Darfur Crisis
Progress in Aid and Peace Monitoring Threatened by Ongoing Violence and Operational Challenges Gao ID: GAO-07-9 November 9, 2006In 2003, violent conflict in Darfur, Sudan broke out between rebel groups, government troops, and government-supported Arab militias, known as the Janjaweed. The conflict has displaced about 2 million Darfurians and has so affected over 1.9 million others that they require assistance. Since October 2003, the U.S. government has provided humanitarian assistance in Darfur and supported African Union Mission in Sudan's (AMIS) efforts to fulfill a peace support mandate. This report reviews (1) U.S. humanitarian assistance provided to Darfur and the challenges that have been encountered and (2) African Union efforts to fulfill its mandate and challenges that have affected these efforts.
The United States has been the largest donor of humanitarian aid to Darfur, obligating nearly $1 billion from October 2003 through September 2006. Although more than 68 percent of this assistance consisted of food aid, U.S. assistance has also supported other needs, such as water and sanitation, shelter, and health care. Since 2003, humanitarian organizations have made significant progress in increasing the number of people in Darfur receiving aid. In addition, malnutrition and mortality rates in Darfur dropped, a trend that U.S. and other officials attribute in part to humanitarian assistance efforts. However, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the entities providing U.S. humanitarian assistance have encountered several challenges that have hampered delivery of, or accountability for, humanitarian services in Darfur. These challenges include continued insecurity in Darfur; Sudanese government restrictions on access to communities in need; the timing of funding; and an incapacity to ensure monitoring of, and reporting on, U.S.-funded programs. AMIS has taken several positive actions in Darfur to pursue its mandate, although some actions have been incomplete or inconsistent. For example, to monitor compliance with a 2004 cease-fire agreement--one mandate component--AMIS investigated alleged cease-fire violations and identified numerous violations; however, the resulting reports were not consistently reviewed at higher levels or made fully publicly available to identify those violating the agreement. The U.S. government, via private contractors, provided about $280 million from June 2004 through September 2006 tobuild and maintain 32 camps for AMIS forces in Darfur, according to the Department of State. Numerous challenges have been identified by African Union or U.S. officials, among others, as negatively affecting AMIS's efforts in Darfur. These challenges include inadequacies in AMIS's organization, management, and capacity, such as inconsistent interpretation of the AMIS mandate; its relatively small forces; limited or poorly allocated resources; and a lack of intelligence regarding, and cooperation from, the parties to the conflict. A transition from AMIS to a UN peacekeeping operation is being considered, although the Sudanese government has rejected such a transition. A possible NATO-assisted review of AMIS operations has not been conducted. Meanwhile, insecurity and violence continue in Darfur.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-07-9, Darfur Crisis: Progress in Aid and Peace Monitoring Threatened by Ongoing Violence and Operational Challenges
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
November 2006:
Darfur Crisis:
Progress in Aid and Peace Monitoring Threatened by Ongoing Violence and
Operational Challenges:
GAO-07-9:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-9, a report to congressional requesters
Why GAO Did This Study:
In 2003, violent conflict in Darfur, Sudan broke out between rebel
groups, government troops, and government-supported Arab militias,
known as the Janjaweed. The conflict has displaced about 2 million
Darfurians and has so affected over 1.9 million others that they
require assistance. Since October 2003, the U.S. government has
provided humanitarian assistance in Darfur and supported African Union
Mission in Sudan‘s (AMIS) efforts to fulfill a peace support mandate.
This report reviews (1) U.S. humanitarian assistance provided to Darfur
and the challenges that have been encountered and (2) African Union
efforts to fulfill its mandate and challenges that have affected these
efforts.
What GAO Found:
The United States has been the largest donor of humanitarian aid to
Darfur, obligating nearly $1 billion from October 2003 through
September 2006. Although more than 68 percent of this assistance
consisted of food aid, U.S. assistance has also supported other needs,
such as water and sanitation, shelter, and health care. Since 2003,
humanitarian organizations have made significant progress in increasing
the number of people in Darfur receiving aid. In addition, malnutrition
and mortality rates in Darfur dropped, a trend that U.S. and other
officials attribute in part to humanitarian assistance efforts.
However, USAID and the entities providing U.S. humanitarian assistance
have encountered several challenges that have hampered delivery of, or
accountability for, humanitarian services in Darfur. These challenges
include continued insecurity in Darfur; Sudanese government
restrictions on access to communities in need; the timing of funding;
and an incapacity to ensure monitoring of, and reporting on, U.S.-
funded programs.
Figure: U.S. Food Aid in South Darfur; AMIS Troops in North Darfur:
[See PDF for Image]
Source: GAO.
[End of Figure]
AMIS has taken several positive actions in Darfur to pursue its
mandate, although some actions have been incomplete or inconsistent.
For example, to monitor compliance with a 2004 cease-fire agreement”one
mandate component”AMIS investigated alleged cease-fire violations and
identified numerous violations; however, the resulting reports were not
consistently reviewed at higher levels or made fully publicly available
to identify those violating the agreement. The U.S. government, via
private contractors, provided about $280 million from June 2004 through
September 2006 to build and maintain 32 camps for AMIS forces in
Darfur, according to the Department of State. Numerous challenges have
been identified by African Union or U.S. officials, among others, as
negatively affecting AMIS‘s efforts in Darfur. These challenges include
inadequacies in AMIS‘s organization, management, and capacity, such as
inconsistent interpretation of the AMIS mandate; its relatively small
forces; limited or poorly allocated resources; and a lack of
intelligence regarding, and cooperation from, the parties to the
conflict. A transition from AMIS to a UN peacekeeping operation is
being considered, although the Sudanese government has rejected such a
transition. A possible NATO-assisted review of AMIS operations has not
been conducted. Meanwhile, insecurity and violence continue in Darfur.
What GAO Recommends:
This report recommends that the Secretary of State encourage the
Chairperson of the African Union Commission to ensure that a ’lessons
learned“ assessment of AMIS operations is conducted in order to (1)
strengthen future African Union peace support planning and operations
and (2) optimize future donor assistance. The Department of State
supports this recommendation.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-9].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact David Gootnick at 202 512-
3149 or gootnickd@gao.gov.
[End of Section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
United States Primarily Contributed Food Aid; Meanwhile, Assistance
Provision Grew and Other Conditions Improved:
Numerous Challenges Have Hampered U.S. Assistance Efforts and
Oversight:
African Union Has Taken Actions to Meet Mandate, but Some Actions Have
Been Incomplete or Inconsistent:
Numerous Factors Have Complicated AMIS Efforts:
Conclusions:
Recommendation:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Timeline of Darfur Events:
Appendix III: Evolution of AMIS:
Appendix IV: NGOs and UN Agencies Receiving U.S. Nonfood Assistance
Funding during Fiscal Years 2004-2006:
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of State:
GAO Comments:
Appendix VI: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International
Development:
GAO Comments:
Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Bibliography:
Tables:
Table 1: U.S. Food Aid to Darfur in Metric Tons (MT) and Millions of
Dollars in Fiscal Years 2004-2006:
Figures:
Figure 1: Map of Sudan:
Figure 2: Darfur Preconflict Population Density Map:
Figure 3: Timeline of Darfur Events, January 2003-October 2006:
Figure 4: Darfur IDP Camps Dispersion and Estimated Affected
Population, October 2005:
Figure 5: Process for Monitoring Cease-fire Agreement Compliance:
Figure 6: Total Humanitarian Assistance Pledged or Obligated for Darfur
by International Donors, as of June 1, 2006:
Figure 7: U.S. Obligations for Food and Nonfood Humanitarian Assistance
to Darfur by Fiscal Year, Including Supplemental Appropriations:
Figure 8: U.S. Commodities at a World Food Program Storage Facility in
South Darfur:
Figure 9: Food Distribution in Zam Zam IDP Camp in North Darfur:
Figure 10: U.S. Nonfood Humanitarian Assistance to Darfur in Fiscal
Years 2004-2006 by Sector:
Figure 11: Health Clinic in Al Salaam IDP Camp in North Darfur:
Figure 12: Water Pump in Abu Shouk IDP Camp in North Darfur:
Figure 13: Income Generation and Protection Activities in Various IDP
Camps:
Figure 14: Affected Population Compared with Recipients of Humanitarian
Assistance, April 2004-July 2006:
Figure 15: AMIS Confidence-Building Patrol Near Kabkabiya in North
Darfur:
Figure 16: AMIS Firewood Patrol Near Kass in South Darfur:
Figure 17: AMIS Camps:
Abbreviations:
AMIS: African Union Mission in Sudan:
DOD: Department of Defense:
IDP: internally displaced person:
JEM: Justice and Equality Movement:
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation:
NGO: nongovernmental organization:
SLM/A: Sudan Liberation Movement/Army:
SPLM/A: Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army:
UN: United Nations:
UNMIS: United Nations Mission in Sudan:
USAID: U.S. Agency for International Development:
November 9, 2006:
The Honorable Tom Lantos:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on International Relations:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Mike DeWine:
The Honorable Richard J. Durbin:
United States Senate:
In 2003, violent conflict broke out in the Darfur region of western
Sudan when rebel groups, believing that the region was marginalized by
the Sudanese government, led attacks against the government. In
response, the government armed and supported local Arab tribal
militias, commonly known as the Janjaweed, to defeat the rebels.
Attacks on the civilian population by these militias, sometimes in
conjunction with the Sudanese armed forces, have resulted in the deaths
of many thousands. These attacks have also displaced approximately 1.85
million people within Darfur--internally displaced persons (IDP)--most
of whom now live in camps in Darfur and have affected an additional
1.91 million Darfur residents (affected residents) so that they now
require humanitarian assistance.[Footnote 1] In addition, the attacks
have forced about 220,000 Darfur refugees to take shelter in
Chad.[Footnote 2]
Since fiscal year 2004, the United States has provided humanitarian
assistance to Darfur through various implementing partners--
international nongovernmental organizations (NGO) and United Nations
(UN) agencies--with funding from the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) and the Department of State (State). Over the same
period, the U.S. government, through State contracts with two private
sector firms, provided funding for building and maintaining 32 camps
throughout Darfur for African Union forces involved in monitoring a
2004 cease-fire agreement.[Footnote 3] Since May 2004, the African
Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) has deployed more than 7,000 personnel
(comprising military observers, protection force troops, and civilian
police) throughout Darfur on a peace support mission to respond to a
three-part mandate: (1) monitor compliance with the cease-fire
agreement, which was signed in April 2004 by the three parties to the
conflict; (2) assist in "confidence building"; and (3) contribute to
improving the region's security environment. AMIS's mandate will expire
on December 31, 2006, and a UN peacekeeping mission is currently under
consideration. Meanwhile, a peace agreement signed by the government of
Sudan and one rebel group in May 2006 gives AMIS new responsibilities,
such as verifying disarmament of the Janjaweed and monitoring
demilitarized zones around IDP camps.
We were asked to review and assess, among other things, U.S. assistance
in Darfur aimed at promoting health, peace, and security in Sudan. This
report examines (1) U.S. humanitarian assistance provided to help
relieve the crisis in Darfur, (2) challenges that USAID and its
implementing partners have encountered, (3) the African Union's efforts
to fulfill its peace support mandate in Darfur, and (4) factors
affecting the implementation of this mandate.[Footnote 4]
To answer our first two objectives, we reviewed all USAID Darfur grants
and cooperative agreements with UN agencies and NGOs for fiscal years
2004 to 2005 and the first 8 months of fiscal year 2006; UN
humanitarian information profiles for Darfur; and international
standards for humanitarian assistance. To answer our third and fourth
objectives, we reviewed State contracts, task orders, and expenditure
information as well as documents prepared by the African Union, State,
and a key U.S. contractor. For all four objectives, we discussed U.S.
assistance with appropriate Sudanese, USAID, State, and Department of
Defense (DOD) officials and advocacy groups in Washington, D.C., as
well as UN officials in New York, NY. Further, we interviewed
appropriate U.S., European Union, Sudanese, UN, NGO, African Union, and
contractor officials in Khartoum, Sudan, and in the northern and
southern Darfur states. We also visited seven IDP camps and discussed
events in Darfur with IDPs, including the leaders of those communities.
Although we reviewed data on U.S. humanitarian assistance to Darfur
refugees in Chad, we did not assess this assistance in detail. Finally,
we visited eight African Union camps within North and South Darfur and
met with officials at African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia. (See app. I for a detailed discussion of our scope and
methodology.) We conducted our work from September 2005 to November
2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.
Results in Brief:
In fiscal years 2004 through 2006, the United States provided nearly $1
billion in humanitarian assistance for Darfur, with over $275 million
of this amount provided through supplemental legislation that augmented
initial funding levels.[Footnote 5] USAID provided more than 68 percent
of the total assistance as food aid, primarily by providing commodities
to the UN World Food Program and to the International Committee of the
Red Cross. U.S. assistance to Darfur has also supported other vital
needs, such as water and sanitation, shelter, and primary health care
services. Since 2004, NGOs and UN agencies increased their presence in
Darfur by several thousand staff and made significant progress in
increasing the number of IDPs and affected residents receiving aid. In
addition, malnutrition and mortality rates in Darfur dropped between
2004 and 2005, a trend that U.S. and other officials attributed in part
to international humanitarian assistance efforts.
NGOs and UN agencies implementing humanitarian activities and programs
in Darfur have faced three key challenges in providing humanitarian
assistance. First, continued insecurity, such as attacks on NGOs and UN
agencies and banditry of aid convoys, has made it difficult for
humanitarian agencies to provide assistance throughout the region.
Second, NGOs' and UN agencies' efforts to deliver humanitarian
assistance have been constrained by Sudanese government restrictions on
access to IDP communities. Third, according to NGO and UN agency
officials, the timing of U.S. funding in fiscal years 2006, as well as
delays in funding from other international donors, hampered the
provision of humanitarian assistance for 2006. For example, because
more than half of U.S. food aid funding was not provided until late in
fiscal year 2006, the UN World Food Program cut Darfur food rations to
half the minimum daily requirement in May 2006; as of October 2006, the
ration had not been fully restored. In addition, USAID's oversight of
U.S. humanitarian assistance has been limited by a reduction of USAID
program staff in Darfur since 2004--despite growing numbers of NGO and
UN humanitarian staff and displaced and affected Darfurians--as well as
incomplete reporting by implementing NGOs.
Although the African Union has taken positive actions to fulfill its
mandate, some of these actions have been incomplete or inconsistent.
According to U.S. and other officials, AMIS is viewed as having
lessened large-scale violence in the region through the deterrent
effect of its presence. To monitor compliance with the cease-fire
agreement--the first part of the AMIS mandate--AMIS military observers
in Darfur have actively investigated alleged cease-fire agreement
violations and have identified numerous violations since 2004. However,
the resulting reports have not been consistently reviewed at higher
levels according to established procedure or made publicly available to
identify parties who are violating the agreement. To build confidence
and to improve security--the second and third parts of the mandate--
AMIS troops have taken actions such as conducting patrols and escorting
IDP women foraging for firewood outside IDP camps, to protect them from
violent attacks. AMIS troops have also intervened to stop impending
violence against civilians; however, AMIS has not intervened in other
instances where attacks were imminent. Further, AMIS civilian police
have worked with Sudanese police to improve law enforcement, although
they have encountered difficulties, such as an inability to obtain
information regarding Sudanese police activities. To support AMIS's
efforts to fulfill the mandate, the U.S. government, via private
contractors, provided about $280 million from June 2004 through
September 2006, primarily to build and maintain the 32 camps that house
AMIS forces throughout Darfur, according to State sources. Meanwhile,
other international donors, such the European Union, the United
Kingdom, the Netherlands, and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty
Organization), supported AMIS with funding, goods, and services.
Numerous factors have been identified by African Union or U.S.
government officials, among others, as contributing to AMIS's
difficulties in meeting its mandate in Darfur. These challenges
include:
* inadequacies in AMIS's management, organization, and capacity;
* the relatively small size of the AMIS force responsible for
monitoring and patrolling Darfur;
* constrained and inefficiently allocated AMIS resources; and:
* a lack of intelligence regarding, and cooperation from, the parties
to the conflict.
The challenges AMIS has faced have been magnified by the new
responsibilities assigned to AMIS in the May 2006 peace agreement, such
as the requirement to verify the eventual disarmament of the Janjaweed
by the Sudanese government. As AMIS has faced challenges, the U.S.
government and other parties have supported a transition of AMIS's
responsibilities to a UN peacekeeping operation when AMIS's mandate
expires at the end of December 2006. However, as of October 2006, the
Sudanese government had rejected the proposed transition. In June 2006,
following a NATO offer, the African Union formally requested assistance
from NATO in, among other things, identifying lessons learned from AMIS
operations; however, according to a State official, African Union
headquarters had taken no further action to pursue this review as of
August 2006. Meanwhile, insecurity and violence have continued in
Darfur.
In this report, we recommend that the Secretary of State encourage the
Chairperson of the African Union Commission to ensure that an
assessment of AMIS operations is conducted so that "lessons learned"
can be used to strengthen future African Union peace support planning
and operations and future donor assistance can be provided in a manner
that will minimize the difficulties experienced by AMIS.
We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of State and
Defense as well as USAID. We received comment letters from the
Department of State and USAID. The Department of State supported our
recommendation and noted that the report presents a balanced and
accurate picture of the situation in Darfur. The department also
suggested that the report provide additional details or
characterizations regarding certain, primarily AMIS, issues. We
incorporated such information into the report as appropriate. See
appendix V for a reproduction of State's letter and our response. USAID
commented that in general, it found the report to be a comprehensive
assessment of USAID's involvement in Darfur but felt that we should
include additional information in our discussions of areas such as
staffing levels and grant monitoring. We made adjustments as
appropriate. See appendix VI for a reproduction of USAID's letter and
our response. DOD provided no comments on the draft report.
Background:
Sudan is the largest country in Africa (see fig. 1), and its
population, estimated at about 40 million, is one of the continent's
most diverse. Sudan's population comprises two distinct major cultures,
Arab and black African, with hundreds of ethnic and tribal subdivisions
and language groups. More than half of Sudan's population lives in the
northern states, which make up most of Sudan and include the majority
of the urban centers; most residents of this area are Arabic-speaking
Muslims. Residents of the southern region, which has a predominantly
rural, subsistence economy, practice mainly indigenous traditional
beliefs, although some are Christian. The South contains many tribal
groups and many more languages than are used in the North. Darfur is
another distinct region of Sudan, located in the west, and was an
independent sultanate for most of the period between 1600 and 1916,
when the British captured it and incorporated it into the Sudanese
state. Darfur's population is predominantly Muslim.
Figure 1: Map of Sudan:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO based on Map Resources (map).
[End of figure]
Sudan's North-South War:
For most of its existence since gaining independence from Britain and
Egypt in 1956, Sudan has endured civil war rooted in cultural and
religious divides. The North, which has traditionally controlled the
country, has sought to unify it along the lines of Arabism and Islam,
whereas non-Muslims and other groups in the South have sought, among
other things, greater autonomy. After 17 years of war, from 1955 to
1972, the government signed a peace agreement that granted the South a
measure of autonomy. However, civil war began again in 1983, when the
President of Sudan declared Arabic the South's official language,
transferred control of Southern armed forces to the central government,
and, later that year, announced that traditional Islamic punishments
drawn from Shari'a (Islamic law) would be incorporated into the penal
code. The South's rebellion was orchestrated by the Sudan People's
Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). In 1989, the conflict intensified
when an Islamic army faction, led by General Omar Hassan al-Bashir, led
a coup of the government and installed the National Islamic
Front.[Footnote 6]
In 2001 President Bush named former Senator John Danforth as his
Presidential Envoy for Peace in Sudan, assigning him to explore a U.S.
role in ending the civil war and enhance the delivery of humanitarian
aid to Sudan's affected population. On January 9, 2005, the Sudanese
government and the SPLM/A signed a set of agreements called the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement, providing for a new constitution and new
arrangements for power sharing, wealth sharing, and security applicable
throughout Sudan. On July 9, 2005, Bashir assumed the presidency under
the new arrangements, with the SPLM/A Chairman assuming the office of
First Vice President. In 2011, Southern Sudan will hold a vote to
determine whether to become independent. To assist in implementing the
peace agreement, the UN Security Council established the UN Mission in
Sudan (UNMIS), which currently has a force of more than 7,000.[Footnote
7]
Conflict in Darfur:
While the North-South agreement was nearing completion, a rebellion
broke out in Darfur, located in western Sudan with an estimated
preconflict population of about 6 million (see fig. 2).[Footnote 8]
Figure 2: Darfur Preconflict Population Density Map:
[See PDF for image] - graphic text:
Source: GAO from UN OCHA.
Attribution: Map provided courtesy of the Humanitarian Information
Centre Darfur, United Nations Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs.
Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on
this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United
Nations.
[End of figure] - graphic text:
The South's success motivated rebel groups in Darfur to fight for a
similar outcome. In early 2003, Darfur rebels attacked Sudanese police
stations and the airport in El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur (see
fig. 3 for an interactive timeline of key events associated with Darfur
and app. II for a related description of events). In El Fasher, the
rebel groups destroyed numerous military aircraft, killed several
Sudanese soldiers, and kidnapped a Sudanese general. After the
government armed and supported local tribal and Arab militias--the
Janjaweed[Footnote 9]--fighting between the rebel groups and the Sudan
military and Janjaweed intensified during late 2003.[Footnote 10] The
principal rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and
the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), represent agrarian farmers who
are black African Muslims.[Footnote 11] The SLM/A has recently split
into two factions--one faction, with the larger military force, led by
Minni Minawi and the other led by Abdulwahid El Nour.
Figure 3: Timeline of Darfur Events, January 2003-October 2006:
[See PDF for image] - graphic text:
Source: GAO.
[End of figure] - graphic text:
In addition to disrupting the lives of almost 4 million Darfurians,
Janjaweed and Sudanese government attacks in Darfur have resulted in
many thousands of deaths.[Footnote 12] The Agreement on Humanitarian
Ceasefire was signed by the Sudanese government, the SLM/A and the JEM
on April 8, 2004, in N'Djamena, Chad. In signing the agreement, the
parties agreed to accept an automatically renewable cessation of
hostilities; to refrain from any military action and any reconnaissance
operations; to refrain from any act of violence or any other abuse on
civilian populations; to ensure humanitarian access; and to establish a
Ceasefire Commission to monitor the agreement, along with a Joint
Commission to which the Ceasefire Commission would report. The African
Union was to monitor cease-fire compliance. Peace negotiations
continued under African Union auspices with Chadian participation, and
additional interim agreements were also reached. However, after a
relatively calm 2005, cease-fire violations and violent incidents
reportedly began to increase in the final months of that year and into
2006.
On May 5, 2006, the government of Sudan and the Minawi faction of the
SLM/A signed the Darfur Peace Agreement, establishing agreements in key
areas such as power sharing, wealth sharing, and security arrangements.
* Power sharing. The Darfur Peace Agreement creates the position of
Senior Assistant to the President--the fourth-highest position in the
Sudanese government--appointed by the President from a list of nominees
provided by the rebel movements. The Senior Assistant to the President
will also serve as Chairperson of the newly created Transitional Darfur
Regional Authority, which is responsible for the implementation of the
agreement and coordination among the three states of Darfur. Further, a
referendum will be held by July 2010 to allow Darfurians to decide
whether to establish Darfur as a unitary region with a single
government or to retain the existing three regions.[Footnote 13]
* Wealth sharing. The Darfur Peace Agreement creates a Darfur
Reconstruction and Development Fund to collect and disburse funds for
the resettlement, rehabilitation, and reintegration of internally and
externally displaced persons. The government of Sudan will contribute
$300 million to the fund in 2006 and at least $200 million annually in
2007 and 2008. Further, the government of Sudan will place $30 million
in a fund for monetary compensation for those negatively affected by
the conflict in Darfur.
* Security arrangements. The Darfur Peace Agreement calls for the
verifiable disarmament of the Janjaweed by the Sudanese government by
mid-October 2006.[Footnote 14] This disarmament must be verified by the
African Union before rebel groups undertake their own disarmament and
demobilization. Demilitarized zones are to be established around IDP
camps and humanitarian assistance corridors, into which rebel forces
and the Sudanese military cannot enter, and buffer zones are to be
established in the areas of the most intense conflict. Rebel group
forces will be integrated into the Sudanese military and police: 4,000
former combatants will be integrated into the armed forces; 1,000
former combatants will be integrated into the police; and 3,000 will be
supported through education and training programs.
The UN estimates that displaced and affected persons are located in
more than 300 locations, including camps and other gatherings, with
populations up to 90,000 people. Figure 4 shows the camp dispersion and
estimated population at many of the camps throughout Darfur, as of
October 2005.
Figure 4: Darfur IDP Camps Dispersion and Estimated Affected
Population, October 2005:
[See PDF for image] - graphic text:
Source: GAO from UN OCHA.
Attribution: Map provided courtesy of the Humanitarian Information
Centre Darfur, United Nations Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs.
Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on
this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United
Nations. Locality boundaries are not complete for South Darfur.
Affected population numbers are based on the October Humanitarian Needs
Profile (HNP). For more information, please refer to the October HNP
published by the OCHA Darfur Cell (located in UNDP compound Khartoum).
Printing date February 09, 2006.
[End of figure] - graphic text:
African Union Mission in Sudan:
Since 2004, the African Union has been responsible for peace support
operations in Darfur through AMIS.[Footnote 15] Subsequent to its
establishment of an African Union observer mission in Darfur in May
2004,[Footnote 16] the African Union Peace and Security Council
established a specific mandate for AMIS in October 2004 (see app. III
for a discussion of the evolution of AMIS).[Footnote 17] AMIS's mandate
has three components:
* To monitor and observe compliance with the April 2004 humanitarian
cease-fire agreement and all such agreements in the future;
* To assist in the process of confidence building; and:
* To contribute to a secure environment for the delivery of
humanitarian relief and, beyond that, the return of IDPs and refugees
to their homes, in order to assist in increasing the level of
compliance of all parties with the April 2004 cease-fire agreement and
to contribute to the improvement of the security situation throughout
Darfur.
Regarding the first component of the mandate, per the terms of the
cease-fire agreement, related agreements, and African Union Peace and
Security Council guidance, military observers were to investigate and
report on allegations of ceasefire violations, with a protection force
presence as needed. Final investigation reports, prepared by the
Ceasefire Commission headquartered in El Fasher, Darfur, were to be
submitted to the Joint Commission. The Joint Commission was mandated to
make consensus-based decisions on matters brought before it by the
Ceasefire Commission. According to a senior African Union official, the
Joint Commission was to submit Ceasefire Commission reports to African
Union headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, for appropriate action.
(Fig. 5 illustrates the established process for investigating, and
reporting on, cease-fire agreement violations.)
Figure 5: Process for Monitoring Cease-fire Agreement Compliance:
[See PDF for image] - graphic text:
Source: The 2004 Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement and related
modalities agreement, Ceasefire Commission reports, and State and
African Union officials.
[End of figure] - graphic text:
The council determined that AMIS would, in the framework of its
mandate, "protect civilians whom it encounters under imminent threat
and in the immediate vicinity, within resources and capability, it
being understood that the protection of the civilian population is the
responsibility of the government of Sudan."[Footnote 18] The council
also determined that AMIS would have, in addition to military observers
and protection force troops, civilian police, to monitor the actions of
Sudanese police and interact with IDPs and civilians, as well as
appropriate civilian personnel. The AMIS force authorized and deployed
in Darfur to execute its mandate has grown incrementally over time from
several hundred personnel in 2004 to 7,271 personnel (military
observers, protection force troops, and civilian police) deployed as of
April 30, 2006. Numerous studies by the African Union, the UN, and
others reviewing the performance of AMIS have been conducted that
discuss the operations of this effort undertaken by the newly created
African Union (see the bibliography for a listing of these reviews).
The May 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement establishes several new
responsibilities for AMIS, such as verifying the eventual disarmament
of the Janjaweed by the Sudanese government. The 2006 agreement also
designates AMIS as responsible for actions such as designing and
running awareness programs in Darfur to ensure that local communities
and others understand, among other things, the AMIS mandate; patrolling
and monitoring demilitarized zones around IDP camps; patrolling buffer
zones established in areas of the most intense conflict; and developing
and monitoring implementation of a plan for the regulation of nomadic
migration along historic migration routes.
U.S. and UN Policy Responses to the Darfur Conflict:
The U.S. government has been active in addressing the Darfur
conflict.[Footnote 19] After the conflict began, senior State officials
traveled to Sudan on a half-dozen occasions, stressing the need to end
the violence. On July 22, 2004, the U.S. House and the Senate each
passed separate resolutions citing events in Darfur as acts of
genocide.[Footnote 20] Further, on September 9, 2004, in testimony
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the U.S. Secretary of
State announced that "genocide" had been committed in Darfur, and noted
that the Sudanese government had supported the Janjaweed, directly and
indirectly, as they carried out a "scorched earth" policy toward the
rebels and the African civilian population in Darfur.[Footnote 21] In a
press release the same day, President Bush stated that genocide was
occurring and requested the UN to investigate events in Darfur, as the
Secretary of State had also done. On October 13, 2006, President Bush
signed into law the Darfur Peace and Accountability Act of 2006, which
imposes sanctions against persons responsible for genocide, war crimes,
and crimes against humanity; supports measures for the protection of
civilians and humanitarian operations; and supports peace efforts in
Darfur.
Although the UN has not identified the events in Darfur as genocide, it
has repeatedly expressed concern over the continuing violence. In July
2004, the UN, with the government of Sudan, issued a communiqué
emphasizing a commitment to facilitating humanitarian assistance to the
region and establishing a commitment by the Sudanese government to
disarm the Janjaweed. In September 2004, the UN Security Council
adopted a resolution stating that the UN Secretary-General should
"rapidly establish an international commission of inquiry in order
immediately to investigate reports of violations of international
humanitarian law and human rights law in Darfur by all parties, to
determine also whether or not acts of genocide have occurred, and to
identify the perpetrators of such violations with a view to ensuring
that those responsible are held accountable."[Footnote 22] In January
2005, the UN issued a report stating that "the Government of Sudan and
the Janjaweed are responsible for serious violations of international
human rights and humanitarian law amounting to crimes under
international law."[Footnote 23] The report concluded that a policy of
genocide had not been pursued but noted that "the crimes against
humanity and war crimes that have been committed in Darfur may be no
less serious and heinous than genocide."
The UN Security Council has also adopted resolutions establishing a
travel ban and asset freeze for those determined to impede the peace
process or violate human rights[Footnote 24] and referring the
situation in Darfur to the prosecutor of the International Criminal
Court and calling on the government of Sudan and all other parties to
the conflict to cooperate with the court.[Footnote 25] Further, in
creating UNMIS to support implementation of the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement, the council requested the UN Secretary-General to report to
the council on options for the mission to reinforce the effort to
foster peace in Darfur through appropriate assistance to AMIS.
International Response to Darfur Humanitarian Crisis:
Large-scale international humanitarian response to the displacement in
Darfur did not begin until fiscal year 2004. In October 2003, USAID's
Office of Food for Peace began to contribute food aid to the UN World
Food Program for distribution in Darfur and USAID set an internal goal
of meeting at least 50 percent of Sudan's food aid needs as assessed by
the World Food Program. In addition, USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster
Assistance established a Disaster Assistance Response Team in Darfur to
respond to the humanitarian needs of the population affected by the
conflict once the cease-fire agreement was signed. The United States
was the largest donor of humanitarian assistance for Darfur in fiscal
years 2004 to 2006, providing approximately 47 percent of all
humanitarian assistance to the region (the UN has reported $1.9 billion
in total pledges and obligations of assistance from all
donors).[Footnote 26] The European Union and the United Kingdom
provided the largest amounts of assistance pledged or obligated by
other international donors. Figure 6 shows the percentages of total
humanitarian assistance pledged or obligated for Darfur by
international donors.
Figure 6: Total Humanitarian Assistance Pledged or Obligated for Darfur
by International Donors, as of June 1, 2006:
[See PDF for image] - graphic text:
Source: GAO analysis of UN Resource Tracking Service data.
[End of figure] - graphic text:
United States Primarily Contributed Food Aid; Meanwhile, Assistance
Provision Grew and Other Conditions Improved:
In fiscal years 2004 through 2006, the United States provided almost $1
billion for food and other humanitarian aid in Darfur. More than 68
percent of the U.S. obligations as of September 30, 2006, supplied food
aid in the form of commodities provided to the UN World Food Program
and the International Committee of the Red Cross. In addition, the
United States provided assistance to meet a range of nonfood needs,
such as health care and water. During this period, humanitarian access
and coverage for IDPs and affected residents of Darfur improved
significantly. In addition, IDP malnutrition and mortality rates
decreased over time, a trend that U.S., UN, and other officials
attribute in part to humanitarian assistance.
United States Provided Nearly $1 Billion in Assistance, Partly through
Supplemental Appropriations:
U.S. obligations for food and other humanitarian aid in Darfur totaled
approximately $996 million in fiscal years 2004 through 2006 (see fig.
7). From 2004 to 2005, obligations for food and nonfood assistance
increased from about $186 million to $444 million, or by 58 percent. In
fiscal year 2006, obligations decreased to about $366 million, or by 18
percent. Funds provided in supplemental appropriations accounted for
about $71 million--16 percent of the total--in 2005[Footnote 27] and
$205 million--56 percent of the total--in 2006.[Footnote 28]
Figure 7: U.S. Obligations for Food and Nonfood Humanitarian Assistance
to Darfur by Fiscal Year, Including Supplemental Appropriations:
[See PDF for image] - graphic text:
Source: GAO analysis of USAID and State data.
[End of figure] - graphic text:
U.S. Assistance Focused on Food Aid:
For fiscal years 2004 through 2006, USAID provided $681 million (over
68 percent) as food aid for Darfur--approximately $113 million in 2004,
$324 million in 2005, and $243 million in 2006 (see table 1).
Table 1: U.S. Food Aid to Darfur in Metric Tons (MT) and Millions of
Dollars in Fiscal Years 2004-2006:
Dollars in millions.
Aid provided to: UN World Food Program;
2004[A]: MT: 118,400;
2004[A]: Dollar amount: $112.9;
2005[B]: MT: 369,170;
2005[B]: Dollar amount: $318.2;
2006: MT: 308,140;
2006: Dollar amount: $227.4;
Total: MT: 795,710;
Total: Dollar amount: $658.5.
Aid provided to: International Committee of the Red Cross;
2004[A]: MT: 0;
2004[A]: Dollar amount: $0;
2005[B]: MT: 7,710;
2005[B]: Dollar amount: $6.3;
2006: MT: 19,770;
2006: Dollar amount: $16.5;
Total: MT: 27,480;
Total: Dollar amount: $22.8.
Total;
2004[A]: MT: 118,400;
2004[A]: Dollar amount: $112.9;
2005[B]: MT: 376,880;
2005[B]: Dollar amount: $324.5;
2006: MT: 327,910;
2006: Dollar amount: $243.9;
Total: MT: 823,190;
Total: Dollar amount: $681.3.
Source: USAID Food For Peace.
[A] Includes commodities and funds approved for non-Darfur programs but
transferred to Darfur at the beginning of the crisis in 2003. USAID did
not transfer funds to the International Committee of the Red Cross in
2004.
[B] Includes Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust contribution of 200,000 MT
valued at $172 million. Fiscal years 2004 and 2006 did not include such
contributions.
Note: The dollar amount of the food aid includes the cost of the
commodities; ocean and air freight; and internal transport, storage,
and handling.
[End of table]
As table 1 shows, after rising from fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year
2005, U.S. food aid funding for Darfur decreased from fiscal year 2005
to fiscal year 2006 by approximately 25 percent and the quantity of
food provided decreased by almost 13 percent.[Footnote 29] The UN World
Food Program planned assistance to Sudan also fell by more than 16
percent between calendar years 2005 and 2006,[Footnote 30] while the
food aid component of planned assistance decreased by 29
percent.[Footnote 31] According to World Food Program and USAID
officials, in fiscal years 2005 and 2006, USAID supplied at least half
of the 2005 and 2006 food aid assistance requested for Sudan by the UN
World Food Program. A World Food Program official in Washington, D.C.,
stated that the U.S. government provided essential food aid
contributions in fiscal year 2006 and that the reduction in the level
of U.S. funding did not negatively impact the food situation in Darfur.
USAID Food for Peace obligated aid for Darfur for fiscal years 2004
through 2006, primarily for commodities intended to meet minimum
nutritional requirements, to the UN World Food Program and the
International Committee of the Red Cross.
* Obligations to the UN World Food Program. As table 1 shows, USAID
Food for Peace obligated $658.6 million for commodities, including
transportation and other shipping costs, to the World Food Program to
address emergency food needs in Darfur in fiscal years 2004 through
2006.[Footnote 32] According to a USAID official, this assistance
included commodities previously allocated for assistance to southern
Sudan, which Food for Peace and the World Food Program reallocated to
respond to the emergency situation in Darfur before the official
emergency program began. World Food Program officials said that U.S.
food aid funding allowed the program to preposition food in various
storage facilities in Darfur, enabling the program to avoid costly air
drops. World Food Program officials indicated that prepositioning food
helps avoid shortfalls during rainy seasons resulting from the typical
6-month time lag between confirmation and distribution of food aid
donations.
* Obligations to the Red Cross. USAID Food for Peace obligated $22.8
million for commodities to the International Committee of the Red
Cross. This assistance was intended particularly for rural village
residents who had not been displaced by the ongoing conflict and whose
needs had not been addressed by other agencies in the region.
During our field work in Darfur, we visited World Food Program
warehouses outside Nyala, in South Darfur, built to expedite the
distribution of food aid during the rainy season; we observed local
staff repackaging U.S. wheat from bags that were damaged in transit to
the storage facility in Nyala (see fig. 8).
Figure 8: U.S. Commodities at a World Food Program Storage Facility in
South Darfur:
[See PDF for image] - graphic text:
Source: GAO.
[End of figure] - graphic text:
Additionally, we witnessed NGOs distributing rations in Zam Zam IDP
camp (although the funds and commodities are transferred to the UN
World Food Program, NGOs operating in Darfur distribute the rations in
IDP camps), where U.S.-provided sorghum, vegetable oil, lentils, and
wheat were distributed as part of the monthly rations (see fig. 9).
Figure 9: Food Distribution in Zam Zam IDP Camp in North Darfur:
[See PDF for image] - graphic text:
Source: GAO.
[End of figure] - graphic text:
U.S. Assistance Addressed Range of Other Needs:
In addition to providing food aid, as of September 30, 2006, the United
States had obligated approximately $315 million for other humanitarian
assistance in a range of sectors, including shelter, water and
sanitation, health care, and nutrition. This assistance was provided
through USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and Office of
Transition Initiatives as well as State's Bureau of Population,
Refugees and Migration.[Footnote 33] The U.S. government has provided
nonfood assistance to the affected residents of Darfur through 31 NGOs
and 10 UN agencies, which implement programs and activities to aid the
people of Darfur (see app. IV for a list of NGOs and UN agencies that
received U.S. nonfood assistance funding for fiscal years 2004 to
2006). Of this assistance, the largest amounts have been obligated for
health care, water and sanitation, logistics, protection, and food
security/agriculture (see fig. 10).[Footnote 34]
Figure 10: U.S. Nonfood Humanitarian Assistance to Darfur in Fiscal
Years 2004-2006 by Sector:
[See PDF for image] - graphic text:
Source: GAO analysis of data from USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster
Assistance, USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives, and State's
Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration.
Note: "Other sectors" includes information management, rehabilitation,
capacity building, monitoring/evaluation, staff salaries, stockpiles,
travel, and disaster assistance programs.
[End of figure] - graphic text:
Health. The United States obligated $57.4 million for the health
sector, supporting activities such as medical clinics, immunizations,
and maternal health care. We visited five NGO-operated health clinics
in Darfur IDP camps. These clinics, which served between 110 to 1,200
IDPs per day, provided basic medical examinations, referring serious
illnesses to Sudanese hospitals. The clinics also provided
vaccinations, reproductive health services for pregnant women, and
medical services for victims of gender-based violence (see fig. 11).
Figure 11: Health Clinic in Al Salaam IDP Camp in North Darfur:
[See PDF for image] - graphic text:
Source: GAO.
[End of figure] - graphic text:
Water and sanitation. The United States provided about $53.5 million
for water and sanitation activities, which consisted of building and
rehabilitating wells, installing hand pumps and latrines, and
conducting hygiene programs. According to NGO officials, the Kalma camp
water facilities we visited served approximately 45,000 IDPs and
dispensed approximately 18 liters of chlorinated water per person per
day (above the Sphere standard of 15 liters)[Footnote 35] to provide
for IDPs' personal needs and to allow them to water their animals.
According to NGO officials, in Abu Shouk camp, a water tank and hand
pumps provided 13.5 liters of water per person per day (see fig. 12).
Figure 12: Water Pump in Abu Shouk IDP Camp in North Darfur:
[See PDF for image] - graphic text:
Source: GAO.
[End of figure] - graphic text:
Protection and income-generation activities. The United States provided
about $28.6 million for protection activities and $9.1 million for
income-generation activities, which USAID and NGO officials indicated
helped protect women and girls by minimizing their exposure to
violence. We observed women building fuel-efficient stoves, which, by
requiring less wood, are intended to reduce the frequency of women's
wood-collecting forays outside the camp and, thus, their vulnerability
to attacks (see fig. 13). We also observed IDPs preparing goods that
could be sold--including making baskets and other goods, preparing
fresh pasta, and sewing garments--to provide sources of income that
would reduce their need to go outside the camps to earn money. Literacy
and educational training was also provided to IDPs in camps in
conjunction with income-generation and protection activities.
Figure 13: Income Generation and Protection Activities in Various IDP
Camps:
[See PDF for image] - graphic text:
Source: GAO.
[End of figure] - graphic text:
Provision of Assistance Grew and Health Indicators Improved, but Risk
Remains:
Since fiscal year 2004, when the United States and other international
donors began providing humanitarian assistance, the numbers of
humanitarian organizations and staff have grown, and the amount of
humanitarian assistance and the coverage for IDPs and affected
residents have increased. Also, since 2004, malnutrition and mortality
rates among IDPs and affected residents have diminished.
* Increased presence of humanitarian organizations. According to UN and
NGO officials, U.S. assistance contributed to growth in the number of
humanitarian organizations and staff in Darfur. UN humanitarian
profiles show that from April 2004 to July 2006, the number of
international and national humanitarian aid workers in Darfur expanded
from 202 to about 13,500 staff of 84 NGOs and 13 UN agencies.[Footnote
36] NGO and UN officials in Darfur indicated that the U.S. contribution
was essential to their operations, in some cases making up the totality
of their budget, and that they would be unable to provide services
inside and outside the camps without U.S. funding.
* Increase coverage for affected residents and IDPs. Each aid sector in
Darfur provided humanitarian assistance to increasing numbers of
affected residents or IDPs between April 2004 and July 2006 (see fig.
14). The total affected population receiving assistance such as food,
water, and health care increased, although substantial numbers of
affected persons did not receive assistance, especially in inaccessible
areas, owing to continued security concerns. In addition, after August
2005, the percentage of the targeted population receiving such
assistance began to decrease, according to the UN, as continued
conflict and insecurity in Darfur limited access to, and distribution
of, humanitarian aid.
Figure 14: Affected Population Compared with Recipients of Humanitarian
Assistance, April 2004-July 2006:
[See PDF for image] - graphic text:
Source: GAO analysis of UN humanitarian profiles.
[End of figure] - graphic text:
NGOs and UN agencies reported that assistance provided only to IDPs
also expanded.[Footnote 37] For example, the number of IDPs receiving
sanitation assistance increased more than sixtyfold, from about 21,000
IDPs in April 2004 to more than 1.4 million IDPs in July 2006.
* Reduced malnutrition and mortality rates. Since 2004, malnutrition
rates recorded in Darfur have decreased significantly. A UN World Food
Program survey in Darfur showed that malnutrition rates were
significantly lower in 2005 than in 2004. In addition, although
nutrition among IDPs in Darfur remains precarious, UN nutritional
reports show improvement since 2004 and attribute the improvement
partly to external assistance and large-scale food aid. According to UN
Emergency Food Security and Nutrition Assessments, the prevalence of
global acute malnutrition in Darfur was reported at 11.9 percent in
March of 2006, a significant decrease from the 21.8 percent reported in
October 2004.[Footnote 38]
Furthermore, several mortality surveys have concluded that mortality
rates in Darfur decreased from 2004 to 2005. For example, surveys
conducted by the World Health Organization and Médecins Sans Frontières
(also known as Doctors Without Borders) reported mortality rates
ranging between 1.5 to 9.5 deaths per 10,000 people per day in 2004. In
September 2005, the UN World Food Program reported that the crude
mortality rate in Darfur had dropped below the emergency threshold of 1
death per 10,000 persons per day, as defined by Sphere.[Footnote 39]
Humanitarian assistance provided for Darfur by the United States and
other international donors has been cited as contributing to improved
mortality rates in Darfur. Experts and NGO, UN, and U.S. officials
noted that other factors, such as reduced violence, can also contribute
to a decrease in mortality rates.
Despite the efforts of the humanitarian organizations to increase the
numbers of people receiving humanitarian assistance, as well as provide
assistance to help reduce malnutrition and mortality rates, the
situation in Darfur remains precarious. Continued insecurity restricts
humanitarian organizations' access to IDPs and affected residents of
Darfur. In addition, NGO and UN officials indicated that mortality and
malnutrition rates would likely rise above emergency levels if
necessary funding were not continued.
Numerous Challenges Have Hampered U.S. Assistance Efforts and
Oversight:
Since the beginning of the humanitarian crisis in Darfur, entities
delivering U.S. humanitarian assistance to affected residents and IDPs
have faced numerous challenges. Continued insecurity in the region has
limited the ability of NGOs and UN agencies to access parts of Darfur
and reach all affected residents and IDPs. In addition, the Sudanese
government and rebel groups have placed restrictions and requirements
on NGOs that have severely limited the NGO staffs' ability to travel to
and in Darfur and to provide services to affected residents and IDPs.
Further, the late timing of U.S. funding in 2006 initially limited the
operations of NGOs and UN agencies and threatened to force some
reduction in services in Darfur. Meanwhile, the large size of Darfur
and the large quantity of U.S. humanitarian assistance have challenged
USAID's ability to ensure accountability for the assistance provided.
In addition, targeting of humanitarian assistance for IDPs is
complicated by the difficulty of counting and managing the numbers of
people who receive assistance and their use of the goods provided.
Insecurity in Darfur Has Limited Mobility and Access of Humanitarian
Staff:
The frequent violence and continued conflict within all three Darfur
states have negatively impacted the ability of NGOs and UN agencies to
provide humanitarian assistance within Darfur. Attacks on, and
harassment of, humanitarian staff, as well as banditry and theft of
humanitarian convoys, have increased throughout Darfur since the
beginning of the humanitarian response; and according to the UN,
violence, sexual abuse, and displacement have dramatically increased
since May 2006.
NGO, UN, and U.S. personnel have been injured, abducted, and killed in
attacks against the humanitarian community, and humanitarian staff have
regularly reported harassment from Sudanese government officials.
According to UN and USAID reports, UN and NGO humanitarian staff were
attacked and harassed with increasing frequency in 2005, and NGO staff
members were attacked and abducted. In several instances, drivers and
other humanitarian staff were abducted or killed during attacks on
humanitarian aid convoys. USAID reported more than 200 incidents of
harassment, arrest, or attack against UN, NGO, or AMIS personnel in
2005. USAID and the UN also reported that increasing violence had
resulted in the deaths of nine humanitarian staff in July 2006--more
than the number of staff killed in the past 2 years. Further, in August
2006, the UN reported that attacks against humanitarian staff were at a
record high.
In addition, banditry and looting of NGO convoys occur with regularity,
according to UN and USAID reports. USAID reported and some UN officials
confirmed the theft of vehicles, cash, food, and other humanitarian
aid. However, many NGO and UN officials told us that the banditry has
mainly resulted in the theft of communications equipment and cash,
rather than the humanitarian aid in the convoy. A World Food Program
official estimated that less than 1 percent of total food aid in Darfur
was lost to banditry, but that the incidents typically resulted in the
theft of petty cash, fuel, or the trucks carrying the World Food
Program supplies.
Furthermore, humanitarian access to affected residents and IDPs has
been curtailed as a result of continued conflict, especially in rural
areas. USAID, NGO, and UN officials in Darfur stated that the lack of
security has forced humanitarian organizations to limit access to
insecure areas. For example, in response to continued attacks and
insecurity in West Darfur, in January 2006, the UN Department of
Security and Safety announced the withdrawal of UN staff from most of
West Darfur for 2 months, and USAID also removed its staff from West
Darfur. (Although UN access was restricted, some NGOs did not evacuate
the area and were able to continue operations.) According to USAID, the
situation dramatically curtailed the ability of organizations to access
the affected residents and IDP population in the area and to implement
life-saving programs in West Darfur. Additionally, the UN reported
that, as a result of significant insecurity in North Darfur,
approximately 460,000 Darfurians were cut off from emergency food aid
in July 2006, and in August 2006, 355,000 Darfurians remained blocked
from receiving food aid. According to the UN, as of August 2006,
humanitarian aid organizations' access to IDPs and affected residents
in Darfur was at its lowest levels since 2003, and areas of
inaccessibility were expanding. Meanwhile, an estimated 50,000 people
were displaced between June and August 2006.
Sudan Government and Rebel Groups Have Restricted NGO and UN Staff
Movements:
The government of Sudan and, to a lesser extent, the rebel groups have
hindered the humanitarian community from accessing affected residents
and IDPs in Darfur. According to UN and NGO officials and USAID, as
well as UN reports, the government of Sudan has restricted access to
Darfur for NGOs and UN agencies since the initial international
humanitarian response by delaying or denying visas and travel permits.
NGO officials noted that issuance of visas for staff is often delayed
or denied without explanation. In addition, according to NGO officials,
although the government of Sudan requires NGO officials to purchase
travel permits for all travel within Darfur, government police and
other authorities do not always accept the permits and often deny
access to NGO staff. According to USAID officials, in September 2006,
the government of Sudan restricted movement of U.S. government
personnel to within 25 miles of the presidential palace in Khartoum,
which has forced USAID to remove all personnel from Darfur. This travel
ban remained in place as of October 20, 2006. Rebel groups also place
requirements on NGOs that delay transportation of humanitarian aid or
services into rebel-controlled areas. For example, NGO and UN officials
stated that they must contact numerous rebel leaders to safely
transport humanitarian aid into a rebel-controlled area.
Sudanese government officials in Darfur deny NGO and UN officials
allegations that the government restricts access and travel in Darfur
and insist that the government attempts to help NGOs and UN agencies
provide assistance to the people of Darfur. However, USAID, NGO and UN
officials indicated that although the Sudanese government has an
official policy of cooperation with humanitarian assistance in Darfur,
the government's actions have severely limited humanitarian assistance
within the region.
Timing of 2006 U.S. Funding Impacted Humanitarian Operations in Darfur:
Delayed provision of more than half of U.S. humanitarian aid for 2006
limited NGO and UN agency partners' ability to supply needed food
assistance and negatively affected their ability to plan for nonfood
assistance. The initial U.S. appropriation for fiscal year 2006
supplied approximately 44 percent of the total U.S. humanitarian aid
funding for Darfur in fiscal year 2006. With the passage of the
supplemental appropriation on June 15, 2006--9 months into the fiscal
year--total U.S. food and nonfood assistance for 2006 reached the
intended levels, including meeting at least half of the World Food
Program's appeal for Sudan. However, because NGOs and UN agencies in
Darfur did not receive the funds until late in the fiscal year, they
were forced to reduce food rations and temporarily interrupt some
humanitarian aid services.
* Impact on food assistance. The provision of approximately 56 percent
of 2006 U.S. food aid funding late in the fiscal year made it difficult
for the UN World Food Program to distribute supplies throughout Darfur
in a timely fashion. In particular, because of the 6-month lag between
confirmation and distribution of donations, the delay made it difficult
for the program to preposition food prior to the rainy season,
according to a World Food Program official. Owing in part to this
delay, the program announced in April 2006 that, beginning in May, it
would reduce rations in Darfur to half the minimum daily requirement
(from 2,100 calories to as few as 1,050 calories per day) to extend
limited food stocks. In response, the Sudanese government donated
sorghum, and the President of the United States directed USAID to ship
emergency food stockpiles to Darfur, raising the rations to 84 percent
(1,770 kilocalories) of the daily requirement for Darfurians receiving
food aid. In June, the cereal component of the ration was fully
restored. However, as of October 2006, the World Food Program continued
to face gaps in food aid, and, according to program officials, it
planned to maintain the 84 percent ration through the end of the
calendar year.
According to a World Food Program official in Khartoum, if the current
level of funding had been available earlier in the year, the ration
cuts could have been avoided entirely. A USAID official told us that,
although the reduction in 2006 U.S. funding did not significantly
decrease the food aid contribution for Darfur, the delay of $137
million (56 percent) of the 2006 U.S. food aid funding until late in
the fiscal year negatively affected the food situation in Darfur
earlier in the year. This outcome aligns with previous GAO findings
that lack of sufficient, timely donations contributed to food aid
shortfalls in other emergency situations.[Footnote 40]
* Impact on nonfood assistance. The delay of U.S. nonfood humanitarian
assistance, as well as a reduction in funding from other international
donors, led NGO and UN officials to anticipate a negative impact on
nonfood humanitarian operations in Darfur. In February 2006, these
officials told us that the initial U.S. funding for the year had been
less than planned for and needed to ensure continued levels of
assistance to Darfur's affected residents and IDPs. As a result of the
funding delays, the NGO officials said, their organizations would be
forced to make cuts in the services and programs they provided or to
reduce their humanitarian aid staff in Darfur. For example, one NGO
official indicated that the reduction in funding had forced the
organization to downsize its health program and to transfer
responsibility for the clinics to the Sudanese government. Several NGO
and UN officials also indicated that without additional funds, key
indicators such as the malnutrition and mortality rates, which had
improved in 2005, would likely rise again above emergency levels. USAID
officials told us in October 2006 that after receiving the supplemental
funding, USAID's partners had been able to restore humanitarian
programs in Darfur to their previous levels and coverage.
Oversight of Assistance Was Limited by Reduced Staff and Incomplete
Reporting:
USAID's ability to provide oversight and measure the impact of U.S.
humanitarian assistance in Darfur has been limited by reductions in its
staff who could directly monitor U.S. assistance or ensure that
implementing partners fulfilled reporting requirements.
From April 2004 to July 2006, as NGO and UN humanitarian staff in
Darfur significantly increased--from 202 to 13,500--USAID's staff in
Darfur decreased. During the first 2 years of the conflict, USAID staff
ranged between 10 and 20 personnel; within the last 9 months, that
number has been reduced to 6 to 8 USAID personnel. USAID officials
believe that the remaining number of USAID personnel is adequate to
oversee the implementation of U.S. humanitarian assistance and USAID
grant agreements, among other responsibilities.[Footnote 41] USAID
officials indicated that other, external factors, such as UN and U.S.
Embassy security requirements and restrictions imposed by the
government of Sudan, limit the number of staff in Darfur. In addition,
USAID officials indicated that they visited camps and communicated with
NGO and UN agency officials regularly to discuss operations and
difficulties and to assist in delivering humanitarian assistance.
However, USAID officials told us that owing to limited time and staff
in Darfur, security restrictions throughout the region, the size of
Darfur, and the scale of U.S. assistance provided, they could not
monitor compliance with all of the grant agreement indicators at
locations in Darfur that were targeted for assistance.
Furthermore, required NGO reporting has been incomplete. As a result,
USAID lacks information to evaluate NGO operations, monitor their
performance, and measure the impact of the assistance
provided.[Footnote 42] According to USAID's Office of U.S. Foreign
Disaster Assistance Guidelines for Proposals and Reporting, NGOs must
submit proposals outlining the indicators and outcomes expected from
the humanitarian activities and services provided for with U.S. funds.
Each grant agreement also specifies that 90 days after the agreement's
expiration, the NGO must submit a final report that includes the
cumulative achievements and a comparison of actual accomplishments
against the goals, objectives, indicators, and targets established for
the agreement. Examples of indicators used by NGOs in proposals
include, for example, the crude mortality rate in the target population
or the number of latrines constructed. However, we found that 6 of 15
final reports that NGOs were required to submit by June 1, 2006, had
not been submitted to USAID. Moreover, most of the reports that NGOs
submitted did not include all required information.
USAID's Darfur Program Manager stated that because officials maintain
constant communication with NGOs and conduct evaluations of activities
in Darfur, the agency is aware of implementing partners'
accomplishments, or lack thereof, in Darfur, despite the incompleteness
of most NGO reports. However, the reports and indicators are essential
in monitoring and evaluating humanitarian operations, given that USAID
staff are often constrained by limited access due to insecurity and
violence throughout Darfur. In response to our observations USAID
acknowledged the importance of obtaining required reports and has taken
efforts to ensure reporting compliance from its NGO partners. As a
result, USAID reported that in July 2006 it received all quarterly
reports from current NGO partners.
Difficulties Existed in Ensuring that U.S. Assistance Was Used as
Intended:
Challenges in accurately counting the populations of IDP camps have
made it difficult for NGOs and UN agencies to ensure that all U.S.
humanitarian assistance was provided to the intended recipients. In
addition, some IDPs used humanitarian assistance for purposes other
than those for which it was intended.
* In part because the IDP camps' large size makes it difficult to
control who receives assistance, some assistance has been distributed
to recipients other than those targeted. For example, UN humanitarian
profiles show that between December 2004 and October 2005, IDPs in
Kalma camp, the largest camp in Darfur, were estimated at between
103,000 and 163,000. The World Food Program distributed food aid for
IDPs based on these estimates. Prior to October 2005, several efforts
to count the actual number of IDPs in Kalma camp were determined to be
invalid because of problems with the counts and an inability to stop
non-IDPs from participating. An October 2005 count was completed by
more than 400 staff from six NGOs, with help from USAID staff, and with
assistance from Sudanese government troops--who surrounded the camp to
stop non-IDPs from entering--and AMIS civilian police, who provided
security inside the camp. On October 4, 2005, a count of 87,000 was
declared accurate, approximately 70,000 IDPs less than the previous
estimate. According to a USAID official, residents from the nearby
state capital of Nyala had previously received improper food
distributions at the camp. According to USAID, without accurate counts
of camp populations, the humanitarian community struggles to distribute
food aid appropriately to the populations with the greatest need.
* Not all resources and assistance are being used as intended, although
USAID and NGO officials indicated that this is typical of any emergency
situation, especially one of this size and duration. For example, in
Abu Shouk camp, we observed IDPs using treated drinking water to make
bricks, either for their own shelters or for sale on the market.
According to a UN official, IDPs in the camp used approximately 30
percent of available water in the camp to make bricks and, as a result,
8 of the 30 water pumps in Abu Shouk dried up.
African Union Has Taken Actions to Meet Mandate, but Some Actions Have
Been Incomplete or Inconsistent:
Although the African Union's peace support operation has reportedly
contributed to a reduction of large-scale violence in Darfur, AMIS's
actions to fulfill its mandate in Darfur have been taken in an
incomplete or inconsistent manner. To monitor compliance with the cease-
fire agreement, the first component of its mandate, AMIS military
observers in Darfur have actively investigated alleged cease-fire
agreement violations. However, the resulting reports have not been
reviewed according to established procedure or widely publicized to
identify parties who have violated the agreement. To build confidence
and to improve security, the second and third components of its
mandate, AMIS troops have taken actions such as conducting patrols and
escorting IDP women who leave camps to forage for firewood. In
addition, AMIS troops have intervened to stop impending violence
against civilians and provided escorts for NGO convoys in some
instances, although AMIS has not intervened in other instances.
Further, the AMIS civilian police are working with Sudanese police to
improve law enforcement, but the civilian police have encountered
difficulties with the Sudanese authorities. To support AMIS's efforts
to meet its mandate, the U.S. government provided about $280 million
from June 2004 through September 2006, according to State, primarily to
build and maintain the 32 camps that house AMIS forces throughout
Darfur.
AMIS Is Seen as Having Made Important Contribution:
AMIS is viewed by many as having made an important contribution in
Darfur. U.S. and other officials cite AMIS as responsible for
decreasing large-scale violence simply by the deterrent effect of its
presence in the region. State officials have emphasized that AMIS
participants have a strong desire to be effective and make the AMIS
initiative work and that the presence of AMIS's patrols has had a
positive impact. Further, a senior UN official told us that AMIS
"jumped into Darfur" with few resources in a genuine attempt to "put
out this fire" and that AMIS's presence has had a notable impact.
Further, State and UN officials noted that AMIS forces were deployed to
Darfur quickly in comparison with other international peacekeeping
missions.
AMIS Has Taken Actions to Meet Mandate, but Some actions Have Been
Incomplete or Inconsistent:
AMIS has taken a number of positive actions in Darfur in response to
its mandate to (1) monitor compliance with the cease-fire agreement,
(2) assist in confidence building, and (3) contribute to improving
security.[Footnote 43] However, some of these actions have been
executed in an incomplete or inconsistent manner, limiting the extent
to which AMIS has been able to fulfill its mandate.
AMIS Has Monitored Cease-fire Compliance, but Monitoring Has Been
Incomplete:
To address the first component of its mandate, AMIS military observers
in Darfur investigated and identified a number of violations of the
2004 cease-fire agreement. However, the Joint Commission has not
consistently reviewed the resulting Ceasefire Commission investigation
reports. Further, the publicly available record of recent cease-fire
violation investigations is incomplete, making it impossible to
establish how many total cease-fire violations have been identified by
the Ceasefire Commission since its creation in 2004 and which parties
have been responsible for recent cease-fire agreement violations.
Ceasefire Commission reports provide specific information regarding
violations.[Footnote 44] The commission found that all three parties to
the conflict had committed violations, many of which occurred in South
Darfur. Of the 80 allegations of cease-fire agreement violations that
we reviewed,[Footnote 45] the Ceasefire Commission was unable to make a
determination in 30 instances, often because an outside party (such as
the Janjaweed) had allegedly committed the violation. These cases
involved acts such as the killing of numerous civilians at a time and
attacks on villages. In several cases, the Sudanese government was
accused of fighting alongside the Janjaweed. In three of the cases we
reviewed, the Ceasefire Commission determined that no violation had
occurred. For the remaining 47 allegations of cease-fire agreement
violations, the Ceasefire Commission found 54 violations.[Footnote 46]
* Sudanese government. The commission found that the Sudanese
government had committed 27 cease-fire agreement violations. Among
these violations, 9 involved civilian deaths; 10 involved village
attacks; 7 involved attacks, harassment, or intimidation of civilians;
and 7 involved Sudanese troop movements into new territory without
proper notification to the Ceasefire Commission.
* SLM/A. The commission found that the SLM/A had committed 25 cease-
fire agreement violations. Among these violations, six involved attacks
on Sudanese facilities (e.g., military camps, police stations,
convoys); seven involved abductions of civilians, local political
representatives, or Sudanese government personnel; two involved village
attacks; and two involved civilian deaths.
* JEM. The commission found that the JEM had committed two cease-fire
agreement violations, both of which involved attacks on Sudanese
facilities.
The Ceasefire Commission's recommendations in the reports vary from
general to specific. General recommendations include urging the parties
to the conflict to adhere to the cease-fire agreement; reminding them
that they are required to give the commission prior notice of any
administrative troop movements; and requesting party leaders to educate
their members about the provisions of the agreement. More specific
recommendations include those recommending that the Sudanese government
disarm, neutralize, or restrain the Janjaweed and that SLM/A stop
looting, or return looted goods, and release those whom it had
abducted. In reports issued after November 2004, the Ceasefire
Commission frequently appealed to the Joint Commission to become more
involved in various aspects of the monitoring process.
However, although the reports provide detailed information regarding
parties that violated the cease-fire agreement and the nature of the
violations, African Union and U.S. officials told us that the Joint
Commission had not met regularly, had been ineffective in reviewing
reports, and had no means of forcing the violating parties to take
action based on report results. Further, although the Joint Commission
has condemned cease-fire violations by the parties to the conflict and
asked all parties to end all attacks, a DOD official noted that
officials at African Union headquarters were not pushing the Joint
Commission to review or approve Ceasefire Commission reports.
African Union and U.S. officials emphasized that because the reports
are available on the African Union's Web site and publicly identify
violators of the cease-fire agreement, the reports pressure the parties
to the conflict to improve compliance with the agreement. The officials
viewed this transparency and resulting pressure as a central benefit of
the reports. However, we found that the public record of investigated
cease-fire violations is incomplete, making it impossible to establish
the total number of alleged or confirmed violations and to identify all
responsible parties. For example, we were unable to open 37 of the 116
Ceasefire Commission reports listed as available on the African Union's
Web site. Further, we were unable to locate any reports subsequent to
September 2005 to validate other claims regarding violations. For
example, no Ceasefire Commission reports are publicly available to
substantiate or refute a January 2006 report, which was prepared by the
Chairperson of the African Union Commission and submitted to the Peace
and Security Council, stating that cease-fire violations had escalated
since October 2005 and that some of the most serious violations had
occurred since that time.[Footnote 47]
Confidence-Building and Security-Improvement Efforts Have Been
Sporadic:
To fulfill the second and third components of the mandate, AMIS forces
have provided patrols and escorts for IDPs, NGOs, and U.S. contractor
staff; intervened to prevent violence; and collaborated with Sudanese
government police. However, in some instances, AMIS patrols and escorts
have not been able to prevent attacks or to provide needed services;
AMIS forces have not intervened consistently to prevent violence; and
AMIS civilian police have had difficult relations with the Sudanese
police.
AMIS Has Provided Patrols and Escorts but Has Not Prevented All Attacks
or Provided All Needed Protection:
To build confidence among affected residents and IDPs and create a more
secure environment, AMIS troops have taken actions such as conducting
patrols and providing escorts for vulnerable groups. However, AMIS
escorts and the escorted groups have sometimes encountered violent
attacks, and AMIS has had insufficient resources to provide all needed
escort services.
* Patrols. AMIS officials at several AMIS camps we visited told us that
AMIS military observers or civilian police try to conduct about two
patrols each day, for example, to make AMIS's presence known and to
interact positively with local communities, collect information, or
investigate an alleged cease-fire agreement violation. We accompanied
one confidence-building patrol near the North Darfur town of Kabkabiya;
AMIS military observers interviewed local residents and a community
leader to identify any problems that required AMIS attention. (See fig.
15.)
Figure 15: AMIS Confidence-Building Patrol Near Kabkabiya in North
Darfur:
[See PDF for image] - graphic text:
Source: GAO.
[End of figure] - graphic text:
* Escorts. To further build confidence and improve security, AMIS
troops have also provided escorts for groups of women foraging for
firewood outside IDP camps. According to African Union and U.S.
officials, the presence of AMIS troops has prevented these groups from
being attacked. We accompanied an AMIS escort of a group of women as
they walked more than 9 miles outside the town of Kass in South Darfur
to find firewood for the next several days. Escorted by AMIS protection
force troops and civilian police, as well as Sudanese government
police, the 79 women went about their activities freely and without
incident (see fig. 16). AMIS officials also told us that they have
escorted NGO convoys to prevent theft and banditry.
Figure 16: AMIS Firewood Patrol Near Kass in South Darfur:
[See PDF for image] - graphic text:
Source: GAO.
[End of figure] - graphic text:
However, in several instances, AMIS troops or those being escorted have
been threatened or killed. For example, several people were killed in
rebel attacks on convoys, including four Nigerian soldiers and two
local contractor staff in October 2005.[Footnote 48] In July 2006, 32
AMIS soldiers escorting a fuel convoy in North Darfur were abducted by
one SLM/A faction; although the soldiers were eventually released, two
fuel tanker drivers, the fuel tankers, and four AMIS vehicles were not
released at that time. According to a senior U.S. contracting official
working in Darfur, the drivers and tankers were released in October
2006, and the vehicles have not been returned. According to a December
2005 African Union-led assessment of AMIS (with participation from the
UN, European Union, and United States), such incidents "undermine the
Mission's credibility in the eyes of civilians and embolden those who
may target AMIS."[Footnote 49] Further, a UN official emphasized that
AMIS's ability to provide services such as firewood escorts is limited
and that AMIS cannot begin to cover all instances where such escorts
would be useful.
AMIS Has Intervened to Prevent Violence in Some Cases but Not in
Others:
AMIS troops have also intervened to protect civilians under imminent
threat of violence, as directed by the African Union mandate. For
example, according to the December 2005 assessment of AMIS, AMIS troops
were deployed to Zalingei in West Darfur to prevent retaliation against
IDPs when there was heightened tension following the kidnapping of
civilians by the SLM/A. Another AMIS deployment to Muhajariya halted a
Sudanese military advance on the town that could have resulted in the
substantial displacement of IDPs. In addition, following attacks on the
town of Labado in South Darfur in late 2004, a deployment of AMIS
troops in January 2005 deterred further attacks and led to the return
of many town residents, who began to repair their homes and rebuild
their lives.[Footnote 50]
However, in other instances, AMIS has not intervened to prevent
violence. For example, according to UN and U.S. documentation, AMIS did
not maintain a regular presence around Mershing and its surroundings in
South Darfur despite concerns about security in the area and repeated
requests from the international community for a continuous AMIS
presence. Ultimately, armed militia attacks resulted in the death of
several IDPs and subsequent displacement in early 2006.[Footnote 51] In
addition, an NGO official told us that AMIS was slow in responding to
requests for assistance from NGOs caught in a battle between SLM/A and
Sudanese government forces in the Jebel Marra area; however, AMIS did
help evacuate NGO staff from the area 24 hours after the conflict
began. According to an AMIS commander, although AMIS has taken
preemptive action to stop attacks or skirmishes, the territory is too
large for AMIS to be able prevent such violence overall.
AMIS Has Collaborated with Sudanese Police, but Relations Have Been
Difficult:
AMIS has worked with the Sudanese police to improve security,[Footnote
52] but some of its relations with the Sudanese police have been
problematic. AMIS civilian police officers reported to us that they
were working to ensure that the Sudanese police are acting on cases
provided by the AMIS civilian police.[Footnote 53] AMIS civilian police
also noted that, where appropriate, they have encouraged the use of
village councils to resolve disputes, rather than referring every case
to the Sudanese authorities.
However, some AMIS civilian police officers reported that relations
with the Sudanese police had at times been difficult. AMIS civilian
police officers told us that Sudanese police had been slow to act on
cases provided by AMIS, that these cases often do not result in
convictions or adequate punishment, and that it can be difficult to
obtain information from the Sudanese police regarding the status of
referred cases. In addition, AMIS civilian police mentioned that
Sudanese police have at times perpetrated violent acts against citizens
of Darfur and AMIS police. Moreover, the civilian police have had
difficulty gaining access to some areas that are controlled by rebel
groups and lack an official Sudanese police presence.
Further, the limited and misunderstood role of AMIS's civilian police
frustrated IDPs and NGO staff, who expressed the view that these police
provided limited useful services. IDPs and NGOs told us that they did
not understand why civilian police did not get involved when problems
arose. Their frustration was heightened by the fact that civilian
police have visible stations adjacent to IDP camps.[Footnote 54] AMIS
and UN officials also noted that because the civilian police are
unarmed, they require AMIS protection force escorts, which are not
always available.
U.S. and Other External Donors Have Supported African Union's Efforts
to Fulfill Its Mandate:
The United States has supported AMIS primarily by funding the
construction and maintenance of AMIS camps in Darfur by a contractor,
PAE Government Services, Inc. (PAE). Other international donors have
provided funding or goods and services to support AMIS's peacekeeping
operations.[Footnote 55]
U.S. Government Has Funded AMIS Camps:
To support AMIS's efforts to carry out its mandate, the U.S. government
expended about $240 million from June 2004 to August 2006 and obligated
another $40 million in September of 2006, primarily to build and
maintain the 32 camps that house AMIS forces throughout Darfur,
according to a State official who tracks this funding.[Footnote 56]
African Union and U.S. officials told us that camp sites were chosen to
be near population centers and known conflict areas. State contracted
with PAE to build and maintain the camps as well as to maintain AMIS
vehicles and communication equipment (see fig. 17).[Footnote 57] PAE is
also maintaining armored personnel carriers provided by Canada; the
Canadian government has provided State with more than $20 million for
fiscal year 2006 for this purpose. Finally, PAE is responsible for
hiring, housing, and compensating U.S. military observers (referred to
by State officials in Darfur as "U.S. representatives" owing to their
range of contributions to AMIS beyond observing activities).[Footnote
58] Although 16 U.S. military observers are authorized, only 11 were on
the ground in Darfur during our February 2006 visit.[Footnote 59]
Figure 17: AMIS Camps:
[See PDF for image] - graphic text:
Sources: GAO (photo), PAE (photos), and MapInfo (map).
[End of figure] - graphic text:
Construction of the 32 camps, between June 2004 and December 2005,
involved a number of challenges. According to a senior PAE official in
Darfur, key costs associated with building the camps included supplying
generators and, particularly as construction was beginning,
transporting supplies and equipment via aircraft. Construction of the
camps, which together can house 9,300 people,[Footnote 60] was
complicated by the difficulty of finding international staff willing to
come to Darfur and local staff possessing adequate skills. In addition,
the remote locations of camp sites, combined with the inadequate
condition of roads throughout the region, made it difficult to
transport building supplies to the sites; PAE officials told us that in
some cases, supplies were transported across insecure areas via
donkeys. Further, the various augmentations of AMIS over time
(including the introduction of the civilian police component) had to be
incorporated into preexisting building plans. Moreover, the relatively
small size of some of the land parcels provided by the government of
Sudan made it difficult for PAE to, for example, construct sufficient
perimeter protection around camps. Other sites provided by the
government are in vulnerable locations; for instance, PAE officials
identified one camp that was built in a natural "bowl," making
protection problematic, although steps were recently taken to relocate
portions of this camp.
According to PAE and State officials, PAE's current costs for
maintaining the camps, as well as AMIS communications equipment and
vehicles, are about $7.8 million per month.[Footnote 61] PAE faces
additional challenges in maintaining AMIS facilities, with the
provision of water a key difficulty. According to a PAE situation
report dated May 5, 2006, there are significant concerns regarding the
provision of an uninterrupted supply of water to several AMIS
camps.[Footnote 62] In some cases, unprotected water bore holes have
been sabotaged. In the past, PAE also experienced the theft of jet
fuel. A PAE official noted that other environmental challenges to
maintaining the camps include heat, ultraviolet rays, and sand.
Other International Donors Have Provided Cash, Goods, and Services:
The European Union, also a key AMIS donor, has provided about $200
million as direct budget support for AMIS operational costs such as per
diem[Footnote 63] and food, according to a State official. Many other
donor contributions have been "in kind"--that is, goods and services
rather than direct funding. For example, the Canadian government loaned
AMIS 25 helicopters and 105 armored personnel carriers; the British
government provided vehicles and ground fuel; the Dutch government
provided communications equipment; and the Norwegian government is
building civilian police stations near IDP camps.[Footnote 64] Further,
since October 2004, the UN has provided assistance to AMIS via a
technical assistance cell working in Addis Ababa and funded by the UN
Mission in Sudan. According to an official in the cell, it has provided
services such as technical support (including an August 2005 UN-led
exercise to prepare AMIS for troop deployments and identify areas where
capacity building was required) and training (such as arranging
training for military observers and bringing a financial officer to
African Union headquarters for 3 months to assist with financial
management). NATO has also provided training for AMIS personnel and has
assisted with troop rotation efforts.[Footnote 65]
Numerous Factors Have Complicated AMIS Efforts:
Numerous factors have been identified by AMIS and U.S. government
officials, among others, as contributing to AMIS's difficulties in
meeting its mandate. These factors include inadequacies in management,
organization, and capacity; a relatively small force; resources that
have been constrained or inefficiently allocated; and a lack of
information regarding, and cooperation from, parties to the
conflict.[Footnote 66] As AMIS has faced operational and other
challenges, the UN has approved a UN peacekeeping operation in Darfur
when AMIS's mandate expires; however, as of October 2006, the Sudanese
government had rejected the proposal. In June 2006, following a NATO
offer, the African Union formally requested assistance from NATO in,
among other things, identifying lessons learned from AMIS operations;
however, according to a State official, African Union headquarters had
taken no further action to pursue this review as of August 2006.
Meanwhile, instability and violence have continued in Darfur.
Inadequacies in Management, Organization, and Capacity Have Hampered
AMIS Deployment:
AMIS has reportedly experienced numerous difficulties in its
management, organization, and capacity that have limited its ability to
carry out its mandate.
Inadequate and Inconsistent Management:
Regarding AMIS management, U.S., UN, and other sources have commonly
expressed the view that AMIS's command and control has been inadequate
and confused.[Footnote 67] A UN-led assessment of AMIS in August 2005
stated, "The evolution of the mission has been such that it has
depended on individual components conducting their own planning rather
than tackling problems from a mission perspective. This has led to
considerable disparity between components, duplication of effort, and
the potential for planning at cross purposes."[Footnote 68] A State
official emphasized that AMIS has had no clear lines of authority
between Addis Ababa, El Fasher, and the field and that a lack of
coordination has made a rapid response to crisis situations
problematic. A Refugees International study reported that "AMIS has
suffered from language and cultural barriers between officers from
various countries, confusion in procedures, limited future planning,
and ineffective communications systems. Much of this stems from lack of
peacekeeping experience."[Footnote 69] The Brookings Institution-
University of Bern study also stated that AMIS command and control had
been slow and cumbersome and that "[t]he unwieldy bureaucracy at
African Union headquarters hampered all aspects of deployment; there is
no institutional expertise for peace operations yet in the [African
Union]."[Footnote 70]
Moreover, AMIS leadership has demonstrated inconsistency in
interpreting the AMIS mandate, creating confusion among AMIS troops and
civilians and limiting its protection of civilians within its
capabilities.[Footnote 71] AMIS leadership's willingness to take
certain actions to meet the mandate--for example, to protect civilians-
-has varied throughout Darfur, as already noted. State officials have
observed that AMIS's willingness to actively protect Darfur residents
to the extent provided for in the mandate has been "uneven." A U.S.
official we met with in Sudan noted that in some cases, the degree to
which AMIS's mandate was robustly interpreted seemed to depend on
leadership personalities.[Footnote 72]
Lack of Coordination:
According to the December 2005 African Union-led assessment of AMIS,
"military and police mission components are not operating in a
sufficiently joint and coordinated manner."[Footnote 73] The Brookings
Institution--University of Bern study noted a similar problem, stating
that the civilian police "rely on the AMIS protection force for their
movements, but they are not currently integrated into military planning
structures."[Footnote 74] Many parties, including U.S. and UN
officials, have called for the creation of a joint operations center
that would serve as the focal point for the coordination and
integration of AMIS military and civilian police operations; however,
such a unit has not yet been created. On the other hand, a joint
logistics operations center has been established to improve the
logistical coordination of the AMIS components.[Footnote 75]
Limited Capacity:
African Union, U.S., and other sources have identified problems with
the capacity and experience of African Union and AMIS as a key factor
negatively affecting AMIS performance. According to the Brookings
Institution-University of Bern study, "For many commanders, this
African Union mission is their first operational experience."[Footnote
76] Troops are also viewed as having limited experience. For example,
according to a Human Rights Watch report, "[African Union] troop-
contributing countries have sometimes struggled to identify and deploy
properly trained staff officers, particularly those with appropriate
language skills—. Most troop-contributing countries have previously
contributed to UN missions that were often western-led operations, thus
leaving the [African Union] troops with limited operational experience
above the tactical level."[Footnote 77] An African Union official and a
U.S. official noted separately that, although AMIS has training
standards, little is done to verify that AMIS troops arriving in Darfur
have received appropriate training. Further, according to the Brookings
Institution-University of Bern study, the quality of AMIS police is not
adequate, with limited screening prior to deployment to
Darfur.[Footnote 78]
Small Size of AMIS Force Has Limited Its Ability to Patrol and Protect:
The AMIS force, with its 7,271 personnel, has been characterized as a
relatively small contingent that cannot effectively monitor and patrol
all of Darfur, an area almost the size of France with a punishing
environment (however, some regions in Darfur, such as the far north,
are largely unpopulated [see fig. 2]).[Footnote 79] According to State
officials, the small size of the force has limited AMIS's ability to
patrol such a large, difficult region and sufficiently interact with
residents and other parties in Darfur. Further, according to a Refugees
International report, "AMIS doesn't have enough troops to sufficiently
protect itself, let alone protect displaced civilians and humanitarian
organizations."[Footnote 80] In addition, an International Crisis Group
document stated in July 2005 that as many as 15,000 troops were needed
in Darfur to protect villages and IDPs, provide security for
humanitarian operations, and neutralize militias.[Footnote 81] The
December 2005 African Union-Led Joint Assessment of AMIS reported that
the absence of an authorized battalion had a significant operational
impact and overstretched existing personnel.[Footnote 82]
Constrained and Inefficiently Allocated Resources Have Restricted AMIS
Operations:
African Union and other parties have stated that AMIS does not have
sufficient resources, including equipment and translators, to conduct
the activities necessary to fulfill its mandate.[Footnote 83] A senior
African Union official told us that AMIS's reliance on outside donors
has resulted in a lack of control for the mission because basic
operational elements, such as facilities, logistics, and funding rest
in the hands of other parties. According to January 2006 African Union
documentation, the African Union has not been able to provide critical
resources, such as vehicles and communications equipment, in a timely
fashion; as a result, AMIS has functioned with about half of the needed
logistical capacity. U.S. officials have countered that the African
Union has at times been slow to respond to offers of assistance or to
prioritize resource needs. During some periods, donor support for AMIS
has been less than what the African Union had expected, with African
Union documentation stating that a lack of funds has been a major
constraint.
According to African Union officials, a lack of resources such as
vehicles and long-range communications equipment has complicated AMIS
operations. For example, one AMIS commander told us that AMIS has
inadequate transportation equipment[Footnote 84] and communications
equipment, as well as a lack of night vision equipment. AMIS officials
whom we interviewed expressed their concern that the lack of adequate
communications equipment limited their ability to interact with
different camps in the region. Further, an AMIS civilian police
official noted that the civilian police often receive less equipment
than the military component of AMIS, which has resulted in situations
such as the need to rely on military colleagues' equipment to
communicate with their civilian police colleagues. One AMIS commander
also noted that AMIS required more printers, computers, and
photocopiers. However, a DOD official noted that until AMIS makes the
most efficient use of its current resources, such as vehicles and
communications equipment, it is unclear whether more resources are
needed.[Footnote 85] Further, the December 2005 African Union-led
report on AMIS notes that, where civilian police matters are concerned,
equipment is both insufficient and incorrectly distributed.[Footnote
86]
A lack of translators who can facilitate discussions between AMIS and
the residents of Darfur has also been repeatedly cited as a central
problem hindering AMIS's ability to monitor compliance with the cease-
fire agreement or build confidence. According to an official from the
African Union's Darfur Integrated Task Force, AMIS needs about 200
interpreters; however, as of February 2006, AMIS had only about 70
interpreters. The lack of interpreters has been attributed to the
difficulty in finding people who speak both Arabic and English. One
U.S. military observer told us that many uneducated people in Darfur
speak only their tribal language, further complicating AMIS's ability
to ensure effective communication. In addition, we were told that at
times, AMIS patrols used representatives of the parties to the conflict
as translators, which meant that AMIS officials could not verify that
translators were conducting the interview in an objective fashion,
asking the required questions, or reporting responses accurately. In
one example provided by an AMIS civilian police official in El Daein in
South Darfur, an SLM/A translator stated that a woman had said she was
"helped" in a particular instance, when in fact she had stated that she
had been violently attacked. Someone within the investigative team was
able to discern that this mistake had been made and communicate it to
the rest of the team. IDPs also voiced frustration over the lack of
civilian police translators able to communicate with IDPs and respond
to IDPs reporting violence in the camps.
AMIS Has Had Limited Information on, and Cooperation from, Parties to
the Conflict:
Several analyses of AMIS have commented on its lack of capacity to
collect needed intelligence regarding the situation in Darfur. The
International Crisis Group has noted that "AMIS does not have an
intelligence apparatus or collection capacity and does not actively
analyze or disseminate intelligence." The Brookings Institution-
University of Bern study further stressed that "[g]ood intelligence is
vital in Darfur, yet AMIS's capacity to gather, analyze and act on
information has been very weak."[Footnote 87] According to a former
U.S. military observer to AMIS, "The African Union does not understand
the importance of having an 'intelligence cell' and of having good
information on the command structure, for example, of the Janjaweed."
The December 2005 African Union-led assessment of AMIS emphasized, "If
AMIS operations are to be effective, the use of intelligence is
essential," and further noted that the lack of intelligence collection,
analysis, and dissemination seriously reduces the effectiveness and
focus of operations.[Footnote 88]
The December 2005 African Union-led assessment also noted:
The effectiveness of AMIS is directly related to the level of
cooperation it receives from the parties to the conflict. Thus far,
that cooperation has been extremely inconsistent. The [Sudanese]
government continues to create bureaucratic obstacles to AMIS's ability
to operate freely. These include curfews, early airport closings, and
long delays in issuing permits and visas. AMIS has not, as they should
have, protested against these restrictions on movements, notably the
curfew. The government's use of white vehicles and aircraft (which
resemble AMIS) in military operations is also inconsistent with its
commitments to support the [African Union] Mission—. The [SLM/A] and
JEM bear an equal responsibility for accepting and supporting the
presence of AMIS. Ongoing obstruction of [African Union] activities by
the rebels has included obstruction of movement, threatening patrols,
harassment, theft of equipment, and even abduction of
personnel.[Footnote 89]
U.S. and UN officials emphasized an instance where the government of
Sudan detained the 105 Canadian armored personnel carriers at the
border and released them only after intense external pressure. A U.S.
embassy official in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, noted that Dutch
communications equipment had been in Khartoum customs for months,
demonstrating how the Sudanese government can obstruct, rather than
facilitate, AMIS operations.
In addition, all parties to the conflict--the Sudanese government, the
SLM/A, and the JEM--have been cited several times for violating the
2004 cease-fire agreement. Representatives of these parties to
Ceasefire Commission investigations, particularly the Sudanese
government, routinely file objections to final report conclusions.
According to an International Crisis Group report, "AMIS was born out
of the N'djamena agreement [2004 Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement],
which lacked a true enforcement mechanism and was based on the
assumption of compliance and goodwill by the parties. International
pressure on those parties to respect their commitments has been
ineffective, thus undermining the [African Union] mission."[Footnote
90]
UN and NATO Offers of Assistance Have Not Been Acted On; Meanwhile,
Violence in Darfur Continues:
While AMIS has faced challenges in Darfur, the UN and NATO have offered
to assist the African Union in, respectively, supplying a peacekeeping
force when AMIS's mandate expires at the end of December 2006 and
identifying lessons learned from AMIS operations. The U.S. government
and other parties have supported the proposed transition of AMIS
responsibilities to a UN peacekeeping operation. In January 2006, the
African Union's Peace and Security Council officially declared its
approval, in principle, for the transition of AMIS to a UN
operation.[Footnote 91] In March, the council reaffirmed this position,
and in May it declared that "concrete steps should be taken to effect
the transition from AMIS to a UN peacekeeping operation."[Footnote 92]
The UN Security Council subsequently adopted a resolution endorsing
this African Union decision to transition AMIS to a UN peacekeeping
operation and emphasizing that a UN operation would have, to the extent
possible, a strong African participation and character.[Footnote 93] In
August 2006, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution expanding
UNMIS's mandate and calling for an UNMIS deployment to Darfur.[Footnote
94]
According to a State official, a UN operation would be expected to
build on AMIS efforts. Some portion of troops already participating in
AMIS would be "bluehatted"--that is, could transition to UNMIS.
According to a State official, under this scenario, the UN mission
would have a unified command for the entire operation, with separate
commanders for UNMIS efforts in southern Sudan and Darfur. According to
the Department of State fiscal year 2007 budget request and a State
official, this UN effort in Sudan would cost the U.S. government about
$442 million in fiscal year 2007; a State official roughly estimated
that the Darfur portion of this operation would cost the United States
between $160 million and $180 million for the year.[Footnote 95]
As of October 2006, the Sudanese government had refused a transition to
a UN force in Darfur. However, in October the Sudanese president
expressed support for a September offer by the UN Secretary-General to
provide assistance to AMIS. The UN assistance package consists of
equipment and personnel dedicated to supporting AMIS in the following
ways: logistical and material support, military staff support, advisory
support to civilian police, and other staff support in the areas of
assistance in implementing the Darfur Peace Agreement, public
information, mine action, and humanitarian coordination.
In addition, in June 2006, following an offer by NATO, the Chairperson
of the African Union Commission requested that NATO provide, among
other things, assistance in reviewing AMIS operations in Darfur to
identify "lessons learned," which could help the African Union better
execute any future peace support efforts. However, a State official
reported that, although the Chairperson of the African Union Commission
formally accepted NATO's offer of this assistance, as of August 2006,
the African Union headquarters had taken no further action to pursue
the review.[Footnote 96] Such reviews are typically conducted after
peacekeeping operations are completed; for example, the UN Department
of Peacekeeping Operation's Best Practices Section undertakes such
reviews following UN peacekeeping efforts.[Footnote 97]
Meanwhile, instability and violence continued in Darfur, furthering
calls for UN involvement. According to a report prepared by the
Chairperson of the African Union Commission, as of May 2006, "the
region has continued to witness persistent insecurity, with ceasefire
violations, banditry activities, hijacking of vehicles, attacks on
villages and killing of unarmed civilians by the various parties,
particularly the janjaweed." One NGO reported 200 sexual assaults
around Kalma camp in South Darfur within 5 weeks during the summer of
2006 and the African Union reported that two AMIS soldiers were killed
in mid-August. In August 2006, the environment in Darfur remained
insecure, with attacks and displacement continuing and, during some
periods, worsening over time. State has noted that the Sudanese
government offensive that began in August 2006 against parties that did
not sign the Darfur Peace Agreement has directly impacted the ability
of AMIS to conduct operations, the African Union's ability to implement
the agreement, and the delivery of humanitarian aid. A senior State
official reported that "Darfur is on the verge of a dangerous downward
spiral. The parties are rearming and repositioning to renew their
fighting." The level of acceptance of the peace agreement overall in
Darfur is uncertain, owing to a general lack of information throughout
the population regarding the terms of the agreement as well as concern
over the fact that the smaller SLM/A faction and the JEM declined to
sign the deal. UN officials have warned that continued militia attacks
on IDPs are affecting implementation of the peace agreement and
emphasized that successful implementation of the agreement is key to
peace in Darfur, in the Sudan, and in the wider region. In September
2006, an African Union Peace and Security Council communiqué noted that
"the security situation remains volatile and continues to deteriorate
even further in some parts of Darfur, consequently worsening the
humanitarian and human rights situation, and the current build-up of
forces by all the parties poses further risks and challenges to the
peace efforts." On September 19, 2006, the U.S. President named former
USAID Administrator Andrew Natsios as a Presidential Special Envoy to
lead U.S. efforts to resolve outstanding disputes in Darfur.
Conclusions:
As the primary donor of humanitarian assistance for Darfur, the United
States has provided essential aid for the people of Darfur and improved
the health and livelihood of IDPs and affected residents. Without U.S.
assistance, the humanitarian organizations responding to the crisis
would likely have been incapable of providing coverage to many of the
affected population. The U.S. contribution to building and maintaining
all AMIS facilities has also been essential, along with other donor
assistance, to AMIS's ability to pursue its mandate. As insecurity
continues in Darfur, such support may be required well into the future.
At the same time, delayed humanitarian assistance has hindered NGO and
UN operations, jeopardizing these USAID partners' ability to provide
services to affected and IDP communities needed to maintain improved
levels of health. Further, continued resistance and lack of cooperation
from the government of Sudan, as well as continued insecurity and
conflict within Darfur, have made it nearly impossible for humanitarian
organizations to provide consistent and complete coverage to the
affected residents and IDPs throughout Darfur. Although USAID has taken
steps to ensure more complete reporting, the limitations in its
oversight of U.S. assistance have made it difficult to accurately
determine the impact of U.S. humanitarian assistance. The fact that the
violence in Darfur has not abated, and has even worsened in some
instances, indicates the region's need for continued assistance.
Although AMIS is seen as having contributed, through its presence in
Darfur, to decreasing large-scale violence, its fulfillment of its
mandate has been limited by the incompleteness or inconsistency of some
of its actions--such as efforts to protect civilians--in addition to
numerous operational challenges. Some of these challenges--for example,
AMIS's small size, its resources constraints, and the lack of
cooperation from the parties to the conflict--have remained beyond its
control. However, other challenges, such as AMIS's inadequate
management, organization, and capacity, may stem from the African
Union's lack of experience with peace support efforts. At the same
time, the ongoing and increasing violence in Darfur, as well as AMIS's
added responsibilities under the May 2006 peace agreement, make it
likely that the challenges AMIS has faced will intensify. The proffered
NATO assistance in reviewing AMIS operations---a typical "lessons
learned" activity following a peacekeeping initiative--could provide a
useful critical analysis of these challenges and their root causes. The
resulting insights could assist the African Union in strengthening
AMIS, if its mandate is renewed, as well as in planning and executing
any future peace support efforts. Absent a stronger AMIS or
intervention by another international party such as the UN, the
conflict in Darfur could continue indefinitely to disrupt and destroy
the lives of Darfurians.
Recommendation:
We recommend that the Secretary of State encourage the Chairperson of
the African Union Commission to ensure that an appropriate body, such
as NATO, provide assistance for an assessment of AMIS operations to
identify the key challenges AMIS has faced and the reasons for those
challenges. Such a "lessons learned" assessment would provide
information necessary to allow (1) the African Union to strengthen its
future peace support planning and operations and (2) the donor
community to support future African Union peace support efforts in a
manner that could minimize difficulties such as those encountered by
AMIS.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of State and
Defense as well as USAID. We received written comments from the
Department of State and USAID. The Department of State supported our
recommendation and noted that the report presents a balanced and
accurate picture of the situation in Darfur. The department also
suggested that the report provide additional details or
characterizations regarding certain, primarily AMIS, issues. For
example, State suggested that the report should (1) emphasize the speed
with which AMIS forces were deployed to Darfur and (2) note that the
Sudanese government's offensive against parties that did not sign the
Darfur Peace Agreement has directly impacted the ability of AMIS to
conduct operations. We incorporated such information into the report as
appropriate. See appendix V for a reproduction of State's letter and
our response. USAID commented that in general, it found the report to
be a comprehensive assessment of USAID's involvement in Darfur but said
that we should include additional information in our discussions of
areas such as the number of USAID staff working in Darfur and the
variety of efforts used by the agency to monitor grants. Specifically,
USAID stated that our reference to reduced staff in Darfur was
incomplete and felt that our discussion of incomplete reporting did not
highlight other monitoring efforts, such as site visits and meetings
with NGOs. We made adjustments as appropriate. See appendix VI for a
reproduction of USAID's letter and our response. DOD provided no
comments on the draft report.
As arranged with your offices, unless you publicly announce the
contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until
30 days after the date of this letter. At that time, we will send
copies of this report to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of
Defense, the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance and USAID
Administrator, relevant congressional committees, and other interested
parties. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In
addition, the report will be available on GAO's Web site at [Hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-3149 or at gootnickd@gao.gov. Contact points
for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be
found on the last page of this report. Other contacts and major
contributors are listed in appendix VII.
Signed by:
David Gootnick, Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
This report examines (1) U.S. humanitarian assistance provided to help
relieve the crisis in Darfur, (2) challenges that the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) and its implementing partners have
encountered, (3) the African Union's efforts to fulfill its peace
support mandate in Darfur, and (4) factors affecting the implementation
of this mandate.
We collected data on international contributions (in dollar amounts)
for Darfur provided by the UN Resource Tracking Service from September
2003 through June 2006. The amounts provided by the UN contain both
amounts committed and amounts pledged for Darfur by international
donors. We did not include pledges and commitments from international
donors that support the refugees located in Chad, because we did not
review U.S. obligations to refugees in Chad. We made this decision
because (1) security restrictions and conflict in the area prevented us
from observing U.S.-funded activities in Chad and (2) the support for
refugees in Chad was small in comparison with assistance provided to
Darfur. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the
purpose of broadly comparing the United States' contributions with
those of other international donors. We noted several limitations in
the data, notably, that the data include verbal pledges that were self-
reported to the UN Resource Tracking System by the donors. According to
a UN official, the data may exceed other, similar UN data on donor
contributions, because they include verbal pledges that have not been
formally submitted to and verified by UN sources. Furthermore, we were
unable to determine the reliability of financial records and the dollar
amounts reportedly pledged by donors.
To review U.S. funding of humanitarian assistance--our first objective-
-we collected and reviewed U.S. obligations data for assistance for
Darfur from USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, Office of
Transition Initiatives, and Office of Food for Peace, as well as The
Department of State (State) Bureau of Population, Refugees, and
Migration. To assess the reliability of these data, we interviewed
State and USAID officials regarding their methods for managing and
tracking the obligation data, and we compared these data with the
amounts listed in State's and USAID's agreements with nongovernmental
organizations (NGO) and UN agencies. According to a USAID official,
expenditure data for the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance are not
tracked in the office's reporting system, but the data are reconciled
on a daily basis and include any amounts that may have been de-
obligated. A USAID Food for Peace official also indicated that the
office's tracking system is also reconciled on a regular basis.
Therefore, we concluded that the data we collected on obligations from
each agency are sufficiently reliable for the purpose of reviewing U.S.
humanitarian assistance for Darfur from October 1, 2003, through
September 30, 2006.
To review the activities and programs undertaken with U.S. humanitarian
assistance, we reviewed USAID grant agreements. We interviewed USAID
and State officials in Washington, D.C., as well as UN officials
located in New York who were involved in humanitarian assistance for
Darfur. In February 2006, we traveled to Khartoum and Darfur, Sudan, to
examine the activities supported by U.S. humanitarian assistance. In
Khartoum we met with U.S. implementing partners from NGOs and UN
agencies, as well as an official from the government of Sudan's
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In addition, we visited seven camps for
internally displaced persons (IDP)--Abu Shouk, Al Salaam, El Serif,
Kalma, Kass, Otash, and Zam Zam--located in North and South Darfur to
observe activities and programs implemented with U.S. funds. We
observed a variety of programs and activities supported by U.S.
assistance, including food distribution, medical clinics, clean water
and sanitation facilities, income-generation activities, provision of
shelter materials, and nutritional feeding centers. We spoke with
officials from the NGOs and UN agencies implementing these activities
programs in Darfur. We also spoke with IDPs in the camps to obtain
their perspectives on the provision of humanitarian assistance in the
camps. Restrictions placed on our travel by the State Regional Security
Officer in Khartoum because of security concerns limited the area in
which we traveled and observed NGO and UN operations in Darfur.
To examine the results of the humanitarian assistance activities, we
reviewed the 15 final reports submitted by NGOs to USAID's Office of
Foreign Disaster Assistance. We reviewed the original NGO proposals to
identify the indictors used to identify performance, and we also
reviewed USAID guidance for reporting. We compared the indicators
included in the original proposals to the reported indicators in each
final report and identified the indicators that were absent from the
final reports. We interviewed USAID officials to identify USAID's
efforts to monitor and evaluate NGO and UN activities in Darfur as well
as efforts to motivate NGOs to submit final reports. We also reviewed
the Office of Food for Peace performance review questionnaires
submitted by implementing partners providing food aid for Darfur. In
addition, we spoke with an official from the USAID Office of Transition
Initiatives to discuss an ongoing program review. We also reviewed UN
Humanitarian Profile reports that provide an overview of humanitarian
assistance from April 2004 to July 2006. These reports were also used
to identify the IDP and affected resident population in Darfur, by
month. According to UN officials and the profiles, NGOs and UN agencies
operating throughout Darfur submitted the information from the reports
to the UN on a monthly basis until January 2006, and now submit it
quarterly. Although the data contained in the reports are self-
reported, UN officials indicated that they confirm data to the extent
possible and update the data each month. Furthermore, the UN
Humanitarian Profiles are the only source of information regarding the
total number of IDPs and affected residents in Darfur and the number of
IDPs receiving assistance in each sector. We determined that the
population data and the data regarding the population receiving
assistance were reliable for the purposes of presenting a general
overview of assistance in Darfur.
To determine the obstacles and challenges facing NGOs and UN agencies-
-our second objective--we reviewed UN and USAID reports and cables
discussing humanitarian operations and problems in Darfur. We
interviewed USAID, UN, and NGO officials in Darfur to discuss the
challenges they face in implementing assistance program and activities
in Darfur. We also met with officials from the Sudan government
Humanitarian Assistance Committee to discuss the obstacles and concerns
of NGOs and UN officials operating in Darfur and obtain the perspective
and input of the Sudan government regarding these issues.
In order to identify African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) efforts and
the operational challenges AMIS has faced--our third and fourth
objectives--as well as resources available to AMIS to pursue its
mandate, we used numerous African Union sources. We reviewed African
Union Peace and Security Council communiqués, as well as reports
prepared by the Chairperson of the African Union Commission that were
submitted to the council. We also reviewed African Union-led reviews of
AMIS, conducted in March and December 2005, as well as a UN-led
assessment of AMIS performance conducted in August of that year. In
February 2006, we met with AMIS leadership (military and civilian
police) at AMIS headquarters in El Fasher and the following AMIS group
sites in North and South Darfur--Zam Zam, Kabkabiya, Sarif Umra, Um
Kadada, Nyala, Kass and El Daein--where we discussed the AMIS mandate
and AMIS activities at each location. We also discussed AMIS efforts
with the U.S. representative to the African Union-led Ceasefire
Commission, as well as U.S. representatives (military observers) in
four locations. We were unable to travel to AMIS sites in West Darfur
owing to security concerns. At African Union headquarters in Addis
Ababa, Ethiopia, we met with senior African Union officials, including
the Commissioner for the African Union's Peace and Security Council and
the head of the Darfur Integrated Task Force in February 2006. To
assess reports prepared by the AMIS Ceasefire Commission, we analyzed
the contents of all publicly available reports from the African Union's
Web site, [Hyperlink, http://www.africa-union.org/DARFUR/CFC.htm].
We also discussed the African Union's initiative in Darfur and external
donor efforts with officials from the Departments of State (in
Washington, D.C; Khartoum and El Fasher, Sudan; and Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia) and Defense (DOD). At State headquarters in Washington, we
discussed the situation in Darfur and AMIS efforts with the following
bureaus and offices: Administration, African Affairs; International
Organization Affairs; Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor; Population,
Refugees, and Migration; and War Crimes Issues. At DOD, we met with the
staff from the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Further, we reviewed
UN Security Council resolutions, UN reports that addressed the
situation in Darfur, and a UN August 2005 report that assessed AMIS
operations. We met with officials from the UN's Department of
Peacekeeping Operations in New York. We also met with European Union
and UN officials at African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa. In
addition, we met with officials from, and reviewed reports prepared by,
expert and advocacy groups such as the International Crisis Group,
Human Rights Watch, and Refugees International. Finally, we met with
Sudanese government officials in Khartoum and Washington, D.C.
To review the U.S. government's support for AMIS, we discussed this
support with officials from the African Union and Departments of State
and Defense. To identify contractor activities, we reviewed the
contract documentation defining the terms for tasks performed by PAE
Government Services, Inc., (PAE) in Darfur. Further, we reviewed PAE
weekly situation reports, describing events related to camp
construction and maintenance and submitted to State, and met with
officials from PAE in Washington, D.C., and North and South Darfur. We
also discussed PAE's efforts with an official who was working on
contract in Darfur as State's Contracting Officer's Technical
Representative. PAE and State officials accompanied us on our visit to
AMIS camps, providing tours of each AMIS site, as well as to the
logistics operating base in El Fasher and the forward operating base in
Nyala, explaining the process for constructing and maintaining AMIS
facilities. We determined that data obtained from PAE were sufficiently
reliable for inclusion in our report. To identify the amount of U.S.
funding that has been provided to construct and maintain AMIS camps, we
spoke with State officials from the African Affairs and Administration
bureaus. In particular, we had detailed discussions with a key official
from the African Affairs Bureau who provided information on funding,
provided by fiscal year, and the funding source. The official prepared
a calculation of U.S. funding for PAE efforts independently. All
figures addressing State funding to support AMIS provided in the report
are attributed to this State official and were not independently
verified. However, after discussions with multiple State officials
knowledgeable about State support for PAE who cited the State official
as a key source within State for this information, combined with a
review of State's information by PAE officials, we have determined that
the funding information provided is sufficiently reliable for inclusion
in our report with appropriate attribution. We discussed oversight
regarding this funding with State officials in Darfur and Washington.
We conducted our work from September 2005 to November 2006 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Timeline of Darfur Events:
Topic: Beginning of conflict;
Date: Early 2003;
Summary: Darfur conflict begins;
Description: In early 2003, Darfur rebels attacked Sudanese police
stations and the airport in El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur. In
El Fasher, the rebels destroyed numerous military aircraft, killed
numerous soldiers, and kidnapped a Sudanese general. In response, the
government armed and supported local tribal and other militias (the
Janjaweed). Fighting between the rebel groups and the Sudan military
and other armed militia intensified during late 2003. The principal
rebel groups are the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/ A) and the
Justice and Equality Movement (JEM).
Topic: Humanitarian assistance events;
Date: April 2004;
Summary: 202 humanitarian staff working in Darfur;
Description: In April 2004, there was limited humanitarian presence in
Darfur, with only 202 humanitarian staff working in the region. In
addition, some of the nongovernmental organizations (NGO) operating in
Darfur provided only limited humanitarian assistance, since their
primary focus was on development assistance.
Topic: Humanitarian assistance events;
Date: December 2004;
Summary: Save the Children-UK withdraws after death of four staff;
Description: On December 21, 2004, Save the Children-UK announced that
it was discontinuing humanitarian operations in Darfur following two
incidents in October and December that resulted in the deaths of four
staff members. Save the Children had operated in Darfur for 20 years.
Topic: Humanitarian assistance events;
Date: End of 2004;
Summary: Donors provide $890 million in humanitarian assistance;
Description: At the end of 2004, total pledges and commitments for
Darfur from international donors in 2004 totaled more than $890
million. The United States committed or pledged more than $271 million
(31 percent).
Topic: Humanitarian assistance events;
Date: July 2005;
Summary: Over 3 million people affected by crisis;
Description: The population of Darfur estimated to be affected by the
violence, both internally displaced persons (IDP) and affected
residents, rose to more than 3.2 million people, 1.9 million of whom
are IDPs.
Topic: Humanitarian assistance events;
Date: October 2005;
Summary: Humanitarian staff increase to almost 14,000;
Description: The number of humanitarian aid workers in Darfur grew to a
total of 13,715 workers from 13 UN agencies and 82 NGOs.
Topic: Humanitarian assistance events;
Date: End of 2005;
Summary: Donors provide $675 million in humanitarian assistance;
Description: Total pledges and commitments for Darfur in 2005, from all
donors, totaled almost $675 million. The United States committed or
pledged nearly $365 million (54 percent).
Topic: Humanitarian assistance events;
Date: January 2006;
Summary: GOAL suspends operations in Jebel Mara;
Description: Following an escalation of violence in the Jebel Mara area
of West Darfur, on January 25, 2006, GOAL, an international NGO,
evacuated all staff in the region and abandoned operations. During the
evacuation of staff, a helicopter crash resulted in the death of one
GOAL aid worker.
Topic: Humanitarian assistance events;
Date: April 2006;
Summary: World Food Program (WFP) announces cuts in Darfur food
rations;
Description: On April 28, the UN WFP announced that shortages in funds
would force WFP to begin reducing the daily food rations for the people
of Darfur in May. WFP indicated that the reduced rations would extend
limited food stocks during the "hunger season," when needs are
greatest. Owing to contributions by the U.S. and Sudanese governments,
the rations were only cut to 84 percent of the daily requirement.
Topic: Humanitarian assistance events;
Date: June 2006;
Summary: Donors provide $331 million in humanitarian assistance;
Description: As of June 2006, international pledges and commitments for
Darfur in 2006 totaled almost $331 million. According to the UN, this
amount was approximately $320 million less than the required funding
for 2006. The United States committed almost $240 million (72 percent).
Topic: African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) events;
Date: May 2004;
Summary: First African Union observer mission to Darfur;
Description: On May 25, 2004, the African Union's Peace and Security
Council issued a communiqué stressing the need for the three parties to
the conflict-
-the government of Sudan, the SLM/A, and the JEM--to implement the
April 2004 Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement. Further, the Peace and
Security Council authorized the initial deployment of an African Union
Observer Mission to support the work of the newly created Ceasefire
Commission.
Topic: AMIS events;
Date: October 2004;
Summary: African Union's Mission in Sudan established with 3,320
personnel;
Description: On October 20, 2004, the African Union's Peace and
Security Council issued a communiqué that established an AMIS presence
in Darfur of 3,320 personnel. These personnel were to include 2,341
military personnel, among them 450 observers, and up to 815 civilian
police as well as appropriate civilian personnel. Further, AMIS was
given a specific mandate to monitor and observe compliance with the
ceasefire agreement, assist in the process of confidence building, and
contribute to a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian
relief. This was the first time the council called for a civilian
police presence.
Topic: AMIS events;
Date: April 2005;
Summary: AMIS forces increased to 7,731;
Description: On April 28, 2005, the African Union's Peace and Security
Council issued a communiqué praising AMIS efforts and noting
improvements where the mission was deployed in Darfur but concluding
that the current force was overstretched. The communiqué increased
AMIS's strength to a total of 6,171 military personnel, with an
appropriate civilian component, including up to 1,560 civilian police
personnel, for a total force of at least 7,731.
Topic: AMIS events;
Date: August 2005;
Summary: Violence against AMIS personnel increases;
Description: From August 2005 on, 35 AMIS personnel were abducted;
4 Nigerian protection force soldiers were killed;
and vehicles, communications equipment, weapons, and ammunition were
lost. According to an African Union assessment of AMIS, these attacks
on AMIS undermined the mission's credibility in the eyes of civilians
and emboldened those who might target AMIS. In July 2006, 32 AMIS
personnel were abducted.
Topic: AMIS events;
Date: March 2006;
Summary: African Union supports, in principle, AMIS transition to UN;
Description: On March 10, 2006, the African Union's Peace and Security
Council confirmed its January 2006 expression of support for a
transition of AMIS to a UN operation. The council requested that the
African Union Commission vigorously pursue its efforts toward reaching,
as quickly as possible, the authorized AMIS strength of 7,731.
Topic: AMIS events;
Date: April 2006;
Summary: AMIS deployment is over 7,200, but below authorized level of
about 7,700;
Description: On April 30, 2006, AMIS deployment reached 7,271 (755
military observers, 5,086 protection force troops, and 1,430 civilian
police). In addition, another 155 personnel were serving as air crew or
interpreters or in other roles. Of total AMIS deployment, 312 were
women. Protection force troops came from Rwanda, Nigeria, Senegal,
Gambia, and South Africa. AMIS deployment was below the authorized
level of about 7,731, primarily because an expected contingent of South
African troops was never deployed.
Topic: AMIS events;
Date: September 2006;
Summary: AMIS mandate is extended to December 31, 2006;
Description: On September 20, the African Union Peace and Security
Council extended the mandate of AMIS from September 30, 2006 to
December 31, 2006.
Topic: Peace negotiation efforts;
Date: September 2003;
Summary: Sudan and rebel group sign cease-fire;
agreement later collapses;
Description: The initial cease-fire agreement between the parties to
the conflict (the Sudanese government and SLM/A) and mediated by the
government of Chad, is signed;
the agreed collapsed by December of 2003.
Topic: Peace negotiation efforts;
Date: April 2004;
Summary: Three negotiating parties sign cease-fire;
Description: On April 8, 2004 the three parties to the conflict signed
the "Agreement on Humanitarian Ceasefire on the Conflict in Darfur" in
N'djamena, Chad. The parties agreed to, among other things, refrain
from any act of violence or any other abuse on civilian populations.
The parties further agreed to establish a cease-fire commission to,
among other things, plan, verify, and ensure implementation of the
cease-fire agreement provisions.
Topic: Peace negotiation efforts;
Date: November 2004;
Summary: Three parties sign two protocols to improve humanitarian and
security situation;
Description: On November 9, 2004, the three parties to the conflict
signed two protocols in Abuja, Nigeria. (1) "Protocol Between the
Government of the Sudan (GOS), the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army
(SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) on the Improvement
of the Humanitarian Situation in Darfur" commits the parties to, among
other things, guarantee unimpeded and unrestricted access for
humanitarian workers and assistance to reach all needy people
throughout Darfur and take all steps required to prevent all attacks
against civilians by any party or group, including the Janjaweed. The
protocol also requests the UN to expand the number of human rights
monitors in Darfur. (2) "Protocol Between the Government of the Sudan
(GOS), the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and
Equality Movement (JEM) on the Enhancement of the Security Situation in
Darfur in Accordance with the N'djamena Agreement" commits the parties
to, among other things, recommit themselves to ensuring an effective
cease-fire by refraining from all hostilities and military actions,
submit to the cease-fire commission all information needed to carry out
its mandate, and release all persons detained in relation to the
hostilities in Darfur. The Sudanese government also agreed to implement
its stated commitment to neutralize and disarm the Janjaweed.
Topic: Peace negotiation efforts;
Date: July 2005;
Summary: Three negotiating parties sign declaration of principles;
Description: On July 5, 2005, the three parties to the conflict signed
the "Declaration of Principles for the Resolution of the Sudanese
Conflict in Darfur." This declaration established 17 principles to
guide future deliberations and constituted the basis for a settlement
of the Darfur conflict. These principles address issues such as;
* respect for the diversity of the Sudanese people, democracy,
political pluralism, rule of law, independence of the judiciary, and
freedom of the media;;
* effective representation in all government institutions by the
citizens of Sudan, including those from Darfur;;
* equitable distribution of national wealth;;
* provision of humanitarian assistance;;
* return to places of origin for IDPs;;
* rehabilitation/reconstruction of Darfur; and;
* broad security arrangements.
Topic: Peace negotiation efforts;
Date: May 2006;
Summary: Sudan and the largest faction of SLM/A sign Darfur Peace
Agreement;
Description: On May 5, 2006, the Sudanese government and the SLM/A
faction with the largest military force signed the Darfur Peace
Agreement. This agreement has provisions on;
* power sharing (including the creation of the Senior Assistant to the
President, the fourth-highest position in the Sudanese government,
appointed by the President from a list of nominees provided by the
rebel movements);;
* wealth sharing (including the creation of a Darfur reconstruction and
development fund that will receive $700 million in funds from the
Sudanese government between 2006 and 2008); and;
* security arrangements (including a requirement for verifiable
disarmament of the Janjaweed militia by the Sudanese government);
The smaller SLM/A faction and JEM did not sign the agreement.
Topic: Major U.S. actions;
Date: April 2004;
Summary: USAID establishes Disaster Assistance Response Team;
Description: In 2003 and 2004, USAID/Office of Foreign Disaster
Assistance (OFDA) deployed field staff to Sudan to assess the extent of
the Darfur crisis. In April 2004, responding to the growing
humanitarian emergency, USAID/OFDA mobilized a Disaster Assistance
Response Team. USAID continued a phased deployment of humanitarian
personnel as official access and improved security allowed for its
increased presence in Darfur.
Topic: Major U.S. actions;
Date: June 2004;
Summary: Secretary of State Powell visits Sudan;
Description: Secretary Powell visited Sudan, the first U.S. Secretary
of State to do so in 26 years. Powell met with Sudan's President Omar
Al-Bashir, emphasizing the need to dismantle the Janjaweed to restore
security to the region and enable IDPs to return home. The government
of Sudan agreed to this objective as well as to removing restrictions
on humanitarian aid and participating in a political resolution of the
Darfur crisis facilitated by the African Union.
Topic: Major U.S. actions;
Date: June 2004;
Summary: U.S. company begins building camps for African Union troops;
Description: PAE, a U.S. company, via a contract with the U.S.
Department of State and with assistance from another U.S. contractor,
began building camps for AMIS troops in Darfur. PAE initially
constructed five camps (in El Fasher, Nyala, El Geneina, Tine, and
Kabkabiya) for AMIS troops. Significant challenges were identified in
building these camps, such as transporting materials to building sites
and providing water to AMIS personnel. PAE eventually built a total of
32 AMIS camps.
Topic: Major U.S. actions;
Date: July 2004;
Summary: Both houses of Congress pass resolutions declaring atrocities
to be genocide;
Description: On July 22, 2004, the U.S. House of Representatives and
Senate unanimously passed separate resolutions [H.Con.Res. 467, 108th
Cong. (2004);
S.Con.Res. 133, 108th Cong. (2004)] declaring the crisis in Darfur to
be genocide, based on articles of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948. These resolutions declare
that the government of Sudan has violated the Convention and call upon
the member states of the United Nations to undertake measures to
prevent genocide in Darfur from escalating further. The resolutions
also commend the administration's efforts in seeking a peaceful
resolution to the conflict and in providing humanitarian assistance and
urge it to continue to lead an international effort to stop the
genocide in Darfur.
Topic: Major U.S. actions;
Date: September 2004;
Summary: President Bush and Secretary Powell declare that genocide is
occurring;
Description: On September 9, 2004, Powell testifies before Senate
Foreign Relations Committee and declares atrocities in Darfur to be
genocide, based on evidence collected by the Department of State.
Further, he states that the government of Sudan and the Janjaweed are
responsible and that the United States, as a contracting party to the
Genocide Convention, will demand that the UN initiate a full
investigation. President Bush made similar statements that day.
Topic: Major U.S. actions;
Date: May 2006;
Summary: Secretary Rice reaffirms that Darfur violence constitutes
genocide;
Description: On May 9, 2006, addressing the UN Security Council
Ministerial on Sudan, Secretary of State Rice reaffirmed the
administration's declaration that the violence in Darfur constitutes
genocide. Additionally, Secretary Rice stated that the Darfur Peace
Agreement is an opportunity to end the crisis in the region and allow
people to return to their homes, emphasizing a role for UN troops to
implement the peace agreement. Secretary Rice also stated that the
United States had provided nearly all of the support that the WFP's
mission in Darfur had received.
Topic: Major U.S. actions;
Date: October 2006;
Summary: U.S. President signs Darfur Peace and Accountability Act of
2006;
Description: On October 13, 2006, President Bush signed into law the
Darfur Peace and Accountability Act of 2006 which imposes sanctions
against persons responsible for genocide, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity;
supports measures for the protection of civilians and humanitarian
operations;
and supports peace efforts in Darfur.
Topic: Major UN actions;
Date: December 2003;
Summary: UN Under- Secretary-General calls humanitarian situation "one
of the worst" worldwide;
Description: On December 5, 2003, the UN Under-Secretary- General in
charge of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
stated, "The humanitarian situation in Darfur has quickly become one of
the worst in the world.".
Topic: Major UN actions;
Date: July 2004;
Summary: Sudan commits to facilitate assistance and disarm Janjaweed;
Description: On July 3, 2004, the government of Sudan and the UN signed
a joint communiqué in which the Sudanese government pledged to remove
obstacles to humanitarian assistance in Darfur and committed to
disarming the Janjaweed and other armed outlaw groups.
Topic: Major UN actions;
Date: July 2004;
Summary: UN calls for cooperation from Sudan and disarmament of
militias;
Description: The UN Security Council called for the Sudanese government
to fulfill its commitment to facilitate humanitarian relief in Darfur
and remove restrictions that might hinder humanitarian aid to Darfur.
In addition, the council called for the government to disarm the
Janjaweed militias and bring perpetrators of human rights and
international humanitarian law violations and other atrocities to
justice.
Topic: Major UN actions;
Date: January 2005;
Summary: UN reports that Sudan has not pursued a policy of genocide;
Description: On January 25, 2005, the International Commission of
Inquiry, established by the UN, issued a report stating that the
government of Sudan has not pursued a policy of genocide. However, the
commission reported that the Sudanese government and the Janjaweed,
have committed international offences such as crimes against humanity
and war crimes that may be no less serious and heinous than genocide.
Topic: Major UN actions;
Date: March 2005;
Summary: UN establishes UN Mission in Sudan;
Description: On March 24, 2005, the UN Security Council established the
UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) after determining that the situation in
Darfur continued to threaten international peace and security. UNMIS
was mandated to support implementation of the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement;
to facilitate and coordinate the voluntary return of refugees and IDPs
and humanitarian assistance;
to contribute to international efforts to protect and promote human
rights in Sudan;
and to coordinate international efforts to protect civilians. The
council also called on all Sudanese parties to take immediate steps to
achieve a peaceful settlement to the Darfur conflict and take all
necessary action to prevent further violations of human rights and
international humanitarian law.
Topic: Major UN actions;
Date: March 2005;
Summary: UN refers Darfur situation to International Criminal Court;
Description: On March 31, 2005, the UN Security Council referred the
situation in Darfur to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal
Court, taking note of the International Commission of Inquiry report on
violations of international law and human rights in Darfur.
Topic: Major UN actions;
Date: March 2006;
Summary: UN requests planning to transition AMIS to UN;
Description: On March 24, 2006, the UN Security Council called for
preparatory planning for a transition of AMIS to a UN operation. The
plan was to include options for reinforcing the Darfur peace effort
through additional appropriate transitional assistance to AMIS,
including assistance in logistics, mobility and communications.
Topic: Major UN actions;
Date: August 2006;
Summary: UN calls for UNMIS deployment to Darfur;
Description: On August 31, 2006, the UN Security Council commended the
efforts of the African Union for the successful deployment of AMIS but
reaffirmed its concern that ongoing violence in Darfur might further
negatively affect the rest of the Sudan as well as the region. The UN
Security Council expanded UNMIS's mandate and determined that UNMIS
should deploy to Darfur. As of October 2006, the Sudanese government
had refused a transition to a UN force in Darfur.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Evolution of AMIS:
The African Union mission in Sudan (AMIS) evolved as the African Union
has authorized the incremental deployment of thousands of personnel to
carry out its responsibilities in Darfur. In May 2004, after three
parties signed the April 2004 humanitarian cease-fire agreement, the
African Union's Peace and Security Council authorized an observer
mission to Darfur.[Footnote 98] This mission began operations in June
2004 with 60 military observers and 300 protection force soldiers as
well as observers from the Sudanese parties. In July, the Peace and
Security Council called for a comprehensive plan to enhance the
effectiveness of the mission, including the possibility of transforming
the mission into a full-fledged peacekeeping mission to ensure the
effective implementation of the cease-fire agreement.[Footnote 99] In
October 2004, in conjunction with the issuance of an African Union
report that discussed the status of the mission and described the
situation in Darfur,[Footnote 100] the council decided to enhance AMIS
to a total of 3,320 personnel, including 2,341 military personnel
(military observers and protection force troops), among them 450
observers; up to 815 civilian police personnel (the first time that a
civilian police component was formally established); and appropriate
civilian personnel.[Footnote 101]
The African Union Peace and Security Council provided AMIS II with the
following specific mandate for its peace support efforts: (1) to
monitor and observe compliance with the 2004 humanitarian cease-fire
agreement; (2) to assist in the process of confidence building; and (3)
to contribute to a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian
relief and, beyond that, the return of IDPs and refugees to their
homes, and to contribute to the improvement of the security situation
throughout Darfur. In working to meet this mandate, the council decided
that AMIS II would, among other tasks, "protect civilians whom it
encounters under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity, within
resources and capability, it being understood that the protection of
the civilian population is the responsibility of the government of
Sudan."
In early 2005, the African Union decided to augment AMIS once again. In
April 2005, the Peace and Security Council authorized increasing the
size of AMIS to 6,171 military personnel, in addition to an appropriate
civilian component, including up to 1,560 civilian police personnel
(for a total of more than 7,700).[Footnote 102] This further expansion
is referred to as AMIS II-E. These AMIS personnel operate throughout
eight sectors in Darfur that have been established to help organize
AMIS efforts. A Darfur Integrated Task Force was established at African
Union headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to assist with planning,
force generation, procurement and logistics, and administrative support
and to interact with AMIS donors.
The African Union did not call for an AMIS civilian police presence
until AMIS operations were well under way. The civilian police
component was added to AMIS in October 2004 to, according to a senior
UN official, further the "rule of law" by working with Sudanese police.
The European Union was a strong proponent of a civilian police
component, and European Union officials told us that the civilian
police gave European Union member states the opportunity to play a
direct role in AMIS by providing police staff. Specifically, the role
of the civilian police is, among other things, to establish and
maintain contact with the Sudanese police, observe and report on
Sudanese police service delivery, and monitor the security of IDPs.
As of April 30, 2006, AMIS had 7,271 personnel in Darfur (755 military
observers, 5,086 soldiers/protection force, and 1,430 civilian
police).[Footnote 103] According to a UN official, AMIS deployed its
troops much faster than the UN could have done (although UN efforts
have higher standards regarding aspects of deployment such as required
troop skills and equipment). The majority of AMIS soldiers have come
from Rwanda and Nigeria, with additional troops from Senegal, Gambia,
and South Africa.[Footnote 104] Military observers from more than 20
countries (numerous African countries and the United States, the
European Union, and the three parties to the conflict) and civilian
police are participating in AMIS. The total number of the AMIS force
deployed in Darfur is far less than the authorized AMIS size of more
than 7,700--according to African Union sources, primarily because
expected South African troops were never fully deployed to Darfur.
In January 2006, the African Union's Peace and Security Council
officially declared its approval, in principle, for the transition of
AMIS to a UN operation.[Footnote 105] In March, the council reaffirmed
this position, and in May it declared that "concrete steps should be
taken to effect the transition from AMIS to a UN peacekeeping
operation."[Footnote 106] The UN Security Council subsequently adopted
a resolution commending AMIS's role in reducing large-scale, organized
violence in Darfur; endorsing this African Union decision to transition
AMIS to a UN peacekeeping operation; and stressing that a UN operation
would have, to the extent possible, a strong African participation and
character.[Footnote 107] In August 2006, the UN Security Council
adopted a resolution expanding UNMIS's mandate and calling for an UNMIS
deployment to Darfur.[Footnote 108] The mandate of AMIS expires on
December 31, 2006.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: NGOs and UN Agencies Receiving U.S. Nonfood Assistance
Funding during Fiscal Years 2004-2006:
NGO/ UN agency: Action Contre le Faim.
NGO/ UN agency: Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development.
NGO/ UN agency: American Refugee Committee.
NGO/ UN agency: CARE.
NGO/ UN agency: CHD.
NGO/ UN agency: Coalition for International Justice.
NGO/ UN agency: Community, Habitat, Finance.
NGO/ UN agency: CONCERN.
NGO/ UN agency: Catholic Relief Services.
NGO/ UN agency: Development Alternatives, Inc.
NGO/ UN agency: Freedom House.
NGO/ UN agency: GOAL.
NGO/ UN agency: Harvard School of Public Health.
NGO/ UN agency: Halo Partnership.
NGO/ UN agency: International Committee of the Red Cross.
NGO/ UN agency: International Medical Corps.
NGO/ UN agency: International Rescue Committee.
NGO/ UN agency: Internews Network.
NGO/ UN agency: Mercy Corps.
NGO/ UN agency: MEDAIR.
NGO/ UN agency: MERLIN.
NGO/ UN agency: Relief International.
NGO/ UN agency: Samaritan's Purse.
NGO/ UN agency: Save the Children-UK.
NGO/ UN agency: Save the Children-US.
NGO/ UN agency: Solidarites.
NGO/ UN agency: Tearfund.
NGO/ UN agency: Tufts University.
NGO/ UN agency: United Methodist Committee on Relief.
NGO/ UN agency: United Nations Development Program (UNDP).
NGO/ UN agency: United Nations Department of Safety and Security.
NGO/ UN agency: United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization.
NGO/ UN agency: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
NGO/ UN agency: United Nations Children's Fund.
NGO/ UN agency: United Nations Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs.
NGO/ UN agency: United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.
NGO/ UN agency: United Nations World Food Program.
NGO/ UN agency: United Nations Joint Logistics Center.
NGO/ UN agency: United Nations World Health Organization.
NGO/ UN agency: World Relief.
NGO/ UN agency: World Vision - USA.
Source: USAID and State.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of State:
United States Department of State:
Assistant Secretary for Resource Management and Chief Financial
Officer:
Washington, D.C. 20520:
Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers:
Managing Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N. W.
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001:
Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers:
We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "Darfur
Crisis: Progress in Aid and Peace Monitoring Threatened by Ongoing
Violence and Operational Challenges," GAO Job Code 320375.
The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.
If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact
Jason Small, Deputy Director, Bureau of African Affairs, at (202) 647-
4084.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Bradford R. Higgins:
cc: GAO - Leslie Holen:
AF - Jendayi Frazer:
State/OIG - Mark Duda:
Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report:
Darfur Crisis: Progress in Aid and Peace Monitoring Threatened by
Ongoing Violence and Operational Challenges, (GAO-07-9, GAO Code
320375):
Thank you for allowing the Department of State the opportunity to
comment on the draft report Darfur Crisis: Progress in Aid and Peace
Monitoring Threatened by Ongoing Violence and Operational Challenges.
The Department of State commends the U.S. Government Accountability
Office for the thorough research and overall objective analysis of the
successes and challenges of providing humanitarian assistance and
support for peacekeeping operations since the beginning of the Darfur
conflict. In general, we believe the report presents a balanced and
accurate picture of the situation. We understand that USAID will
provide more directed comments on the humanitarian aid sections.
The Department of State supports the recommendation of the report to
encourage the Chairperson of the African Union (AU) Commission to
conduct a "lessons learned" assessment. In a June 2, 2006 letter to
NATO Secretary-General de Hoop Scheffer, AU Chairperson Konare invited
NATO to join other partners in establishing mechanisms for the AU to
collect and analyze lessons learned from the African Union Mission in
Sudan (AMIS). We will continue to encourage the AU Commission
Secretariat in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, as well as NATO, to establish
these mechanisms as soon as possible.
After a thorough review, we would like to make some modest suggestions
to certain areas we believe could have been better emphasized and/or
characterized.
1. Actions of the U.S. and international community to strengthen AMIS:
The efforts of the African Union have reduced large-scale organized
violence and we are pleased to see African nations become increasing
involved in peacekeeping operations, especially in Africa. As AMIS
increased to its current deployment level, some of its command and
control and logistics deficiencies magnified, reducing its overall
effectiveness. As a result, the African Union decided as early as its
January 2006 Peace and Security Council meeting to transition to a
larger, more robust UN peacekeeping operation. In the interim, the
international community, led by the U.S., has committed to
strengthening AMIS. The U.S. participated in j oint assessment missions
with the AU, UN, and key donors, and having identified shortcomings,
sought to offer the AU the assistance it needed as it transitioned to a
UN mission. The Department offered to double the number of U.S.
military observers (from 16 to 32), send military officers to assist in
the formation of a Joint Operations Center and to help the AU carry out
a verification mission called for by the Darfur Peace Agreement, and
engaged NATO in providing vital training assistance. The United States
has also provided training and equipment to African battalions (notably
Rwanda) preparing to deploy to Darfur, which emphasizes the importance
of Department of State programs such as the Global Peace Operations
Initiative (GPOI) and the African Contingency Operations Training and
Assistance (ACOTA), which train troops for peacekeeping operations.
Some of these offers, particularly those of NATO, have not been fully
accepted by the African Union. We continue to urge the AU to accept
these offers.
2. Rapidity of AU deployment:
Other international donors have commended the speed with which the AU,
supported by international donors, was able to deploy peacekeeping
forces to Darfur, compared to other international peacekeeping
missions. The AU proved successful in addressing the severe challenges
of quickly deploying and sustaining peacekeeping troops in this austere
region.
3. Role of Rebel Commanders:
The report tended to over-emphasize the role of rebel commanders in
restricting humanitarian access. In most cases, rebel commanders have
supported the delivery of humanitarian assistance in their areas of
control. The greater impact on humanitarian access is continued
fighting between the parties and acts of banditry, especially those
targeted at humanitarian convoys.
4. Inconsistencies in the period of evaluation:
The report seemed to cover the period up to August 2006, although in
many areas, particularly the analysis of the effectiveness of the
Ceasefire Commission and Joint Commission, the analysis ended at the
signing of Darfur Peace Agreement in May 2006. The renewed GOS
offensive against non-signatories that began in August 2006 should be
mentioned, as it has directly impacted the ability of AMIS to conduct
operations, the AU's ability to implement the DPA (including its
support on the ground, which has eroded for many other reasons as
well), and the delivery of humanitarian aid.
5. AMIS Civilian Police:
Especially since the deterioration of the security situation in Darfur
since the May 2006 signing of the DPA, civilian police have played an
increasingly greater role in the overall operations of AMIS. The report
appeared to undervalue their role, particularly their positive impact
in the camps. There are some instances where the IDPs have lauded the
civilian police while at the same time protesting the ineffectiveness
of the AMIS military.
6. Impact on Mortality Rates:
We believe the report should have emphasized the combined impact of
U.S. diplomatic efforts and U.S. humanitarian assistance to the
contribution in reduction of mortality rates in Darfur. For example,
Secretary Powell and UN Secretary-General Annan traveled to Sudan in
July 2004 to press the government to open up humanitarian access, and
to expedite visas for international humanitarian workers. The
government subsequently instituted a 48-hour visa policy. Since the
beginning of the conflict, the United States continues to press the
Government of Sudan and rebel leaders to provide unrestricted
humanitarian access, and it has been the combination of active
diplomacy and the delivery of humanitarian assistance that has
contributed to reductions in mortality rates.
7. Cross-border implications:
The report omits the important point that insecurity in Darfur
negatively affects the humanitarian situation in Eastern Chad as well.
Following are GAO's comments on the Department of State's letter dated
October 2, 2006.
GAO Comments:
1. We have added the U.S. contribution of training and equipping
Rwandan and Nigerian battalions through the African Contingency
Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program to footnote 65.
2. We have added State's perspective regarding the quick deployment of
AMIS troops, as well as a similar view expressed by a senior UN
official working in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
3. The report's discussion of rebel group control over humanitarian
access reflects the views of UN and NGO officials. Further, the report
cites banditry and looting, as well as more violent acts, such as
attacks and the killing of humanitarian workers.
4. Owing to scope and time limitations, our review of specific AMIS
operations did not cover the period subsequent to the signing of the
Darfur Peace Agreement in May 2006. However, we have added State's
point regarding Sudanese government actions against parties that did
not sign the agreement.
5. As noted above, our review did not assess AMIS operations subsequent
to the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement in May 2006, although we
have identified instances of violence against the AMIS civilian police
since that time, such as (1) the burning of a civilian police station
and three vehicles by IDPs in Hassahisa IDP camp at Zalengei and (2)
the killing of a civilian police language assistant and the attack of
eight civilian police officers by IDPs in Kalma IDP camp at Nyala. Such
incidents appear contrary to the portrayal of the relationship between
the civilian police and IDPs provided here by State.
6. The report states that the improvements in mortality in Darfur have
been attributed, in part, to the humanitarian assistance provide by the
United States.
7. We have added this point to footnote 5.
[End of section]
Appendix VI: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International
Development:
USAID:
From The American People:
Oct 17 2006:
David Gootnick:
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Gootnick:
I am pleased to provide the U.S. Agency for International Development's
(USAID) formal response on the draft GAO report entitled Darfur Crisis:
Progress in Aid and Peace Monitoring Threatened by Ongoing Violence and
Operational Challenges (GAO-07-9).
Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the draft report and for
the courtesies extended by your staff in the conduct of this review. We
applaud GAO for the tremendous efforts your staff undertook to produce
the comprehensive document which details the three years of USAID's
involvement in Darfur. We would also like thank GAO for addressing many
of USAID's comments in the report.
USAID comments on the draft report focus on GAO's observations of
USAID's staff, capacity to monitor programs and funding received.
Because of the level of detail, we are providing our response in an
enclosure.
Thank you for the opportunity to formally comment. We look forward to
continued collaboration which supports U.S. Government accountability
in Darfur.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Mosina H. Jordan:
Counselor to the Agency:
Enclosure: a/s:
U.S. Agency for International Development:
1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW:
Washington, DC 20523:
www.usaid.gov:
Detailed USAID Comments of the draft GAO report entitled Darfur Crisis:
Progress in Aid and Peace Monitoring Threatened by Ongoing Violence and
Operational Challenges (GAO-07-9):
1. Reduced Staff:
We appreciate GAO's inclusion of the numerous factors which influence
USAID staffing levels in Darfur, most notably including security and
U.S. Embassy directives. The 11 th bullet in the table of contents and
page 8 of the report, however, still state "oversight of assistance was
limited by reduced staff and incomplete reporting." We disagree with
the reference to reduced staff. Although the current number of Darfur
Field Office (DFO) staff stands at six, there are three critical staff
which directly support the six DFO core staff.
2. Reporting and monitoring of USAID programs in Darfur:
We appreciate GAO's inclusion of external factors which affect USAID's
ability to monitor programs, including security, time constraints, and
the size of Darfur. However page 32 notes:
Furthermore, required NGO reporting is incomplete. As a result, USAID
lacks information to evaluate NGO operations, monitor their
performance, and measure the impact of the assistance provided.
We believe this is an inaccurate appraisal of USAID's ability to
monitor its programs in Darfur. Notwithstanding security constraints,
bureaucratic obstacles imposed by the Government of Sudan (visas,
travel permits, etc.), and other external factors, USAID employs a
variety of wide-ranging efforts to monitor grants, including, but not
limited to, reports, site visits, and meetings with NGOs in the field
and in Washington. We would especially appreciate the report's
inclusion of USAID's recent efforts at collecting NGO reports, which
resulted in a 100% compliance rate - that is, USAID received quarterly
reports from all current partners in July 2006, and we anticipate
receipt of all reports due for the period of July to September 2006 at
the end of October.
3. Updated IDP numbers:
Although we have received verbal confirmation from the U.N. Office for
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) that the number of IDPs in
Darfur has increased to 1.9 million as of September 2006, we have not
yet received written confirmation. As soon as we do, we will forward
this information to GAO.
Following are GAO's comments on USAID's letter dated October 17, 2006.
GAO Comments:
1. The current number of USAID staff in Darfur has been reduced from as
many as 20 people to the current number of 6 staff in Darfur, although
the crisis in Darfur has resulted in increased number of IDPs and
affected residents that require assistance and a greater number of NGOs
and UN agencies operating in Darfur. We understand that USAID does not
always have control over staffing decisions and is sometimes limited by
staff ceilings set by State. However, we believe that in the absence of
complete reporting by NGOs, a reduction in USAID staff, complicated by
the current inability of these staff to work in Darfur, affects USAID's
ability to provide comprehensive oversight of U.S.-funded humanitarian
assistance in Darfur.
2. We determined that 6 of the 15 required final reports were not
submitted by USAID partners and that most of the reports did not
provide all required information. The lack of required reporting
prevented USAID from fully monitoring NGO performance and measuring the
impact of U.S. humanitarian assistance to Darfur. However, we report
additional USAID monitoring and evaluation efforts, such as regular
communication with NGOs, performed by USAID in Darfur. In addition, we
note that such efforts can be limited by issues identified in our
report such as travel restrictions imposed by the Sudanese government
and continuing insecurity throughout the region. We also have added
information to the report noting recent USAID efforts to collect
reports from its implementing partners that reportedly resulted in 100
percent compliance with quarterly reporting requirements in July 2006.
USAID's recent emphasis on collecting required reports may improve its
ability to conduct oversight of U.S.-funded humanitarian operations in
Darfur.
3. In late October, we identified a UN humanitarian profile for July 1,
2006, that had become available to the public. This document stated
that the number of IDPs stood at 1.85 million as of July 1, 2006.
[End of section]
Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
David Gootnick, (202) 512-3149:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the person named above, Emil Friberg, (Assistant
Director), Martin De Alteriis, Etana Finkler, Leslie Holen, Theresa Lo,
Reid Lowe, Grace Lui, John F. Miller, and Chhandasi Pandya made key
contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Bibliography:
Published Reviews of AMIS Operations:
[African Union]-Led Joint Assessment Mission 10 - 20 December 2005.
African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), MAPEX Exercise AMIS Renaissance
After Action Review, August 2005.
The [African Union] Assessment Mission to Darfur, Sudan 10-22 March
2005: Report of the Joint Assessment Team.
Human Rights Watch, "Sudan: Imperatives for Immediate Change, The
African Union:
Mission in Sudan," January 2006 (available at [Hyperlink,
http://hrw.org/reports/2006/sudan0106].)
International Crisis Group, "The [African Union]'s Mission in Darfur:
Bridging the Gaps," Africa Briefing No. 28, July 2005 (available at
[Hyperlink, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=3547].)
International Crisis Group, "The [European Union]/[African Union]
Partnership in Darfur: Not Yet a Winning Combination," Africa Report
No. 99, October 2005 (available at [Hyperlink,
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3766].)
Sally Chin and Jonathan Morgenstein, "No Power to Protect: The African
Union Mission in Sudan," Refugees International, November 2005
(available at [Hyperlink,
http://www.refugeesinternational.org/content/publication/detail/7222].)
William G. O'Neill and Violette Cassis, "Protecting Two Million
Internally Displaced: The Successes and Shortcomings of the African
Union in Darfur," Occasional Paper, The Brookings Institution-
University of Bern Project on Internal Displacement, November 2005
(available at [Hyperlink,
http://www.brookings.edu/comm/news/200511_au_darfur.htm].)
(320375):
FOOTNOTES
[1] The United Nations (UN) defines IDPs as "[p]ersons or groups of
persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or leave their homes or
places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order
to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized
violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made
disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized
border." Affected residents are defined as "habitual residents or
returnees, not including IDPs, seriously affected by the recent
conflict and as a result in need of humanitarian assistance." Together
these groups are referred to as the affected population.
[2] According to U.S. law (8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42)(A)), a refugee is
any person who is outside his or her country of nationality and who is
unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail
himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion.
[3] The African Union, headquartered in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, was
launched in 2002 as the successor to the Organization of African Unity.
The African Union has 53 member states, including Sudan. Its objectives
are, among other things, to achieve greater unity and solidarity
between African countries and the people of Africa; to defend the
sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of member states;
to accelerate the political and socioeconomic integration of the
continent; and to promote peace, security, and stability on the
continent.
[4] Simultaneously with the release of this report, we are issuing a
separate report evaluating various estimates of deaths attributable to
the crisis in Darfur; identifying general challenges involved in making
such estimates; and suggesting measures that the U.S. government can
take to improve death estimates in the future. See GAO, Darfur Crisis:
Death Estimates Demonstrate Severity of Crisis, but Their Accuracy and
Credibility Could Be Enhanced, GAO-07-24 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 9,
2006).
[5] In addition to the U.S. assistance provided for Darfur, an
additional $197 million has supported Darfur refugees located in
Eastern Chad from fiscal year 2004 through September 2006. For this
report, we did not evaluate the U.S. assistance to refugees in Chad.
State has emphasized that insecurity in Darfur has negatively affected
the humanitarian situation in Eastern Chad.
[6] According to a State document, as a result of this coup, the U.S.
government suspended official development assistance to Sudan. In
addition, although Sudan has provided concrete cooperation against
international terrorism since September 11, 2001, the Bashir government
had previously provided sanctuary to terrorists such as Osama bin
Laden. As a result, Sudan remains on the U.S. list of states that
sponsor terrorism, and comprehensive economic, trade, and financial
sanctions have been imposed on Sudan by the United States since 1997.
In addition, in 1998 the U.S. government launched cruise missiles to
destroy a pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum in retaliation for attacks
on the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya earlier that year; the
attack was justified on the grounds that the plant was involved in
producing chemical weapons and had ties with al Qaeda.
[7] UN Security Council Resolution 1590, adopted March 24, 2005.
[8] Estimates for the preconflict population of Darfur range from about
4 million to close to 7 million. Experts that we have interviewed noted
uncertainty regarding the population estimate for Darfur due to the
lack of a current census and the fact that migration in this region
occurs even during nonconflict times.
[9] In the past, the nomadic Arab Muslims known as the Janjaweed had
grazed their cattle, camels, and other livestock on the land of
farmers, with occasional conflicts that were managed through a
traditional dispute resolution process. However, as desertification in
the northern region of Darfur led to southward movement by nomadic
herders, such conflicts increased in frequency, straining relations
between the two groups prior to the intense conflict that began in
2003.
[10] Attacks by the Sudanese government and the Janjaweed have been
targeted at the Fur, Zaghawa, and Massalit ethnic groups in Darfur.
[11] Although the various Arab and African tribes of Darfur have
historically intermarried, creating fluid ethnic identities, the
hardening of these identities is a recent phenomenon, resulting from
the Arabization undertaking by the Sudanese government in Khartoum.
[12] State has estimated the total number of deaths in Darfur, between
March 2003 and January 2005, at 98,000 to 181,000. Estimates prepared
by other parties for varying periods of time range up to about 400,000.
See GAO-07-24.
[13] Unlike the agreement between the North and the South, the Darfur
Peace Agreement does not provide an option allowing citizens of Darfur
to eventually determine whether the region will become independent.
[14] According to a State official, very little, if any, real
disarmament had occurred as of November.
[15] According to a State official, State encouraged African Union
involvement in Darfur, in part, in order to support the concept of
"African solutions for African problems."
[16] African Union Peace and Security Council, 10TH meeting, communiqué
dated May 25, 2004.
[17] African Union Peace and Security Council, 17TH meeting, communiqué
dated October 20, 2004.
[18] African Union Peace and Security Council, 17TH meeting, communiqué
dated October 20, 2004.
[19] The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide of 1948 defines genocide as any of the following acts
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) killing members of
the group, (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
group, (c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part,
(d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group, or
(e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. The
U.S. government ratified the convention in 1988. Sudan is not a party
to this convention. The convention requires parties to enact domestic
legislation to give effect to the provisions of the convention and to
provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide. The
convention also requires parties to grant extradition in accordance
with their laws and treaties in force. Furthermore, while the
convention grants parties the authority to call upon the competent
organs of the UN to take action for the prevention and suppression of
acts of genocide, it does not specify further requirements on the
parties.
[20] H. Con. Res. 467, 108th Cong. (2004); S. Con. Res. 133, 108th
Cong. (2004).
[21] According to a State official, the key factor in the genocide
determination was the intent of the Sudanese government regarding its
actions in Darfur (i.e., its intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
specific group of people); the number of deaths attributable to the
crisis was not a critical factor.
[22] UN Security Council resolution 1564, adopted September 18, 2004.
[23] United Nations, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry
on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General, Pursuant to Security
Council Resolution 1564 of 18 September 2004 (Geneva: 2005).
[24] UN Security Council resolution 1591, adopted March 29, 2005. UN
Security Council resolution 1672, adopted April 25, 2006, identified
four individuals subject to these sanctions.
[25] UN Security Council resolution 1593, adopted March 31, 2005. In
June 2006, the International Criminal Court's Prosecutor briefed the UN
Security Council and noted that the International Criminal Court had
gathered significant evidence on crimes committed in Darfur, but no
conclusions will be drawn regarding allegations that some of those
crimes had been committed with specific genocidal intent until the
completion of a full and impartial investigation. According to the UN,
the Prosecutor stated that identifying those with greatest
responsibility for the most serious crimes was a key challenge for the
investigation, and the complexity of the Darfur conflict exacerbated
that challenge, given that it involved multiple parties, varying over
time throughout the different states and localities.
[26] The assistance reported by the UN as provided by other donors
includes both pledges and obligations. According to the UN, a pledge is
a nonbinding announcement of an intended contribution or allocation by
the donor. An obligation represents a contractual obligation of funding
by the donor against which agencies can begin spending.
[27] The Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the
Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief for 2005 (Pub. L. No. 109-13,
119 Stat. 231 (2005) appropriated $40 million for international
disaster and famine asssistance, $48.4 million for migration and
refugee assistance, and up to $240 million for food aid for Darfur (see
H.R. Rep. No. 109-72 at 128, 130, and 134). According to USAID and
State officials, from this supplemental appropriation, $40 million of
international disaster and famine assistance, $6 million of migration
and refugee assistance, and $25 million of food aid assistance was
obligated for Darfur.
[28] The Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of Defense, The
Global War on Terror, and Hurricane Recovery of 2006 (Pub. L. 109-234,
120 Stat. 418 (2006) appropriated $161.3 million for international
disaster and famine assistance and $350 million for P.L. 480 Title II
grants. USAID and State officials told us that from these supplemental
appropriations, $66 million of international disaster and famine
assistance, $2 million of migration and refugee assistance, and $137
million of food aid assistance was allocated for Darfur.
[29] The quantity, or tonnage, of food aid fell by less than the
funding amount due to the fact that the 2006 funding does not include
the value of some commodities provided for Darfur in fiscal year 2006.
According to a USAID official, these commodities, originally intended
as aid for another African country, were transferred to Darfur after
the other country's program ended in November-December 2005.
[30] UN Work Plans for the Sudan, including midyear revisions, show
that the World Food Program's planned assistance to Sudan decreased
from $1.08 billion for 2005 to $900 million for 2006. According to
World Food Program and USAID officials, the lowered appeal for 2006
reflected (1) a larger harvest in Sudan in 2005 than in 2004, resulting
in greater food supplies for some of the nondisplaced communities in
Darfur in 2006, (2) a significant amount of food aid carried over by
the program from 2005 to 2006, and (3) the World Food Program's use of
UN internal funding mechanisms to cover urgent food needs in Darfur in
2005.
[31] The World Food Program activities included in the UN Work Plan for
the Sudan include food aid, as well as other activities such as basic
infrastructure and development, education and vocational training, and
food security and livelihood recovery.
[32] This amount includes $172 million of commodities that USAID
transferred through the Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust--a USDA-managed
reserve of commodities for unanticipated emergency needs in developing
countries--to address Darfur food needs in fiscal year 2005. USAID Food
for Peace provided the food aid for Darfur through funding provided by
Public Law 480, Title II.
[33] About $47 million of humanitarian aid was also provided to the
International Committee of the Red Cross for all of Sudan, including
Darfur, in fiscal years 2005 and 2006 by State's Bureau of Population,
Refugees, and Migration. However, according to a State official, there
is no way to accurately determine the funds provided solely to Darfur.
This contribution is therefore not included in the total amount.
[34] Protection activities are intended to enhance the safety and basic
rights of vulnerable persons affected by the conflict in Darfur,
including protecting women from violence and rape outside of the camps.
Logistics activities include humanitarian air transport and logistical
support for humanitarian agencies and activities in Darfur. Food
security/agriculture includes activities intended to increase food
production and access to food, thereby reduce dependency on food aid,
such as farming assistance and provision of seeds.
[35] Sphere, launched in 1997 by a group of humanitarian NGOs and the
Red Cross, developed standards to be attained in disaster assistance in
five sectors, water supply and sanitation, nutrition, food aid,
shelter, and health services.
[36] UN humanitarian profiles, developed by the UN Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, are intended to provide a
comprehensive overview and analysis of the number and locations of the
conflict affected population in Darfur, the humanitarian assistance
provided, remaining gaps in assistance, humanitarian presence in the
region, and sectoral issues. Information on IDPs and humanitarian
assistance is provided monthly by NGOs and UN agencies implementing
humanitarian assistance.
[37] According to UN officials and the UN profiles, because UN
officials assume that most affected residents have access to sanitation
at a level that does not require additional emergency assistance, the
target populations for sanitation include only IDPs. However, the other
aid sectors target all affected residents and IDPs.
[38] According to the Sphere Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards
in Disaster Response (Geneva: Switzerland, 2004), also known as the
Sphere Handbook, Global Acute Malnutrition refers to wasting or the
thinness of children between the ages of 6 to 59 months.
[39] According to the Sphere Handbook, the daily crude mortality rate-
-that is, the rate of death for the entire population, including both
sexes and all ages--is the most specific and useful health indicator to
monitor in a disaster situation, when mortality may change
significantly during a short time interval. The Sphere standards report
that a doubling of the baseline crude mortality rate indicates a
significant public health emergency requiring an immediate response; if
the baseline rate is unknown, health agencies should aim to maintain
the crude mortality rate at below 1.0 per 10,000 per day. The normal
crude mortality rate in the United States is about 0.25 deaths per
10,000 per day. Typically, both the crude mortality rate and mortality
rates for specific groups (such as those younger than 5 years or of a
specific sex) are reported.
[40] See GAO, Foreign Assistance: Sustained Efforts Needed to Help
Southern Africa Recover from Food Crisis, GAO-06-644 (Washington, D.C.:
Jun. 25, 2003), and Foreign Assistance: Lack of Strategic Focus and
Obstacles to Agricultural Recovery Threaten Afghanistan's Stability,
GAO-03-607 (Washington, D.C.: Jun. 30, 2003).
[41] USAID routinely draws on technical, security, and communication
specialists to supports its efforts in Darfur to conduct assessments on
humanitarian assistance. USAID has deployed staff to conduct food
assessments and for missions covering administrative, safety and
security, and disease prevention tasks.
[42] According to USAID, the UN is not subject to reporting
requirements, thus the requirements apply only to a small portion of
the total U.S. assistance to Darfur.
[43] Our assessment does not include the changes made to AMIS
responsibilities and activities included in the May 2006 Darfur Peace
Agreement. For example, in June 2006, a Darfur Ceasefire Commission was
inaugurated to implement and monitor the cease-fire provisions of the
peace agreement and other previous agreements between the Sudanese
parties. We are not reviewing the activities of this newly created
body.
[44] These reports, covering allegations received between July 2004 and
September 2005, were available on the African Union Web site
(Hyperlink, http://www.africa-union.org/DARFUR/CFC.htm) as of June
2006. According to a State official, this Web site is the only public
source of the reports.
[45] We were able to open 79 reports on the African Union Web site that
contained 88 claims of possible cease-fire violations. Eight of these
reports were incomplete with respect to determinations, leaving 80
claims for us to assess.
[46] In seven cases, the Ceasefire Commission determined that two
parties were in violation of the 2004 agreement.
[47] According to a DOD official, the African Union will only release
Ceasefire Commission reports that have been approved by the Joint
Commission. The inactivity of the Joint Commission over the past
several months is a likely explanation for the lack of available
reports subsequent to September 2005.
[48] In addition, a Senegalese soldier was killed and 10 other AMIS
troops were injured in January 2006.
[49] [African Union]-Led Joint Assessment Mission 10-20 December 2005,
p. 3.
[50] William G. O'Neill and Violette Cassis, "Protecting Two Million
Internally Displaced: The Successes and Shortcomings of the African
Union in Darfur," Occasional Paper, The Brookings Institution-
University of Bern Project on Internal Displacement, November 2005
(available at Hyperlink,
http://www.brookings.edu/comm/news/200511_au_darfur.htm).
[51] AMIS reportedly increased the frequency of its patrols, and the
civilian police established a base in Mershing subsequent to this
event.
[52] AMIS civilian police are deployed in Darfur to build confidence
and monitor the activities of Sudanese police, who are ultimately
responsible for ensuring that Darfur citizens are adequately protected.
AMIS civilian police have no authority for direct involvement with
Sudanese police matters.
[53] AMIS police provide an avenue for civilians--many of whom distrust
the Sudanese police--to report crimes. In particular, women can report
cases of rape and violence, many of which would not be reported without
the presence of the civilian police and its female officers. AMIS
police refer these cases to the Sudanese police.
[54] Currently, 26 such stations exist, and another 39 stations to be
built by the Norwegian government, are planned.
[55] We were unable to locate a comprehensive list of all donor
assistance that has been provided for AMIS. According to a U.S. Embassy
official in Addis Ababa, the donor community meets weekly to discuss
AMIS resource needs, with this effort coordinated by the European
Union.
[56] Of the total of $240 million expended, over 20 percent ($50
million) was provided via emergency supplemental legislation. According
to a State official, the Fiscal Year 2006 Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Hurricane
Recovery provides about $173 million for AMIS-related activities.
[57] According to a senior PAE official, PAE's contract provides time
and materials for labor, and cost plus reimbursable for materials and
equipment and other direct costs. Another U.S. company, DynCorp, won
bids to provide troop equipment and strategic transport for U.S.
efforts to build AMIS camps. According to a State official, DynCorp has
received approximately $23.5 million of the total funding that has gone
to support AMIS.
[58] For example, one U.S. military observer told us that, in addition
to being an observer, he provides advice on operational issues to AMIS
commanders and their staffs, with a goal toward building capacity. He
also provides training to AMIS leaders who in turn pass on this
training to lower levels. Further, he works as a coordinator to
facilitate collaboration between AMIS components, local agencies, PAE,
parties to the conflict, and NGOs.
[59] According to a State official, the number of U.S. military
observers in Darfur has ranged from about 4 to 16 at various times
during the past 2 years.
[60] PAE also maintains a forward operating base in Nyala that can
house 300 transient and 330 overflow AMIS personnel. In addition, the
AMIS camp in Zam Zam can house 400 transient AMIS personnel.
[61] The Department of State's Contracting Officer's Technical
Representative in Darfur is the principal U.S. government official
responsible for oversight of PAE's activities in Darfur. State
Department officials told us that it can be difficult to determine
whether PAE's costs are appropriate and reasonable. One State official
noted that PAE's costs on a "per soldier" basis (which he placed at
approximately $30 per soldier per day) are similar to other initiatives
to build camps for peacekeeping efforts. This official noted that State
reviews weekly "situation reports" submitted by PAE and interacts
frequently with PAE staff in Washington, D.C. State officials who have
experience with past similar peace support efforts are also involved
with the Darfur initiative and can provide insights based on their
historical experience. Further, during our visit to Darfur, the
Technical Representative told us that he reviewed PAE invoices over
$15,000 and had imposed a freeze on increases in employment and vehicle
numbers.
[62] Differences in water usage between AMIS camps have been
substantial. For example, according to PAE data for the last week of
April 2006, water usage per person in Umm Barro camp was about 53
liters per day, while at Sarif Umra camp, water usage per person was
about 237 liters per day. PAE has had difficulty convincing AMIS
leaders to encourage AMIS personnel to use less water.
[63] According to a European Union official, military observers and
civilian police receive $80 per person per day, while protection force
troops receive $25 per person per day (after $10 is deducted for
rations/food).
[64] According to contractor documents, AMIS has, for example, over 750
vehicles, 675 Motorola handheld radios, and 100 Thuraya satellite
telephones.
[65] According to a DOD official, DOD's direct contributions to address
the Darfur crisis have been limited to staff expertise, military
observers, training and the provision of airlift to move troops in and
out of Darfur. This official noted that U.S. military assistance has
been funneled through NATO since July 2005. State officials emphasized
in particular U.S. government efforts to train and equip Rwandan and
Nigerian battalions through the African Contingency Operations Training
and Assistance program.
[66] A detailed discussion of challenges that have faced UN
peacekeeping missions, some of which are similar to what AMIS has
experienced, can be found in the UN's August 2000 "Report of the Panel
on United Nations Peace Operations" (available at http://www.un.org/
peace/reports/peace_operations). This document was prepared by a panel
convened by the UN Secretary-General to assess the UN's ability to
conduct peace operations effectively, and to offer recommendations for
ways in which to enhance that capacity.
[67] "Command and control" generally refers to the exercise of
authority and direction by a designated commander over assigned and
attached forces in the accomplishment of a mission. Command and control
functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment,
communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in
planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and
operations in the accomplishment of the mission. For a discussion of
command and control in peace operations see GAO, United Nations:
Limitations in Leading Missions Requiring Force to Restore Peace, GAO/
NSIAD-97-34 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 27, 1997).
[68] African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), MAPEX Exercise AMIS
Renaissance After Action Review, August 2005, p. 3.
[69] Sally Chin and Jonathan Morgenstein, "No Power to Protect: The
African Union Mission in Sudan," Refugees International, November 2005
(available at Hyperlink,
http://www.refugeesinternational.org/content/publication/detail/7222),
p. 9.
[70] O'Neill and Cassis, "Protecting Two Million," p. 50.
[71] AMIS has a responsibility to "protect civilians whom it encounters
under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity, within resources
and capability" and does not have what is known as a "Chapter VII"
mandate, which refers to Chapter VII of the UN charter entitled "Action
with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts
of aggression." According to UN documentation, aware of the dangers of
deploying peacekeepers in situations where there is no real peace to
keep, the UN Security Council now provides, when it deems necessary, UN
peacekeeping operations with more "robust" mandates based on Chapter
VII. These mandates allow and in fact require peacekeepers to "use all
necessary means" to protect civilians, prevent violence against UN
staff and personnel and deter armed elements from ignoring peace
agreements.
[72] Adding to the concern over AMIS's actions is the belief among some
organizations that AMIS should have a stronger mandate that allows for
more active protection of civilians and IDPs, given, among other
things, the Sudanese government's apparently limited willingness to
protect its own citizens. The International Crisis Group, the Brookings
Institution, and Refugees International have called for a strengthened
AMIS mandate. The December 2005 African Union-led joint assessment
proposes that AMIS's current mandate is adequate but is not clearly
understood by commanders at all levels. It further notes that a robust
interpretation of the mandate is required to maintain force credibility
and to provide the necessary degree of protection to civilians within
capabilities. It states that mandate training at the commander level,
as well as rules of engagement to ensure consistent interpretation, are
needed. The study noted the importance of maximizing existing
capabilities through a robust interpretation of the AMIS mandate when
protection of civilians is at issue. U.S. officials stated that the
AMIS mandate is sufficient but that, to maximize AMIS performance,
improvements in command and control are needed.
[73] [African Union]-Led Joint Assessment Mission 10-20 December 2005,
p. 8.
[74] O'Neill and Cassis, "Protecting Two Million," p. 54.
[75] The creation of a joint logistics operations center is intended to
improve resource management between the various AMIS components and
reduce problems such as unequal resource allocation to the civilian
police. However, the December 2005 African Union-led assessment of AMIS
noted that "there is limited support for the concept from the military
component of AMIS and the joint logistics operations center lacks
sufficient authority to fulfill its role."
[76] O'Neill and Cassis, "Protecting Two Million," pp. 50-51.
[77] Human Rights Watch, "Imperatives for Immediate Change, The African
Union Mission in Sudan," January 2006 (available at Hyperlink,
http://hrw.org/reports/2006/sudan0106), p. 41.
[78] O'Neill and Cassis, "Protecting Two Million," p. 31.
[79] A lack of troops to carry out mandates has been an issue with
other peacekeeping efforts. See GAO, Issues in Implementing
International Peace Operations, GAO-02-707R (Washington, D.C.: May 24,
2002).
[80] Chin and Morgenstein, "No Power to Protect," p. 7.
[81] International Crisis Group, "The [African Union]'s Mission in
Darfur: Bridging the Gaps," Africa Briefing No. 28, July 2005
(available at Hyperlink,
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=3547), p. 1.
[82] [African Union]-Led Joint Assessment Mission 10-20 December 2005,
p. 10.
[83] Sufficiency of resources has been a long-standing concern for
peacekeeping efforts. For example, see GAO, "UN Peacekeeping: Issues
Related to Effectiveness, Cost, and Reform," GAO/T-NSIAD-97-139
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 9, 1997).
[84] This official emphasized the importance of 105 armored personnel
carriers recently provided by Canada. One AMIS official emphasized to
us that virtually all ground vehicles are useless in Darfur during the
rainy season, which runs from June through September.
[85] According to this official, when AMIS received a donation of 100
Thuraya satellite telephones, the majority of them were kept at AMIS
headquarters in El Fasher for AMIS leadership, instead of being
distributed to the field where the telephones were most needed.
[86] [African Union]-Led Joint Assessment Mission 10-20 December 2005,
p. 13.
[87] O'Neill and Cassis, "Protecting Two Million," p. 53.
[88] [African Union]-Led Joint Assessment Mission 10-20 December 2005,
pp. 11, 16.
[89] [African Union]-Led Joint Assessment Mission 10-20 December 2005,
pp. 2-3.
[90] International Crisis Group, "The [European Union]/[African Union]
Partnership in Darfur: Not Yet a Winning Combination," Africa Report
No. 99, October 2005 (available at Hyperlink,
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3766), p. 4.
[91] African Union Peace and Security Council, 45TH meeting, communiqué
dated January 12, 2006.
[92] African Union Peace and Security Council, 46TH meeting, communiqué
dated March 10, 2006.African Union Peace and Security Council, 51ST
meeting, communiqué dated May 15, 2006.
[93] UN Security Council Resolution 1679, adopted May 16, 2006.
[94] UN Security Council Resolution 1706, adopted August 31, 2006. The
expanded UNMIS mandate includes, among other things, supporting the
implementation of the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement and the 2004
Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement. The resolution also states that, per
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, UNMIS is authorized to use all necessary
means, in the areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within
its capabilities, to, for example, protect UN personnel, humanitarian
workers, and assessment and evaluation commission personnel. The
resolution states that UNMIS shall be expanded to as many as 17,300
military personnel and an appropriate civilian component, including up
to 3,300 civilian police.
[95] This cost is reportedly less than if UN operations in Darfur were
starting up without a presence already established in Sudan; the
current presence of the UN in Sudan would result in economies of scale
for the Darfur component that would lower costs.
[96] State regularly works with the African Union to facilitate NATO
assistance, according to a State official.
[97] A DOD official reported that by capturing "lessons learned,"
relevant parties learn from past experiences, prevent repeating
avoidable mistakes, adapt quickly to new and equally complex
situations, and can share constructive criticisms with other interested
parties.
[98] African Union Peace and Security Council, 10TH meeting, communiqué
dated May 25, 2004.
[99] African Union Peace and Security Council, 13TH meeting, communiqué
dated July 27, 2004.
[100] African Union Peace and Security Council, 17TH meeting, "Report
of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in the Darfur,
the Sudan," dated October 20, 2004.
[101] African Union Peace and Security Council, 17TH meeting,
communiqué dated October 20, 2004.
[102] African Union Peace and Security Council, 28TH meeting,
communiqué dated April 28, 2005.
[103] This information is taken from a situation report prepared by
PAE, the U.S. contractor responsible for maintaining all AMIS camps,
and submitted to the Department of State. This report also notes that
an additional 155 personnel were serving as air crew, interpreters, or
in other roles, and of the total AMIS deployment 312 were women.
[104] Kenya has contributed a small number of military police.
[105] African Union Peace and Security Council, 45th meeting,
communiqué dated January 12, 2006.
[106] African Union Peace and Security Council, 46th meeting,
communiqué dated March 10, 2006. African Union Peace and Security
Council, 51st meeting, communiqué dated May 15, 2006.
[107] UN Security Council Resolution 1679, adopted May 16, 2006.
[108] UN Security Council Resolution 1706, adopted August 31, 2006. The
expanded UNMIS mandate includes, among other things, supporting the
implementation of the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement and the 2004
Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement. The resolution also states that, per
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, UNMIS is authorized to use all necessary
means, in the areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within
its capabilities, to, for example, protect UN personnel, humanitarian
workers, and assessment and evaluation commission personnel. The
resolution states that UNMIS shall be expanded to as many as 17,300
military personnel and an appropriate civilian component, including up
to 3,300 civilian police, and that elements of UNMIS shall begin to be
deployed in Darfur no later than October 1, 2006.
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