacks on the electrical grid system spiked upwards in 2003 to
23 and are increasing again as the electrical attacks in the first
seven months of 2005 have surpassed attacks in all of 2004 (see fig.
5). According to Occidental, as of July 2005 the attacks on the
electrical grid system have cost $117 million in lost production since
2002.
Figure 5: Electrical Grid System Attacks that Have Affected Occidental,
2000-July 2005:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Strong Colombian Leadership and U.S. Special Forces Training
Contributed to Increased Security in Arauca:
The Colombian government has made security and the re-establishment of
state presence in Arauca a priority. According to a State official,
before the United States provided any equipment or training to the
Colombian Army in Arauca, many changes were already occurring due to
interventions by the Colombian government. For example, in January
2003, the Colombian government stripped the Arauca department of
control over its oil royalties to restore fiscal responsibility to the
department. Additionally, in order to disrupt systemic corruption, in
November 2003, the government arrested about 30 public officials,
including a city mayor, who were connected to insurgent groups.
To strengthen the army in Arauca, the Colombian government changed its
leadership. Historically, according to the MilGroup, the army had been
passive and reactive in part because Colombia's military structure
holds leaders personally responsible for the loss of soldiers and
equipment. The MilGroup and State officials noted that President Uribe
replaced some of the army commanders in Arauca with others who were
more aggressive and proactive against the insurgent groups, and he
extended the current Brigadier General's term in Arauca because of his
strong leadership abilities.
In addition to improvements made by the Colombian government, U.S.
Special Forces training has improved the Colombian Army's capabilities.
In the past, the Colombian Army lacked tactical and operation planning,
civilian-military programs, and ground mobility. According to the
Colombian Army Colonel in Saravena, due to U.S. Special Forces
training, his troops are better able to infiltrate areas, react to
situations, and work with the civilian population while respecting
human rights. For example, in April 2005, the Colombian Army unit near
the town of Saravena captured 18 insurgents, and an additional 5
insurgents turned themselves in during the first 4 months of 2005.
Moreover, better coordination exists among the Colombian Army, police,
and the fiscalia. Both army and police officials acknowledged they have
established a good working relationship, which has helped in
neutralizing the insurgent groups. The Colombian Army and police
perform daily foot patrols and carry out joint missions. Because of
this teamwork, the army and police have been able to seize rockets and
landmines, and capture insurgents. In 2001, the fiscalia were
incorporated into the Colombian Army operations and now accompany units
on investigations. Since 2002, the fiscalia have prosecuted 597
individuals, compared to only three arrests between 1986 and 2001.
Finally, interactions between the Colombian Army and the civilian
population have dramatically improved. In 2001, neither the civilian
population nor the army would travel along the roads or in the town of
Saravena because it was not safe. Today, however, the Colombian Army
holds meetings with various communities, provides entertainment,
administers medical care, and performs daily foot patrols in Saravena.
New Exploration Is Occurring:
New oil exploration is occurring in Arauca due to increased security.
Prior to 2004, Occidental did not look for additional oil reserves due
to safety concerns, even though the Caño Limón oilfield will probably
only produce oil near its current rate for a few more years. Today,
Occidental is able to increase its exploration within Arauca, by
working with the Colombian Army and police. According to Occidental, it
drilled 40 new wells in the Caño Limón oilfield this year and is making
an effort to find new oil reserves. Additionally, according to
Occidental, the Colombian Army's protection of the Caño Limón pipeline
makes it possible for their employees to safely repair the pipeline and
get it operational quickly. The safety of Occidental employees has been
a concern in the past. For example, in 2002 a bus carrying 30
Occidental employees was attacked by insurgents, leaving 2 dead, 12
injured, and 3 missing.
Occidental acknowledged that while exploration is becoming more
attractive in Colombia, challenges remain. For instance, according to
Occidental, some of the best prospective locations for oil in Arauca
are located in coca-growing areas controlled by insurgents. The U.S.
Embassy, Bogotá also reports that although oil companies have stated
they are concerned about the financial losses and damage caused by
ongoing attacks to the oil sector, the problem is now being contained,
and security concerns no longer outweigh profit possibilities in the
country.
Sustainability of Progress Uncertain:
As we reported in 2000 and 2003, the Colombian Army did not have the
capability to fully operate and maintain the U.S.-provided helicopters
it had. At that time we recommended that the Secretary of State, in
consultation with the Secretary of Defense, examine U.S. assistance
programs to the Colombian Army to (1) establish clear objectives for
the programs and (2) estimate future funding requirements for U.S.
support.[Footnote 21] The Secretary has not addressed our
recommendation. We added that this analysis should designate specific
performance measures for assessing progress, define the roles of U.S.
personnel and contractors, and develop a timeline for achieving the
stated objectives. On our visit to Colombia in April 2005, a NAS
official told us Colombia will not have a sufficient number of trained
helicopter pilots until fiscal year 2008, and this assumes that none
leave or fail the training program.[Footnote 22] In addition, NAS and
Defense officials estimate Colombia will not have enough trained
mechanics until at least 2010.
Additionally, the reduction in U.S. Special Forces trainers will slow
training. Due to commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. Special
Forces will be reducing personnel throughout Colombia by over 50
percent starting in October 2005. According to a MilGroup official,
training will be suspended in Arauca until early 2006 when U.S. Special
Forces is planning to deploy a training team to Arauca for about 10
weeks. The MilGroup told us that training for the Colombian Army units
in Arauca ideally should occur through fiscal year 2010.
Conclusions:
Colombia's original plan to secure a 110-mile portion of the Caño Limón
pipeline is nearing completion. The helicopters have arrived, the
Colombian Army protecting the pipeline has received training, and the
Colombian government has improved security and governance in Arauca.
Pipeline attacks in Arauca have decreased since 2001 and new oil
exploration is occurring.
Despite these improvements, more attacks are occurring on the pipeline
in Norte de Santander and on the electrical grid system in Arauca, and
State has not addressed how it will help Colombia sustain the progress
made. As we reported in 2003, Colombia does not have the capacity to
sustain the U.S. helicopters provided to the Colombian Army without
continued U.S. support. The 10 helicopters provided for the pipeline
security program will exacerbate this problem. Moreover, because the
U.S. Special Forces are reducing the number of trainers throughout
Colombia, training additional personnel for infrastructure security and
sustaining the training already provided to units in Arauca will be
problematic.
Recommendation for Executive Action:
Because Colombia continues to face serious obstacles in its long-
standing insurgency and in protecting the Caño Limón-Coveñas oil
pipeline, we recommend that the Secretary of State, in consultation
with the Secretary of Defense, develop a plan for transitioning the
pipeline security program in Arauca to the Government of Colombia. The
plan should delineate (1) how the helicopters provided for pipeline
security will be used and maintained, (2) how the progress made to date
will be sustained, and (3) an expected completion date for U.S.
involvement.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
State provided written comments on a draft of this report (see app.
II). State commented that the report provided an accurate assessment of
the program and agreed that challenges remain and the Government of
Colombia will need continued assistance to support the program. State
concurred with the report's recommendation to develop a plan for
transitioning the pipeline security program to the Government of
Colombia, including the aviation component. State stated this plan
should be incorporated into a larger United States government strategy
to transition responsibilities for key U.S. funded programs to the
Colombian government.
However, State expressed some concern that we overemphasized the time
required to deliver the helicopters, but it did not provide any
additional information for us to modify our discussion. The point is
that the planned rapid reaction capability for the pipeline security
program was not available until almost 2-1/2 years after the program
began.
Defense did not comment on this report, but along with State, provided
technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days
from the date of this letter. We are sending copies of this report to
interested congressional committees and the Secretaries of State and
Defense. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In
addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web
site at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
call me at (202) 512-4268 or [Hyperlink, FordJ@gao.gov]. Key
contributors to this report were Al Huntington, Hynek Kalkus, Kerry
Lipsitz, and Summer Pachman. Contact Points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this report.
Signed by:
Jess T. Ford, Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
[End of section]
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To determine how the U.S. funding and resources provided to secure the
first 110 miles of the Caño Limón pipeline were used, we reviewed
Departments of State and Defense project information, reports, budget
documents, memoranda, cables, and related documents. We assessed budget
and funding documentation regarding the uses of the assistance, and
found the data sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We interviewed
knowledgeable officials involved in the program in State's Bureau for
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and Bureau of
Western Hemisphere Affairs. We also interviewed officials from the
Defense Security Cooperation Agency and U.S. Southern Command.
To determine what progress has been made and the challenges that remain
for securing the Caño Limón pipeline, we examined reports, cables, and
related documents prepared by cognizant State and Defense officials.
Specifically,
* To determine the reliability of the data provided on pipeline and
electrical grid system attacks, we interviewed officials from the U.S.
Embassy, Bogotá; Ecopetrol; and Occidental Petroleum Corporation to
determine how they collected and verified the data. We also reviewed
State, Ecopetrol, and Occidental documents related to infrastructure
attacks and cross-referenced the information with comments made by
officials. We found the documents and officials reported similar
numbers. Based on this review, we concluded that these data were
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.
* We discussed challenges of the program with officials in State's
Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and
Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs. We also spoke with Defense
officials from the U.S. Southern Command. On our visit to Colombia in
April 2005, we interviewed Colombian government officials from the
Ministries of Defense and Justice, and the National Planning
Department. We also interviewed officials from Ecopetrol and Occidental
Petroleum Corporation, which operate the Caño Limón pipeline and
oilfield.
* We traveled to Bogotá in April 2005 and met with State and Defense
officials at the U.S. Embassy, including the Narcotics Affairs Section
and the Military Group. We also spoke with the Ambassador, the Deputy
Chief of Mission, and staff from the economic and political affairs
offices.
* Finally, we also traveled to Saravena, Arauca, and toured the State-
constructed facility for stationing the helicopters and met with
various U.S. officials involved in the pipeline security program. We
interviewed the local commanders of the Colombian Army and Colombian
National Police, and spoke with U.S. Special Forces trainers who were
conducting training.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of State:
United States Department of State:
Assistant Secretary and Chief Financial Officer:
Washington, D. C. 20520:
AUG 23 2005:
Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers:
Managing Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001:
Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers:
We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "SECURITY
ASSISTANCE: Efforts to Secure Colombia's Cano Limon-Covenas Oil
Pipeline Have Reduced Attacks, But Challenges Remain," GAO Job Code
320323.
The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.
If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact Jeff
Bischoff, Political-Military Narcotics Officer, Bureau of Western
Hemisphere Affairs, at (202) 647-6373.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Sid Kaplan (Acting):
cc: GAO - Addison Ricks:
WHA - Patrick Duddy, Acting:
State/OIG - Mark Duda:
Department of State Comments on GAO Report SECURITY ASSISTANCE: Efforts
to Secure Colombia's Cano Limon-Covens Oil Pipeline have Reduced
Attacks, But Challenges Remain (GAO-05-971, GAO Code 320323):
The Department of State appreciates the opportunity to review and
comment on the draft Report "SECURITY ASSISTANCE: Efforts to Secure
Colombia's Cano Limon-Covens Oil Pipeline Have Reduced Attacks, But
Challenges Remain." This program is an important part of Colombia's
National Security Strategy and is a key component of Colombia's effort
to secure its national territory and bring peace and prosperity to
Colombia. The Department is committed to executing its security
assistance programs and its other programs in support of Colombia in a
coherent manner that complies with United States law and helps the
United States Government achieve its foreign policy goals.
The report represents a generally accurate assessment of intent and
execution of the program. We would emphasize the importance of the
first paragraph of the report's conclusion:
"Colombia's original plan to secure a 110-mile portion of the Cano
Limon Pipeline is nearing completion. The helicopters have arrived, the
Colombian Army brigade protecting the pipeline has received training,
and the Colombian government has improved security and governance in
Arauca. Pipeline attacks in Arauca have decreased since 2001 and new
oil exploration is occurring."
Nevertheless, we also recognize, as noted in the conclusion, that
challenges remain and that for the short-to-medium- term, the
Government of Colombia will need continued assistance to support this
program, especially in the areas of training and maintenance support
for the aviation component of the program.
The Department would additionally highlight the point found in footnote
two, page two, which states that the Colombian effort to secure Arauca
and the Cano-Limon pipeline has been subsumed into the larger Colombian
strategy for bringing peace and prosperity to Colombia. Support for the
program to assist Colombian forces securing Arauca and the Cano-Limon
pipeline has also been incorporated into our broader Foreign Military
Financing (FMF) and Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) budgets request
for Colombia. Beginning in FY 2004, support for the ground portion of
the program has been included in our FMF request while support for the
aviation portion of the program has been included in our ACI request.
The Department concurs with the recommendation that State, in
consultation with the Department of Defense, develop a plan for
transitioning the pipeline security program to the Government of
Colombia, including the aviation program. The plan should also include
long-term sustainment and an expected completion date. The Department
believes that because the purpose of United States' security assistance
to Colombia has expanded beyond the security of Arauca and the Cano-
Limon pipeline, the plan should be presented as part of a larger United
States Government strategy to transition the responsibility for key
United States Government funded programs to the Government of Colombia.
The Department finds the draft report a generally accurate assessment.
We are concerned that it may over emphasize the time required to
deliver the helicopters, which were subject to the vagaries of funding
availability and contracting difficulties, rather than the end result
of improved security in Arauca and a decline in attacks against the
pipeline. The Department recognizes that the helicopters are a key
element in the program, but notes, as does the draft report, that the
number of attacks against the pipeline dropped before the arrival of
the helicopters, attributable to other elements of the program.
Finally, the draft report notes that attacks against the pipeline and
the electrical system that supports it have increased in 2005 over the
same period in 2004. Nevertheless, attacks against the pipeline and the
electrical system in 2005 (24) are still dramatically below the level
of attacks in against the pipeline 2001 (170), which is before the
program began. The Department recognizes that changes in terrorists'
tactics associated with the increase in attacks in 2005 will require
adjustments by Colombian security forces and changes in the allocation
of assets provided under this program. The Department will work with
the Department of Defense and the Government of Colombia to adjust our
support to the Government of Colombia to counter the changes in
terrorist tactics.
[End of section]
(320323):
FOOTNOTES
[1] For the purpose of this report, we refer to the Caño Limón-Coveñas
oil pipeline as the Caño Limón pipeline or simply the pipeline.
[2] The Caño Limón pipeline is approximately 3 meters underground.
Usually when the pipeline is attacked, a hole must be dug and
explosives placed near the pipeline, which results in a dent or
rupture.
[3] The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, the National Liberation
Army, and the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia are designated as
terrorist organizations by the United States.
[4] The strategy originally consisted of three phases. Phase two was to
protect the rest of the pipeline and phase three was to secure other
infrastructure throughout Colombia. However, State officials told us
the infrastructure security strategy has been incorporated into
Colombia's National Security Strategy, which was finalized in June
2003.
[5] U.S. Southern Command and the Military Group at the U.S. Embassy,
Bogotá.
[6] The helicopters are State assets and are provided under a no-cost
lease to the Government of Colombia.
[7] In 2000 and 2003, we reported that Colombia has limited capacity to
absorb the U.S. assistance. See GAO, Drug Control: U.S. Assistance to
Colombia Will Take Years to Produce Results, GAO-01-26 (Washington,
D.C.: Oct. 17, 2000) and GAO, Drug Control: Specific Performance
Measures and Long-Term Costs for U.S. Programs in Colombia Have Not
Been Developed, GAO-03-783 (Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2003).
[8] The Caño Limón pipeline traverses the Departments of Arauca,
Boyaca, Norte de Santander, Cesar, Magdalena, Bolivar, and Sucre.
[9] Economic infrastructure includes roads, bridges, power lines,
telephone towers, reservoirs, and pipelines.
[10] For example, according to Defense, insurgent groups killed more
than 40 municipal legislators and nine reporters in the department in
2002.
[11] When the pipeline is attacked, Occidental's instrumentation will
sense a drop in the pipeline's pressure. It then notifies the Colombian
Air Force, which flies over the location to confirm the attack. Once
confirmed, the Colombian Army is notified and soldiers are sent to the
location to sweep the area of landmines and make it secure for
Occidental employees to repair the damage.
[12] According to State officials, Colombia incorporated the
infrastructure security strategy into its National Security Strategy,
which was finalized in June 2003.
[13] For example, in 2003 it moved regulatory responsibilities from the
state-owned oil company, Ecopetrol, to a newly created agency. Under
the new arrangement, Ecopetrol no longer has a mandatory share in joint
ventures, and oil companies may now assume up to 100 percent of
investment and risk activities in all exploration and production
contracts. In 2003, Colombia surpassed its exploratory goal to drill 28
wells, but in 2004 drilled only 21, short of its target of 25.
[14] 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act for Further Recovery From and
Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States, Pub. L. 107-206,
116 Stat. 820, 855, and Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003,
Pub. L. 108-7, 117 Stat. 11, 176.
[15] Depot-level maintenance primarily entails rebuilding and
overhauling equipment.
[16] Tolemaida is approximately 50 miles from Bogotá and the
headquarters for the Colombian Army Aviation Battalion.
[17] Several State and Defense documents listed a number of dates for
the scheduled arrival of the helicopters, with the earliest being May
2004.
[18] In April and November 2004, about 75 Colombian Army soldiers from
Arauca went to Tolemaida to conduct air assault training, however, it
was only for a 2-week period.
[19] Additionally, prior to training, the army unit was vetted for
human rights issues.
[20] When the Caño Limón oil pipeline is shut down because of an attack
on the pipeline, oil can still be pumped into storage tanks that have a
7-day holding capacity. However, when the electrical grid system is
attacked, the oil wells cannot pump oil into the storage tanks,
shutting down oil production.
[21] See GAO-01-26 and GAO-03-783. In 2003, we noted the start of the
infrastructure security program and discussed the implications of
providing additional helicopters to Colombia.
[22] According to a U.S. Embassy, Bogotá, cable to State, the
helicopters provided to help protect the pipeline require 50 pilots and
additional mechanics to maintain them.
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