Combating Nuclear Smuggling
Corruption, Maintenance, and Coordination Problems Challenge U.S. Efforts to Provide Radiation Detection Equipment to Other Countries Gao ID: GAO-06-311 March 14, 2006According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, between 1993 and 2004, there were 662 confirmed cases of illicit trafficking in nuclear and radiological materials. Three U.S. agencies, the Departments of Energy (DOE), Defense (DOD), and State (State), have programs that provide radiation detection equipment and training to border security personnel in other countries. GAO examined the (1) progress U.S. programs have made in providing radiation detection equipment to foreign governments, including the current and expected costs of these programs; (2) challenges U.S. programs face in this effort; and (3) steps being taken to coordinate U.S. efforts to combat nuclear smuggling in other countries.
Since fiscal year 1994, DOE, DOD, and State have provided radiation detection equipment to 36 countries as part of the overall U.S. effort to combat nuclear smuggling. Through the end of fiscal year 2005, these agencies had spent about $178 million on this assistance through seven different programs. Primary among these programs is DOE's Second Line of Defense "Core" program, which has installed equipment mostly in Russia since 1998. U.S. efforts to install and effectively operate radiation detection equipment in other countries face a number of challenges including: corruption of some foreign border security officials, technical limitations of some radiation detection equipment, inadequate maintenance of some equipment, and the lack of supporting infrastructure at some border sites. DOE, DOD, and State officials told us they are concerned that corrupt foreign border security personnel could compromise the effectiveness of U.S.-funded radiation detection equipment by either turning off equipment or ignoring alarms. In addition, State and other agencies have installed equipment at some sites that is less effective than equipment installed by DOE. Since 2002, DOE has maintained the equipment but has only upgraded one site. As a result, these border sites are more vulnerable to nuclear smuggling than sites with more sophisticated equipment. Further, while DOE assumed responsibility for maintaining most U.S.-funded equipment, some handheld equipment provided by State and DOD has not been maintained. Lastly, many border sites are located in remote areas that often lack infrastructure essential to operate radiation detection equipment. As the lead interagency coordinator of all U.S. radiation detection equipment assistance overseas, State has taken some steps to coordinate U.S. efforts. However, its ability to carry out its role as lead coordinator is limited by shortcomings in the strategic plan for interagency coordination. Additionally, State has not maintained an interagency master list of all U.S.-funded radiation detection equipment overseas. Without such a list, program managers at DOE, DOD, and State cannot accurately assess if equipment is operational and being used as intended; determine the equipment needs of countries where they plan to provide assistance; or detect if an agency has unknowingly supplied duplicative equipment.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-06-311, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Corruption, Maintenance, and Coordination Problems Challenge U.S. Efforts to Provide Radiation Detection Equipment to Other Countries
This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-06-311
entitled 'Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Corruption, Maintenance, and
Coordination Problems Challenge U.S. Efforts to Provide Radiation
Detection Equipment to Other Countries' which was released on March 28,
2006.
This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part
of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this
document to Webmaster@gao.gov.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this
material separately.
Report to Congressional Requesters:
March 2006:
Combating Nuclear Smuggling:
Corruption, Maintenance, and Coordination Problems Challenge U.S.
Efforts to Provide Radiation Detection Equipment to Other Countries:
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-311]
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-311, a report to congressional requesters:
Why GAO Did This Study:
According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, between 1993 and
2004, there were 662 confirmed cases of illicit trafficking in nuclear
and radiological materials. Three U.S. agencies, the Departments of
Energy (DOE), Defense (DOD), and State (State), have programs that
provide radiation detection equipment and training to border security
personnel in other countries. GAO examined the (1) progress U.S.
programs have made in providing radiation detection equipment to
foreign governments, including the current and expected costs of these
programs; (2) challenges U.S. programs face in this effort; and (3)
steps being taken to coordinate U.S. efforts to combat nuclear
smuggling in other countries.
What GAO Found:
Since fiscal year 1994, DOE, DOD, and State have provided radiation
detection equipment to 36 countries as part of the overall U.S. effort
to combat nuclear smuggling. Through the end of fiscal year 2005, these
agencies had spent about $178 million on this assistance through seven
different programs. Primary among these programs is DOE‘s Second Line
of Defense ’Core“ program, which has installed equipment mostly in
Russia since 1998.
U.S. efforts to install and effectively operate radiation detection
equipment in other countries face a number of challenges including:
corruption of some foreign border security officials, technical
limitations of some radiation detection equipment, inadequate
maintenance of some equipment, and the lack of supporting
infrastructure at some border sites. DOE, DOD, and State officials told
us they are concerned that corrupt foreign border security personnel
could compromise the effectiveness of U.S.-funded radiation detection
equipment by either turning off equipment or ignoring alarms. In
addition, State and other agencies have installed equipment at some
sites that is less effective than equipment installed by DOE. Since
2002, DOE has maintained the equipment but has only upgraded one site.
As a result, these border sites are more vulnerable to nuclear
smuggling than sites with more sophisticated equipment. Further, while
DOE assumed responsibility for maintaining most U.S.-funded equipment,
some handheld equipment provided by State and DOD has not been
maintained. Lastly, many border sites are located in remote areas that
often lack infrastructure essential to operate radiation detection
equipment.
As the lead interagency coordinator of all U.S. radiation detection
equipment assistance overseas, State has taken some steps to coordinate
U.S. efforts. However, its ability to carry out its role as lead
coordinator is limited by shortcomings in the strategic plan for
interagency coordination. Additionally, State has not maintained an
interagency master list of all U.S.-funded radiation detection
equipment overseas. Without such a list, program managers at DOE, DOD,
and State cannot accurately assess if equipment is operational and
being used as intended; determine the equipment needs of countries
where they plan to provide assistance; or detect if an agency has
unknowingly supplied duplicative equipment.
DOD-Funded Radiation Portal Monitor in Uzbekistan:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is making recommendations to the Secretaries of Energy and State to
(1) integrate cost projections for anticorruption measures into long-
term program cost estimates; (2) upgrade less sophisticated portal
monitors; (3) provide maintenance for all handheld radiation detection
equipment provided by U.S. programs; (4) revise the interagency
strategic plan; and (5) compile, maintain, and share a master list of
all U.S. radiation detection equipment assistance.
DOE and State generally agreed with our conclusions and
recommendations. DOD did not provide comments on the report.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-311.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Gene Aloise at (202) 512-
5841 or aloisee@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Three U.S. Agencies Have Spent About $178 Million to Provide Radiation
Detection Equipment to 36 Countries, but Future Spending Requirements
for Some Programs Are Uncertain:
The Threat of Corruption, Technological Limitations, Maintenance
Problems, and Site Infrastructure Issues Challenge U.S. Programs to
Combat Nuclear Smuggling:
State's Efforts to Coordinate U.S. Assistance Are Limited by
Deficiencies in the Interagency Strategic Plan and the Lack of a
Comprehensive List of Equipment Provided by U.S. Programs:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Additional Information on Radiation Detection Assistance
Programs at the Department of Energy:
Appendix III: Additional Information on Radiation Detection Assistance
Programs at the Department of Defense:
Appendix IV: Additional Information on Radiation Detection Assistance
Programs at the Department of State:
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Energy:
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of State:
Table:
Table 1: U.S. Spending by Program on Radiation Detection Equipment and
Related Training Provided to Foreign Countries through the End of
Fiscal Year 2005:
Figures:
Figure 1: Radiation Portal Monitors Containing Both Gamma and Neutron
Radiation Detectors at a Border Site in Northern Greece:
Figure 2: Older Radiation Portal Monitor Able to Detect Only Gamma
Radiation at a Border Site in Georgia:
Figure 3: Handheld Radiation Detector in Georgia Needing Recalibration:
Figure 4: Rail Portal Monitor in Western Uzbekistan with Antitampering
Protection:
Figure 5: Radiation Portal Monitor in Uzbekistan with Heat Shield
Enclosure:
Figure 6: Map of Countries Where DOE's SLD-Core Program Has Installed
Equipment and Signed Agreements to Begin Work:
Figure 7: DOE Spending on the SLD-Core Program through the End of
Fiscal Year 2005:
Figure 8: Map of Countries Where DOE Maintains Equipment Previously
Provided by Other U.S. Agencies:
Figure 9: Map of Countries Where DOE's CRITr Project Has Provided and
Plans to Provide Radiation Detection Equipment:
Figure 10: DOD Spending on Radiation Detection Equipment Assistance
Programs through the End of Fiscal Year 2005:
Figure 11: Map of Countries Where DOD's WMD-PPI Program Has Provided
Radiation Detection Equipment or Signed Agreements to Install
Equipment:
Figure 12: Map of Countries Where DOD's ICP Has Provided Radiation
Detection Equipment:
Figure 13: Flowchart of ICP Training Courses:
Figure 14: State Spending on Radiation Detection Equipment Assistance
Programs through the End of Fiscal Year 2005:
Figure 15: Map of Countries Where State's Export Control and Related
Border Security Program Has Provided Radiation Detection Equipment:
Figure 16: Map of Countries Where State's Nonproliferation and
Disarmament Fund Has Provided Radiation Detection Equipment:
Abbreviations:
CRITr: Cooperative Radiological Instrument Transfer project:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
DNDO: Domestic Nuclear Detection Office:
DOE: Department of Energy:
DOD: Department of Defense:
EXBS: Export Control and Related Border Security program:
GBSLE: Georgia Border Security and Law Enforcement program:
ICP: International Counterproliferation Program:
IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency:
NDF: Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund:
NNSA: National Nuclear Security Administration:
RIID: radioactive isotope identification device:
SLD-Core: Second Line of Defense "Core" program:
WMD: weapons of mass destruction:
WMD-PPI: Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation Prevention
Initiative:
Letter March 14, 2006:
Congressional Requesters:
According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, between 1993 and
2004, there were 662 confirmed cases of illicit trafficking in nuclear
and radiological materials, and the number of reported cases has risen
dramatically since 2002. Many of these cases involved material that
could be used to produce either a nuclear weapon or a device that uses
conventional explosives with radioactive material (known as a "dirty
bomb," or radiological dispersal device). Especially in the aftermath
of the attacks on September 11, 2001, there is heightened concern that
terrorists may try to smuggle nuclear materials or a nuclear weapon
into the United States. If terrorists were to accomplish this, the
consequences could be devastating to our national and economic
interests. In April 2004, the United Nations Security Council passed a
resolution calling for every member state to put in place appropriate
effective border controls and law enforcement to detect, deter,
prevent, and combat the illicit trafficking and brokering in nuclear
materials and other items related to weapons of mass
destruction.[Footnote 1]
In response to the growing concern about nuclear smuggling, three U.S.
agencies, the Departments of Energy (DOE), Defense (DOD), and State
(State), have programs that provide radiation detection equipment and
related training to border security personnel and customs officials in
other countries.[Footnote 2] Initial concerns about the threat posed by
nuclear smuggling were focused on nuclear materials originating in the
former Soviet Union. As a result, the first major initiatives to combat
nuclear smuggling concentrated on deploying radiation detection
equipment at borders in countries of the former Soviet Union and in
Eastern Europe. Beginning in the mid-1990s, DOD and State provided
fixed radiation detection equipment, known as radiation portal
monitors, and handheld radiation detection equipment to a number of
countries in this region. In 1998, DOE established the Second Line of
Defense "Core" (SLD-Core) program,[Footnote 3] which has primarily
worked to help Russia detect illicit nuclear materials trafficking by
providing radiation detection equipment to the Federal Customs Service
of Russia. In coordination with State, DOE, through its National
Nuclear Security Administration,[Footnote 4] has recently expanded its
efforts in the SLD-Core program to include countries other than Russia,
including installing radiation detection equipment at border sites in
Greece as part of the overall U.S. effort to provide security
assistance prior to the 2004 Olympic Games.[Footnote 5] In addition to
DOE's efforts through the SLD-Core program, six other programs--one at
DOE, two at DOD, and three at State--have provided radiation detection
equipment to assist foreign governments in combating nuclear smuggling.
Further, State is the lead interagency coordinator of U.S. nuclear
detection assistance overseas.
As agreed with your offices, this report addresses U.S. efforts to
combat nuclear smuggling by examining (1) the progress U.S. programs
have made in providing radiation detection equipment to foreign
governments, including the current and expected costs of these
programs; (2) the challenges U.S. programs face in deploying or
operating radiation detection equipment in foreign countries; and (3)
the steps being taken to coordinate U.S. efforts to combat nuclear
smuggling in other countries. To address these objectives, we analyzed
documentation on U.S. efforts to combat nuclear smuggling from DOE and
its contractors, both at DOE's national laboratories and in the private
sector; DOD and its contractors; State; and DHS and conducted
interviews with key program officials at each of these agencies. We
also visited six countries (Georgia, Greece, Macedonia, Russia,
Ukraine, and Uzbekistan), where U.S. agencies have provided radiation
detection equipment, to observe U.S.-funded radiation detection
equipment in operation and to discuss the implementation of U.S.
programs with foreign officials. In addition, we analyzed cost and
budgetary information from DOE, DOD, State, and DHS; performed a data
reliability assessment of this data; and interviewed knowledgeable
agency officials on the reliability of the data. We determined these
data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. More
details on our scope and methodology can be found in appendix I. We
conducted our review from April 2005 to February 2006 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Results in Brief:
Since fiscal year 1994, DOE, DOD, and State have provided radiation
detection equipment to 36 countries as part of the overall U.S. effort
to combat nuclear smuggling. Through the end of fiscal year 2005, these
agencies had spent about $178 million on this assistance through seven
different programs. Specifically, as of fiscal year 2005, DOE's SLD-
Core program had completed installation of radiation portal monitors at
83 border sites in Russia, Greece, and Lithuania at a cost of about
$130 million. DOE plans to install radiation detection equipment at a
total of about 350 sites in 31 countries by 2012 at a total cost of
about $570 million. A second DOE program has provided handheld
radiation detection equipment to regulatory agencies and patrol
officers in 9 countries at a cost of about $1 million. In addition to
DOE's efforts, two DOD programs have spent about $22 million to provide
radiation portal monitors, handheld equipment, and radiation detection
training to 8 countries in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
DOD plans to complete its Uzbekistan Portal Monitoring project in
fiscal year 2009 at a total cost of about $54 million. Furthermore, DOD
also plans to continue providing limited amounts of handheld radiation
detection equipment to other countries in the future. Similarly, three
Department of State programs have provided radiation detection
equipment and training to 31 countries at a cost of about $25 million.
However, future spending requirements for State's radiation detection
assistance programs are uncertain, in part, because State's Export
Control and Related Border Security program provides radiation
detection equipment to foreign countries on an as needed basis as a
part of its effort to increase export control enforcement in foreign
countries. In coordination with DOE, this program also selectively
funds more expensive radiation portal monitors to certain sites on a
case-by-case basis, such as at one site in Armenia, where State
believes the imminence of a smuggling threat warranted immediate
action.
U.S. efforts to provide radiation detection equipment to other
countries face a number of challenges that can impact the effective
operation of this equipment, including: possible corruption of border
security officials in some countries, technical limitations of
radiation detection equipment previously deployed by State and other
agencies, inadequate maintenance of some equipment deployed by DOD and
State, and the lack of infrastructure and harsh environmental
conditions at some border sites.
* According to officials from several recipient countries we visited,
corruption is a pervasive problem within the ranks of border security
organizations. DOE, DOD, and State officials told us they are concerned
that corrupt foreign border security personnel could compromise the
effectiveness of U.S.-funded radiation detection equipment by either
turning off equipment or ignoring alarms. To mitigate this threat, DOE
and DOD plan to deploy communications links between individual border
sites and national command centers so that alarm data can be
simultaneously evaluated by multiple officials, thus establishing
redundant layers of accountability for alarm response. In addition, DOD
plans to implement a program in Uzbekistan to combat some of the
underlying issues that can lead to corruption through periodic
screening of border security personnel. State also conducts
anticorruption training as part of its overall export control
assistance to foreign countries.
* Some radiation portal monitors that State and other U.S. agencies
previously installed at foreign border sites have technical limitations
and can only detect gamma radiation, which makes them less effective at
detecting weapons-usable nuclear material than equipment with both
gamma and neutron radiation detection capabilities. Since 2002, DOE has
maintained this equipment but has not upgraded any of it, with the
exception of one site in Azerbaijan. According to DOE officials, new
implementing agreements with the appropriate ministries or agencies
within the governments of each of the countries where the old equipment
is located are needed before DOE can install more sophisticated
equipment. According to DOE officials, these agreements are important
because they exempt DOE from paying foreign taxes and require host
governments to provide DOE with data on detections of illicit
trafficking in nuclear materials. Until these border sites receive
equipment with both gamma and neutron detection capability, they will
remain vulnerable to certain forms of nuclear smuggling.
* Regarding problems with equipment maintenance, DOE has not
systematically maintained handheld radiation detection equipment
provided by State and other agencies. As a result, many pieces of
handheld equipment, which are vital for border officials to conduct
secondary inspections of vehicles or pedestrians, may not function
properly. For example, in Georgia, we observed border guards performing
secondary inspections with a handheld radiation detector that had not
been calibrated (adjusted to conform with measurement standards) since
1997. According to the detector's manufacturer, yearly recalibration is
necessary to ensure that the detector functions properly.
* Finally, many border sites are located in remote areas that often do
not have access to reliable supplies of electricity, fiber optic lines,
and other infrastructure essential to operate radiation detection
equipment and associated communication systems. Additionally,
environmental conditions at some sites, such as extreme heat, can
affect the performance of equipment. To mitigate these concerns, DOE,
DOD, and State have provided generators and other equipment at remote
border sites to ensure stable supplies of electricity and, when
appropriate, heat shields or other protection to ensure the
effectiveness of radiation detection equipment.
State has taken some steps to coordinate U.S. radiation detection
equipment assistance overseas, but its ability to carry out its role as
lead coordinator is limited by shortcomings in its strategic plan for
interagency coordination and by its lack of a comprehensive list of all
U.S. radiation detection equipment assistance. In response to a
recommendation we made in 2002, State led the development of a
governmentwide plan to coordinate U.S. radiation detection equipment
assistance overseas. This plan broadly defines a set of interagency
goals and outlines the roles and responsibilities of participating
agencies. However, the plan lacks key components we recommended,
including overall program cost estimates, projected time frames for
program completion, and specific performance measures. Without these
elements in the plan, State will be limited in its ability to
effectively measure U.S. programs' progress toward achieving the
interagency goals. Additionally, in its role as lead interagency
coordinator, State has not maintained accurate information on the
operational status and location of all radiation detection equipment
provided by U.S. programs. While DOE has responsibility for maintaining
information on previously deployed U.S.-funded portal monitors, State
primarily works through its in-country advisors to gather and maintain
information on handheld radiation detection equipment provided by State
and other U.S. agencies. However, four of nine in-country advisors we
spoke with, who are stationed in countries that have received
significant amounts of handheld radiation detection equipment, said
that they did not have up-to-date information regarding the operational
status and location of this equipment. Furthermore, while DOE, DOD, and
State each maintain lists of radiation detection equipment provided by
their programs, they do not regularly share such information, and there
is no comprehensive list of all equipment provided by U.S. programs.
Without such a coordinated master list, program managers at DOE, DOD,
and State cannot accurately assess if equipment is operational and
being used as intended; determine the equipment needs of countries
where they plan to provide assistance; or detect whether an agency has
unknowingly supplied duplicative equipment.
To strengthen program management and effectiveness, we recommend that
the Secretary of Energy, working with the Administrator of the National
Nuclear Security Administration, revise the long-term cost projections
for the SLD-Core program to account for the cost of providing specific
anticorruption measures and upgrade portal monitors previously provided
by other U.S. government agencies and currently maintained by DOE that
do not have both gamma and neutron detection capability as soon as
possible. Additionally, to strengthen accountability of U.S. radiation
detection assistance programs, we recommend that the Secretary of
State, working with the Secretaries of Defense and Energy and the
Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, ensure
maintenance is provided for all handheld radiation detection equipment
supplied by U.S. programs; strengthen the Strategic Plan for
Interagency Coordination of U.S. Government Nuclear Detection
Assistance Overseas by including specific performance measures, overall
cost estimates, and projected time frames for completion of U.S.
efforts; and compile, maintain, and share a master list of all U.S.
radiation detection assistance.
We provided the Departments of Energy, Defense, and State with draft
copies of this report for their review and comment. DOE and State
generally agreed with our conclusions and recommendations. DOD had no
written comments on our report. DOE provided additional information
clarifying its prioritization process, anticorruption measures, and
maintenance efforts. State disagreed with our emphasis on the
interagency working group and in-country advisors as the primary
mechanisms for coordination of U.S. radiation detection equipment
assistance programs. State believes that informal coordination between
State program officers and their interagency counterparts in
Washington, D.C., is the primary coordination mechanism. We have added
language that notes the existence of such informal coordination.
However, State's own Strategic Plan for Interagency Coordination of
U.S. Government Nuclear Detection Assistance Overseas does not mention
such informal mechanisms. Rather, State's plan emphasizes the role of
the interagency working group and states that such coordination is
"vital to the overall success of U.S. nuclear detection assistance
efforts." DOE, DOD, and State also provided technical comments, which
we incorporated as appropriate.
Background:
Since our May 2002 report on nuclear smuggling, the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has reported 481 additional confirmed cases
of the smuggling of nuclear and/or radiological materials.[Footnote 6]
One of these cases involved nuclear material suitable for use in a
nuclear weapon.[Footnote 7] The majority of new cases IAEA reported
involved radiological sources, which could be combined with
conventional explosives to create a "dirty bomb." According to IAEA,
the majority of all reported incidents with radiological sources
involved criminal activity, most frequently theft. Radiological sources
and devices in which they are used can be attractive for thieves
because of their perceived high resale value or the value of their
ability to shield or encapsulate illegally shipped materials within
legal shipments of radioactive materials. Some of the reported cases
indicate a perceived demand for radioactive materials on the black
market, according to IAEA. From 2003 to 2004, the number of incidents
reported by IAEA substantially increased. IAEA indicated that improved
reporting may, in part, account for this increase. As of December 2004,
82 of IAEA's Member States were participating in contributing to the
database.[Footnote 8]
Detecting actual cases of illicit trafficking in nuclear material is
complicated because one of the materials of greatest concern--highly
enriched uranium--is among the most difficult materials to detect
because of its relatively low level of radioactivity. Uranium emits
only gamma radiation so detection equipment, which generally contains
both gamma and neutron detection capabilities, only detects uranium
from the gamma detector. However, gamma radiation emissions can be
shielded by encasing nuclear material within another high density
material, such as lead. Another nuclear material of great concern is
plutonium, which emits both gamma and neutron radiation. However,
shielding nuclear material generally does not prevent the detection of
neutron radiation and, as a result, plutonium can be detected by
neutron detectors regardless of the amount of shielding from high
density material. According to DOE officials, neutron radiation alarms
are only caused by man-made materials, such as plutonium, while gamma
radiation alarms are caused by a variety of naturally occurring sources
including commercial goods such as bananas, ceramic tiles, and
fertilizer, in addition to dangerous nuclear materials, such as uranium
and plutonium.
The most common types of radiation detection equipment are radiation
portal monitors; handheld equipment, including both survey meters and
radioactive isotope identification devices; and radiation pagers. The
radiation detection equipment that U.S. programs provide to foreign
countries is commercially available, off-the-shelf technology.
Radiation portal monitors are stationary pieces of equipment designed
to detect radioactive materials being carried by vehicles, pedestrians,
or railcars. Radiation portal monitors currently being provided by U.S.
agencies have the ability to detect both gamma and neutron radiation,
which is important for detecting highly enriched uranium and plutonium,
respectively. According to DOE, radiation portal monitors with both
gamma and neutron detectors cost between about $28,000 and $55,000,
plus the additional costs associated with installing the equipment and
communication systems necessary to operate it.[Footnote 9] Figure 1
shows a picture of radiation portal monitors with both gamma and
neutron detectors.
Figure 1: Radiation Portal Monitors Containing Both Gamma and Neutron
Radiation Detectors at a Border Site in Northern Greece:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
In 2002, we reported that some U.S. agencies, primarily State, provided
radiation portal monitors that did not have the ability to detect
neutron radiation to foreign governments.[Footnote 10] Because this
equipment is capable of detecting only gamma radiation, it is less
effective in detecting certain nuclear material, such as plutonium that
has been shielded with high density material. Replacement cost for
similar equipment (capable of detecting only gamma radiation), is about
$5,000, not including installation costs, according to DOE officials.
Figure 2 shows an example of such a radiation portal monitor.
Figure 2: Older Radiation Portal Monitor Able to Detect Only Gamma
Radiation at a Border Site in Georgia:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Handheld radiation detection equipment, such as survey meters and
radioactive isotope identification devices, are used by customs
officials and border guards to conduct secondary inspections,[Footnote
11] the aim of which is to localize the source of an alarm and
determine the nature of the material present. Survey meters can be used
to detect the level of radiation by providing a count of the radiation
level in the area. Radioactive isotope identification devices, commonly
known as RIIDs, identify the specific isotope of the radioactive source
detected. In addition, U.S. programs often provide radiation pagers,
which are small radiation detection devices worn on belts by border
security personnel to continuously monitor levels of radiation in the
area. Pagers are considered personal safety devices and, therefore,
should not be relied upon to implement secondary inspections.[Footnote
12]
Three U.S. Agencies Have Spent About $178 Million to Provide Radiation
Detection Equipment to 36 Countries, but Future Spending Requirements
for Some Programs Are Uncertain:
Since fiscal year 1994, DOE, DOD, and State have spent about $178
million to provide radiation detection equipment to 36 countries as
part of the overall U.S. effort to combat nuclear smuggling. However,
because some U.S. agencies provide radiation detection equipment to
foreign countries on an as needed basis, future U.S. government
spending requirements for such assistance are uncertain.
DOE, DOD, and State Had Spent a Combined Total of About $178 Million
through the End of Fiscal Year 2005 to Provide Radiation Detection
Equipment to 36 Countries:
DOE has spent about $131 million to provide radiation detection
equipment and training to 12 countries and to maintain certain types of
equipment previously installed by other U.S. agencies in 23 countries.
DOD has also spent almost $22 million to provide radiation portal
monitors, handheld radiation detection devices, and radiation detection
training to 8 countries in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
Similarly, State has spent about $25 million to provide various types
of radiation detection equipment and related training to 31 countries.
(See table 1.)
Table 1: U.S. Spending by Program on Radiation Detection Equipment and
Related Training Provided to Foreign Countries through the End of
Fiscal Year 2005:
Dollars in millions.
Agency: DOE;
Program: Second Line of Defense "Core" program;
Expenditures: $129.5.
Agency: DOE;
Program: Cooperative Radiological Instrument Transfer project;
Expenditures: $1.2.
Agency: DOD;
Program: Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation Prevention
Initiative;
Expenditures: $7.9.
Agency: DOD;
Program: International Counterproliferation Program;
Expenditures: $14.5.
Agency: State;
Program: Export Control and Related Border Security program;
Expenditures: $15.4.
Agency: State;
Program: Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund;
Expenditures: $9.1.
Agency: State;
Program: Georgia Border Security and Law Enforcement program;
Expenditures: $0.2.
Total;
Expenditures: $177.8.
Sources: GAO analysis of DOD, DOE, and State data.
Note: Figures have been rounded.
[End of table]
DOE Has Spent About $131 Million Providing Radiation Detection
Equipment and Related Training:
Since fiscal year 1998, DOE has spent about $130 million through its
SLD-Core program to provide radiation detection equipment and training
at 83 border sites in Russia, Greece, and Lithuania and to maintain
certain types of equipment previously installed by State and other U.S.
agencies in 23 countries.[Footnote 13] DOE recently signed implementing
agreements with the governments of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Slovenia, and
Ukraine and will begin work in those countries in fiscal year 2006.
Through its SLD-Core program, DOE currently plans to install radiation
detection equipment at a total of about 350 sites in 31 countries by
2012 at an estimated total cost of $570 million.
In addition, DOE spent about $1 million to provide radiation detection
equipment to nine countries through its Cooperative Radiological
Instrument Transfer project (CRITr), which began in 2004. Through
CRITr, DOE refurbishes previously decommissioned handheld radiation
detection equipment located at various DOE sites and provides this
equipment to foreign law enforcement officers. DOE plans to provide
handheld equipment to six additional countries through the CRITr
project in fiscal year 2006.[Footnote 14]
DOD Has Spent About $22 Million to Provide Handheld Radiation Detection
Devices to Eight Countries and to Install Portal Monitors in
Uzbekistan:
Through the end of fiscal year 2005, DOD had spent about $22 million
through two programs to provide handheld radiation detection devices to
eight countries in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and to
install fixed radiation portal monitors in Uzbekistan. Specifically,
through its Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation Prevention
Initiative (WMD-PPI), DOD spent about $0.2 million to provide various
types of handheld radiation detection equipment to three countries and
about $6.4 million to install radiation portal monitors at 11 sites in
Uzbekistan.[Footnote 15] DOD plans to complete installation at 6 more
sites in Uzbekistan by the end of fiscal year 2006 and to finish all
associated radiation detection work in Uzbekistan by fiscal year 2009
at a total cost of about $54 million. In fiscal year 2006, DOD plans to
transfer responsibility for maintenance of the equipment it has
provided to Uzbekistan to DOE's SLD-Core program.[Footnote 16]
Through its International Counterproliferation Program (ICP), DOD has
spent about $15 million to provide handheld radiation detection
equipment and training on weapons of mass destruction proliferation
prevention to 6 countries in the former Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe. In addition, DOD has provided a variety of training on weapons
of mass destruction proliferation to 17 additional countries. Through
ICP, DOD plans to continue to provide limited amounts of handheld
radiation detection equipment to other countries in the
future.[Footnote 17]
State Has Spent About $25 Million to Provide Radiation Detection
Equipment and Related Training to 31 Countries:
The Department of State, through three programs--the Export Control and
Related Border Security program (EXBS), the Nonproliferation and
Disarmament Fund (NDF), and the Georgia Border Security and Law
Enforcement program (GBSLE)--has spent about $25 million since fiscal
year 1994 to provide radiation detection equipment and related training
to 31 foreign countries. State's EXBS program has spent approximately
$15.4 million to provide radiation portal monitors, various types of
handheld radiation detection devices, X-ray vans equipped with
radiation detectors, and training on how to use this equipment to 30
countries mainly in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
Similarly, through NDF, State spent about $9.1 million from fiscal year
1994 through 2001 to, among other things, install portal monitors in
countries other than Russia, provide handheld radiation detectors, and
provide vans equipped with X-ray machines to countries, including
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. Lastly, through its GBSLE
program, State spent $0.2 million in 1999 to provide border guards and
customs officials in the Republic of Georgia with 137 radiation pagers.
State has not provided any additional radiation detection equipment
assistance through NDF since 2001 or through its GBSLE program since
1999.[Footnote 18]
Future U.S. Spending on Radiation Detection Assistance Is Uncertain:
Because some U.S. programs provide radiation detection equipment to
foreign countries on an as needed basis and DOE has yet to gain
agreements with all of the countries where it would like to install
equipment, future U.S. government spending requirements for radiation
detection assistance remain uncertain. For example, although DOE is the
primary U.S. agency responsible for installing radiation portal
monitors in foreign countries, State selectively funds projects to
provide radiation portal monitors to foreign countries through its EXBS
program. State officials told us that State coordinates its work in
this area with DOE to avoid duplication, and it conducts these projects
on an as needed basis to provide a quick response to emerging nuclear
smuggling threats. For example, in December 2005, State installed
portal monitors and provided handheld radiation detection equipment to
one site in Armenia at a cost of about $0.5 million, in part because it
believed that the threat of nuclear smuggling warranted immediate
installation of this equipment. State officials we spoke with told us
that they coordinated with DOE to ensure State's work in Armenia is
consistent with overall U.S. goals and that the specific equipment
installed met minimum detection standards. Furthermore, State officials
also told us that the newly installed radiation portal monitors at this
site in Armenia provide a redundant layer of security with DOE's
planned work to install equipment on the opposite side of the border in
the Republic of Georgia.
Because State selectively funds portal monitor projects through its
EXBS program to provide a quick U.S. government response to emerging
security threats of nuclear smuggling, it is uncertain how many other
projects State will fund in this area, in what countries these projects
will be conducted, or how much they will cost. Additionally, State
officials also told us that they have yet to determine whether or not
they will fund any future projects to provide radiation detection
equipment assistance to foreign countries through the Nonproliferation
and Disarmament Fund or the Georgia Border Security and Law Enforcement
program. As a result, it is uncertain how many other projects State
will fund through either of these two programs or how much they will
cost.
DOE currently plans to install equipment at a total of about 350 sites
in 31 countries by 2012 at an estimated cost of $570 million based on a
strategy that analyzes and prioritizes countries for receiving
installations. However, it cannot be certain which countries will be
included in the SLD-Core program until it signs the necessary
agreements with these countries' governments. For example, DOE planned
to complete installations in Georgia, Kazakhstan, Slovenia, and Ukraine
in fiscal year 2005. However, installations in Georgia, Slovenia, and
Ukraine will not be completed until at least fiscal year 2006 because
of delays in signing implementing agreements with these countries.
Additionally, DOE is still in the process of trying to reach agreement
with Kazakhstan. In fiscal year 2004, DOE reallocated a portion of its
funding to directly fund its planned work at certain border sites in
Kazakhstan. However, difficulty in reaching agreement with Kazakhstan
continues to delay this work. If DOE continues to experience delays in
signing agreements with foreign countries, or cannot reach agreements
with all of the countries where it currently plans to install
equipment, it may need to alter its planned scope of work and overall
cost estimates for the program. Furthermore, once DOE reaches agreement
with a certain country, it still needs to conduct individual site
assessments to determine at which sites providing radiation detection
equipment will be cost-effective, as well as the amount of equipment
each site will require. Therefore, DOE is limited in its ability to
determine the total cost of the SLD-Core program until it signs
implementing agreements with the governments of countries where it
plans to work and conducts assessments to determine which specific
sites within those countries require radiation detection equipment and
in what amounts.
The Threat of Corruption, Technological Limitations, Maintenance
Problems, and Site Infrastructure Issues Challenge U.S. Programs to
Combat Nuclear Smuggling:
U.S. programs that provide radiation detection equipment to foreign
governments face a number of challenges that affect the installation
and effective operation of radiation detection equipment, including:
the threat of corruption of border security officials in some foreign
countries, technical limitations of radiation detection equipment
previously deployed by State and other agencies, inadequate maintenance
of some handheld equipment, and the lack of infrastructure necessary to
operate radiation detection equipment and harsh environmental
conditions at some border sites. DOE, DOD, and State have taken some
steps to address these challenges, such as providing multitiered
communications systems to mitigate corruption so that alarm data can be
simultaneously viewed at several levels of authority and supplying
protective casings for radiation portal monitors to prevent damage from
vandals or extreme heat.
Possible Corruption of Border Guards Poses a Threat to the Effective
Operation of U.S.-Funded Radiation Detection Equipment:
According to U.S. and foreign government officials, corruption is a
pervasive problem within the ranks of border security organizations.
Specifically, because foreign border guards are often poorly paid and
geographically isolated, there are concerns that foreign officials
could be bribed and turn off the radiation detection equipment and
allow nuclear smuggling to occur. For example, an official might turn
off the equipment to allow a nuclear smuggler to pass through a border
crossing. According to a Russian press report, in October 2004, a
Russian customs agent at a site in western Russia was fired because he
was aiding a smuggling ring. Additionally, in July 2005, after the
newly elected President of Ukraine took office, he reorganized many
agencies within the government, including the Customs Service, because
of concerns about corruption.
DOE, DOD, and State officials told us they are concerned that corrupt
foreign border security personnel could compromise the effectiveness of
U.S.-funded radiation detection equipment by either turning off
equipment or ignoring alarms. As a result, U.S. programs that provide
fixed radiation portal monitors are taking some steps to evaluate the
degree to which corruption is present in the countries and regions
where they are working or plan to work. For example, DOE's SLD-Core
program commissioned three studies to better understand corruption and
the challenges that it could bring to the program. Additionally, DOE
includes countrywide corruption assessments as part of its efforts to
help program officials prioritize countries to include in the SLD-Core
program. In addition, DOD and State also include anticorruption courses
as part of the radiation detection training they provide to foreign
border security personnel.
Some U.S. programs also have taken or plan to take other specific steps
to mitigate the threat of corruption, such as (1) providing multitiered
communications systems so that alarm data can be simultaneously viewed
at several levels of authority, (2) implementing programs to combat
some of the underlying issues that can lead to corruption through
periodic screening of border security personnel, and (3) installing
radiation portal monitors on both sides of a particular border if there
are concerns about corruption of personnel in these countries. For
example, DOE and DOD are deploying communication systems that link the
activities at individual border sites with regional and national
command centers. By doing so, alarm data can be simultaneously
evaluated by officials both at the site and up the chain of command,
thus establishing redundant layers of accountability for responding to
alarms. As a result, if a local official turns off the radiation
detection equipment at a site, higher level officials can quickly be
made aware of the incident and investigate the reasons for the alarm.
Additionally, DOD plans to implement an Employee Dependability Program
in Uzbekistan that includes background checks, personal interviews of
applicants, monitoring of performance and behavior, and annual
refresher training to combat some of the underlying issues that can
lead to corruption among border security personnel. DOE officials told
us that they are considering implementing such a screening program in
some countries where the SLD-Core program works. Lastly, U.S. programs
are installing radiation portal monitors on both sides of some borders
to create redundant coverage to increase the likelihood of detection
and interdiction. In fiscal year 2006, DOE plans to install radiation
portal monitors at a number of sites in Georgia. At one site in
Armenia, across the border from a planned DOE installation, State
installed radiation portal monitors in December 2005, in part, because
of concerns about corruption on both sides of the border at this
location. DOE is also considering employing this type of redundant
coverage at other locations throughout Eastern Europe and the former
Soviet Union.
While DOE has taken steps to determine the level of corruption in some
countries and regions where it works and includes countrywide
corruption assessments as part of its prioritization model, DOE is
still in the process of determining in what countries it will provide
specific anticorruption measures and how much it will cost to do so
based on its analysis of the corruption threat. For example, DOE
estimates that it will spend about $1 million to provide radiation
detection equipment and related communications systems at a typical
foreign border crossing. DOE officials noted that the standard
communication systems the SLD-Core program provides with radiation
portal monitors have some anticorruption value because radiation alarms
require more than one official to review and close out before the
system can be reset. However, DOE has not included the costs associated
with other specific anticorruption measures in the long-term cost
estimates for its SLD-Core program.
Some Border Crossings Remain More Vulnerable to Nuclear Smuggling
Because DOE Has Not Upgraded Less Sophisticated Equipment Installed by
Other U.S. Agencies:
In 2002, DOE assumed responsibility for maintaining some radiation
detection equipment previously installed by State and other U.S.
agencies in 23 countries in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
However, DOE has not upgraded any of this less sophisticated equipment,
with the exception of one site in Azerbaijan.[Footnote 19] Through an
interagency agreement, DOE assumed responsibility for ensuring the long-
term sustainability and continued operation of radiation portal
monitors and X-ray vans equipped with radiation detectors that State
and other U.S. agencies provided to these countries. Through this
agreement, DOE provides spare parts, preventative maintenance, and
repairs for the equipment through regularly scheduled maintenance
visits. Through the end of fiscal year 2005, DOE had conducted
maintenance and sustainability activities for equipment in 21 of the 23
countries where equipment had been provided. DOE officials told us
that, although Belarus received a significant amount of radiation
detection equipment from DOD, DOE is currently prohibited from
maintaining this equipment by restrictions placed on U.S. assistance to
Belarus.[Footnote 20] As a result, the maintenance status of the 38
portal monitors and almost 200 pieces of handheld radiation detection
equipment DOD provided to Belarus is unknown. Additionally, at the
request of the Turkish government, DOE no longer maintains 41 portal
monitors and over 150 pieces of handheld radiation detection equipment
State previously provided to Turkey.
As we originally reported in 2002, at some sites in foreign countries,
State and other U.S. agencies installed portal monitors that contained
only gamma radiation detectors, which are less effective in detecting
certain nuclear material, such as plutonium, than detectors with both
gamma and neutron detection capability. Although State's current policy
is to install radiation detection equipment with both gamma and neutron
detection capability, according to DOE officials, because of their
configuration and sensitivity, these older portal monitors are less
likely to detect small quantities of highly enriched uranium or nuclear
material that is shielded, for example, by a lead container or certain
parts of a vehicle. When it assumed responsibility for maintaining this
equipment, DOE conducted an initial assessment of these portal monitors
to determine whether they were functional and what maintenance was
required. During the course of this analysis, DOE found that much of
the equipment was damaged and required total replacement or major
repairs. In such cases, DOE installed similar equipment with gamma
radiation detectors but chose not to upgrade the equipment with newer
portal monitors that would be capable of detecting both gamma and
neutron radiation. DOE's policy was to replace this equipment in-kind
and wait to upgrade the equipment as part of a countrywide deployment
through the SLD-Core program. However, according to SLD-Core program
officials, DOE did not have funds earmarked for upgrading the equipment
in the absence of a countrywide deployment through the SLD-Core
program.
Additionally, SLD-Core program officials stated that DOE would need to
sign new agreements with the appropriate ministries or agencies within
the governments of the countries where State and other agencies had
previously installed equipment before DOE could invest "substantial
resources" to upgrade the equipment. DOE officials noted that replacing
the less sophisticated portal monitors with similar equipment usually
costs less than $5,000, plus installation costs, while deploying a
comprehensive system comprised of portal monitors that can detect both
gamma and neutron radiation, associated communication systems, and
related training can cost up to $1 million per site. The agreements are
important because they exempt DOE from payment of host government
taxes, customs duties, or other charges per congressional guidance. In
addition, these agreements require the host government to provide DOE
with data on detections of illicit trafficking in nuclear materials
gathered as a result of assistance DOE provided through the SLD-Core
program. Though the SLD-Core program has signed agreements with some
countries where the less sophisticated equipment was installed, such as
Ukraine, DOE has yet to upgrade any of the equipment in these
countries, with the exception of one site in Azerbaijan, primarily
because the details of the countrywide installations are still being
determined. According to DOE officials, as countries with older
equipment sign agreements with DOE to implement the full SLD-Core
program, sites in these countries with less sophisticated equipment
will be upgraded.
In November 2005, DOE completed an assessment of the maintenance
activities it performs on equipment provided by other U.S. agencies.
DOE found that equipment failures at many of these sites go unattended,
often for months. DOE determined that its maintenance of X-ray vans
previously provided by State was not critical to the mission of the SLD-
Core program. As a result, DOE is planning to phase out its maintenance
of X-ray vans after fiscal year 2007. According to DOE officials, the
budget of the SLD-Core program cannot sustain what DOE considers "non-
mission critical work." In fiscal year 2005, DOE bore the full
financial responsibility for all maintenance activities because State
provided no funding to DOE for this work. In addition to the X-ray
vans, DOE evaluated the sites where portal monitors were previously
installed by State and other agencies and identified those monitors
that should no longer be supported by the SLD-Core program. DOE
assessed each location where less sophisticated portal monitors are
maintained and prioritized which sites should receive upgraded
equipment. DOE plans to work with State to upgrade selected sites and
decommission some sites that have equipment that is not being used or
is beyond repair.
Concerns Exist About Maintenance of Some Handheld Radiation Detection
Equipment:
DOE and State signed an interagency agreement in 2002 giving
responsibility for maintaining most radiation detection equipment
previously installed by State and other U.S. agencies to DOE. However,
this agreement did not make DOE responsible for maintaining handheld
radiation detection equipment previously deployed by these agencies.
State has also not assumed responsibility for maintaining about 1,000
handheld radiation detectors provided by its programs that are vital to
border officials for conducting secondary inspections of vehicles and
pedestrians, and, as a result, much of this equipment is in
disrepair.[Footnote 21] For example, at one site in Georgia, we
observed border guards performing secondary inspections with a handheld
radiation detector, previously provided by State, which had not been
calibrated since 1997 (see fig. 3). According to the detector's
manufacturer, yearly recalibration is necessary to ensure that the
detector functions properly. Furthermore, DOE officials we spoke with
told us that--similar to radiation portal monitors--handheld radiation
detection devices require periodic maintenance checks and recalibration
to ensure that they remain operable and continue to meet minimum
detection standards.
Figure 3: Handheld Radiation Detector in Georgia Needing Recalibration:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Batteries used in some handheld radiation detection equipment typically
need to be replaced every 2 years and some types of handhelds are
fragile and can be easily broken, requiring that replacement devices or
spare parts be readily available. At the request of State, DOE is
currently evaluating the costs associated with maintaining this
handheld equipment. Specifically, DOE has asked its contractor
currently responsible for maintaining the portal monitors and X-ray
vans in these countries to develop a proposal for assuming
responsibility for maintenance of the handheld equipment as well.
According to DOE officials, maintenance of handheld equipment could be
conducted during regularly scheduled visits for maintenance of portal
monitors and X-ray vans.[Footnote 22] As a result, DOE officials
believe that no additional travel funds would be required for this
activity. However, DOE officials also told us that if they were to
assume full responsibility for maintaining the handheld equipment at
sites where they are maintaining radiation portal monitors installed by
State and other agencies they would need additional funding for labor
and to provide replacement equipment and spare parts.
Limited Infrastructure and Harsh Environmental Conditions at Some
Border Sites Pose Equipment Problems:
Limited infrastructure and harsh environmental conditions at some
foreign border sites create challenges to the installation and
operation of radiation detection equipment. For example, many border
sites are located in remote areas, which often do not have access to
reliable supplies of electricity, fiber optic lines, and other
infrastructure needed to operate radiation portal monitors and
associated communication systems. Prior to providing radiation portal
monitors, U.S. programs typically perform site assessments to determine
the details surrounding how radiation detection equipment will be
installed at a given site. The assessment includes the operational
needs of the equipment depending on the infrastructure available at the
site. To address the needs identified, DOE, DOD, and State provide
generators at some sites to supply electricity to the radiation
detection equipment because the electric power supply shuts down
periodically or may be very low at these remote sites. Additionally,
the communication systems that are provided to report activities from
the radiation detectors require fiber optic cabling for their
operation. If no cabling exists, underground cabling or radio wave
operated communication systems must be installed to perform this
function. Finally, at some border sites, the radiation portal monitors
are located significant distances from the control and communication
system center. U.S. program officials we spoke with expressed concern
that theft could occur because of the remote location of this
equipment. To prevent such interference with the equipment,
antitampering measures such as protective cages are used to protect the
integrity of the portal monitors (see fig. 4).
Figure 4: Rail Portal Monitor in Western Uzbekistan with Antitampering
Protection:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Additionally, environmental conditions at some sites, such as extreme
heat, can compromise the effectiveness of radiation detection
equipment. Extreme heat can accelerate the degradation of components
within radiation detection equipment and, as a result, can affect the
performance and long-term sustainability of the equipment. DOD placed a
protective casing around the radiation portal monitors it installed in
Uzbekistan as a heat shield to ensure the effective long-term operation
of the equipment (see fig. 5).
Figure 5: Radiation Portal Monitor in Uzbekistan with Heat Shield
Enclosure:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
State's Efforts to Coordinate U.S. Assistance Are Limited by
Deficiencies in the Interagency Strategic Plan and the Lack of a
Comprehensive List of Equipment Provided by U.S. Programs:
State coordinates U.S. radiation detection equipment assistance
overseas through an interagency working group and in-country advisors.
However, its ability to carry out its role as lead interagency
coordinator is limited by deficiencies in the strategic plan for
interagency coordination and by its lack of a comprehensive list of all
U.S. radiation detection assistance. Specifically, the interagency
strategic plan lacks key components, such as overall program cost
estimates, projected time frames for program completion, and specific
performance measures. Additionally, State has not maintained accurate
information on the operational status and location of all radiation
detection equipment provided by U.S. programs.
State Coordinates U.S. Radiation Detection Equipment Assistance through
an Interagency Working Group and In-Country Advisors:
As the lead coordinator of U.S. radiation detection equipment
assistance overseas, State has taken some steps to coordinate the
efforts of U.S. programs that provide this type of assistance to
foreign countries. State's coordination takes place primarily through
two methods: an interagency working group and State's in-country
advisors. The main coordination mechanism for U.S. radiation detection
assistance programs is the interagency working group, chaired by State,
which consists of program representatives from DOE, DOD, State, and
DHS. According to State, this working group holds meetings about once
every 2 months to coordinate the activities of U.S. programs that
provide radiation detection equipment and export control assistance
overseas. These interagency meetings attempt to identify and prevent
overlap among the various U.S. programs through discussion of such
issues as funding, upcoming program activities, and recent trips to
countries receiving U.S. assistance. Meetings are attended by program
managers responsible for overseeing and implementing radiation
detection equipment assistance programs in foreign countries. While DOD
and DOE officials we spoke with told us that these interagency meetings
are somewhat beneficial, they stated that meetings primarily facilitate
coordination at a high level and typically lack the specific detail
necessary to identify and prevent program overlap within countries and
regions where multiple U.S. programs provide radiation detection
equipment assistance. Through this working group, State also maintains
an interagency schedule that provides information on planned
activities, training, and site visits of U.S. programs.
State also coordinates U.S. programs through in-country advisors,
stationed in more than 20 foreign countries. While State funds these
advisors, State officials told us that they work on behalf of all U.S.
programs that provide nuclear detection assistance in their respective
countries. According to State officials, these advisors serve as the on-
the-ground coordinators of U.S. export control and border security
assistance and are the primary sources of information concerning past
and present provision of U.S. radiation detection equipment assistance
in their respective countries. State officials also noted that frequent
informal coordination takes place between program managers at State and
their counterparts in Washington, D.C., at other federal agencies.
In addition to State's coordination efforts, DHS recently created the
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) with responsibilities
including coordinating nuclear detection research and developing a
global nuclear detection architecture.[Footnote 23] According to DHS,
though DNDO is principally focused on domestic detection, its
coordinating work will enhance U.S. efforts overseas through the design
of a global nuclear detection architecture implemented under current
agency responsibilities. Equally, while detection technologies
developed by DNDO will be directed primarily by operational
requirements for domestic applications, many technologies developed
could have application in overseas radiation detection equipment
assistance programs. However, DOE, DOD, and State officials we spoke
with were unclear on what specific future role DNDO would play in
coordinating activities of U.S. programs that provide radiation
detection equipment assistance to foreign countries. These agencies are
working with DNDO to clarify the future role that the office will play.
The Interagency Strategic Plan to Coordinate U.S. Radiation Detection
Equipment Assistance Overseas Lacks Key Components:
In 2002, we reported that U.S. efforts to help other countries combat
nuclear smuggling needed strengthened coordination and planning to link
U.S. programs through common goals and objectives, strategies and time
frames for providing assistance, and performance measures for
evaluating the effectiveness of U.S. assistance.[Footnote 24] State, as
the lead coordinator of U.S. nuclear detection assistance overseas, led
the development of a governmentwide interagency strategic plan to guide
the efforts of U.S. programs that provide this assistance.[Footnote 25]
The plan broadly defines a set of interagency goals and objectives,
establishes minimum technological standards for radiation detection
equipment that U.S. programs provide, and outlines the roles and
responsibilities of each agency. However, the plan does not include
several elements necessary to effectively link U.S. programs together,
prevent duplication, and guide their efforts toward completion.
While the plan provides U.S. agencies with a broad framework for
coordinating this type of assistance by defining a set of interagency
goals and outlining the roles and responsibilities of each agency, it
does not include specific performance measures, overall program cost
estimates, or projected time frames for program completion. Without
incorporating these key elements into its plan, State will be limited
in its ability, as lead coordinator, to effectively link U.S. programs
and guide their efforts toward achieving interagency goals. For
example, a primary goal in its plan is that recipient countries possess
a comprehensive capability to detect and interdict illicitly trafficked
nuclear and radiological material. However, without incorporating
specific performance measures into its plan, State has no transparent
way to effectively measure the performance of U.S. programs in this
regard or to determine the degree to which they are reaching this or
other interagency goals discussed in its plan. Finally, without
incorporating overall program cost estimates and time frames for
program completion into its plan, State cannot effectively determine
the amount of U.S. government resources that will be required to
achieve interagency goals and objectives or under what time frames
these resources will be required. If State does not take steps to
include these key elements in its plan, it will continue to be limited
in its ability to effectively track the progress of U.S. programs,
measure their performance toward achieving interagency goals and
objectives, and determine the amount of funding required to achieve
these goals and under what time frames these resources will be needed.
State Has Not Maintained Accurate Information on All Previously
Provided Handheld Equipment, Which Inhibits Its Ability to Effectively
Coordinate U.S. Assistance:
State, in its role as lead interagency coordinator, has not maintained
accurate information on the operational status and location of all the
handheld radiation detection equipment previously provided by U.S.
programs. While DOE has taken responsibility for maintaining
information on previously deployed U.S.-funded radiation portal
monitors, State primarily works through its in-country advisors and its
interagency working group to gather and maintain information on
handheld radiation detection equipment provided by U.S. programs.
State, through its EXBS program, assumed direct management of the in-
country advisors from DHS in February 2005. As part of their duties,
State's in-country advisors are required to maintain a record of the
transfer of all U.S.-provided export/border control equipment,
including radiation detection equipment, within their respective
countries and to follow up to ensure it is at the locations specified
by the recipient government and is properly maintained. However, four
of the nine advisors we spoke with, who are stationed in countries that
have received a combined total of about 1,000 pieces of handheld
radiation detection equipment from U.S. programs, acknowledged that
they did not have up-to-date information regarding the present
operational status or location of this equipment. Additionally, five of
nine advisors we spoke with were unaware that, as part of their duties,
they are required to maintain a record of all U.S.-provided equipment
within their country. However, some advisors we spoke with stated that
they attempt to determine this information but are sometimes limited in
their ability to do so because other U.S. programs have not always
coordinated with them before providing equipment in their country. As a
result, it is necessary for some advisors to follow up with the host
government to determine the status and location of U.S.-provided
radiation detection equipment. According to some advisors, however,
host governments may not always provide accurate information on what
equipment has been provided in the past, where it is currently located,
and its current operational status.
According to State officials, there is no comprehensive interagency
list of radiation detection equipment that has been previously provided
to foreign governments by U.S. programs. In 2002, we recommended that
State, as the lead interagency coordinator, work with DOE and DOD to
develop such a list. Officials we spoke with at DOE and DOD stated that
having access to accurate information on past provisions of all
radiation detection equipment provided by U.S. programs is essential to
interagency coordination, preventing overlap among programs, as well as
appropriately assessing a specific country's equipment needs. During
the course of our review, program officials at DOE, DOD, and State
provided us with lists of radiation detection equipment their programs
had provided to other countries. According to information we received
from program managers at DOE, DOD, and State, more than 7,000 pieces of
handheld radiation detection equipment, including radiation pagers and
radioactive isotope identification devices, had been provided to 36
foreign countries through the end of fiscal year 2005. Because much of
this equipment was provided to the same countries by multiple agencies
and programs, it is difficult to determine the degree to which
duplication of effort has occurred. For example, since fiscal year
1994, a total of 17 different countries have received handheld
radiation detection equipment from more than one U.S. agency. However,
although DOE, DOD, and State programs each maintain their own lists of
radiation detection equipment provided to foreign countries, officials
at these agencies told us that they do not regularly share such
information with each other. Without the development of a comprehensive
interagency list of U.S.-funded radiation detection equipment, program
managers at DOE, DOD, and State cannot accurately assess the equipment
needs of countries where they plan to provide assistance, may
unknowingly provide duplicative sets of equipment, and cannot determine
if the equipment is being used for its intended purpose or is in need
of maintenance and repair.
Conclusions:
Since the mid-1990s, DOE, DOD, and State have spent about $178 million
to provide a variety of radiation detection equipment to countries
around the world, and it is important that this equipment be properly
maintained so that it can be effectively used to combat nuclear
smuggling overseas. Since taking over responsibility for maintaining
portal monitors deployed by other agencies in 2002, DOE has worked to
ensure that this equipment is functioning and being used as intended.
However, because DOE's interagency maintenance agreement with State did
not include maintaining handheld radiation detection equipment
previously provided by State and other agencies, much of this equipment
may not be properly functioning. Handheld radiation detection equipment
is vital for border officials to conduct secondary inspections of
vehicles or pedestrians. Without taking steps to ensure that all
previously provided radiation detection equipment, specifically
handheld equipment, is adequately maintained and remains operational,
State cannot ensure the continued effectiveness or long-term
sustainability of this equipment.
Because corrupt officials could undermine the effectiveness of U.S.
radiation detection assistance programs overseas by turning off
radiation detection equipment or not properly responding to alarms, it
is important for U.S. programs to employ anticorruption efforts, such
as multitiered communication systems for radiation alarms, training,
employee dependability programs, and redundant installations of
equipment when providing such assistance. While we are encouraged that
DOE, DOD, and State employ some corruption mitigation measures in their
programs, DOE is still in the process of determining in which countries
it will provide these specific anticorruption measures and how much
such assistance would cost to implement.
In addition, though DOE has maintained less sophisticated radiation
portal monitors previously deployed by other agencies since 2002, it
has not upgraded the equipment at any of these sites. As a result,
border sites with less sophisticated radiation portal monitors are more
vulnerable to nuclear smuggling than sites with equipment that can
detect both gamma and neutron radiation. We originally reported on this
problem in our May 2002 report. In its official comments on that
report, DOE stated that these less sophisticated monitors "are not as
reliable [as monitors with both gamma and neutron radiation detection
capabilities], and have limited or no ability to detect shielded
plutonium." Although it is encouraging that DOE has recently undertaken
an assessment of the equipment it maintains that was installed by other
U.S. agencies, DOE has not yet improved the neutron detection
capabilities of any of these less sophisticated monitors, with the
exception of one site in Azerbaijan. As a result, these sites remain
just as vulnerable to certain types of nuclear smuggling as they were
when we first reported this deficiency in May 2002.
Finally, we believe that, unless key components such as overall program
cost estimates, projected time frames for completion, and specific
performance measures are incorporated into the interagency strategic
plan, State will be limited in its ability to determine the amount of
resources and time needed to achieve the broader interagency goals
discussed in its plan or to effectively measure U.S. programs' progress
toward achieving these goals. Furthermore, without accurate information
on the current status and location of radiation detection equipment
previously provided by U.S. programs, State cannot effectively fulfill
its role as interagency coordinator of U.S. assistance. Because there
are at least seven U.S. programs at three federal agencies that provide
radiation detection equipment to foreign countries, program managers at
DOE, DOD, and State need access to a "master list" that shows the
status and location of all U.S. radiation detection equipment
assistance to more accurately determine the needs of specific countries
and to avoid duplication of effort among U.S. programs. Without such a
list, the potential exists for programs to provide duplicative sets of
radiation detection equipment to the same country.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To strengthen program management and effectiveness, we recommend that
the Secretary of Energy, working with the Administrator of the National
Nuclear Security Administration, take the following two actions:
* Integrate projected spending on specific anticorruption measures into
the long-term cost estimates for the SLD-Core program.
* Upgrade less sophisticated portal monitors previously installed by
other U.S. agencies where DOE has determined this to be appropriate as
soon as possible and include funding to accomplish this in DOE's
planning and budgeting process.
To strengthen accountability of U.S. radiation detection equipment
assistance programs, we recommend that the Secretary of State, working
with the Secretaries of Defense and Energy and the Administrator of the
National Nuclear Security Administration, take the following three
actions:
* Ensure continued maintenance of all radiation detection equipment
provided to foreign governments, including all handheld equipment
previously provided by State and other agencies.
* Strengthen the Strategic Plan for Interagency Coordination of U.S.
Government Nuclear Detection Assistance Overseas by including in the
plan (1) specific performance measures to more effectively track and
measure the progress U.S. programs are making toward achievement of
interagency goals and objectives and (2) overall cost estimates and
projected time frames for completion of U.S. radiation detection
equipment assistance efforts to determine the amount of U.S. government
resources required to achieve interagency goals and objectives and
under what time frames these resources will be required.
* To the extent possible, account for all U.S.-funded radiation
detection equipment provided to foreign governments, especially
handheld equipment, by creating, maintaining, and sharing among all
agencies a comprehensive list of such assistance.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
DOE and State agreed in general with our conclusions and
recommendations. DOD had no written comments on our report. DOE, DOD,
and State provided technical comments, which we incorporated as
appropriate.
In its comments, DOE wrote that it does not believe that our report
adequately reflects the department's efforts to maintain handheld
radiation detection equipment provided by State and other agencies
because DOE has a process in place to identify and replace handheld
equipment used at sites where DOE maintains radiation portal monitors
installed by State and other agencies. However, we believe that the
extent of DOE's program is fairly presented because this effort does
not cover all handheld equipment previously provided by State and other
agencies--only equipment at the selected sites visited by DOE's
maintenance teams is maintained. Further, the current operational
status of the vast majority of handheld radiation detection equipment
previously deployed by State and other agencies cannot be determined,
in large part, because State has not maintained a comprehensive list of
such equipment.
In its comments, State disagreed with our lack of emphasis on the
"informal coordination role played by the department's front-line
country program officers." State considers informal consultations
between these officials and their interagency counterparts to be the
"primary means of coordination of its efforts concerning radiation
detection equipment provisions." State believes that such informal
coordination is "much more important than coordination through the
interagency working group or with State's in-country advisors." We have
added language to our report noting the role of informal coordination
in these programs. However, State's emphasis on them as its primary
means of coordinating radiation detection assistance programs conflicts
with its own planning documents. In its Strategic Plan for Interagency
Coordination of U.S. Government Nuclear Detection Assistance Overseas,
State claims that "a standing sub-working group, the International
Nuclear Detection Interagency Working Group, will routinely coordinate
nuclear detection, interdiction, and investigation assistance provided
by U.S. government agencies." State's plan emphasizes the role of the
interagency working group and states that such coordination is "vital
to the overall success of U.S. nuclear detection assistance efforts."
State's plan does not, however, emphasize or even mention informal
coordination mechanisms as a method for State's coordination of U.S.
radiation detection assistance programs.
State also believes that its in-country advisors are unfairly
criticized for not maintaining comprehensive lists of radiation
detection equipment in countries where they are responsible. State
cited competing claims on the advisors' time, their many
responsibilities within the EXBS program, and the limited resources at
their disposal. However, State's own guidance to its in-country
advisors states that the advisors' "general duties include—maintaining
a record of the transfer of all U.S. government-provided
nonproliferation export/border control equipment, and following-up to
ensure that it is operational, being used for intended purposes at the
locations previously specified by the recipient government, and in
accordance with U.S. laws and policies."
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days
from the report date. We will then send copies of this report to the
Secretary of Energy; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of State;
the Secretary of Homeland Security; the Administrator, National Nuclear
Security Administration; the Director, Office of Management and Budget;
and interested congressional committees. We also will make copies
available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be made
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [Hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-3841 or [Hyperlink, aloisee@gao.gov]. Contact
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs
can be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this
report include R. Stockton Butler, Julie Chamberlain, Nancy Crothers,
Chris Ferencik, Gregory Marchand, and Jim Shafer.
Signed by:
Gene Aloise:
Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
List of Requesters:
The Honorable Susan M. Collins:
Chairman:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Norm Coleman:
Chairman:
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Ranking Minority Member:
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Honorable John D. Dingell:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Energy and Commerce:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
We performed our review of U.S. programs that provide radiation
detection equipment assistance to foreign countries at the Departments
of Energy (DOE), Defense (DOD), Homeland Security (DHS), and State
(State) in Washington, D.C; Los Alamos National Laboratory in Los
Alamos, New Mexico; and Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque,
New Mexico. Additionally, we also visited a "nonprobability" sample of
six countries (Georgia, Greece, Macedonia, Russia, Ukraine, and
Uzbekistan) where U.S. agencies have provided radiation detection
equipment.[Footnote 26] We visited these six countries to observe U.S.-
funded radiation detection equipment in operation and to discuss the
implementation of U.S. programs with foreign officials. We determined
which specific countries to visit based on several criteria, such as
historic U.S. government spending to provide radiation detection
equipment within that country; countries receiving radiation detection
equipment from multiple U.S. agencies and programs; countries receiving
significant amounts of handheld equipment; countries with an in-country
advisor stationed at a U.S. Embassy; countries where DOE maintains
radiation detection equipment previously installed by State and other
U.S. agencies; the current political environment within the country;
and our ability to travel from country to county within a reasonable
amount of time.
To address the progress U.S. programs have made in providing radiation
detection equipment assistance to foreign countries, we reviewed
documents and had discussions with officials from DOE's Second Line of
Defense "Core" (SLD-Core) program, Cooperative Radiological Instrument
Transfer project, and International Nuclear Export Control program;
DOE's Office of General Counsel; and DOE's private sector contractors-
-SI International, Tetra Tech/Foster Wheeler, Bechtel-Nevada, TSA
Systems, and Miratek. We also reviewed documents and interviewed
relevant officials from DHS's Customs and Border Protection; State's
Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) program,
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund, and Georgia Border Security and
Law Enforcement program; DOD's Weapons of Mass Destruction
Proliferation Prevention Initiative (WMD-PPI), International
Counterproliferation Program (ICP), and Defense Threat Reduction
Agency; DOD's private sector contractor--Washington Group
International; Los Alamos National Laboratory; Sandia National
Laboratories; and Oak Ridge National Laboratory.
In addition, in October 2004, we visited Greece and Macedonia to
interview Greek and Macedonian officials and to see U.S. radiation
detection assistance provided in each country. In August 2005, we
visited Georgia, Russia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan to see where U.S.
agencies have provided radiation detection equipment, to observe U.S.-
funded radiation detection equipment in operation, and to discuss the
implementation of U.S. programs with foreign officials. We also visited
Belgium to meet with officials from the European Union to discuss
radiation detection equipment assistance provided to foreign countries
by that organization. During our visit to Greece, we spoke with Greek
officials from the Greek Atomic Energy Commission; the Greek Ministry
of Economy and Finance; and Customs Directorate General (Greek Customs
Service). While in Greece, we toured two border crossings where DOE had
installed radiation detection equipment through the SLD-Core program,
SLD-Core installations at Athens International Airport, and a small
research reactor in Athens that received physical security upgrades
from DOE prior to the 2004 Olympic Games. While in Macedonia, we
interviewed Macedonian officials and toured one border site where
radiation detection equipment had previously been provided by the
International Atomic Energy Agency and the Department of State.
While in Russia, we spoke with officials from the Federal Customs
Service of Russia, ASPECT (a Russian company that develops radiation
detection equipment), and DOE officials responsible for implementing
the SLD-Core program in Russia. During our visit to Russia, we toured
DOE installations at three airports and one seaport, the Federal
Customs Service Central Command Center where Russian Customs officials
gather and respond to portal monitor alarm data, and the Federal
Customs Service Training Academy in Saint Petersburg. While in
Uzbekistan, we spoke with officials from DOD's WMD-PPI program,
Washington Group International, State and DOD officials at the U.S.
Embassy in Tashkent, Uzbekistan's Institute of Nuclear Physics, and the
Uzbek State Customs Committee. While in Uzbekistan, we toured the
Tashkent Airport and a land border crossing where DOD had provided
radiation detection equipment assistance through the WMD-PPI program.
We also toured a small research reactor in Uzbekistan that previously
received physical security upgrades from DOE, such as barbed-wire
fences and video surveillance cameras. During our visit to Georgia, we
spoke with officials from State's Georgia Border Security and Law
Enforcement program, Department of Georgian State Border Defense,
Georgia Border Security Coordinating Group, and Georgia's
Andronikashvili Institute of Nuclear Physics. We toured a land border
crossing where State had previously provided radiation detection
equipment and visited the Georgian Border Guard Training Academy. While
in Ukraine, we spoke with DOE, DOD, and State officials at the U.S.
Embassy in Kiev, Ukraine's Border Security Coordinating Group,
Ukraine's Border Guard Service, and toured a land border crossing where
State had previously provided radiation detection equipment that DOE
currently maintains.
We discussed coordination issues with U.S. in-country advisors
stationed in countries receiving U.S. assistance, including Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Malta, Moldova, Poland, Romania, and
Ukraine. We developed a structured interview guide with a standard set
of questions, which we asked all of our interviewees. We designed our
interview guide with the assistance of a GAO methodologist. The
practical difficulties of asking questions may introduce other types of
errors. For example, differences in how a particular question is
interpreted or the sources of information available to respondents can
introduce unwanted variability into the responses, so we included steps
to minimize such errors. We pretested the content and format of the
interview guide with two individuals and made minor changes as
appropriate.
We chose which specific in-country advisors to interview based on
several criteria that include advisors who are stationed in the
countries we would be visiting, advisors who are stationed in countries
receiving significant amounts of radiation detection equipment from
multiple U.S. agencies and programs, and advisors who are stationed in
countries where DOE maintains radiation detection equipment previously
installed by State and other U.S. agencies. Once we determined which
specific advisors to interview, we created a list, which we then
randomly ordered to provide an unbiased approach to conducting our
interviews. Our goal was to talk with all the advisors on the list, but
we knew that circumstances might prevent that so we used a randomized
list to provide the order of contacting the advisors. We initiated
contact with each advisor from this list, but if we could not establish
contact with that advisor, we attempted to establish contact with the
next advisor on our list. In some instances, we slightly modified our
list due to unforeseen developments. For example, during our visit to
the Republic of Georgia, we became aware of a Department of State
project to install radiation detection equipment in Armenia opposite
the Georgian border. Since this met our criteria for including a
country in our pool of interviewees, we agreed it was appropriate, for
the purposes of this review, to add Armenia. We then contacted the in-
country advisor stationed in Armenia to learn more about this project.
In addition, we removed the responses from the advisor in Russia from
our total list of advisors because he failed to respond to more than
half of our questions and stated that his role in coordinating this
type of assistance in Russia is nonexistent because DOE, through its
SLD-Core program, conducts and coordinates radiation detection
assistance provided to Russia. Lastly, we interviewed the advisor
responsible for overseeing implementation of U.S. assistance to the
Republic of Georgia because Georgia has received radiation detection
equipment in the past from multiple U.S. programs. To obtain responses
to our structured interview questions, we generally used e-mail and
phone interviews. However, during our visits to Georgia and Ukraine, we
were able to meet with the in-country advisors to obtain responses to
our questions.
To assess the current and expected future costs of U.S. programs that
provide radiation detection equipment assistance to foreign countries,
we reviewed documents from DOE, DOD, State, and DHS detailing program
expenditures, projected costs, and schedule estimates. We reviewed
contract data for expenditures through the end of fiscal year 2005 and
met numerous times with officials from DOE, DOD, State, and DHS to
discuss the data. We obtained responses from key database officials to
a number of questions focused on data reliability covering issues such
as data entry access, internal control procedures, and the accuracy and
completeness of the data. Follow-up questions were added whenever
necessary. Caveats and limitations to the data were noted in the
documentation where necessary. For example, in our discussions with the
DOD official who manages its financial database, she stated that
program support costs were prorated between WMD-PPI's projects based on
usage. Therefore, the expenditure amount added for the program support
cost for Uzbekistan is a reasonable approximation but may not be exact.
We determined that the data we received were sufficiently reliable for
the purposes of this report based on work we performed.
To identify challenges U.S. programs face in deploying and operating
radiation detection equipment in foreign countries, we examined
documents and spoke with officials from DOE, DOD, State, DHS, Los
Alamos National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratories, Washington
Group International, and several nongovernmental entities, including
the Transnational Crime and Corruption Center at American University.
Additionally, during our visits to Georgia, Greece, Macedonia, Russia,
Ukraine, and Uzbekistan we spoke with various foreign officials to
better understand the challenges they face in operating radiation
detection equipment provided by U.S. programs. We also attended a
National Academies of Science conference on nonintrusive technologies
for improving the security of containerized maritime cargo and the
National Cargo Security Council conference on radiation detection and
screening.
To understand the steps U.S. programs take to coordinate radiation
detection equipment assistance provided by multiple U.S. programs, we
met with program officials from each of the agencies providing
assistance and reviewed pertinent documents, including individual
agency's assistance plans and State's Strategic Plan for Interagency
Coordination of U.S. Government Nuclear Detection Assistance Overseas.
We also assessed coordination through the interagency group headed by
State and met with the lead official of that effort--the Director of
Export Control and Cooperation--and members of his staff. We discussed
coordination issues with U.S. advisors stationed in countries receiving
U.S. assistance including Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan,
Malta, Moldova, Poland, Romania, and Ukraine. Several of these advisors
were responsible for tracking assistance efforts in more than one
country. For example, the advisor stationed in Poland is also
responsible for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Finally, we relied on
our previous reviews of the U.S. nonproliferation programs within DOE,
DOD, and State. At State, we interviewed the Coordinator of U.S.
Assistance to Europe and Eurasia and met with officials from the Bureau
of International Security and Nonproliferation. We also relied on
related prior GAO reports. We performed our review from April 2005 to
February 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Additional Information on Radiation Detection Assistance
Programs at the Department of Energy:
The Department of Energy's (DOE) Second Line of Defense "Core" program
provides comprehensive radiation detection equipment packages to
foreign countries to combat nuclear smuggling. Its associated
maintenance program focuses on maintaining equipment previously
provided by the Department of State and other U.S. agencies. In
addition, DOE implements another program within its Office of Global
Threat Reduction that provides handheld radiation detection equipment
to foreign countries.
Second Line of Defense "Core" Program:
In 1998, DOE established the Second Line of Defense "Core" (SLD-Core)
program, which has primarily worked to help Russia detect illicit
nuclear materials trafficking by providing radiation detection
equipment to the Federal Customs Service of Russia. DOE recently
expanded its efforts in the SLD-Core program to include countries other
than Russia. SLD-Core activities focus on providing radiation detection
equipment, software and hardware communications equipment and support,
and training/processes to foreign countries' border sites. The
radiation detection equipment DOE provides is U.S.-made, except in
Russia where Russian-made equipment is installed. The communication
systems DOE installs provide important information on the radiation
detector alarms, such as the radiation profile of the substance
detected. In addition to training at sites where equipment is
installed, DOE provides other training courses at the Hazardous
Materials Management and Emergency Response training center at Pacific
Northwest National Laboratory.
Through the end of fiscal year 2005, DOE's SLD-Core program had
completed installation of radiation portal monitors at 83 sites in
Greece, Lithuania, and Russia at a cost of about $130 million. In
fiscal year 2005, DOE planned to complete 29 sites in seven countries:
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Russia, Slovenia, and Ukraine.
However, due to delays in signing implementing agreements with the
governments of some of these countries, many of these sites were not
completed. As of December 2005, DOE had signed implementing agreements
with Azerbaijan, Georgia, Slovenia, and Ukraine, and plans to commence
work in these countries in fiscal year 2006 (see fig. 6). Additionally,
the SLD-Core program will be installing radiation detection equipment
at some foreign ports, referred to as "feeder" ports, to assist the
work done by DOE's Megaports Initiative.[Footnote 27]
Figure 6: Map of Countries Where DOE's SLD-Core Program Has Installed
Equipment and Signed Agreements to Begin Work:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
DOE has been cooperating with the Federal Customs Service of Russia
since 1998, and, coupled with the large number of sites where Russia
has installed equipment on its own, the nature of DOE's work through
the SLD-Core program in Russia is evolving. DOE is transitioning its
activities in Russia from installation of new equipment to
sustainability of equipment it has previously installed. DOE and the
Federal Customs Service of Russia signed an agreement in April 2005
that details plans for the long-term sustainability of radiation
detection equipment DOE has provided to Russia. DOE is also now
supporting other activities in Russia, such as regional radiation alarm
response exercises and rechecks of previously installed equipment.
Through the end of fiscal year 2005, DOE spent about $66 million
installing radiation portal monitors at 78 border sites in Russia, 4
sites in Greece, 1 site in Lithuania, and to conduct preliminary site
assessments in other countries. DOE spent about $50 million on various
program integration activities, which are costs not directly associated
with installing equipment at a particular site within a specific
country. Of this amount, about $15 million was spent on advanced
equipment procurement activities, which include the purchase and
storage of portal monitors and associated spare parts for use at future
installations. DOE also spent almost $16 million on program oversight
activities, such as program cost and schedule estimating, technical
assistance provided by participating national laboratories, and
translation services. In addition, DOE spent over $5 million to develop
and maintain its prioritization model for the SLD-Core program,
maintained by Los Alamos National Laboratory, which is used to rank
foreign countries, as well as specific sites within a country, in terms
of their attractiveness to a potential nuclear material smuggler. DOE
also spent about $4 million on equipment testing and evaluation to test
the effectiveness and performance of the radiation detection equipment
that it provides through the program. DOE spent over $8 million on the
development of materials and curricula for training foreign customs
agents on the use of radiation detection equipment.[Footnote 28]
Finally, DOE spent almost $2 million on other program integration
activities. See figure 7 for more information on program integration
expenditures.
Figure 7: DOE Spending on the SLD-Core Program through the End of
Fiscal Year 2005:
[See PDF for image]
Note: Figures have been rounded.
[End of figure]
DOE's Maintenance of Equipment Previously Installed by Other U.S.
Agencies:
In 2002, DOE assumed the responsibility for maintaining certain
radiation detection equipment, such as radiation portal monitors and X-
ray vans with gamma radiation detection capability, previously
installed in 23 countries by State and other U.S. agencies (see fig.
8). Through the end of fiscal year 2005, DOE has successfully conducted
maintenance and sustainability activities for this equipment in 21 of
23 countries.[Footnote 29] DOE contractors service these radiation
portal monitors annually and X-ray vans biannually. Since 2002, DOE has
spent about $8 million to provide spare parts, preventative
maintenance, and repairs for this equipment.[Footnote 30] DOE
anticipates that the future scope of the maintenance program will be
reduced as the SLD-Core program expands into countries where equipment
was previously installed by other U.S. agencies.
Figure 8: Map of Countries Where DOE Maintains Equipment Previously
Provided by Other U.S. Agencies:
[See PDF for image]
[A] DOE has not maintained equipment DOD provided to Belarus.
[B] At the request of the government of Turkey, DOE has not maintained
equipment State provided to that country.
[C] State provided Malta with both radiation portal monitors and X-ray
vans.
[End of figure]
If DOE is notified that there are problems with the radiation portal
monitors in a certain country, they will add this repair onto a
scheduled maintenance trip of a nearby country. According to the DOE
maintenance contractor, this occurs 5-6 times a year. However, DOE
officials often are not made aware of specific problems with equipment
prior to arriving at the site to conduct regular servicing. As a
result, DOE's maintenance teams must be equipped with a wide variety of
components in the event that major repairs are required. At times,
maintenance teams have had to improvise temporary repairs for equipment
due to a lack of necessary replacement parts. For example, during our
visit to a border site in Ukraine, DOE's maintenance team discovered
that a truck had struck and damaged a pole holding the wiring for the
radiation detection equipment's communication systems. The truck's
impact caused the wiring to snap in numerous places. Because the
maintenance team was unaware of this damage prior to our arrival at the
site, it had to repair the cable using connectors rather than replacing
the entire wire as they would have preferred to do. DOE officials told
us that, during the next scheduled maintenance visit to this site, the
wiring will be replaced.
Cooperative Radiological Instrument Transfer Project:
In 2004, DOE established the Cooperative Radiological Instrument
Transfer project (CRITr) within its Global Threat Reduction
Initiative.[Footnote 31] In this project, DOE partners with Interpol,
which provides knowledge of foreign law enforcement to determine the
countries to select for assistance and coordinates all CRITr training
logistics within its member countries.[Footnote 32] Through the CRITr
project, DOE collects and refurbishes handheld radiation detection
devices deemed surplus by DOE national laboratories and provides this
equipment to first responders in foreign countries. The handheld
radiation detection equipment DOE provides through CRITr consists
mostly of survey meters and does not include radiation pagers.[Footnote
33] In addition to providing radiation detection equipment through the
CRITr project, DOE provides training for foreign officials on how to
use the equipment. DOE originally provided assistance through the CRITr
project in Greece by providing over 100 handheld radiation detection
devices prior to the Olympic Games in 2004. According to DOE officials,
in fiscal year 2004, with Interpol's assistance, DOE selected seven
additional countries to receive assistance through the project:
Croatia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Poland, Romania, Turkey, and
Uzbekistan (see fig. 9). DOE also provided radiation detection
equipment to Tanzania in fiscal year 2005. Through the CRITr project,
DOE spent almost $0.5 million in fiscal year 2004 and almost $0.6
million in fiscal year 2005, according to DOE officials. DOE has
budgeted almost $0.4 million for fiscal year 2006 to supply instruments
and training to law enforcement officials in Albania, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, and Uganda and
to provide additional equipment to Tanzania.
Figure 9: Map of Countries Where DOE's CRITr Project Has Provided and
Plans to Provide Radiation Detection Equipment:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Additional Information on Radiation Detection Assistance
Programs at the Department of Defense:
The Department of Defense (DOD) implements two programs that assist
other countries in combating nuclear smuggling: the Weapons of Mass
Destruction Proliferation Prevention Initiative (WMD-PPI) and the
International Counterproliferation Program (ICP). As figure 10 shows,
DOD spent about $22 million on these programs between fiscal years 1994
and 2005.
Figure 10: DOD Spending on Radiation Detection Equipment Assistance
Programs through the End of Fiscal Year 2005:
[See PDF for image]
Note: Figures have been rounded.
[End of figure]
Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation Prevention Initiative:
WMD-PPI was created as a project within the Cooperative Threat
Reduction Program[Footnote 34] and is implemented by DOD's Defense
Threat Reduction Agency with oversight and policy guidance from the
Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy. In the 2003
National Defense Authorization Act, the Congress created WMD-PPI with a
$40 million budget to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) and related materials and technologies from the
former Soviet Union.[Footnote 35] WMD-PPI seeks to accomplish this
mission through three projects: the Uzbekistan Land Border project, the
Caspian Sea Maritime Proliferation Prevention project in Azerbaijan and
Kazakhstan, and the Ukraine Land and Maritime Border projects.
* In Uzbekistan, DOD is installing radiation portal monitors at 17
sites; 11 of which were completed by the end of fiscal year 2005. To
date, WMD-PPI has spent over $6 million to install radiation portal
monitors in Uzbekistan. However, this spending total is misleading
because DOD has obligated over $19 million to three contracts for
program costs associated with installing radiation detection equipment,
such as communication systems and training. Because DOD only executes
spending on these contracts after all work has been completed, these
contracts were not paid in fiscal year 2005. DOD projects that the
Uzbekistan Portal Monitoring project will cost about $54 million and be
completed in fiscal year 2009. Once these portal monitors are installed
in fiscal year 2006, DOE will maintain the equipment within its Second
Line of Defense "Core" program.
* The Caspian Sea project focuses on improving command and control,
surveillance, detection and interception of WMD, operation, and
sustainability along the Caspian Sea border by providing training and
associated equipment, including handheld radiation detection devices.
In Azerbaijan, the project's cost is estimated at $63.4 million and, in
Kazakhstan, it is estimated at $60.6 million.
* In Ukraine, WMD-PPI is implementing a similar project along the Black
Sea border. The Maritime Border Security Project in Ukraine is expected
to cost over $39 million and will be finished in fiscal year 2009. The
Ukrainian Land Border Forces Proliferation Prevention project focuses
on securing the points of entry and the green border--border that is
not a formal crossing point between countries--between Moldova and
Ukraine. It seeks to improve Ukraine's capabilities to detect and
interdict WMD and related materials by providing equipment and
training. Radiation detection equipment, such as pagers, is included in
this equipment assistance. DOD expects this project will cost over $51
million and be completed in fiscal year 2008.
Figure 11: Map of Countries Where DOD's WMD-PPI Program Has Provided
Radiation Detection Equipment or Signed Agreements to Install
Equipment:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
International Counterproliferation Program:
The 1995 National Defense Authorization Act directed DOD and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation to establish a program to improve
efforts to deter the possible proliferation and acquisition of WMD and
related materials across the borders and through the former Soviet
Union, the Baltic region, and Eastern Europe.[Footnote 36] Similarly,
the 1997 National Defense Authorization Act directed DOD to work with
U.S. Customs to carry out programs to assist customs officials and
border guards in those regions in preventing unauthorized transfer and
transportation of WMD and related materials.[Footnote 37] DOD
established ICP in response to these requirements. The program is
implemented by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. According to DOD
officials, ICP policy guidance comes from DOD's Eurasia Department
because of its strong ties and contacts within the regional scope of
the program. Through ICP, DOD provides a range of law enforcement and
border security training and equipment, including handheld radiation
detection equipment, to foreign law enforcement officials in
participating countries. According to an ICP official, the program does
not currently provide much radiation detection equipment because, in
many countries, other U.S. programs have already provided such
equipment. ICP coordinates with the Federal Bureau of Investigation to
conduct training of foreign government personnel. In some participating
countries, ICP provides both equipment and training, and in others it
provides only training, depending upon the needs of the country.
Through the end of fiscal year 2005, DOD had spent over $14 million to
provide radiation detection equipment and radiation detection training
to foreign countries through ICP. Of this amount, DOD spent over $0.5
million to provide handheld radiation detection equipment to six
countries (see fig. 12). The remaining funds were spent on a variety of
training related to radiation detection, WMD interdiction, and crime
scene investigation.[Footnote 38] Figure 13 shows the flowchart of
training DOD provides to participating countries through ICP.
Figure 12: Map of Countries Where DOD's ICP Has Provided Radiation
Detection Equipment:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Figure 13: Flowchart of ICP Training Courses:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
According to ICP officials, the program has worked in 23 countries,
including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Serbia and
Montenegro, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. In the National Defense
Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2005,[Footnote 39] DOD was given
permission by the Congress to expand ICP's scope outside of the
original region. According to a DOD official, ICP plans to initiate
programs in Malaysia, Singapore, and Pakistan.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Additional Information on Radiation Detection Assistance
Programs at the Department of State:
Since fiscal year 1994, the Department of State (State) has provided
various types of radiation detection equipment assistance to 31 foreign
countries. State has provided this assistance, primarily through three
programs (1) the Export Control and Related Border Security program
(EXBS), (2) the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF), and (3)
the Georgia Border Security and Law Enforcement program (GBSLE). As
figure 14 shows, State spent about $25 million from fiscal year 1994
through fiscal year 2005 on radiation detection equipment assistance to
foreign countries.
Figure 14: State Spending on Radiation Detection Equipment Assistance
Programs through the End of Fiscal Year 2005:
[See PDF for image]
Note: Figures have been rounded.
[End of figure]
Export Control and Related Border Security Program:
State's Export Control and Related Border Security program, which began
in 1998, is a comprehensive U.S. government effort to help foreign
countries improve their export controls and border security
capabilities.[Footnote 40] The program provides a broad array of
assistance to foreign countries, such as workshops to assist foreign
countries draft and implement new export control laws and regulations,
as well as various types of equipment and training for foreign border
control agencies. Assistance provided through the program focuses on
five core areas: (1) laws and regulations, (2) licensing, (3)
enforcement, (4) government and industry cooperation, and (5)
interagency cooperation and coordination. While the original focus of
the program was to provide assistance to potential "source countries"
in the former Soviet Union or to countries that produce munitions or
dual-use items,[Footnote 41] State later expanded the program's focus
to include states on potential smuggling routes in Eastern and Central
Europe, East Asia, Central Asia, the Caucasus, Latin America, and
Africa, as well as potential "source countries" in South Asia and
countries with major transshipment hubs in the Mediterranean, Middle
East, and Southeast Asia. Through the end of fiscal year 2005, State
has spent $15.4 million to provide a variety of radiation detection
equipment assistance to 30 countries (see fig. 15).
Figure 15: Map of Countries Where State's Export Control and Related
Border Security Program Has Provided Radiation Detection Equipment:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
In addition, State also provided funding to the Department of Homeland
Security's (DHS) Customs and Border Protection (formerly known as U.S.
Customs) to implement certain types of radiation detection equipment
assistance on behalf of its Export Control and Related Border Security
program. Specifically, from fiscal year 1999 through 2005, DHS and its
predecessor organizations spent about $10.5 million to provide
radiation detection equipment and training to 30 countries. This
equipment included, among other things, radiation pagers that border
officials wear on their belts and radioactive isotope identification
devices. Training provided by DHS included assistance in operating the
X-ray vans equipped with radiation detectors, hands-on instruction in
using radiation detection equipment to detect nuclear smuggling,
teaching techniques for investigating smuggling operations, and
tracking the movements of smugglers between ports of entry. In
addition, DHS also stationed 22 in-country advisors covering 25
countries, on behalf of the program, to assist in implementing and
coordinating U.S. government assistance in these countries. In February
2005, State, through its EXBS program, assumed direct responsibility of
the in-country advisors from DHS. According to State officials, this
management change was done to better address coordination and
responsiveness issues in the advisor program.
Russian Federal Customs Service Central Command Center:
In addition to providing radiation detection equipment assistance to
foreign countries, State has also provided other types of assistance
designed to better ensure the effectiveness of radiation detection
equipment previously provided to foreign countries through U.S.
programs. Specifically, in fiscal year 2005, State, through its EXBS
program, spent about $1.5 million to fund construction of a national
command center for the Federal Customs Service of Russia. Through this
project, portal monitors located at various Russian border sites can be
directly linked to a national command center, located at Federal
Customs Service headquarters in Moscow. By doing so, alarm data can be
simultaneously evaluated by Russian officials both at the site and up
the chain of command, thus establishing redundant layers of
accountability for responding to alarms. For example, when a portal
monitor alarms at a specific land border site, airport, or seaport,
information will immediately be sent from the site directly to the
command center enabling Russian officials to identify which specific
site an alarm occurred at, quickly analyze it, and respond
appropriately. Prior to the initiation of this project, the Federal
Customs Service did not have an effective way to coordinate and
integrate all of the information at its borders. While the total scope
of work to be done at the command center has not been clearly defined
yet, State officials told us that the primary activity will be to
maintain and respond to alarm data from the various border sites. State
officials we spoke with stated that linking alarm data from the local
alarm station at individual border sites to a centrally located command
center will enhance Russia's ability to (1) ensure that U.S. provided
equipment is being properly operated, (2) mitigate the possibility of
corruption or other nefarious acts being committed by its border
guards, and (3) effectively respond to any alarms and/or seizures of
illicitly trafficked nuclear or radiological materials.
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund:
State's Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund spent approximately $9.1
million, from fiscal year 1994 through 2001, to provide various types
of radiation detection equipment assistance to 21 countries (see fig.
16). This assistance included vehicle portal monitors, mobile vans
equipped with X-ray machines and radiation detection equipment,
handheld radiation detectors, dosimeters, and radiation pagers. For
example, in fiscal year 2001, State approved a $1.3 million NDF project
to install vehicle portal monitors at 16 sites in one country, and a
$0.5 million project to assist another country's upgrading its
domestically produced portal monitors in order to better detect nuclear
material. State also provided $0.8 million to DHS to provide radiation
detection equipment and training to seven countries under a project
called "Project Amber." Of this amount, DHS spent $0.6 million to
implement the project in these countries. In fiscal year 2001, State
began to consolidate its assistance provided to foreign countries for
the purposes of combating nuclear smuggling under its EXBS program.
However, State officials told us that they have not yet determined
whether or not they will fund any future projects to provide radiation
detection equipment to foreign countries through NDF. As a result, it
is uncertain how many other projects State will fund through NDF, in
what countries these projects will be conducted, or how much they will
cost.
Figure 16: Map of Countries Where State's Nonproliferation and
Disarmament Fund Has Provided Radiation Detection Equipment:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Georgia Border Security and Law Enforcement Program:
State's Georgia Border Security and Law Enforcement program focuses on
developing the Republic of Georgia's border infrastructure by assisting
the Georgian Customs Administration and Georgian Border Guards in
gaining control of the country's borders and seacoast and strengthening
its border security against any type of crime. The program primarily
focuses on establishing a transparent land border regime with
Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Turkey and strengthening border security
against nuclear smuggling. As such, the program has provided assistance
to enhance the Georgian Border Guards' capabilities to prevent, deter,
and detect potential weapons of mass destruction smuggling. Through the
program, State has provided a limited amount of radiation detection
equipment assistance. Specifically, in fiscal year 1999, State spent
$0.2 million to provide 137 radiation detection pagers to Georgia.
According to State officials, no radiation detection equipment has been
provided through the program since fiscal year 1999. However, State
officials also told us that they have not yet determined if they will
provide any additional radiation detection equipment assistance through
the program to the Republic of Georgia in the future. As a result, it
is uncertain what additional equipment State might provide or how much
it will cost.
[End of section]
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Energy:
Department of Energy:
National Nuclear Security Administration:
Washington, DC 20585:
February 15, 2006:
Mr. Gene Aloise, Director:
Natural Resources and Environment:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
Washington, D.C. 20584:
Dear Mr. Aloise:
The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) appreciates the
opportunity to review the Government Accountability Office's (GAO)
draft report GAO-06-311, "COMBATING NUCLEAR SMUGGLING: Corruption,
Maintenance, and Coordination Problems Challenge U.S. Efforts to
Provide Radiation Detection Equipment to Other Countries." We
understand that the intent of the audit was to determine (1) the
progress that has been made in providing radiation detection equipment
to foreign governments; (2) challenges facing programmatic efforts; and
(3) steps being taken to coordinate efforts to combat nuclear
smuggling.
The two main issues raised in the report - combating corruption and
upgrading older equipment - are long-time priorities for the Second
Line of Defense (SLD) Program. The SLD Program is structured to fully
address each of these issues.
Through the SLD Program, NNSA has in place a carefully thought through
and active effort to assist host governments in combating illicit
trafficking in nuclear and other radiological material that is not
fully reflected in this report. The combination of strategic planning
for deployments, equipment installation (including both radiation
monitoring and communication equipment), comprehensive training, and
ongoing maintenance support provides host governments with powerful
tools to carry out this key component of their nonproliferation
activities. The program is now actively underway in seven countries,
with negotiations ongoing in four others. We have clear, articulated
priorities for where we work, but it is important to underline that the
program is working with sovereign countries and the pace at which they
embrace this program remains to a great extent out of the control of
SLD.
The SLD programs addresses corruption by requiring that all radiation
portal monitors deployed under the program be networked to at least one
central alarm station. The associated communications software requires
reporting by a host country operator on the cause of the alarm and a
summary of the actions taken in response to the alarm. Installations
and operations are structured so that more than one person will be
involved in reviewing and closing an alarm, thus making it more
difficult for a corrupt official to bypass the system. One reason the
program does not like single monitor installations-without
communications systems, without full site coverage, and without high
level support-is that these types of systems are the most vulnerable to
corruption. Additionally, SLID planning includes redundant monitors (on
both sides of a border) along key pathways to protect against
corruption at a single site. In certain countries, the SLID Program
will provide the means to send status of health, alarm and other data
to central locations within the host country for further oversight and
technical assistance. Such systems are under development in Russia and
are being deployed in Greece. Based on these experiences, the program
will deploy these systems more widely. We have established a
methodology for selecting those countries in which the systems will be
installed and will ensure that our fiscal planning documents reflect
this approach. Programs that help ensure personnel reliability are
under consideration for selected countries. We do not believe that the
cost of such programs will considerably impact our life-cycle
projections.
As to upgrading less sophisticated portal monitors previously installed
by other U.S. agencies, we intend to replace these single monitors with
full installations as part of our comprehensive country-wide program.
In fact, to accelerate this process, we have significantly increased
our Fiscal Year (FY) 2007 SLD Core activities Congressional Budget
request. We firmly believe that upgrading single monitor installations,
except in special circumstances, is not the best use of our resources.
Such installations are more likely to be bypassed, to be vulnerable to
corruption, and to fall into disuse or misuse because there is no
training or sustainability program in place.
Finally, in response to the point made in the report that NNSA has not
systematically maintained handheld radiation detection equipment
provided by State and other agencies, we believe that the report does
not adequately reflect what we have done in this area. We wish to
clarify that the SLD maintenance program does in fact have a process in
place to identify and replace non-functioning handheld equipment. SLID
maintenance teams routinely inquire about the handhelds when performing
regular maintenance of portal monitors. Maintenance of handheld
equipment is provided whenever possible and units are being replaced on
a case-by-case basis. In FY05, NNSA received reports from the
maintenance teams that many sites were in need of additional or
replacement handheld detection equipment. In response, we ordered
handhelds specifically for this purpose (135 units at a total cost of
$386K). These units are being distributed to sites during the FY06
maintenance visits.
NNSA appreciates the efforts of GAO to incorporate changes to the
original draft report. These changes clarify issues that are directly
related to NNSA. We agree with the recommendations that are contained
in the modified draft report and have enclosed our specific comments to
those recommendations.
Should you have any questions related to this response, please contact
Richard Speidel, NNSA's Director, Policy and Internal Controls
Management.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Michael C. Kane:
Associate Administrator for Management and Administration:
Enclosure:
cc: Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation;
Senior Procurement Executive:
Director, Service Center:
Comments to GAO Draft Report, GAO-06-311 "COMBATING NUCLEAR SMUGGLING:
Corruption, Maintenance, and Coordination Problems Challenge U.S.
Efforts to Provide Radiation Detection Equipment to Other Countries"
Recommendation 1:
Integrate projected spending on specific anticorruption measures into
the long-term cost estimates for the SLD-Core program.
Management Comment:
Concur:
NNSA has accomplished a significant portion of this work. We will
factor cost estimates for centralized communications systems and
personnel reliability programs. Since this is an ongoing effort we
believe that NNSA has met the intent of the recommendation.
Recommendation 2:
Upgrade less sophisticated portal monitors previously installed by
other U.S. agencies where DOE has determined this to be appropriate as
soon as possible and include funding to accomplish this in DOE's
planning and budgeting process.
Management Comment:
Concur:
NNSA's plans and programs to upgrade these monitors in full-site
installations as part of a country-wide program are captured within
NNSA's Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Evaluation process. As
such, the funding has been requested to accelerate this process. NNSA
believes that we are responsive to the recommendation and have met its
intent.
[End of section]
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of State:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made Progress Deploying Radiation
Detection Equipment at U.S. Ports of Entry, but Concerns Remain.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-389]
Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2006.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Efforts to Deploy Radiation Detection
Equipment in the United States and in Other Countries.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-840T]
Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2005.
Olympic Security: U.S. Support to Athens Games Provides Lessons for
Future Olympics.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-547]
Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2005.
Preventing Nuclear Smuggling: DOE Has Made Limited Progress in
Installing Radiation Detection Equipment at Highest Priority Foreign
Seaports.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-375]
Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2005.
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Nonproliferation Programs Need Better
Integration.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-157]
Washington, D.C.: January 28, 2005.
Customs Service: Acquisition and Deployment of Radiation Detection
Equipment.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-235T]
Washington, D.C.: October 17, 2002.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Combat Nuclear Smuggling.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-02-989T]
Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2002.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat
Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and Planning.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-02-426]
Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2002.
(360560):
FOOTNOTES
[1] See S.C.Res. 1540, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1540 (Apr. 28, 2004).
[2] In addition to DOE, DOD, and State's efforts to combat nuclear
smuggling in other countries, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
is installing radiation detection equipment at U.S. ports of entry. We
recently reported on DHS's efforts in GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling:
DHS Has Made Progress Deploying Radiation Detection Equipment at U.S.
Ports of Entry, but Concerns Remain, GAO-06-389 (Washington, D.C.: Mar.
14, 2006).
[3] We originally reported on U.S. efforts to combat nuclear smuggling
in 2002. For additional information, see GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation:
U.S. Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat Nuclear Smuggling Need
Strengthened Coordination and Planning, GAO-02-426 (Washington, D.C.:
May 16, 2002).
[4] The National Nuclear Security Administration is a separately
organized agency within DOE that was created by the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-65 (2000), with
responsibility for the nation's nuclear weapons, nonproliferation, and
naval reactors programs.
[5] Additionally, in 2003, DOE began implementing a related program,
the Megaports Initiative, to focus on the threat posed by nuclear
smuggling at major foreign seaports. We recently reported on this
program; therefore, we will not address the Megaports Initiative in
this report. For additional information, see GAO, Preventing Nuclear
Smuggling: DOE Has Made Limited Progress in Installing Radiation
Detection Equipment at Highest Priority Foreign Seaports, GAO-05-375
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2005). Through January 2006, DOE had
completed installations at four ports in Greece, the Netherlands, Sri
Lanka, and the Bahamas. DOE anticipates completing an additional port
in Spain in April 2006. DOE has signed agreements to begin work at
ports in seven other countries (China, Honduras, Israel, Oman, the
Philippines, Thailand, and the United Arab Emirates).
[6] IAEA's database includes incidents involving unauthorized
acquisition, provision, possession, use, transfer, or disposal of
nuclear materials or other radioactive materials, whether intentional
or unintentional and with or without crossing international borders,
including unsuccessful and thwarted events. These include incidents
involving loss and discovery of uncontrolled nuclear and radiological
materials.
[7] According to IAEA, in June 2003, an individual was arrested while
attempting to smuggle 170 grams of highly enriched uranium across the
border between Armenia and Georgia.
[8] It is important to note that participation in IAEA's nuclear
trafficking database is voluntary.
[9] The price of radiation portal monitors varies depending on the
manufacturer and type of monitor, e.g., whether the portal monitor is
built to screen pedestrians, vehicles, or trains.
[10] See GAO-02-426.
[11] Primary inspections are conducted with radiation portal monitors
to determine whether there is a presence of radiation. After radiation
is detected, a secondary inspection is conducted to determine where the
source is located and what material is present.
[12] Handheld radiation detection equipment is generally less expensive
than fixed radiation portal monitors, in part, because there are no
installation costs associated with providing handheld equipment.
According to DOE, DOD, State, and DHS officials, survey meters cost
about $1,200 to $7,000; RIIDs typically cost about $3,000 to $18,000;
and radiation pagers cost about $1,500.
[13] From fiscal year 1997 through fiscal year 2001, State provided DOE
with approximately $2.7 million to assist its SLD-Core program with
installing radiation detection equipment at eight sites in Russia.
These sites included an airport near Moscow, six seaports, and one
railroad crossing. We have included the $2.7 million provided by State
under total expenditures for DOE.
[14] Additional information on these DOE radiation detection assistance
programs can be found in appendix II.
[15] The program spending total for DOD's WMD-PPI program is misleading
because, in addition to about $6 million in expenditures, DOD has
obligated over $19 million to three contracts for program costs
associated with installing radiation detection equipment in Uzbekistan,
such as communication systems and training. Because DOD only executes
spending on these contracts after all work has been completed, these
contracts were not paid until fiscal year 2006 and, therefore, are not
included in the program's expenditure total.
[16] According to DOE officials, DOE's SLD-Core program has worked with
DOD to coordinate on the types of radiation detection equipment and
specific sites in Uzbekistan that will receive assistance.
[17] Additional information on these DOD radiation detection assistance
programs can be found in appendix III.
[18] For additional information on these radiation detection equipment
assistance programs at State, see appendix IV.
[19] DOE completed upgrading one site in Azerbaijan in December 2005 at
a cost of about $86,000.
[20] State's Selective Engagement Policy prohibits a variety of U.S.
assistance to Belarus and was applied to that country beginning in
1997.
[21] In addition to the handheld radiation detection equipment cited
above, about 900 radiation pagers were also previously provided by
State and other U.S. agencies. However, according to DOE and State
officials, radiation pagers generally require little maintenance and
have a relatively low replacement cost compared with radioactive
isotope identification devices or other handheld radiation detection
equipment used for conducting secondary inspections.
[22] DOE officials noted that, during regular site visits to conduct
maintenance on radiation portal monitors, DOE maintenance teams often
are asked by the host government to maintain handheld radiation
detection equipment provided by other U.S. programs. DOE officials also
stated that although this work is outside the scope of DOE's
responsibility, when time and funding permit, DOE maintenance teams
have replaced some dysfunctional equipment on a case-by-case basis.
[23] According to DHS, other responsibilities of DNDO include the (1)
acquisition and support-to-deployment of the domestic detection system,
(2) enhancement of effective sharing and use of nuclear detection-
related information and intelligence, and (3) establishment of
procedures and training for the end users of equipment developed and
deployed through the new office.
[24] For additional details on the findings and recommendations
discussed in our prior report, see GAO-02-426.
[25] The Strategic Plan For Interagency Coordination of U.S. Government
Nuclear Detection Assistance Overseas is intended to complement the
existing program management plans of all participating agencies, which
include DOE, DOD, State, DHS, and the Department of Commerce. DHS and
Commerce are implementers of parts of State's EXBS program and thus
were included as signatories to the plan.
[26] Results from nonprobability samples cannot be used to make
inferences about a population, because in a nonprobability sample some
elements of the population being studied have no chance or an unknown
chance of being selected as part of the sample.
[27] For more information on the Megaports Initiative, see GAO-05-375.
[28] Additionally, some of these funds were spent to pay for training
of U.S. Customs and Border Protection officials at the Hazardous
Materials Management and Emergency Response training center at Pacific
Northwest National Laboratory.
[29] DOE officials told us that, although Belarus has received a
significant amount of radiation detection equipment from U.S. programs,
it is currently prohibited from maintaining this equipment due to
restrictions placed on U.S. assistance to Belarus through State's
Selective Engagement Policy, which was instituted in 1997.
Additionally, at the request of the government of Turkey, DOE no longer
maintains radiation detection equipment provided to that country by
State.
[30] State, through an interagency agreement with DOE, annually
provides DOE with a portion of the funding required to maintain the
equipment that State and other U.S. agencies previously installed.
Through fiscal year 2005, State has provided DOE with approximately
$3.2 million, which has been about one-third of the required funding
necessary to conduct these activities. We have included these
expenditures in the total expenditures for DOE's SLD-Core program.
[31] The Global Threat Reduction Initiative consolidated DOE's efforts
to identify, secure, remove, and/or facilitate disposition of high-risk
nuclear and other radioactive materials around the world that pose a
potential threat to the international community. Within this office,
DOE's International Radiological Threat Reduction program works to
locate, identify, recover, consolidate, and enhance the security of
dangerous radioactive materials outside the United States.
[32] Interpol is the largest international police organization focusing
on cross border police cooperation.
[33] In addition to the CRITr project, DOE's International Radiological
Threat Reduction program has provided some radiation detection
equipment to nuclear regulatory bodies and national laboratories in
foreign countries. This equipment is intended to help these entities
locate and identify orphaned radiological sources within their
countries, rather than for law enforcement purposes. As a result, we
did not include this part of DOE's radiation detection assistance in
our review.
[34] Congress passed the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991,
Pub. L. No. 102-228 (1991), popularly referred to as the Nunn-Lugar
Act, authorizing U.S. threat reduction assistance to the former Soviet
Union, due to concerns about the safety and security of Soviet nuclear
weapons. The legislation authorized funding to assist the former Soviet
Union with its efforts to (1) destroy nuclear, chemical, and other
weapons; (2) transport, store, disable, and safeguard weapons in
connection with their destruction; and (3) establish verifiable
safeguards against the proliferation of such weapons.
[35] Pub. L. No. 107-314 (2002).
[36] Pub. L. No. 103-337 (1994).
[37] Pub. L. No. 104-201 (1996).
[38] Most ICP training courses do not focus solely on radiation
detection training but have a module during the training on radiation
detection. Therefore, according to a DOD official, breaking out the
specific cost of radiation detection training is difficult. Only one
ICP training course focuses solely on radiation detection.
[39] Pub. L. No. 108-375 (2004).
[40] State's Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation
manages the Export Control and Related Border Security program. In
1998, an export control assistance account was established as part of
the Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, De-Mining and Related Programs
account of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act. Pub. L. No. 105-
118 (1997). In fiscal year 2000, this program evolved into the Export
Control and Related Border Security program.
[41] A "source country" is a country known to possess material that can
be used to develop a weapon of mass destruction. For example, a country
known to possess plutonium or highly enriched uranium would be
considered a "source country."
GAO's Mission:
The Government Accountability Office, the investigative arm of
Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional
responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability
of the federal government for the American people. GAO examines the use
of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides
analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make
informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO's commitment to
good government is reflected in its core values of accountability,
integrity, and reliability.
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony:
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no
cost is through the Internet. GAO's Web site ( www.gao.gov ) contains
abstracts and full-text files of current reports and testimony and an
expanding archive of older products. The Web site features a search
engine to help you locate documents using key words and phrases. You
can print these documents in their entirety, including charts and other
graphics.
Each day, GAO issues a list of newly released reports, testimony, and
correspondence. GAO posts this list, known as "Today's Reports," on its
Web site daily. The list contains links to the full-text document
files. To have GAO e-mail this list to you every afternoon, go to
www.gao.gov and select "Subscribe to e-mail alerts" under the "Order
GAO Products" heading.
Order by Mail or Phone:
The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2
each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent
of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or
more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent.
Orders should be sent to:
U.S. Government Accountability Office
441 G Street NW, Room LM
Washington, D.C. 20548:
To order by Phone:
Voice: (202) 512-6000:
TDD: (202) 512-2537:
Fax: (202) 512-6061:
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs:
Contact:
Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:
Public Affairs:
Jeff Nelligan, managing director,
NelliganJ@gao.gov
(202) 512-4800
U.S. Government Accountability Office,
441 G Street NW, Room 7149
Washington, D.C. 20548:
