U.S. Public Diplomacy
State Department Efforts Lack Certain Communication Elements and Face Persistent Challenges Gao ID: GAO-06-707T May 3, 2006Public opinion polls have shown continued negative sentiments toward the United States in the Muslim world. Public diplomacy activities--led by the State Department (State)--are designed to counter such sentiments by explaining U.S. foreign policy actions, countering misinformation, and advancing mutual understanding between nations. Since 2003, we have issued three reports on U.S. public diplomacy efforts that examined (1) changes in public diplomacy resources since September 11, 2001; (2) strategic planning and coordination of public diplomacy efforts; and (3) the challenges facing these efforts. We have made several recommendations in the last 3 years to the Secretary of State to address strategic planning issues, private sector engagement, and staffing challenges related to public diplomacy. For example, today's report recommends that the Secretary develop written guidance detailing how the department intends to implement its public diplomacy goals as they apply to the Muslim world. State has consistently concurred with our findings and recommendations for improving public diplomacy, and the department, in several cases, is taking appropriate actions. However, the department has not established a timetable for many of these actions.
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, State has expanded its public diplomacy efforts globally, focusing particularly on countries in the Muslim world considered to be of strategic importance in the war on terrorism. Since 2001, State has increased its public diplomacy resources, particularly in regions with significant Muslim populations. That funding trend has continued more recently, with increases of 25 percent for the Near East and 39 percent for South Asia from 2004 to 2006, though public diplomacy staffing levels have remained largely the same during that period. The Secretary of State recently announced plans to reposition some staff to better reflect the department's strategic priorities, including plans to shift 28 public diplomacy officers from posts in Europe and Washington, D.C., to China, India, and Latin America, as well as to the Muslim world. In 2003 and again in 2005, we reported that the government lacked an interagency communication strategy to guide governmentwide public diplomacy activities, and it continues to lack this strategy. We also noted that State did not have a strategy to integrate its diverse public diplomacy activities and that efforts to effectively engage the private sector had met with mixed success. Today, although State has developed a strategic framework to focus its public diplomacy efforts and related tactics to achieve these goals, the department has not issued guidance on how to implement these strategies and tactics. In addition, posts' public diplomacy efforts generally lack important strategic communication elements found in the private sector, which GAO and others have suggested adopting as a means to better communicate with target audiences. These elements include having core messages, segmented target audiences, in-depth research and analysis to monitor and evaluate results, and an integrated communication plan to bring all these elements together. State officials indicate that the department has begun to develop communication plans for 15 pilot posts, but it remains to be seen whether these communication plans will contain all of these strategic elements. Posts throughout the world, and particularly in the Muslim world, face several challenges in implementing their public diplomacy programs, including concerns related to staff numbers and language capabilities and the need to balance security with public outreach. For example, we found that 24 percent of language-designated public diplomacy positions worldwide were filled by officers without the requisite language skills. Furthermore, security concerns have limited embassy outreach efforts and public access. State has begun to address many of these challenges, but it is too early to evaluate the effectiveness of many of these efforts.
GAO-06-707T, U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Efforts Lack Certain Communication Elements and Face Persistent Challenges
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United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Science, the Departments of State, Justice,
and Commerce, and Related Agencies, House Committee on Appropriations:
U.S. Public Diplomacy:
State Department Efforts Lack Certain Communication Elements and Face
Persistent Challenges:
Statement of Jess T. Ford:
Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
GAO-06-707T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-707T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Science, the Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, and Related
Agencies, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Public opinion polls have shown continued negative sentiments toward
the United States in the Muslim world. Public diplomacy activities”led
by the State Department (State)”are designed to counter such sentiments
by explaining U.S. foreign policy actions, countering misinformation,
and advancing mutual understanding between nations. Since 2003, we
have issued three reports on U.S. public diplomacy efforts that
examined (1) changes in public diplomacy resources since September 11,
2001; (2) strategic planning and coordination of public diplomacy
efforts; and (3) the challenges facing these efforts.
What GAO Found:
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, State has expanded
its public diplomacy efforts globally, focusing particularly on
countries in the Muslim world considered to be of strategic importance
in the war on terrorism. Since 2001, State has increased its public
diplomacy resources, particularly in regions with significant Muslim
populations. That funding trend has continued more recently, with
increases of 25 percent for the Near East and 39 percent for South Asia
from 2004 to 2006, though public diplomacy staffing levels have
remained largely the same during that period. The Secretary of State
recently announced plans to reposition some staff to better reflect the
department‘s strategic priorities, including plans to shift 28 public
diplomacy officers from posts in Europe and Washington, D.C., to China,
India, and Latin America, as well as to the Muslim world.
In 2003 and again in 2005, we reported that the government lacked an
interagency communication strategy to guide governmentwide public
diplomacy activities, and it continues to lack this strategy. We also
noted that State did not have a strategy to integrate its diverse
public diplomacy activities and that efforts to effectively engage the
private sector had met with mixed success. Today, although State has
developed a strategic framework to focus its public diplomacy efforts
and related tactics to achieve these goals, the department has not
issued guidance on how to implement these strategies and tactics. In
addition, posts‘ public diplomacy efforts generally lack important
strategic communication elements found in the private sector, which GAO
and others have suggested adopting as a means to better communicate
with target audiences. These elements include having core messages,
segmented target audiences, in-depth research and analysis to monitor
and evaluate results, and an integrated communication plan to bring all
these elements together. State officials indicate that the department
has begun to develop communication plans for 15 pilot posts, but it
remains to be seen whether these communication plans will contain all
of these strategic elements.
Posts throughout the world, and particularly in the Muslim world, face
several challenges in implementing their public diplomacy programs,
including concerns related to staff numbers and language capabilities
and the need to balance security with public outreach. For example, we
found that 24 percent of language-designated public diplomacy positions
worldwide were filled by officers without the requisite language
skills. Furthermore, security concerns have limited embassy outreach
efforts and public access. State has begun to address many of these
challenges, but it is too early to evaluate the effectiveness of many
of these efforts.
What GAO Recommends:
We have made several recommendations in the last 3 years to the
Secretary of State to address strategic planning issues, private sector
engagement, and staffing challenges related to public diplomacy. For
example, today‘s report recommends that the Secretary develop written
guidance detailing how the department intends to implement its public
diplomacy goals as they apply to the Muslim world. State has
consistently concurred with our findings and recommendations for
improving public diplomacy, and the department, in several cases, is
taking appropriate actions. However, the department has not
established a timetable for many of these actions.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-707T].
To view the full product, including the scope
and methodology, click on the link above.
For more information, contact Jess T. Ford at (202) 512-4128 or
fordj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss GAO's work on U.S. public
diplomacy efforts, particularly in the Muslim world.[Footnote 1] Since
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, foreign public opinion
polls have shown that negative attitudes toward the United States have
generally grown worse in many countries around the world. One
particular concern has been a marked worsening of such attitudes in the
Muslim world--an audience of key strategic interest in the United
States' war on terrorism. U.S. public diplomacy activities--led by the
State Department (State)--are designed to counter such sentiments by
explaining U.S. foreign policy actions, countering misinformation, and
advancing mutual understanding among nations. Today, we are issuing a
report on the State's public diplomacy efforts in the Muslim
world.[Footnote 2] This follows our April 2005 report examining
interagency coordination of public diplomacy activities[Footnote 3] and
our September 2003 report on State's overall public diplomacy
efforts.[Footnote 4] These efforts include daily news operations,
information programs, and various types of exchange programs.
Mr. Chairman, you asked us to discuss our findings from these reports
and, where possible, to highlight ways of strengthening public
diplomacy going forward. Today, I will talk about (1) changes in U.S.
public diplomacy resources since September 11, 2001; (2) strategic
planning and coordination of public diplomacy efforts; and (3) the
challenges facing these efforts. My comments will focus on State's
activities, as State was the subject of our work. While our most recent
report focuses on activities in the Muslim world, many of our findings
apply to public diplomacy efforts worldwide.
As part of our reviews of public diplomacy, we met with officials from
the Departments of State and Defense (DOD), U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID), and Broadcasting Board of Governors
(BBG). We traveled to Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, and the United
Kingdom and met with a broad cross-section of U.S. embassy officials,
British Council and embassy staff, and local focus groups. We also
convened roundtables of experts on public relations, international
opinion research, and the Muslim world. The reports used for this
testimony were conducted in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.
Summary:
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, State has expanded
its public diplomacy efforts globally, focusing particularly on
countries in the Muslim world considered to be of strategic importance
in the war on terrorism. Since 2001, State has increased its public
diplomacy resources, particularly in regions with significant Muslim
populations. From 2004 to 2006, funding in two regions with significant
Muslim populations--the Near East and South Asia--increased 25 and 39
percent, respectively. However, public diplomacy staffing levels have
remained largely the same during that period.
Since 2003, we have reported that the government lacked an interagency
public diplomacy strategy to guide the activities of disparate
agencies, and it continues to lack this strategy. We also noted that
State did not have a strategy to integrate its diverse public diplomacy
activities and that efforts to effectively engage the private sector
had met with mixed success. State has begun to address these
shortcomings. In 2005, State developed a strategic framework to focus
its public diplomacy efforts and related tactics to achieve its goals,
including marginalizing extremists and promoting understanding of
shared values. However, the department has not issued guidance to its
posts abroad on how to implement these strategies and tactics. In
addition, our report released today reveals that posts' public
diplomacy efforts generally lack important strategic communication
elements found in the private sector, which we and others have
suggested adopting as a means to better communicate with target
audiences. These elements include having core messages, segmented
target audiences, in-depth research and analysis to monitor and
evaluate results, and an integrated communication plan to bring all
these elements together. State officials indicated that the department
has begun an effort to develop communication plans for 15 pilot posts,
but it remains to be seen whether these communication plans will
contain all of these strategic elements.
State faces multiple challenges in implementing its public diplomacy
programs, especially at the field level. These challenges include
concerns related to staff numbers, time available for public diplomacy
activities, staff language capabilities, and the need to balance
security with public outreach. According to State data, roughly 15
percent of its public diplomacy positions overseas were vacant in 2005.
Several embassy officials indicated that insufficient numbers of staff
and lack of staff time for public diplomacy activities hinder outreach
efforts. We also identified this problem in our 2003 report, where a
survey of Public Affairs officers in the field showed that more than 50
percent said that the number of public diplomacy officers was
inadequate and more than 40 percent said the amount of time available
for public diplomacy activities was insufficient. The Secretary of
State recently announced plans to reposition some staff, including
plans to shift 28 public diplomacy officers from posts in Europe and
Washington, D.C., to China, India, and Latin America, as well as to the
Muslim world. Additionally, our report notes that 30 percent of
officers in language-designated public diplomacy positions in the
Muslim world have not attained the level of language proficiency
required for their positions, hampering their ability to engage with
foreign publics. In addition to these staffing challenges, security
concerns limit public diplomacy activities, especially in the Muslim
world. Security, along with budgetary concerns, has forced embassies to
close publicly accessible facilities and curtail certain public
outreach efforts, sending the unintended message that the United States
is unapproachable. The department has attempted to compensate for the
lack of public presence through a variety of means, including the use
of small-scale external facilities, and expanded embassy speaker
programs.
We have made several recommendations since 2003 to the Secretary of
State to address strategic planning issues, private sector engagement,
and staffing challenges related to public diplomacy. For example, in
2003, we recommended that the Secretary develop a strategy that
integrates private sector techniques into its public diplomacy efforts
and that the Secretary strengthen efforts to train Foreign Service
officers in foreign languages and public diplomacy. Today's report
recommends that the Secretary develop written guidance detailing how
the department intends to implement its public diplomacy goals as they
apply to the Muslim world and strengthen existing systems of sharing
best practices to more systematically transfer knowledge among
embassies around the world. The primary purpose of these proposed
actions is to help officers in the field strategically plan and
implement public diplomacy programs in line with the Under Secretary's
articulated goals. State has consistently concurred with our findings
and recommendations for improving public diplomacy and indicated that
the department, in several cases, is taking appropriate actions, such
as developing a broad public diplomacy strategy and strengthening
strategic planning at the post level. However, the department has not
established a timetable for many of these actions, including the
issuance of an interagency public diplomacy strategy and the creation
of the Office of Private Sector Outreach.
Background:
The overall goal of U.S. public diplomacy is to understand, inform,
engage, and influence the attitudes and behavior of foreign audiences
in ways that support U.S. strategic interests. The State Department
leads these efforts, which are guided by the Under Secretary for Public
Diplomacy and Public Affairs and include academic and professional
exchanges, English language teaching, information programs, and news
management. The department's regional and functional bureaus also
contain public diplomacy offices, which report to the relevant
assistant secretary. The Under Secretary has direct authority over the
three public diplomacy bureaus but does not have line authority over
public diplomacy operations in other regional or functional
bureaus.[Footnote 5] In overseas missions, Foreign Service public
diplomacy officers (including Public Affairs, Cultural Affairs,
Information, Information Resources, and Regional English Language
officers) operate under the authority of the chief of mission and
report to their regional bureau managers in Washington, D.C.
In fiscal year 2005, State dedicated $597 million to public diplomacy
and public affairs. According to the department's performance plan, its
investment in public diplomacy continues to increase, particularly for
efforts targeting audiences in the Middle East. Exchange programs
received $356 million, the majority of fiscal year 2005 funding and a
12.4 percent increase over fiscal year 2004. State's information
programs received roughly $68 million in fiscal year 2005 to fund
programs such as the U.S. speakers program, mission Web sites, and
American Corners, which are centers that provide information about the
United States, hosted in local institutions and staffed by local
employees. The remaining public diplomacy funds went to State's
regional bureaus to pay the salaries of locally engaged staff overseas,
among other purposes.
Public Diplomacy Resources Have Shifted to the Muslim World, but
Staffing Numbers Have Leveled Off:
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, State has expanded
its public diplomacy efforts globally, focusing particularly on
countries in the Muslim world considered to be of strategic importance
in the war on terrorism. Between 2004 and 2006, total spending on
overseas public diplomacy will increase 21 percent, from $519 million
to an estimated $629 million. Much of this increase has gone to regions
with significant Muslim populations, including South Asia (39 percent),
East Asia and the Pacific (28 percent), and the Near East (25 percent).
These increases continue the trend we reported in 2003, when we found
that the largest relative increases in overseas public diplomacy
resources went to regions with large Muslim populations. However, the
Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs continues to receive the
largest overall share of overseas public diplomacy resources--roughly
36 percent of the total for all six regional bureaus.
In 2003, we noted that authorized officer positions overseas had
significantly expanded, with the most notable increases occurring in
State's Near East (27-percent increase) and South Asia (15-percent
increase) bureaus. However, current data show that staff numbers have
stayed largely the same over the past 3 years, with increases of 3
percent or less. In January 2006, Secretary Rice announced plans to
reposition officers as part of her transformational diplomacy
initiative. State officials said that the department will initially
reposition approximately 75 Foreign Service officers this year from
posts in Europe and Washington, D.C., to India, China, and Latin
America, as well as to the Muslim world. According to these officials,
28 of the positions to be relocated are public diplomacy positions.
Strategy, Planning, and Coordination Efforts Are Inadequate:
Since 2003, we have reported on the lack of strategic elements to guide
U.S. public diplomacy efforts. Despite several attempts, the United
States still lacks an interagency public diplomacy strategy. While
State has recently developed a strategic framework for its public
diplomacy efforts, it has not issued guidance on how this framework is
to be implemented in the field. In addition, posts generally lack a
strategic approach to public diplomacy.
Government Lacks an Interagency Public Diplomacy Strategy:
In 2003, we reported that the United States lacked a governmentwide,
interagency public diplomacy strategy, defining the messages and means
for communication efforts abroad. We reported that the administration
had made a number of aborted attempts to develop a strategy, but to
date no public diplomacy strategy has been developed. The lack of such
a strategy complicates the task of conveying consistent messages, which
increases the risk of making damaging communication mistakes. State
officials said that the lack of such a strategy diminishes the
efficiency and effectiveness of governmentwide public diplomacy
efforts, while several reports concluded that a strategy is needed to
synchronize agencies' target audience assessments, messages, and
capabilities.
On April 8, 2006, the President established a new Policy Coordination
Committee on Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communications. This
committee, to be led by the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and
Public Affairs,[Footnote 6] is intended to coordinate interagency
activities to ensure that:
* all agencies work together to disseminate the President's themes and
messages;
* all public diplomacy and strategic communications resources,
programs, and activities are effectively coordinated to support those
messages; and:
* every agency gives public diplomacy and strategic communications the
same level of priority that the President does.
According to department officials, one of the committee's tasks will be
to issue a formal interagency public diplomacy strategy. It is not
clear when this strategy will be developed.
State Has Established Public Diplomacy Strategic Framework but Lacks
Implementing Guidance:
In 2005, the Under Secretary established a strategic framework for U.S.
public diplomacy efforts, which includes three priority goals: (1)
support the President's Freedom Agenda with a positive image of hope;
(2) isolate and marginalize extremists; and (3) promote understanding
regarding shared values and common interests between Americans and
peoples of different countries, cultures, and faiths. The Under
Secretary noted that she intends to achieve these goals using five
tactics--engagement, exchanges, education, empowerment, and evaluation--
and by using various public diplomacy programs and other means. This
framework partially responds to our 2003 recommendation that the
department develop and disseminate a strategy to integrate all State's
public diplomacy efforts and direct them toward achieving common
objectives. However, the department has not yet developed written
guidance that provides details on how the Under Secretary's new
strategic framework should be implemented in the field.
In 2005, we noted that State's efforts to engage the private sector in
pursuit of common public diplomacy objectives had met with mixed
success and recommended that the Secretary develop a strategy to guide
these efforts. State is currently establishing an office of private
sector outreach and is partnering with individuals and the private
sector on various projects. The Under Secretary plans to
institutionalize this function within the department surrounding key
public diplomacy objectives, but it is unclear when this office will be
established and whether it will develop a comprehensive strategy to
engage the private sector.
Posts Lack a Strategic Approach to Public Diplomacy:
GAO and others have suggested that State adopt a strategic approach to
public diplomacy by modeling and adapting private sector communication
practices to suit its purposes (see fig. 1). However, based on our
review of mission performance plans[Footnote 7] and on fieldwork in
Nigeria, Pakistan, and Egypt, we found that the posts' public diplomacy
programming generally lacked these important elements of strategic
communications planning. In particular, posts lacked a clear theme or
message and did not identify specific target audiences. According to a
senior embassy official in Pakistan, the United States has too many
competing messages, and the post needs to do a better job of defining
and clarifying its message. Posts also failed to develop detailed
strategies and tactics to direct available public diplomacy programs
and tools toward clear, measurable objectives in the most efficient
manner possible. Finally, posts lack detailed, country-level
communication plans to coordinate their various activities.
Figure 1: Key Elements of a Typical Public Relations Strategy:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Recently, State has begun to help posts improve their strategic
communications planning. For example, the department has issued
guidance on preparing fiscal year 2008 mission performance plans that
calls for more strategic thinking and planning than was required in the
past, including identification of specific target audiences, key themes
and messages, detailed strategies and tactics, and measurable
performance outcomes that can clearly demonstrate the ultimate impact
of U.S. public diplomacy efforts. If fully implemented, this guidance
should begin to address the shortcomings we found in mission
performance plans; however, it will not be implemented for another 2
years, raising significant concerns about what the department intends
to do now to address strategic planning shortfalls. Moreover, it is
unclear whether this guidance will include all the strategic elements
from private sector communication practices.
In addition to this guidance, the department is currently developing a
sample country-level communication plan and has asked 15 pilot posts to
develop specific plans for their host countries. These plans are
intended to better focus U.S. efforts to counter ideological support
for terrorism, according to State. Part of this process will include
the development of a key influencers analysis to help identify target
audiences in each country. State officials said that they expect to
have plans for these countries by fall or winter 2006.
Staffing Challenges and Security Concerns Limit U.S. Public Diplomacy
Activities:
Public diplomacy efforts in the field face several other challenges,
many of which are heightened in the Muslim world. Officials at posts we
visited said they lacked sufficient staff and time to conduct public
diplomacy tasks, and we found that many public diplomacy positions are
filled by officers without the requisite language skills. Furthermore,
public diplomacy officers struggle to balance security with public
access and outreach to local populations.
Insufficient Staff and Lack of Staff Time Hinders Public Diplomacy
Activities:
While several recent reports on public diplomacy have recommended an
increase in spending on U.S. public diplomacy programs, several embassy
officials stated that, with current staffing levels, they do not have
the capacity to effectively utilize increased funds. According to State
data, the department had established 834 public diplomacy positions
overseas in 2005, but 124, or roughly 15 percent, were vacant.
Compounding this challenge is the loss of public diplomacy officers to
temporary duty in Iraq, which, according to one State official, has
drawn down field officers even further. Staffing shortages may also
limit the amount of training public diplomacy officers receive.
According to the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, "the
need to fill a post quickly often prevents public diplomacy officers
from receiving their full training."[Footnote 8]
In addition, public diplomacy officers at post are burdened with
administrative tasks and thus have less time to conduct public
diplomacy outreach activities than previously. One senior State
official said that administrative duties, such as budget, personnel,
and internal reporting, compete with officers' public diplomacy
responsibilities. Another official in Egypt told us that there was
rarely enough time to strategize, plan, or evaluate her programs. These
statements echo comments we heard during overseas fieldwork and in a
survey for our 2003 report. Surveyed officers told us that, while they
manage to attend functions within their host country capitals, it was
particularly difficult to find time to travel outside the capitals to
interact with other communities. This challenge is compounded at posts
with short tours of duty, which include many in the Muslim world.
According to data provided by State, the average tour length at posts
in the Muslim world is about 22 percent shorter than tour lengths
elsewhere. Noting the prevalence of one-year tours in the Muslim world,
a senior official at State told us that Public Affairs officers who
have shorter tours tend to produce less effective work than officers
with longer tours.
To address these challenges, we recommended in 2003 that the Secretary
of State designate more administrative positions to overseas public
affairs sections to reduce the administrative burden. Officials at
State said that the Management bureau is currently considering options
for reducing the administrative burden on posts, including the
development of centralized administrative capabilities offshore. State
is also repositioning several public diplomacy officers as part of its
transformational diplomacy initiative; however, this represents a shift
of existing public diplomacy officers and does not increase the overall
number of officers in the department.
Language Deficiencies Pronounced, Especially in the Muslim World:
In 2005, 24 percent of language-designated public diplomacy positions
were filled by officers without the requisite language proficiency,
similar to our findings in 2003. At posts in the Muslim world, this
shortfall is even greater, with 30 percent of public diplomacy
positions filled by officers without sufficient language skills. This
figure is primarily composed of languages that are considered difficult
to master, such as Arabic and Persian, but also includes languages
considered easier to learn, such as French.
Embassies Must Balance Security and Public Outreach:
Security concerns have limited embassy outreach efforts and public
access, forcing public diplomacy officers to strike a balance between
safety and mission. Shortly after the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001, then-Secretary of State Colin Powell stated, "Safety is one
of our top priorities— but it can't be at the expense of the mission."
While posts around the world have faced increased threats, security
concerns are particularly acute in countries with significant Muslim
populations, where the threat level for terrorism is rated as
"critical" or "high" in 80 percent of posts (see fig. 2).
Figure 2: Terrorist Threat Ratings for Posts in the Muslim and non-
Muslim Worlds, October 2005:
[See PDF for image]
Source: State Department.
[End of figure]
Security and budgetary concerns have led to the closure of publicly
accessible facilities around the world, such as American Centers and
Libraries. In Pakistan, for example, all of the American Centers have
closed for security reasons; the last facility, in Islamabad, closed in
February 2005. These same concerns have prevented the establishment of
a U.S. presence elsewhere. As a result, embassies have had to find
other venues for public diplomacy programs, and some activities have
been moved onto embassy compounds, where precautions designed to
improve security have had the ancillary effect of sending the message
that the United States is unapproachable and distrustful, according to
State officials. Concrete barriers and armed escorts contribute to this
perception, as do requirements restricting visitors' use of cell phones
and pagers within the embassy. According to one official in Pakistan,
visitors to the embassy's reference library have fallen to as few as
one per day because many visitors feel humiliated by the embassy's
rigorous security procedures.
Other public diplomacy programs have had to limit their publicity to
reduce the risk of becoming a target. A recent joint USAID-State report
concluded that "security concerns often require a 'low profile'
approach during events, programs or other situations, which, in happier
times, would have been able to generate considerable good will for the
United States."[Footnote 9] This constraint is particularly acute in
Pakistan, where the embassy has had to reduce certain speaker and
exchange programs.
State has responded to security concerns and the loss of publicly
accessible facilities through a variety of initiatives, including
American Corners, which are centers that provide information about the
United States, hosted in local institutions and staffed by local
employees. According to State data, there are currently approximately
300 American Corners throughout the world, including more than 90 in
the Muslim world, with another 75 planned (more than 40 of which will
be in the Muslim world). However, two of the posts we visited in
October 2005 were having difficulty finding hosts for American Corners,
as local institutions fear becoming terrorist targets.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to
respond to any questions you or other members of the subcommittee may
have at this time.
Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
For questions regarding this testimony, please contact Jess T. Ford at
(202) 512-4128 or fordj@gao.gov. Individuals making key
contributions to this statement include Diana Glod, Assistant Director;
Michael ten Kate; Robert Ball; and Joe Carney.
FOOTNOTES
[1] For the purposes of this testimony, the "Muslim world" refers to
the 58 countries and territories identified as "countries with
significant Muslim populations" by the State Department's Bureau of
Educational and Cultural Affairs. This list includes Muslim-majority
countries and members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference.
[2] GAO, U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Efforts to Engage
Muslim Audiences Lack Certain Communication Elements and Face
Significant Challenges, GAO-06-535 (Washington, D.C.: May 3, 2006).
[3] GAO, U.S. Public Diplomacy: Interagency Coordination Efforts
Hampered by the Lack of a National Communication Strategy, GAO-05-323
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 4, 2005).
[4] GAO, U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Expands Efforts but
Faces Significant Challenges, GAO-03-951 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 4,
2003).
[5] State has begun to appoint "dual-hatted" Deputy Assistant
Secretaries for Public Diplomacy in each of the six regional bureaus.
These individuals report directly to both their Regional Assistant
Secretary and to the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public
Affairs.
[6] The Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications
and Global Outreach will serve as the committee's executive secretary.
This position, whose responsibilities include U.S. public diplomacy
efforts, was created in March 2005 when the President reorganized the
National Security Council.
[7] Mission performance plans serve as top-level statements of agency
program goals and objectives, resource requirements, strategies and
tactics, and performance indicators.
[8] U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, 2005 Report
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 7, 2005).
[9] USAID, Operating in High Threat Environments (Washington, D.C.:
June 2005).
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