U.S. Public Diplomacy
State Department Efforts to Engage Muslim Audiences Lack Certain Communication Elements and Face Significant Challenges Gao ID: GAO-06-535 May 3, 2006Public opinion polls have shown continued negative sentiments toward the United States in the Muslim world. Public diplomacy activities--led by the State Department (State)--are designed to counter such sentiments by explaining U.S. foreign policy actions, countering misinformation, and advancing mutual understanding between nations. GAO was asked to examine (1) what public diplomacy resources and programs State has directed to the Muslim world, (2) whether posts have adopted a strategic approach to implementing public diplomacy, and (3) what challenges remain to be addressed.
State has increased public diplomacy resources to countries with significant Muslim populations in recent years and launched three major initiatives directed at the Muslim world. Comparing data for fiscal years 2004 and 2006, overseas operations budgets have increased, with the largest percentage increases going to regional bureaus with significant Muslim populations. However, the number of authorized overseas positions in all regional bureaus increased slightly or not at all. As part of the Secretary of State's newly announced transformational diplomacy initiative, the department intends to reposition staff to better align with policy priorities. Since 2002, State has initiated three public diplomacy activities focused on the Muslim world--a media campaign, a youth-oriented magazine, and a group of youth-focused exchange programs--but these initiatives have been largely terminated or suspended. However, several exchange programs continue to target youth in the Muslim world. In addition, posts in the Muslim world use a range of standard programs and tools which the Under Secretary plans to supplement with several new initiatives. GAO's fieldwork revealed that posts' public diplomacy efforts generally lacked important strategic communication elements found in the private sector, which GAO and others have suggested adopting as a means to better communicate with target audiences. These elements include having core messages, segmented target audiences, in-depth research and analysis to monitor and evaluate results, and an integrated communication plan that brings all these elements together. These findings were reinforced by State's own post-level review. State established a new strategic framework for public diplomacy in fiscal year 2006, calling for, among other things, marginalizing extremists and demonstrating respect for Muslim cultures. However, posts have not been given written guidance on how to implement this strategy. Such guidance is a critical first step to developing in-depth communication plans in the field. Posts in the Muslim world face several challenges in implementing their public diplomacy programs, including the need to balance security with public outreach and concerns related to staff numbers and language capabilities. For example, we found that 30 percent of language designated public diplomacy positions in the Muslim world were filled by officers without the requisite language skills. State has begun to address many of these challenges, but it is too early to evaluate the effectiveness of many of these efforts. Further, State lacks a systematic, comprehensive means of sharing best practices in public diplomacy, which could help transfer knowledge and experience across posts.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-06-535, U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Efforts to Engage Muslim Audiences Lack Certain Communication Elements and Face Significant Challenges
This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-06-535
entitled 'U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Efforts to Engage
Muslim Audiences Lack Certain Communication Elements and Face
Significant Challenges' which was released on May 3, 2006.
This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part
of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this
document to Webmaster@gao.gov.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this
material separately.
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Science, the Departments of
State, Justice, and Commerce, and Related Agencies, Committee on
Appropriations, House of Representatives:
May 2006:
U.S. Public Diplomacy:
State Department Efforts to Engage Muslim Audiences Lack Certain
Communication Elements and Face Significant Challenges:
GAO-06-535:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-535, a report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on
Science, the Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, and Related
Agencies, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Public opinion polls have shown continued negative sentiments toward
the United States in the Muslim world. Public diplomacy activities”led
by the State Department (State)”are designed to counter such sentiments
by explaining U.S. foreign policy actions, countering misinformation,
and advancing mutual understanding between nations. GAO was asked to
examine (1) what public diplomacy resources and programs State has
directed to the Muslim world, (2) whether posts have adopted a
strategic approach to implementing public diplomacy, and (3) what
challenges remain to be addressed.
What GAO Found:
State has increased public diplomacy resources to countries with
significant Muslim populations in recent years and launched three major
initiatives directed at the Muslim world. Comparing data for fiscal
years 2004 and 2006, overseas operations budgets have increased, with
the largest percentage increases going to regional bureaus with
significant Muslim populations. However, the number of authorized
overseas positions in all regional bureaus increased slightly or not at
all. As part of the Secretary of State‘s newly announced
transformational diplomacy initiative, the department intends to
reposition staff to better align with policy priorities. Since 2002,
State has initiated three public diplomacy activities focused on the
Muslim world”a media campaign, a youth-oriented magazine, and a group
of youth-focused exchange programs”but these initiatives have been
largely terminated or suspended. However, several exchange programs
continue to target youth in the Muslim world. In addition, posts in the
Muslim world use a range of standard programs and tools which the Under
Secretary plans to supplement with several new initiatives.
GAO‘s fieldwork revealed that posts‘ public diplomacy efforts generally
lacked important strategic communication elements found in the private
sector, which GAO and others have suggested adopting as a means to
better communicate with target audiences. These elements include having
core messages, segmented target audiences, in-depth research and
analysis to monitor and evaluate results, and an integrated
communication plan that brings all these elements together. These
findings were reinforced by State‘s own post-level review. State
established a new strategic framework for public diplomacy in fiscal
year 2006, calling for, among other things, marginalizing extremists
and demonstrating respect for Muslim cultures. However, posts have not
been given written guidance on how to implement this strategy. Such
guidance is a critical first step to developing in-depth communication
plans in the field.
Posts in the Muslim world face several challenges in implementing their
public diplomacy programs, including the need to balance security with
public outreach and concerns related to staff numbers and language
capabilities. For example, we found that 30 percent of language
designated public diplomacy positions in the Muslim world were filled
by officers without the requisite language skills. State has begun to
address many of these challenges, but it is too early to evaluate the
effectiveness of many of these efforts. Further, State lacks a
systematic, comprehensive means of sharing best practices in public
diplomacy, which could help transfer knowledge and experience across
posts.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Secretary of State develop (1) implementing
guidance for its public diplomacy strategy modeled on private sector
best practices, (2) a sample country-level communication plan that
could be adapted for local use by posts, and (3) a systematic mechanism
for sharing best practices data to address long-standing program
challenges. State agreed with the report‘s recommendations.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-535].
To view the full product, including the scope
and methodology, click on the link above.
For more information, contact Jess T. Ford at (202) 512-4128 or
fordj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
State Devotes Significant Public Diplomacy Resources to the Muslim
World, but Programs Generally Remain the Same:
Post Program Planning and Evaluation Efforts Lack Appropriate Guidance,
but Improvements Are Planned:
Security and Staffing Pose Challenges to Public Diplomacy Efforts in
the Muslim World:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Countries and Territories with Significant Muslim
Populations:
Appendix III: Inventory of State Department Public Diplomacy Positions
and Selected Programs:
Appendix IV: Private Sector Best Practices:
Appendix V: Comments from the State Department:
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Overseas Public Diplomacy Resources by Regional Bureau, Fiscal
Years 2004 and 2006:
Table 2: Selected Public Diplomacy Activities at Posts in Nigeria,
Pakistan, and Egypt, Fiscal Year 2005 15:
Figures:
Figure 1: Map of the Muslim World:
Figure 2: Unsold Copies of Hi Magazine Returned to the U.S. Embassy in
Cairo, October 2005:
Figure 3: Key Elements of a Typical Public Relations Strategy:
Figure 4: Logic Model for State Public Diplomacy Programs:
Figure 5: Terrorist Threat Ratings for Posts in the Muslim and Non-
Muslim Worlds, October 2005:
Figure 6: Photographs of American Corner, Abuja, Nigeria:
Figure 7: Average Tour of Duty Length by Region (as of December 2005):
Figure 8: Percentage of Filled Language-Designated Public Diplomacy
Positions in the Muslim World Staffed by Officers Meeting Language
Requirements (as of August 2005):
Figure 9: Elements of a Typical Public Relations Strategy:
Abbreviations:
BBG: Broadcasting Board of Governors:
BDA: Business for Diplomatic Action:
DOD: Department of Defense:
PLUS: Partnerships for Learning-Undergraduate Study:
USAID: U.S. Agency for International Development:
USIA: U.S. Information Agency:
VOA: Voice of America:
YES: Youth Exchange and Study:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
May 3, 2006:
The Honorable Frank R. Wolf:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on Science, the Departments of State, Justice, and
Commerce, and Related Agencies:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, foreign public opinion
polls conducted by the State Department (State) and firms such as Zogby
International have shown that negative attitudes toward the United
States have generally grown worse in many countries around the world.
One particular concern has been a marked worsening of such negative
attitudes in the Muslim world[Footnote 1]--an audience of key strategic
interest in the United States' war on terrorism.[Footnote 2] State's
public diplomacy programs and activities are designed to counter such
negative sentiments through ongoing attempts to communicate with elites
and mass audiences overseas. These efforts include crisis management
and daily news operations designed to explain U.S. foreign policy
positions and actions; strategic information programs designed to more
broadly engage, inform, and influence target audiences; and long-term
activities, such as exchanges, to promote relationship building and
mutual understanding.[Footnote 3]
As a follow-up to our April 2005 public diplomacy report,[Footnote 4]
we reviewed State's current public diplomacy initiatives designed to
reach out to countries with significant Muslim populations and
determined how such initiatives are being implemented at the post
level. Specifically, we examined: (1) what public diplomacy resources
and programs State has directed to the Muslim world, (2) whether posts
have adopted a strategic approach to implementing public diplomacy, and
(3) what program challenges remain to be addressed.
To accomplish our objectives, we interviewed State officials from the
Under Secretary's office, the Bureau of Educational and Cultural
Affairs, the Bureau of International Information Programs, the Bureau
of Public Affairs, and the Bureau of Resource Management. We also
interviewed officials in State's Bureaus of Near Eastern Affairs, South
and Central Asian Affairs,[Footnote 5] African Affairs, and East Asian
and Pacific Affairs. We collected and analyzed data on the allocation
of public diplomacy staff and selected program costs by regional
bureau. We also convened a roundtable of nongovernment Muslim experts
in Washington, D.C., who were identified by various U.S. government
officials and others as knowledgeable of U.S. efforts to engage Muslim
audiences, to discuss key program challenges, obstacles, and potential
solutions.
We conducted fieldwork in Nigeria, Pakistan, and Egypt to review the
implementation of U.S. public diplomacy efforts in countries of
particular strategic interest to the United States. In each country, we
met with a broad cross section of U.S. embassy officials, British
Council and embassy staff, and local focus groups to discuss public
perceptions of the United States, program implementation efforts,
effectiveness measurement efforts, and program challenges.
Additionally, we conducted phone interviews with State Public Affairs
officers in Indonesia and Turkey to supplement the information we
collected at the three posts we visited. The combined population of
these countries is approximately 680 million, or 45 percent of the
total population of the 58 countries and territories in the Muslim
world.
The focus of our review was public diplomacy activities designed to
communicate information about the United States to target audiences
overseas. Thus, we did not review State-led reform initiatives, such as
the Middle East Partnership Initiative.[Footnote 6] Aside from State,
we examined U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) efforts
to tell America's assistance story and Department of Defense (DOD)
efforts to support State's public diplomacy activities. In addition, we
collected funding and program information on U.S. international
broadcasting but did not seek to evaluate the effectiveness of Radio
Sawa and the Alhurra satellite television network--the Broadcasting
Board of Governors' (BBG) two primary initiatives aimed at Arab
audiences. GAO is reviewing these broadcast initiatives separately.
We performed our work from April 2005 to February 2006 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Results in Brief:
State has increased public diplomacy resources to countries with
significant Muslim populations in recent years and launched three major
initiatives directed at the Muslim world. Comparing data from fiscal
years 2004 and 2006, regional bureau budgets for overseas operations
increased by 21 percent in total, with the largest percentage going to
the South Asia (39 percent), East Asia and the Pacific (28 percent),
and Near East (25 percent) regions, each of which includes countries
with large Muslim populations. Over the past 3 years, however, the
number of authorized overseas positions in all regional bureaus
increased slightly or not at all. As part of the Secretary of State's
newly announced transformational diplomacy initiative, the department
intends to reposition some staff to better align available resources
with its strategic priorities, including initial plans to shift 28
public diplomacy officers from posts in Europe and Washington, D.C., to
India, China, and Latin America, as well as to the Muslim world. Since
2002, State has initiated three public diplomacy activities focused on
the Muslim world--Shared Values, a media campaign; Hi, a youth-oriented
magazine; and Partnerships for Learning, a group of exchange programs
geared to younger audiences. While these particular initiatives have
been largely terminated or suspended, posts continue to pursue a range
of standard public diplomacy programs and tools available to embassies
around the world. In addition, while Partnerships for Learning no
longer provides a focal point for State's exchange efforts in the
Muslim world, several exchange programs continue to target younger,
marginalized sectors of society in the Muslim world. The new Under
Secretary has introduced several new public diplomacy initiatives to
help officers at all posts better advocate U.S. policy and respond to
breaking news, while many other initiatives are still in their early
stages of development.
Our fieldwork revealed that posts' public diplomacy efforts generally
lacked important strategic communication elements found in the private
sector, which GAO and others have suggested adopting as a means to
better communicate with target audiences. These elements include having
core messages, segmented target audiences, detailed strategies and
tactics, in-depth research and analysis to monitor and evaluate
results, and a communication plan that brings it all together. These
findings were reinforced by a worldwide review of mission performance
plans conducted by State in 2005, which also concluded that a large
number of posts lacked at least some of these key strategic elements.
State recently established a strategic framework outlining priority
goals for public diplomacy, such as marginalizing extremists, and
related tactics that include education and empowerment; however, the
department has not issued guidance on how these strategies and tactics
should be implemented. Such guidance is a critical first step to
developing detailed communication plans in the field.
U.S. embassies face multiple challenges in implementing their public
diplomacy programs, including the need to balance security with public
outreach and concerns related to staff numbers, time, and language
capabilities. These challenges are particularly acute in countries with
significant Muslim populations; for example, the threat level for
terrorism is rated as "critical" or "high" in 80 percent of posts in
the Muslim world, and 15 of State's 20 so-called unaccompanied posts
are located in countries in the Muslim world. Security and budgetary
concerns have forced embassies to close publicly accessible facilities
and curtail certain public outreach efforts, sending foreign publics
the unintended message that the United States is unapproachable.
Efforts to compensate for this loss in public presence include the use
of small-scale external facilities staffed with local employees,
expanded embassy speaker programs, and traveling teams of embassy
employees engaging in outreach efforts. Meanwhile, public diplomacy
efforts at post are hindered by a shortage of officers, and these
officers face an increasing administrative burden. Tours of duty for
diplomats at posts in the Muslim world are shorter than elsewhere,
which can limit the effectiveness of public diplomacy efforts in these
posts. Furthermore, State's data show that as many as 30 percent of
public diplomacy positions in countries with significant Muslim
populations are filled by officers with insufficient language skills.
As a result, public diplomacy officers in the Muslim world spend less
time communicating with local audiences than the position requires.
While State has begun to address many of these challenges, it is too
early to determine the effectiveness of such efforts. Further,
opportunities to share best practices across posts on how to overcome
some of these challenges remain underutilized.
To increase the sophistication and effectiveness of U.S. public
diplomacy outreach efforts, we recommend that the Secretary of State
develop written guidance detailing how the department intends to
implement the Under Secretary's priority goals and tactics as they
apply to the Muslim world. We recommend the development of a sample
country-level communication plan to accompany this document as a guide
for posts to use and adapt to their environment. Finally, we recommend
that the Secretary develop a systematic mechanism for sharing best
practices data to address long-standing program challenges, which have
been particularly acute in the Muslim world. In commenting on a draft
of this report, State concurred with our findings and recommendations.
We have reprinted State's comments in appendix V. We also incorporated
technical comments from State where appropriate.
Background:
The overall goal of U.S. public diplomacy efforts is to understand,
inform, engage, and influence the attitudes and behavior of global
audiences in ways that support the United States' strategic interests.
U.S. public diplomacy efforts are implemented by several entities,
including State, DOD, USAID, and BBG, and function under the broad
guidance of the White House and the National Security Council.[Footnote
7] Funding is concentrated in State and BBG, which together received
approximately $1.2 billion for public diplomacy in fiscal year 2005.
USAID and DOD have relatively small public diplomacy budgets.
State Department Public Diplomacy Efforts:
State's public diplomacy operations are guided by the Under Secretary
for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, who oversees the Bureaus of
Educational and Cultural Affairs, International Information Programs,
and Public Affairs. The department's regional and functional bureaus
also contain public diplomacy offices, which report to the relevant
assistant secretary.[Footnote 8] The Under Secretary has direct
authority over the three public diplomacy bureaus but does not have
line authority over public diplomacy operations in other regional or
functional bureaus.[Footnote 9] In overseas missions, Foreign Service
public diplomacy officers (including Public Affairs, Cultural Affairs,
Information, Information Resources, and Regional English Language
officers) operate under the authority of the chief of mission and
report to their regional bureau managers in Washington, D.C.
Public Diplomacy Budget and Programs:
In fiscal year 2005, State dedicated $597 million to pubic diplomacy
and public affairs. According to the department's performance plan, its
investment in public diplomacy and public affairs continues to
increase, particularly for efforts targeting audiences in the Middle
East. Exchange programs received the majority of fiscal year 2005
funding, $356 million, which was a 12.4 percent increase over fiscal
year 2004. These programs include international visitors, citizen
exchanges, the Fulbright academic exchange program, and English-
language teaching. State's information programs received roughly $68
million in fiscal year 2005 to fund programs such as the U.S. speakers
program, mission Web sites, and American Corners, which are centers
that provide information about the United States, hosted in local
institutions and staffed by local employees. The remaining public
diplomacy funds go to State's regional bureaus to pay for the salaries
of locally engaged staff overseas, among other purposes. Appendix III
provides a summary of selected programs managed by each bureau along
with a description of staff positions.
USAID, DOD, and BBG also support the U.S. government's communication
efforts in the field. USAID reports that it has established an overseas
network of more than one hundred Development Outreach and
Communications officers, who work with Public Affairs officers to
promote America's assistance story. DOD has also become involved in
public diplomacy and is developing a strategy for "military support for
public diplomacy" to identify ways it can effectively support State's
operations. For example, DOD Military Information Support Teams have
been dispatched to selected posts, at the request of the Ambassador, to
assist with outreach efforts. Finally, U.S. international broadcasting,
led by the BBG, is a major contributor to the United States' efforts to
communicate directly with foreign audiences. Between fiscal years 2004
and 2006, the BBG expects to spend nearly $240 million on its Middle
East Broadcasting Network, which includes Alhurra satellite television
network and the Arabic-language Radio Sawa.
Definition of the Muslim World:
According to State's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, the
Muslim world is composed of 58 countries and territories with
significant Muslim populations, many of which are members of the
Organization of the Islamic Conference. These countries have a combined
population of more than 1.5 billion and are located in Africa, Asia,
and Europe (see app. II). Figure 1 shows their locations.
Figure 1: Map of the Muslim World:
[See PDF for image]
Source: State Department.
[End of figure]
State's public diplomacy investment in these 58 countries and
territories has increased in recent years. According to department
data, State provided funds for 179 speakers to travel to these
countries in fiscal year 2005, up from 157 in fiscal year 2004.
Additionally, the department funded nearly 5,800 exchange participants
from these countries in fiscal year 2005, up from about 5,100 in fiscal
year 2004. The department spent nearly $115 million on exchange and
information programs in these countries in fiscal year 2005.
State Devotes Significant Public Diplomacy Resources to the Muslim
World, but Programs Generally Remain the Same:
State devotes significant public diplomacy program and staffing
resources to regions with large Muslim populations. Beginning in 2002,
State introduced three key initiatives focused on reaching younger and
broader Muslim audiences to supplement the standard exchange and
information programs used by most embassies; these initiatives have
been largely terminated or suspended. Nevertheless, posts in the Muslim
world continue to generally employ the same exchange, cultural, and
information programs used throughout the world.[Footnote 10] In fiscal
year 2006, the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs
introduced several new initiatives designed to help officers in the
field improve their advocacy of U.S. foreign policy and enhance their
ability to quickly respond to breaking news stories, while other
initiatives, some of which are specific to Muslim audiences, are still
in development.
Resources Directed to Regions with Significant Muslim Populations:
In our 2003 report on public diplomacy, we reported that the department
had increased its overall spending on public diplomacy since the
terrorist attacks of September 11, with the largest relative increases
going to regions with large Muslim populations. Specifically, we noted
that while State's Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs received the
largest overall share of overseas public diplomacy resources, the
largest percentage increases in such resources occurred in regions with
significant Muslim populations. As table 1 shows, this pattern has
continued over the past 3 years, with total spending on overseas public
diplomacy increasing 21 percent between fiscal years 2004 and 2006. The
Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs continues to receive the
largest overall share of overseas public diplomacy resources, with the
largest percentage increases in resources going to regions with
countries with large Muslim populations including South Asia (39
percent), East Asia and Pacific (28 percent), and the Near East (25
percent).
Table 1 provides data on public diplomacy funding and staffing for each
of State's regional bureaus. The table also shows the number of
countries with significant Muslim populations in each region, according
to State's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, along with the
population of these countries.
Table 1: Overseas Public Diplomacy Resources by Regional Bureau, Fiscal
Years 2004 and 2006:
Dollars in millions:
Region bureau: Africa; Funding;
2004 (actual): $59;
2006: (estimated): $70;
Percentage increase: 19%;
Countries with significant Muslim populations: Number of countries (58
total): 24;
Countries with significant Muslim populations: Muslim population:
(millions): 432.
Region bureau: Africa; Authorized officers;
2004 (actual): $90;
2006: (estimated): $91;
Percentage increase: 1%.
Region bureau: East Asia and Pacific; Funding;
2004 (actual): $78;
2006: (estimated): $100;
Percentage increase: 28%;
Countries with significant Muslim populations: Number of countries (58
total): 3;
Countries with significant Muslim populations: Muslim population:
(millions): 266.
Region bureau: East Asia and Pacific; Authorized officers;
2004 (actual): $89;
2006: (estimated): $89;
Percentage increase: 0%.
Region bureau: Europe and Eurasia; Funding;
2004 (actual): $198;
2006: (estimated): $229;
Percentage increase: 16%;
Countries with significant Muslim populations: Number of countries (58
total): 9;
Countries with significant Muslim populations: Muslim population:
(millions): 141.
Region bureau: Europe and Eurasia; Authorized officers;
2004 (actual): $192;
2006: (estimated): $192;
Percentage increase: 0%.
Region bureau: Near East; Funding;
2004 (actual): $69;
2006: (estimated): $86;
Percentage increase: 25%;
Countries with significant Muslim populations: Number of countries (58
total): 18;
Countries with significant Muslim populations: Muslim population:
(millions): 341.
Region bureau: Near East; Authorized officers;
2004 (actual): $66;
2006: (estimated): $68;
Percentage increase: 3%.
Region bureau: South Asia[A]; Funding;
2004 (actual): $41;
2006: (estimated): $57;
Percentage increase: 39%;
Countries with significant Muslim populations: Number of countries (58
total): 4;
Countries with significant Muslim populations: Muslim population:
(millions): 337.
Region bureau: South Asia[A]; Authorized officers;
2004 (actual): $38;
2006: (estimated): $39;
Percentage increase: 3%.
Region bureau: Western Hemisphere; Funding;
2004 (actual): $74;
2006: (estimated): $87;
Percentage increase: 18%;
Countries with significant Muslim populations: Number of countries (58
total): 0;
Countries with significant Muslim populations: Muslim population:
(millions): N/A.
Region bureau: Western Hemisphere; Authorized officers;
2004 (actual): $103;
2006: (estimated): $103;
Percentage increase: 0%.
Source: State Department.
Notes: Funding data include American salaries for overseas staff
including regional bureau employees and employees from the Bureau for
International Information Programs and the Bureau for Educational and
Cultural Affairs. Data do not include salary costs of locally engaged
staff.
Funding data include exchange programs, regional bureau program funds,
and program budgets managed by Information Resource officers and
Regional English Language officers.
Authorized officer positions cover overseas staff including regional
bureau employees, Information Resource officers, and Regional English
Language officers.
[A] Data current as of January 2006.
[End of table]
In our 2003 report, we noted that authorized officer positions overseas
had significantly expanded, with the most notable increases occurring
in State's Near East (27 percent increase) and South Asia (15 percent
increase) bureaus. However, current data show that staff numbers have
stayed largely the same over the past 3 years with increases of 3
percent or less. In January 2006, Secretary Rice announced plans to
reposition officers as part of her transformational diplomacy
initiative. State officials said that the department will initially
reposition approximately 75 Foreign Service officers this year from
posts in Europe and Washington, D.C., to India, China, and Latin
America, as well as to the Muslim world. According to these officials,
over one-third of the positions that will be relocated are public
diplomacy positions.
Muslim-Specific Initiatives Have Been Short-lived:
State has developed three programs specifically designed to reach
Muslim audiences: the Shared Values media campaign, the Arabic-language
Hi magazine, and the youth-oriented Partnerships for Learning exchange
strategy. These initiatives have been largely suspended or terminated,
but State continues to focus many of its exchange programs on younger
audiences.
Shared Values Initiative:
In 2002, State launched the Shared Values Initiative to highlight the
common values and beliefs shared by Muslims and Americans, demonstrate
that America is not at war with Islam, and stimulate dialogue between
the United States and the Muslim world. The initiative, which cost
about $15 million, centered on a paid television campaign, which was
developed by a private sector advertising firm and attempted to
illustrate the daily lives of Muslim Americans. This multimedia
campaign also included a booklet on Muslim life in America, speaker
tours, an interactive Web site to promote dialogue between Muslims in
the United States and abroad, and other information programs. The
initial phase of the Shared Values Initiative was aired in six
languages in Pakistan, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Kuwait, as well as on
pan-Arab media. State estimates that 288 million people were exposed to
these messages, but television stations in several countries, including
Egypt and Lebanon, refused to air the programs for political and other
reasons.
In 2003, the report by the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the
Arab and Muslim World, commonly referred to as the Djerejian report,
credited the campaign for having a solid research basis but criticized
it for taking far longer to develop than similar private sector
advertising campaigns.[Footnote 11] The report also noted that some
embassies were reluctant to promote the ads. A department analysis of
foreign reaction to the Shared Values Initiative concluded that media
outlets in many countries found the campaign to be propaganda and
unlikely to succeed as long as U.S. foreign policy remained unchanged.
While some posts continue to host events on Muslim life in America, the
Shared Values Initiative's centerpiece television campaign aired only
for the holy month of Ramadan in the winter of 2002-03 and was
subsequently discontinued. Additionally, the interactive Web site,
"Open Dialogue," is no longer in operation.
Hi Magazine and Web Site:
Following the demise of the Shared Values Initiative, State launched
the Arabic-language Hi magazine in July 2003 with an annual budget of
$4.5 million. Designed to highlight American culture, values, and
lifestyles, Hi was directed at Arab youth in the Middle East and North
Africa and was expected to influence Arab youth to have a more positive
perception of the United States. Hi was produced by a private sector
magazine firm, and State estimated its circulation to be about 50,000
in the Arab world. One official in Egypt, however, said that of the
2,500 copies the embassy distributed monthly to newsstands in Cairo,
often as many as 2,000 copies were returned unsold (see fig. 2). State
officials in Washington noted that, as a matter of practice, these
copies were subsequently redistributed to public institutions in Egypt,
such as schools and libraries. According to embassy officials, they
were unable to sell many copies of Hi because it was so new and
relatively expensive. In December 2005, State suspended publication of
Hi magazine pending the results of an internal evaluation, which was
prompted by concerns over the magazine's cost, reach, and impact,
according to State officials. State expects this evaluation to be
completed by May 2006. According to one official, an initial assessment
of the magazine found that most readers access Hi via its Web sites,
which remain in operation.[Footnote 12]
Figure 2: Unsold Copies of Hi Magazine Returned to the U.S. Embassy in
Cairo, October 2005:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Partnerships for Learning:
In 2002, State's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs developed
an exchange initiative specifically for youth from Muslim communities
called Partnerships for Learning, which provided an organizing theme to
help guide the department's exchange investments. Designed to reach a
"younger, broader, deeper" audience in the Muslim world, one senior
State official called Partnerships for Learning, "the heart of our
extensive engagement with the Arab and Muslim world." According to a
senior State official, the Partnerships for Learning program was
terminated as an organizing theme in late 2005 with the appointment of
the latest Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs.
Nevertheless, department officials said that its exchange programs will
continue to focus on younger audiences. These officials stated that the
department is exploring other program models to engage the greatest
number of undergraduate students while increasing cost effectiveness.
Similarly, State told us that the Partnerships for Learning concept
continues to infuse almost all of its citizen exchange programs.
Between 2002 and 2005, the department estimates that nearly $150
million was spent on exchanges supporting the Partnerships for Learning
theme. This figure includes new programs developed to implement this
theme and funds spent on existing exchange programs that targeted a
younger, more diverse, and less elite audience in the Muslim world. The
two major new programs developed by the department were the Youth
Exchange and Study (YES) program and the Partnerships for Learning
Undergraduate Studies (PLUS) program.[Footnote 13] Between 2003 and
2005, the YES program provided scholarships to more than 600 high
school students from the Muslim world to study in the United States.
Similarly, since 2004 the PLUS program has brought more than 170
students from the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia to the
United States for 2 years of academic study at an American college or
university. The YES and PLUS programs, with a combined budget of $25
million, remain active in fiscal year 2006. The department has not yet
conducted a formal evaluation of the YES and PLUS programs.[Footnote 14]
Public Diplomacy Efforts at Selected Posts Rely on Standard Programs
and Tools:
Officials at the three posts we visited--Nigeria, Pakistan, and Egypt-
-said that they use a broad range of programs available to them,
similar to the mix of programs used throughout the world, including
information, exchange, and cultural programs. Table 2 provides a
breakdown of selected activities at each post. In addition to these
programs, these officials said that they spend a significant amount of
time on news and crisis management, such as responding to media
inquiries and coordinating media events. In Pakistan, for example, we
observed the acting public affairs officer coordinate media events
related to the Secretary of State's visit and arrange interviews for
the Ambassador regarding U.S. relief efforts in the wake of the October
2005 South Asian earthquake.
Table 2: Selected Public Diplomacy Activities at Posts in Nigeria,
Pakistan, and Egypt, Fiscal Year 2005:
American Corners: Number-opened;
Nigeria: 10;
Pakistan: 0;
Egypt: 0.
American Corners: Number-planned;
Nigeria: 2;
Pakistan: 5;
Egypt: 2.
Number of speakers;
Nigeria: 5;
Pakistan: 18;
Egypt: 7.
Number of exchange participants;
Nigeria: 143;
Pakistan: 215;
Egypt: 359.
Local language magazine;
Nigeria: Magama;
Pakistan: Khabr-o-Nazar;
Egypt: Hi.
Sources: GAO and State Department.
[End of table]
Academic and professional exchanges were an important public diplomacy
tool at each post we visited. In fiscal year 2005, State obligated more
than $12 million for such exchanges in these countries. All of the
posts we visited had an active Fulbright exchange program, managed by
the embassy in Nigeria and by binational commissions in Pakistan and
Egypt. In Nigeria, the embassy has participated in the Partnerships for
Learning-YES program since 2003 and has sent about 35 Nigerian high
school students and their teachers to study in Iowa through this
program. According to the Public Affairs officer in Nigeria, the
embassy has shifted resources to assure that 50 percent of exchange
participants are Muslim, reflecting their overall proportion of
Nigeria's population. Additionally, the Public Affairs officer in
Islamabad is working to develop a database of Pakistani exchange alumni
to enable the embassy to maintain better contact with this audience.
Posts have also made use of information programs such as speakers,
magazines, information resource centers, and, to a limited extent,
American Corners. Data from State's Bureau of International Information
Programs show that the bureau funded 5 speakers in Nigeria, 18 in
Pakistan, and 7 in Egypt in fiscal year 2005. These speakers discussed
topics such as the 2004 U.S. presidential election, Muslim life and
religious tolerance in America, and U.S. foreign policy. In addition,
these posts take advantage of "target of opportunity" speakers--
American experts who already happen to be in the region. Each post we
visited also distributes a U.S.-funded magazine in local languages,
such as the Hausa Magama in Nigeria and the Urdu Khabr-o-Nazar in
Pakistan. Further, these posts operate small reference libraries within
the embassy compound, known as Information Resource Centers. According
to officials in Egypt, the embassy's resource center receives more than
1,000 visitors per month, on average, while security concerns in
Pakistan have limited the numbers of visitors to its center.
Additionally, the embassy in Nigeria has established 10 American
Corners, with plans to open more in the near future. While there are no
American Corners in Egypt or Pakistan, embassy officials in those
countries told us they are currently seeking local partners to host
such a facility.
Finally, other agencies have played a limited role in supporting the
mission's overall public diplomacy efforts in the countries we visited.
USAID has hired Development Outreach and Communication officers in
Nigeria and Egypt and was in the process of hiring an officer in
Pakistan in October 2005. DOD has sent two Military Information Support
Teams to Nigeria to help publicize the department's humanitarian
assistance programs in the country. In addition, U.S. broadcasting
reaches audiences in Nigeria and Pakistan through Voice of America's
(VOA) Hausa, English, and Urdu services, and the Arabic Radio Sawa and
Alhurra satellite television network reach some audiences in Egypt.
Finally, in November 2005, VOA announced the launch of a new half-hour
television program in Urdu to be broadcast on GEO-TV, a commercial
station in Pakistan.
Recent Initiatives Focus on Improving State's Policy Advocacy and News
Management Operations:
During the past 6 months, State has launched a number of initiatives
designed to broadly improve its ability to explain U.S. foreign policy
decisions and respond to breaking news both within and outside the
Muslim world. These initiatives, created in Washington, D.C., impact
field operations to the extent that Ambassadors and other spokespersons
at posts will be better positioned to advocate U.S. foreign policy
decisions and actions and effectively react to developing news stories.
These initiatives include the following:
* A Rapid Response Unit established in the Bureau of Public Affairs to
produce a daily report on stories driving news around the world and
give the U.S. position on those issues. This report is distributed to
U.S. cabinet and subcabinet officials, Ambassadors, public affairs
officers, regional combatant commands, and others.
* "Echo Chamber" messages to provide U.S. Ambassadors and others with
clear guidance so they are better able to advocate U.S. policy on major
news stories and policy issues. These policy-level statements are
posted to State's internal Web site and can be broadly accessed by post
staff around the world. These statements are also made available to
VOA's policy office for use in crafting editorials reflecting the views
of the U.S. government.
* Establishing a regional public diplomacy hub in Dubai, a key media
market, this summer. The hub, which will operate out of commercial
office space to facilitate public access, will be staffed with two to
three spokespersons whose full-time job will be to appear on regional
media outlets, with a focus on television given its broad reach, to
advocate U.S. policies. According to State officials, a regional center
is needed since embassy public affairs staff focus on bilateral issues
and no one in the department is specifically responsible for
transregional media operations.
In addition to these initiatives, several other efforts are under way.
These efforts include empowering the American Muslim community to speak
out for the United States,[Footnote 15] creating an Office of Public/
Private Partnerships to stimulate private sector involvement, and
developing enhanced technology to expand the use of new communication
venues in order to better reach target audiences.
Post Program Planning and Evaluation Efforts Lack Appropriate Guidance,
but Improvements Are Planned :
Our review of mission performance plans for the countries we visited
found that they lacked key strategic planning elements recognized by
GAO and the private sector as vital to effectively communicating with
target audiences. Among the missing elements are core messages and
themes, target audience segmentation and analysis, details on program
strategies and tactics, in-depth research and evaluation to inform
strategic communication decisions, and a fully developed communication
plan to tie everything together.[Footnote 16] In 2005, State
established a strategic framework for U.S. public diplomacy efforts;
however, these early efforts lack guidance from Washington to the field
on strategies and tactics. In addition, posts are not required to
develop in-depth analysis to better inform and support their program
decisions or country-specific communication plans to help inform and
guide their implementation efforts.
Posts Lack Strategic Approach to Public Diplomacy:
GAO and other groups, including the Defense Science Board,[Footnote 17]
have suggested that State adopt a strategic approach to public
diplomacy by modeling and adapting private sector communication
practices to suit its purposes (see app. IV). Key best practices
identified in GAO's September 2003 report are shown in figure 3.
Figure 3: Key Elements of a Typical Public Relations Strategy:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Based on our review of mission performance plans[Footnote 18] and on
fieldwork in Nigeria, Pakistan, and Egypt, we found that posts' public
diplomacy programming generally lacked these important elements of
strategic communications planning. In particular, posts lacked a clear
theme or message and specific target audiences were generally not
identified. Posts also failed to develop detailed strategies and
tactics to direct available public diplomacy programs and tools toward
clear, measurable objectives in the most efficient manner possible.
Further, research and evaluation efforts to inform all facets of
strategic communications are limited by the relatively small budget in
Washington, D.C., allocated to such efforts and a general lack of
expertise in the field with regard to commissioning and conducting such
studies. Finally, posts lack detailed, country-level communication
plans to tie everything together. These findings are reinforced by a
worldwide review of fiscal year 2007 mission performance plans
conducted by State's Bureau of Resource Management in 2005. In
particular, State determined that post efforts were generally not
directed at specific target audiences, lacked specific and reasonable
communication objectives and strategies, and often failed to provide
outcome and impact measures of program success.
Post Efforts Not Directed Toward a Core Message or Theme:
Private sector communication best practices suggest the need for a core
message or theme, which can be developed on a worldwide, regional, or
country-by-country basis, and should be consistently applied to and
woven through all program activities and events. The posts we visited
did not have a core message or theme to direct their communication
efforts. We found that post efforts focused on general program goals
established in Washington, D.C., which are found in the mission
performance plans. For public diplomacy, these goals are promoting
mutual understanding, advancing American values, and influencing
international public opinion. According to State officials, these goals
can be interpreted in many different ways and have limited practical
utility for developing a targeted communication strategy. As one senior
embassy official in Nigeria noted, these goals are "amorphous" in
nature and "hard to quantify" in practice. Specifically, posts noted
the following communication goals in their fiscal year 2006 mission
performance plans:
* Nigeria--Influencing International Public Opinion: Nigeria's fiscal
year 2006 mission performance plan simply states that the post intends
to move the opinions of Northern Nigerians to mirror those of the rest
of the Nigerian population, which is largely supportive of U.S. values
and principles.[Footnote 19]
* Pakistan--Promoting Mutual Understanding: Pakistan's mission
performance plan states that the post will seek to enhance the image of
the United States in Pakistan and increase the depth of understanding
among Pakistanis of how American society, culture, and values shape the
objectives behind and reasons for U.S. policies towards Pakistan.
* Egypt--Advancing American Values: Egypt's mission performance plan
notes that the post will use information activities, exchanges, and
local information programming to bolster awareness among Egyptians of
values shared with Americans and increase Egyptian public understanding
of American society.
The Deputy Chief of Mission in Pakistan told us that, while specific
messages have been developed at post, there are in fact too many
competing messages (such as the United States is a great place to live,
the United States is a great place to visit, American cultural
diversity and democracy are good things), and the post needed to do a
better job of defining and clarifying its message. A senior embassy
official in Nigeria echoed this point by stating that his post needed a
core message that could be coordinated across State, USAID, DOD, and
other supporting agencies.
Target Audiences Have Not Been Clearly Defined:
Private sector best practices suggest that analyzing target markets in
depth and segmenting these markets are critical to developing effective
information campaigns. The posts we visited generally had not used
these practices to help refine and focus their communication efforts.
In its worldwide review, State's Resource Management Bureau found that
some posts had done a poor job of answering the basic question of
whether to direct their communication efforts at a mass audience or
opinion leaders. The reviewers concluded that posts should focus on
opinion leaders in the 130 less developed countries with poor
communications infrastructure (many countries with significant Muslim
populations fall in this group), while posts in roughly 40 other
countries with adequate communications infrastructures should focus on
reaching the general public. As a first step, the reviewers recommended
that posts in the former group undertake an inventory of opinion
leaders they wished to influence. This "key influencers analysis" could
be segmented into various groups such as youth; women; opinion and
editorial writers; professors; and ethnic, religious, and business
leaders, who could serve as message multipliers. In 2004, Washington
sought to supplement mission performance planning activities by asking
posts worldwide to prepare an analysis of key influencers. According to
senior officials in Washington, D.C., only about one-half of posts
worldwide ever submitted the requested analysis. Among the posts we
visited, only Nigeria was able to produce a copy of an influence
analysis, which we found to be rudimentary in nature and not fully
responsive to the guidance provided by Washington, D.C.
The posts we visited generally neither focused on important
subcategories such as urban versus rural, men versus women, and
religious versus nonreligious, nor did they segment based on the level
or intensity of opposition (ranging from "soft" to "hard") toward the
United States. However, posts have attempted to reach a "younger,
broader, and deeper" audience[Footnote 20] through exchange programs
such as YES, which targets high school students. Also, some efforts are
under way to target exchange program alumni,[Footnote 21] locals who
have studied in or visited the United States, and expatriates living in
the United States who could serve as goodwill ambassadors for the
United States.
In contrast to post practices, we noted that the British
Council,[Footnote 22] which maintains a presence in all three countries
we visited, relies on a four tier audience system, which is used
worldwide to target their outreach efforts.[Footnote 23] Also, the
Defense Science Board has reported that target audiences in the Muslim
world can be divided into five categories, ranging from hard opposition
to hard support. Their report notes that identifying audiences that are
"winnable" in terms of increased public support is critical to
successful strategic communication and requires borrowing from campaign
and private sector methodologies and conducting political-style
attitudinal research and identifying the highest priority support
groups that can most likely be influenced.
Strategies and Tactics Lack Detail:
The private sector uses sophisticated strategies to integrate complex
communication efforts involving multiple players. Our review of mission
performance plans revealed that only limited attention had been given
to developing detailed public diplomacy strategies and tactics to guide
their implementation of an array of public diplomacy programs and
tools. While such strategies can include message amplification tactics
or the use of third-party spokespersons to increase the credibility of
delivered messages,[Footnote 24] the mission performance plans we
reviewed were noteworthy for their brevity and lack of detail on such
strategies. For example, the Nigerian post's goal paper on public
diplomacy and public affairs runs just over two pages. These two pages
serve as the road map for implementing the post's public diplomacy
efforts, which involve several agencies, assorted programs and
projects, and substantial program funds. The plan devotes one sentence
to describe its strategy to achieve its performance goal and three
sentences to describe the tactics that will be used to implement the
strategy.
On occasion, the strategies and tactics outlined in mission performance
plans were or will be supplemented by additional planning efforts. In
Pakistan, we noted that the Public Affairs officer had drafted a
summary level plan to guide the efforts of the public affairs section.
In Egypt, the Public Affairs officer told us that the Chief of Mission
has directed his section to develop an "Islamic strategy" for Egypt to
include details on working with religious leaders, integrating English
language teaching efforts, working with local universities, and so on.
In its review, State's Resource Management Bureau also found that posts
had generally not developed meaningful strategies and tactics that
would lead to quantifiable results. The reviewers suggested that posts
adopt a more rigorous and measurable outreach strategy focused on
opinion leaders in countries where a mass audience cannot easily be
reached. As defined earlier, the first step entails identifying the
opinion leaders the post would like to influence. Second, posts should
identify a "critical mass" of opinion leaders who must be reached and
influenced in order to have a significant impact on the target
audience. Third, posts should develop programs and initiatives designed
to reach these specific individuals, with the goal of persuading and
motivating opinion leaders to spread the message. The reviewers
suggested that exchange programs could be reinforced with targeted
strategic information programs. Public Affairs officers were briefed on
these findings in 2005, and mission performance plan guidance has been
updated to incorporate most of these recommended elements.
Research and Evaluation Efforts Are Limited:
Private sector best practices highlight the value of a research driven
approach to designing, implementing, evaluating, and fine-tuning
strategic communications efforts. Given the relatively small budgets
devoted to research and evaluation efforts, posts had access to a
limited amount of information to help guide their strategic
communication activities.[Footnote 25] Valuable research can include
such topics as: (1) audience attitudes and beliefs; (2) root causes
driving negative sentiments and beliefs; (3) country-specific social,
economic, political, and military environments; (4) local media and
communication options; and (5) diagnosis of deeper performance issues
and possible program fixes.
Because the posts we visited did not have the budgets or required
expertise to conduct this type of research or program evaluation on
their own, they relied on the Bureau of Intelligence and Research and
evaluation staff in Washington, D.C., to conduct such studies for them.
However, only a limited range of research and evaluation data is
available to posts. Most of this data is not tailored to a specific
country and it was unclear whether available research and evaluation
results are incorporated in post planning and evaluation activities.
Available research and evaluations products include the following:
* Broad public opinion polling data: Conducted by State's Bureau of
Intelligence and Research, these polls document that local populations,
to a significant degree, hold negative views toward the United States.
Such polls serve a valuable role in identifying the depth of the public
perception problem but are of limited utility in diagnosing the source
of the problem or the specific impact that U.S. public diplomacy
efforts have had on alleviating such negative perceptions.
* Root cause polling data: In particular, State's Bureau of
Intelligence and Research released an opinion analysis in March 2003
based on a series of surveys examining the root causes of anti-American
sentiments in 10 Muslim-majority countries (Jordan, Saudi Arabia,
Egypt, Turkey, Nigeria, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Uzbekistan, Malaysia, and
Indonesia). Significantly, the 2003 analysis notes that "the belief
that the U.S. is hostile toward Muslim countries was the single largest
component of anti-American sentiments in all 10 countries, outweighing
even the publics' view of how the United States treats their own
country." This type of insight can provide the basis for identifying
and developing a core message or theme--one of the key private sector
best practices discussed earlier. Our roundtable of nongovernment
Muslim experts noted that this view is grounded in Muslim concerns over
U.S. foreign policies and actions in the Muslim world. All of our
panelists agreed that U.S. foreign policy is the major root cause
behind anti-American sentiments among Muslim populations and that this
point needs to be better researched, absorbed, and acted upon by
government officials. According to our panelists, these core issues
include the Arab/Israeli conflict, the war in Iraq, U.S. support for
antidemocratic regimes in the region, perceptions of U.S. imperialism,
and U.S. support for globalization, which is viewed as hurting Muslims.
* Program evaluations: While State has traditionally focused its
evaluation activities on exchanges, the department has established an
evaluation schedule that includes ongoing assessments of key public
diplomacy programs and initiatives, including the English ACCESS
Microscholarship program, Hi magazine, American Corners, and a contract
with the Performance Institute to examine State's performance
measurement framework for public diplomacy. Planned evaluations include
media training and outreach and the U.S. speakers programs. These
evaluations are conducted by staff in the Bureau of Educational and
Cultural Affairs, the Bureau of International Information Programs, and
the Office of Policy, Planning, and Resources in the Under Secretary's
office.
Additionally, other forms of research are not being fully utilized. In
particular, the Central Intelligence Agency sponsored a series of
public diplomacy planning papers in 2005 for six countries of strategic
national interest to the United States (China, Egypt, France,
Indonesia, Nigeria, and Venezuela). These papers included detailed
country profiles and issue analyses, recommended public diplomacy
strategies for each country, and served as the focus of two conferences
that sought to promote dialogue among academic and agency experts
regarding how to improve and refine U.S. public diplomacy efforts in
each country. However, we found that State officials in both Egypt and
Nigeria were not familiar with this exercise or the papers produced for
their host countries.
Country-Level Communication Plans Lacking:
Private sector best practices suggest that a detailed, country-specific
communication plan serves to pull together the complex data and
analysis required for a feasible plan of action that can be monitored
and improved as needed based on performance feedback. However, none of
the posts we visited had such a detailed communication plan. Prior to
1999, when public diplomacy efforts were managed by the former U.S.
Information Agency (USIA), detailed communication plans were developed
on a country-by-country basis. These plans included details on core
messages and themes, target audiences, and research on key opinion
leaders, audience attitudes, and the local media environment. With the
integration of the USIA into State in 1999, these country plans were
eliminated, leaving the mission performance plans as the focal point
for such information. As suggested by several post officials, the
country plans prepared by USIA were superior to the mission performance
planning process since they focused on public diplomacy (a program
driven function that is distinct from the policy focus predominant in
other department operations) and provided a detailed road map to guide
program implementation efforts.
In marked contrast to State, we noted that USAID's new Development
Outreach and Communications officers are developing country-level
communication plans. These plans are based on guidance prepared by
public affairs staff in Washington, D.C., pertaining to roles and
responsibilities, coordination requirements, communication tips and
techniques, and the development of a long-term communication strategy.
This guidance notes that "having a thoughtful communication strategy
that is understood by the key leadership of the Mission is integral to
communicating most effectively." The guidance suggests that a good
communication strategy should adequately describe the Mission's public
relations goals, should be linked to a specific time frame and resource
request, and should identify the Mission's communication strengths and
weaknesses, key themes and messages, priority audiences, and the best
means to reach them. Most importantly, the messages must be repeated
over and over again to ensure that they are heard.
Strategic Framework Lacks Implementing Guidance:
In 2005, the Under Secretary established a strategic framework for U.S.
public diplomacy efforts, which includes three priority goals: (1)
support the President's Freedom Agenda with a positive image of hope;
(2) isolate and marginalize extremists; and (3) promote understanding
regarding shared values and common interests between Americans and
peoples of different countries, cultures, and faiths. The Under
Secretary noted she intends to achieve these goals using five tactics-
-engagement, exchanges, education, empowerment, and evaluation--and by
using various public diplomacy programs and other means. This framework
represents a noteworthy start; however, the department has not yet
developed written guidance that provides details on how the Under
Secretary's new strategic framework should be implemented in the field.
Our past reports have detailed the difficulties the White House and the
department have encountered in developing any type of written
communication strategy. In our 2003 report and again in our 2005
report, we noted several attempts by State and the National Security
Council to develop a communication strategy for the interagency
community. In 2004, the National Security Council and the department
created the Muslim World Outreach Policy Coordinating Committee to
develop an interagency strategy to marginalize extremists. The
committee collected information from embassies around the world to help
develop a draft outreach strategy, but it was ultimately not released
to posts pending further guidance from the new Under Secretary. On
April 8, 2006, the President established a new Policy Coordinating
Committee on Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication. This
committee, to be led by the Under Secretary, is intended to coordinate
interagency activities. According to department officials, one of the
committee‘s tasks will be to issue a formal interagency public
diplomacy strategy. It is not clear how long this effort will take or
when a strategy will be developed.
Post Planning and Evaluation Improving but Certain Elements Still
Lacking:
While the department has not yet issued guidance on how to implement
the strategic framework established by the Under Secretary, officials
in Washington acknowledged the need to improve message delivery at the
post level and have begun to implement a more rigorous approach to
program planning and evaluation. Based on prior reports by GAO and
others, the department has begun to institute a "culture of
measurement," which should significantly impact the rigor and
sophistication of its strategic planning and evaluation efforts.
Beginning 2 years ago, the department sought to establish this culture
through a variety of means, including the creation of an Office of
Policy, Planning, and Resources within the office of the Under
Secretary; the creation of a Public Diplomacy Evaluation Council to
share best practices; the creation of a unified office of program
evaluations; and the development of an expanded evaluation schedule,
which places a new emphasis on assessing the department's strategic
information programs.
The department also plans to institutionalize the use of the "logic
model" approach endorsed by GAO and others, which could have a
significant impact on the department's program design, implementation,
and evaluation efforts.[Footnote 26] The logic model calls for program
managers to define their key inputs, activities, outputs, outcomes, and
impact. The head of the Public Diplomacy Evaluation Council has briefed
field staff on the logic model using the illustration in figure 4.
Figure 4: Logic Model for State Public Diplomacy Programs:
[See PDF for image]
Source: State Department.
[End of figure]
The logic model will be implemented via a performance measurement
framework contract led by the Performance Institute. Implementation
details, guidance, training, and so on will be developed by the
Performance Institute in coordination with key State stakeholders.
Major elements of the model should be in place by September 2006, with
full implementation expected by the 2009 mission performance plan cycle.
In January 2006, the department issued guidance on preparing mission
performance plans that embodies its desire to increase the rigor and
sophistication of post strategic planning and evaluation efforts.
Issued for the fiscal year 2008 planning cycle, this guidance calls for
more strategic thinking and planning than was required in the past,
noting that "there are increased expectations for measurement and
specificity in planning for public diplomacy and this leads to requests
for more sophisticated information from the field." The guidance calls
for identification of specific target audiences, key themes and
messages, detailed strategies and tactics, and performance outcomes
that can be measured with a reasonable degree of precision and clearly
demonstrate the ultimate impact of U.S. public diplomacy efforts. If
fully implemented, this guidance should begin to address the
shortcomings we found in mission performance plans in Nigeria,
Pakistan, and Egypt. However, such guidance will not be implemented for
another 2 years, raising significant concerns about what the department
intends to do now to address strategic planning shortfalls.
While Washington's guidance is designed to significantly improve the
strategic decisions summarized in mission performance plans, it does
not require that missions prepare in-depth analyses to better inform
and support their strategic program decisions. Such analyses include
country-situation papers, in-depth audience research, media analyses to
understand how people receive information and who the key media
providers are, and details on how related agency programs and planning
efforts should be integrated to achieve common communication
objectives. Finally, this guidance does not require that missions
develop a separate communication plan to incorporate Washington and
post-conducted analyses and planned strategies and tactics. The lack of
a country-level communication plan increases the risk that planning
will remain largely conceptual and fall short in terms of effectiveness
at the tactical level. Also, country-level communication plans could be
prepared and updated as needed, apart from the mission performance
planning cycle, particularly as the new guidance for mission
performance plans will not take effect until fiscal year 2008.
Security and Staffing Pose Challenges to Public Diplomacy Efforts in
the Muslim World:
Public diplomacy officers struggle to balance security with public
access and outreach to local populations. The public diplomacy corps in
the field faces several human capital challenges, such as the lack of a
sufficient number of officers, lack of staff time, shortened tours of
duty, and limited language proficiency. While State has taken steps to
address these challenges, it is too early to assess the effectiveness
of some of these efforts, and officers at the three posts we visited
told us that many of these issues remain unresolved. In addition, State
lacks an effective means to share embassy best practices that could
help address some of these challenges.
Embassy Must Balance Security and Public Outreach:
Security concerns have limited embassy outreach efforts and public
access, forcing public diplomacy officers to strike a balance between
safety and mission. Shortly after the terrorist attacks of September
11, then-Secretary of State Colin Powell stated, "Safety is one of our
top priorities— but it can't be at the expense of the mission." While
posts around the world have faced increased threats, security concerns
are particularly acute at many posts in countries with significant
Muslim populations. As figure 5 illustrates, the threat level for
terrorism is rated as "critical" or "high" in 80 percent of posts in
the Muslim world, compared with 34 percent of posts elsewhere.
Figure 5: Terrorist Threat Ratings for Posts in the Muslim and Non-
Muslim Worlds, October 2005:
[See PDF for image]
Source: State Department.
[End of figure]
Security and budgetary concerns have led to the closure of publicly
accessible facilities around the world, such as American Centers and
Libraries. According to one State official, in 1990 the majority of
posts had such publicly accessible facilities; now, however, few do. In
Pakistan, for example, all of the American Centers have closed for
security reasons, with the last such facility, in Islamabad, closed in
February 2005. These same concerns have prevented the establishment of
a U.S. presence elsewhere. Officials in Nigeria said they would like to
open a facility in the north of the country to serve the region's 70
million predominantly Muslim inhabitants, but security and budgetary
concerns prevent them from doing so--one senior embassy official in
Nigeria said that nothing they can do from the capital, Abuja, would be
as effective as having a permanent presence in the north. As a result,
embassies have had to find other venues for public diplomacy programs,
and some activities have been moved onto embassy compounds.
Other public diplomacy programs have had to limit their publicity to
reduce the risk of becoming a target. A recent joint USAID-State report
concluded that "security concerns often require a 'low profile'
approach during events, programs or other situations, which, in happier
times, would have been able to generate considerable good will for the
United States."[Footnote 27] This constraint is particularly acute in
Pakistan, where the embassy has had to reduce certain speaker and
exchange programs. For example, an official in Peshawar, Pakistan, said
that consulate staff handpicked students for a 9/11 Commission Report
reading group because the consulate could not widely publicize the
program. While several officials in Pakistan described the reading
group as a success, its reach was limited due to security concerns.
Furthermore, precautions designed to improve the security of American
facilities have had the ancillary effect of sending the message that
the United States is unapproachable and distrustful, according to State
officials. Concrete barriers and armed escorts contribute to this
perception, as do requirements restricting visitors' use of cell phones
and pagers within the embassy. According to one official in Pakistan,
visitors to the embassy's Information Resource Center have fallen to as
few as one per day because many visitors feel humiliated by the
embassy's rigorous security procedures. In Egypt, one of the
ambassador's priorities is remodeling the embassy in order to make it
more inviting to visitors.
State Has Developed Initiatives to Respond to Security Concerns:
State has responded to security concerns and the loss of publicly
accessible facilities through a variety of initiatives, including
American Corners, which are centers that provide information about the
United States, hosted in local institutions and staffed by local
employees. According to State data, there are currently approximately
300 American Corners throughout the world, including more than 90 in
the Muslim world, with another 75 planned (more than 40 of which will
be in the Muslim world). Several recent studies on public diplomacy
have recommended the expansion of the American Corners program, but its
effectiveness has not been evaluated.[Footnote 28] While one State
official told us that American Corners are the best solution given the
current security environment, others have described them as public
diplomacy "on the cheap." The American Corner we visited in Nigeria was
confined to a single small room housing a limited reference library and
a small selection of donated books (see fig. 6); at a meeting with a
focus group of Nigerians in Abuja who had participated in U.S.
sponsored exchanges, no one present was familiar with the American
Corner. Other posts we visited have had difficulty finding hosts for
American Corners, as local institutions fear becoming terrorist targets.
Figure 6: Photographs of American Corner, Abuja, Nigeria:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Information Resource Centers, small reference libraries for limited
audiences created to replace some of the functions of American Centers'
open libraries, most of which have closed, are another attempt to
balance security and access. State's Bureau of International
Information Programs operates more than 170 such centers worldwide.
Because they are located within the embassy compound, however, public
access to these facilities is often limited. For example, in Abuja, the
center is open only to students and other specific demographic groups,
and access is granted by appointment only; officials in Islamabad
reported similar restrictions. The head of the center in Abuja said
that accessibility was one of his primary challenges.
State has also made departmentwide efforts to expand public outreach
beyond external facilities, and individual posts are devising creative
solutions to this challenge. In Nigeria, several embassy staff,
including the Ambassador, often travel together to cities lacking a
permanent American presence; according to embassy officials, these
"embassy on the road" tours typically last 3 or 4 days and can involve
dozens of individuals. Additionally, in Pakistan we observed an embassy-
funded American Discovery Center, a small kiosk providing information
on America, placed in a local school. There are over 180 such kiosks in
schools across Pakistan, although one embassy official remarked that as
many as half of these schools have restricted access to the kiosk for a
variety of reasons.
Addressing concerns over the United States' decreased outreach
capabilities, Secretary Rice recently announced plans to deploy more
diplomats in areas with a limited U.S. presence by increasing the
number of American Presence Posts. There are currently 8 such
posts,[Footnote 29] which are staffed by one Foreign Service officer
and are intended to extend the U.S. diplomatic presence beyond foreign
capitals and reach out to "emerging communities of change." We visited
one such post in Alexandria, Egypt, which contained a publicly
accessible reading room, offered free computer access, and hosted
frequent cultural events. One advantage of the American Presence Posts
over American Corners, according to the principal officer in
Alexandria, was that the post was able to maintain control over the
facility.
Another means of reaching large audiences in high-threat posts while
minimizing security concerns is through international
broadcasting.[Footnote 30] However, in a 2003 survey conducted by GAO,
almost 30 percent of public diplomacy officers in the field said that
transmission strength was ineffective in helping to achieve public
diplomacy goals in their country. Officials we spoke with in Pakistan
and Egypt said this challenge still exists, suggesting that poor signal
strength for U.S. broadcasts in their host countries limits the impact
of broadcasting. The administration's fiscal year 2007 budget request
includes a request to increase U.S. broadcasting to countries in the
Muslim world while reducing broadcasts elsewhere, particularly in
Europe and Eurasia.
Staffing Challenges at Posts in the Muslim World: Tour Length, Time,
and Language Capability:
Insufficient numbers of public diplomacy staff and staff time hinder
outreach efforts at posts in the Muslim world. Additionally, tours of
duty tend to be shorter in the Muslim world than elsewhere, which
negatively impacts continuity at a post, as well as the ability to
cultivate personal relationships. Further, we found that public
diplomacy officers at many posts cannot communicate effectively with
local populations in local languages, hampering overall U.S. public
diplomacy efforts. To address these challenges, State has taken several
steps, both at the department and post level, highlighted by the
Secretary's transformational diplomacy initiative, but it is too early
to evaluate the effectiveness of this initiative.
Lack of Staffing and Staff Time Hinders Public Diplomacy Efforts:
While several recent reports on public diplomacy have recommended an
increase in spending on U.S. public diplomacy programs, several embassy
officials told us that, with current staffing levels, they do not have
the capacity to effectively utilize increased funds. According to State
data, the department had established 834 public diplomacy positions
overseas in 2005, but 124, or roughly 15 percent, were vacant.
Compounding this challenge is the loss of public diplomacy officers to
temporary duty in Iraq, which, according to one State official, has
drawn down field officers even further. Staffing shortages may also
limit the amount of training public diplomacy officers receive.
According to the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, "the
need to fill a post quickly often prevents public diplomacy officers
from receiving their full training."[Footnote 31]
In addition, public diplomacy officers at post are burdened with
administrative tasks and thus have less time to conduct public
diplomacy outreach activities than previously. One senior State
official said that administrative duties, such as budget, personnel,
and internal reporting, compete with officers' public diplomacy
responsibilities. Another official in Egypt told us that there was
rarely enough time to strategize, plan, or evaluate her programs. In
addition, State officials in Washington acknowledged that additional
requirements for posts to improve strategic planning and evaluation of
their public diplomacy programs would need to be accompanied by
additional staff with relevant expertise.
Short Tours of Duty in the Muslim World:
Staffing challenges in public affairs sections at posts in the Muslim
world are exacerbated by shorter tours of duty and fewer officers
bidding on public diplomacy positions than in the non-Muslim world.
According to data provided by State, the average tour length at posts
in the Muslim world is 2.1 years, compared with 2.7 years in the non-
Muslim world. Figure 7 shows the average tour length by region.
Furthermore, as a result of the security concerns mentioned above,
tours at many posts in the Muslim world are for only 1 year, without
family members. Of State's 20 so-called unaccompanied posts, 15 are in
the Muslim world.
Figure 7: Average Tour of Duty Length by Region (as of December 2005):
[See PDF for image]
Source: State Department.
[End of figure]
Shorter tours contribute to insufficient language skills and limit
officers' ability to cultivate personal relationships, which, according
to a senior public diplomacy officer, are vital to understanding Arabs
and Muslims. Another senior State official, noting the prevalence of
one-year tours in the Muslim world, told us that Public Affairs
officers who have shorter tours tend to produce less effective work
than officers with longer tours. In Pakistan, we were told that the
Public Affairs officer views himself as a "management consultant," in
part because of his short tour in Islamabad. Furthermore, the
department's Inspector General observed that the rapid turnover of
American officers in Pakistan was a major constraint to public
diplomacy activities in the country.[Footnote 32]
In addition, public diplomacy positions in the Muslim world have
received fewer bids than public diplomacy positions elsewhere. An
analysis of data from State's summer 2005 posting cycle shows that
public diplomacy positions in the Muslim world received fewer than half
the average number of bids of non-Muslim posts--averaging 3.7 bids per
position at posts in the Muslim world, compared with 8.9 bids per
position elsewhere. As a result of the lower number of bids for public
diplomacy positions in the Muslim world, it has been harder to fill
these positions.
Language Deficiencies Pronounced in the Muslim World:
Many public diplomacy officers in the Muslim world do not meet the
language requirements established for their positions by
State.[Footnote 33] According to data provided by State, in countries
with significant Muslim populations, 30 percent of language-designated
public diplomacy positions are filled by officers without the requisite
proficiency in those languages, compared with 24 percent elsewhere. In
Arabic language posts, about 36 percent of language-designated public
diplomacy positions are filled by staff unable to speak Arabic at the
designated level. In addition, State officials told us that there are
even fewer officers who are willing or able to speak on television or
engage in public debate in Arabic. The Information Officer in Cairo
stated that his office does not have enough Arabic speakers to engage
the Egyptian media effectively. Figure 8 shows the percentage of public
diplomacy positions in the Muslim world staffed by officers meeting
language requirements.
Figure 8: Percentage of Filled Language-Designated Public Diplomacy
Positions in the Muslim World Staffed by Officers Meeting Language
Requirements (as of August 2005):
[See PDF for image]
Source: State Department.
[End of figure]
As a result, many public diplomacy officers in the Muslim world cannot
communicate as well with local audiences as their position requires.
According to the Djerejian report, "The ability to speak, write, and
read a foreign language is one of the recognized prerequisites of
effective communications. Foreign Service officers who are fluent in
Arabic immediately convey a sense of respect for and interest in the
people to whom they speak, and fluency prevents the distortion of
translation." State's Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural
Affairs has said that communicating in other languages is a public
diplomacy challenge and that encouraging Americans to speak foreign
languages is a priority for public diplomacy.
State Has Taken Several Steps to Address These Human Capital Challenges:
State has recently made several efforts to address its human capital
challenges; in particular, following the Secretary of State's comment
that public diplomacy is the job of the entire embassy, officials in
Washington have encouraged posts to expand their embassy employee
speaker programs. By increasing the number of American officers
speaking to foreign audiences, posts have attempted to compensate for
the loss of public diplomacy staff and the diminished amount of time
public diplomacy officers have available for outreach. We observed
these efforts in Abuja, Islamabad, and Peshawar, where the embassies
have developed mission speaker bureaus, which are lists of embassy
staff willing to speak to local audiences on a variety of topics
related to America. In Egypt, however, the department's Inspector
General noted that non-public diplomacy officers rarely engage in
public outreach, missing a valuable opportunity to further increase
understanding of U.S. policies, culture, and values.
The Secretary of State also recently proposed changes in staff
incentives as part of her call for transformational diplomacy. New
requirements for career advancement would include service in at least
one hardship post, fluency in two or more languages, and expertise in
two or more regions. In addition, the Secretary has announced plans to
reposition staff in all career tracks, starting in summer 2006, from
posts in Europe and Washington, D.C., to India, China, and Latin
America, as well as to the Muslim world. It is too early to evaluate
the impact of these efforts.
Recognizing a persistent national foreign language deficit, in January
2006 President Bush announced plans for a National Security Language
Initiative to further strengthen national security by developing
foreign language skills.[Footnote 34] The President's original request
for this initiative was $114 million in fiscal year 2007, split between
State, DOD, the Department of Education, and the Director of National
Intelligence--State's share of this funding is about $27 million,
according to department officials. State's efforts will focus on
critical languages spoken in the Muslim world, such as Arabic, Farsi,
Turkish, and Urdu, among others. Under this initiative, State will
provide opportunities for U.S. high school students, undergraduates,
and graduate students to study these and other languages abroad and
will strengthen foreign language teaching in the United States through
exchanges and professional development. State has also established a
facility in Tunis for advanced Arabic language instruction, including
courses to train staff to appear on Arabic-language television and
radio.
State Lacks Systematic Means for Communicating Best Practices:
While individual posts have devised innovative approaches to overcome
the challenges their public diplomacy programs face, State generally
lacks a systematic, comprehensive means of communicating these
practices and transferring knowledge and experience across posts. For
example, in Nigeria, we noted the embassy practice of taking a team,
headed by the Ambassador, on coordinated outreach efforts to key cities
in the country where the United States currently lacks a diplomatic
presence. The Deputy Chief of Mission noted frustration with the post's
inability to share this and other practices with posts that might
benefit from lessons learned in Nigeria.
Existing means of sharing best practices among public diplomacy
officers tend to be regional in scope, ad hoc in nature, or
underutilized in practice. These mechanisms include annual Public
Affairs officer conferences in each region, anecdotal submissions in
State's RESULTS database, and weekly newsletters issued by regional
public diplomacy offices. While some officers stated that the regional
Public Affairs officer conferences were helpful for sharing these
practices, one official noted that no formal reports were generated at
these conferences and that there has only been one global conference.
The department maintains a database of public diplomacy program
results, which is based on anecdotes submitted by officers in the field
following speaker, exchange, or other public diplomacy programs. While
it is a potential tool for retaining institutional memory at State,
some State officials said that anecdotes were not systematically
entered into the database. Others suggested that this database be
modified to enable officers to flag best practices to make them easier
to locate in the future. In March 2006, State officials told us that
the Under Secretary's office was working on a Web-based system for
officers in the field and in Washington, D.C., to share ideas and
expected this system to be operational within the next month.
A strengthened, institutionalized system for sharing best practices
could improve the retention of institutional memory at State. However,
given the constraints on public diplomacy officers' time, any means of
sharing best practices should not create an additional reporting burden
on officers in the field. Furthermore, whichever method State chooses
to communicate best practices, it should ensure that the practices are
not self-submitted but rather reviewed by a third party for
appropriateness.
Conclusions:
In recent years, State has shifted public diplomacy resources to the
Muslim world, but three of its new initiatives specifically designed to
reach Muslim audiences have been short-lived. Lacking specifically
targeted programs, posts in Muslim-majority countries continue to use
the same information and exchange programs available to posts
throughout the world. GAO and others have suggested the adoption of
private sector best practices as a means to improve the department's
communication efforts in Washington and at the post level. These
practices call for the use of central messages or themes, target
audience segmentation and analysis, in-depth audience research and
evaluation, and the preparation of detailed communication plans to pull
these various elements together. Communication efforts at the posts we
visited generally lacked these strategic elements. State has taken
several steps to address this problem, including the development of a
strategic framework with goals and tactics, the creation of a
transformational diplomacy initiative to implement some of these best
practices, and the issuance of updated guidance to improve fiscal year
2008 mission performance plans. These are all positive steps. However,
Washington still lacks written guidance to implement the strategic
framework developed by the current Under Secretary. In addition, posts
have not prepared in-depth analyses or detailed communication plans to
support their strategic communication decisions. Compounding this lack
of strategic planning and evaluation are challenges related to staffing
and security at posts in the Muslim world. State currently lacks a
systematic mechanism for sharing best practices, which could help
address some of these challenges.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To improve the delivery of public diplomacy messages to Muslim
audiences around the world, we recommend that the Secretary of State
direct the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public
Affairs to take the following two actions:
* To increase the sophistication and effectiveness of U.S. outreach
efforts, develop written guidance detailing how the department intends
to implement its public diplomacy goals as they apply to the Muslim
world and incorporates the strategic communication best practices
discussed in this report. This guidance should be developed in
consultation with the White House, affected government agencies, and
outside experts who have a practical knowledge of what is needed to
translate private sector best practices into practical steps which can
be taken in the field. To accompany this guidance, we recommend that
State develop a sample country-level communication plan that posts can
tailor to local conditions.
* To meet the challenges facing public diplomacy officers in the field,
including the need to balance security with outreach and short tours of
duty at certain posts, strengthen existing systems of sharing best
practices in order to more systematically transfer knowledge among
embassies around the world.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
The State Department provided written comments on a draft of this
report (see app. V). State concurred with the report's findings and
conclusions. State also indicated that it has begun to address the
recommendations contained in this report. State said it is developing
an integrated strategic plan that includes elements of private sector
best practices. State also said it is developing a sample country-level
communication plan and constructing a Web-based system for conveying
best practices. State did not indicate when the strategic plan or
sample country-level communication plans will be completed. We modified
our findings regarding State's exchange programs, noting their
continued focus on younger audiences. In addition, State provided
technical comments, which have been incorporated throughout the report
where appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to other interested Members of
Congress and the Secretary of State. We will also make copies available
to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no
charge on the GAO Web site at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. If you
or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me
at (202) 512-4128 or fordj@gao.gov. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are
listed in appendix VI.
Sincerely yours,
Signed By:
Jess T. Ford:
Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
[End of section]
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
To determine what public diplomacy resources and programs the State
Department (State) has directed to the Muslim world, we reviewed State
budget requests, annual performance and accountability reports, and
other documents. We also interviewed officials from State's Office of
the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs; the Office
of Policy, Planning, and Resources; the Bureaus of Educational and
Cultural Affairs, International Information Programs, and Public
Affairs; the Bureau of Resource Management; and regional bureaus. We
also observed training classes for new public diplomacy officers at
State's Foreign Service Institute. We obtained and analyzed documents
on public diplomacy budgets and program descriptions from these offices
and bureaus. To assess the reliability of State's data, we reviewed
documentation related to the data sources and discussed the data with
knowledgeable State officials. We determined the data were sufficiently
reliable for the purposes of this report. We also compared data on the
populations of countries in the Muslim world from the United Nations,
World Bank, and CIA World Factbook, and found them sufficiently
reliable for the purposes of this report.
We based our definition of the Muslim world on State's Bureau of
Educational and Cultural Affairs' list of 58 countries and territories
with significant Muslim populations. These countries are spread across
the Middle East, Asia, Africa, and Europe, and have a combined
population of more than 1.5 billion people. Appendix II lists these
countries.
To assess whether posts adopted a strategic approach to implementing
public diplomacy, we reviewed Washington-produced mission performance
planning guidance prepared by the Office of Policy, Planning, and
Resources (located within the Office of the Under Secretary for Public
Diplomacy and Public Affairs), the results of a fiscal year 2005 review
of mission performance plans conducted by the Bureau of Resource
Management, public opinion polling results prepared by the Bureau of
Intelligence and Research, and related strategic planning and
evaluation documents prepared by the Bureau of Educational and Cultural
Affairs and the Bureau of International Information Programs. In Egypt,
Nigeria, and Pakistan, we reviewed fiscal year 2005 mission performance
plans and related strategic planning and evaluation documentation, and,
to discuss the scope and adequacy of each post's strategic planning and
evaluation efforts, also met with a wide range of embassy officials
including the Ambassador or Deputy Chief of Mission, public affairs
section staff, political and economic officers, regional affairs
officers, and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and
Department of Defense (DOD) officials. To discuss a range of strategic
planning, research, and evaluation issues in Washington, we met with
representatives from the Office of Policy, Planning, and Resources; the
Bureau of Resource Management; the Bureau of Intelligence and Research;
the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs; and the Bureau of
International Information Programs. We also discussed private sector
communication best practices with a representative from Business for
Diplomatic Action.
To identify the challenges facing U.S. public diplomacy efforts in the
Muslim world and what State has done to address these challenges, we
reviewed recent studies and reports on public diplomacy. In addition:
* We met with officials from State's Office of the Under Secretary for
Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, and the Office of Policy,
Planning, and Resources; the Bureaus of Educational and Cultural
Affairs, International Information Programs, and Public Affairs; and
regional bureaus in Washington, D.C.
* We met with U.S. embassy officers and foreign government, academic,
and nongovernmental organization representatives in Nigeria, Pakistan,
and Egypt to learn about and observe challenges facing public diplomacy
efforts at posts abroad. We also spoke with U.S. embassy officials in
Indonesia and Turkey by telephone. We selected these countries based on
their strategic importance to the United States, their proportion of
the total population of the Muslim world, their geographic
distribution, and their mix of public diplomacy programs.
* We analyzed State data on staffing, language requirements, bids for
public diplomacy positions, and threat ratings from 2005. To assess the
reliability of these data, we surveyed agency officials responsible for
collecting and analyzing these data. We determined the data to be
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.
* In September 2005, we convened a roundtable of Muslim experts in
Washington, D.C., to discuss program challenges and potential
solutions. Participants included experts in public opinion and public
affairs, foreign journalists, and representatives from think tanks and
academia.
We did not review covert strategic communications efforts managed by
DOD or the intelligence community. We limited our review of USAID to
the agency's efforts to communicate its assistance efforts and did not
review the assistance efforts themselves. We limited our review of DOD
to its support of State's public diplomacy activities. We did not
review State-led reform initiatives such as the Middle East Partnership
Initiative but focused instead on public diplomacy activities designed
to communicate information about the United States to target overseas
audiences. For the BBG, we collected funding and program information
but did not seek to evaluate the effectiveness of Radio Sawa and the
Alhurra satellite network--the BBG's two primary initiatives aimed at
Arab audiences. We are reviewing these broadcast initiatives separately.
We performed our work from April 2005 to February 2006 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Countries and Territories with Significant Muslim
Populations:
Region: Africa; Country: Benin;
Population[A]: 7.5;
Percentage Muslim: 20%.
Region: Africa; Country: Burkina Faso;
Population[A]: 13.9;
Percentage Muslim: 50%.
Region: Africa; Country: Cameroon;
Population[A]: 16.4;
Percentage Muslim: 20%.
Region: Africa; Country: Chad;
Population[A]: 9.8;
Percentage Muslim: 51%.
Region: Africa; Country: Comoros;
Population[A]: 0.7;
Percentage Muslim: 98%.
Region: Africa; Country: Cote d'Ivoire;
Population[A]: 17.3;
Percentage Muslim: 35-40%.
Region: Africa; Country: Djibouti;
Population[A]: 0.5;
Percentage Muslim: 94%.
Region: Africa; Country: Eritrea;
Population[A]: 4.6;
Percentage Muslim: >50%.
Region: Africa; Country: Ethiopia;
Population[A]: 73.1;
Percentage Muslim: 45-50%.
Region: Africa; Country: Gabon;
Population[A]: 1.4;
Percentage Muslim: 50%.
Region: Africa; Country: Sudan;
Population[A]: 40.2;
Percentage Muslim: 70%.
Region: Africa; Country: Togo;
Population[A]: 5.7;
Percentage Muslim: 20%.
Region: Africa; Country: Uganda;
Population[A]: 27.3;
Percentage Muslim: 16%.
Region: East Asia and Pacific;
Country: Brunei; Population[A]: 0.4;
Percentage Muslim: 67%.
Region: East Asia and Pacific; Country: Indonesia;
Population[A]: 242.0;
Percentage Muslim: 88%.
Region: East Asia and Pacific; Country: Malaysia;
Population[A]: 24.0;
Percentage Muslim: 60%.
Region: Europe and Eurasia; Country: Albania;
Population[A]: 3.6;
Percentage Muslim: 70%.
Region: Europe and Eurasia; Country: Azerbaijan;
Population[A]: 7.9;
Percentage Muslim: 93%.
Region: Europe and Eurasia; Country: Kazakhstan;
Population[A]: 15.2;
Percentage Muslim: 47%.
Region: Europe and Eurasia; Country: Kosovo;
Population[A]: N/A;
Percentage Muslim: N/A.
Region: Europe and Eurasia; Country: Kyrgyzstan;
Population[A]: 5.1;
Percentage Muslim: 75%.
Region: Europe and Eurasia; Country: Tajikistan;
Population[A]: 7.2;
Percentage Muslim: 90%.
Region: Europe and Eurasia; Country: Turkey;
Population[A]: 69.7;
Percentage Muslim: 100%.
Region: Europe and Eurasia; Country: Turkmenistan;
Population[A]: 5.0;
Percentage Muslim: 89%.
Region: Europe and Eurasia; Country: Uzbekistan;
Population[A]: 26.9;
Percentage Muslim: 88%.
Region: Near East; Country: Algeria;
Population[A]: 32.5;
Percentage Muslim: 99.
Region: Near East; Country: Bahrain;
Population[A]: 0.7;
Percentage Muslim: 100%.
Region: Near East; Country: Egypt;
Population[A]: 77.5;
Percentage Muslim: 94%.
Region: Near East; Country: Iran;
Population[A]: 68.0;
Percentage Muslim: 98%.
Region: Near East; Country: Iraq;
Population[A]: 26.1;
Percentage Muslim: 97%.
Region: Near East; Country: Jordan;
Population[A]: 5.8;
Percentage Muslim: 92%.
Region: Near East; Country: Kuwait;
Population[A]: 2.3;
Percentage Muslim: 85%.
Region: Near East; Country: Lebanon;
Population[A]: 3.8;
Percentage Muslim: 60%.
Region: Near East; Country: Libya;
Population[A]: 5.8;
Percentage Muslim: 97%.
Region: Near East; Country: Morocco;
Population[A]: 32.7;
Percentage Muslim: 99%.
Region: Near East; Country: Oman;
Population[A]: 3.0;
Percentage Muslim: >75%.
Region: Near East; Country: Qatar;
Population[A]: 0.9;
Percentage Muslim: 95%.
Region: Near East; Country: Saudi Arabia;
Population[A]: 26.4;
Percentage Muslim: 100%.
Region: Near East; Country: Syria;
Population[A]: 18.4;
Percentage Muslim: 74%.
Region: Near East; Country: Tunisia;
Population[A]: 10.1;
Percentage Muslim: 98%.
Region: Near East; Country: UAE;
Population[A]: 2.6;
Percentage Muslim: 96%.
Region: Near East; Country: West Bank and Gaza;
Population[A]: 3.8;
Percentage Muslim: 75%.
Region: Near East; Country: Yemen;
Population[A]: 20.7;
Percentage Muslim: 90%.
Region: South Asia; Country: Afghanistan;
Population[A]: 29.9;
Percentage Muslim: 99%.
Region: South Asia; Country: Bangladesh;
Population[A]: 144.3;
Percentage Muslim: 83%.
Region: South Asia; Country: Maldives;
Population[A]: 0.3;
Percentage Muslim: >50%.
Region: South Asia; Country: Pakistan;
Population[A]: 162.4;
Percentage Muslim: 97%.
Sources: State Department and Central Intelligence Agency World
Factbook.
Note: As defined by the State Department's Bureau of Educational and
Cultural Affairs.
[A] In millions.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Inventory of State Department Public Diplomacy Positions
and Selected Programs:
Positions:
Public Affairs Officer (PAO): The PAO is the senior public diplomacy
adviser in the embassy. He/she coordinates all aspects of mission
public affairs ensuring that public diplomacy resources are deployed in
support of mission goals. The PAO also supervises the public affairs
section including the work of the information/press section and the
cultural section.
Cultural Affairs Officer (CAO): The CAO manages the embassy's
educational and professional exchange programs, including the Fulbright
program. He/she also carries out cultural programs that highlight
American society and achievements and administers the speaker program
that brings U.S. experts to address targeted audiences in the host
country.
Information Officer (IO): The IO is the embassy spokesperson and
primary point of contact for information about the United States and
mission affairs. The IO advises senior management on media relations
and public affairs strategies and manages the distribution of
information to members of the target audience.
Information Resource Officer (IRO): Generally librarians by training,
IROs are responsible for embassies' Information Resource Centers (IRC)
and American Corners. They are also responsible for supporting IRC
programs and training local IRC staff. There are approximately 20 IROs
at missions around the world.
Regional English Language Officer (RELO): Worldwide, State has 17
experienced TEFL/TESL professionals, known as RELOs. RELOs help
embassies design strategies to support English teaching and work with
various partners to organize in teacher training seminars and workshops
and offer general guidance.
Programs:
Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Programs:
* Fulbright Program: Flagship U.S. government exchange program for
graduate students, professors, researchers, professionals, and
secondary level teachers to teach, study, and conduct research.
Americans are hosted by schools or universities around the world, and
foreign participants by U.S. secondary schools, colleges, or
universities.
* International Visitors (IV): 3-week visits to the United States by
rising leaders in diverse fields. IVs travel in groups or as
individuals and experience American cultural life and society along
with professional interchange with U.S. counterparts.
* Voluntary Visitors (VV): Programs for foreign nationals already
traveling to the United States, including professional appointments and
domestic travel support. VVs can partly be funded by an embassy.
* Office of Citizen Exchanges professional and institutional exchange
programs: Exchanges designed to link private sector American expertise
and resources with priority institutions to engage youth influencers
and promote civil society, democracy, youth leadership, and
volunteerism, among other topics.
* Humphrey Program: Midlevel professionals from developing countries
come to the United States for a year of academic study and professional
experience.
* English Language Teaching: Targeted English language programs in
specific regions and countries of the world, coordinated with the
embassy. Programs include the English ACCESS Microscholarship program,
English Language Fellow program, English Language Specialist program,
and E-Teacher program.
* Rhythm Road: Professional jazz and urban music groups who tour
countries with limited exposure to American culture, playing concerts
and talking about their music and American society.
* Feature Film Service: Films provided to posts by the Motion Picture
Association of America and other organizations for festivals,
screenings by Ambassadors, and other programmatic usage by post public
affairs sections.
* Cultural Ambassadors: Utilizes world-renowned American cultural
figures to reach out to young people around the globe.
* Cultural Envoys and Cultural Visitors: Cultural Envoys aims to
utilize the talents of average Americans to engage with young people
abroad. Cultural Visitors is designed to bring young "idea" leaders in
the arts and humanities to the United States for internships.
* Arts Exchanges in International Issues: An annual grants competition
designed to identify American partner organizations to conduct exchange
programs in priority countries, utilizing cultural and artistic media
and programs to address priority U.S. foreign policy goals.
* Ambassador's Fund for Cultural Preservation: Assists less developed
countries in preserving their cultural heritage and demonstrates U.S.
respect for other cultures.
* International Partnership Among Museums: An institutional linkage
program carried out with the American Association of Museums, selecting
American museums to partner with a museum abroad to develop a
collaborative program built around a theme.
* International Cultural Property Protection: Carries out the
Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act, which protects
cultural patrimony of signatory nations.
* National Security Language Initiative: Program activity will include
in-country language training for U.S. Fulbright students in Arabic,
Turkish, and Indic languages; summer intensive language programs abroad
for undergraduate beginning students and intermediate/advanced training
for undergraduate and graduate students; expansion of the Fulbright
Foreign Language Teaching Assistant Program to bring 300 native
speakers of critical languages to teach in U.S. universities and
schools; and a new component to the teacher exchange program to assist
U.S. teachers of critical need languages to study abroad.
* Study of the U.S.: Promotes better understanding of the United States
through Summer Institutes for foreign university faculty, reference
collections, and the Currents in American Scholarship series.
* EducationUSA: Promotes higher education abroad by supporting overseas
advising centers and collaborating with U.S. educational organizations
to strengthen international exchange.
Bureau of International Information Programs:
* U.S. Speakers: American subject-matter experts travel to a host
country to address selected audiences on a range of policy issues and
various aspects of American society.
* American Corners: Public diplomacy outposts in host-country
organizations, such as libraries and universities, that provide access
to information about the United States through book collections, the
Internet, and local programming to the general public.
* Information Resource Centers: Computer-based knowledge platforms at
embassies and consulates that provide information about U.S. policies
and American society to targeted sectors of the host-country population.
* Digital video conferences: Two-way video/phone dialogues between U.S.
subject-matter experts and their counterparts in a host country.
* USINFO: Authoritative, up-to-date Web site providing information on
U.S. policy and American issues directed at foreign readers. Available
in English and six world languages.
* Washington File: Daily compilations of news articles and official
texts intended for foreign audiences. Available on the USINFO Web site.
* Electronic Journals: Web-based monthly publications focused on themes
supporting mission performance plan goals. Available in several
languages, Electronic Journals can be downloaded and printed for local
distribution.
* Infocentral: On-line resource for U.S. government spokespersons and
embassy officers who need information on policy issues, access to press
clips, and cleared guidance.
* Mission Web sites: Each embassy maintains its own Web site with links
to the State Department and other sources of information about the
United States and U.S. policy.
* Issue Briefs: Background information on policy topics, available at
the Infocentral Web site, intended for use only by U.S. officials who
need to articulate and explain policy positions.
* Paper Shows: Exhibitions of 35-40 panels featuring photographic and
documentary images and text on significant American personalities,
issues, and events. Paper shows are produced in several languages and
displayed in museums, libraries, theaters, and other public places
worldwide.
Bureau of Public Affairs Programs:
* Foreign Press Centers: Support centers for foreign journalists in
Washington, D.C., New York, and Los Angeles providing facilitative
assistance, interviews with U.S. officials, and information resources.
* Office of Broadcast Services: Provides television and radio to
overseas posts, runs American Embassy Television Network, and assists
foreign TV crews making film documentaries in the United States on
subjects of interest to the U.S. government.
Other Programs:
* Media reaction: Summary compilations of foreign editorial and op-ed
reactions to issues of interest to the United States, available daily
on the Web.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Private Sector Best Practices:
GAO and other groups have called for a transformation in how U.S.
public diplomacy efforts are conducted. One key element of this
proposed transformation is the perceived need to adopt and adapt
strategic communication best practices from the private sector.
GAO suggested in its September 2003 report on State public diplomacy
efforts that the department examine private sector public relations
efforts and political campaigns' use of sophisticated strategies to
integrate complex communication efforts involving multiple players.
GAO's roundtable with public relations firms from the private sector
revealed that the key strategic components of such efforts include
establishing the scope and nature of the problem, identifying the
target audience, determining the core message, and defining both
success and failure. The panel emphasized the importance of
synchronizing these activities in a systematic way, so that
communication efforts are mutually reinforcing in advancing the
campaign's overall objectives. They noted that without a carefully
integrated plan, the various elements are at risk of canceling each
other out and possibly damaging the overall campaign. Figure 9
illustrates the steps in the process.
Figure 9: Elements of a Typical Public Relations Strategy:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO; developed from Weber Shandwick.
[End of figure]
Business for Diplomatic Action:
Testimony by the President of Business for Diplomatic Action
(BDA)[Footnote 35] provides a suggested strategic road map for the
government to follow, building on private sector best
practices.[Footnote 36] BDA suggests that U.S. public diplomacy efforts
be redesigned following a five step plan: (1) listen, ask questions,
and analyze; (2) participate in foundation building process for a
comprehensive communication strategy; (3) introduce a "positioning
concept" for the United States in a post-9/11 world; (4) develop a
comprehensive communication plan; and (5) put someone in charge. Under
step one, BDA notes that "there are knowledge gaps with regard to
issues of anti-American sentiment and public diplomacy programming."
Under step two, BDA suggests that a task force of public and private
sector parties explore the significance and implications of the
research data collected under step one. Under step three, a
"positioning concept" for the United States would be developed,
capturing a point of view, a promise, and a personality. Step four
requires the development of a comprehensive communication plan which
can take the form of a multiaudience grid listing existing attitudes,
desired attitudes, barriers standing between existing and desired
attitudes, and the best means to address and remove these barriers. BDA
notes that answers to these questions will vary by target audience
(e.g., Muslim parents, Muslim youth, Chinese business leaders, etc.),
but all must be translations of the "positioning concept" agreed to in
step three. Finally, someone must be in put in charge to ensure that
all activities, behaviors, and messages are aligned to the new
positioning concept.
Defense Science Board:
In its September 2004 report on strategic communications, the Defense
Science Board makes a case that borrowing and adapting private sector
communication practices is a critical step toward revitalizing U.S.
public diplomacy efforts.[Footnote 37] The report notes that the United
States approaches modern warfare with cutting-edge strategies, tactics,
and weapons, designed to be effective against modern foes, and
constantly updated. By contrast, the report argues, U.S. current
strategic communication planning and execution is mired in diplomatic
and marketing tactics of yesteryear. The United States has no clearly
defined strategic framework, themes, or messages. The report goes on to
note that building an effective strategic communication culture that
borrows the most effective private sector marketing and political
campaign techniques will be at the core of rebuilding and reinventing
the way the United States listens, engages, and communicates with the
world.
The report notes that achieving this goal will involve the following
three key steps:
* As in a successful political campaign, the United States must clearly
define what success means in terms of its benefits for all target
audiences. All constituents must understand what success means for them
in personal terms. A carefully defined set of themes and messages must
reinforce targeted audiences' perceived and personal benefits.
* The United States must communicate what its vision for the future
promises on individual terms, not national or pan-national religious
terms. The United States should personalize the benefits of its defined
future, for example, personal control, choice and change, personal
mobility, meritocracy, and individual rights (in particular, women's
rights).
* As with most effective private sector and political marketing
campaigns, the United States must understand what target populations
must be reached and influenced to achieve success. And the United
States must understand what it takes to move them. More importantly, it
must target audiences that can be moved--pragmatically and
strategically picking its target audiences.
[End of section]
Appendix V: Comments from the State Department:
United States Department of State:
Assistant Secretary and Chief Financial Officer:
Washington, D.C. 20520:
Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers:
Managing Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N. W.:
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001:
Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers:
We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report,
"U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Efforts to Engage Muslim
Audiences Lack Certain Communication Elements and Face Significant
Challenges," GAO Job Code 320339.
The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.
If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact Bud
Jacobs, Senior Advisor, Bureau of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs,
Office of Planning and Resources, at (202) 647-0444.
Sincerely,
Signed By:
Bradford R. Higgins:
cc: GAO-Michael Ten Kate:
R/PPR - Gretchen Welch:
State/OIG - Mark Duda:
Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report:
U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Efforts to Engage Muslim
Audiences Lack Certain Communication Elements and Face Significant
Challenges, (GAO-06-535, GAO Code 320339):
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the GAO's report on U.S.
public diplomacy in the Muslim world. We appreciate the fact that the
report acknowledges steps the Department has taken to adopt a strategic
approach to engage Muslim audiences. As we reported to GAO auditors, we
are in the midst of developing an integrated strategic communication
plan that includes core messages, segmented target audiences, detailed
strategies and tactics, and in-depth research and analyses to monitor
and evaluate results. (This survey has been conducted - we are awaiting
final reports on which to base our plan.)
We have worked closely with the GAO to correct technical inaccuracies
we found in this draft report. However, we remain concerned about two
issues the report raises with respect to our exchange programs. The
draft report states that the State Department has not created new and
lasting programs to engage key audiences in the Arab and Muslim Worlds
and that the Partnerships for Learning (P4L) Program has been
terminated. In fact, we have put in place innovative exchange programs
directed at Muslim and Arab audiences and we have adapted longstanding
exchanges of demonstrated effectiveness to help achieve our goals.
While many of these programs no longer carry the P4L label, the concept
remains sound and imbues these youth-oriented programs.
The Department believes that the recommendations contained in the draft
report are in sync with the improvements we have underway. We have laid
the foundations for a broad public diplomacy strategy that includes
elements of private sector best practices. We are developing a sample
country-level communication plan and specific plans for a number of
individual countries that are key to this effort. We have asked our
embassies in a number of pilot countries to prepare analyses of their
"key influencers" as part of that process. We are currently building an
intranet website devoted to best practices that will encourage
interactive engagement and sharing of information among our public
diplomacy practitioners. The site will also contain a wealth of
practical information on how to access and use public diplomacy
resources.
[End of section]
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Jess Ford (202) 512-4128:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the individual named above, Diana Glod, Assistant
Director; Michael ten Kate; Robert Ball; Mehrunisa Qayyum; Richard
Bakewell; and Joe Carney made significant contributions to this report.
Martin de Alteriis, Elaine Vaurio, and Ernie Jackson provided technical
assistance.
(320339):
[End of section]
FOOTNOTES
[1] For the purposes of this report, the "Muslim world" refers to the
58 countries and territories identified as "countries with significant
Muslim populations" by the State Department's Bureau of Educational and
Cultural Affairs. This list includes Muslim-majority countries and
members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. Appendix II
lists these countries.
[2] These negative trends amongst Muslim populations have been
documented in a variety of analyses and polls. For example, see Office
of Research, State Department. "Independent Survey of Arab Publics
Shows Bad U.S. Image Based Primarily on U.S. Regional Policy." Opinion
Analysis. Washington, D.C.: M-34-05, Mar. 23, 2005.
[3] Public diplomacy programs and tools also support the department's
traditional policy-oriented goals such as promoting regional stability,
democracy and human rights, and economic prosperity and security.
[4] GAO, U.S. Public Diplomacy: Interagency Coordination Efforts
Hampered by the Lack of a National Communication Strategy, GAO-05-323
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 4, 2005).
[5] In February 2006, State moved the Central Asian nations of
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan from
the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs to the Bureau of South
Asian Affairs, creating the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs.
[6] In August 2005 GAO issued a report on the Middle East Partnership
Initiative. See GAO, Foreign Assistance: Middle East Partnership
Initiative Offers Tools for Supporting Reform, but Project Monitoring
Needs Improvement, GAO-05-711 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 8, 2005).
[7] In March 2005, the President reorganized the National Security
Council and created a Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic
Communications and Global Outreach, whose responsibilities include U.S.
public diplomacy efforts.
[8] State's regional bureaus are the Bureaus of African Affairs, East
Asian and Pacific Affairs, European and Eurasian Affairs, Near Eastern
Affairs, South and Central Asian Affairs, and Western Hemisphere
Affairs. Functional Bureaus with public diplomacy responsibilities
include: Administration; Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor; Economic
and Business Affairs; Intelligence and Research; International Security
and Nonproliferation; Information Resource Management; Oceans and
International Environmental and Scientific Affairs; and Political-
Military Affairs.
[9] State has begun to appoint "dual-hatted" Deputy Assistant
Secretaries for Public Diplomacy in each of the six regional bureaus.
These individuals report directly to both their Regional Assistant
Secretary and to the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public
Affairs.
[10] These programs are outlined in appendix III.
[11] Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World,
Changing Minds Winning Peace (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 1, 2003).
[12] State estimated that Hi's Web sites received approximately 3
million hits in December 2005.
[13] Other Partnerships for Learning programs include CultureConnect,
which supports American cultural figures' engagement of young audiences
in the Muslim world, and English ACCESS Microscholarships, which
provide English language instruction to low-income and underserved
youth abroad.
[14] State officials noted however, that the Youth Exchange and Study
program was modeled after the department's Future Leaders Exchange
program, which was assessed in 2003 and found to be meeting its goals.
[15] GAO's roundtable of nongovernment Muslim experts focused on the
importance given to reaching out to American Muslims and empowering
them to reach out to the Muslim world. State has begun to take specific
steps toward this end. For example, the department sponsored a
symposium in Brussels in November 2005 to bring together American and
Belgium Muslims to discuss common areas of concerns. State officials
noted that this symposium was intended to serve as a prototype and that
similar conferences could be held elsewhere in Europe and beyond.
[16] Appendix IV provides more details on such private sector best
practices.
[17] The Defense Science Board advises DOD on scientific, technical,
manufacturing, acquisition process, and other matters of special
interest to the department.
[18] Mission performance plans serve as top-level statements of agency
program goals and objectives, resource requirements, strategies and
tactics, and performance indicators.
[19] Post officials in Nigeria are faced with the prospect of reaching
a countrywide audience of over 130 million people, roughly half of whom
are concentrated in the Northern portion of the country, where the
United States does not have a permanent diplomatic presence.
[20] According to a senior official in Washington, D.C., the term
"younger" implied the need to target even high school students who
might be tomorrow's opinion leaders. "Broader" implied the need to
reach beyond elites and target disadvantaged youth as well. "Deeper"
implied a desire that all program participants have as meaningful an
experience as possible.
[21] State officials noted that they have developed a worldwide
database of exchange participants, established a global alumni Web site
to encourage dialogue, provided field staff with training and best
practices information to facilitate the establishment of local alumni
programs, and codified the responsibilities of the Alumni Division in
Washington with regards to these and other activities.
[22] The British Council manages the British government's exchanges and
cultural programming outreach efforts.
[23] The British Council divides its audiences into four tiers: T-1:
top 100 most influential individuals in the host country; T-2:
academics, professional networks (journalists/lawyers), alumni
associations, and teachers; T-3: young professionals; and T-4: informed
audience.
[24] Message amplification involves using a positive story about U.S.
assistance or actions and delivering it to a mass audience via
available communication channels including newspapers, radio, and
television. The use of third-party spokespersons, such as local
religious leaders, can help ensure message credibility, which is often
difficult when information is transmitted from the United States to a
target audience.
[25] As noted in GAO, U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Expands
Efforts but Faces Significant Challenges, GAO-03-951 (Washington, D.C.:
Sept. 4, 2003), our roundtable of public relations experts estimated
that State would need to spend up to $50 million to conduct adequate
opinion research and performance measurement given the size of its
public diplomacy budget and scope of operations. We reported that
State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research spent only about $3.5
million annually on overseas opinion research. In fiscal year 2005,
this amount increased to $4.4 million.
[26] See GAO-03-951 and GAO, Program Evaluation: Strategies for
Assessing How Information Dissemination Contributes to Agency Goals,
GAO-02-923 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30, 2002).
[27] USAID, Operating in High Threat Environments (Washington, D.C.:
June 2005).
[28] The department is currently evaluating the American Corners
program.
[29] American Presence Posts are located in Alexandria, Egypt; Medan,
Indonesia; Winnipeg, Canada; and Bordeaux, Lille, Lyon, Rennes, and
Toulouse, France.
[30] GAO has reviewed U.S. broadcasting efforts in the Middle East
separately. See GAO, U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department and the
Broadcasting Board of Governors Expand Efforts in the Middle East but
Face Significant Challenges, GAO-04-435T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 10,
2004). A separate GAO review will evaluate the effectiveness of Radio
Sawa and the Alhurra satellite network--the Broadcasting Board of
Governors' two primary initiatives aimed at Arab audiences.
[31] U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, 2005 Report
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 7, 2005).
[32] State Department Office of the Inspector General, Inspection of
Embassy Islamabad, Pakistan, ISP-I-05-35A (Washington, D.C.: August
2005).
[33] In January 2002, GAO reported on language proficiency shortfalls
at State and other agencies. See GAO, Foreign Languages: Human Capital
Approach Needed to Correct Staffing and Proficiency Shortfalls, GAO-02-
375 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31, 2002).
[34] For a detailed description of the National Security Language
Initiative, see appendix III.
[35] Incorporated in January 2004 by interested private sector leaders,
BDA seeks to counter anti-American sentiments that can harm U.S.
business interests by helping to coordinate the outreach efforts of
U.S. multinational companies.
[36] Reinhard, Keith. Testimony before the U.S. Congress. House of
Representatives. Committee on Government Reform. The 9/11 Commission
Recommendations on Public Diplomacy: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on
National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations. 108th
Cong. 2nd sess., Aug. 23, 2004.
[37] Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic
Communication (Washington, D.C.: September 2004).
GAO's Mission:
The Government Accountability Office, the investigative arm of
Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional
responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability
of the federal government for the American people. GAO examines the use
of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides
analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make
informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO's commitment to
good government is reflected in its core values of accountability,
integrity, and reliability.
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony:
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no
cost is through the Internet. GAO's Web site ( www.gao.gov ) contains
abstracts and full-text files of current reports and testimony and an
expanding archive of older products. The Web site features a search
engine to help you locate documents using key words and phrases. You
can print these documents in their entirety, including charts and other
graphics.
Each day, GAO issues a list of newly released reports, testimony, and
correspondence. GAO posts this list, known as "Today's Reports," on its
Web site daily. The list contains links to the full-text document
files. To have GAO e-mail this list to you every afternoon, go to
www.gao.gov and select "Subscribe to e-mail alerts" under the "Order
GAO Products" heading.
Order by Mail or Phone:
The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2
each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent
of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or
more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent.
Orders should be sent to:
U.S. Government Accountability Office
441 G Street NW, Room LM
Washington, D.C. 20548:
To order by Phone:
Voice: (202) 512-6000:
TDD: (202) 512-2537:
Fax: (202) 512-6061:
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs:
Contact:
Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:
Public Affairs:
Jeff Nelligan, managing director,
NelliganJ@gao.gov
(202) 512-4800
U.S. Government Accountability Office,
441 G Street NW, Room 7149
Washington, D.C. 20548:
